Relevantly, Valenzuela adverted to the intent of the framers in the genesis of Section 4 (1), Article VIII, viz:

V . Intent of the Constitutional Commission

The journal of the Commission which drew up the present Constitution discloses that the original proposal was to have an
eleven-member Supreme Court. Commissioner Eulogio Lerum wanted to increase the number of Justices to fifteen. He also wished
to ensure that that number would not be reduced for any appreciable length of time (even only temporarily), and to this end proposed
that any vacancy must be filled within two months from the date that the vacancy occurs. His proposal to have a 15-member Court
was not initially adopted. Persisting however in his desire to make certain that the size of the Court would not be decreased for any
substantial period as a result of vacancies, Lerum proposed the insertion in the provision (anent the Courts membership) of the
same mandate that IN CASE OF ANY VACANCY, THE SAME SHALL BE FILLED WITHIN TWO MONTHS FROM
OCCURRENCE THEREOF. He later agreed to suggestions to make the period three, instead of two, months. As thus amended,
the proposal was approved. As it turned out, however, the Commission ultimately agreed on a fifteen-member Court. Thus it was
that the section fixing the composition of the Supreme Court came to include a command to fill up any vacancy therein
within 90 days from its occurrence.

In this connection, it may be pointed out that that instruction that any vacancy shall be filled within ninety days (in the last
sentence of Section 4 (1) of Article VIII) contrasts with the prohibition in Section 15, Article VII, which is couched in stronger
negative language - that a President or Acting President shall not make appointments

The commission later approved a proposal of Commissioner Hilario G. Davide, Jr. (now a Member of this Court) to add to
what is now Section 9 of Article VIII, the following paragraph: WITH RESPECT TO LOWER COURTS, THE PRESIDENT
SHALL ISSUE THE APPOINTMENT WITHIN NINETY DAYS FROM THE SUBMISSION OF THE LIST (of nominees by the
Judicial and Bar Council to the President). Davide stated that his purpose was to provide a uniform rule for lower courts. According
to him, the 90-day period should be counted from submission of the list of nominees to the President in view of the possibility that
the President might reject the list submitted to him and the JBC thus need more time to submit a new one.
On the other hand, Section 15, Article VII - which in effect deprives the President of his appointing power two months
immediately before the next presidential elections up to the end of his term - was approved without discussion.[68]

However, the reference to the records of the Constitutional Commission did not advance or support the result in Valenzuela. Far to the contrary, the
records disclosed the express intent of the framers to enshrine in the Constitution, upon the initiative of Commissioner Eulogio Lerum, a command [to
the President] to fill up any vacancy therein within 90 days from its occurrence, which even Valenzuela conceded.[69]The exchanges during deliberations
of the Constitutional Commission on October 8, 1986 further show that the filling of a vacancy in the Supreme Court within the 90-day period was
a true mandate for the President, viz:

MR. DE CASTRO. I understand that our justices now in the Supreme Court, together with the Chief Justice, are only 11.

MR. CONCEPCION. Yes.

MR. DE CASTRO. And the second sentence of this subsection reads: Any vacancy shall be filled within ninety days
from the occurrence thereof.

MR. CONCEPCION. That is right.

MR. DE CASTRO. Is this now a mandate to the executive to fill the vacancy?

MR. CONCEPCION. That is right. That is borne out of the fact that in the past 30 years, seldom has the Court had a
complete complement.[70]
Moreover, the usage in Section 4(1), Article VIII of the word shall an imperative, operating to impose a duty that may be enforced [71]should
not be disregarded. Thereby, Sections 4(1) imposes on the President the imperative duty to make an appointment of a Member of the Supreme Court
within 90 days from the occurrence of the vacancy. The failure by the President to do so will be a clear disobedience to the Constitution.
The 90-day limitation fixed in Section 4(1), Article VIII for the President to fill the vacancy in the Supreme Court was undoubtedly a special
provision to establish a definite mandate for the President as the appointing power, and cannot be defeated by mere judicial interpretation
in Valenzuela to the effect that Section 15, Article VII prevailed because it was couched in stronger negative language. Such interpretation even turned
out to be conjectural, in light of the records of the Constitutional Commissions deliberations on Section 4 (1), Article VIII.

How Valenzuela justified its pronouncement and result is hardly warranted. According to an authority on statutory construction: [72]

xxx the court should seek to avoid any conflict in the provisions of the statute by endeavoring to harmonize and reconcile
every part so that each shall be effective. It is not easy to draft a statute, or any other writing for that matter, which may not in some
manner contain conflicting provisions. But what appears to the reader to be a conflict may not have seemed so to the drafter.
Undoubtedly, each provision was inserted for a definite reason. Often by considering the enactment in its entirety, what appears to
be on its face a conflict may be cleared up and the provisions reconciled.

Consequently, that construction which will leave every word operative will be favored over one which leaves some word
or provision meaningless because of inconsistency. But a word should not be given effect, if to do so gives the statute a meaning
contrary to the intent of the legislature. On the other hand, if full effect cannot be given to the words of a statute, they must be made
effective as far as possible. Nor should the provisions of a statute which are inconsistent be harmonized at a sacrifice of the
 legislative intention. It may be that two provisions are irreconcilable; if so, the one which expresses the intent of the law-makers
should control. And the arbitrary rule has been frequently announced that where there is an irreconcilable conflict between the
different provisions of a statute, the provision last in order of position will prevail, since it is the latest expression of the legislative
will. Obviously, the rule is subject to deserved criticism. It is seldom applied, and probably then only where an irreconcilable
conflict exists between different sections of the same act, and after all other means of ascertaining the meaning of the legislature
have been exhausted. Where the conflict is between two statutes, more may be said in favor of the rules application, largely because
of the principle of implied repeal.

In this connection, PHILCONSAs urging of a revisit and a review of Valenzuela is timely and appropriate. Valenzuela arbitrarily ignored the
express intent of the Constitutional Commission to have Section 4 (1), Article VIII stand independently of any other provision, least of all one found
in Article VII. It further ignored that the two provisions had no irreconcilable conflict, regardless of Section 15, Article VII being couched in the
negative. As judges, we are not to unduly interpret, and should not accept an interpretation that defeats the intent of the framers.[73]

Consequently, prohibiting the incumbent President from appointing a Chief Justice on the premise that Section 15, Article VII extends to appointments
in the Judiciary cannot be sustained. A misinterpretation like Valenzuela should not be allowed to last after its false premises have been exposed.[74] It
will not do to merely distinguish Valenzuela from these cases, for the result to be reached herein is entirely incompatible with
what Valenzuela decreed. Consequently, Valenzuela now deserves to be quickly sent to the dustbin of the unworthy and forgettable.

We reverse Valenzuela.

Second. Section 15, Article VII does not apply as well to all other appointments in the Judiciary.

There is no question that one of the reasons underlying the adoption of Section 15 as part of Article VII was to
eliminate midnightappointments from being made by an outgoing Chief Executive in the mold of the appointments dealt with in the leading case
of Aytona v. Castillo.[75] In fact, in Valenzuela, the Court so observed, stating that:

xxx it appears that Section 15, Article VII is directed against two types of appointments: (1) those made for buying votes and (2) those
made for partisan considerations. The first refers to those appointments made within the two months preceding a Presidential election and are similar
to those which are declared election offenses in the Omnibus Election Code, viz.:

xxx

The second type of appointments prohibited by Section 15, Article VII consists of the so-called midnight appointments.
In Aytona v. Castillo, it was held that after the proclamation of Diosdado Macapagal as duly elected President, President Carlos P.
Garcia, who was defeated in his bid for reelection, became no more than a caretaker administrator whose duty was to prepare for
the orderly transfer of authority to the incoming President.Said the Court:

The filling up of vacancies in important positions, if few, and so spaced as to afford some assurance of deliberate action and careful
consideration of the need for the appointment and appointee's qualifications may undoubtedly be permitted. But the issuance of 350
appointments in one night and the planned induction of almost all of them in a few hours before the inauguration of the new President may,
with some reason, be regarded by the latter as an abuse of Presidential prerogatives, the steps taken being apparently a mere partisan effort to
fill all vacant positions irrespective of fitness and other conditions, and thereby to deprive the new administration of an opportunity to make
the corresponding appointments.

As indicated, the Court recognized that there may well be appointments to important positions which have to be made even
after the proclamation of the new President. Such appointments, so long as they are few and so spaced as to afford some
assurance of deliberate action and careful consideration of the need for the appointment and the appointees
qualifications, can be made by the outgoing President.Accordingly, several appointments made by President Garcia, which were
shown to have been well considered, were upheld.
Section 15, Article VII has a broader scope than the Aytona ruling. It may not unreasonably be deemed to
contemplate not only midnight appointments those made obviously for partisan reasons as shown by their number and the
time of their making but also appointments presumed made for the purpose of influencing the outcome of the Presidential
election.

On the other hand, the exception in the same Section 15 of Article VII allowing appointments to be made during the period
of the ban therein provided is much narrower than that recognized in Aytona. The exception allows only the making
of temporary appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies will prejudice public service or endanger public
safety. Obviously, the article greatly restricts the appointing power of the President during the period of the ban.

Considering the respective reasons for the time frames for filling vacancies in the courts and the restriction on the President's
power of appointment, it is this Courts view that, as a general proposition, in case of conflict, the former should yield to the
latter. Surely, the prevention of vote-buying and similar evils outweighs the need for avoiding delays in filling up of court vacancies
or the disposition of some cases. Temporary vacancies can abide the period of the ban which, incidentally and as earlier pointed out,
comes to exist only once in every six years. Moreover, those occurring in the lower courts can be filled temporarily by
designation. But prohibited appointments are long-lasting and permanent in their effects.They may, as earlier pointed out, in fact
influence the results of elections and, for that reason, their making is considered an election offense. [76]

Given the background and rationale for the prohibition in Section 15, Article VII, we have no doubt that the Constitutional Commission
confined the prohibition to appointments made in the Executive Department. The framers did not need to extend the prohibition to appointments in the
Judiciary, because their establishment of the JBC and their subjecting the nomination and screening of candidates for judicial positions to the unhurried
and deliberate prior process of the JBC ensured that there would no longer be midnight appointments to the Judiciary. If midnight appointments in the
mold of Aytona were made in haste and with irregularities, or made by an outgoing Chief Executive in the last days of his administration out of a desire
to subvert the policies of the incoming President or for partisanship,[77] the appointments to the Judiciary made after the establishment of the JBC would
not be suffering from such defects because of the JBCs prior processing of candidates. Indeed, it is axiomatic in statutory construction that the
ascertainment of the purpose of the enactment is a step in the process of ascertaining the intent or meaning of the enactment, because the reason
for the enactment must necessarily shed considerable light on the law of the statute, i.e., the intent; hence, the enactment should be construed with
reference to its intended scope and purpose, and the court should seek to carry out this purpose rather than to defeat it.[78]

Also, the intervention of the JBC eliminates the danger that appointments to the Judiciary can be made for the purpose of buying votes in a
coming presidential election, or of satisfying partisan considerations. The experience from the time of the establishment of the JBC shows that even
candidates for judicial positions at any level backed by people influential with the President could not always be assured of being recommended for
the consideration of the President, because they first had to undergo the vetting of the JBC and pass muster there. Indeed, the creation of the JBC
was precisely intended to de-politicize the Judiciary by doing away with the intervention of the Commission on Appointments. This insulating process
was absent from the Aytona midnight appointment.

Third. As earlier stated, the non-applicability of Section 15, Article VII to appointments in the Judiciary was confirmed by then Senior
Associate Justice Regalado to the JBC itself when it met on March 9, 1998 to discuss the question raised by some sectors about the constitutionality of
xxx appointments to the Court of Appeals in light of the forthcoming presidential elections. He assured that on the basis of the (Constitutional)
Commissions records, the election ban had no application to appointments to the Court of Appeals. [79] This confirmation was accepted by the JBC,
which then submitted to the President for consideration the nominations for the eight vacancies in the Court of Appeals. [80]

The fault of Valenzuela was that it accorded no weight and due consideration to the confirmation of Justice Regalado. Valenzuela was
weak, because it relied on interpretation to determine the intent of the framers rather than on the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission.
Much of the unfounded doubt about the Presidents power to appoint during the period of prohibition in Section 15, Article VII could have been
dispelled since its promulgation on November 9, 1998, had Valenzuela properly acknowledged and relied on the confirmation of a distinguished
member of the Constitutional Commission like Justice Regalado.

Fourth. Of the 23 sections in Article VII, three (i.e., Section 14, Section15, and Section 16) concern the appointing powers of the President.

Section 14 speaks of the power of the succeeding President to revoke appointments made by an Acting President,[81] and evidently
refers only to appointments in the Executive Department. It has no application to appointments in the Judiciary,
because temporary or actingappointments can only undermine the independence of the Judiciary due to their being revocable at will. [82] The
letter and spirit of the Constitution safeguard that independence. Also, there is no law in the books that authorizes the revocation of
appointments in the Judiciary. Prior to their mandatory retirement or resignation, judges of the first and second level courts and the Justices
of the third level courts may only be removed for cause, but the Members of the Supreme Court may be removed only by impeachment.

Section 16 covers only the presidential appointments that require confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. Thereby, the
Constitutional Commission restored the requirement of confirmation by the Commission on Appointments after the requirement was removed from
the 1973 Constitution. Yet, because of Section 9 of Article VIII, the restored requirement did not include appointments to the Judiciary.[83]

Section 14, Section 15, and Section 16 are obviously of the same character, in that they affect the power of the President to appoint. The fact
that Section 14 and Section 16 refer only to appointments within the Executive Department renders conclusive that Section 15 also applies only to the
Executive Department. This conclusion is consistent with the rule that every part of the statute must be interpreted with reference to the context, i.e. that
every part must be considered together with the other parts, and kept subservient to the general intent of the whole enactment.[84] It is absurd to assume
that the framers deliberately situated Section 15 between Section 14 and Section 16, if they intended Section 15 to cover all kinds of presidential
appointments. If that was their intention in respect of appointments to the Judiciary, the framers, if only to be clear, would have easily and surely
inserted a similar prohibition in Article VIII, most likely within Section 4 (1) thereof.

Fifth. To hold like the Court did in Valenzuela that Section 15 extends to appointments to the Judiciary further undermines the intent of the
Constitution of ensuring the independence of the Judicial Department from the Executive and Legislative Departments. Such a holding will tie the
Judiciary and the Supreme Court to the fortunes or misfortunes of political leaders vying for the Presidency in a presidential election. Consequently,
the wisdom of having the new President, instead of the current incumbent President, appoint the next Chief Justice is itself suspect, and cannot ensure
judicial independence, because the appointee can also become beholden to the appointing authority. In contrast, the appointment by the incumbent
President does not run the same risk of compromising judicial independence, precisely because her term will end by June 30, 2010.

Sixth. The argument has been raised to the effect that there will be no need for the incumbent President to appoint during the prohibition
period the successor of Chief Justice Puno within the context of Section 4 (1), Article VIII, because anyway there will still be about 45 days of the 90
days mandated in Section 4(1), Article VIII remaining.

The argument is flawed, because it is focused only on the coming vacancy occurring from Chief Justice Punos retirement by May 17, 2010.
It ignores the need to apply Section 4(1) to every situation of a vacancy in the Supreme Court.

The argument also rests on the fallacious assumption that there will still be time remaining in the 90-day period under Section 4(1), Article
VIII. The fallacy is easily demonstrable, as the OSG has shown in its comment.

Section 4 (3), Article VII requires the regular elections to be held on the second Monday of May, letting the elections fall on May 8, at the
earliest, or May 14, at the latest. If the regular presidential elections are held on May 8, the period of the prohibition is 115 days. If such elections are
held on May 14, the period of the prohibition is 109 days. Either period of the prohibition is longer than the full mandatory 90-day period to fill the
vacancy in the Supreme Court. The result is that there are at least 19 occasions (i.e., the difference between the shortest possible period of the ban of
109 days and the 90-day mandatory period for appointments) in which the outgoing President would be in no position to comply with the constitutional
duty to fill up a vacancy in the Supreme Court. It is safe to assume that the framers of the Constitution could not have intended such an absurdity. In
fact, in their deliberations on the mandatory period for the appointment of Supreme Court Justices under Section 4 (1), Article VIII, the framers
neither discussed, nor mentioned, nor referred to the ban against midnight appointments under Section 15, Article VII, or its effects on the 90-day
period, or vice versa. They did not need to, because they never intended Section 15, Article VII to apply to a vacancy in the Supreme Court, or in
any of the lower courts.

Seventh. As a matter of fact, in an extreme case, we can even raise a doubt on whether a JBC list is necessary at all for the
President any President to appoint a Chief Justice if the appointee is to come from the ranks of the sitting justices of the Supreme Court.
Sec. 9, Article VIII says:

xxx. The Members of the Supreme Court xxx shall be appointed by the President from a list of at least three nominees
prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council for any vacancy. Such appointments need no confirmation.
xxx

The provision clearly refers to an appointee coming into the Supreme Court from the outside, that is, a non-member of the Court aspiring to become
one. It speaks of candidates for the Supreme Court, not of those who are already members or sitting justices of the Court, all of whom have previously
been vetted by the JBC.

Can the President, therefore, appoint any of the incumbent Justices of the Court as Chief Justice?

The question is not squarely before us at the moment, but it should lend itself to a deeper analysis if and when circumstances permit. It
should be a good issue for the proposed Constitutional Convention to consider in the light of Senate President Juan Ponce Enriles statement that the
President can appoint the Chief Justice from among the sitting justices of the Court even without a JBC list.

II
The Judiciary Act of 1948

The posture has been taken that no urgency exists for the President to appoint the successor of Chief Justice Puno, considering that the Judiciary Act
of 1948 can still address the situation of having the next President appoint the successor.

Section 12 of the Judiciary Act of 1948 states:

Section 12. Vacancy in Office of Chief Justice. In case of a vacancy in the office of Chief Justice of the Supreme Court or
of his inability to perform the duties and powers of his office, they shall devolve upon the Associate Justice who is first in
precedence, until such disability is removed, or another Chief Justice is appointed and duly qualified. This provision shall apply to
every Associate Justice who succeeds to the office of Chief Justice.

The provision calls for an Acting Chief Justice in the event of a vacancy in the office of the Chief Justice, or in the event that the Chief Justice
is unable to perform his duties and powers. In either of such circumstances, the duties and powers of the office of the Chief Justice shall devolve upon
the Associate Justice who is first in precedence until a new Chief Justice is appointed or until the disability is removed.

Notwithstanding that there is no pressing need to dwell on this peripheral matter after the Court has hereby resolved the question of consequence, we
do not find it amiss to confront the matter now.

We cannot agree with the posture.

A review of Sections 4(1) and 9 of Article VIII shows that the Supreme Court is composed of a Chief Justice and 14 Associate Justices, who all shall
be appointed by the President from a list of at least three nominees prepared by the JBC for every vacancy, which appointments require no confirmation
by the Commission on Appointments. With reference to the Chief Justice, he or she is appointed by the President as Chief Justice, and the appointment
is never in an acting capacity. The express reference to a Chief Justice abhors the idea that the framers contemplated an Acting Chief Justice to head
the membership of the Supreme Court. Otherwise, they would have simply written so in the Constitution. Consequently, to rely on Section 12 of the
Judiciary Act of 1948 in order to forestall the imperative need to appoint the next Chief Justice soonest is to defy the plain intent of the Constitution.

For sure, the framers intended the position of Chief Justice to be permanent, not one to be occupied in an acting or temporary capacity. In
relation to the scheme of things under the present Constitution, Section 12 of the Judiciary Act of 1948 only responds to a rare situation in which the
new Chief Justice is not yet appointed, or in which the incumbent Chief Justice is unable to perform the duties and powers of the office. It ought to be
remembered, however, that it was enacted because the Chief Justice appointed under the 1935 Constitution was subject to the confirmation of the
Commission on Appointments, and the confirmation process might take longer than expected.

The appointment of the next Chief Justice by the incumbent President is preferable to having the Associate Justice who is first in precedence
take over. Under the Constitution, the heads of the Legislative and Executive Departments are popularly elected, and whoever are elected and
proclaimed at once become the leaders of their respective Departments. However, the lack of any appointed occupant of the office of Chief Justice
harms the independence of the Judiciary, because the Chief Justice is the head of the entire Judiciary. The Chief Justice performs functions absolutely
significant to the life of the nation. With the entire Supreme Court being the Presidential Electoral Tribunal, the Chief Justice is the Chairman of the
Tribunal. There being no obstacle to the appointment of the next Chief Justice, aside from its being mandatory for the incumbent President to make
within the 90-day period from May 17, 2010, there is no justification to insist that the successor of Chief Justice Puno be appointed by the next President.

Historically, under the present Constitution, there has been no wide gap between the retirement and the resignation of an incumbent Chief
Justice, on one hand, and the appointment to and assumption of office of his successor, on the other hand. As summarized in the comment of the OSG,
the chronology of succession is as follows:

1. When Chief Justice Claudio Teehankee retired on April 18, 1988, Chief Justice Pedro Yap was appointed on the same day;

2. When Chief Justice Yap retired on July 1, 1988, Chief Justice Marcelo Fernan was appointed on the same day;

3. When Chief Justice Fernan resigned on December 7, 1991, Chief Justice Andres Narvasa was appointed the following
day,December 8, 1991;

4. When Chief Justice Narvasa retired on November 29, 1998, Chief Justice Hilario Davide, Jr. was sworn into office the following
early morning of November 30, 1998;

5. When Chief Justice Davide retired on December 19, 2005, Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban was appointed the next day,
December 20, 2005; and

6. When Chief Justice Panganiban retired on December 6, 2006, Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno took his oath as Chief Justice
at midnight of December 6, 2006.[85]

III
Writ of mandamus does not lie against the JBC

May the JBC be compelled to submit the list of nominees to the President?

Mandamus shall issue when any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act that the law
specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station.[86] It is proper when the act against which it is directed is one addressed to
the discretion of the tribunal or officer. Mandamus is not available to direct the exercise of a judgment or discretion in a particular way.[87]

For mandamus to lie, the following requisites must be complied with: (a) the plaintiff has a clear legal right to the act demanded; (b) it must be the duty
of the defendant to perform the act, because it is mandated by law; (c) the defendant unlawfully neglects the performance of the duty enjoined by law;
(d) the act to be performed is ministerial, not discretionary; and (e) there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law.

Section 8(5) and Section 9, Article VIII, mandate the JBC to submit a list of at least three nominees to the President for every vacancy in the
Judiciary:

Section 8. xxx

(5) The Council shall have the principal function of recommending appointees to the Judiciary. xxx

Section 9. The Members of the Supreme Court and judges of lower courts shall be appointed by the President from a list of
at least three nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council for every vacancy. Such appointments need no confirmation.

For the lower courts, the President shall issue the appointments within ninety days from the submission of the list.

However, Section 4(1) and Section 9, Article VIII, mandate the President to fill the vacancy in the Supreme Court within 90 days
from the occurrence of the vacancy, and within 90 days from the submission of the list, in the case of the lower courts. The 90-day period is
directed at the President, not at the JBC. Thus, the JBC should start the process of selecting the candidates to fill the vacancy in the Supreme
Court before the occurrence of the vacancy.

Under the Constitution, it is mandatory for the JBC to submit to the President the list of nominees to fill a vacancy in the Supreme Court in
order to enable the President to appoint one of them within the 90-day period from the occurrence of the vacancy. The JBC has no discretion to
submit the list to the President after the vacancy occurs, because that shortens the 90-day period allowed by the Constitution for the President
to make the appointment. For the JBC to do so will be unconscionable on its part, considering that it will thereby effectively and illegally deprive the
President of the ample time granted under the Constitution to reflect on the qualifications of the nominees named in the list of the JBC before making
the appointment.

The duty of the JBC to submit a list of nominees before the start of the Presidents mandatory 90-day period to appoint is ministerial, but its
selection of the candidates whose names will be in the list to be submitted to the President lies within the discretion of the JBC. The object of the
petitions for mandamus herein should only refer to the duty to submit to the President the list of nominees for every vacancy in the Judiciary, because
in order to constitute unlawful neglect of duty, there must be an unjustified delay in performing that duty.[88] For mandamus to lie against the JBC,
therefore, there should be an unexplained delay on its part in recommending nominees to the Judiciary, that is, in submitting the list to the President.
 The distinction between a ministerial act and a discretionary one has been delineated in the following manner:

The distinction between a ministerial and discretionary act is well delineated. A purely ministerial act or duty is one which an
officer or tribunal performs in a given state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in obedience to the mandate of a legal authority,
without regard to or the exercise of his own judgment upon the propriety or impropriety of the act done. If the law imposes
a duty upon a public officer and gives him the right to decide how or when the duty shall be performed, such duty is
discretionary and not ministerial. The duty is ministerial only when the discharge of the same requires neither the exercise
of official discretion or judgment.[89]

Accordingly, we find no sufficient grounds to grant the petitions for mandamus and to issue a writ of mandamus against the JBC. The actions for that
purpose are premature, because it is clear that the JBC still has until May 17, 2010, at the latest, within which to submit the list of nominees to the
President to fill the vacancy created by the compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Puno.

IV
Writ of prohibition does not lie against the JBC

In light of the foregoing disquisitions, the conclusion is ineluctable that only the President can appoint the Chief Justice. Hence, Sorianos
petition for prohibition in G.R. No. 191032, which proposes to prevent the JBC from intervening in the process of nominating the successor of Chief
Justice Puno, lacks merit.

On the other hand, the petition for prohibition in G.R. No. 191342 is similarly devoid of merit. The challenge mounted against the composition
of the JBC based on the allegedly unconstitutional allocation of a vote each to the ex officio members from the Senate and the House of Representatives,
thereby prejudicing the chances of some candidates for nomination by raising the minimum number of votes required in accordance with the rules of
the JBC, is not based on the petitioners actual interest, because they have not alleged in their petition that they were nominated to the JBC to fill some
vacancies in the Judiciary. Thus, the petitioners lack locus standi on that issue.

WHEREFORE, the Court:

1. Dismisses the petitions for certiorari and mandamus in G.R. No. 191002 and G.R. No. 191149, and the petition for mandamus in G.R.
No. 191057 for being premature;

2. Dismisses the petitions for prohibition in G.R. No. 191032 and G.R. No. 191342 for lack of merit; and

3. Grants the petition in A.M. No. 10-2-5-SC and, accordingly, directs the Judicial and Bar Council:

(a) To resume its proceedings for the nomination of candidates to fill the vacancy to be created by the compulsory retirement of
Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno by May 17, 2010;

(b) To prepare the short list of nominees for the position of Chief Justice;

(c) To submit to the incumbent President the short list of nominees for the position of Chief Justice on or before May 17, 2010; and

(d) To continue its proceedings for the nomination of candidates to fill other vacancies in the Judiciary and submit to the President
the short list of nominees corresponding thereto in accordance with this decision.

SO ORDERED.