Pharmaceutical and Health Care Association of the Philippines vs.

Duque III
(Austria-Martinez, October 9, 2007) Held: No. However what may be implemented is the RIRR based on the Milk Code
which in turn is based on the ICMBS as this is deemed part of the law of the land. The
Nature: Special Civil Action in the Supreme Court. Certiorari other WHA Resolutions however cannot be imposed as they are not deemed part of
Petitioner: Pharmaceutical and Healthcare Association of the Philippines the law of the land.
Respondents: DOH Sec. Francisco Duque III, DOH Undersecretaries Dr. Ethelyn Nieto,
Dr. Margarita Galon, Atty. Alexander Padilla and Dr. Jade Del Mundo; and Asst. Ratio:
Secretaries Dr. Mario Villaverde, Dr. David Lozada and Dr. Nemesio Gako Are the international instruments referred to by the respondents part of the law of the
land?
Facts: The various international instruments invoked by respondents are:
Executive Order No. 51 (The Milk Code - TMC) was issued by Pres. Aquino on Oct. 28, The UN Conventions on the Rights of the Child
1986 by virtue of the legislative powers granted to her under the Freedom Constitution. The International Convenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights
One of the preambular clauses of TMC – the law seeks to give effect to Article 11 of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women
International Code of Marketing of Breastmilk Substituttes (ICMBS), a code adopted by These instruments only provide general terms of the steps that States must take to
the WHA (World Health Assembly) in 1981. prevent child mortality. Hence, they do not have anything about the use and marketing
In 1990, the Philippine ratified the International Convention on the Rights of the Child. of breastmilk substitutes
Art. 24 of the instrument mandates that States should take measure to diminish infant
mortality and should ensure that all segments of society are informed of the The ICMBS and other WHA Resolutions however, are the international instruments
advantages of breastfeeding. which have specific provisions on breastmilk substitutes
From 1982 – 2006, the WHA adopted several resolutions to the effect that Under the 1987 Constitution, international law can become part of domestic law in 2
breastfeeding should be supported, promoted and protected, hence, it should be ways:
ensured that nutrition and health claims are not permitted for breastmilk substitutes. Transformation – an international law is transformed into a domestic law through a
May 15, 2006 – DOH issues the assailed RIRR (Revised Implementing Rules and constitutional mechanism such as local legislation
Regulations of E.O. 51 or A.O. No. 2006-0012) which was to take effect on July 7, 2006. Treaties become part of law of the land through this method, pursuant to Art 7, Sec 21
– The RIRR imposes a ban on all advertisements of breastmilk substitutes – wherein “no treaty or international agreement shall be valid.. unless concurred by at
June 28, 2006 – Petitioner filed the present Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with least 2/3 of Senate”
Prayer for the Issuance of a TRO or Writ of Preliminary injunction. The ICMBS and WHA Resolutions are NOT treaties as they haven’t been concurred in by
August 15, 2006 – the Court issued a Resolution granting the TRO, enjoining the the required 2/3 vote.
respondents from implementing the assailed RIRR. HOWEVER, the ICMBS has been transformed into domestic law through local legislation
Petitioner assails the RIRR for going beyond the provisions of TMC thereby amending that is TMC.
and expanding the coverage of the said law. Therefore, it is not the ICMBS per se that has the force of law but it’s TMC.
DOH meanwhile contends that the RIRR implements not only TMC but also various While TMC is almost a verbatim reproduction of the ICMBS, it did not adopt the latter’s
international instruments regarding infant and young child nutrition. They posit that provision on the absolute prohibition on advertising of products within the scope of the
the said international instruments are deemed part of the law of the land and therefore ICMBS. Instead the MC provides that advertising promotion or other marketing
may be implemented by the DOH in the RIRR. materials may be allowed if such materials are approved by a committee.
Incorporation – by mere constitutional declaration, international law is deemed to have
Issue: W/n the RIRR is unconstitutional? the force of domestic law
Sub-issue(s): W/n the RIRR is in accord with TMC? W/n pertinent international This is found under Art 2, Sec 2 – The Philippines… adopts generally accepted principles
agreements entered into by the Philippines are part of the law of the land and may thus of international law as part of the law of the land
be implemented through an RIRR, if so, is the RIRR in accord with such international In Mihares v. Ranada: International law becomes customary rules accepted as binding
agreements? as a result of two elements:
Established, widespread, and consistent practice on part of the state
Note: I focused on the parts on international law. The other matters (in case ma’am Opinion juris sive necessitates (opinion as to law or necessity.
asks) are at the bottom of the digest.
Generally accepted principles of international law refer to norms of general or
customary international law which are binding on all states, valid through all kinds of
human societies, and basic to legal systems generally
Fr. Bernas has a definition similar to the one above. Customary international law has
two factors:
Material factor – how states behave
The consistency and the generality of the practice
Psychological or subjective factor – why they behave the way they do
Once state practice has been established, now determine why they behave they do. Is it
ouor of courtesy or opinio juris (the belief that a certain type of behavior is obligatory)
When a law satisfies the two factors it becomes part of customary international law
which is then incorporated into our domestic system
Since the WHA Resolutions have not been embodied in any local legislation, have they
attained the status of customary law and hence part of our law of the land?
The World Health Organization (WHO) is one of the international specialized agencies
of the UN.
According to the WHO Constitution, it’s the WHA which determines the policies of the
WHO, the former also has the power to “adopt regulations concerning advertising and
labeling of pharmaceutical and similar products” and “to make recommendations to
members on any matter within the Organization’s competence”
Note that the legal effect of a regulation as opposed to recommendation is quite
different
Regulations which are duly adopted by the WHA are binding on member states
On the other hand, recommendations of the WHA do not come into force for its
members unlike regulations. Rather, they carry moral and political weight as they
constitute the judgment on a health issue of the collective membership of the highest
body in the field of health.
The WHA resolution adopting the ICMBS and the subsequent WHA resolutions urging
states to implement the ICMBS are merely recommendatory and legally non-binding.
Hence, unlike the ICMBS which has become TMC through legislative enactment, the
subsequent WHA Resolutions, which provide for exclusive breastfeeding and
prohibition on advertisements and promotions of breastmilk have not been adopted as
domestic law.
WHA Resolutions have been viewed to constitute “soft law” or non-binding norms,
which influence state behavior. Soft law has been noted to be a rapid means of norm
creation, in order to reflect and respond to the changing needs and demands of
constituents (of the UN.)
As previously discussed, for an international rule to be considered customary law, it
must be established that such rule is followed by states because it is considered
obligatory (opinio juris).
In the case at bar, respondents have not presented any evidence to prove that the WHA
Resolutions are in fact enforced or practice by member states. Further, they failed to
establish that provisions of pertinent WHA Resolutions are customary international law
that may be deemed part of law of the land.
Hence, legislation is necessary to transform the WHA resolutions into domestic law.
They cannot thus be implemented by executive agencies without the need of a law to
be enacted by legislature.
On other issues:
W/n the petitioner is the real party in interest? Yes.
An association has standing to file suit for its workers despite its lack of direct interest
of its members are affected by the action. An organization has standing to assert the
concerns of its constituents. (Exec Sec vs CA)
The Court has rules that an association has the legal personality to represent its
members because the results of the case will affect their vital interests. (Purok Bagong
Silang Association Inc. vs. Yuipco)
In the petitioner’s Amended Articles of Incorporation, it states that the association is
formed “to represent directly or through approved representatives the pharmaceutical
and health care industry before the Philippine Government and any of its agencies, the
medical professions and the general public.”
Therefore, the petitioner, as an organization, has an interest in fulfilling its avowed
purpose of representing members who are part of the pharmaceutical and health care
industry. Petitioner is duly authorized to bring to the attention of the government
agencies and courts any grievance suffered by its members which are directly affected
by the assailed RIRR.
The petitioner, whose legal identity is deemed fused with its members, should be
considered as a legal party-in-interest which stands to be benefited or injured by any
judgment in the case.
W/n the DOH has the power to implement the WHA Resolutions under the Revised
Administrative Code even in the absence of a domestic law? Only the provisions of the
Milk Code. (as per the discussion above)
Section 3, Chapter 1, Title IX of the RAC of 1987 provides that the DOH shall define the
national health policy and can issue orders and regulations concerning the
implementation of established health policies.
A.O. No 2005 -0014 which provides the national policy on infant and young child
feeding, does not declare that as part of its policy, the advertisement or promotion of
breastmilk substitutes should be absolutely prohibited.
Only the provisions of the Milk Code, but not those of the subsequent WHA
Resolutions, can be validly implemented by the DOH through the subject RIRR.
W/n the provisions of the RIRR being in accordance with the Milk Code? Not all of them
Assailed provisions: [1] extending the coverage to young children; [2] imposing
exclusive breastfeeding for infants from 0-6 months; [3] imposes an absolute ban on
advertising and promotion for breastmilk substitutes; [4] requiring additional labeling
requirements; [5] prohibits the dissemination of information on infant formula; [6]
forbids milk manufacturers and distributors to extend assistance in research and
continuing education Although the DOH has the power under the Milk Code to control
information regarding breastmilk vis-à-vis breastmilk substitutes, this power is not
absolute because it has no power to impose an absolute prohibition in the marketing,
promotion and advertising of breastmilk substitutes. Several provisions of the Milk
Code attest to the fact that such power to control information is not absolute.
Sections 11 and 4(f) of the RIRR are clearly violative of the Milk Code because such
provisions impose an absolute prohibition on advertising, promotion and marketing of
breastmilk substitutes, which is not provided for in the Milk Code. Section 46 is
violative of the Milk Code because the DOH has exceeded its authority in imposing such
fines or sanctions when the Milk Code does not do so. Other assailed provisions are in
accordance with the Milk Code.
W/n Section 13 of the RIRR providing a sufficient standard? Yes.
Questioned provision, in addition to Section 26 of Rule VII provide labeling
requirements for breastmilk substitutes  found to be in consonance with the Milk
Code
The provisions in question provide reasonable means of enforcing related provisions in
the Milk Code.
W/n Section 57 of the RIRR repeals existing laws?
Section in question only repeals orders, issuances and rules and regulations, not laws.
The provision is valid as it is within the DOH’s rule-making power.
An administrative agency has quasi-legislative or rule-making power. However, such
power is limited to making rules and regulation subjected to the boundaries set by the
granting statute and the Constitution. The power is also subject to the doctrine of non-
delegability and separability of powers. The power, which includes amending, revising,
altering or repealing, is granted to allow for flexibility in the implementation of the
laws.
W/n On Section 4, 5(w), 11, 22, 32, 47 and 52 violates the due process clause of the
Constitution (Article III Section 1)?
Despite the fact that the present Constitution enshrines free enterprise as a policy, it
nonetheless reserves to the government the power to intervene whenever necessary
to promote the general welfare… free enterprise does not call for the removal of
protective regulations. It must be clearly explained and proven by competent evidence
just exactly how such protective regulation would result in the restraint of trade.
Section 4 – proscription of milk manufacturers’ participation in any policymaking body;
Section 22 – classes and seminars for women and children; Section 32 – giving of
assistance, support and logistics or training; Section 52 – giving of donations
In the instant case, petitioner failed to show how the aforementioned sections hamper
the trade of breastmilk substitutes. They also failed to establish that these activities are
essential and indispensable to their trade.
Disposition: The Petition is Partially Granted. Only sections 4(f), 11 and 46 of A.O. 2006-
0014 are declared null and void for being ultra vires. The TRO is lifted insofar as the rest
of the provisions of A.O. 2006-0012 is concerned.
G.R. No. 159618 February 1, 2011
BAYAN MUNA, as represented by Rep. SATUR OCAMPO, Rep. CRISPIN BELTRAN, and
Rep. LIZA L. MAZA, Petitioner,
vs.
ALBERTO ROMULO, in his capacity as Executive Secretary, and BLAS F. OPLE, in his
capacity as Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Respondents.
VELASCO, JR., J.:
Facts:
Petitioner Bayan Muna is a duly registered party-list group established to represent the
marginalized sectors of society. Respondent Blas F. Ople, now deceased, was the
Secretary of Foreign Affairs during the period material to thiscase. Respondent Alberto
Romulo was impleaded in his capacity as then Executive Secretary.
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. Having a key determinative bearing
on this case is the Rome Statute establishing the International Criminal Court (ICC) with
the power to exercise its jurisdiction over persons for the mostserious crimes of
international concern and shall be complementary to the national criminal jurisdictions
Theserious crimes adverted to cover those considered grave under international law,
such as genocide, crimes againsthumanity, war crimes, and crimes of aggression.On
December 28, 2000, the RP, through Charge d·Affaires
Enrique A. Manalo, signed the Rome Statute which, by itsterms,is subject to ratification,
acceptance or approval by the signatory states. As of the filing of the instant petition,
only 92 out of the 139 signatory countries appear to have completed the ratification,
approval and concurrence process. The Philippines is not among the 92.
Issue: Whether or not the RP-US Non Surrender Agreement is void ab initio for
contracting obligations that are either immoral or otherwise at variance with
universally recognized principles of international law.
Held: No. Petitioner urges that theAgreement be struck down as void ab initio for
imposing immoral obligations and/or being at variance with allegedly universally
recognized principles of international law. The immoral aspect proceedsfrom the fact
that the Agreement, as petitioner would put it, leaves criminals immune from
responsibility for unimaginable atrocities that deeply shock the conscience of
humanity; it precludes our country from delivering an American criminal to the ICC.
The above argument is a kind of recycling of petitioners earlier position, which, as
already discussed, contends that the RP, by entering into the Agreement, virtually
abdicated its sovereignty and in theprocess undermined its treaty obligations under the
Rome Statute, contrary to international law principles.
The Court is not persuaded. Suffice it to state in this regard that the non-surrender
agreement, as aptly described by the Solicitor General, is an assertion by the
Philippines of its desire to try and punish crimes under its national law. The agreement
is a recognition of the primacy and competence of the countrys judiciary to try offenses
under its national criminal laws and dispense justice fairly and judiciously. Petitioner,
labors under the erroneous impression that the Agreement would allow Filipinos and
Americans committing high crimes of international concern to escape criminal trial and
punishment. This is manifestly incorrect. Persons who may have committed acts
penalized under the Rome Statute can be prosecuted and punished in the Philippines
or in the US; or with the consent of the RP or the US, before the ICC, assuming that all
the formalities necessary to bind both countries to the Rome Statute have been met.
Perspective wise, what the Agreement contextually prohibits is the surrender by either
party of individuals to international tribunals, like the ICC, without the consent of the
other party, which may desire to prosecute the crime under its existing laws. With this
view, there is nothing immoral or violative of international law concepts in the act of
the Philippines of assuming criminal jurisdiction pursuant to the non-surrender
agreement over an offense considered criminal by both Philippine laws and the Rome
Statute
International Agreements; treaties and executive agreements. Under international law,
there is no difference between treaties and executive agreements in terms of their
binding effects on the contracting states concerned, as long as the negotiating
functionaries have remained within their powers. However, a treaty has greater
“dignity” than an executive agreement, because its constitutional efficacy is beyond
doubt, a treaty having behind it the authority of the President, the Senate, and the
people; a ratified treaty, unlike an executive agreement, takes precedence over any
prior statutory enactment. Petitioner, in this case, argues that the Non-Surrender
Agreement between the Philippines and the US is of dubious validity, partaking as it
does of the nature of a treaty; hence, it must be duly concurred in by the Senate.
Petitioner relies on the case, Commissioner of Customs v. Eastern Sea Trading, in which
the Court stated: international agreements involving political issues or changes of
national policy and those involving international arrangements of a permanent
character usually take the form of treaties; while those embodying adjustments of
detail carrying out well established national policies and traditions and those involving
arrangements of a more or less temporary nature take the form of executive
agreements. According to petitioner, the subject of the Agreement does not fall under
any of the subject-categories that are enumerated in the Eastern Sea Trading case that
may be covered by an executive agreement, such as commercial/consular relations,
most-favored nation rights, patent rights, trademark and copyright protection, postal
and navigation arrangements and settlement of claims. The Supreme Court held,
however, that the categorization of subject matters that may be covered by
international agreements mentioned in Eastern Sea Trading is not cast in stone. There
are no hard and fast rules on the propriety of entering, on a given subject, into a treaty
or an executive agreement as an instrument of international relations. The primary
consideration in the choice of the form of agreement is the parties’ intent and desire to
craft an international agreement in the form they so wish to further their respective
interests. The matter of form takes a back seat when it comes to effectiveness and
binding effect of the enforcement of a treaty or an executive agreement, as the parties
in either international agreement each labor under the pacta sunt servanda principle.
International Agreements; limitations on sovereignty. The RP, by entering into the
Agreement, does thereby abdicate its sovereignty, abdication being done by its waiving
or abandoning its right to seek recourse through the Rome Statute of the ICC for erring
Americans committing international crimes in the country. As it were, the Agreement is
but a form of affirmance and confirmation of the Philippines’ national criminal
jurisdiction. National criminal jurisdiction being primary, it is always the responsibility
and within the prerogative of the RP either to prosecute criminal offenses equally
covered by the Rome Statute or to accede to the jurisdiction of the ICC. Thus, the
Philippines may decide to try “persons” of the US, as the term is understood in the
Agreement, under our national criminal justice system; or it may opt not to exercise its
criminal jurisdiction over its erring citizens or over US “persons” committing high crimes
in the country and defer to the secondary criminal jurisdiction of the ICC over them. In
the same breath, the US must extend the same privilege to the Philippines with respect
to “persons” of the RP committing high crimes within US territorial jurisdiction. By their
nature, treaties and international agreements actually have a limiting effect on the
otherwise encompassing and absolute nature of sovereignty. By their voluntary act,
nations may decide to surrender or waive some aspects of their state power or agree to
limit the exercise of their otherwise exclusive and absolute jurisdiction. The usual
underlying consideration in this partial surrender may be the greater benefits derived
from a pact or a reciprocal undertaking of one contracting party to grant the same
privileges or immunities to the other.
Shigenori Kuroda was the highest ranking Japanese officer stationed in the Philippines
during the Japanese occupation. He was then charged before the Military Commission,
headed by Major General Rafael Jalandoni, due to the atrocities that were done against
non combatant civilians and prisoners during the war. His trial was in pursuant to
Executive Order No. 68 which established the National War Crimes Office and
prescribing rules and regulations governing the trial of accused war criminals. Kuroda is
questioning the legality of the said EO arguing that the same is not provided for in the
Constitution. He further underscores the fact that the Philippines is not a signatory of
the Hague Convention on the Rules and Regulations Covering Land Warfare hence we
cannot impose against him any criminal charges because it has no laws to base on,
national or international.
ISSUE: Whether or not Kuroda can be charged in Philippine courts?
HELD: Yes. EO No. 68 is constitutional hence the Philippine courts can take cognizance
of the case at bar. EO No 68 is in pursuant to the constitutional provision that states
“the Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy, and adopts the
generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the nation.” The
Hague Convention and other similar conventions whose principles are generally
accepted are hence considered as part of the law of the land.
USA VS GUINTO
G.R. No. 76607 182 SCRA 644 February 26, 1990
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, FREDERICK M. SMOUSE AND YVONNE REEVES,
petitioners,
vs.
HON. ELIODORO B. GUINTO, Presiding Judge, Branch LVII, Regional Trial Court,
Angeles City, ROBERTO T. VALENCIA, EMERENCIANA C. TANGLAO, AND PABLO C. DEL
PILAR, respondents.
Facts:
The case involves the doctrine of state immunity. The United States of America was not
impleaded in the case at bar but has moved to dismiss on the ground that they are in
effect suits against it to which it has not consented.
The private respondents are suing several officers of the US Air Force in Clark Air Base
in connection with the bidding conducted by them for contracts for barber services in
the said base. Among those who submitted their bids were private respondents
Roberto T. Valencia, Emerenciana C. Tanglao, and Pablo C. del Pilar.
The Bidding was won by Ramon Dizon over the objection of the private respondents
who claimed that he had made a bid for 4 facilities, including the Civil Engineering Area
which was not included in the invitation to bid.
The private respondents filed a complaint in the court below to compel Philippine Area
Exchange (PHAX) and the individual petitioners to cancel the award to Dizon, to
conduct a rebidding for the barbershop concessions and to allow the private
respondents by a writ of preliminary injunction to continue operating the concessions
pending litigation.
The petitioners filed a motion to dismiss and opposition to the petition for preliminary
injunction on the ground that the action was in effect a suit against USA which had not
waived its non-suability, but trial court denied the application for a writ of preliminary
injunction.
Issues:
Whether or not the action was in effect a suit against United States of America.
Whether or not the petitioners were immune from suit under the RP-US Bases Treaty
for acts done by them in the performance of their official duties.
Discussions:
The rule that a state may not be sued without its consent, is one of the generally
accepted principles of international law that we have adopted as part of the law of our
land.
Even without such affirmation, we would still be bound by the generally accepted
principles of international law under the doctrine of incorporation. Under this doctrine,
as accepted by the majority of states, such principles are deemed incorporated in the
law of every civilized state as a condition and consequence of its membership in the
society of nations. Upon its admission to such society, the state is automatically
obligated to comply with these principles in its relations with other states.
While the doctrine appears to prohibit only suits against the state without its consent,
it is also applicable to complaints filed against officials of the states for acts allegedly
performed by them in the discharge of their duties. The rule is that if the judgment
against such officials will require the state itself to perform an affirmative act to satisfy
the same, the suit must be regarded as against the state although it has not been
formally impleaded. When the government enters into a contract, it is deemed to have
descended to the level of the other contracting party and divested of its sovereign
immunity from suit with its implied consent.
Rulings:
The court finds the barbershops subject to the concessions granted by the US
government to be commercial enterprises operated by private persons. They are not
agencies of the United States Armed Forces nor are their facilities demandable as a
matter of right by the American servicemen. These establishments provide for the
grooming needs of their customers. This being the case, the petitioners cannot plead
any immunity from the complaint filed by the private respondents in the court below.
Petitioners states they have acted in the discharge of their official functions as officers
or agents of the United States. They are sought to be held answerable for personal torts
in which the United States itself is not involved. If found liable, they and they alone
must satisfy the judgment.
The Court would have directly resolved the claims against the defendants, except for
the paucity of the record in the case at hand. The evidence of the alleged irregularity in
the grant of the barbershop
concessions is not before the Court. The respondent court will have to receive that
evidence first, so it can later determine on the basis thereof if the plaintiffs are entitled
to the relief they seek. Accordingly, this case must also be remanded to the court below
for further proceedings.
Agustin vs Edu
Facts
This case is a petition assailing the validity or the constitutionality of a Letter of
Instruction No. 229, issued by President Ferdinand E. Marcos, requiring all vehicle
owners, users or drivers to procure early warning devices to be installed a distance
away from such vehicle when it stalls or is disabled. In compliance with such letter of
instruction, the Commissioner of the Land Transportation Office issued Administrative
Order No. 1 directing the compliance thereof.
This petition alleges that such letter of instruction and subsequent administrative order
are unlawful and unconstitutional as it violates the provisions on due process, equal
protection of the law and undue delegation of police power.
Issue
Whether or not the Letter of Instruction No. 229 and the subsequent Administrative
Order issued is unconstitutional
Ruling
The Supreme Court ruled for the dismissal of the petition. The statutes in question are
deemed not unconstitutional. These were definitely in the exercise of police power as
such was established to promote public welfare and public safety. In fact, the letter of
instruction is based on the constitutional provision of adopting to the generally
accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land. The letter of
instruction mentions, as its premise and basis, the resolutions of the 1968 Vienna
Convention on Road Signs and Signals and the discussions on traffic safety by the
United Nations - that such letter was issued in consideration of a growing number of
road accidents due to stalled or parked vehicles on the streets and highways.
Marcos vs Manglapus
FACTS:
Former President Marcos, after his and his family spent three year exile in Hawaii, USA,
sought to return to the Philippines. The call is about to request of Marcos family to
order the respondents to issue travel order to them and to enjoin the petition of the
President's decision to bar their return to the Philippines.
ISSUE:
Whether or not, in the exercise of the powers granted by the Constitution, the
President may prohibit the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines.
RULING:
Yes
According to Section 1, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution: "The executive power shall
be vested in the President of the Philippines." The phrase, however, does not define
what is meant by executive power although the same article tackles on exercises of
certain powers by the President such as appointing power during recess of the
Congress (S.16), control of all the executive departments, bureaus, and offices (Section
17), power to grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons, and remit fines and
forfeitures, after conviction by final judgment (Section 19), treaty making
power (Section 21), borrowing power (Section 20), budgetary power (Section
22), informing power (Section 23).
The Constitution may have grant powers to the President, it cannot be said to be
limited only to the specific powers enumerated in the Constitution. Whatever power
inherent in the government that is neither legislative nor judicial has to be executive.
WHO vs Aquino
Facts:
Dr. Leonce Verstuyft was assigned by WHO to its regional office in Manila as Acting
Assistant Director of Health Services. His personal effects, contained in twelve
(12) crates, were allowed free entry from duties and taxes. Constabulary Offshore
Action Center (COSAC) suspected that the crates “contain large quantities of highly
dutiable goods” beyond the official needs of Verstuyft. Upon application of the COSAC
officers, Judge Aquino issued a search warrant for the search and seizure of the
personal effects of Verstuyft.
Secretary of Foreign Affairs Carlos P. Romulo advised Judge Aquino that Dr. Verstuyft is
entitled to immunity from search in respect for his personal baggage as accorded to
members of diplomatic missions pursuant to the Host Agreement and requested that
the search warrant be suspended. The Solicitor General accordingly joined Verstuyft for
the quashal of the search warrant but respondent judge nevertheless summarily denied
the quashal. Verstuyft, thus, filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the
SC. WHO joined Verstuyft in asserting diplomatic immunity.
Issue:
Whether or not personal effect of Verstuyft can be exempted from search and seizure
under the diplomatic immunity.
Held: Held: The petition has no merit and the law is constitutional.

Yes. The executive branch of the Phils has expressly recognized that Verstuyft is entitled
to diplomatic immunity, pursuant to the provisions of the Host Agreement. The DFA
formally advised respondent judge of the Philippine Government's official position. The
Solicitor General, as principal law officer of the gorvernment, likewise expressly
affirmed said petitioner's right to diplomatic immunity and asked for the quashal of the
search warrant.
1. Petitioner contends that the tenor of a provision in the Organic Act makes the
creation of an autonomous region absolute, such that even if only two provinces vote
in favor of autonomy, an autonomous region would still be created composed of the
two provinces where the favorable votes were obtained. there is a specific provision in
the Transitory Provisions (Article XIX) of the Organic Act, which incorporates
substantially the same requirements embodied in the Constitution and fills in the
details, thus:

It is a recognized principle of international law and under our system of separation of SEC. 13. The creation of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao
powers that diplomatic immunity is essentially a political question and courts should shall take effect when approved by a majority of the votes cast by the
refuse to look beyond a determination by the executive branch of the government, constituent units provided in paragraph (2) of Sec. 1 of Article II of
and where the plea of diplomatic immunity is recognized and affirmed by the executive this Act in a plebiscite which shall be held not earlier than ninety (90)
branch of the government as in the case at bar, it is then the duty of the courts to days or later than one hundred twenty (120) days after the approval
accept the claim of immunity upon appropriate suggestion by the principal law officer of this Act: Provided, That only the provinces and cities voting
of the government, the Solicitor General in this case, or other officer acting under his favorably in such plebiscite shall be included in the Autonomous
discretion. Courts may not so exercise their jurisdiction by seizure and detention of Region in Muslim Mindanao. The provinces and cities which in the
property, as to embarass the executive arm of the government in conducting foreign plebiscite do not vote for inclusion in the Autonomous Region shall
relations. remain the existing administrative determination, merge the existing
regions.
The Court, therefore, holds the respondent judge acted without jurisdiction and with
grave abuse of discretion in not ordering the quashal of the search warrant issued by
Thus, under the Constitution and R.A. No 6734, the creation of the autonomous region
him in disregard of the diplomatic immunity of petitioner Verstuyft. (World Health
shall take effect only when approved by a majority of the votes cast by the constituent
Organization vs. Aquino, G.R. No. L-35131, November 29, 1972, 48 SCRA 243)
units in a plebiscite, and only those provinces and cities where a majority vote in favor
of the Organic Act shall be included in the autonomous region. The provinces and cities
wherein such a majority is not attained shall not be included in the autonomous region.
Abbas vs. COMELEC
It may be that even if an autonomous region is created, not all of the thirteen (13)
G.R. No. 89651 November 10, 1989
provinces and nine (9) cities mentioned in Article II, section 1 (2) of R.A. No. 6734 shall
be included therein. The single plebiscite contemplated by the Constitution and R.A.
Topics: nature of plebiscite, constitutionality of RA 6734
No. 6734 will therefore be determinative of (1) whether there shall be an autonomous
region in Muslim Mindanao and (2) which provinces and cities, among those
Facts: A plebiscite in thirteen (13) provinces and nine (9) cities in Mindanao and enumerated in R.A. No. 6734, shall compromise it.
Palawan, was scheduled for November 19, 1989, in implementation of RA 6734,
entitled "An Act Providing for an Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim
2. The question has been raised as to what this majority means. Does it refer to a
Mindanao" (Organic Act). These consolidated petitions pray that the Court: (1) enjoin
majority of the total votes cast in the plebiscite in all the constituent units, or a majority
the COMELEC from conducting the plebiscite; and (2) declare RA 6734, or parts thereof,
in each of the constituent units, or both?
unconstitutional. The arguments against R.A. 6734 raised by petitioners may generally
be categorized into either of the following: (a) that R.A. 6734, or parts thereof, violates
the Constitution, and (b) that certain provisions of R.A. No. 6734 conflict with the The 1987 Constitution provides: The creation of the autonomous region shall be
effective when approved by majority of the votes cast by the constituent units in a
Tripoli Agreement.
plebiscite called for the purpose, provided that only provinces, cities and geographic
areas voting favorably in such plebiscite shall be included in the autonomous region.
Issue: Whether or not certain provisions of the Organic Act are unconstitutional.
[Art. X, sec, 18, para, 2]. It will readily be seen that the creation of the autonomous
region is made to depend, not on the total majority vote in the plebiscite, but on the 6. Every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality. Based on the grounds
will of the majority in each of the constituent units and the proviso underscores this. raised by petitioners to challenge the constitutionality of R.A. No. 6734, the Court finds
that petitioners have failed to overcome the presumption. The dismissal of these two
3. Petitioner avers that not all of the thirteen (13) provinces and nine (9) cities included petitions is, therefore, inevitable.
in the Organic Act, possess such concurrence in historical and cultural heritage and
other relevant characteristics. By including areas, which do not strictly share the same ICHONG vs HERNANDEZ
characteristic as the others, petitioner claims that Congress has expanded the scope of
the autonomous region which the constitution itself has prescribed to be limited. Lao Ichong is a Chinese businessman who entered the country to take advantage of
business opportunities herein abound (then) – particularly in the retail business. For
Petitioner's argument is not tenable. The Constitution lays down the standards by some time he and his fellow Chinese businessmen enjoyed a “monopoly” in the local
which Congress shall determine which areas should constitute the autonomous region. market in Pasay. Until in June 1954 when Congress passed the RA 1180 or the Retail
Guided by these constitutional criteria, the ascertainment by Congress of the areas that Trade Nationalization Act the purpose of which is to reserve to Filipinos the right to
share common attributes is within the exclusive realm of the legislature's discretion. engage in the retail business. Ichong then petitioned for the nullification of the said Act
Any review of this ascertainment would have to go into the wisdom of the law. on the ground that it contravened several treaties concluded by the RP which,
according to him, violates the equal protection clause (pacta sund servanda). He said
4. Both petitions also question the validity of R.A. No. 6734 on the ground that it that as a Chinese businessman engaged in the business here in the country who helps
violates the constitutional guarantee on free exercise of religion [Art. III, sec. 5]. The in the income generation of the country he should be given equal opportunity.
objection centers on a provision in the Organic Act which mandates that should there ISSUE: Whether or not a law may invalidate or supersede treaties or generally accepted
be any conflict between the Muslim Code and the Tribal Code on the one had, and the principles.
national law on the other hand, the Shari'ah courts created under the same Act should
apply national law. Petitioners maintain that the islamic law (Shari'ah) is derived from HELD: Yes, a law may supersede a treaty or a generally accepted principle. In this case,
the Koran, which makes it part of divine law. Thus it may not be subjected to any "man- there is no conflict at all between the raised generally accepted principle and with RA
made" national law. Petitioner Abbas supports this objection by enumerating possible 1180. The equal protection of the law clause “does not demand absolute equality
instances of conflict between provisions of the Muslim Code and national law, wherein amongst residents; it merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like
an application of national law might be offensive to a Muslim's religious convictions. circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced”;
and, that the equal protection clause “is not infringed by legislation which applies only
In the present case, no actual controversy between real litigants exists. There are no to those persons falling within a specified class, if it applies alike to all persons within
conflicting claims involving the application of national law resulting in an alleged such class, and reasonable grounds exist for making a distinction between those who
violation of religious freedom. This being so, the Court in this case may not be fall within such class and those who do not.”
calleupon to resolve what is merely a perceived potential conflict between the For the sake of argument, even if it would be assumed that a treaty would be in conflict
provisions the Muslim Code and national law. with a statute then the statute must be upheld because it represented an exercise of
the police power which, being inherent could not be bargained away or surrendered
5. According to petitioners, said provision grants the President the power to merge through the medium of a treaty. Hence, Ichong can no longer assert his right to
regions, a power which is not conferred by the Constitution upon the President. operate his market stalls in the Pasay city market.

While the power to merge administrative regions is not expressly provided for in the
Constitution, it is a power which has traditionally been lodged with the President to
facilitate the exercise of the power of general supervision over local governments.
There is no conflict between the power of the President to merge administrative
regions with the constitutional provision requiring a plebiscite in the merger of local
government units because the requirement of a plebiscite in a merger expressly applies
only to provinces, cities, municipalities or barangays, not to administrative regions.