 1 Case Title: Air Transportation Office (ATO) v. Sps.

David and Elisea Ramos

 G.R. no and Date: G.R. No. 159402 February 23, 2011
 Ponente: Justice Bersamin
 Facts
Sps. Ramos discovered that a portion of their land (somewhere in Baguio) was being
used as part of the runway and running shoulder of the Loakan Airport which is operated
by ATO. Sometime in 1995, respondents agreed to convey the subject portion by deed
of sale to ATO in consideration of the amount of Php778,150.00. However, ATO failed to
pay despite repeated verbal and written demands. Thus, an action for collection against
ATO was filed by the respondents before the RTC. ATO’s primary contention was that
the deed of sale was entered into the performance of governmental functions. RTC ruled
in favor of the respondents. CA affirmed RTC. Hence, the petition.
 Issue/s
Whether ATO could be sued without the State’s consent.
 Ruling/s
SC dismissed the petition for lack of merit.
The State’s immunity from suit does not extend to the petitioner (ATO) because it is an
agency of the State engaged in an enterprise that is far from being the State’s exclusive
prerogative. The CA thereby correctly appreciated the juridical character of the ATO as
an agency of the Government not performing a purely governmental or sovereign
function, but was instead involved in the management and maintenance of the Loakan
Airport, an activity that was not the exclusive prerogative of the State in its sovereign
capacity. Hence, the ATO had no claim to the State’s immunity from suit. The SC further
observes that the doctrine of sovereign immunity cannot be successfully invoked to
defeat a valid claim for compensation arising from the taking without just compensation
and without the proper expropriation proceedings being first resorted to of the plaintiff’s
property.
Lastly, the issue of whether or not the ATO could be sued without the States consent has
been rendered moot by the passage of Republic Act No. 9497, otherwise known as the
Civil Aviation Authority Act of 2008. R.A. No. 9497 abolished the ATO and u nder its
Transitory Provisions, R.A. No. 9497 established in place of the ATO the Civil Aviation
Authority of the Philippines (CAAP), which thereby assumed all of the ATOs powers,
duties and rights, assets, real and personal properties, funds, and revenues. Section 23
of R.A. No. 9497 enumerates the corporate powers vested in the CAAP, including the
power to sue and be sued, to enter into contracts of every class, kind and description, to
construct, acquire, own, hold, operate, maintain, administer and lease personal and real
properties, and to settle, under such terms and conditions most advantageous to it, any
claim by or against it. With the CAAP having legally succeeded the ATO pursuant to R.A.
No. 9497, the obligations that the ATO had incurred by virtue of the deed of sale with the
Ramos spouses might now be enforced against the CAAP.
2 Heirs of Mendoza vs dpwh
Petitioners assail the Court of Appeals' ruling that the contract entered into by the
DPWH was made in the exercise of its governmental, not proprietary, function and was
imbued with public interest. Petitioners likewise assail the Court of Appeals' ruling that
the DPWH has no juridical personality of its own and thus, the suit was against the
agency's principal, the State. Petitioners further argue that the DPWH entered into a
contract with Mendoza and by its act of entering into a contract, it already waived its
immunity from suit.

The doctrine of immunity from suit is anchored on Section 3, Article XVI of the 1987
Constitution which provides:

Section 3. The State may not be sued without its consent.

The general rule is that a state may not be sued, but it may be the subject of a suit if it
consents to be sued, either expressly or impliedly.[33] There is express consent when a law
so provides, while there is implied consent when the State enters into a contract or it
itself commences litigation.[34] This Court explained that in order to determine implied
waiver when the State or its agency entered into a contract, there is a need to distinguish
whether the contract was entered into in its governmental or proprietary capacity, thus:

x x x. However, it must be clarified that when a state enters into a contract, it does not
automatically mean that it has waived its non-suability. The State "will be deemed to
have impliedly waived its non-suability [only] if it has entered into a contract in its
proprietary or private capacity. [However,] when the contract involves its sovereign or
governmental capacity[,] x x x no such waiver may be implied." Statutory provisions
waiving [s]tate immunity are construed in strictissimi juris. For, waiver of immunity is
in derogation of sovereignty.[35]

In Air Transportation Office v. Ramos,[36] the Court expounded:

An unincorporated agency without any separate juridical personality of its own enjoys
immunity from suit because it is invested with an inherent power of sovereignty. x x x.
However, the need to distinguish between an unincorporated government agency
performing governmental function and one performing proprietary functions has arisen.
The immunity has been upheld in favor of the former because its function is
governmental or incidental to such function; it has not been upheld in favor of the latter
whose function was not in pursuit of a necessary function of government but was
essentially a business.[37]

Having made this distinction, we reiterate that the DPWH is an unincorporated

government agency without any separate juridical personality of its own and it enjoys
immunity from suit.[38]
3 Title: KHOSROW MINUCHER, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and ARTHUR
SCALZO, respondents. G.R. No. 142396, February 11, 2003 VITUG, J.
Issue: Whether or not Arthur Scalzo is indeed entitled to diplomatic immunity from civil suit
conformably with the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations
Facts: Khosrow Minucher was an Iranian National who came to the Philippines in to study and
later became a refugee of the United Nations after the Iranian government he was
working for was deposed.
On the other hand, Arthur Arthur Scalzo was a special agent of the United States Drug
Enforcement Administration. He conducts surveillance operations on suspected drug dealers in
the Philippines and believes to be the source of prohibited drugs shipped to the US and make
the actual arrest.
Khosrow Minucher and one Abbas Torabian were charged for violation of Section 4 of Republic
Act No. 6425, otherwise also known as the "Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972," before the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 151, of Pasig City, such criminal charge was followed by a buy-bust operation
conducted by the Philippine police narcotic agents where Scalzo was a witness for the
prosecution.They were acquitted later on.
On 03 August 1988, Minucher filed Civil Case No. 88-45691 before the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 19, of Manila for damages on account of what he claimed to have been trumped-up
charges of drug trafficking made by Arthur Scalzo. In his complaint, he said that during the buy-
bust operation wherein he was arrested without any warrant, some of his valuable were missing.
He averred that his arrest as a heroine trafficker was well publicized and that when he got
arrested, he was not given any food or water for 3 days.
Scalzo, in his defense, asserted his diplomatic immunity as evidenced a Diplomatic Note. He
contended that it was recognized by the US Government pursuant to the Vienna Convention on
Diplomatic Relations and the Philippine government itself thru its Executive Department and
Department of Foreign Affairs.
The trial court decided in favor of Minucher citing that even if Scalzo was a diplomatic agent, he
should be still held liable of the crime since he committed it outside his official duties. On appeal
, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s decision and sustained Scalzo’s defense that he
was sufficiently clothed with Diplomatic immunity during his term of duty and thereby immune
from the criminal and civil jurisdiction of the “Receiving State” pursuant to the terms of the
Vienna Convention.
Ruling: A foreign agent, operating within a territory, can be cloaked with immunity from suit but
only as long as it can be established that he is acting within the directives of the sending state.
The consent of the host state is an indispensable requirement of basic courtesy between the two
sovereigns.
In the instant case, the official exchanges of communication between agencies of the
government of the two countries, certifications from officials of both the Philippine Department
of Foreign Affairs and the United States Embassy, as well as the participation of members of the
Philippine Narcotics Command in the "buy-bust operation" conducted at the residence of
Minucher at the behest of Scalzo, may be inadequate to support the "diplomatic status" of the
latter but they give enough indication that the Philippine government has given its imprimatur, if
not consent, to the activities within Philippine territory of agent Scalzo of the United States Drug
Enforcement Agency. The job description of Scalzo has tasked him to conduct surveillance on
suspected drug suppliers and, after having ascertained the target, to inform local law enforcers
who would then be expected to make the arrest. In conducting surveillance activities on
Minucher, later acting as the poseur-buyer during the buy-bust operation, and then becoming a
principal witness in the criminal case against Minucher, Scalzo hardly can be said to have acted
beyond the scope of his official function or duties.
All told, this Court is constrained to rule that respondent Arthur Scalzo, an agent of the United
States Drug Enforcement Agency allowed by the Philippine government to conduct activities in
the country to help contain the problem on the drug traffic, is entitled to the defense of state
immunity from suit.

4 CITY OF CALOOCAN and NORMA M. ABRACIA,

petitioners,v.
HON. MAURO T. ALLARDE, Presiding Judge of Branch 123, RTC of Caloocan City, ALBERTO A.CASTILLO, Deputy Sheriff of
Branch 123, RTC of Caloocan City, and DELFINA HERNANDEZSANTIAGO and PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK (PNB),
respondents.
G.R. No. 107271; September 10, 2003 CORONA,
FACTS in 1972, Mayor Marcial Samson of Caloocan abolished the position of Assistant
City Administrator and 17 other positions via Ordinance No. 1749. The affected employees
assailed thelegality of the abolition. The CF
in 1973 declared abolition illegal and ordered the reinstatement of all thedismissed
employees and the payment of their back-wages and other emoluments. The City
Government appealed the decision but such was dismissed.
n 1986 the City paid Santiago P75,083.37 as partial payment of her back-wages. The
others were paid in full.
n 1987 the City appropriated funds for her unpaid back salaries (supplemental budget #3)
but the City refused to release the money to Santiago. The City of Caloocan argued that
Santiago was not entitled to back wages. On July 27, 1992 Sheriff Castillo levied and sold
at public auction one of the motor vehicles of the City Government for P100,000.The
amount was given to Santiago. The City Government questioned the validity of the motor
vehicle; properties of the municipality were exempt from execution. Judge Allarde denied
the motion and directed the sheriff to levy and schedule at public auction 3 more vehicles.
On October 5, 1993 the City Council of Caloocan passed Ordinance No. 0134 which
included the amount of P439,377.14 claimed by Santiago as back-wages, plus interest.
Judge Allarde issued an order to the City Treasurer to release the check but the City
Treasurer can¶t do so because the Mayor refuses to sign the check. On May 7, 1993.
Judge Allarde ordered the Sheriff to immediately garnish the funds of the City Government
of Caloocan corresponding to the claim of Santiago. Notice of garnishment was forwarded
to the PNB but the City Treasurer sent an advice letter to PNB that the garnishment was
illegal and that it would hold PNB liable for any damages which may be caused by the
withholding the funds of the city.
ISSUE Whether or not the funds of City of Caloocan, in PNB, may be garnished (i.e.
exempt from execution), to satisfy Santiago’s claim.
HELD Garnishment is considered a specie of attachment by means of which the plaintiff
seeks to subject to his claim property of the defendant in the hands of a third person, or
money owed by such third person or garnishee to the defendant. The rule is and has
always been that all government funds deposited in the PNB or any other official depositary
of the Philippine Government by any of its agencies or instrumentalities, whether by general
or special deposit, remain government funds and may not be subject to garnishment or levy,
in the absence of a corresponding appropriation as required by law. Even though the rule as
to immunity of a state from suit is relaxed, the power of the courts ends when the judgment
is rendered. Although the liability of the state has been judicially ascertained, the state is at
liberty to determine for itself whether to pay the judgment or not, and execution cannot
issue on a judgment against the state. Such statutes do not authorize a seizure of state
property to satisfy judgments recovered, and only convey an implication that the legislature
will recognize such judgment as final and make provision for the satisfaction thereof.
However, the rule is not absolute and admits of a well-defined exception, that is, when there
is a corresponding appropriation as required by law.
n such a case, the monetary judgment may be legally enforced by judicial processes.
Herein, the City Council of Caloocan already approved and passed Ordinance No. 0134,
Series of 1992, allocating the amount of P439,377.14for Santiago’s back-wages plus
interest. This case, thus, fell squarely within the exception. The judgment of the trial court
could then be validly enforced against such funds.

5 HOLY SEE VS. ROSARIOMARCH 28, 2013 ~ VBDIAZ G.R. No. 101949 December 1,
1994
FACTS: Petitioner is the Holy See who exercises sovereignty over the Vatican City in
Rome, Italy, and is represented in the Philippines by the Papal Nuncio; Private respondent,
Starbright Sales Enterprises, Inc., is a domestic corporation engaged in the real estate
business.
This petition arose from a controversy over a parcel of land consisting of 6,000 square
meters located in the Municipality of Paranaque registered in the name of petitioner. Said lot
was contiguous with two other lots registered in the name of the Philippine Realty
Corporation (PRC).
The three lots were sold to Ramon Licup, through Msgr. Domingo A. Cirilos, Jr., acting as
agent to the sellers. Later, Licup assigned his rights to the sale to private respondent.
In view of the refusal of the squatters to vacate the lots sold to private respondent, a dispute
arose as to who of the parties has the responsibility of evicting and clearing the land of
squatters. Complicating the relations of the parties was the sale by petitioner of Lot 5-A to
Tropicana Properties and Development Corporation (Tropicana).
private respondent filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 61, Makati, Metro
Manila for annulment of the sale of the three parcels of land, and specific performance and
damages against petitioner, represented by the Papal Nuncio, and three other defendants:
namely, Msgr. Domingo A. Cirilos, Jr., the PRC and Tropicana
petitioner and Msgr. Cirilos separately moved to dismiss the complaint — petitioner for lack
of jurisdiction based on sovereign immunity from suit, and Msgr. Cirilos for being an
improper party. An opposition to the motion was filed by private respondent.
the trial court issued an order denying, among others, petitioner’s motion to dismiss after
finding that petitioner “shed off [its] sovereign immunity by entering into the business
contract in question” Petitioner forthwith elevated the matter to us. In its petition, petitioner
invokes the privilege of sovereign immunity only on its own behalf and on behalf of its
official representative, the Papal Nuncio.
ISSUE:
Whether the Holy See is immune from suit insofar as its business relations regarding selling
a lot to a private entity

RULING: The Republic of the Philippines has accorded the Holy See the status of a foreign
sovereign. The Holy See, through its Ambassador, the Papal Nuncio, has had diplomatic
representations with the Philippine government since 1957 (Rollo, p. 87). This appears to
be the universal practice in international relations.
There are two conflicting concepts of sovereign immunity, each widely held and firmly
established. According to the classical or absolute theory, a sovereign cannot, without its
consent, be made a respondent in the courts of another sovereign. According to the newer
or restrictive theory, the immunity of the sovereign is recognized only with regard to public
acts or acts jure imperii of a state, but not with regard to private acts or acts jure gestionis
If the act is in pursuit of a sovereign activity, or an incident thereof, then it is an act jure
imperii, especially when it is not undertaken for gain or profit.
In the case at bench, if petitioner has bought and sold lands in the ordinary course of a real
estate business, surely the said transaction can be categorized as an act jure gestionis.
However, petitioner has denied that the acquisition and subsequent disposal of Lot 5-A
were made for profit but claimed that it acquired said property for the site of its mission or
the Apostolic Nunciature in the Philippines. Private respondent failed to dispute said claim.
Lot 5-A was acquired by petitioner as a donation from the Archdiocese of Manila. The
donation was made not for commercial purpose, but for the use of petitioner to construct
thereon the official place of residence of the Papal Nuncio. The right of a foreign sovereign
to acquire property, real or personal, in a receiving state, necessary for the creation and
maintenance of its diplomatic mission, is recognized in the 1961 Vienna Convention on
Diplomatic Relations (Arts. 20-22). This treaty was concurred in by the Philippine Senate
and entered into force in the Philippines on November 15, 1965.
The decision to transfer the property and the subsequent disposal thereof are likewise
clothed with a governmental character. Petitioner did not sell Lot 5-A for profit or gain. It
merely wanted to dispose off the same because the squatters living thereon made it almost
impossible for petitioner to use it for the purpose of the donation. The fact that squatters
have occupied and are still occupying the lot, and that they stubbornly refuse to leave the
premises, has been admitted by private respondent in its complaint
Private respondent is not left without any legal remedy for the redress of its grievances.
Under both Public International Law and Transnational Law, a person who feels aggrieved
by the acts of a foreign sovereign can ask his own government to espouse his cause
through diplomatic channels.
Private respondent can ask the Philippine government, through the Foreign Office, to
espouse its claims against the Holy See. Its first task is to persuade the Philippine
government to take up with the Holy See the validity of its claims. Of course, the Foreign
Office shall first make a determination of the impact of its espousal on the relations between
the Philippine government and the Holy See (Young, Remedies of Private Claimants
Against Foreign States, Selected Readings on Protection by Law of Private Foreign
Investments 905, 919 [1964]). Once the Philippine government decides to espouse the
claim, the latter ceases to be a private cause.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is GRANTED and the complaint in Civil Case No. 90-183 against
petitioner is DISMISSED.

6 Department of Agriculture vs NLRC G.R. No. 104269 Doctrine of non-suability

Facts: The case is regarding money claim against Department of Agriculture (DA) as
filed and requested by National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC).
Petitioner Department of Agriculture and Sultan Security Agency entered into a contract
for security services to be provided by the latter to the said governmental entity.
Pursuant to their arrangements, guards were deployed by Sultan Security Agency in the
various premises of the DA. Thereafter, several guards filed a complaint for
underpayment of wages, non-payment of 13th month pay, uniform allowances, night
shift differential pay, holiday pay, and overtime pay, as well as for damages against the
DA and the security agency.
The Labor Arbiter rendered a decision finding the DA jointly and severally liable with the
security agency for the payment of money claims of the complainant security guards.
The DA and the security agency did not appeal the decision. Thus, the decision became
final and executory. The Labor Arbiter issued a writ of execution to enforce and execute
the judgment against the property of the DA and the security agency. Thereafter, the City
Sheriff levied on execution the motor vehicles of the DA.
The petitioner charges the NLRC with grave abuse of discretion for refusing to quash the
writ of execution. The petitioner faults the NLRC for assuming jurisdiction over a money
claim against the Department, which, it claims, falls under the exclusive jurisdiction of
the Commission on Audit. More importantly, the petitioner asserts, the NLRC has
disregarded the cardinal rule on the non-suability of the State.
The private respondents, on the other hand, argue that the petitioner has impliedly waived its immunity
from suit by concluding a service contract with Sultan Security Agency.
Issues:Whether or not the doctrine of non-suability of the State applies in the case.
Discussions: Act No. 3083, aforecited, gives the consent of the State to be “sued upon
any moneyed claim involving liability arising from contract, express or implied. However,
the money claim should first be brought to the Commission on Audit. Act 3083 stands as
the general law waiving the State’s immunity from suit, subject to its general limitation
expressed in Section 7 thereof that ‘no execution shall issue upon any judgment
rendered by any Court against the Government of the (Philippines), and that the
conditions provided in Commonwealth Act 327 for filing money claims against the
Government must be strictly observed.
Rulings: No. The rule does not say that the State may not be sued under any
circumstances. The State may at times be sued. The general law waiving the immunity
of the state from suit is found in Act No. 3083, where the Philippine government
“consents and submits to be sued upon any money claims involving liability arising from
contract, express or implied, which could serve as a basis of civil action between private
parties.” In this case, The DA has not pretended to have assumed a capacity apart from
its being a governmental entity when it entered into the questioned contract; nor that it
could have, in fact, performed any act proprietary in character. But the claims of the
complainant security guards clearly constitute money claims.

7 VETERANS MANPOWER VSCOURT OF APPEALSG.R. NO. 91359FACTS:

VMPSI (Veterans Manpower and Protective Services, Inc.) alleges that the provisions of
RA 5487(Private Security Agency Law) violate the provisions of the Constitution against
monopolies, unfaircompetition and combinations of restraint of trade and tend to favor
and institutionalize the PADPAO(Philippine Association of Detective and Protective
Services, Inc.). Furthermore, VMPSI questions theprovision on requiring all private
security agencies or company security forces to register as members of any PADPAO
chapter organized within the region. On May 12, 1986, a Memorandum of Agreement
wasexecuted by PADPAO and the PC Chief, which fixed the minimum monthly contract
rate per guard for 8hours of security service per day at P2,255.00 within Metro Manila
and P2,215.00 outside of MetroManila. PADPAO found VMPSI guilty of cut-throat
competition when it charged MetropolitanWaterworks and Sewerage System lower than
the standard minimum rates provided in the MOA. As aresult, PADPAO refused to issue
a clearance/certificate of membership to VMPSI. VMPSI filed a civil caseagainst the PC
chief and PC-SUSIA (Philippine Constabulary Supervisory Unit for Security
andInvestigation Agencies). PC Chief and PC-SUSIA filed a motion to dismiss on the
grounds that the case isagainst the State which had not given consent thereto.
ISSUE: Whether or not VMPSIs complaint against the PC Chief and PC-SUSIA is a
suit against the State without its consent.
HELD: Yes. A public official may sometimes be held liable in his personal or private
capacity if he acts inbad faith, or beyond the scope of his authority or jurisdiction,
however, since the acts for which the PCChief and PC-SUSIA are being called to
account in this case, were performed as part of their officialduties, without malice, gross
negligence, or bad faith, no recovery may be had against them in theirprivate capacities.
Furthermore, the Supreme Court agrees with the Court of Appeals that theMemorandum
of Agreement dated May 12, 1986 does not constitute an implied consent by the State
tobe sued.The consent of the State to be sued must emanate from statutory authority,
hence, a legislative act, notfrom a mere memorandum. Without such consent, the trial
court did not acquired jurisdiction over thepublic respondents.Petition for review is
denied and the judgment appealed from is affirmed in toto.
Other RULING: The answer is yes. The state may not be sued without its consent, esp
in this case because VMPSI's complaint seeks not only to compel the public respodents
to act in a certain way but because it seeks actual and compensatory damages,
exemplary damages and attorney's fees. A public official may cometimes be held liable
for his personal or private capacity if he acts in bad faith or beyond the scope of his
authority or jurisdiction but since the acts of PC CHIEF and PC SUSIA were performed
by them as part of their official duties, without malice, gross negligence, or bad faith, no
recovery ay be had against them in their prvate capacities. The petitiom for review is
DENIED and the judgement appealed from is AFFIRMED in toto. No costs.

8 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. SANDIGANBAYAN Republic of the Philippines (Presidential

Commission on Good Government) Vs. Sandiganbayan, Bienvenido R. Tantoco Jr. And Dominador R. Santiago
G.R. No. 90478

FACTS: The case was commencedon July 21, 1987 by the Presidential Comission on
Good Government (PCGG) in behalf of the Republic of thePhilippines. The complaint
which initiated the action was denominated “for the conveyance, reversion, accounting,
restitution and damages,” and was filed pursuant to Executive Order No. 14 of the then
President Corazon Aquuino. After having been served with summons, Tantoco Jr. and
Santiago, instead of filing their answer, jointly filed a “MOTION TO STRIKEOUT SOME
PORTIONS OF THE COMPLAINT AND FOR BILL OF PARTICULARS OF OTHER
PORTIONS.” The PCGG filed an opposition thereto, and the movants files a reply to the
opposition. The Sandiganbayan in January 29, 1988, gave the PCGG 45 days to expand
its complaint to make more specific certain allegation, in order to expedite the
proceedings and accomodate the defendants Tantoco and Santiago then presented a
“MOTION FOR LEAVETO FILE INTERROGATORIES UNDER RULE 25 OF THE
RULES OF COURT”, to which the PCGGresponded by filing a motion. On March 18,
1988, in compliance with the order of January 29, 1988, the PCGG filed an EXPANDED
COMPLAINT, to which the Sandiganbayan denied with a Resolution. Tantoco and
Santiago then filed with the Sandiganbayan a pleading dominated
“INTERROGATORIES TO PLAINTIFF,” and on August 2, 1989 as”AMMENDED
INTERROGATORIES TO PLAINTIFF” as well as MOTION FOR PRODUCTION AND
INSPECTION OF DOCUMENTS. The Sandiganbayan admitted the AMMENDED
INTERROGATORIES and granted the Motion for production and inspection of
documents respectively. PCGG filed a MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF THE
RESOLUTION DATED AUGUST 25, 1989. The PCGG also filed an opposition to the
AMMENDED INTERROGATORIES. Tantoco and Santiago filed a reply to the opposition.
After hearing, the Sandiganbayan promulgated 2 Resolutions on September 29, 1989:
(1) denying reconsideration of the Resolution allowing the production of documents; and
(2) reiterating by implication the permission to serve the ammended interrogatories on
the plaintiff (PCGG). These Resolutions promulgated by the Sandiganbayan led to the
petition of PCGG contending that the said orders dated Sept.29, 1989 should be
nullified, because the said orders were rendered with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to excess of jurisdiction.
ISSUES: Whether or not the petitioner can object to the interrogatories served on it.
RULING: No. Under theDoctrine of State Immunity, “the State may not be sued without
its consent.” This is in recognition of the sovereign power of the State and of an express
affirmation of the unwritten rule insulating it from the jurisdiction of the courtsof justice.
As for the case at bar, the Sandiganbayan represents the State, therefore the PCGG
cannot object to the interrogatories served upon them. Also, the PCGG cannot claim a
superior or preferred status to the State, may it be while assuming to represent or act for
the State. DECISION:Petition is DENIED, without pronnouncement as to costs.

11 G.R. No. 76607 February 26, 1990 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, FREDERICK M. SMOUSE AND YVONNE REEVES, petitioners, vs.HON.
ELIODORO B. GUINTO, Presiding Judge, Branch LVII, Regional Trial Court, Angeles City, ROBERTO T. VALENCIA, EMERENCIANA C. TANGLAO, AND PABLO
C. DEL PILAR, respondents.

These cases have been consolidated because they involve the same doctrine of state immunity.

US v. Rodrigo (G.R. No. 79470, Feb. 26, 1990) US v. Ceballos (G.R. No. 80018, Feb. 26, 1990) US v.
Vergara (GR No. 80258, Feb. 26, 1990)

Facts:

GR 76607 The private respondents, Roberto T. Valencua, Emerencia C. Tanglao, and Pablo C. del
Pilar, are suing several USAF officers stationed in Clark Air base in connection with the bidding
which the latter conducted for contracts for barber services in the said base. On Feb. 24, 1986
the Western Pacific Contracting

Office, Okinawa Area Exchange, US Air Force, solicited bids for such contracts.The bidding was
won by a Ramon Dizon. The private respondents objected, claiming that Dizon had made a bid
for four facilities, including the CivilEngineering Area, which was not included in the invitation to
bid. On June 30, 1986 the private respondents filed a complaint to cancel the award to Dizon
and to conduct a rebidding, and to allow the private respondents by a writ of preliminary
injunction to continue operating the concessions pending litigation. Upon filing the complaint,
the respondent court issued an ex parte order directing the petitioners to maintain the status
quo. On July 22, 1986 the petitioners filed a motion to dismiss the case on the ground that the
action was in effect a suit against the USA, which had not waived it’s immunity. The individual
defendants, being official employees of the USAF were also immune. On October 10, 1988 the
RTC denied the motion to dismiss. The court stated that a concessionaireship such as a barber
shop is not under the RP-US Bases Agreement.

GR 79470 Fabian Genove filed a complaint for damages againts the petitioners for his dismissal
as cook in the USAF Recreation Center at the John Hay Air Station in Baguio City. It had been
ascertained after investigation that Genove had poured urine into the soup stock used in cooking
the vegetables served to the club customers. He was suspended and eventually dismissed by
Anthony Lamachia, who was then the club manager. Genove’s filed a complaint in the RTC of
Baguio City against the individual petitioners. On March 13, 1987, the defendants, joined by the
USA, moved to dismiss the complaint, alleging that Lamachia, as an officer of the USAF, is
immune from suit for his actions are within his official capacity. On June 4, 1987, the motion was
denied. The respondent judge stated that although the petitioners acted initially in their official
capacities, they went beyond what their functions called for and thus no longer immune to
suability.

GR 80018 Luis Bautista, employed as a barracks boy in Camp O’Donnell, an extension of Clark Air
Base, was arrested following a buy-bust operation conducted by the petitioners, Tomi King,
Darrel Dye, and Stephen Bostick, who are USAF officers and agents of the Air Force Office of
Special Investigators. According to the sworn statements of the petitioners, Bautista violated RA
6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act, and therefore a case was filed against him
in the RTC of Tarlac. Bautista was eventually dismissed from his job. Bautista then filed a
complaint for damages against the petitioners. The petitioners filed a motion to dismiss the
complaint on the basis that they were acting in their official capacity when they did the acts
complained. The respondent judge dismissed the motion and held that the claimed immunity
under the Military Bases agreement covered only criminal and not civil cases.

GR 80258 A complaint for damages was filed by the private respondents against the petitioners,
who are USAF officers--except the USA--for injuries allegedly sustained by the former when they
were beaten, handcuffed, and dogs were unleashed upon them by the petitioners. However, the
latter denied this stating that the respondents were resisting arrest for theft and thus sustained
the said injuries. The petitioners filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the grounds that the
acts done by them were in the performance of their official functions The RTC denied the
motion stating that the alleged criminal acts cannot be deemed as Acts of State.

Issue: Whether or not the petitioners are immune from suit as provided by the RP-US Bases
Treaty.
Ruling: According to Article XVI, Sec. 3 of the 1987 Constitution, a state may not be sued without
its consent. This provision was adopted from generally accepted principles of international law
(Art. II, Sec, 2). This immunity is not only applicable to the state itself but also to its officials who
commits acts in the performance of their official duties. A suit filed against an official of a state
in the performance of his duties is also a suit filed against that state. However, the doctrine of
state immunity is not absolute. The state may not be sued without its consent, thus the state
may be sued if it consents. The consent of the state to be sued may be manifested expressly or
impliedly. Expressed consent may be embodied in a general law or special law. Implied consent
is when the state enters into a contract or it commences litigation itself. In Act no. 3083, the
Philippines waives its state immunity from suit and “consents and submits to be sued on
moneyed claim involving liability arising from contract, express of implied, which could serve as
a basis of civil action between private parties.” In Merritt v. Gov’t of the Philippine Is., “When the
government enters into a contact, it is deemed to have descended to the level of the other
contracting party and divested of its sovereign immunity from suit with its implied consent.
Waiver is also implied when the government files a complaint, thus opening itself to a
counterclaim.” However, such rules are subject to qualification. Express consent is effected only
by the will of the legislature through the enactment of statues. Moreover, not all contracts
entered by the government will be considered as waiver of its non-suability; a distinction must
be made between its sovereign and proprietary acts. As for the filing of a complaint by the
government, the suability will result only when claiming affirmative relief from the defendant.
The United States of America, like any other state, will be deemed to have impliedly waived its
immunity from suability if it has entered into a contract in its proprietary or private capacity. It is
only when the contract involves its sovereign or governmental capacity that no such waiver may
be implied. As to activities of a state, there is a need to distinguish between sovereign and
governmental acts (jure imperii) and private, commercial and proprietary acts (jure gestionis).
State immunity only extends only to acts jure imperii. This rule is now applicable in the US, UK,
and other European states. The other petitioners all claim that they have acted in the discharge
of their official functions as officers or agents of the US. However, this is still a matter of
evidence. The charges against them cannot be summarily dismissed on their mere assertion of
immunity from suit. In US vs Guinto, it is found that the barbershops subject of the concessions
are commercial in nature and operated by private persons. They are not agencies of the US
Armed Forces and are not vital to its operation. Hence, the petitioners cannot claim immunity
from the complaint filed. The petition is DISMISSED, respondent judge is directed to proceed
with the hearing, TRO is LIFTED. In US vs Rodrigo, the court assumes that the restaurant services
offered at the John Hay Air Station has the nature of a business enterprise undertaken by the US
gov’t in its proprietary capacity. Such services are not even free for American servicemen, and
are available to the public in general, including tourists, all of which pay for the privileges therein
as one would with an ordinary restaurant. Thus operated for profit. The petitioners cannot
invoke the doctrine of state immunity. Even if they are acting their official duties, by the mere
fact that the US gov’t itself enters into contract with Genove as an act of its proprietary
functions, it is implied that it waives its immunity from suit. But even with these said
considerations, the complaint against the petitioners must till be dismissed. While suable, the
petitioners cannot be held liable. It is obvious that the claim for damage cannot be allowed
given the strength of the evidence. It has been established upon thorough investigation that
Genove has polluted the soup stock with urine. disgusting offense. The peitioners acted properly
in terminating Genove. “It is surprising that he should still have the temerity to file his complaint
for damages after committing his utterly disgusting offense.” The petition is GRANTED and the
civil case is DISMISSED. In US vs Ceballos, the petitioners were cleary, upon the study of the
records, acting in the exercise of their official functions when they conducted the buy-bust
operation against the complainant. By being special agents of the US gov’t, they thus represent
the USA, and thus immune from suability. The petition is GRANTED and the civil case is
DISMISSED. In US vs Vergara, the contradictory factual allegations in this case need a closer
study of what actually happened. The record was too meager to indicate if the defendants were
really discharging their official duties or had actually exceeded their authority when the incident
occurred.The needed inquiry must first be made by the lower court so it may assess and resolve
the conflicting claims of the parties. The petition is DISMISSED and the respondent court is
directed to proceed with the hearing and decision of civil case. TRO is LIFTED.

14 Republic of the Philippines v. Sandoval G.R. No. 84607 March 19, 1993
FACTS: On January 22, 1987, the Mendiola Massacre took place. It was the end of the
eight days and seven nights of encampment by the members of the militant Kilusang
Magbubukid sa Pilipinas (KMP) at the then Ministry (now Department) of Agrarian
Reform (MAR) at the Philippine Tobacco Administration Building along Elliptical Road in
Diliman, Quezon City.

The heirs of the deceased, together with those injured (Caylao Group), instituted a
petition under Sec. 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. They sought to reverse and set
aside of the orders of respondent Judge Sandoval on May 31 and August 8, 1988
dismissing the complaint for damages against the Republic of the Philippines on the
case entitled, “Erlinda Caylao, et al. v. Republic of the Philippines, et al.”

The order on May 31, 1988 stated that the impleaded Military Officers, since they are
being charged in their personal and official capacity, and holding them liable, would not
result in financial responsibility of the government, the principle of immunity from suit
cannot be applied to them. The motions for reconsideration of the order was denied on
August 8, 1998 since respondent Judge found no cogent reason to disturb the said
order.

The incident started when the farmers and their sympathizers presented their demands
for what they called "genuine agrarian reform". The KMP, led by its national president,
Jaime Tadeo, presented their problems and demands, among which were: (a) giving
lands for free to farmers; (b) zero retention of lands by landlords; and (c) stop
amortizations of land payments.

The dialogue between the farmers and the MAR officials began on January 15, 1987.
Two days later, there was a marked increase in people at the encampment. On January
20, 1987, Jaime Tadeo spoke with then Minister Heherson Alvarez, demanding that the
minimum comprehensive land reform program be granted immediately. Minister Alvarez
then promised to do his best to bring the matter to then Pres. Aquino during the cabinet
meeting the next day.

On the 7th day of encampment, the farmers barricaded the MAR premises and prevented
the employees from going inside their offices. They hoisted the KMP flag together with
the Phil flag. On Jan. 22, 1987, Tadeo’s group decided to march to Malacanang to air
their demands. On their way, they were joined by the members of other sectoral
organizations such as the Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU), Bagong Alyansang Makabayan
(BAYAN), League of Filipino Students (LFS), and Kongreso ng Pagkakaisa ng
Maralitang Lungsod (KPML).

Capital Regional Command (CAPCOM) inspected the adequacy of the preparations of

the government forces to quell impending attacks. Intelligence reports were also
received that the KMP was heavily infiltrated by CCP/NPA elements and that an
insurrection was impending. Government anti-riot forces were assembled at Mendiola.

At around 4:30pm, the marchers numbered about 10,000-15,000 and proceeded

towards the police line, without any dialogue taking place between them and the anti-riot
squad. It was at this moment that the clash occurred and “pandemonium broke loose.”
12 rallyists were killed, 39 were wounded by gunshots, and 12 sustained minor injuries.
Pres. Aquino issued AO No. 11 dated Jan. 22, 1987 which created the Citizens’
Mendiola Commission for the purpose of conducting an investigation on the incident,
which then submitted their report and recommended for the prosecution of Tadeo for the
march without permit, as well as particular military officers and police forces involved,
and for the deceased and wounded victims of the Mendiola incident to be compensated
by the government. Notwithstanding such information, no concrete form of
compensation was received by the victims. They institution of action for damages
against the Republic of the Philippines which was dismissed on the ground that the
State cannot be sued without its consent. Petitioners contended that the State has
impliedly waived its immunity through the recommendations of the Committee and the
public addresses by then Pres. Aquino to which Judge Sandoval dismissed on the
ground that there was no such waiver.

ISSUE: Whether or not the State has waived its immunity from suit

RULING: No. According to Art. XIV, Sec. 3 of the 1987 Constitution, the State may not
be sued without its consent. The recommendations of the Citizens’ Mendiola
Commission does not in any way mean that liability automatically attaches to the State.
AO 11 expressly stated that the purpose of creating the Commission was only to
conduct an investigation of the disorder, deaths, and casualties that took place. Its
findings and recommendations shall serve only as cause of action for litigation; it does
not bind the State immediately, and are not final and executory. Pres. Aquino’s public
addresses are likewise not binding on the State; they are not tantamount to a waiver by
the State.

Some instances where a suit against the State is proper are: (1) When the Republic is
sued by name; (2) When the suit is against an unincorporated government agency; (3)
When the suit is on its face against a government officer but the case is such that the
ultimate liability will belong not to the officer but to the government.

As to the military officers and personnel, although they were performing their official
functions during the incident, their functions ceased to be official the moment they
exceeded their authority. They were deployed to ensure that the rally would be peaceful
and orderly as well as to guarantee the safety of the very people that they are duty-
bound to protect. However, the facts as found by the trial court showed that they fired at
the unruly crowd to disperse the latter. This court has made it quite clear that even a
“high position in the government does not confer a license to persecute or recklessly
injure another.”

Wherefore, finding there was no reversible error, the petitions were dismissed.

Sanders v. Veridiano

15 G.R. No. L-46930 FACTS: The petitioner Dale Sanders during the time the incident
occured was the special services director of the U.S. Naval Station (NAVSTA) in Olangapo City.
Petitioner Moreau was the commanding officer of the Subic Naval Base which includes the same
station. Private respondent Anthony M. Rossi is and American citizen with permanent residence
in the Philippines, so is the other private respondent, Ralph L. Wyers, who died two years ago.
Both respondents were employed as gameroom attendants in the special services department
of the NAVSTA.
On October 3, 1975, the private respondents were advised that their employment had
been converted from permanent full-time to permanent part-time, which will take effect on
October 18, 1975. They protested and instituted grievance proceedings conformably to the
pertinent rules and regulations of the U.S. Department of Defense. The result of which was the
approval of the hearing officer who conducted the proceedings for the reinstatement of the
respondents to permanent full-time status plus backwages.
Sanders on the otherhand, disagreed with the hearing officer's report and
recommendation which was manifested on a letter he sent to petitioner Moreau. On November
7, 1975, before the start of the grievance hearings petitioner Moreau as the commanding
general of the U.S. Naval Station in Subic bay, sent a letter to the Chief of Naval Personnel
ordering him to concur with the respondent's change of employment status.
Respondents then filed a complaint claiming that the letters contained libelous
imputations that had exposed them to ridicule and caused them mental anguish and that the
prejudgment of the grievance proceedings was an invasion of their personal and proprietary
rights.
Petitioner then argued that the acts complained were performed by them in the discharge
of their official duties and that, consequently, the court had no jurisdiction over them under
doctrine of state immunity.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners can invoke the doctrine of state immunity
HELD: YES. It was evident on the present case that the acts for which the petitioners are being
called to account were performed by them in discharge of their official duties. Sanders, being
the director of the special services department of NAVSTA, has the authority and supervision
over its personnel which includes the private respondents. Moreau, as the immediate superior
of Sanders and directly answerable to naval Personnel in matters involving the special
department of NAVSTA is in fact in discharge of his duty when the incident happened. The court
finds that the acts of the petitioners are protected by the presumption of good faith which has
not been overturned by the private respondents.
The court held that the petitioners cannot be sued, because it has been proven that the
petitioners acted on behalf of the government of United States and not personally, thus it is the
government and not the petitioners personally responsible for their acts. As we follow the
generally accepted principle of the sovereign equality of the states which wisely admonishes
that par in parem non habet imperium and that a contrary attitude would "unduly vex the peace
of nations". Thus, courts justification of which was the our adherence to the percept formally
expressed in Article II, Section 2, of our Constitution where we reiterate from our previous
charters that the Philippines "adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as
part of the law of the land".
17 Republic v Feliciano [ G.R. No. 70853, March 12, 1987] YapJ;
Facts: 86 settlers of Barrio salvacion, appeal for the dismiss of the complaint filed by Feliciano, because the
Republic of the Philippines cannot be sued without its consent.
Backgroud.: On January 22, 1970 respondent Feliciano complaint against the Republic of the Philippines,
represented by the Land Authority. For the recovery of ownership of parcel of land consisting of 4 lots situated in
Barrio of Salvacion, Municipality of Tinambac, Camarines Sur. Plaintiff said that he bought the land from Victor
Gariola which bought it from the heirs of Francisco Abrazado, there was an Absolute Deed of sale and the
turnover of the informacion posesori. On November 1, 1954, President Ramon Magsaysay issued a Proclamation
No. 90 reserving for settlement purposes, under the administration of the National Resettlement and
Rehabilitation Administration (NARRA). The lands in question are included in the sub-division and distribution of
land, so the plaintiff said that it was a private property and therefore be excluded from NARRA settlement
reservation. On August 29, 1970 the trial court, through Judge Rafael Sison, made the decision that lot No. 1
would be the private property of the plaintiff and lots 2,3 & 4 be given back to public domain. The motion to
intervene was files by 86 settlers, alleging among other things that the intervenors has been in possession of
land for more than 20 years.
On January 25, 1971 the court reconsidered its decision, reopened the case and directed the intervenors
to file and present pleadings and evidence. On August 20, 1971, the date of presentation of evidence, the
intervenors did not show up and files for postponement and resetting of the hearing for the next day, this was
denied and so the plaintiff showed evidence . August 31, 1971 Judge Sison reiterated his decision on August 29,
1970. There was a motion for reconsideration made by the intervnors and a motion for execution files by the
plaintiff the latter was denied Judge Miguel Navarro reopened the case.
On August 30, 1971, the intervenors filed for the motion to dismiss the decision on the grounds that the
Republic of the Philippines cannot be sued without its consent. On August 21, 1980 the trial court through Judge
Esteban Lising, dismissing the case for lack of jurisdiction while the solicitor General, said that the dismissal was
proper on the ground that the existence of non-suability of the state was applicable in this case or/and
authenticity of the purported possessory information title of the respondents’ predecessor-in- interest had not
been demonstrated and that at any rat the same is not an evidence of title , or if it is, it’s efficacy has been lost
by prescription and laches. Upon the denial of reconsideration plaintiff went gain to the Intermediate Appellate
Court on petition for certiorari. On April 30, 1985, the respondent appellate court rendered its decision reversing
the order of Judge Lising and remanding the case to the court for further preceeding. Hence this petition.
The plaintiff has impleaded the Republic of the Philippines as defendant in an action for recovery of
ownership and possession of a parcel of land, bringing the state to court just like any private person who is
claimed to keep a piece of property. A suit for the recory of property is not an action in rem, but an action in
personam. The informacion posesoria of the respondent had not been converted into a record of ownership.
Respondent must also contend with facts admitted by him and stated in the decision of the courts that settlers
have been occupying the land since before the outbreak of war. Which puts in grace doubts his own claim to the
lands. The Solicitor General pointed out the respondents’ informacion posesaria, registered in the office of
Register of deed in Camarines Sur was a reconstituted one by his own. Reconstitution can only be validly made in
case of the original was lost, there was no mention of the original being lost.
ISSUE: Whether or not the state can be sued for recovery and possession of a parcel of land?
Ruling:
No, The state cannot be sued without its consent. Consent must be made by the legislative body
and it must be expressed or by implication with statutory language too plain to be
misinterpreted. A suit for the recovery of property is not an action in rem, but an action in
personam. It is an axtion directed against a specific party or parties and any jusgement binds
only such parties. The complaint files by the plaintiff is directed against the Republic of the
Philippines. There was no evidence showing that the state consented to be sued.

18 US vs. Ruiz G.R. No. L-35645, May 22, 1985ABAD SANTOS, J.

FACTS: The United States of America had a naval base in Subic, Zambales. The base was one of those provided
in the Military Bases Agreement between the Philippines and the United States. Sometime in May, 1972, the
United States invited the submission of bids for the following projects
1. Repair offender system, Alava Wharf at the U.S. Naval Station Subic Bay, Philippines.
2. Repair typhoon damage to NAS Cubi shoreline; repair typhoon damage to shoreline revetment,
NAVBASE Subic; and repair to Leyte Wharf approach, NAVBASE Subic Bay, Philippines.
Eligio de Guzman & Co., Inc. responded to the invitation and submitted bids. Subsequent thereto,
the company received from the United States two telegrams requesting it to confirm its price proposals
and for the name of its bonding company. The company complied with the requests. In June, 1972, the
company received a letter which was signed by Wilham I. Collins, Director, Contracts Division, Naval
Facilities Engineering Command, Southwest Pacific, Department of the Navy of the United States, who is
one of the petitioners herein. The letter said that the company did not qualify to receive an award for
the projects because of its previous unsatisfactory performance rating on a repair contract for the sea
wall at the boat landings of the U.S. Naval Station in Subic Bay. In the abovementioned Civil Case No.
779-M, the company sued the United States of America and Messrs. James E. Galloway, William I.
Collins and Robert Gohier all members of the Engineering Command of the U.S. Navy. The complaint is
to order the defendants to allow the plaintiff to perform the work on the projects and, in the event that
specific performance was no longer possible, to order the defendants to pay damages. The company
also asked for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction to restrain the defendants from entering
into contracts with third parties for work on the projects.
The defendants entered their special appearance for the purpose only of questioning the
jurisdiction of this court over the subject matter of the complaint and the persons of defendants,
the subject matter of the complaint being acts and omissions of the individual defendants as
agents of defendant United States of America, a foreign sovereign which has not given her
consent to this suit or any other suit for the causes of action asserted in the complaint."
Subsequently the defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint which included an
opposition to the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction. The company opposed the
motion. The trial court denied the motion and issued the writ. The defendants moved twice to
reconsider but to no avail. Hence the instant petition which seeks to restrain perpetually the
proceedings in Civil Case No. 779-M for lack of jurisdiction on the part of the trial court.
ISSUE: W/N Petitioners are entitled to State Immunity.
HELD: YES. The traditional rule of State immunity exempts a State from being sued in the courts
of another State without its consent or waiver. This rule is a necessary consequence of the
principles of independence and equality of States. However, the rules of International Law are
not petrified; they are constantly developing and evolving. And because the activities of states
have multiplied, it has been necessary to distinguish them-between sovereign and governmental
acts (jure imperii) and private, commercial and proprietary acts (jure gestionis). The result is that
State immunity now extends only to acts jure imperil The restrictive application of State
immunity is now the rule in the United States, the United Kingdom and other states in western
Europe. That the correct test for the application of State immunity is not the conclusion of a
contract by a State but the legal nature of the act.
Petition is granted; the questioned orders of the respondent judge are set aside and Civil Case
No. is dismissed. Costs against the private respondent.
21 PNB vs. PABALAN G.R. No. L-33112 Facts: A writ of execution was issued by Judge Javier
Pabalan against respondent Philippine Virginia Tobacco Administration (PVTA), followed by a
notice of garnishment of the funds of PVTA. Philippine National Bank (PNB) invoked the doctrine
of non-suability since PNB alleges that the funds of PVTA in the PNB La Union branch amounting
to 12, 724.66 Philippine Peso are public in character.
Issue: Whether or not the doctrine of non-suability of the state exempts the respondent from
garnishment. Held: Wherefore, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition of PNB for certiorari
and prohibition with no cost. Thus, the writ of execution issued by Judge Pabalan must be
imposed immediately to PVTA. Also, the Supreme Court denied the non-suability clause raised
by the respondent as a government owned corporation. Quoting from Manila Hotel Employees
Association vs Manila Hotel Company that "it is well-settled that when the government enters
into commercial business, it abandons its sovereign capacity and is to be treated like any other
corporation."

22 Republic of the Philippines VS. Villasor G.R. No. L-30671 (November 28, 1973)
Facts: -Honorable Guillermo P. Villasor rendered the decision in favor of respondents P.J. Kiener
Co., Ltd, Gavino Unchuan and International Construction Corporation final and executory.
-The writ of execution was issued by the respondent, Honorable Guillermo Villasor. The sheriffs
of Rizal Province, Manila and Quezon city were then tasked to execute the decision made by the
respondent. The sheriffs of Rizal province served notices of Garnishment to several banks,
especially to PNB and Philippine Veteran's Bank.
-The funds of the Armed forces of the Philippines are deposited in PNB and Philippine Veteran's
Bank. These funds are duly allocated for retirees payments, military and civil personnel
allowances as well as for the AFP operations. -On certiorari, the petitioner filed prohibitions
proceedings with regards to respondent's action in excess of jurisdiction with the grave abuse of
discretion for granting the Writ of Execution against the funds and properties of AFP. For this
reason, the notices and garnishment were said to be null and void.
Issue: The validity of the Writ of execution issued by the respondent, Judge Villasor.
Held/Ruling: The respondent's action/decision towards the case doesn't conform with the
injunctions of the Constitution. It is a fundamental postulate of constitutionalism which flows
from the justifiable concept of sovereignty that the state and government has immunity from
suit unless it gives consent. The sovereign (authority) is exempted from suit because of practical
and logical grounds with regards to no legal right as against the authority that makes the law on
which the rights are dependent. Before the State can be sued, there must be a consent. The
judgement against the state can't be enforced by execution because of the universal rule there
were limited “only up to the completion of proceedings anterior to the state of execution” and
that the power of the Courts ends when the judgement is rendered, since the garnishment of
the funds and properties of the government may not be seized under the Writ of Execution and
garnishment just to satisfy the judgement of the respondent. The functions and public services
of the State can't be disrupted by any form of diversion as they are subjected to legitimacy and
policies as appropriated by the law and the constitution itself.
Terminology: certiorari- writ or order by which the higher court reviews the decision made by the lower
courtwrit- a form of written command in the name of a court or other legal authority to act (ex. Subpoena, warrant, court
order)postulate- something that's suggested as true and factual as a basis of reasoning.
23 VICTORIA AMIGABLE, plaintiff-appellant, vs. NICOLAS CUENCA, as Commissioner of Public Highways and REPUBLIC OF
THE PHILIPPINES, defendants-appellees. G.R. No. L-26400 February 29, 1972
FACTS: This is an appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Cebu in its Civil Case
No. R-5977, dismissing the plaintiff's complaint.
The appellant Victoria Amigable is the registered owner of Lot No. 639 of the Banilad Estate in
Cebu City as shown by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-18060 issued to her by the Register of
Deeds of Cebu on February 1, 1924. No annotation in favor of the government of any right or
interest in the property appears at the back of the certificate.
Without prior expropriation or negotiated sale, the government used a portion of said lot, with
an area of 6,167 square meters, for the construction of the Mango and Gorordo Avenues.
It appears that said avenues already existed in 1921, the tracing of said roads began in 1924,
and the formal construction in 1925.
March 27, 1958 - Amigable's counsel wrote the President of the Philippines, requesting payment
of the portion of her lot which had been appropriated by the government.
December 9, 1958 - The claim was indorsed to the Auditor General, who disallowed it in his 9th
Indorsement.
January 7, 1959 - A copy of said indorsement was transmitted to Amigable's counsel by the
Office of the President.
February 6, 1959 - Amigable filed in the court a quo a complaint, which was later amended on
April 17, 1959 upon motion of the defendants, against the Republic of the Philippines and
Nicolas Cuenca for the recovery of ownership and possession of the 6,167 sq. m. of land
traversed by the Mango and Gorordo Avenues. She also sought the payment of compensatory
damages for the illegal occupation of her land, moral damages, attorney's fees and the costs of
the suit.
The defendants filed a joint answer denying the material allegations of the complaint and
interposing the following affirmative defenses contending:
(1) that the action was premature
(2) that the right of action for the recovery of any amount had already prescribed
(3) that suit against the Government, the claim for moral damages, attorney's fees and costs had
no valid basis since as the Government had not given its consent to be sued
(4) that plaintiff had no cause of action against the defendants
July 29, 1959 - the court rendered its decision holding that it had no jurisdiction over the
plaintiff's cause of action for the recovery of possession and ownership of the portion of her lot
in question on the ground that the government cannot be sued without its consent; that it had
neither original nor appellate jurisdiction to hear, try and decide plaintiff's claim for
compensatory damages in the sum of P50,000.00, the same being a money claim against the
government; and that the claim for moral damages had long prescribed, nor did it have
jurisdiction over said claim because the government had not given its consent to be sued.
Accordingly, the complaint was dismissed. The plaintiff appealed to the Court of Appeals, which
subsequently certified the case to Us, there being no question of fact involved.
ISSUE: Whether or not the appellant may properly sue the government under the facts of the
case.
RULING: YES. Considering that no annotation in favor of the government appears at the back of
her certificate of title and that she has not executed any deed of conveyance of any portion of
her lot to the government, the appellant remains the owner of the whole lot.
In a similar case involving a claim for payment of the value of a portion of land used for the
widening of the Gorordo Avenue in Cebu City (Ministerio vs. Court of First Instance of Cebu) , this
Court, through Mr. Justice Enrique M. Fernando, held that where the government takes away
property from a private landowner for public use without going through the legal process of
expropriation or negotiated sale, the aggrieved party may properly maintain a suit against the
government without thereby violating the doctrine of governmental immunity from suit without
its consent.
Since restoration of possession of said portion by the government is neither convenient nor
feasible at this time because it is now and has been used for road purposes, the only relief
available is for the government to make due compensation which it could and should have done
years ago. To determine the due compensation for the land, the basis should be the price or
value thereof at the time of the taking.
The decision appealed from is hereby set aside and the case remanded to the court a quo for
the determination of compensation, including attorney's fees, to which the appellant is entitled
as above indicated. No pronouncement as to costs.

24 Festejo vs. Fernando ( L-5156, March 11, 1954)

Facts: Carmen Celebracion, owner of sugar lands of approximately 9 hectares, sued Isaiah
Ferando, Director of Public Works, for taking possession of portions of three parcel of land on or
about February 1951 and caused an irrigation canal to be constructed. Defendant (Isaiah
Fernando) being the Director of Public Works is responsible for system and projects of irrigation
as well as systems of officer irrigation in the country. However, in the possession of the land,
defendant pursued to do so without first obtaining authority from the Court of First Instance of
Ilocos Sur, a right of way, without the consent and knowledge of the plaintiff and against her
express objection.

Issue: WoN the defendant can be personally liable for actions he took in his official run concept
with respect to the possession of the land?

Held: Article 32, Civil Code states:

Art. 32. Any public officer or employee, or any private individual who directly or indirectly
obstructs, defeats, violates, or in any manner impedes or impairs any of the following right and
liberties of another person shall be liable for damages of the latter:
(6) The right against deprivation of property without due process of law;

Therefore, appealed order if revoked and ordered the continuation of the processing of the
claim under the regulations provided.

26 Bureau of Printing (Serafin Salvador and Mariano Ledesma, petitioners) vs.

The Bureau of Printing Employees Association (NLU) (Pacifico Advincula, Roberto Mendoza,
Ponciano Arganda and Teodulo Toleran, respondents)
(G.R. No. L-15751, January 28, 1961)
Facts: The Bureau of Printing Employees Association (NLU) Pacifico Advincula, Roberto
Mendoza, Ponciano Arganda and Teodulo Toleran filed a complaint against petitioners Bureau of
Printing, Serafin Salvador, the Acting Secretary of the Department of General Services, and
Mariano Ledesma the Director of the Bureau of Printing due to the unfair labor practices by
interfering with employees of the Bureau of Printing, particularly, the members of the
complaining association petition, in their exercise of their right to self-organization by
“discriminating in regard to hire and tenure of their employment in order to discourage them
from pursuing the union activities.”
The petitioners denied the charges. Their affirmative defense were the following: the
respondents were suspended for breach of Civil Service rules and regulations petitions; the
Bureau of Printing has no juridical personality to sue and be sued; the Bureau of Printing is not
an industrial concern engaged for the purpose of gain but is an agency of the Republic
performing government functions. They petitioned for the dismissal of the case for lack of
jurisdiction. They filed an Omnibus Motion, or a legal examination, before the hearing of the
case in the Industrial Court. It was granted, but after the hearing, the theory of the court that
that the functions of the Bureau of Printing are "exclusively proprietary in nature" is maintained.
Therefore, their prayer of case dismissal was denied. Reconsideration was also denied. As an
effect, the petitioners brought the case to the Supreme Court through the present petition for
certiorari and prohibition.
Issues: Whether or not the Bureau of Printing may be sued. | Whether or not the complaint of
the respondents is valid.
Ruling: The Bureau of Printing receives outside private printing jobs from time to time (only
0.5% of their overall job), imposes overtime work with pay on their employees when needed,
but since its function is to meet the printing needs of the Government, it is chiefly a service
bureau, not a business with an aim to gain monetary profit. It is not fully proprietary in nature.
In relation to this, the Industrial Court has no jurisdiction in taking over the case as it is not an
industrial or a business organization. Therefore, the Bureau of Printing cannot be sued. A suit,
action or proceeding against it, would actually be a suit, action or proceeding against the
Government itself, and the Government cannot be sued without its consent, much less over its
objection, according to the Sec. 1, Rule 3, Rules of Court.
The case was proven to be a result of the charges against some officers of the respondent
Bureau of Printing Employees' Association by the Acting Secretary of General Services due to
“insubordination, grave misconduct and acts prejudicial to public service committed by inciting
the employees, of the Bureau of Printing to walk out of their jobs against the order of the duly
constituted officials.” The head may take responsibility in investigating administrative charges
against erring employees.
The petition for a writ of prohibition is granted, and the complaint for unfair labor practice
against the petitioners is dismissed, with costs against the respondents.

27 Meritt vs Government of the Philippine Islands GR No. 11154, March 21 1916

Facts: E. Merrit, plaintiff, was riding a motorcycle that was going toward the western part of calle
Padre Faura, crashed into an ambulance of General Hospital. As a result of that, he sustained
multiple physical injuries which are fractured right leg and fractured skull. It was determined
that the cause of this accident was the chauffeur of the ambulance and From this event, the
Attorney General and the Director of Public Works recommended that Act No. 2457(An act
authorizing E. Merritt to bring suit against the Government of the Philippine Islands and
authorizing the Attorney General of said islands to appear In said suit) to be passed by the
legislature to allow E. Merritt to bring suit to the courts against the Government.

Issue:WON the Government can sued and should be liable for the Tort committed by the
Chauffeur of the Ambulance of the General Hospital.

Held: Since the laws of the Government of the Philippines is based on the United States Federal
Laws, the Enactment of the Act No. 2457 gives rise to the condition that the state could be sued
upon the determination of the high courts. According to section 1 of the said act "SECTION 1. E.
Merritt is hereby authorized to bring suit in the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila
against the Government of the Philippine Islands in order to fix the responsibility for the collision
between motorcycle and the ambulance of the General Hospital, and to determine the amount
of the damages, if any, to which Mr. E. Merritt is entitled on account of said collision, and the
Attorney General of the Philippine Islands is hereby authorized and directed to appear at the
trial on the behalf of the Government of said Islands, to defend said Government at the same”
According to Art.1903, par 5 of the Civil Code, “The state is liable in this sense when it acts
through a special agent, but not when the damage should have been caused by the official to
whom properly it pertained to do the act performed, in which case the provisions of the
preceding article shall be applicable." In this sense, the chauffeur that was employed at the time
of that accident could not be considered to be a special agent.
For the circumstances mentioned, the courts determined that the legislature should be the one
to determine up to what extent the government will be liable and the judgement is reversed.