Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Law Digest Pau
Law Digest Pau
Law Digest Pau
70639, 1987
PARAS, J:
This is an appeal from a decision of the Regional Trial Court of Dumaguete City, 7th Judicial Region,
Branch XL, in Criminal Case No. 5832, convicting the nine (9) accused, Pedro Dollantes, Hamlet
Dollantes, Lauro Dollantes, Monico Dollantes, Sidrito Lokesio, Merlando Dollantes, Hugo Grengia,
Danny Esteban and Leonilo Villaester, all equally guilty of the complex crime of "Assault upon a
Person in Authority Resulting in Murder" and sentencing the abovementioned accused to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the heirs of the deceased, jointly and severally, the
sum of P30,000.00 to pay attomey's fees in the amount of P3,000.00 and to pay the costs.
That on or about the 21st day of April 1983 at nighttime, in the Municipality of Tayasan,
Province of Negros Oriental, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating together and helping one another
with evident premeditation and treachery, and with intent to kill did then and there, willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab one Marcos Gabutero, Barangay Captain
of Maglihe, Tayasan, Negros Oriental, an agent of a person in authority and which fact
accused had full knowledge, while the latter was in the lawful performance of his official duty
or function as Barangay Captain or on the occasion of such function, with a bolo and hunting
knives with which the accused were then armed and provided, thereby inflicting the following
wounds in the victim, viz:
1. Stab wound measuring three and a half (3 1/2) cm. in length and half (1/2) cm. in
width, ten (10) cm. depthness located at the left anterior aspect of the trunk at the
level of the 3rd intercostal space, 5 cm. away from the anterior mid-line. The wound
was oriented horizontally and directed vertically and slightly to the back. Ventricle
and lung tissue penetrated.
2. Stab wound measuring four (4) cm. in length, 1 cm. in width, eleven and a half (11
1/2) cm. depthness, located at the right anterior aspect of the trunk, at the level of the
2nd intercostal space about five (5) cm. away from the anterior and midline, the
wound was oriented horizontally and directed downward and slightly to the back.
3. Incised wound five (5) cm. in length, 1 cm. in width located at the left anterior
aspect of the trunk about 26 cm. below the left clavicle and four (4) cm. away from
the anterior mid-line. The wound was oriented obliquely.
4. Incised wound measuring two (2) cm. in length and one (1) cm. in width, located at
the right anterior aspect of the trunk about twenty-one (21) cm. below the right
clavicle and eight (8) cm. away from the anterior line. The wound was oriented
obliquely.
5. Incised wound measuring one and a half (1 1/2) cm. in length, half (1/2) cm. in
width located at the anterior aspect of the upper extremity about nine (9) cm. above
the wrist joint one and a half (1 1/2) cm. away from the anterior mid-line and medially.
The wound was oriented vertically.
6. Incised wound measuring four (4) cm. in length, 1 cm. in width located at the
lateral aspect of the right upper extreme about five (5) cm. above the elbow joint and
five (5) cm. away from the posterior midline laterally. The wound was oriented
horizontally.
7. Through and through stab wound located at the left upper extremity the wound of
entrance measuring about three and a half (3 1/2) cm. in length and one (1) cm. in
width located at the posterior aspect of the forearm above five (5) em. below the
elbow joint, three (3) cm. away from the anterior mid-line medially. The wound was
oriented vertically.
8. Incised wound measuring 3 cm. in length half (1/2) cm. in width located at the
lateral aspect of the left upper extremity about five (5) cm. below the elbow joint and
(5) cm. away from the posterior mid-line. The wound was oriented horizontally.
9. Stab wound measuring one and one-half (1 1/2) cm. in width and four (4) cm.
depthness located at the left anterior aspect of the trunk, about seven and a half (7
1/2) cm. above the ihac crest and twelve (12) cm. away from the anterior mid-line.
The wound was oriented obliquely and directed downward, slightly to the right and
posteriority, perforating part of the intestine.
10. Stab wound measuring three (3) cm. in length, one (1) cm. in width and seven
and a half (7) cm. in depthness, located at the left posterior of the trunk about three
(3) cm. above the lower angle of the scapula, and seven (7) cm. away from the
posterior mid-line. The wound was oriented obliquely and directed downward and
slightly to the left.
11. Stab wound measuring three(3) cm. in length, one (l) cm. in width and twelve (12)
cm. in depthness, located at the left posterior aspect of the trunk about thirteen (13)
cm. below the lower angle of the scapula and six (6) cm. away from the posterior
mid-line. The wound was oriented obliquely and directed anteriority to the left.
12. Hemothorax on the left pleural cavity, which wounds caused the latter's untimely
death.
The evidence for the prosecution consisted principally of the testimonies of Dionilo Garol, Bonifacio
Cero, Marciana Gabutero, the wife of the deceased, Pat. Ricardo Barrera, Dr. Rogelio Kho who
conducted the post mortem examination of the deceased, Ponsimillo Balasabas, the Municipal
Treasurer of Tayasan, Negros Oriental and Pat. Jose Amis of the Integrated National Police.
On the other hand, the defense presented the following witnesses: Accused: Hugo Grengia, Leonilo
Villaester, Danny Esteban, Alfredo Dollantes, Hamlet Dollantes, and other witnesses: Machim
Dollantes and Tacio Fausto.After a careful evaluation of the evidence, the trial court was convinced
that all the accused in this case conspired in the commission of the crime.
Thus on February 20, 1985, the trial court rendered its decision finding all the accused guilty of the
complex crime of assault upon a person in authority resulting in murder. The dispositive portion of
the decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, the prosecution having proven the guilt of all the accused beyond reasonable
doubt, this Court hereby finds the accused Pedro Dollantes, Hamlet Dollantes, Alfredo
Dollantes, Lauro Dollantes, Monico Dollantes, Sidrito Lokesia, Merlando Dollantes, Hugo
Grengia, Danny Esteban and Leonilo Villaester, guilty of the complex crime of assault upon a
person in authority resulting in murder, and hereby sentences the above-mentioned accused
to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the heirs of Marcos Gabutero,
jointly and severally, the sum of Thirty Thousand (P30,000.00) PESOS, to pay attorney's
fees in the amount of Three Thousand (P3,000.00) Pesos, and to pay the costs of the
proceedings.
From the aforementioned decision, all the accused appealed. Accused Hugo Grengia submitted a
separate brief.
The appellant raised the following assignment of errors:
FIRST ERROR
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING FULL WEIGHT AND CREDIT TO THE BIASED,
INCREDIBLE AND CONTRADICTORY STATEMENTS OF THE PROSECUTION
WITNESSES DIONILO GAROL, BONIFACIO CERO AND MARCIANA GABUTERO AND IN
NOT CONSIDERING AT LEAST THE UNCONTRADICTED TESTIMONY OF
INDEPENDENT WITNESSES DOLLANTES AND TACIO FAUSTO.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT GIVING WEIGHT TO THE EXPERT PROSECUTION
WITNESS DR. ROGELIO R. KHO WHICH IN EFFECT CONTRADICTS THE THEORY OF
THE PROSECUTION AND THAT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DECIDING THAT
CONSPIRACY EXISTS.
FOURTH ERROR
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED FROM NOT GIVING WEIGHT TO THE TESTIMONY OF
ACCUSED HUGO GRENGIA, LEONILO VILLAESTER alias "Laon," DANILO ESTEBAN,
HAMLET DOLLANTES, ALFREDO DOLLANTES AND THE TESTIMONY OF
INDEPENDENT WITNESSES TACIO FAUSTO AND MCLEAN DOLLANTES.
FIFTH ERROR
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED GUILTY OF THE COMPLEX
CRIME OF ASSAULT UPON A PERSON IN AUTHORITY RESULTING TO MURDER AND
SENTENCING THEM TO SUFFER THE PENALTY OF RECLUSION PERPETUA AND TO
INDEMNIFY THE HEIRS OF MARCOS GABUTERO, JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY, THE
SUM OF THIRTY THOUSAND (P30,000.00) PESOS, and TO PAY THE COSTS OF THE
PROCEEDINGS. (Brief for Accused-Appellant, Rollo, p. 62)
In his separate brief, accused Hugo Grengia assigns the following errors:
1. The lower court erred in not giving weight and credence to the admission of accused-
appellant Hamlet Dollantes that he was the lone perpetrator of the alleged stabbing of victim
Marcos Gabutero.
2. The lower court erred in not considering the testimonies of prosecution witnesses, namely:
Patrolman Ricardo Barrera, Dr. Rogeho Kho which in effect buttressed the theory of the
defense.
3. The lower court erred in not considering the entry in the police logbook of the Tayasan
Integrated National Police, dated April 21, 1983, as testified to by Patrolman Jose Amis.
4. The lower court erred in holding that conspiracy exist in perpetration of the felony.
5. The lower court erred in holding that the case of People vs. Agag (L-64951, June 29,
1984) is applicable to the case at bar to justify the conviction of the accused-appellants.
6. The lower court erred in not giving weight and credence to the testimony of the defense
witnesses.
7. Finally, the trial court erred in holding that the accused-appellant herein is guilty of the
crime charged. (Brief for accusedappellant Hugo Grengia, pp. 1-2)
The accused were positively identified by three (3) prosecution eye witnesses. They were: Dionilo
Garol, Bonifacio Cero and Marciana Gabutero, the wife of the victim. Except for the latter, the two
other witnesses Garol and Cero are not related to the victim or the accused. The testimonies of
these three (3) witnesses were subjected to a lengthy cross-examination and were found credible
and free from material contradictions by the trial court (Rollo, p. 75).
Dionilo Garol who was six (6) meters away, saw clearly what happened. He testified that when the
Barangay Captain started to deliver his speech, the accused Pedro Dollantes brandishing a knife
shouted "Who is brave here?" (TSN, page 6, Oct. 7, 1983). The victim then approached to admonish
him t the latter stabbed the victim on the arm. Garol immediately approached the accused Pedro
Dollantes and tried to wrest the knife away from the hand of the accused. The accused Hugo
Grengia also tried to grab the knife but it was Garol who succeeded. The accused Grengia then told
him "Do not try to intervene because you might be included in the plan." (TSN, page 8, Oct. 17,
1983). Then Grengia made some signs by nodding his head and the accused Hamlet Dollantes and
Alfredo Dollantes rushed to and attacked the victim followed by the other co-accused in this case
who also rushed at and stabbed the victim. He specified that accused Alfredo Dollantes, Lauro
Dollantes, Monico Dollantes and Sidrito Lokesio were carrying knives while the accused Merlando
Dollantes was carrying a bolo; and that they stabbed the victim one after another. He said that the
accused Danny Esteban, Hugo Grengia andLeonilo Villaester were all carrying stones which they
threw at the store of the victim's wife (TSN, pp. 7-10; Oct. 17, 1983).
This testimony was fully corroborated by another prosecution eyewitness Bonifacio Cero who was
about three (3) meters away and whose narration tallied on all material ints with that of Dionilo Garol
as to what transpired that night. He stated further that when he saw the Barangay Captain being
stabbed he tried to approach the group but he was held by Danny Esteban who said "do not try to
interfere, you are not a party to this. We have already gotten what we have been aiming for." (TSN,
page 12, Oct. 18, 1983). Thereafter, he ran away but Alfredo Dollantes, Pedro Dollantes and Danny
Esteban stoned him because they intended to kill him also. He also testified that when he returned to
the crime scene, he saw Hugo Grengia, Danny Esteban and companions simultaneously kicking the
dead body and shouting "who is brave among here. "
Marciana Gabutero, the wife of the victim funy corroborated the testimonies of Garol and Cero. She
also added that Hugo Grengia wanted to be a Barangay Captain and she happened to know that as
a fact, because he told the crowd not to long as Barangay Captain. She also testified that the
accused Leonilo Villaester splashed one glass of tuba on the face of the deceased and that the
victim had had a misunderstanding with the Dollantes on a theft case involving Hamlet Dollantes
(Rollo, pp. 68-69).
It will be noted that the above witnesses were categorical and straightforward when they stated that
they saw appellants stab the victim. They even specified the type of weapon used by each of said
appellants.
There is no possibility that they could have been mistaken in their Identification for apart from being
near the crime scene which was well illuminated with two Petromax lamps (TSN, page 6, Oct. 19,
1983), these witnesses are familiar with the appellants since they are all residents of the same
locality. Furthermore, there is no showing that the witnesses had any motive to testify falsely against
the appellants.
In fact, under similar circumstances, the Court has held that where the scene of the stabbing was
clearly lighted and no motive was shown why prosecution witnesses would incriminate the
appellants, identification would be given full faith and credit (People v. Escoltero, 139 SCRA 218).
The theory of the defense in this case is that it was only the accused Hamlet Dollantes who stabbed
the victim while the other accused did not participate in the stabbing incident (Rollo, pp. 75-76).
In an attempt to disprove the findings of the trial court, appellants pointed out that there are certain
inconsistencies that render the testimonies of prosecution witnesses, incredible.
For one thing they claim that Dionilo Garol could not have een Hamlet Dollantes stab the victim
because as Garol himself stated, when said accused rushed towards the victim, he ran away. The
evidence shows however, that Garol clearly testified that he saw au of them stab the Barrio Captain,
one after another and it was only after the Barrio Captain fell to the ground that he ran towards the
municipal hall to report the incident to the police (TSN, page 11, Oct. 17, 1983).
Another circumstance allegedly raising grave doubts on the credibility of Dionilo Garol was his failure
to report to the police authorities the fact of stoning (Rollo, pp. 71-72).
However, the fact of stoning was not the means used to kill the victim and the omission of the same
in the narration in the report does not detract from the established fact that the victim was stabbed
several times which caused his death.
It was also pointed out that Dionilo Garol testified that the store of the victim's wife was stoned while
Bonifacio Cero also testified that he was the one being stoned.
There appears to be no inconsistency between the two testimonies. The fact that the store of the
victim's wife was stoned does not preclude the possibility that Bonifacio Cero was also stoned.
Finally, appellants maintain that Bonifacio Cero could not have seen with precision the stabbing of
the victim while he was being hugged by Danny Esteban and he had a feeling that he would be killed
by the group. Much less could it be possiblefor accused Danny Esteban, Leonflo Villaester, Sidrito
Lokesio and Alfredo Dollantes who were at the store of Severina Cadillero, to join in stabbing the
victim, the appellants argued (Rollo, pp. 73-74).
The records show that Cero testified that he saw appellants stab the deceased before he was
embraced by appellant Danny Esteban who told him "do not interfere you are not a party to this. We
have already gotten what we have been aiming for." (TSN, page 12, Oct. 18, 1983). Clearly, the
language is unmistakable that in that at said point, the stabbing and the killing being described by all
the witnesses had already been accomphshed.
Indeed, if there be any inconsistency or contradictions in their testimonies, the same are trivial and
merely refer to minor matters which do not affect credibility. They do not detract from the essential
facts or vital details of the crime pinpointing their criminal responsibility (Appellee's Brief, p. 16). As
held by this Court, discrepancies in minor details are to be expected from an uncoached witness
(People v. Arbois, 138 SCRA 31). Such minor variations would rather show the sincerity of the
witnesses and the absence of connivance between them to make their testimonies tally in every
respect (People v. Pielago, 140 SCRA 419, 423). Truth to tell, such trivial differences constitute fail-
safe reliability.
Accused Hugo Grengia claims that the trial court erred in not giving weight to the admission of
accused Hamlet Dollantes that he was the lone perpetrator of the killing incident (Brief for Accused-
Appellant Hugo Grengia, p. 7). Thus the defense argues that the accused Pedro Dollantes, Alfredo
Dollantes, Merlando Dollantes, Lauro Dollantes, Sidrito Lokesio, Monico Dollantes and Leonilo
Villaester, did not stab the victim and were not at the scene of the crime and that it was only accused
Hamlet Dollantes who stabbed the victim.
As found by the trial court, such claim is not supported by sufficient evidence. On the contrary, an
entry in the Police Logbook (Exhibit "D") of the Integrated National Police of Tayasan, Negros
Oriental, shows that one Gloria Callao, wife of the accused Lauro Dollantes, turned over to the police
two (2) hunting knives owned by the accused Hamlet Dollantes and Alfredo Dollantes. Moreover, as
correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General, such theory is behed by the Identification made by the
prosecution witnesses and by the number and location of the victim's wounds which are mute
evidence that several persons comn)itted the crime (People's Brief, p. 17).
As repeatedly held by the Supreme Court, the claim of alibi by the accused cannot prevail over
positive Identification by credible witnesses (People v. Tirol, 102 SCRA 58); more so where as in the
case at bar, it was not demonstrated that it was physically impossible for the accused to have been
at the scene of said crime at the time of its commission (People v. Mercado, 97 SCRA 232).
On the other hand, the claim of Hamlet Dollantes of self-defense when he stabbed the victim is not
sustained by the records. As found by the trial court, the victim was not armed at the time of the
incident, so that there was no danger to the life and limb of the accused. The latter claims that he
had to stab the victim who boxed him and would not release his wounded hand (Rollo, p. 76). Apart
from the obvious disproportion of the means used to repel the alleged attack, three witnesses of the
prosecution testified that the accused Hamlet Dollantes rushed towards the victim and stabbed the
latter at the back. Said testimonies were corroborated by the Post Mortem Examination (Exhibit "A")
and the Sketch (Exhibit "B") of the human body of the victim which showed a stab wound at the
back. Furthermore, the nature, character, location and extent of the wound suffered by the victim,
negates the accused's claim of self-defense. (People v. Tolentino, 54 Phil. 77). In fact, the eleven
(11) wounds suffered by "he victim are indicative of aggression (People v. Somera, 83 Phil. 548;
People v. Mendoza, L-16392, Jan. 30, 1965).
Accused-appellant Hugo Grengia submits that the prosecution failed to prove the existence of
conspiracy. Among others, he pointed out that he was unarmed at the time of the incident, that his
name was not mentioned in the report made by Dionilo Garol to Patrolman Barrera as to the
perpetrators of the crime; that his name was not included in the entry in the police logbook of the
Integrated National Police of Tayasan, Negros Oriental and that he had no participation in the
commission ofthe felony except the alleged nodding of his head at a time when he was trying to
wrest the knife from Pedro Dollantes which is not an indication of conspiracy (Brief for Grengia, pp.
13-16).
While it is true that the accused Hugo Grengia, Danny Esteban and Leonilo Villaester did not
participate in the stabbing, the lower court finds them equally liable as principals with the other
accused in this case. They were found to be holding stones which they threw at the store owned by
the victim and his wife; they participated in kicking and dancing around the dead body of the
Barangay Captain and although Grengia also tried to wrest the knife from Pedro Dollantes, he
clearly told Dionilo Garol when the latter succeeded in getting the knife and was holding the hands of
Pedro Dollantes, "do not try to intervene here because you might be included in the plan." (TSN, pp.
7-10, Octoer 17, 1983). Danny Esteban uttered the same statements to Bonifacio Cero, saying "do
not try to interfere you are not a party to this. We have already gotten what we have been aiming or."
(TSN, pp. 9-14, October 18,1983).
Furthermore, as previously stated, while the victim was delivering a speech, Hugo Grengia was
telumg people not to listen to the victim as he will not stay long as a Barangay Captain. It is also to
be noted that although he was a compadre of the victim, he never tried to help the former while he
was being stabbed and after the incident, he never visited the victim's family.
The accused Hugo Grengia, Danny Esteban and Leonilo Villaester by their acts, aimed at
the same object, and their acts, though apparently independent, are in fact concerted and
cooperative, indicating closeness of personal association, concerted action and concurrence
of sentiments. The conduct of the defendants, before, during and after the commission of the
crime clearly shows that they acted in concert. (People v. Emilio Agag, L-64951, June 29,
1984, Justice Relova) There being conspiracy, the Court finds them guilty of Murder.
(Decision, Crim. Case No. 5832, Rollo p. 77)
In one case, this Court held "that while the acts done by the petitioners herein vary from those of
their co-accused, there is no question that they were all prompted and linked by a common desire to
assault and retaliate against the group..... Thus, they must share equal liability for all the acts done
by the participants in the felonious undertaking." (Pring v. Court of Appeals, 138 SCRA 185-186
[1985]).
Appellant Hugo Grengia lays much stress on the testimony of Dr. Rogeho Kho that it is possible that
all the stab wounds were inflicted by the same weapon, in a desperate effort to show that only one
person committed the crime and that there is no conspiracy.
The records show however, that said Doctor merely replied to he questions propounded by the
defense lawyer as to the different possibilities on how the wounds of the victim may have been
inflicted. But testifying specifically on the case at bar, he categorically stated that actually the
wounds could be produced by a single bladed weapon with different sizes but not necessarily only a
single bladed weapon.
Atty. Jayme:
Q Basing upon your physical findings, Doc, upon the victim Marcos Gabutero, is it
possible Doc, that in accordance with your drawing that the wounds inflicted was
caused by a single bladed weapon, is it possible, Doctor, that this wound was caused
by a single bladed weapon? Is it possible that this. I repeat the question, your Honor.
Q According to your drawing which is labelled "BS" which according to you "blunt and
sharp bladed weapon which is practically single bladed weapon, according to your
physical findings there is similarly in the weapons used, could we say practically,
Doctor, that these stab wounds as well as those incised wounds may be caused by
one single-bladed weapon?
A Actually it could be produced by a single bladed weapon with different sizes but not
necessarily only a single bladed weapon.
Q According to you it was a single bladed weapon with different or several sizes,
now, what is your honest observation upon your physical findings, what will be
themaximum weapon used? I have here a zerox copy for your own reference.
A With respect to the length of the wound there are two wounds that have three em.
in length, it could be possible that the same kind of weapon or instrument has been
used. This refers to Wounds Nos.10 and 11. By the way, Sir, this refers to the stab
wounds because the size of the incised wounds is difficult to determine.
Atty. Jayme:
A It's hard to determine Wound No. 9 because the length is not indicated here, so it
is possible that there are 3 or 4 kinds of instrument or weapons being used. (TSN,
pp. 26- 27, December 15, 1983)
Appellant Hugo Garcia also emphasizes the testimony of Dr. Kho that the latter did not observe any
contusions on the body of the deceased, obviously to disprove that appellants danceda round and
kicked the body after the victim was slain.
As correctly observed by the Solicitor General, "although the examining doctor failed to find any
contusion or abrasion on the cadaver of the victim, nevertheless, such absence is not conclusive
proof that appellants did not kick the deceased. It might be possible that kicks did not cause or
produce contusions or abrasions or that they were not noticed by the doctor." (Appellee's Brief, p.
22). Moreover, the fact of dancing and kicking complained of, is only one of the acts showing
conspiracy, without which, conspiracy cannot be said not to have been established.
The lower court also found that treachery was present in the commission of the crime, and that the
accused Alfredo Dollantes, Lauro Dollantes, Monico Dollantes, Sidrito Lokesio and Merlando
Dollantes are as equally guilty as principals by direct participation. These accused took turns in
stabbing the victim. In fact the victim was caught by surprise and did not have time to defend
himself.
Finally, the records show that the Barangay Captain was in the act of trying to pacify Pedro
Dollantes who was making trouble in the dance hall when he was stabbed to death. He was
therefore killed while in the performance of his duties. In the case of People v. Hecto (135 SCRA
113), this Court ruled that "As the barangay captain, it was his duty to enforce the laws and
ordinances within the barangay. If in the enforcement thereof, he incurs, the enmity of his people
who thereafter treacherously slew him the crime committed is murder with assault upon a person in
authority."
There is no qeustion that the trial court's conclusions on credibilitY of witnesses are entitled to great
weight on appeal. (People v. Oliverio, 120 SCRA 22). After a careful review of the records, no
plausible reason could be found to disturb the findings of fact and of law of the lower court in this
case.
Fernan (Chairman), Gutierrez, Jr., Padilla, Bidin and Cortes, JJ., concur.
42 Phil. 886
JOHNSON, J.:
This is an original petition, filed in this court, for the writs of induction and
prohibition. It appears from the record that on April 30, 1919, one Ramon
Gayanilo, corporal of the Philippine Constabulary, presented to the judge of
the Court of First Instance of Iloilo an application for search warrant, the
said Ramon Gayanilo stating in his application; "That in the house of Chino
Uy Kheytin, Sto. Nino St., No. 20, Iloilo, under the writing desk in his store,
there is kept a certain amount of opium." The application was subscribed
and sworn to by the said complainant before the Honorable L. M.
Southworth, judge of the Twenty-third Judicial District.
Upon that application the said judge, on the same day, issued a search
warrant in the following terms:
"No. 3.-One wrap of paper containing an opium pipe, complete, one opium
container, one wrap of opium ashes, one rag soaked in opium and one
thimble with opium.
"No. 4.-One leather hand bag containing 7 small bottles containing opium,
with two cedulas belonging to Tian Liong, with key.
"No. 6.-One tin box containing 23 small empty cans, opium containers.
"No. 7.-One cardboard box containing 3 pieces of wood, one old chisel, one
file, one piece of soldering lead, one box of matches, 5 pieces of iron plates,
and several other tin plates.
"No. 15.-One tin box containing 60 cans of molasses, with 1 small bottle
containing molasses."
Thereafter a criminal complaint was filed in the court of the justice of
the peace of Iloilo against all the petitioners herein, charging them with a
violation of the Opium Law. They were duly arrested, and a preliminary
investigation was conducted by the justice of the peace, after which he
found that there was probable cause for believing that the crime
complained of had been committed and that the defendants were the
persons responsible therefor. The cause was duly transmitted to the Court
of First Instance.
While said cause was in the Court of First Instance, pending the filing of a
complaint by the provincial fiscal, the defendants, petitioners herein,
through their attorney, filed a petition in the Court of First Instance, asking
for the return of "private papers, books and other property" which the
Constabulary officers had seized from said defendants, upon the ground
that they had been so seized illegally and in violation of the constitutional
rights of the defendants. It was urged (1) that the search warrant of April
30th was illegal because the requisites prescribed by the General Orders
No. 58 had not been complied with in its issuance; (2) that the searches and
seizures made on May 1st had been made without any semblance of
authority and hence illegal; and (3) that the seizure of the defendants'
books and letters was a violation of the provisions of the Jones Law
providing that no person shall be compelled to testify against himself, and
protecting him against unreasonable searches and seizures.
After a hearing upon said motion, the Honorable Antonio Villareal, judge,
in a very carefully prepared opinion, reached the conclusion that the
searches and seizures, complained of had been legally made, and
consequently, denied the defendants' petition.
Thereafter and on November 22, 1919, the said defendants, petitioners
herein, filed the present petition in this court, praying as follows:
"First, restraining the respondent judge, and his successors from making
any cognizance of any action of any kind which has or may be brought
against these petitioners which have resulted directly or indirectly from the
unlawful searches and seizures above-mentioned;
The petitioners contend that the search warrant of April 30, 1919, was
illegal, (1) because it was not issued upon either of the grounds mentioned
in section 96 of General Orders No. 58, and (2) because the judge who
issued it did not determine the probable cause by examining witnesses
under oath, as required by section 98 of said General Orders No. 58.
"Sec. 96. It (a search warrant) may be issued upon either of the following
grounds:
"2. When it was used or when the intent exists to use it as the means of
committing a felony."
In support of their first contention the petitioners argue that the property
ordered to be seized, namely, opium under the said search warrant, had not
been stolen or embezzled, nor had it been used or intended to be used as
the means of committing a felony; that the word "felony" is applicable only
to a serious crime which is malum per se and not to one which is
merely malum prohibitum, such as the possession of opium.
"SEC. 98. The judge or justice must, before issuing the warrant, examine on
oath the complainant and any witnesses he may produce and take their
depositions in writing."
Section 97 provides that "a search warrant shall not issue except for
probable cause" and section 98 above quoted provides the manner in which
that probable cause shall be determined by the judge issuing the
warrant. In the present case, however, the judge did not examine any
witness under oath but relied solely upon the sworn application of the
Constabulary officer in determining whether; there was probable cause. In
that application the complainant swore positively: "That in the house of
Chino, Uy Kheytin, Sto. Nino St., No. 20, Iloilo, under the writing desk in
his store, there is kept a certain amount of opium." This statement was
found to be true by the subsequent finding and seizure of a considerable
quantity of opium in the place mentioned. The question now is, whether
the omission of the judge to comply with the requirements of section 98
would, under the circumstances, justify the court in declaring that the
search warrant in question was illegal and ordering the return of the opium
found and seized under said warrant.
"That no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, supported by oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the
person or thing to be seized."
A person, then, is protected from unreasonable arrests just as much as he is
protected from unreasonable searches. But suppose he happened to be
arrested without any warrant, or upon a warrant which had been issued by
a judge without first properly determining whether there was probable
cause, and upon investigation it should be found, from his own admissions,
that he was the author of the crime,-should he be released upon the ground
that he had not been legally arrested? In the case of Ker vs. Illinois (119 U.
S., 436) Ker having committed the crime of larceny, escaped and went to
Peru. He was kidnapped in Peru and brought back to the State of Illinois
without any pretense of authority. Passing upon the question of the
constitutionality of the arrest of Ker, the Supreme Court of the United
States, speaking through Mr. Justice Miller, said:
"We do not intend to say that there may not be proceedings previous to the
trial in regard to which the prisoner could invoke in some manner the
provisions of this clause of the Constitution; but for mere irregularities in
the manner in which he may be brought into the custody of the law, we do
not think he is entitled to say that he should not be tried at all for the crime
with which he is charged in a regular indictment. He may be arrested for a
very heinous offense by persons without any warrant, or without any
previous complaint, and brought before a proper officer, and this may be in
some sense said to be 'withuot due process of law.' But it would hardly be
claimed that after the case had been investigated, and the defendant held by
the proper authorities to answer for the crime, he could plead that he was
first arrested 'without due proces of law.'" (Followed in U. S. vs. Grant and
Kennedy, 18 Phil., 122, 146; U. S. vs. Wilson, 4 Phil., 317.)
In the present case there was an irregularity in the issuance of the search
warrant in question in that the judge did not first examine the complainant
or any witnesses under oath, as required by section 98 of General Orders
No. 58. But the property sought to be searched for and seized having been
actually found in the place described by the complainant, reasoning by
analogy from the case of an improper arrest, we are of the opinion that that
irregularity is not sufficient cause for ordering the return of the opium
found and seized under said warrant, to the petitioners, and exonerating
the latter.
II
Petitioners contend that this was made without any search warrant and
without any authority of law; that the search warrant of April 30th could
not be used on May 1st because that warrant had been executed on the day
of its issuance. In support of this contention counsel for the petitioners, in
the lower court, argued that:
"While it is true that a warrant is good for 10 days after the date of issuance,
this cannot be interpreted to mean that a search warrant can be used
every day for 10 days, and for a different purpose each day. This would be
absurd. It is admitted, for sake of argument, that if upon a search, under a
legally issued warrant, some other prohibited articles than those named in
the warrant should be found, these articles might be seized. Also, it might
possibly be true, that if a warrant was issued to search for a certain article
and it was not found after the first search, that another search could be
made sometime within the 10 days. But this is certainly the furthest
possible extreme the doctrine could be carried. It certainly could not be
interpreted to allow a search to be made, and after the articles for which the
warrant was issued had been seized, to use this same warrant as authority
to make another search."
We agree with counsel that a search warrant cannot be used every day for
ten days, "and for a different purpose each day," and that after the articles
for which the warrant was issued have been seized the same warrant
cannot be used as authority to make another search. But this argument is
not applicable to the facts in this case. It appears from the oral evidence
adduced during the hearing of the petitioners' motion in the court below
that the search for opium, the property mentioned in the warrant, was not
completed on April 30th; it was interrupted by the necessity to ascertain
who the owner of the bodega on the ground-floor was, because the
petitioner Uy Kheytin falsely disclaimed ownership thereof. In other
words, the search of May 1st was not made "for a different purpose," nor
could it be considered "another search," but was really a continuation of the
search begun on April 30th. This is shown by the fact that during the
interval between the two searches the premises in question were guarded
by Constabulary soldiers, and the petitioners were made to understand on
April 30th that the authorities were not yet through with the search and
would continue the same as soon as they found out that the bodega was
also occupied by the petitioner Uy Kheytin. We are, therefore, of the
opinion that the search made on May 1st was authorized under the search
warrant of April 30th.
III
"We have said that if the officer follows the command of his warrant, he is
protected; and this is so even when the complaint proves to have been
unfounded. But if he exceed the command by searching in places not
described therein, or by seizing persons or articles not commanded, he is
not protected by the warrant, and can only justify himself as in other cases
where he assumes to act without process. Obeying strictly the command of
his warrant, he may break open outer or inner doors, and his justification
does not depend upon his discovering that for which he is to make
search." (Cooley on Constitutional Limitations, 7th ed., p. 434.)
That the officers of the law believed that the books, papers, etc., which they
seized might be used as evidence against the petitioners herein in a
criminal action against them for a violation of the Opium Law, is no reason
or justification under the law for the seizure: First, because they were not
"particularly described" or even mentioned in the search warrant; second,
because, even if they had been mentioned in the search warrant, they could
not be legally seized, for a search warrant cannot be used for the purpose of
obtaining evidence; and third, because to compel a person to produce his
private papers to be used in evidence against him would be equivalent to
compelling him to be a witness against himself.
1. The authorities for the first proposition have already been given
above.
3. In the case of Boyd vs. United States (116 U. S., 616), the Supreme
Court of the United States, speaking through Mr. Justice Bradley,
said:
"Both amendments (fourth and fifth) relate to the personal security of the
citizen. They nearly run into and mutually throw light upon each
other. When the thing forbidden in the Fifth Amendment, namely,
compelling a man to be a witness against himself, is the object of a search
and seizure of his private papers, it is an 'unreasonable search and seizure'
within the Fourth Amendment.
"Search and seizure of a man's private papers to be used in evidence for the
purpose of convicting him of a crime, recovering a penalty, or of forfeiting
his property, is totally different from the search and seizure of stolen goods,
dutiable articles on which the duties have not been paid, and the like, which
rightfully belong to the custody of the law." (See also Silverthorne Lumber
Co. vs.United States, decided Jan. 26, 1920, by the Supreme Court of the
United States.)
2. That the search made on May 1st was a continuation of the search
begun on the previous day, and, therefore, did not require another
search warrant.
AVANCEÑA, J.,
I concur with the decision except as to the part which declares that the
search warrant was irregularly issued.
"The judge or justice must, before issuing the warrant, examine on oath the
complainant and any witnesses he may produce and take their depositions
in writing."
"If the judge or justice is thereupon satisfied of the existence of facts upon
which the application is based, or that there is probable cause to believe
that they exist, he must issue the warrant, which must be substantially in
the following form:
"..............................................}
"Province of...........................}
"Proof, by affidavit, having this day been made before me by, etc. etc."
"In the present case there was an irregularity in the issuance of the search
warrant in question in that the judge did not first examine the complainant
or any witnesses under oath, as required by section 98 of General Orders
No. 58. But the property sought to be searched for and seized having been
actually found in the place described by the complainant, reasoning by
analogy from the case of an improper arrest, we are of the opinion that that
irregularity is not sufficient cause for ordering the return of the opium
found and seized under said warrant, to the petitioners, and exonerating
the latter."
Judging from the quantity of opium captured, all the articles mentioned in
the decision were used by the petitioners for unlawful purposes; i. e., the
carrying on of a trade in opium. Liquid opium is necessarily put up in
bottles and other small receptacles, and it would seem that the metal found
was for making small containers for the opium. The writer does not know
why the molasses was present, but it is most frequently present where
inhere is any considerable quantity of opium found.
It would seem that what petitioners really want are the Chinese account
book and the letters, and the reason for their ardent desire to get them can
easily be imagined.
We must follow the decisions quoted, and hold that this book and the
letters should be returned, and to this I agree, but we must assume that
everything else was used in and about the sale of opium, and they should
not be returned.
EN BANC
MAPA, J.:
On the 8th of February, 1911, the provincial fiscal of Misamis, Agusan, and Surigao presented
against the defendant a complaint of the following purport:
The undersigned charged of Cayetano Ramayrat with the crime of gross disobedience to the
authorities, committed as follows:
That, on February 1, 1910, who Sabino Vayson filed suit against Cayetano Ramayrat, in the
justice of the peace court of Misamis (Exhibit A), for the recovery of possession of a parcel of
land belonging to the said Sabino Vayson; that, on March 9, 1910, the said justice of the
peace court rendered judgment by sentencing the said Cayetano Ramayrat to deliver the
possession of the said land to the plaintiff, Sabino Vayson (Exhibit B); that, when Cosme
Nonoy, the deputy sheriff of the municipality of Misamis, demanded of the defendant,
Cayetano Ramayrat, on April 29, 1910, in this municipality of Misamis, Province of Misamis,
within the jurisdiction of this court, that he deliver the said land to the plaintiff, Sabino
Vayson, the said defendant, Cayetano Ramayrat, voluntarily, unlawfully and criminally
refused, and still refuses, to deliver the said land to the aforementioned Sabino Vayson. The
exhibits A, B, and C form an integral part of this complaint. Said crime was committed in
violation of the law and, particularly, of article 252 of the Penal Code.
The exhibits mentioned in the complaint and which are made an integral part thereof, are,
respectively, of the following tenor:
EXHIBIT A.
1. That both are natives and residents of the municipality of Misamis, Province of Misamis,
P.I.
2. That in or about the year 1895 the defendant asked permission of the plaintiff to erect a
house on the latter's land (the plaintiff's property) situated in the barrio of Mindug of this
district, under the condition that he, the defendant, would plant the said land in accounts and
divide in equal shares with the plaintiff the trees that should survive.
He prays the court render judgment in his favor by sentencing the defendant to return the
said land to him and to pay the costs of this suit.
JOSE VAYSON,
Counsel for the plaintiff.
EXHIBIT B.
JUDGMENT.
Complaint filed. Judgment rendered in favor of the plaintiff by sentencing the defendant to
make the return and to pay the costs of the case.
ANDRES PACIENTE,
Auxiliary Justice of the Peace.
EXHIBIT C—1.
In the justice of the peace court of Misamis, Province of Misamis, P.I. Sabino
Vayson, plaintiff, vs. Cayetano Ramayrat, defendant. Case No. 112.
WRIT OF EXECUTION.
To the governor, sheriff, or to any other person authorized by law to serve writs.
Greeting:
Whereas, on March 9, 1910, judgment was rendered against Cayetano Ramayrat, the
defendant in the present case, in an action prosecuted before the justice of the peace court
of this municipality of Misamis by Sabino Vayson, the plaintiff in this case, by sentencing the
said defendant to return to the latter a parcel of unirrigated land situated in the sitio of
Mindug, a district of this municipality.
Therefore, you are ordered to place the plaintiff, Sabino Vayson, in possession of the said
land and to make return of this writ to this court within a period of fifteen days from the date
hereof.
Failure to comply with this order will subject you to the penalties of the law.
TIBURCIO K. SORIANO,
Justice of the Peace.
EXHIBIT C-2.
I, Cayetano Ramayrat, the undersigned, certify that I am not willing to deliver to Sabino
Vayson or to the deputy sheriff of this municipality, Cosme Nonoy, the land in my
possession, as I have been directed to do by the said sheriff, in order that, in the latter case,
he might deliver the same to the aforementioned Vayson, in conformity with the order issued
by the justice of the peace of this municipality.
CAYETANO RAMAYRAT.
2. That, in the complaint, allegations are made which, if true, would be a justification and legal
exemption for the defendant.
By an order of February 9, 1911, the court sustained the demurrer interposed by the defense and
therefore dismissed the complaint, with the costs de oficio. From this order an appeal has been
taken by the Attorney-General.
Virtually, it is stated in the order appealed from that the defendant grossly disobeyed the order of the
justice of the peace court (Exhibits B and C) to deliver the land in question to Sabino Vayson; that
such disobedience, were it punishable, would fall within the sanction of the sections 232 and 236 of
Act No. 190 (Code of Procedure in Civil Actions), and not article 252 of the Penal Code, which latter
in the opinion of the court, was repealed by the two former, in so far as it be incompatible therewith;
and that, inasmuch as the said sections of Act No. 190 punish the disobedience to judicial orders
only when these latter are legal, and that the order herein concerned of the justice of the peace is
manifestly illegal, the result follows as a necessary conclusion, according to the trial judge, that the
disobedience charged to the defendant in the complaint does not constitute a penally actionable
matter, pursuant to the law. And it is said in the same order appealed from that the aforementioned
order of the justice of the peace is illegal for the reason that it was issued in an action brought for the
recovery of possession of land, which could not validly be heard by a justice of the peace court, as
such classes of actions come exclusively within the jurisdiction of the Courts of First Instance.
Section 232 of Act No. 190, cited in the order appealed from, provides, in part, as follows:
SEC. 232. What other acts are contempts of court. — A person guilty of any of the following
acts may be punished as for contempt:
(a) Disobedience of, or resistance to, a lawful writ, process, order, judgment, or command of
a court, or injunction granted by a court or judge;
Section 236 penalizes such acts of contempt with a fine that shall not exceed one thousand pesos,
or imprisonment of not more that six months, or both, in the discretion of the court.
Article 252 of the Penal Code, cited in the complaint and which the trial court held to be repealed by
the said sections of the Code of Civil Procedure, is as follows:
ART. 252. The persons who, without being included in article 249, should resist the
authorities, or their agents, or should grossly disobey them in the performance of the duties
of their office, shall be punished with the penalties of arresto mayor and a fine of from 325 to
3,250 pesetas.
The Attorney-General alleges as a ground for his appeal that the trial court erred in holding that
disobedience of judicial orders is not comprised within article 252 of the Penal Code and that this
article was repealed by sections 232 and 236 of the Code of Civil Procedure, in so far as it was
incompatible therewith.
In view of the opinion we have formed of the facts alleged in the complaint, it becomes unnecessary
for us to decide the aforementioned questions set up in the Attorney-General's brief. We do not think
that the defendant disobeyed any judicial order whatever. The order issued by the justice of the
peace (Exhibit C) and alleged to have to have been disobeyed, is a writ of execution and addressed,
as was natural and proper, to the competent sheriff, and not to the defendant. In it the sheriff is
commanded to place the plaintiff, Sabino Vayson, who had won in the suit against the herein
defendant for the recovery of the property, in possession of the said disputed land. Such command
is made solely and exclusively to the sheriff, and not to the defendant. Absolutely no order
whatsoever is made to the latter; nothing is demanded on him and he is not restrained from doing
anything, neither is he required to do anything; he is not told to perform, or not to perform, any act
whatsoever; in a word, the writ or order in question in no wise refers to him. Nor could this process,
indeed, be addressed to the defendant, for the reason that it wholly concerns the execution of a
judgment, the serving of which is specially and exclusively incumbent upon the sheriff. And it is
superfluous to add that the defendant could hardly disobey an order that in no wise concerned him.
The order itself leaves to this be clearly understood by warning the sheriff, and no one else, that he
shall be liable to the penalties of the law in case of noncompliance. "Failure to comply with this
order," it says literally, "will subject you," the sheriff, "to the penalties of the law." The warning is
solely for the sheriff, because the writ must be served by him, and he alone it was who could fail to
comply with or disobey it.
But, while the defendant did not disobey the said writ of execution, may it be said that he disobeyed
the sentence of the justice of the peace who ordered that he restore the disputed land to the plaintiff,
Vayson? It is contended by the Attorney-General in his brief that he did. He says that the act
performed by the defendant in setting forth in Exhibit C-2 that he was not willing to deliver the land to
Vayson was one of the disobedience to the said sentence. This may be true, and undoubtedly is, in
a certain sense, — in the same sense that it may be said that he who infringes or violates any law
passed by the legislative power disobeys its authority; or that the defendant who refuses to
surrender himself voluntarily and of his own free accord to the prison authorities for the purpose of
serving his sentence disobeys the sentence that imposes imprisonment upon him. But this is not the
disobedience that is punished as a crime by article 252 of the Penal Code. The juridical conception
of this crime consists in a failure to comply with orders directly issued by the authorities in the
exercise of their official duties, and not with legal provisions of a general character, nor with judicial
decisions merely declaratory of rights or obligations, such as those proper to be rendered in a civil
suit relative to property or possession of land, like that which gave rise to the present controversy.
Nor even do the violations of prohibitory decisions, although undoubtedly of a more serious
character, constitute the crime of disobedience to the authorities provided for and punished by the
aforecited article of the Penal Code, for they give rise only to a civil action. (Decisions of the
supreme court of Spain of September 25 and October 4, 1889, and June 30, 1893.)
The judgment of the justice of the peace which is supposed to have been disobeyed, orders, it is
true, the herein defendant to return the land, the subject of the suit, to the plaintiff, Vayson, but it
does not order him, nor could it legally order him, to effect the return himself. As hereinbefore stated,
this is the duty of the sheriff, to whom the law entrusts the execution of judgments.
The Code of Civil Procedures contains the following provisions with respect to writs of execution:
SEC. 443. When execution may issue. — The party in whose favor judgment is given, may,
at any time within five years after the entry thereof have a writ of execution issued for its
enforcement, as hereinafter provided.
SEC. 444. Issuance, form, and requisites of execution. — The execution must be issued in
the name of the United States of America, Philippine Islands, sealed with the seal of the
court, and subscribed by the judge, or clerk thereof, and be directed to the governor of the
province, or any of his deputies, and must intelligibly refer to the judgment, stating the court,
and the province where the record of the judgment is . . . , and must direct the governor or
his deputy, substantially as follows:
(e) If it be for the delivery of the possession of real or personal property, it must require the
governor, or his deputy, to deliver the possession of the same, describing it, to the party
entitled thereto. . . .
According to these sections, it is exclusively incumbent upon the sheriff to execute, to carry out the
mandates of the judgment in question, and, in fact, it was he himself, and he alone, who was
ordered by the justice of the peace who rendered that judgment, to place the plaintiff, Vayson, in
possession of the land. The defendant in this case had nothing to do with that delivery of
possession, and, consequently, his statements expressing his refusal or unwillingness to effect the
same, are entirely officious and impertinent and therefore could not hinder, and much less prevent,
the delivery being made, had the sheriff known how to comply with his duty. It was solely due to the
latter's fault, and not to the alleged disobedience of the defendant, that the judgment was not duly
executed. For that purpose the sheriff could even have availed himself of the public force, had it
been necessary to resort thereto.
The Attorney-General brings up still another aspect of the case. He states in his brief that the
defendant grossly disobeyed an agent of the authorities, such as is the sheriff, by not delivering the
land to Vayson, as he was ordered to do by the said sheriff. In accordance with article 252 of the
Penal Code, disobedience to the agents of the authorities is punishable only when they are in the
exercise of the duties that particularly pertain to their office. As aforesaid, the duty of the sheriff in
the present case was to place Vayson in possession of the land. Instead of so doing, he limited his
action to telling or ordering the defendant to deliver the land to the said Vayson. In acting in this
wise, not only did he fail duly to discharge his official duty, but he openly neglected to perform the
same. He had no right whatever to require that the defendant should perform a duty which he
himself ought to have performed: to do so, would be tantamount to imposing one's own duties upon
another, which, evidently, would be illegal and unjust. Under such circumstances, the defendant's
disobedience, if any there were, does not constitute the crime aforementioned.
Upon the foregoing grounds we hold that the facts alleged in the complaint do not constitute a crime;
we, therefore, affirm the order appealed from, with the costs de oficio.
Separate Opinions
I concur. I think it proper, however, to indicate that as I understand it, the majority opinion is not to be
construed as holding that defendant would not have been guilty of the offense defined and penalized
in article 252 of the Penal Code he refused to surrender possession of the property to the sheriff
himself, upon demand therefor, in order that the sheriff might give possession to the person entitled
thereto as indicated in the writ.
29. U.S. v. Bautista, G.R. No. L-10678, 1915
EN BANC
JOHNSON, J.:
This defendant was charged with the crime of assault upon agents of the authorities and insulting
them. Upon said complaint the defendant was arrested, arraigned, tried, found guilty, and sentenced
by the Honorable Vicente Nepomuceno to be imprisoned for a period of four years two months and
one day of prision correccional, with the accessory penalties of article 61 of the Penal Code, to pay a
fine of P300, and in case of insolvency to suffer subsidiary imprisonment, in accordance with the
provisions of the law, and to pay the costs. From that sentence the defendant appealed to this court.
In this court the appellant alleges that the evidence adduced during the trial of the cause was not
sufficient to show that he was guilty of the crime charged in the complaint.
The record shows that some time in the month of November, 1914, an order of arrest was issued for
the defendant and placed in the hands of the chief of police of the municipality of Gerona. On or
about the 15th of November, the chief of police, accompanied by another policeman, went to the
house where the defendant was staying for the purpose of making the arrest. Upon arrival at the
house, inquiry was made of some of the occupants whether or not the defendant was there. Upon
being informed that he was in the house, the policeman who accompanied the chief of police
entered the house without permission and attempted to arrest the defendant without explaining to
him the cause or nature of his presence there. The defendant, according to the declaration of the
chief of police, resisted the arrest, calling to his neighbors for assistance, using the following
language: "Come here; there are some bandits here and they are abusing me." Many of his
neighbors, hearing his cry, according to the testimony of the chief of police, immediately came to his
assistance and surrounded his house.
The policeman, who accompanied the chief, in his declaration said that when he attempted to arrest
the defendant, the defendant said to him: "Why do you enter my house, you shameless brigands?"
and called to one Basilio, saying:
The policeman further testified that he then informed the defendant that he came there for the
purpose of arresting him, and the defendant asked him if he had an order of arrest, which question
was answered by the policeman in the affirmative. Said policeman further testified that immediately
after he had notified the defendant that he was a policeman and had an order of arrest, the
defendant submitted to the arrest without further resistance or objection.
The whole record shows that the resistance given by the defendant was done under the belief that
the persons who had entered his house were tulisanes. The record also shows, by the declaration of
the witnesses for the prosecution, that as soon as he had been informed that they were officers of
the law, armed with an order of arrest, he peaceably submitted and accompanied them. We do not
believe that the law contemplates the punishment of persons for resistance of the authorities under
circumstances such as those which are disclosed in the present case. If the defendant believed that
those who had entered his house were, in fact, tulisanes, he was entirely justified in calling his
neighbors and making an attempt to expel them from his premises.
After a careful examination of the evidence, we are of the opinion that the record does not disclose
sufficient facts to justify the sentence imposed by the lower court. The defendant is not guilty of the
crime described in the complaint. The sentence of the lower court is therefore hereby revoked, the
complaint is hereby ordered dismissed, and the defendant is discharged from the custody of the law.
So ordered.
EN BANC
Assistant Solicitor General Ruperto Kapunan. Jr. and Solicitor Jesus A. Avanceña for appellant.
Jose L. Coscolluela, Jr. for appellee.
BENGZON, J.:
This appeal calls for practical application of the principles governing the defense of double jeopardy.
In the Court of First Instance of Cebu, on September 10, 1948. Ladislao Bacolod pleaded guilty to an
informations charging him the crime of serious physical injuries thru reckless imprudence committed
on February 21, 1948 in Santa Fe, same province. Thereafter he was arraigned in another case for
having caused a public disturbance on the same date, the second information alleging.
That on or about the 21st day of February, 1948, in the municipality of Santa Fe, province of
Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed
accused with deliberate intent, and on the occasion of a dance held in the municipal tennis
court in connection with the town fiesta, did then and there wilfully, criminally and feloniously
cause a serious disturbance in a public place by firing a sub-machine gun which wounded
one Consorcia Pasinio, thereby causing panic among the numerous people present in the
said dance who ran and scampered in all directions.
His counsel de oficio moved to quash this second information, invoking double jeopardy by reason of
the first information which for convenience is quoted:
That on or about the 21st day of February, 1948, in the municipality of Santa Fe, province of
Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Court, the above-named accused, then a
member of the PC patrol, by reckless imprudence and without taking due care and
precautions to avoid damage and injury to the life and property of other persons, did then
and there fire a shoot of the sub-machine gun thereby hitting Consorcia Pasinio at the back
of right side of her body which physical injury required or will require medical attendance for
more than 30 days but less than 90, and incapacitated or will incapacitate her from
performing her customary labor for the same period of time.
The motion to quash was granted, and the people appealed in due time.
It will be observed that both informations have one common element: defendant's having fired a sub-
machine gun. The first, however, charged him with physical injuries inflicted on Consorcia Pasinio
thru reckless imprudence. On the other hand the second information accuses him of having
deliberately fired the machine gun to cause a disturbance in the festivity or gathering, thereby
producing panic among the people present therein. The two informations do not describe the same
offense. One is a crime against persons; but the other is an offense against public peace and order.1
The first is punished under article 263 of the Revised Penal Code and the latter under article 153
referring to individuals disturbing public gatherings or peaceful meetings. The proof establishing the
first would not establish the second, it being necessary to show, besides the willful discharge of
firearm, that there was a dance in the tennis court in connection with the town fiesta, and that the
people in attendance became panicky and terrified. The offenses are not the same although they
arose from same act of Ladislao Bacolod. Consequently conviction for the first does not bar trial for
the second.2
A majority of the American courts have held that the offense of unlawful assembly and riot is distinct
from the offense of assault and battery.3
The protection against double jeopardy is only for the same offense. A single act may be an offense
against two different provisions of law and if one provision requires proof of an additional fact which,
the other does not an acquittal or conviction under one does not a bar prosecution under the other.4
It is true that section 9 of Rule 113 prohibits prosecution for any offense which necessarily includes
or is necessarily included in the offense charged, in the former, informations. But it may not be held
that the second offense in this case necessarily included the first, physical injuries is included in a
charge of murder. Neither may it be maintained that every crime of physical injuries necessarily
produces such public disorder as is contemplated by section 153 of the Revised Penal Code. Note
especially that the first information did not describe the festal celebration in which the injuries were
inflicted.
It has been suggested that the new Rules of Court modified the above principles, and the precedent
of People vs. Tarok, 40 Off. Gaz., 3488 is invoked. Enough to state, that this last decision and its
doctrinal innovation has been expressly repudiated in Melo vs. People, 47 Off. Gaz., 4631, with
which our present, views substantially conform.
From the foregoing observations it follows that the court a quo made a mistake in dismissing the
second information. Therefore, the appealed resolution is reversed and the record is remanded for
further proceedings. So ordered.
Paras, C.J., Feria, Pablo, Padilla, Montemayor, Tuason, Reyes and Jugo, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
EN BANC
CASTRO, J.:
The appellant Romeo Doriquez, on August, 28, 1964, was charged with the offense of grave oral
defamation before the Court of First Instance of Iloilo, by virtue of an information which recites: .
That on or about April 22, 1964, in the Municipality of Batad, Province of Iloilo, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Court, the above-named defendant, with deliberate intent of
bringing Attorney Sixto Demaisip into discredit, disrepute and public contempt, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously speak and utter in a loud voice and in the presence
of many persons against the said Attorney Demaisip the following insulting and defamatory
words and expressions to wit: "Tonto ka nga klase sang tao, quin pierde mo ang asunto ko,
nagastohan ako sing linibo sang ulihi nag pabakal ikaw kay Purita; pasuguiron ka P30.00
lang ang nabayad ko pero linibo ang gasto ko," which, translated into English runs as
follows: "You are a foolish class of person, you had to lose my case, I spent thousands of
pesos and later you allowed yourself to be sold to Purita; you had been telling people that I
paid you only P30.00 when I spent thousand of pesos for my case," and other similar words
of import.
Six days later, or on September 3, 1964, the same Doriquez was indicted before the same court for
discharge of firearm, committed, in the language of the information, as follows:
That on or about April 22, 1964, in the Municipality of Batad, Province of Iloilo, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Court, the said accused, armed with a revolver and without
intent to kill, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously discharge twice said
revolver at one Attorney Sixto Demaisip.
Upon arraignment, he pleaded not guilty to the two indictments. On December 3, 1964 he moved to
dismiss both informations, claiming that (1) the court a quo has no jurisdiction over the offense of
grave oral defamation in virtue of Republic Act 3828 which enlarged the original exclusive jurisdiction
of city and municipal courts; and (2) the institution of the criminal action for discharge of firearm
places him in double jeopardy or he had already been in jeopardy once in the municipal court of
Batad, Iloilo which dismissed, without his consent, the information charging him with the offense of
alarm and scandal, allegedly based on the self-same facts relied upon by Fiscal Simeon A. Barranco
in support of the aforesaid information for discharge of firearm.
In its order of March 8, 1965 the court a quo denied the motion to dismiss. The subsequent motion
for reconsideration was likewise denied by the trial court in its order of March 20, 1965. From these
two orders, the present appeal was interposed.
Construing the aforequoted section, this Court has repeatedly and uniformly held that a judgment or
order may be appealed only when it is final — in the sense that it completely disposes of the cause
and definitively adjudicates the respective rights of the parties, leaving thereafter no substantial
proceeding to be had in connection with the case except the proper execution of the judgment or
order; and that, conversely, an interlocutory order or judgment is not appealable for it does not
decide the action with finality and leaves substantial proceedings still to be had.1 It is an elementary
rule of adjective law that an order denying a motion to dismiss is interlocutory, hence not appealable,
because it "does not terminate the proceedings, nor finally dispose of the contentions of the
parties."2 An order, for example, rejecting a motion to dismiss based on lack of jurisdiction3 is
interlocutory because after such denial proceedings of substance are still to be had by the trial court,
such as hearing of the case on the merits and rendition of final judgment.
The latest unequivocal restatement of the rule that interlocutory orders are not appealable was made
in Ramos vs. Ardant Trading Corporation.4 Concluding that the appeal therein was premature, Mr.
Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion emphasized that "the orders denying defendant's motion for
dismissal and its subsequent motion for reconsideration are interlocutory in nature, and hence, not
appealable until after the rendition of judgment on that, merits. Defendant's appeal contravenes the
explicit provisions of Rule 41, Section 2, of the Rules of Court ... which, moreover, incorporates a
well-established rule of practice and procedure, constituting one of the main tenets of our remedial
law." In order to stress its disapproval of appeals from interlocutory orders, this Court, in the
aforementioned case, assessed treble costs against the appellant therein, jointly and severally, with
its counsel.
The rationale underlying the rule that an interlocutory order is not appealable is, basically, the
avoidance of "multiplicity of appeals in a single case." If very interlocutory order or judgment may be
appealed, and the appeal stays the progress of the action, there could arise countless appeals in a
single case, and the magnitude and extent of the delay in the final disposition thereof will be such
that, conceivably, in a number of instances, the parties may not survive the case.5 This Court has
consistently frowned upon — and has firmly stricken down — piecemeal appeals, "because it [piece-
meal appeal] delays the speedy disposition of the case, and is often resorted to as a means of
draining the resources of the poorer party and of compelling it to submit out of sheer exhaustion,
even if its demands should be conformable to reason and justice."6
Two alternative remedies were forthwith available to Doriquez after the denial of his motion for
reconsideration, namely, (1) proceed immediately to trial on the merits and interpose as integral part
of his defense the grounds stated in his motion to dismiss, and, in the event of an adverse decision,
appeal to the proper Court for resolution of all pertinent issues, including those he has posed in the
present appeal; (2) interpose a petition for certiorari to enable this Court to dispose, on the merits,
the issues raised herein, anchoring said petition on the twin grounds that (a) the court a quo acted
without jurisdiction or in excess of its jurisdiction in taking cognizance of the offense of grave oral
defamation, and (b) the trial judge committed grave abuse of discretion in refusing to dismiss the
information for discharge of firearm in the face of his avowal that the said indictment places him in
peril of a second jeopardy. This latter action should of course be availed of with candor and absolute
absence of deviousness, with no intention (howsoever disguised) of causing undue delay.
Because, however, all the cogent issues are now before us, we will treat the instant appeal as a
petition for certiorari. This positive and pragmatic approach will definitively resolve the contentions of
Doriquez and thus dissipate any and all speculation on the part of all concerned as to the
correctness of their respective positions. 1äwphï1.ñët
1. Doriquez maintains that the municipal court of Batad, Iloilo, not the Court of First instance of Iloilo,
has original exclusive jurisdiction over the offense of grave oral defamation which, under article 358
of the Revised Penal Code, is punishable by arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision
correccional in its minimum period, reasoning that the exclusive original jurisdiction of municipal and
city courts has been enlarged by Republic Act No. 3828 to include offenses for which the penalty
provided by law is imprisonment for not more than three years, or a fine of not more than three
thousand pesos, or both such imprisonment and fine.
The rule is now beyond all area of dispute that in view of the latest amendment to section 87(c) of
the Judiciary Act of 1948 and also taking into account the unaltered provisions of section 44(f) of the
same Act, the zone of concurrent jurisdiction of municipal and city courts and courts of first instance
has been considerably widened. This jurisdictional parity embraces all offenses for which the penalty
provided by law is imprisonment for more than six months but not exceeding three years (for six
years with respect to city courts and municipal courts in the capitals of provinces and sub-
provinces vis-a-vis the courts of first instance), or a fine of more than two hundred pesos but not
exceeding three thousand pesos (or six thousand pesos in the proper cases), or both such
imprisonment and fine. This confluence of jurisdiction was first clearly etched in Esperat vs. Avila, et
al,.7 and the rule in that case was affirmed in Le Hua Sia vs. Reyes,8 and Andico vs. Roan, et al.9
In Esperat vs. Avila, Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes delineated with specificity the respective jurisdictional
boundaries of the various trial courts. Said Mr. Justice Reyes:
The fallacy in petitioner's argument lies in his failure to consider section 44(f) of the same
Judiciary Act of 1948, in conjunction with its section 87(c). Note that notwithstanding the
various amendments received by section 87, section 44(f) remained unaltered, thereby
indicating the intention of the legislators to retain the original jurisdiction of the court of first
instance in certain cases. The fact that the jurisdiction of the municipal or city courts was
enlarged in virtue of the amendment of section 87(c), cannot be taken as a repeal or
withdrawal of the jurisdiction conferred on the court of first instance. Not only is implied
repeal disfavored by the law, but also, it is a cardinal principle that a statute must be so
construed as to harmonize all apparent conflict's, and give effect to all its provision whenever
possible.
Actually, there is nothing irreconcilable between sections 44(f) and 87(c) of the Judiciary Act.
As therein provided the court of first instance was given original jurisdiction over cases where
the penalty prescribed by law is imprisonment for fore more than 6 months or fine of more
than P200.00; the justices of the peace and municipal or city courts of chartered cities, over
cases where the penalty is imprisonment for not more than 3 years, and fine of not more
than P3,000.00. In other words, where the prescribed penalty is imprisonment for more than
6 months, but not exceeding 3 years, or fine of more than P200.00 but not exceeding
P3,000.00 the justice of the peace or municipal court only has concurrent (and not exclusive)
original jurisdiction with the court of first instance. And, it may be stated that this concurrent
jurisdiction between the inferior courts, and the court of first instance was not provided for the
first time in Republic Act No. 3828. Under Republic Act 2613, crimes the penalties for which
do not exceed 3 years, or fine of not more than P3,000.00, were specifically placed within the
jurisdiction of the justice of the peace and municipal courts, concurrent with the court of first
instance.
It follows, therefore, that the exclusive original jurisdiction of the justice of the peace and
municipal courts is confined only to cases where the prescribed penalty is imprisonment for 6
months or less, or fine of P200.00 or less, whereas, the exclusive original jurisdiction of the
court of first instance covers cases where the penalty is incarceration for more than 3 years
(or 6 years in the case of city courts and municipal courts in provincial capitals), or fine of
more than P3,000.00 (or P6,000.00 in proper cases), or both such imprisonment and fine.
Between these exclusive jurisdictions lies a zone where the jurisdiction is concurrent. This is
the proper construction to be placed on the provisions involved herein, regardless of what
may have been the prior rulings on the matter.
The offense of grave oral defamation which carries a maximum penalty of prision correccional in its
minimum period (or incarceration not exceeding 2 years and 4 months) falls within the above-
described zone of concurrent jurisdiction. Consequently, the court a quo did not err in assuming
jurisdiction.
2. Doriquez likewise contends that the filing of the information for discharge of firearm has placed
him in peril of double jeopardy as he had previously been charged with the offense of alarm and
scandal in a complaint filed in the municipal court of Batad, Iloilo, upon the same facts which
constitute the basis of the indictment for discharge of firearm. The said complaint, which was
allegedly dismissed without his consent, recites:
That on or about 12:00 p.m, April 21, 1964, at the gate in front of the Municipal Building,
Poblacion, Batad, Iloilo, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously with deliberate
intent to cause alarm in the public, discharge his License Revolver caliber .22 SN-368383
one on the ground and one into the air within the town limits and without any justifiable
purpose thus causing alarm upon the general public.
For double jeopardy to attach in his favor, the accused must prove, among other things, that there is
"identity of offenses," so that, in the language of section 9, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Court,
his "conviction or acquittal ... or the dismissal of the case (without his express consent) shall be a bar
to another prosecution for the same offense charged or for any attempt to, commit the same or
frustration thereof, or for any offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the
offense charged in the former complaint or information." It is altogether evident, however, that the
offense of discharge of firearm is not the crime of alarm and scandal, nor is it an attempt or a
frustration of the latter felony. Neither may it be asserted that every crime of discharge of firearm
produces the offense of alarm and scandal. Nor could the reverse situation be true, for the less
grave felony of discharge of firearm does not include or subsume the offense of alarm and scandal
which is a light felony.
Although the indictment for alarm and scandal filed under article 155(1) of the Revised Penal Code
and the information for discharge of firearm instituted under article 258 of the same Code are closely
related in fact (as the two apparently arose from the same factual setting, the firing of a revolver by
the accused being a common element), they are definitely diverse in law. Firstly, the two indictments
do not describe the same felony - alarm and scandal is an offense against public order while
discharge of firearm is a crime against persons. Secondly, the indispensable element of the former
crime is the discharge of a firearm calculated to cause alarm or danger to the public, while the
gravamen of the latter is the discharge of a firearm against or at a certain person, without intent to
kill.
The plea of double jeopardy cannot therefore be accorded merit, as the two indictments are perfectly
distinct in point of law howsoever closely they may appear to be connected in fact.10
It is a cardinal rule that the protection against double jeopardy may be invoked only for the same
offense11 or identical offense.12 A single act may offend against two (or more) entirely distinct and
unrelated provisions of law, and if one provision requires proof of an additional fact or element which
the other does not, an acquittal or conviction or a dismissal of the information under one does not
bar prosecution under the other.13 Phrased elsewise, where two different laws (or articles of the
same code) define two crimes, prior jeopardy as to one of them is no obstacle to a prosecution of the
other, although both offenses arise from the same facts, if each crime involves some important act
which is not an essential element of the other.14
In the case at bar, granting that the two indictments arose from the same act — a contention
traversed by the State — they describe and constitute, nevertheless, essentially different felonies
having fundamentally diverse indispensable elements. Hence, there can be no such "identity of
offenses" as would support the suggestion that double jeopardy has ensued. The trial judge,
therefore, did not commit abuse of discretion in refusing to dismiss the information for discharge of
firearm.
In sum, we hold that the instant appeal is premature, and that — even if it were treated as a petition
for certiorari — the contentions and arguments of the appellant cannot be accorded credit.
ACCORDINGLY, the present appeal is dismissed. This case is hereby ordered remanded to the
court of origin for immediate trial on the merits. Costs against the appellant.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Angeles and Fernando, JJ.,
concur.
Footnotes
Bairan vs. Tan Siu Lay, et al., L-19460, December 28, 1966, 18 SCRA 1235; People vs.
1
Manuel, L-6794 & L-6795, August 11, 1954; Antonio vs. Samonte, L-15410, April 26, 1961.
2Harrison Foundry and Machinery and Chua vs. Harrison Foundry Workers' Association, L-
18432, June 29, 1963; see also Fuster vs. Johnson, 1 Phil. 670; Philippine Refining Co., Inc.
vs. Ponce, et al., 99 Phil. 269.
Hodges vs. Villanueva, 90 Phil. 255; Goat vs. Hugo, 93 Phil. 613; People vs. Aragon, 94
3
5 Moran (1963 edition), p. 353, citing Sitchon vs. Sheriff of Occidental Negros, 80 Phil. 397.
Harrison Foundry and Machinery and Chua vs. Harrison Foundry Workers'
6
10 Gavieres vs. U.S., 41 Phil. 961, citing Burton vs. United States (202 U.S. 344).
People vs. Cabrera, 43 Phil. 82; U.S. vs. Vitog, 37 Phil. 42; U.S. vs. Capurro, 7 Phil 24;
11
U.S. vs. Ching Po, 23 Phil. 578; People vs. Gavieres, supra, note 10.
13 See People vs. Bacolod, 89 Phil. 621: People vs. Capurro, supra, note 11.
SECOND DIVISION
EDMUNDO S. ALBERTO, Provincial Fiscal and BONIFACIO C. INTIA 1st Asst. Provincial
Fiscal, both of Camarines Sur, petitioners,
vs.
HON. RAFAEL DE LA CRUZ, in his capacity as Judge of the CFI of Camarines Sur and ELIGIO
ORBITA, respondents.
CONCEPCION, J.:
Petition for certiorari, with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminay injunction, to annul and set
aside the order of the respondent Judge, dated January 26, 1970, directing the petitioners,
Provincial Fiscal and Assitant Provincial Fiscal of Camarines Sur, to amend the information filed in
Criminal Case No. 9414 of the Court of First Instance of CamarinesSur, entitled: "The People of the
Philippines, plaintiff, versus Eligio Orbita, accused," so as to include, as defendants, Governor
Armando Cledera and Jose Esmeralda, assistant provincial warden of Camarines Sur; as well as the
order dated February 18, 1970, denying the motion for the reconsideration of the said order.
In Criminal Case No. 9414 of the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur, Eligio Orbita, a Provincial
guard, is prosecuted for the crime of Infedelity in the Custody of Prisoner, defined and punished
under Article 224 of the Revised Penal Code, committed, as follows:
That on or about the 12th day of September. 1968, in the barrio of Taculod, municipality of
Canaman, province of Camarines Sur, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the said accused, being then a member of the Provincial Guard of Camarines Sur and
specially charged with the duty of keeping under custody and vigilance detention prisoner Pablo
Denaque, did then and there with great carelessness and unjustifiable negligence leave the latter
unguarded while in said barrio, thereby giving him the opportunity to run away and escape, as in fact
said detention prisoner Pablo Denaque did run away and escape from the custody of the said
accused. 1
In the course of the trial thereof, or more particularly during the cross-examination of prosecution
witness Jose Esmeralda, assistant provincial warden of Camarines Sur, the defense brought forht
and confronted the witness with a note, marked as exhibit, purportedly written by Gov. Armando
Cledera, asking Jose Esmeralda to send five men to work in the construction of a fence at his house
at Taculod, Canaman, Camarines Sur, then leased by the province and used as an official guest
house. Jose Esmeralda, declared, however, that he could not remember who ahnded the note for
him; that he was not sure as to genuineness of the signature appearing therein and that he was not
preszent when the note was made and signed by Gov. Cledera. 2 Beleiving that the escape of Pablo
Denaque was made possible by the note of Gov. Cledera to Jose Esmeralda and that Cledera and
Esmeralda are equally guilty of the offense for which tha accused Eligio Orbita had been charged,
the defense cousel filed a motion in court seeking the amendment of the information so as to include
Gov. cledera and Jose Esmeralda as defendants therein. 3
Acting upon said motion, as well as the opposition of the prosecution officers 4 and finding that "the
court cannot grant the motion or order the inclusion of Gov. Cledera and Lt. Esmeralda at this stage
unless an investigation is made," the respondent Judge directed the Fiscals office, within 15 days
from date, to cause the further investigation of the case, taking into consideration the provisions of
Article 156 in relation to Articles 223 and 224 of the Revised Penal Code in order to determine once
and for all whether the Governor as jailer of the Province and his assistant have any criminatory
participation in the circumstances of Pablo Denaque's escape from judicial custody. 5
In compliance with said order, the Fiscal set the reinvestigation of the case for December 19, 1969.
Summonses were issued to Gov. Cledera Jose Esmeralda, Lorenzo Padua, the provincial warden,
and the accused Eligio Orbita to be present thereat. 6 Dr. went thereat But, on the date set for the
reinvestigation of the case, only Gov. Cledera Jose Esmeralda and Lorenzo Padua appeared. The
accused Eligio Orbita did not appear. Neither was the note (Exhibit 2) produced. Since no additional
evidence was presented, the Fiscal manifested in Court on January 2, 1970 that "after conducting a
reinvestigation of the case and after a thorough and intelligent analysis of the facts and law involved,
no prima facie case against Governor Cledera and Jose Esmeralda exist, hence, they cannot be
charged. 7
On January 19, 1970, the accused Eligio Orbita filed a "Motion for Reconsideration" praying "that the
Order of this Honorable Court dated December 11, 1969 be, in that instead of ordering the Fiscal to
reinvestigate this case, on the basis of the evidence already adduce during the trial of this case, he
be ordered to amend the information on to include Cledera and Esmeralda it appearing the on
record that their inclusion is warranted. 8
On January 26, 1970, the respondent Court issued the order complained of, the dispositive portion
of which reads, as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, in the light of the facts brought about by the prosecuting fiscal
let the charges be so amended by including in the information the author or writer of Exhibit 2 and
the person or persons who carried out the said orders considering the provisions of Article 156 in
relation to Articles 223 and 224 of the Penal Code. 9
The Fiscal filed a motion for the reconsideration of said order, 10 but the motion was denied on
February 18, 1970. 11Hence, the instant recourse.
From the facts of the case, We are convinced that the respondent Judge committed an error in
ordering the fiscal to amend the information so as to include Armando Cledera and Jose Esmeralda
as defendants in Criminal Case No. 9414 of the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur. It is the
rule that a fiscal by the nature of his office, is under no compulsion to file a particular criminal
information where he is not convinced that he has evidence to support the allegations
thereof. 12 Although this power and prerogative of the Fiscal, to determine whether or not the
evidence at hand is sufficient to form a reasonable belief that a person committed an offense, is not
absolute and subject to judicial review, 13 it would be embarrassing for the prosecuting attorney to be
compelled to prosecute a case when he is in no position to do so because in his opinion, he does
not have the necessary evidence to secure a conviction, or he is not convinced of the merits of the
case. The better procedure would be to appeal the Fiscal's decision to the Ministry of Justice and/or
ask for a special prosecutor.
Besides, it cannot be said that the Fiscal had capriciously and whimsically refused to prosecute
Cledera and Esmeralda.
In his order directing the Fiscal's office to conduct a further reinvestigation of the case, the
respondent Judge candidly ad. muted that without a reinvestigation of the case, he cannot determine
once and for all whether or not to include Gov. Cledera and Jose Esmeralda in the information.
Pursuant thereto, a reinvestigation was conducted by the fiscals office. Summonses were issued.
But, no additional fact was elicited since Eligio Orbita did not appear thereat. Neither was the note
(Exh. 2) presented and produced. Gov. Cledera could not admit nor deny the genuineness of the
signature appearing in the note since it was not on hand. Such being the case, the prosecuting
officers had reason to refuse to amend the information filed by them after a previous pre examination
and investigation.
Moreover, there is no sufficient evidence in the record to show a prima facie case against Gov.
Cledera and Jose Esmeralda. The order to amend the information is based upon the following facts:
1. Pablo Denaque, a detention prisoner for homicide, while working at the Guest
House of Governor Cledera on September 12, 1968;
2. The Governor's evidence at that time is being rented by the province and its
maintenance and upkeep is shouldered by the province of Camarines Sur,
3. That neither Governor Cledera nor Lt. Jose Esmeralda was charged or entrusted
with the duty of conveying and the detainee from the jail to the residence of the
governor.
5. That it was the accused Orbita who himself who handpicked the group of
Prisoners to work at the Governor's on 12, 1968. 14
Art. 156. Delivering prisoners from jails. — The city Of arrests mayor in its maximum
period to prison correccional in its minimum Period shall be imposed upon any
person who shall remove from any jail or penal establishment t any person confined
therein or shall help the escape of such person, by means of violence, intimidation,
or bribery.
If other means are used the penalty of arresto mayor shall be imposed. If the escape
of the prisoner shall take place outside of said establishments by taking the guards
by surprise, the same penalties shall be imposed in their minimum period.
The offenders may be committed in two ways: (1) by removing a person confined in any jail or penal
establishment; and (2) by helping such a person to escape. To remove means to take away a
person from the place of his confinement, with or without the active compensation of the person
released To help in the escape of a Person confined in any jail or penal institution means to
furnished that person with the material means such as a file, ladder, rope, etc. which greatly facilitate
his escape. 15 The offenders under this article is usually committed by an outsider who removes from
jail any person therein confined or helps him escape. If the offender is a public officer who has
custody or charge of the prisoner, he is liable for infidelity in the custody of prisoner defined and
penalty under Article 223 of the Revised Penal Code. Since Gov. Cledera as governor, is the jailer of
the province, 16 and Jose Esmeralda is the assistant provincial warden, they cannot be prosecuted
for the escape Of Pablo Denaque under Article 156 of the Revised Penal Code. There is likewise no
sufficient evidence to warrant their prosecution under Article 223 of the Revised Penal Code, which
reads, as follows:
ART. 223. Conniving with or consenting to evasion. — Any Public officer who shall
consent to the escape of a prisoner in his custody or charge, shall be punished
In order to be guilty under the aforequoted provisions of the Penal Code, it is necessary that the
public officer had consented to, or connived in, the escape of the prisoner under his custody or
charge. Connivance in the escape of a prisoner on the part of the person in charge is an essential
condition in the commission of the crime of faithlessness in the custody of the prisoner. If the public
officer charged with the duty of guarding him does not connive with the fugitive, then he has not
violated the law and is not guilty of the crime. 17 For sure no connivance in the escape of Pablo
Denaque from the custody of the accused Eligio Orbita can be deduced from the note of Gov.
Cledera to Jose Esmeralda asking for five men to work in the guest house, it appearing that the
notes does not mention the names of the prisoners to be brought to the guest house; and that it was
the accused Eligio Orbita who picked the men to compose the work party.
Neither is there evidence to warrant the prosecution of Cledera and Esmeralda under Article 224 of
the Revised Penal Code. This article punishes the public officer in whose custody or charge a
prisoner has escaped by reason of his negligence resulting in evasion is definite amounting to
deliberate non- performance of duty. 18 In the constant case, the respondent Judge said:
We cannot, for the present be reconciled with the Idea that the escape. of Denaque
was facilitated by the Governor's or . his assistants negligence. According to law, if
there is any negligence committed it must be the officer who is charged with the
custody and guarding of the ... 19
WHEREFORE, the orders issued on January 26, and February 18, 1970 in Criminal Case No. 9414
of the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur, entitled: "The People of the Philippines, plaintiff,
versus Eligio Orbita, accused are hereby annulled and set aside. The respondent Judge or any other
judge acting in his stead is directed to proceed with the trial of the case. Without costs.
SO ORDERED.
I concur. Governor Armando Cledera and Jose Esmeralda can be indicted in court by the fiscal not
by virtue of a judicial order but only after he has conducted the proper pre investigation in
accordance with Presidential Decree No. 77. The case against Cledera and Esmeralda, if there is
a prima facie case against them, can be prosecuted separately and does not have to be included in
the case against Eligio Orbita.
Separate Opinions
I concur. Governor Armando Cledera and Jose Esmeralda can be indicted in court by the fiscal not
by virtue of a judicial order but only after he has conducted the proper pre investigation in
accordance with Presidential Decree No. 77. The case against Cledera and Esmeralda, if there is
a prima facie case against them, can be prosecuted separately and does not have to be included in
the case against Eligio Orbita.
Footnotes
1 Rollo, p. 23.
2 Id., p. 8
3 Id., p. 28.
4 Id, p. 32.
5 Id, P. 4 1.
7 Id, P. 49.
8 Id. P. 52.
9 Id, p. 17.
10 Id, p. 55.
11 Id, p. 22.
12 People vs. MOBIL 68 Phil 626; Zulueta vs. Nicolas, 102 Phil. 944; Bagatua vs.
Revilla 104 Phil. 392.
19 Rollo, p. 46.
* Mr. Justice Pacifico P. de Castro, a member of the First Division. was designated to
sit in the Second Division.
EN BANC
ROMERO, J.:
In Criminal Case No. C-3217 filed before Branch 16, RTC Roxas City, Rogelio Bayotas y Cordova
was charged with Rape and eventually convicted thereof on June 19, 1991 in a decision penned by
Judge Manuel E. Autajay. Pending appeal of his conviction, Bayotas died on February 4, 1992 at
the National Bilibid Hospital due to cardio respiratory arrest secondary to hepatic encephalopathy
secondary to hipato carcinoma gastric malingering. Consequently, the Supreme Court in its
Resolution of May 20, 1992 dismissed the criminal aspect of the appeal. However, it required the
Solicitor General to file its comment with regard to Bayotas' civil liability arising from his commission
of the offense charged.
In his comment, the Solicitor General expressed his view that the death of accused-appellant did not
extinguish his civil liability as a result of his commission of the offense charged. The Solicitor
General, relying on the case of People v. Sendaydiego 1 insists that the appeal should still be
resolved for the purpose of reviewing his conviction by the lower court on which the civil liability is
based.
Counsel for the accused-appellant, on the other hand, opposed the view of the Solicitor General
arguing that the death of the accused while judgment of conviction is pending appeal extinguishes
both his criminal and civil penalties. In support of his position, said counsel invoked the ruling of the
Court of Appeals in People v. Castillo and Ocfemia 2 which held that the civil obligation in a criminal
case takes root in the criminal liability and, therefore, civil liability is extinguished if accused should
die before final judgment is rendered.
We are thus confronted with a single issue: Does death of the accused pending appeal of his
conviction extinguish his civil liability?
In the aforementioned case of People v. Castillo, this issue was settled in the affirmative. This same
issue posed therein was phrased thus: Does the death of Alfredo Castillo affect both his criminal
responsibility and his civil liability as a consequence of the alleged crime?
Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code is the controlling statute. It reads, in part:
With reference to Castillo's criminal liability, there is no question. The law is plain.
Statutory construction is unnecessary. Said liability is extinguished.
The civil liability, however, poses a problem. Such liability is extinguished only when
the death of the offender occurs before final judgment. Saddled upon us is the task of
ascertaining the legal import of the term "final judgment." Is it final judgment as
contradistinguished from an interlocutory order? Or, is it a judgment which is final
and executory?
We go to the genesis of the law. The legal precept contained in Article 89 of the
Revised Penal Code heretofore transcribed is lifted from Article 132 of the Spanish El
Codigo Penal de 1870 which, in part, recites:
XXVIII Enciclopedia Juridica Española, p. 473, furnishes the ready answer: It says:
The legal import of the term "final judgment" is similarly reflected in the Revised
Penal Code. Articles 72 and 78 of that legal body mention the term "final judgment"
in the sense that it is already enforceable. This also brings to mind Section 7, Rule
116 of the Rules of Court which states that a judgment in a criminal case becomes
final "after the lapse of the period for perfecting an appeal or when the sentence has
been partially or totally satisfied or served, or the defendant has expressly waived in
writing his right to appeal."
By fair intendment, the legal precepts and opinions here collected funnel down to one
positive conclusion: The term final judgment employed in the Revised Penal Code
means judgment beyond recall. Really, as long as a judgment has not become
executory, it cannot be truthfully said that defendant is definitely guilty of the felony
charged against him.
Not that the meaning thus given to final judgment is without reason. For where, as in
this case, the right to institute a separate civil action is not reserved, the decision to
be rendered must, of necessity, cover "both the criminal and the civil aspects of the
case." People vs. Yusico (November 9, 1942), 2 O.G., No. 100, p. 964. See
also: People vs. Moll, 68 Phil., 626, 634; Francisco, Criminal Procedure, 1958 ed.,
Vol. I, pp. 234, 236. Correctly, Judge Kapunan observed that as "the civil action is
based solely on the felony committed and of which the offender might be found
guilty, the death of the offender extinguishes the civil liability." I Kapunan, Revised
Penal Code, Annotated, supra.
Here is the situation obtaining in the present case: Castillo's criminal liability is out.
His civil liability is sought to be enforced by reason of that criminal liability. But then, if
we dismiss, as we must, the criminal action and let the civil aspect remain, we will be
faced with the anomalous situation whereby we will be called upon to clamp civil
liability in a case where the source thereof — criminal liability — does not exist. And,
as was well stated in Bautista, et al. vs. Estrella, et al., CA-G.R.
No. 19226-R, September 1, 1958, "no party can be found and held criminally liable in
a civil suit," which solely would remain if we are to divorce it from the criminal
proceeding."
This ruling of the Court of Appeals in the Castillo case 3 was adopted by the Supreme Court in the
cases of People of the Philippines v. Bonifacio Alison, et al., 4 People of the Philippines v. Jaime
Jose, et al. 5 and People of the Philippines v. Satorre 6 by dismissing the appeal in view of the death
of the accused pending appeal of said cases.
On the other hand, this Court in the subsequent cases of Buenaventura Belamala v. Marcelino
Polinar 7 and Lamberto Torrijos v. The Honorable Court of Appeals 8 ruled differently. In the former,
the issue decided by this court was: Whether the civil liability of one accused of physical injuries who
died before final judgment is extinguished by his demise to the extent of barring any claim therefore
against his estate. It was the contention of the administrator-appellant therein that the death of the
accused prior to final judgment extinguished all criminal and civil liabilities resulting from the offense,
in view of Article 89, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code. However, this court ruled therein:
We see no merit in the plea that the civil liability has been extinguished, in view of the
provisions of the Civil Code of the Philippines of 1950 (Rep. Act No. 386) that
became operative eighteen years after the revised Penal Code. As pointed out by the
Court below, Article 33 of the Civil Code establishes a civil action for damages on
account of physical injuries, entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action.
Assuming that for lack of express reservation, Belamala's civil action for damages
was to be considered instituted together with the criminal action still, since both
proceedings were terminated without final adjudication, the civil action of the
offended party under Article 33 may yet be enforced separately.
It should be stressed that the extinction of civil liability follows the extinction of the
criminal liability under Article 89, only when the civil liability arises from the criminal
act as its only basis. Stated differently, where the civil liability does not exist
independently of the criminal responsibility, the extinction of the latter by death, ipso
facto extinguishes the former, provided, of course, that death supervenes before final
judgment. The said principle does not apply in instant case wherein the civil liability
springs neither solely nor originally from the crime itself but from a civil contract of
purchase and sale. (Emphasis ours)
In the above case, the court was convinced that the civil liability of the accused who was
charged with estafa could likewise trace its genesis to Articles 19, 20 and 21 of the Civil
Code since said accused had swindled the first and second vendees of the property subject
matter of the contract of sale. It therefore concluded: "Consequently, while the death of the
accused herein extinguished his criminal liability including fine, his civil liability based on the
laws of human relations remains."
Thus it allowed the appeal to proceed with respect to the civil liability of the accused, notwithstanding
the extinction of his criminal liability due to his death pending appeal of his conviction.
To further justify its decision to allow the civil liability to survive, the court relied on the following
ratiocination: Since Section 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court 9 requires the dismissal of all money
claims against the defendant whose death occurred prior to the final judgment of the Court of First
Instance (CFI), then it can be inferred that actions for recovery of money may continue to be heard
on appeal, when the death of the defendant supervenes after the CFI had rendered its judgment. In
such case, explained this tribunal, "the name of the offended party shall be included in the title of the
case as plaintiff-appellee and the legal representative or the heirs of the deceased-accused should
be substituted as defendants-appellants."
It is, thus, evident that as jurisprudence evolved from Castillo to Torrijos, the rule established was
that the survival of the civil liability depends on whether the same can be predicated on sources of
obligations other than delict. Stated differently, the claim for civil liability is also extinguished together
with the criminal action if it were solely based thereon, i.e., civil liability ex delicto.
However, the Supreme Court in People v. Sendaydiego, et al. 10 departed from this long-established
principle of law. In this case, accused Sendaydiego was charged with and convicted by the lower
court of malversation thru falsification of public documents. Sendaydiego's death supervened during
the pendency of the appeal of his conviction.
This court in an unprecedented move resolved to dismiss Sendaydiego's appeal but only to the
extent of his criminal liability. His civil liability was allowed to survive although it was clear that such
claim thereon was exclusively dependent on the criminal action already extinguished. The legal
import of such decision was for the court to continue exercising appellate jurisdiction over the entire
appeal, passing upon the correctness of Sendaydiego's conviction despite dismissal of the criminal
action, for the purpose of determining if he is civilly liable. In doing so, this Court issued a Resolution
of July 8, 1977 stating thus:
The claim of complainant Province of Pangasinan for the civil liability survived
Sendaydiego because his death occurred after final judgment was rendered by the
Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, which convicted him of three complex crimes
of malversation through falsification and ordered him to indemnify the Province in the
total sum of P61,048.23 (should be P57,048.23).
The civil action for the civil liability is deemed impliedly instituted with the criminal
action in the absence of express waiver or its reservation in a separate action (Sec.
1, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court). The civil action for the civil liability is separate and
distinct from the criminal action (People and Manuel vs. Coloma, 105 Phil. 1287; Roa
vs. De la Cruz, 107 Phil. 8).
When the action is for the recovery of money and the defendant dies before final
judgment in the Court of First Instance, it shall be dismissed to be prosecuted in the
manner especially provided in Rule 87 of the Rules of Court (Sec. 21, Rule 3 of the
Rules of Court).
The implication is that, if the defendant dies after a money judgment had been
rendered against him by the Court of First Instance, the action survives him. It may
be continued on appeal (Torrijos vs. Court of Appeals, L-40336, October 24, 1975;
67 SCRA 394).
The accountable public officer may still be civilly liable for the funds improperly
disbursed although he has no criminal liability (U.S. vs. Elvina, 24 Phil. 230;
Philippine National Bank vs. Tugab, 66 Phil. 583).
In view of the foregoing, notwithstanding the dismissal of the appeal of the deceased
Sendaydiego insofar as his criminal liability is concerned, the Court Resolved to
continue exercising appellate jurisdiction over his possible civil liability for the money
claims of the Province of Pangasinan arising from the alleged criminal acts
complained of, as if no criminal case had been instituted against him, thus making
applicable, in determining his civil liability, Article 30 of the Civil Code . . . and, for
that purpose, his counsel is directed to inform this Court within ten (10) days of the
names and addresses of the decedent's heirs or whether or not his estate is under
administration and has a duly appointed judicial administrator. Said heirs or
administrator will be substituted for the deceased insofar as the civil action for the
civil liability is concerned (Secs. 16 and 17, Rule 3, Rules of Court).
Succeeding cases 11 raising the identical issue have maintained adherence to our ruling
in Sendaydiego; in other words, they were a reaffirmance of our abandonment of the settled rule that
a civil liability solely anchored on the criminal (civil liability ex delicto) is extinguished upon dismissal
of the entire appeal due to the demise of the accused.
But was it judicious to have abandoned this old ruling? A re-examination of our decision
in Sendaydiego impels us to revert to the old ruling.
To restate our resolution of July 8, 1977 in Sendaydiego: The resolution of the civil action impliedly
instituted in the criminal action can proceed irrespective of the latter's extinction due to death of the
accused pending appeal of his conviction, pursuant to Article 30 of the Civil Code and Section 21,
Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court.
When a separate civil action is brought to demand civil liability arising from a criminal
offense, and no criminal proceedings are instituted during the pendency of the civil
case, a preponderance of evidence shall likewise be sufficient to prove the act
complained of.
Clearly, the text of Article 30 could not possibly lend support to the ruling in Sendaydiego. Nowhere
in its text is there a grant of authority to continue exercising appellate jurisdiction over the accused's
civil liability ex delicto when his death supervenes during appeal. What Article 30 recognizes is an
alternative and separate civil action which may be brought to demand civil liability arising from a
criminal offense independently of any criminal action. In the event that no criminal proceedings are
instituted during the pendency of said civil case, the quantum of evidence needed to prove the
criminal act will have to be that which is compatible with civil liability and that is, preponderance of
evidence and not proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Citing or invoking Article 30 to justify the
survival of the civil action despite extinction of the criminal would in effect merely beg the question of
whether civil liability ex delicto survives upon extinction of the criminal action due to death of the
accused during appeal of his conviction. This is because whether asserted in
the criminal action or in a separate civil action, civil liability ex delicto is extinguished by the death of
the accused while his conviction is on appeal. Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code is clear on this
matter:
Art. 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished. — Criminal liability is totally
extinguished:
However, the ruling in Sendaydiego deviated from the expressed intent of Article 89. It allowed
claims for civil liability ex delicto to survive by ipso facto treating the civil action impliedly instituted
with the criminal, as one filed under Article 30, as though no criminal proceedings had been filed but
merely a separate civil action. This had the effect of converting such claims from one which is
dependent on the outcome of the criminal action to an entirely new and separate one, the
prosecution of which does not even necessitate the filing of criminal proceedings. 12 One would be
hard put to pinpoint the statutory authority for such a transformation. It is to be borne in mind that in
recovering civil liability ex delicto, the same has perforce to be determined in the criminal action,
rooted as it is in the court's pronouncement of the guilt or innocence of the accused. This is but to
render fealty to the intendment of Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code which provides that "every
person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable." In such cases, extinction of the criminal
action due to death of the accused pending appeal inevitably signifies the concomitant extinction of
the civil liability. Mors Omnia Solvi. Death dissolves all things.
In sum, in pursuing recovery of civil liability arising from crime, the final determination of the criminal
liability is a condition precedent to the prosecution of the civil action, such that when the criminal
action is extinguished by the demise of accused-appellant pending appeal thereof, said civil action
cannot survive. The claim for civil liability springs out of and is dependent upon facts which, if true,
would constitute a crime. Such civil liability is an inevitable consequence of the criminal liability and
is to be declared and enforced in the criminal proceeding. This is to be distinguished from that which
is contemplated under Article 30 of the Civil Code which refers to the institution of a separate civil
action that does not draw its life from a criminal proceeding. The Sendaydiego resolution of July 8,
1977, however, failed to take note of this fundamental distinction when it allowed the survival of the
civil action for the recovery of civil liability ex delicto by treating the same as a separate civil action
referred to under Article 30. Surely, it will take more than just a summary judicial pronouncement to
authorize the conversion of said civil action to an independent one such as that contemplated under
Article 30.
Ironically however, the main decision in Sendaydiego did not apply Article 30, the resolution of July
8, 1977 notwithstanding. Thus, it was held in the main decision:
Sendaydiego's appeal will be resolved only for the purpose of showing his criminal
liability which is the basis of the civil liability for which his estate would be liable. 13
In other words, the Court, in resolving the issue of his civil liability, concomitantly made a
determination on whether Sendaydiego, on the basis of evidenced adduced, was indeed guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of committing the offense charged. Thus, it upheld Sendaydiego's
conviction and pronounced the same as the source of his civil liability. Consequently, although
Article 30 was not applied in the final determination of Sendaydiego's civil liability, there was a
reopening of the criminal action already extinguished which served as basis for Sendaydiego's civil
liability. We reiterate: Upon death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction, the criminal
action is extinguished inasmuch as there is no longer a defendant to stand as the accused; the civil
action instituted therein for recovery of civil liability ex delicto is ipso facto extinguished, grounded as
it is on the criminal.
Section 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court was also invoked to serve as another basis for
the Sendaydiego resolution of July 8, 1977. In citing Sec. 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, the Court
made the inference that civil actions of the type involved in Sendaydiego consist of money claims,
the recovery of which may be continued on appeal if defendant dies pending appeal of his conviction
by holding his estate liable therefor. Hence, the Court's conclusion:
"When the action is for the recovery of money" "and the defendant dies before final
judgment in the court of First Instance, it shall be dismissed to be prosecuted in the
manner especially provided" in Rule 87 of the Rules of Court (Sec. 21, Rule 3 of the
Rules of Court).
The implication is that, if the defendant dies after a money judgment had been
rendered against him by the Court of First Instance, the action survives him. It may
be continued on appeal.
Sadly, reliance on this provision of law is misplaced. From the standpoint of procedural law, this
course taken in Sendaydiego cannot be sanctioned. As correctly observed by Justice Regalado:
Said Section 21 of Rule 3 is a rule of civil procedure in ordinary civil actions. There is
neither authority nor justification for its application in criminal procedure to civil
actions instituted together with and as part of criminal actions. Nor is there any
authority in law for the summary conversion from the latter category of an ordinary
civil action upon the death of the offender. . . .
Moreover, the civil action impliedly instituted in a criminal proceeding for recovery of civil liability ex
delicto can hardly be categorized as an ordinary money claim such as that referred to in Sec. 21,
Rule 3 enforceable before the estate of the deceased accused.
Ordinary money claims referred to in Section 21, Rule 3 must be viewed in light of the provisions of
Section 5, Rule 86 involving claims against the estate, which in Sendaydiego was held liable for
Sendaydiego's civil liability. "What are contemplated in Section 21 of Rule 3, in relation to Section 5
of Rule 86, 14 are contractual money claims while the claims involved in civil liability ex delicto may
include even the restitution of personal or real property." 15 Section 5, Rule 86 provides an exclusive
enumeration of what claims may be filed against the estate. These are: funeral expenses, expenses
for the last illness, judgments for money and claim arising from contracts, expressed or implied. It is
clear that money claims arising from delict do not form part of this exclusive enumeration. Hence,
there could be no legal basis in (1) treating a civil action ex delicto as an ordinary contractual money
claim referred to in Section 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court and (2) allowing it to survive by filing a
claim therefor before the estate of the deceased accused. Rather, it should be extinguished upon
extinction of the criminal action engendered by the death of the accused pending finality of his
conviction.
Accordingly, we rule: if the private offended party, upon extinction of the civil liability ex
delicto desires to recover damages from the same act or omission complained of, he must subject to
Section 1, Rule 111 16 (1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended) file a separate civil action,
this time predicated not on the felony previously charged but on other sources of obligation. The
source of obligation upon which the separate civil action is premised determines against whom the
same shall be enforced.
If the same act or omission complained of also arises from quasi-delict or may, by provision of law,
result in an injury to person or property (real or personal), the separate civil action must be filed
against the executor or administrator 17 of the estate of the accused pursuant to Sec. 1, Rule 87 of
the Rules of Court:
Sec. 1. Actions which may and which may not be brought against executor or
administrator. — No action upon a claim for the recovery of money or debt or interest
thereon shall be commenced against the executor or administrator; but actions to
recover real or personal property, or an interest therein, from the estate, or to enforce
a lien thereon, and actions to recover damages for an injury to person or property,
real or personal, may be commenced against him.
This is in consonance with our ruling in Belamala 18 where we held that, in recovering damages for
injury to persons thru an independent civil action based on Article 33 of the Civil Code, the same
must be filed against the executor or administrator of the estate of deceased accused and not
against the estate under Sec. 5, Rule 86 because this rule explicitly limits the claim to those for
funeral expenses, expenses for the last sickness of the decedent, judgment for money and claims
arising from contract, express or implied. Contractual money claims, we stressed, refers only
topurely personal obligations other than those which have their source in delict or tort.
Conversely, if the same act or omission complained of also arises from contract, the separate civil
action must be filed against the estate of the accused, pursuant to Sec. 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of
Court.
2. Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death of accused, if the same
may also be predicated on a source of obligation other than delict. 19 Article 1157 of the Civil Code
enumerates these other sources of obligation from which the civil liability may arise as a result of the
same act or omission:
a) Law 20
b) Contracts
c) Quasi-contracts
d) . . .
e) Quasi-delicts
3. Where the civil liability survives, as explained in Number 2 above, an action for recovery therefor
may be pursued but only by way of filing a separate civil action and subject to Section 1, Rule 111 of
the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended. This separate civil action may be enforced
either against the executor/administrator or the estate of the accused, depending on the source of
obligation upon which the same is based as explained above.
4. Finally, the private offended party need not fear a forfeiture of his right to file this separate civil
action by prescription, in cases where during the prosecution of the criminal action and prior to its
extinction, the private-offended party instituted together therewith the civil action. In such case, the
statute of limitations on the civil liability is deemed interrupted during the pendency of the criminal
case, conformably with provisions of Article 1155 21 of the Civil Code, that should thereby avoid any
apprehension on a possible privation of right by prescription. 22
Applying this set of rules to the case at bench, we hold that the death of appellant Bayotas
extinguished his criminal liability and the civil liability based solely on the act complained of, i.e.,
rape. Consequently, the appeal is hereby dismissed without qualification.
WHEREFORE, the appeal of the late Rogelio Bayotas is DISMISSED with costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Bellosillo, Melo, Quiason,
Puno, Vitug, Kapunan and Mendoza, JJ., concur.
#Footnotes
1 Nos. L-33252, L-33253 and L-33254, 81 SCRA 120.
3 supra.
9 Sec. 21. Where claim does not survive. — When the action is for recovery of
money, debt or interest thereon, and the defendant dies before final judgment in the
Court of First Instance, it shall be dismissed to be prosecuted in the manner
especially provided in these rules.
10 Supra.
11 People v. Badeo, G.R. No. 72990, November 21, 1991, 204 SCRA 122; Petralba
v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 81337, August 16, 1991, 200 SCRA 644; Dumlao v.
Court of Appeals, No. L-51625, October 5, 1988, 166 SCRA 269; Rufo Mauricio
Construction v. Intermediate Appellate Court, No. L-75357, November 27, 1987, 155
SCRA 712; People v. Salcedo, No. L-48642, June 22, 1987, 151 SCRA 220; People
v. Pancho, No. L-32507, November 4, 1986, 145 SCRA 323; People v. Navoa, No. L-
67966, September 28, 1984, 132 SCRA 410; People v. Asibar,
No. L-37255, October 23, 1982, 117 SCRA 856; People v. Tirol, No. L-30538,
January 31, 1981, 102 SCRA 558; and People v. Llamoso, No. L-24866, July 13,
1979, 91 SCRA 364.
. . . this provision contemplates prosecution of the civil liability arising from a criminal
offense without the need of any criminal proceeding to prove the commission of the
crime as such, that is without having to prove the criminal liability of the defendant so
long as his act causing damage or prejudice to the offended party is proven by
preponderance of evidence.
13 Supra, p. 134.
14 Sec. 5. Claims which must be filed under the notice. If not filed,
barred; exceptions. — All claims for money against the decedent, arising from
contract, express or implied, whether the same be due, not due, or contingent, all
claims for funeral expenses and expenses for the last sickness of the decedent, and
judgment for money against the decedent, must be filed within the time limited in the
notice; otherwise they are barred forever, except that they may be set forth as
counterclaims in any action that the executor or administrator may bring against the
claimants. Where an executor or administrator commences an action, or prosecutes
an action already commenced by the deceased in his lifetime, the debtor may set
forth by answer the claims he has against the decedent, instead of presenting them
independently to the court as herein provided, and mutual claims may be set off
against each other in such action; and if final judgment is rendered in favor of the
defendant, the amount so determined shall be considered the true balance against
the estate, as though the claim had been presented directly before the court in the
administration proceedings. Claims not yet due, or contingent, may be approved at
their present value.
Such civil action includes recovery of indemnity under the Revised Penal Code, and
damages under Article 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines
arising from the same act or omission of the accused.
A waiver of any of the civil actions extinguishes the others. The institution of, or the
reservation of the right to file, any of said civil actions separately waives the others.
The reservation of the right to institute the separate civil actions shall be made before
the prosecution starts to present its evidence and under circumstances affording the
offended party a reasonable opportunity to make such reservation.
In no case may the offended party recover damages twice for the same act or
omission of the accused.
When the offended party seeks to enforce civil liability against the accused by way of
moral, nominal, temperate or exemplary damages, the filing fees for such civil action
as provided in these Rules shall constitute a first lien on the judgment except in an
award for actual damages.
In cases wherein the amount of damages, other than actual, is alleged in the
complaint or information, the corresponding filing fees shall be paid by the offended
party upon the filing thereof in court for trial.
17 Justice Regalado cited the Court's ruling in Belamala that since the damages
sought, as a result of the felony committed amounts to injury to person or property,
real or personal, the civil liability to be recovered must be claimed against the
executor/administrator and not against the estate.
18 Ibid.
19 Justice Vitug who holds a similar view stated: "The civil liability may still be
pursued in a separate civil action but it must be predicated on a source of obligation
other than delict, except when by statutory provision an independent civil action is
authorized such as, to exemplify, in the instance enumerated in Article 33 of the Civil
Code." Justice Regalado stressed that:
Conversely, such civil liability is not extinguished and survives the deceased offender
where it also arises simultaneously from or exists as a consequence or by reason of
a contract, as in Torrijos; or from law, as stated in Torrijos and in the concurring
opinion in Sendaydiego, such as in reference to the Civil Code; or from a quasi-
contract; or is authorized by law to be pursued in an independent civil action, as
in Belamala. Indeed, without these exceptions, it would be unfair and inequitable to
deprive the victim of his property or recovery of damages therefor, as would have
been the fate of the second vendee in Torrijos or the provincial government
in Sendaydiego."
20 See Articles 19, 20, 21, 31, 32, 33, 34, 2176 of the Civil Code; see related
provisions of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended, particularly Sec. 1, Rule
111.
21 Art. 1155. The prescription of actions is interrupted when they are filed before the
court, when there is a written extrajudicial demand by the creditors, and when there
is any written acknowledgment of the debt by the debtor.
SECOND DIVISION
EN BANC
MONTEMAYOR, J.:
Florentino Abilong was charged in the Court of First Instance of Manila with evasion of service of
sentence under the following information:
That on or about the 17th day of September, 1947, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said
accused, being then a convict sentenced and ordered to serve two (2) years, four (4) months
and one (1) day of destierro during which he should not enter any place within the radius of
100 kilometers from the City of Manila, by virtue of final judgment rendered by the municipal
court on April 5, 1946, in criminal case No. B-4795 for attempted robbery, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously evade the service of said sentence by going beyond the
limits made against him and commit vagrancy.
Contrary to law.
Upon arraignment he pleaded guilty and was sentenced to two (2) years, four (4) months and one
(1) day of prision correccional, with the accessory penalties of the law and to pay the costs. He is
appealing from that decision with the following assignment of error:
1. The lower court erred in imposing a penalty on the accused under article 157 of the
Revised Penal Code, which does not cover evasion of service of "destierro."
Counsel for the appellant contends that a person like the accused evading a sentence of destierro is
not criminally liable under the provisions of the Revised Penal Code, particularly article 157 of the
said Code for the reason that said article 157 refers only to persons who are imprisoned in a penal
institution and completely deprived of their liberty. He bases his contention on the word
"imprisonment" used in the English text of said article which in part reads as follows:
Evasion of service of sentence. — The penalty of prision correccional in its medium and
maximum periods shall be imposed upon any convict who shall evade service of his
sentence by escaping during the term of his imprisonment by reason of final judgment.
The Solicitor General in his brief says that had the original text of the Revised Penal Code been in
the English language, then the theory of the appellant could be uphold. However, it is the Spanish
text that is controlling in case of doubt. The Spanish text of article 157 in part reads thus:
ART. 157. Quebrantamiento de sentencia. — Sera castigado con prision correccional en sus
grados medio y maximo el sentenciado que quebrantare su condena, fugandose mientras
estuviere sufriendo privacion de libertad por sentencia firme; . . . .
We agree with the Solicitor General that inasmuch as the Revised Penal Code was originally
approved and enacted in Spanish, the Spanish text governs (People vs. Manaba, 58 Phil., 665,
668). It is clear that the word "imprisonment" used in the English text is a wrong or erroneous
translation of the phrase "sufriendo privacion de libertad" used in the Spanish text. It is equally clear
that although the Solicitor General impliedly admits destierro as not constituting imprisonment, it is a
deprivation of liberty, though partial, in the sense that as in the present case, the appellant by his
sentence of destierro was deprived of the liberty to enter the City of Manila. This view has been
adopted in the case of People vs. Samonte, No. 36559 (July 26, 1932; 57 Phil., 968) wherein this
Court held, as quoted in the brief of the Solicitor General that "it is clear that a person under
sentence of destierro is suffering deprivation of his liberty and escapes from the restrictions of the
penalty when he enters the prohibited area." Said ruling in that case was ratified by this Court,
though, indirectly in the case of People vs. Jose de Jesus, (45 Off. Gaz. Supp. to No. 9, p. 370)1,
where it was held that one evades the service of his sentence of destierro when he enters the
prohibited area specified in the judgment of conviction, and he cannot invoke the provisions of the
Indeterminate Sentence Law which provides that its provisions do not apply to those who shall have
escaped from confinement or evaded sentence.
In conclusion we find and hold that the appellant is guilty of evasion of service of sentence under
article 157 of the Revised Penal Code (Spanish text), in that during the period of his sentence
of destierro by virtue of final judgment wherein he was prohibited from entering the City of Manila, he
entered said City.
Finding no reversible error in the decision appealed from, the same is hereby affirmed with costs
against the appellant. So ordered.
Moran, C. J., Paras, Feria, Pablo, Bengzon and Tuason, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
The legal question raised in this case is whether or not appellant, for having violated his judgment
of destierro rendered by the Municipal Court of Manila, can be sentenced under article 157 of the
Revised Penal Code which reads as follows:
Evasion of service of sentence. — The penalty of prision correccional in its medium and
maximum periods shall be imposed upon any convict who shall evade service of his
sentence by escaping during the term of his imprisonment by reason of final judgment.
However, if such evasion or escape shall have taken place by means of unlawful entry, by
breaking doors, windows, gates, walls, roofs, or floors, or by using picklocks, false keys,
disguise, deceit, violence or intimidation, or through connivance with other convicts or
employees of the penal institution, the penalty shall be prision correccional in its maximum
period.
Appellant invokes in his favor the negative opinion of author Guillermo Guevara (Revised Penal
Code, 1946, p. 322). This negative position is supported by another author, Ambrosio Padilla
(Revised Penal Code annotated, p. 474).
The prosecution invokes the decision of this Court in People vs. De Jesus, L-1411,2promulgated
April 16, 1948, but said decision has no application because in said case the legal question involved
in the case at bar was not raised. The Supreme Court did not consider the question of interpretation
of the wording of article 157. Undoubtedly, there was occasion for considering the question, but the
Court nevertheless failed to do so. This failure to see the question, at the time, is only an evidence
that the tribunal is composed of human beings for whom infallibility is beyond reach.
The prosecution maintains that appellant's contention, supported by two authors who have
considered the question, although tenable under the English text of article 157, is not so under the
Spanish text, which is the one controlling because the Revised Penal Code was originally enacted
by the Legislature in Spanish.
There is no quarrel, therefore, that under the above quoted English text, the appellant is entitled to
acquittal. The question now is whether or not the Spanish text conveys a thing different from that
which can be read in the English text. The Spanish text reads as follows:
ART. 157. Quebrantamiento de sentencia. — Sera castigado con prision correccional en sus
grados medio y maximo el sentenciado que quebrantare su condena, fugandose mientras
estuviere sufriendo privacion de libertad por sentencia firme; pero si la evasion o fuga se
hubiere llevado a efecto con escalamiento, fractura de puertas, ventanas, verjas, paredes,
techos o suelos, o empleado ganzuas, llaves falsas, disfraz, engano, violencia o
intimidacion, o poniendose de acuerdo con otros sentenciados o dependientes del
establecimiento donde a hallare recluido la pena sera prision correccional en su grado
maximo.
The question boils down to the words "fugandose mientras estuviere sufriendo privacion de libertad
por sentencia firme," which are translated into English "by escaping during the term of his
imprisonment by reason of final judgment." The prosecution contends that the words "privacion de
libertad" in the Spanish text is not the same as the word "imprisonment" in the English text, and that
while "imprisonment" cannot include destierro, "privacion de libertad" may include it.
The reason is, however, the result of a partial point of view because it obliterates the grammatical,
logical, ideological function of the words "fugandose" and "by escaping" in the Spanish and English
texts, respectively. There should not be any question that, whatever meaning we may want to give to
the words "privacion de libertad," it has to be conditioned by the verb "fugandose," (by escaping).
"Privacion de libertad" cannot be considered independently of "fugandose."
There seems to be no question that the Spanish "fugandose" is correctly translated into the English
"by escaping." Now, is there any sense in escaping from destierro or banishment, where there is no
enclosure binding the hypothetical fugitive? "Fugandose" is one of the forms of the Spanish verb
"fugar," to escape. The specific idea of "evasion" or "escape" is reiterated by the use of said words
after the semi-colon in the Spanish text and after the first period in the English text. Either the verb
"to escape" or the substantive noun "escape" essentially pre-supposes some kind of imprisonment
or confinement, except figuratively, and Article 157 does not talk in metaphors or parables.
"To escape" means "to get away, as by flight or other conscious effort; to break away, get free, or
get clear, from or out of detention, danger, discomfort, or the like; as to escape from prison. To issue
from confinement or enclosure of any sort; as gas escapes from the mains." (Webster's New
International Dictionary.)
"Escape" means "act of escaping, or fact or having escaped; evasion of or deliverance from injury or
any evil; also the means of escape. The unlawful departure of a prisoner from the limits of his
custody. When the prisoner gets out of prison and unlawfully regains his liberty, it is an actual
escape." (Webster's New International Dictionary.)
The "destierro" imposed on appellant banished him from Manila alone, and he was free to stay in all
the remaining parts of the country, and to go and stay in any part of the globe outside the country.
With freedom to move all over the world, it is farfetched to allege that he is in any confinement from
which he could escape.
The words "privacion de libertad" have been correctly translated into the English "imprisonment,"
which gives the idea exactly conveyed by "privacion de libertad" in the Spanish text. Undoubtedly,
the drafters of the latter could have had used a more precise Spanish word, but the literary error
cannot be taken as a pretext to give to the less precise words a broader meaning than is usually
given to them.
"Privacion de libertad," literally meaning "deprivation of liberty or freedom," has always been used by
jurist using the Spanish language to mean "imprisonment." They have never given them the
unbounded philosophical scope that would lead to irretrievable absurdities.
Under that unlimited scope, no single individual in the more than two billion inhabitants of the world
can be considered free, as the freest citizen of the freest country is subject to many limitations or
deprivations of liberty. Under the prosecution's theory, should an accused, sentenced to pay a fine of
one peso, evade the payment of it, because the fine deprives him of liberty to dispose of his one
peso, he will be liable to be punished under article 157 of the Revised Penal Code to imprisonment
of from more that two years to six years. The iniquity and cruelty of such situation are too glaring and
violent to be entertained for a moment under our constitutional framework.
There is no gainsaying the proposition that to allow the violation of a sentence of destierro without
punishment is undesirable, but even without applying article 157 of the Revised Penal Code, the act
of the appellant cannot remain unpunished, because his violation of the sentence of destierro may
be punished as contempt of court, for which imprisonment up to six months is provided.
It is deplorable that article 157 should not provide for a situation presented in this case, but the gap
cannot be filled by this Court without encroaching upon the legislative powers of Congress.
Perhaps it is better that evasions of sentence be punished, as provided by the old Penal Code, by an
increased in the evaded penalty. This will be more reasonable that the penalties provided by article
157, which appear to be disproportionate and arbitrary, because they place on equal footing the
evader of a sentence of one day of imprisonment and a life-termer, one who commits an insignificant
offense and one who perpetrates the most heinous crime. At any rate, this is a problem for Congress
to solve.
I concur in the foregoing dissenting opinion, because evidently the word "fugandose" in the Spanish
text refers to imprisonment, not to destierro.
Footnotes
1 80 Phil., 746.
2 80 Phil., 746.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
The instant petition is one for the review, by way of appeal by certiorari, of the
Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals dated November 20, 1998, and of the Resolution dated
June 14, 1999 denying the motion for reconsideration thereof.
Petitioner was charged on March 8, 1983 with violation of Section 178 (nn) [2] of the
1978 Election Code in Criminal Case No. F-1447 before Branch 33, Regional Trial Court,
Camarines Sur. The Information alleged:
That on May 17, 1982, (Barangay Election Day), at around 8:15 P.M. in Barangay
Ombao, Municipality of Bula, Province of Camarines Sur, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused did, then and there
unlawfully conducted himself in a disorderly manner, by striking the electric bulb and
two (2) kerosene petromax lamps lighting the room where voting center no. 24 is
located, during the counting of the votes in said voting center plunging the room in
complete darkness, thereby interrupting and disrupting the proceedings of the Board
of Election Tellers.[3]
On arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty. Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.
On January 14, 1985, the trial court rendered judgment and declared petitioner guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 178 (nn) of PD 1296, otherwise known as
the 1978 Election Code, as amended, and sentenced petitioner to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of 1 year as minimum to 3 years as maximum.
Aggrieved, petitioner appealed his conviction to the Court of Appeals which
eventually affirmed the decision of the trial court in toto. Said decision became final and
executory. Thus, the execution of judgment was scheduled on October 14, 1987.
On October 12, 1987, an urgent motion to reset the execution of judgment was
submitted by petitioner through his counsel. But it was denied for lack of merit.
During the execution of judgment, petitioner failed to appear which prompted the
presiding judge to issue an order of arrest of petitioner and the confiscation of his
bond.However, petitioner was never apprehended. He remained at large.
Ten years later, on October 24, 1997, petitioner filed before the trial court a motion to
quash the warrant issued for his arrest on the ground of prescription of the penalty
imposed upon him. However, it was denied. His motion for reconsideration thereof was
likewise denied.
Dissatisfied, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition for Certiorari assailing
the orders of the trial court denying both his motion to quash the warrant of arrest and
motion for reconsideration.
On November 20, 1998, the Court of Appeals rendered its now assailed decision
dismissing the petition for lack of merit.
Following the denial of his motion for reconsideration, the instant petition was filed
before us.
Petitioner asserts that the Court of Appeals gravely erred in holding that the penalty
imposed upon petitioner has not prescribed. Petitioner maintains that Article 93 of the
Revised Penal Code provides that the period of prescription shall commence to run from
the date when the culprit should evade the service of his sentence. The Court of Appeals,
in its interpretation of the said provision, engaged in judicial legislation when it added the
phrase by escaping during the term of the sentence thereto, so petitioner claims.
Going over the merits of the petition, the Court finds that the Court of Appeals did not
err in dismissing the petition for certiorari.
The threshold issue in the instant case is the interpretation of Article 93 of the Revised
Penal Code in relation to Article 157 of the same Code.
In dismissing the petition, the Court of Appeals ruled:
When and how penalties prescribe The penalties imposed by the final sentence
prescribed as follows:
The penalty imposed upon the petitioner is one (1) year of imprisonment as minimum
to three (3) years of imprisonment as maximum.
The law under which the petitioner was convicted is a special law, the 1978 Election
Code. This law does not provide for the prescription of penalties. This being the case,
We have to apply the provision of the Revised Penal Code which allows the
application of said code in suppletory character when it provides that:
Offenses which are or in the future may be punishable under special laws are not
subject to the provision of this code. This code shall be supplementary to such laws,
unless the latter should specially provide the contrary.
The penalty imposed upon the petitioner is a correctional penalty under Article 25 in
relation to Article 27 of the Revised Penal Code. Being a correctional penalty it
prescribed in ten (10) years.
The petitioner was convicted by a final judgment on June 14, 1986. Such judgment
would have been executed on October 14, 1986 but the accused did not appear for
such proceeding. And he has never been apprehended.
The contention of the petitioner is that said judgment prescribed on October 24, 1996.
The issue here is whether or not the penalty imposed upon the petitioner has
prescribed.
The elements in order that the penalty imposed has prescribed are as follows:
2. That the convict evaded the service of the sentence by escaping during the
term of his sentence.
3. That the convict who escaped from prison has not given himself up, or been
captured, or gone to a foreign country with which we have no extradition
treaty or committed another crime.
4. That the penalty has prescribed, because of the lapse of time form the date
of the evasion of the service of the sentence by the convict.
From the foregoing elements, it is clear that the penalty imposed has not prescribed
because the circumstances of the case at bench failed to satisfy the second element, to
wit That the convict evaded the service of the sentence by escaping during the service
of his sentence. As a matter of fact, the petitioner never served a single minute of his
sentence.
The foregoing conclusion of the Court of Appeals is consistent with the ruling of this
Court in Tanega vs. Masakayan, et. al.,[4] where we declared that, for prescription of
penalty imposed by final sentence to commence to run, the culprit should escape during
the term of such imprisonment.
The Court is unable to find and, in fact, does not perceive any compelling reason to
deviate from our earlier pronouncement clearly exemplified in the Tanega case.
Article 93 of the Revised Penal Code provides when the prescription of penalties shall
commence to run. Under said provision, it shall commence to run from the date the felon
evades the service of his sentence. Pursuant to Article 157 of the same Code, evasion of
service of sentence can be committed only by those who have been convicted by final
judgment by escaping during the term of his sentence.
As correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General, escape in legal parlance and for
purposes of Articles 93 and 157 of the RPC means unlawful departure of prisoner from
the limits of his custody. Clearly, one who has not been committed to prison cannot be
said to have escaped therefrom.
In the instant case, petitioner was never brought to prison. In fact, even before the
execution of the judgment for his conviction, he was already in hiding. Now petitioner begs
for the compassion of the Court because he has ceased to live a life of peace and
tranquility after he failed to appear in court for the execution of his sentence. But it was
petitioner who chose to become a fugitive. The Court accords compassion only to those
who are deserving. Petitioners guilt was proven beyond reasonable doubt but he refused
to answer for the wrong he committed. He is therefore not to be rewarded therefor.
The assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is based on settled jurisprudence and
applicable laws. It did not engage in judicial legislation but correctly interpreted the
pertinent laws. Because petitioner was never placed in confinement, prescription never
started to run in his favor.
WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the petition is hereby DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, (Chairman), Panganiban, Sandoval-Gutierrez, and Morales, JJ., concur.
[1]
Penned by Associate Justice Eloy R. Bello, Jr. and concurred in by Associate Justices Salome A. Montoya
and Ruben T. Reyes, of the Seventh Division.
[2]
Any person who, in the presence or within the hearing of the election committee or the board of
canvassers during any of its meetings, conducts himself in such a disorderly manner as to interrupt
or disrupt the work or proceedings to the end of preventing either body from performing its functions,
either partly or totally.
[3]
Rollo, p. 13.
[4]
19 SCRA 564 [1967].
FIRST DIVISION
DECISION
AZCUNA, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, assailing the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Angeles City, Branch 56, rendered
on January 31, 2000.1
The facts of this case are undisputed. The petitioner was indicted for simple seduction in Criminal
Case No. 85-816, at the Municipal Trial Court of Angeles City, Branch 3.
During the trial of the case, Atty. Eduardo Pineda, counsel for petitioner, submitted the case for
decision without offering any evidence, due to the petitioner’s constant absence at hearings.
On September 16, 1987, the petitioner was convicted of the offense charged and was sentenced to
serve a penalty of two months and one day of arresto mayor.
On appeal, the Regional Trial Court, on October 24, 1988, affirmed in toto the decision of the
Municipal Trial Court.
On August 9, 1991, the case was called for promulgation of the decision in the court of origin.
Despite due notice, counsel for the petitioner did not appear. Notice to petitioner was returned
unserved with the notation that he no longer resided at the given address. As a consequence, he
also failed to appear at the scheduled promulgation. The court of origin issued an order directing the
recording of the decision in the criminal docket of the court and an order of arrest against the
petitioner.2
Pursuant to the order of arrest, on January 20, 2000, the petitioner was apprehended and detained
at the Mabalacat Detention Cell. On January 24, 2000, petitioner filed a Petition for a Writ of Habeas
Corpus at the Regional Trial Court of Angeles City. He impleaded as respondent the Acting Chief of
Police of Mabalacat, Pampanga.3 Petitioner contended that his arrest was illegal and unjustified on
the grounds that:
(a) the straight penalty of two months and one day of arresto mayor prescribes in five years
under No. 3, Article 93 [of the] Revised Penal Code, and
(b) having been able to continuously evade service of sentence for almost nine years, his
criminal liability has long been totally extinguished under No. 6, Article 89 [of the] Revised
Penal Code.4
After his transfer to the City Jail of Angeles City on January 25, 2000, petitioner filed an Amended
Petition with the Regional Trial Court, impleading herein respondent Col. James D. Labordo, the Jail
Warden of Angeles City, as respondent.5
In response, the Jail Warden alleged that petitioner’s detention was pursuant to the order of
commitment (mittimus), issued by Marlon P. Roque, Clerk of Court III of the Municipal Trial Court of
Angeles City, Branch 3, dated January 25, 2000.6
On January 31, 2000, respondent Judge rendered the decision, which is the subject of this present
appeal, which pronounced:
The Court cannot subscribe to the contention of the petitioner that the penalty imposed on him in the
decision adverted to above had already prescribed, hence, his detention is illegal for under Article 93
of the Revised Penal Code:
"The period of prescription of penalties shall commence to run from the date when the culprit should
evade the service of sentence, and it shall be interrupted if the defendant should give himself up, be
captured, should go to some foreign country with which this Government has no extradition treaty, or
should commit another crime before the expiration of the period of prescription.
2. That convict evaded the service of the sentence by escaping during the term of his
sentence;
3. That the convict who had escaped from prison has not given himself up, or been captured,
or gone to a foreign country with which we have no extradition treaty, or committed another
crime;
4. The penalty has prescribed, because of the lapse of time from the date of the evasion of
the service of the sentence by the convict.
In this case, the essential element of prescription which is the evasion of the service of sentence is
absent. Admittedly, the petitioner herein has not served the penalty imposed on him in prison and
that during the service of the sentence, he escaped therefrom. Notably, at the trial of Crim. Case No.
85-816 in the Municipal Trial Court, Branch III, Angeles City and on the date set for the promulgation
of the affirmed decision, the petitioner failed to appear and remained at large. 1a\^/phi 1.net
"There was no evasion of the service of the sentence in this case, because such evasion
presupposes escaping during the service of the sentence consisting in deprivation of liberty."
(Infante vs. Warden, 48 O.G. No. 122) (92 Phil. 310).
Corollarily, the detention of the petitioner in Angeles City Jail in compliance with the Order of
Commitment (Exhibit E) is not illegal for –
"A commitment in due form, based on a final judgment, convicting and sentencing the defendant in a
criminal case, is conclusive evidence of the legality of his detention, unless it appears that the court
which pronounced the judgment was without jurisdiction or exceeded it." (U.S. vs. Jayne, 24 Phil 90,
24 J.F. 94, Phil. Digest, Vol. 2, 1398).
WHEREFORE, for not being meritorious and well-founded, the petition for a writ of habeas corpus is
hereby denied.
SO ORDERED.
From the above quoted decision, petitioner filed the instant petition for review on a question purely of
law and raised the following issue:
HOW SHOULD THE PHRASE "SHALL COMMENCE TO RUN FROM THE DATE WHEN THE
CULPRIT SHOULD EVADE THE SERVICE OF SENTENCE" IN ARTICLE 93 OF THE REVISED
PENAL CODE ON THE COMPUTATION OF THE PRESCRIPTION OF PENALTIES BE
CONSTRUED? PUT A LITTLE DIFFERENTLY, WHEN DOES THE PRESCRIPTIVE PERIOD OF
PENALTIES BEGIN TO RUN?8
xxx the period for the computation of penalties under Article 93 of the Revised Penal Code begins to
run from the moment the judgment of conviction becomes final and the convict successfully evades,
eludes, and dodges arrest for him to serve sentence.9
The Decision subject of this appeal, which was based on the 1952 ruling rendered in Infante vs.
Warden, 48 O.G. No. 122, 92 Phil. 310, is, petitioner most respectfully submits, not good case law. It
imposes upon the convict a condition not stated in the law. It is contrary to the spirit, nature or
essence of prescription of penalties, creates an ambiguity in the law and opens the law to abuse by
government.
There is no dispute that the duty of government to compel the service of sentence sets in when the
judgment of conviction becomes final.
The dispute, however, is in the construction of the phrase "should evade the service of
sentence." When does the period of prescription of penalties begin to run? The Infante ruling
construes this to mean that the convict must escape from jail "because such evasion presupposes
escaping during the service of the sentence consisting in deprivation of liberty."
Petitioner, with due respect, disagrees because if that were the intention of the law, then the phrase
"should evade the service of sentence" in Article 93 would have read: "should escape during the
service of the sentence consisting in deprivation of liberty." The legislature could have very easily
written Article 93 to read this way –
"The period of prescription of penalties shall commence to run from the date when the culprit should
escape during the service of the sentence consisting in deprivation of liberty, and it shall be
interrupted if the defendant should give himself up, be captured, should go to some foreign country
with which this Government has no extradition treaty, or should commit another crime before the
expiration of the period of prescription."
The legislature wrote "should evade the service of sentence" to cover or include convicts like him
who, although convicted by final judgment, were never arrested or apprehended by government for
the service of their sentence. With all the powers of government at its disposal, petitioner was able to
successfully evade service of his 2 months and 1 day jail sentence for at least nine (9) years, from
August 9, 1991 to January 20, 2000. This is approximately 3 years and 5 months longer than the 5-
year prescriptive period of the penalty imposed on him.
That, as the respondent RTC Judge noted, petitioner did not attend the trial at the Municipal Trial
Court and the promulgation of his judgment of conviction in August 9, 1991 is of no moment. His
bond for provisional release was surely cancelled and an order of arrest was surely issued against
petitioner. The undisputed fact is that on August 9, 1991 the judgment of conviction was
promulgated in absentia and an order for petitioner’s arrest was issued by the Municipal Trial Court
of Angeles City, Branch III.
The duty of government, therefore, to arrest petitioner and compel him to serve his sentence began
on August 9, 1991. The 5-year prescriptive period of his arresto mayor penalty also began to run on
that day considering that no relief was taken therefrom. Since petitioner never gave himself up [n]or
was [he], until January 20, 2000, ever captured, for the service of his sentence nor did he flee to
some foreign country with which [our] government has no extradition treaty, that 5-year prescriptive
period of his penalty ran continuously from August 9, 1991 when his judgment of conviction was
promulgated in absentia and was never interrupted.
For reasons known only to it, however, government failed or neglected, for almost nine (9) years, to
arrest petitioner for the service of his arresto mayor sentence [which] should not be taken against
petitioner. He was able to successfully evade service of his sentence for a period longer than the 5-
year prescriptive period of his penalty and, as such, is entitled to total extinction of his criminal
liability.
To say, as was said in Infante, that the prescriptive period of the penalty never began to run in favor
of petitioner because he never escaped from jail during the service of his sentence imposes a
condition not written in the law. It also violates the basic principle that the criminal statutes are
construed liberally in favor of the accused and/or convict and is contrary to the spirit behind or
essence of statutes of limitations [and] prescription, in criminal cases.10
The Regional Trial Court based its decision on the case of Infante v. Warden11 . In said case, Infante,
the petitioner, was convicted of murder and was sentenced to seventeen years, four months and one
day of reclusion temporal. After serving fifteen years, seven months and eleven days, he was
granted a conditional pardon. The condition was that "he shall not again violate any of the penal laws
of the Philippines." Ten years after his release on conditional pardon, Infante was found guilty by a
Municipal Court for driving without a license. Infante was immediately ordered rearrested for breach
of the condition of his pardon. One of the issues raised by Infante in his petition,
xxx was that the remitted penalty for which the petitioner had been recommitted to jail – one year
and 11 days – had prescribed. xxx 12
The contention is not well taken. According to article 93 of the Revised Penal Code the period of
prescription of penalties commences to run from the date when the culprit should evade the service
of his sentence. It is evident from this provision that evasion of the sentence is an essential element
of prescription. There has been no such evasion in this case. Even if there had been one and
prescription were to be applied, its basis would have to be the evasion of the unserved sentence,
and computation could not have started earlier than the date of the order for the prisoner's rearrest.13
A perusal of the facts in Infante v. Warden reveals that it is not on all fours with the present case. In
Infante, the convict was on conditional pardon when he was re-arrested. Hence, he had started
serving sentence but the State released him. In the present case, the convict evaded service of
sentence from the start, and was arrested eight years later.
The RTC decision, however, must stand, since it is in accord with applicable decisions of this Court.
The issue raised by petitioner is not novel. Article 93 of the Revised Penal Code14 has been
interpreted several times by the Court.
The case of Tanega v. Masakayan15 falls squarely within the issues of the present case. In that case,
petitioner Adelaida Tanega failed to appear on the day of the execution of her sentence. On the
1awphi 1.nét
same day, respondent judge issued a warrant for her arrest. She was never arrested. More than a
year later, petitioner through counsel moved to quash the warrant of arrest, on the ground that the
penalty had prescribed. Petitioner claimed that she was convicted for a light offense and since light
offenses prescribe in one year, her penalty had already prescribed. The Court disagreed, thus:
xxx The period of prescription of penalties — the succeeding Article 93 provides — "shall commence
to run from the date when the culprit should evade the service of his sentence". What then is the
concept of evasion of service of sentence? Article 157 of the Revised Penal Code furnishes the
ready answer. Says Article 157:
"ART. 157. Evasion of service of sentence. — The penalty of prision correccional in its medium and
maximum periods shall be imposed upon any convict who shall evade service of his sentence by
escaping during the term of his imprisonment by reason of final judgment. xxx"
Elements of evasion of service of sentence are: (1) the offender is a convict by final judgment; (2) he
"is serving his sentence which consists in deprivation of liberty"; and (3) he evades service of
sentence by escaping during the term of his sentence. This must be so. For, by the express terms of
the statute, a convict evades "service of his sentence" by "escaping during the term of his
imprisonment by reason of final judgment." That escape should take place while serving sentence, is
emphasized by the provisions of the second sentence of Article 157 which provides for a higher
penalty if such "evasion or escape shall have taken place by means of unlawful entry, by breaking
doors, windows, gates, walls, roofs, or floors, or by using picklocks, false keys, disguise, deceit,
violence or intimidation, or through connivance with other convicts or employees of the penal
institution, . . ." Indeed, evasion of sentence is but another expression of the term "jail breaking."
xxx
We, therefore, rule that for prescription of penalty of imprisonment imposed by final sentence to
commence to run, the culprit should escape during the term of such imprisonment.
Adverting to the facts, we have here the case of a convict who — sentenced to imprisonment by final
judgment — was thereafter never placed in confinement. Prescription of penalty, then, does not run
in her favor.16
In Del Castillo v. Torrecampo 17 , the Court cited and reiterated Tanega. Petitioner, Del Castillo, was
charged for violation of Section 178 (nn) of the 1978 Election Code. The trial court found Del Castillo
guilty beyond reasonable doubt and sentenced him to suffer an indeterminate sentence of
imprisonment of 1 year as minimum to 3 years as maximum. On appeal the Court of Appeals
affirmed the decision of the trial court in toto. During the execution of judgment on October 14, 1987,
petitioner was not present. The presiding Judge issued an order of arrest and the confiscation of his
bond. Petitioner was never apprehended. Ten years later, petitioner filed a motion to quash the
warrant of arrest on the ground that the penalty imposed upon him had already prescribed. The
motion was denied by the trial court. Del Castillo, on a petition for certiorari to the Court of Appeals,
questioned the denial by the trial court. The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for lack of merit.
Upon denial of his Motion for Reconsideration, Del Castillo raised the matter to this Court. The Court
decided against Del Castillo and after quoting the ratio decidendi of the Court of Appeals in full, it
ratiocinated, thus:
The foregoing conclusion of the Court of Appeals is consistent with the ruling of this Court in Tanega
vs. Masakayan, et al., where we declared that, for prescription of penalty imposed by final sentence
to commence to run, the culprit should escape during the term of such imprisonment. 1a\^/phi1.net
The Court is unable to find and, in fact, does not perceive any compelling reason to deviate from our
earlier pronouncement clearly exemplified in the Tanega case.
Article 93 of the Revised Penal Code provides when the prescription of penalties shall commence to
run. Under said provision, it shall commence to run from the date the felon evades the service of his
sentence. Pursuant to Article 157 of the same Code, evasion of service of sentence can be
committed only by those who have been convicted by final judgment by escaping during the term of
his sentence.
As correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General, "escape" in legal parlance and for purposes of
Articles 93 and 157 of the RPC means unlawful departure of prisoner from the limits of his custody.
Clearly, one who has not been committed to prison cannot be said to have escaped therefrom.
In the instant case, petitioner was never brought to prison. In fact, even before the execution of the
judgment for his conviction, he was already in hiding. Now petitioner begs for the compassion of the
Court because he has ceased to live a life of peace and tranquility after he failed to appear in court
for the execution of his sentence. But it was petitioner who chose to become a fugitive. The Court
accords compassion only to those who are deserving. Petitioner's guilt was proven beyond
reasonable doubt but he refused to answer for the wrong he committed. He is therefore not to be
rewarded therefor.
The assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is based on settled jurisprudence and applicable laws.
It did not engage in judicial legislation but correctly interpreted the pertinent laws. Because petitioner
was never placed in confinement, prescription never started to run in his favor.18 l^vvphi 1.net
Consistent with the two cases cited above, this Court pronounces that the prescription of penalties
found in Article 93 of the Revised Penal Code, applies only to those who are convicted by final
judgment and are serving sentence which consists in deprivation of liberty. The period for
prescription of penalties begins only when the convict evades service of sentence by escaping
during the term of his sentence. Since petitioner never suffered deprivation of liberty before his
arrest on January 20, 2000 and as a consequence never evaded sentence by escaping during the
term of his service, the period for prescription never began.
Petitioner, however, has by this time fully served his sentence of two months and one day of arresto
mayor and should forthwith be released unless he is being detained for another offense or charge.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Angeles City, Branch 56 is AFFIRMED,
but petitioner is ordered released effective immediately for having fully served his sentence unless
he is detained for another offense or charge.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Footnotes
3 Rollo, p. 6.
4 Rollo, p. 6.
5 Id.
6 Rollo, p. 27.
8 Rollo, p. 9.
9 Rollo, p. 24.
12 Supra, at 313.
13 Supra, at 313.
14The period of prescription of penalties shall commence to run from the date when the
culprit should evade the service of his sentence, and it shall be interrupted if the defendant
should give himself up, be captured, should go to some foreign country with which this
Government as no extradition treaty, or should commit another crime before the expiration of
the period of prescription.
EN BANC
RESOLUTION
ANGELES, J.:
On petition for a writ of habeas corpus, filed by Ricardo Parulan, directed to the Director of the
Bureau of Prisons, praying that the latter be ordered "to release immediately and without delay the
body of the petitioner from unlawful and illegal confinement", anchoring the relief prayed for on
certain allegations in the petition, to the effect that petitioner's confinement in the state penitentiary at
Muntinglupa, Rizal, under the administrative and supervisory control of the respondent Director of
Prisons, is illegal, for the reason that the sentence of conviction imposed upon said petitioner for the
crime of evasion of service of sentence, penalized under Article 157 of the Revised Penal Code, was
rendered by a court without jurisdiction over his person and of the offense with which he was
charged.
It appears that the petitioner, as alleged in the petition, was confined in the state penitentiary
at Muntinglupa, Rizal, serving a sentence of life imprisonment which, however, was commuted to
twenty (20) years by the President of the Philippines. In October, 1964, he was transferred to the
military barracks of Fort Bonifacio (formerly Fort Wm. McKinley) situated at Makati, Rizal, under the
custody of the Stockade Officer of the said military barracks. In that month of October, 1964, while
still serving his prison term as aforesaid, he effected his escape from his confinement. Petitioner was
recaptured in the City of Manila. Prosecuted for the crime of evasion of service of sentence,
penalized under Article 157 of the Revised Penal Code, before the Court of First Instance of Manila,
after due trial, petitioner was found guilty of the offense charged and sentenced accordingly with the
imposable penalty prescribed by law, on August 3, 1966.
Assuming the correctness of the facts as alleged in the petition, and on the basis thereof, we
shall proceed to discuss the merits of the case regarding the validity and legality of the decision
sentencing the petitioner to a prison term for the crime of evasion of sentence.
Settled is the rule that for deprivation of any fundamental or constitutional rights, lack of
jurisdiction of the court to impose the sentence, or excessive penalty affords grounds for relief
by habeas corpus.
The issue, therefore, as posed in the petition is: Was the Court of First Instance of Manila with
jurisdiction to try and decide the case and to impose the sentence upon the petitioner, for the offense
with which he was charged — evasion of service of sentence?
Place where action is to be instituted. — (a) In all criminal prosecutions the action shall
be instituted and tried in the court of the municipality of province where the offense was
committed or any of the essential ingredients thereof took place.
There are crimes which are called transitory or continuing offenses because some acts
material and essential to the crime occur in one province and some in another, in which case, the
rule is settled that the court of either province where any of the essential ingredients of the crime
took place has — jurisdiction to try the case.1 As Gomez Orbaneja opines —
There are, however, crimes which although all the elements thereof for its consummation may
have occurred in a single place, yet by reason of the very nature of the offense committed, the
violation of the law is deemed to be continuing. Of the first class, the crime of estafa or
malversation3 and abduction 4 may be mentioned; and as belonging to the second class are the
crimes of kidnapping and illegal detention where the deprivation of liberty is persistent and
continuing from one place to another 5 and libel where the libelous matter is published or circulated
from one province to another. 6 To this latter class may also be included the crime of evasion of
service of sentence, when the prisoner in his attempt to evade the service of the sentence imposed
upon him by the courts and thus defeat the purpose of the law, moves from one place to another;
for, in this case, the act of the escaped prisoner is a continuous or series of acts, set on foot by a
single impulse and operated by an unintermittent force, however long it may be. It may not be validly
said that after the convict shall have escaped from the place of his confinement the crime is fully
consummated, for, as long as he continues to evade the service of his sentence, he is deemed to
continue committing the crime, and may be arrested without warrant, at any place where he may be
found. Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Court may be invoked in support of this conclusion, for,
under section 6[c] thereof, one of the instances when a person may be arrested without warrant is
where he has escaped from confinement. 7Undoubtedly, this right of arrest without a warrant is
founded on the principle that at the time of the arrest, the escapee is in the continuous act of
committing a crime — evading the service of his sentence.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro and
Fernando, JJ., concur. 1äw phï1.ñët
Footnotes
5 U.S. v. Laureaga 2 Phil. 71; People v. Parulan, L-2025, April 25, 1951.
6 Art. 360, par. 3, as amended by Rep Act 1289.; People v. Borja, 43 Phil. 618.
THIRD DIVISION
FRANCISCO, J.:p
In an information filed before the Regional Trial Court of Angeles City, appellant was charged with
violation of P.D. No. 1866 for illegal possession of firearms punishable by reclusion
temporal maximum to reclusion perpetua.1Pending trial, appellant was released on bail. Thereafter,
appellant was convicted as charged and meted an indeterminate penalty of 17 years 4 months and 1
day of reclusion temporal to 21 years of reclusion perpetua. He appealed to public respondent Court
of Appeals, but judgment was rendered affirming his conviction. Respondent court cancelled his
bailbond and ordered his arrest for confinement at the New Bilibid Prison. Appellant filed a motion for
reconsideration but was denied. Dissatisfied, appellant is now before us by way of a petition for
review on certiorari with an application for bail praying, among others, to be allowed to post bail for
his temporary liberty. In his subsequent pleading,1 appellant moved for the separate resolution of his
bail application.
Bail is either a matter of right, or of discretion. It is a matter of right when the offense charged is not
punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment.2 On the other hand, upon conviction by
the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment, bail becomes a matter of discretion.3Similarly, if the court imposed a penalty of
imprisonment exceeding six (6) years but not more than twenty (20) years then bail is a matter of
discretion, except when any of the enumerated circumstances4 under paragraph 3 of Section 5, Rule
114 is present then bail shall be denied. But when the accused is charged with a capital offense, or
an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, and evidence of guilt strong, bail
shall be denied,5 as it is neither a matter of right nor of discretion. If the evidence, however, is not
strong bail becomes a matter of
right.6
Thus:
Administrative Circular No. 2-92, in addition, applies in this case. The circular unequivocably
provides that when an accused is charged with a capital offense or an offense which under
the law at the time of its commission and at the time of the application for bail is punishable
by reclusion perpetua and is out on bail and after trial is convicted by the trial court of the
offense charged, his bond shall be cancelled and the accused shall be placed in confinement
pending resolution of his appeal. Appellant's application must, perforce, fail as he is no
longer entitled to bail.
Be that as it may, we are not unwilling to accommodate his request for an X-ray and Magnetic
Resonance Imaging (MRI) at St. Luke's Hospital as follow-up examinations for his 1994 slipped-disc
operation. It has been said that while justice is the first virtue of the court, yet admittedly, humanity is
the second. Hence, petitioner's request for the badly needed X-ray and MRI examinations for which
the New Bilibid Prison Hospital is inadequately equipped, as certified to by its Chief Officer, deserves
attention. We recall that way back in 1946, we allowed in Dela Rama v.People's Court,9 a precedent
on which appellant now anchors his application, a prisoner to be released on bail when his continued
detention would be injurious to his health. This trend, however, has changed with the development of
times. Besides, appellant's situation is not akin to Dela Rama's factual milieu. While appellant now
shall be denied bail, nevertheless, we cannot be indifferent to his medical needs. And by granting
appellant's request, the Court is merely performing its supervisory powers over detainees to
safeguard, among others, their proper accommodation and health pursuant to Section 25 of Rule
114 of the Rules of Court, as amended.
SO ORDERED.
(a) That the accused is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or habitual delinquent, or has committed
the crime aggravated by the circumstances of reiteration;
(b) That the accused is found to have previously escaped from legal confinement, evaded
sentence, or has violated the conditions of his bail without valid justification.
(c) That the accused committed the offense while on probation, parole, or under conditional
pardon;
(d) That the circumstances of the accused or his case indicate the probability of flight if
released on bail; or
(e) That there is undue risk that during the pendency of the appeal, the accused may commit
another crime.
8 Id., at p. 295.
9 77 Phil. 461.
EN BANC
RESOLUTION
For resolution is the enforceability of the conditional pardon granted to accused-appellant Ricky
Mengote during the pendency in this Court of his appeal from his conviction by the trial court.
In the decision1 dated 18 November 1991 of Branch 88 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon
City in Criminal Case No. Q-90-11835, the accused-appellants were found guilty beyond reasonable
doubt as co-principals of the compound crime of murder and destructive arson and were each
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay, jointly and severally, an indemnity
in the sum of P50,000.00 to the heirs of the victim.2
The appellants seasonably filed their Notice of Appeal. On 24 March 1993, this Court accepted the
appeal. On 6 January 1994, however, appellant Francisco Salle, Jr. filed an Urgent Motion to
Withdraw Appeal. The Court then required his counsel, Atty. Ida May La'o of the Free Legal
Assistance Group (FLAG) to verify the voluntariness of the aforesaid motion.
In her Manifestation with Motion to Withdraw Appeal, Atty. La'o informed this Court that her
verification disclosed that Salle signed the motion without the assistance of counsel on his
misimpression that the motion was merely a bureaucratic requirement necessary for his early
release from the New Bilibid Prison (NBP) following the grant of a conditional pardon by the
President on 9 December 1993. He was discharged from the NBP on 28 December 1993. She
further informed the Court that appellant Ricky Mengote was, on the same dates, granted a
conditional pardon and released from confinement, and that he immediately left for his province
without consulting her. She then prays that this Court grant Salle's motion to withdraw his appeal
and consider it withdrawn upon his acceptance of the conditional pardon.
Until now, Mengote has not filed a motion to withdraw his appeal.
In the resolution of 23 March 1994, this Court granted Salle's motion to withdraw his appeal and
considered this case closed and terminated insofar as he is concerned.
On 3 June 1993, Assistant Director Jesus P. Villanueva of the Bureau of Corrections submitted
certified photocopies of the conditional pardon granted separately to Salle3 and Mengote4 and of their
certificates of release.5 The said copies of the conditional pardon state, among other things, that it is
upon acceptance of the pardon that the appellants will be released from confinement. But there is
nothing to show when the appellants accepted the pardon.
In its Comment of 17 August 1994, the Office of the Solicitor General asserted that with their
acceptance of the conditional pardon, the appellants impliedly admitted their guilt and accepted their
sentence, and hence, the appeal should be dismissed.6
After taking into consideration Section 19, Article VII of the Constitution which provides that the
President may, except in cases of impeachment or as otherwise provided in the Constitution, grant
pardon after conviction by final judgment, this Court resolved to require.
1. The Office of the Solicitor General and the counsel for the accused-appellants to
submit, within thirty (30) days from notice hereof, their respective memoranda on the
issue of the enforceability of the conditional pardon; and
2. The Presidential Committee for the Grant of Bail, Release or Pardon to inform the
Court, within ten (10) days from notice hereof, why it recommended to the President
the grant of the conditional pardon despite the pendency of the appeal. 7
In a Comment submitted on behalf of the Presidential Committee for the Grant of Bail, Release, or
Pardon, Assistant Chief State Prosecutor Nilo C. Mariano avers that the Secretariat assisting the
Committee has a standing agreement with the FLAG and other human rights organizations that it will
recommend to the Presidential Committee for conditional pardon by the President of convicted
persons who may have been convicted of crimes against national security and public order or of
common crimes which appear to have been committed in pursuit of their political objectives; and that
where the said convicted persons have pending appeals before the appellate court, the lawyers of
the said organizations, particularly the FLAG, will take care of filing the appropriate motions for the
withdrawal of their appeal considering that presidential pardon may be extended only to those
serving sentence after final conviction. Notwithstanding that agreement, before it recommends to the
Committee the grant of conditional pardon, the Secretariat also checks with the Bureau of
Corrections the carpeta or records of recommendees whether they have pending appeals so that
those concerned may be properly advised to withdraw the same. Mariano further contends that per
information given to the Secretariat by Assistant Director Villanueva, Mengote's carpeta or prison
record does not show that he has a pending appeal with the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court.
For that reason, the Secretariat was not able to advise those concerned to take appropriate steps for
the withdrawal of the appeal before it recommended to the Committee the grant of conditional
pardon in favor of Mengote. Mariano then assures the Court that there was no intention on the part
of the Secretariat and the Committee to violate Section 19, Article VII of the Constitution, and that
what happened was a clear misappreciation of facts due to the incomplete records of Mengote.
In its Memorandum filed for the Appellee on 15 December 1994, the Office of the Solicitor General
maintains that the conditional pardon granted to appellant Mengote is unenforceable because the
judgment of conviction is not yet final in view of the pendency in this Court of his appeal.
On the other hand, the FLAG, through Atty. La'o, submits that the conditional pardon extended to
Mengote is valid and enforceable. Citing Monsanto vs. Factoran, Jr.,8 it argues that although
Mengote did not file a motion to withdraw the appeal, he was deemed to have abandoned the appeal
by his acceptance of the conditional pardon which resulted in the finality of his conviction.
The pivotal issue thus raised is the enforceability of a pardon granted to an accused during the
pendency of his appeal from a judgment of conviction by the trial court.
This calls for a review of the Philippine laws on presidential pardons. We shall start with the Jones
Law.9 Section 21 thereof provided in part as follows:
Sec. 21. That the supreme executive power shall be vested in an executive officer,
whose official title shall be "The Governor-General of the Philippine Islands.". . . He is
hereby vested with the exclusive power to grant pardons and reprieves and remit
fines and forfeitures. . . .
Then came the 1935 Constitution. Paragraph 6, Section 10, Article VII thereof provided as follows:
(6) The President shall have the power to grant reprieves, commutations, and
pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures, after conviction, for all offenses, except in
cases of impeachment, upon such conditions and with such restrictions and
limitations as he may deem proper to impose. He shall have the power to grant
amnesty with the concurrence of the Congress.
This provision differed from that of the Jones Law in some respects. Thus, in People vs. Vera, 10 this
Court held:
Under the Jones Law, as at common law, pardon could be granted any time after the
commission of the offense, either before or after conviction (Vide Constitution of the
United States, Art. II, sec. 2; In reLontok [1922], 43 Phil. 293). The Governor-General
of the Philippines was thus empowered, like the President of the United States, to
pardon a person before the facts of the case were fully brought to light. The framers
of our Constitution thought this undesirable and, following most of the state
constitutions, provided that the pardoning power can only be exercised "after
conviction".
The requirement of after conviction operated as one of the limitations on the pardoning power of the
President. Thus:
It should be observed that there are two limitations upon the exercise of this
constitutional prerogative by the Chief Executive, namely: (a) that the power be
exercised after conviction; and (b) that such power does not extend to cases of
impeachment. 11
The 1973 Constitution went further by providing that pardon could be granted only after final
conviction. Section 14 of Article IX thereof reads as follows:
The 1981 amendments to the 1973 Constitution, however, removed the limitation of final conviction,
thereby bringing us back to the aforementioned provision of the Jones Law. Section 11, Article VII of
the 1973 Constitution, as thus amended, reads:
But the said limitation was restored by the present Constitution. Section 19, Article VII thereof reads
as follows:
Where the pardoning power is subject to the limitation of conviction, it may be exercised at any time
after conviction even if the judgment is on appeal. It is, of course, entirely different where the
requirement is " final conviction, " as was mandated in the original provision of Section 14, Article IX
of the 1973 Constitution, or "conviction by final judgment," as presently prescribed in Section 19,
Article VII of the 1987 Constitution. In such a case, no pardon may be extended before a judgment
of conviction becomes final.
A judgment of conviction becomes final (a) when no appeal is seasonably perfected, (b) when the
accused commences to serve the sentence, (c) when the right to appeal is expressly waived in
writing, except where the death penalty was imposed by the trial court, and (d) when the accused
applies for probation, thereby waiving his right to appeal. 12 Where the judgment of conviction is still
pending appeal and has not yet therefore attained finality, as in the instant case, executive clemency
may not yet be granted to the appellant.
We are not, however, unmindful of the ruling of this Court in People vs. Crisola 13 that the grant of
executive clemency during the pendency of the appeal serves to put an end to the appeal. Thus:
It must, nevertheless, be noted that the constitutional provision quoted is that of the 1973
Constitution, as amended, which authorized the exercise of the pardoning power at anytime,
either before or after conviction. Also, in Monsanto vs. Factoran, 14 this Court stated that the
acceptance of a pardon amounts to an abandonment of an appeal, rendering the conviction
final; thus:
The 1981 amendments had deleted the earlier rule that clemency could be extended
only upon final conviction, implying that clemency could be given even before
conviction. Thus, petitioner's unconditional pardon was granted even as her appeal
was pending in the High Court. It is worth mentioning that under the 1987
Constitution, the former limitation of final conviction was restored. But be that as it
may, it is our view that in the present case, it is not material when the pardon was
bestowed, whether before or after conviction, for the result would still be the same.
Having accepted the pardon, petitioner is deemed to have abandoned her appeal
and her unreversed conviction by the Sandiganbayan assumed the character of
finality.
This statement should not be taken as a guiding rule for it is nothing but an orbiter dictum.
Moreover, the pardon involved therein was extended on 17 December 1984 or under the
regime of Section 11, Article VII of the 1973 Constitution, as amended, which allowed the
grant of pardon either before or after conviction.
The reason the Constitutional Commission adopted the "conviction by final judgment"
requirement, reviving in effect the original provision of the 1973 Constitution on the
pardoning power, was, as expounded by Commissioner Napoleon Rama, to prevent the
President from exercising executive power in derogation of the judicial power. 15
Indeed, an appeal brings the entire case within the exclusive jurisdiction of the appellate
court. A becoming regard for the doctrine of separation of powers demands that such
exclusive authority of the appellate court be fully respected and kept unimpaired. For truly,
had not the present Constitution adopted the "conviction by final judgment" limitation, the
President could, at any time, and even without the knowledge of the court, extend executive
clemency to any one whom he, in good faith or otherwise, believes to merit presidential
mercy. It cannot be denied that under the Jones Law and the 1981 amendments to the 1973
Constitution on the pardoning power which did not require conviction, the President had
unimpeded power to grant pardon even before the criminal case could be heard. And under
the 1935 Constitution which required "conviction" only, the power could be exercised at any
time after conviction and regardless of the pendency of the appeal. In either case, there
could be the risk not only of a failure of justice but also of a frustration of the system of
administration of justice in view of the derogation of the jurisdiction of the trial or appellate
court. Where the President is not so prevented by the Constitution, not even Congress can
impose any restriction to prevent a presidential folly. 16 Hence, nothing but a change in the
constitutional provision consisting in the imposition of "conviction by final judgment"
requirement can change the rule. The new Constitution did it.
Hence, before an appellant may be validly granted pardon, he must first ask for the
withdrawal of his appeal, i.e., the appealed conviction must first be brought to finality.
Accordingly, while this Court, in its resolution of 21 March 1991 in People vs. Pedro
Sepada, 17 dismissed the appeal for having become moot and academic in view of the parole
granted to the appellant, it explicitly declared the necessity of a final judgment before parole
or pardon could be extended. Thus:
Recently, in its resolution of 31 January 1995 in People vs. Hinlo, 18 this Court categorically
declared to be "in clear violation of the law" the "practice of processing applications for
pardon or parole despite pending appeals." This Court resolved therein as follows:
The above pronouncements of this Court in Sepada and in Hinlo may still be unheeded,
either through deliberate disregard thereof or by reason of an erroneous application of
the obiter dictum in Monsanto or of the ruling in Crisola. Hence, the need for decisive action
on the matter.
We now declare that the "conviction by final judgment" limitation under Section 19, Article VII
of the present Constitution prohibits the grant of pardon, whether full or conditional, to an
accused during the pendency of his appeal from his conviction by the trial court. Any
application therefor, if one is made, should not be acted upon or the process toward its grant
should not be begun unless the appeal is withdrawn. Accordingly, the agencies or
instrumentalities of the Government concerned must require proof from the accused that he
has not appealed from his conviction or that he has withdrawn his appeal. Such proof may
be in the form of a certification issued by the trial court or the appellate court, as the case
may be. The acceptance of the pardon shall not operate as an abandonment or waiver of the
appeal, and the release of an accused by virtue of a pardon, commutation of sentence, or
parole before the withdrawal of an appeal shall render those responsible therefor
administratively liable. Accordingly, those in custody of the accused must not solely rely on
the pardon as a basis for the release of the accused from confinement.
And now on the instant case. Considering that appellant Ricky Mengote has not filed a
motion to withdraw his appeal up to this date the conditional pardon extended to him should
not have been enforced. Nonetheless, since he stands on the same footing as the accused-
appellants in the Hinlo case, he may be freed from the full force, impact, and effect of the
rule herein pronounced subject to the condition set forth below. This rule shall fully bind
pardons extended after 31 January 1995 during the pendency of the grantee's appeal.
Let copies of this Resolution be furnished the Office of the President, the Department of
Justice, the Board of Pardons and Parole, and the Presidential Committee for the Grant of
Bail, Release, or Pardon.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Feliciano, Padilla, Regalado, Romero, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza,
Francisco, Hermosisima, Jr. and Panganiban, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
I concur. The grant of reprieves, commutations and pardons, as well as the remission of fines and
forfeitures by the President may be done only after the grantee has been convicted by final judgment
in the instances enumerated in the majority ponencia. This is crystal clear from the terms of Sec. 19,
Art. VII, 1987 Constitution, which states that "[e]xcept in cases of impeachment, or as otherwise
provided in this Constitution, the President may grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons, and
remit fines and forfeitures, after conviction by final judgment . . . ." as distinguished from its
counterpart provision in the 1973 Constitution, as amended, under which People
v. Crisola1 and Monsanto v. Factoran, Jr.,2 were decided. Accordingly, any grant of pardon in favor of
an appellant whose appeal is still pending resolution violates the Constitution.
Thus where an appeal is taken from a judgment of conviction, the appellant must first withdraw his
appeal or await the resolution thereof so that the judgment on appeal may attain finality. If his appeal
is not yet resolved with finality, the appellant must first withdraw his appeal before his application for
reprieve, commutation, pardon, remission of fines or forfeitures may be acted upon favorably by the
Board of Pardons and Parole and, for that matter, by the Presidential Committee for the Grant of
Bail, Release or Pardon. Consequently, such application should not be processed until the applicant
sufficiently shows that the decision finding him guilty has become final.
To allow the processing of such application in the case before us despite the pendency of an appeal
may lead to confusion since the applicant may yet be acquitted by the appellate court although
already granted pardon by the President. That would be incongruous and unwarranted. Hence, the
present practice of the Board of Pardons and Parole, which may be unjustified carry-over from the
past under the old Constitution, and of the Presidential Committee for the Grant of Bail, Release or
Pardon, of processing applications for reprieves, pardons, commutations, etc., despite the pendency
of an appeal must immediately be abated.
The persistent recurrence of the grant of such applications despite repeated admonitions from this
Court demands a firm and uncompromising stand from us lest we permit continuous and unmitigated
diminution if not derogation of judicial prerogative. A mere deferment of suspension of the effectivity
of the conditional pardon until the withdrawal of the appeal, to my mind, is a sanction too lenient, or
an accommodation too generous, that can hardly be considered a corrective measure. The manifest
and repeated violation of the Constitution, wittingly or unwittingly, necessitates a commensurable
response from this Court as guardian of the Constitution.
Separate Opinions
I concur. The grant of reprieves, commutations and pardons, as well as the remission of fines and
forfeitures by the President may be done only after the grantee has been convicted by final judgment
in the instances enumerated in the majority ponencia. This is crystal clear from the terms of Sec. 19,
Art. VII, 1987 Constitution, which states that "[e]xcept in cases of impeachment, or as otherwise
provided in this Constitution, the President may grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons, and
remit fines and forfeitures, after conviction by final judgment . . . ." as distinguished from its
counterpart provision in the 1973 Constitution, as amended, under which People
v. Crisola1 and Monsanto v. Factoran, Jr.,2 were decided. Accordingly, any grant of pardon in favor of
an appellant whose appeal is still pending resolution violates the Constitution.
Thus where an appeal is taken from a judgment of conviction, the appellant must first withdraw his
appeal or await the resolution thereof so that the judgment on appeal may attain finality. If his appeal
is not yet resolved with finality, the appellant must first withdraw his appeal before his application for
reprieve, commutation, pardon, remission of fines or forfeitures may be acted upon favorably by the
Board of Pardons and Parole and, for that matter, by the Presidential Committee for the Grant of
Bail, Release or Pardon. Consequently, such application should not be processed until the applicant
sufficiently shows that the decision finding him guilty has become final.
To allow the processing of such application in the case before us despite the pendency of an appeal
may lead to confusion since the applicant may yet be acquitted by the appellate court although
already granted pardon by the President. That would be incongruous and unwarranted. Hence, the
present practice of the Board of Pardons and Parole, which may be unjustified carry-over from the
past under the old Constitution, and of the Presidential Committee for the Grant of Bail, Release or
Pardon, of processing applications for reprieves, pardons, commutations, etc., despite the pendency
of an appeal must immediately be abated.
The persistent recurrence of the grant of such applications despite repeated admonitions from this
Court demands a firm and uncompromising stand from us lest we permit continuous and unmitigated
diminution if not derogation of judicial prerogative. A mere deferment of suspension of the effectivity
of the conditional pardon until the withdrawal of the appeal, to my mind, is a sanction too lenient, or
an accommodation too generous, that can hardly be considered a corrective measure. The manifest
and repeated violation of the Constitution, wittingly or unwittingly, necessitates a commensurable
response from this Court as guardian of the Constitution.
Footnotes
2 Rollo, 19-31.
3 Rollo, 75.
4 Id., 73.
6 Id., 79.
7 Rollo, 84.
SECOND DIVISION
SYLLABUS
1. PARDON; VENUE IN CASE OF VIOLATION OF PARDON. — While the Court of First Instance of Cavite was
the one which imposed on the appellant the penalty of which he was subsequently pardoned, nevertheless
the violation of the conditions of that pardon, which is the subject matter of the present prosecution, took
place in the Province of Rizal. The present proceeding is not a continuation or a part of the former one. It is
a new proceeding, complete in itself and independent of the latter. It refers to other subsequent facts which
the law (art. 159 of the Revised Penal Code) punishes as a distinct crime the penalty for which is not
necessarily that remitted by the pardon. Held: That the Court of First Instance of Rizal had jurisdiction to
take cognizance of this case.
2. ID.; PRESCRIPTION OF VIOLATION; PENALTY PRESCRIBED FOR VIOLATION. — The penalty prescribed for
the violation is the penalty remitted by the pardon (art. 159 of the Revised Penal Code). In the case at bar
the penalty remitted was six years, six months and fourteen days, or more than six years. The appellant’s
contention that there should be deducted from this remitted penalty the allowance of time provided in article
97 of the Revised Penal Code, is unsound. This allowance is given in consideration of the good conduct of
the prisoner while serving his sentence. Not having served this remitted penalty, there is no reason for the
allowance, namely, the good conduct of the appellant while serving his sentence. The penalty imposable for
the violation being more than six years, this does not prescribe after four years, but after eight, under Act
No. 3585. Moreover, the violation in question is penalized by the Revised Penal Code (art. 159 aforesaid),
which is not a special law, and the prescription thereof, as regulated by article 90 of the same Code, is ten
years. Wherefore, the period of eight years not having elapsed from the time the appellant was found guilty
of the crime of attempted robbery in band with injuries by final judgment rendered on October 27, 1932, nor
from the time he committed this crime on October 27, 1930, the violation of the conditions of his pardon
with which he i8 charged, has not prescribed either under Act No. 3585 or under the Revised Penal Code.
DECISION
AVANCEÑA, C.J. :
The appellant Teodorico Martin was sentenced in the Court of First Instance of Cavite for the crime of
abduction to the penalty of fourteen years, eight months and one day of reclusion temporal, having
commenced to serve this sentence on January 17, 1917. On February 5, 1923, after having served eight
years, one month and seventeen days, leaving still unserved six years, six months and fourteen days, he
was pardoned on condition that he should not again be found guilty of any crime punishable by the laws of
the Philippines. Subsequently the appellant was tried for the crime of attempted robbery in band with
physical injuries and sentenced, by final judgment dated October 27, 1932, to pay a fine of 330 pesetas,
with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
The appellant is charged with a violation of the conditions of his pardon for having committed the crime for
which he was sentenced on October 27, 1932. The Court of First Instance of Rizal, which took cognizance of
this case, found him guilty and sentenced him to suffer the penalty which was remitted in the pardon,
namely, six years, six months and fourteen days of reclusion temporal.
It is alleged that the Court of First Instance of Cavite, and not that of Rizal, had jurisdiction to take
cognizance of this case. We find no merit in this contention. While the Court of First Instance of Cavite was
the one which imposed on the appellant the penalty of which he was subsequently pardoned, nevertheless
the violation of the conditions of that pardon, which is the subject matter of the present prosecution, took
place in the Province of Rizal. The present proceeding is not a continuation or a part of the former one. It is
a new proceeding, complete in itself and independent of the latter. It refers to other subsequent facts which
the law (art. 159 of the Revised Penal Code) punishes as a distinct crime the penalty for which is not
necessarily that remitted by the pardon.
The prescription of the violation is another defense put up by the appellant. He contends that this violation
being punished with prision correccional in its minimum degree which should be imposed in its medium
period, that is, from one year, one month and eleven days to one year, eight months and twenty days (art.
159 of the Revised Penal Code), it prescribes after four years under section 1 of Act No. 3585. This Act
provides:jg c:chan roble s.com.p h
"SECTION 1. Violations penalized by special acts shall, unless otherwise provided in such acts, prescribe in
accordance with the following rules: (a) after a year for offenses punished only by a fine or by imprisonment
for not more than one month, or both; (b) after four years for those punished by imprisonment for more
than one month, but less than two years; (c) after eight years for those punished by imprisonment for two
year s or more, but less than six years; . . . ." cralaw virtua 1aw lib rary
We likewise find no merit in this defense. In the first place, the penalty prescribed for the violation is not
that of prision correccional in its minimum grade, but the penalty remitted by the pardon. Article 159 of the
Revised Penal Code reads: jgc:cha nrob les.co m.ph
"Other cases of evasion of service of sentence. — The penalty of prision correccional in its minimum period
shall be imposed upon the convict, who, having been granted conditional pardon by the Chief Executive,
shall violate any of the conditions of such pardon. However, if the penalty remitted by the granting of such
pardon be higher than six years, the convict shall then suffer the unexpired portion of his original
sentence." cralaw virt ua1aw lib rary
In the case at bar the penalty remitted was six years, six months and fourteen days, or more than six years.
The appellant’s contention that there should be deducted from this remitted penalty the allowance of time
provided in article 97 of the Revised Penal Code, is unsound. This allowance is given in consideration of the
good conduct of the prisoner while serving his sentence. Not having served this remitted penalty, there is no
reason for the allowance, namely, the good conduct of the appellant while serving his sentence. The penalty
imposable for the violation being more than six years, this does not prescribe after four years, but after
eight, under the aforesaid Act No. 3585 the pertinent portion of which has been quoted.
Moreover, the violation in question is penalized by the Revised Penal Code (art. 159 aforesaid), which is not
a special law, and the prescription thereof, as regulated by article 90 of the same Code, is ten years.
Wherefore, the period of eight years not having elapsed from the time the appellant was found guilty of the
crime of attempted robbery in band with injuries by final judgment rendered on October 27, 1932, nor from
the time he committed this crime on October 27, 1930, the violation of the conditions of his pardon with
which he is charged, has not prescribed either under Act No. 3585 or under the Revised Penal Code.
The appealed judgment is affirmed, with the costs to the appellant. So ordered.
DECISION
AZCUNA, J.:
That on or about and prior to November 30, 1996 in Quezon City, Philippines, the
said accused by means of force and intimidation, to wit: by then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously ordering the undersigned minor, 12 years of age, to
remove her T-shirt and then accused sucked her breast and removed her shorts and
panty and forcibly opened her thighs and inserted his penis inside her vagina and
thereafter have carnal knowledge with the undersigned complainant against her will
and without her consent.
That on or about the 30th day of November, 1996, in Quezon City, Philippines, the
said accused by means of force and intimidation, to wit: by then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously removing the short and panty of the undersigned, a minor,
twelve years of age, [his] stepdaughter and put [himself] on top of her and thereafter
[had] carnal knowledge with the undersigned complainant against her will and
without her consent.
Upon being arraigned, appellant pleaded not guilty, whereupon the cases were jointly
tried.
The prosecution presented witnesses whose testimonies are as follows:
Complainant Jobell B. Galang was 13 years old when she testified. Sometime in May,
1994, at around 9:00 oclock to 10:00 oclock in the evening, while she was sleeping on
the floor of her familys small shanty in Balintawak, Quezon City, she woke up to find the
appellant beside her. Complainant tried to run away, but he poked a knife at her neck.
Appellant removed his pants and then mounted the complainant, while rubbing his penis
against her vagina for about three to four minutes. Nothing more happened that night.[4]
After that incident, complainants family moved to another shanty in North Fairview,
Quezon City. Sometime in November, 1996, but prior to November 30, 1996, around
11:00 oclock in the evening, while complainant was again sleeping on the floor of their
shanty, the appellant, already naked, poked a balisong at her and ordered her to remove
her shorts and panties. He then made her lie on the floor and mounted her as he tried to
spread her legs. Complainant resisted, but appellant struck her legs. With her legs
already spread, appellant inserted his penis into her vagina. Appellants dastardly act
would not have ended that night had it not been for a knock on the door. Appellant then
stood up and talked to the person who knocked. Complainant kept her silence since
appellant threatened to kill her mother, brothers, and sisters should she tell anybody
about her harrowing experience.[5]
On November 30, 1996, at around 10:00 oclock in the evening, while complainant
was again asleep, she was roused by the appellant who was removing her shorts and
panties. Again, complainant resisted but he slapped her hard three times. She lost
consciousness and when she woke up, she realized that she was already naked from the
waist down. Her vagina felt painful. When she urinated, she saw a smear of blood. [6] She
only reported these incidents to the police on September 20, 1997, almost a year after
the last incident of rape occurred.
Dr. Cristina B. Freyra, Medico Legal Officer of the Philippine National Police (PNP)
Crime Laboratory, examined the complainant on September 24, 1997. The examination
revealed that complainant sustained both deep and shallow healed lacerations in her
vagina, which appeared to have been inflicted more than seven days prior to the
examination. A hard and blunt object, such as an erect penis, may have caused these
lacerations.[7] Her report reads, thus:
Fairly developed, fairly nourished and coherent female subject. Breast[s] are
hemispherical with dark brown areola and nipples from which no secretion could be
pressed out. Abdomen is flat and soft.
GENITAL:
There is absence of pubic hair. Labia majora are full, convex and coaptated with
pinkish brown labia minora presenting in between. On separating the same disclosed
an elastic, fleshy-type hymen with a deep-healed laceration at 4 and shallow, healed
laceration at 9 oclock position. External vaginal orifice offers moderate resistance to
the introduction of the examining index fin[g]er.Vaginal canal is narrow with
prominent rugosities. Cervix is normal in size, color and consistency.
CONCLUSION
There are no external signs of recent application of any form of trauma at the time of
the examination.
REMARKS:
Vaginal and peri-urethral smears are negative for gram-negative diplococci and for
spermatozoa. [8]
For its part, the defense presented three witnesses whose testimonies are, as follows:
Amalia Galang testified that she is the mother of complainant. The complainant is her
daughter by a previous marriage. She has four other children, two girls and two boys,
who are all residing with her. In May, 1994, when their family was still residing at
Balingasa, Balintawak, Quezon City, she did not notice anything unusual with her
daughter. She testified that her daughter appeared happy and was, in fact, playing most
of the time. When they transferred to Fairview, Quezon City sometime around November,
1996, her daughter was already in Grade Five. Again, she did not find anything unusual
with the actions of her daughter. The witness likewise testified that she was at home on
November 30, 1996, when the second rape allegedy occurred since that day was a
holiday. Her husband arrived home that night at around midnight. She ate supper with
her husband and watched television up to 2:00 oclock in the morning before going to
sleep. She usually sleeps beside her husband. The children sleep beside her together
with her husbands sister-in-law. She woke up at around 3:00 oclock in the morning and
while in bed, she did not notice anything unusual. Upon being asked the question as to
why her daughter would file these charges against appellant, she answered that her uncle
is using her daughter as a leverage against her husband in his quarrel with the latter.
The second witness for the defense, Jobert Manonag, a neighbor of the family in
Fairview since 1996, testified that on November 30, 1996, he was watching television at
the house of the appellant from 8:00 oclock in the evening to 12:00 oclock midnight. There
were around five people in the house, the four children and appellants sister-in-law. The
appellant and his wife were still at work. Appellant had not yet arrived when he left the
house at around midnight.
The third witness for the defense was appellant himself. Appellant testified that he is
the common-law husband of complainants mother, Amalia Galang, with whom he has
three children. Complainant is the daughter of Amalia Galang by her first husband. On
the night of November 30, 1996, he was driving his tricycle until 10:00 oclock in the
evening. He arrived home at around past 11:00 oclock that night. His common-law wife
was already home as were their three children, the complainant, and his sister-in-
law.After talking to his wife for a short while, he went to sleep. He usually sleeps beside
his wife at the end of the room. Their house has only one room where they all sleep. This
room measures about five meters wide and five meters long. The complainant sleeps on
the other side of the room. He woke up the next day at 4:00 oclock in the morning together
with his wife and he went back to driving his tricycle. The children were still asleep when
he went back to work. He denied ever raping the complainant or committing acts of
lasciviousness upon her.
On August 7, 2000, the trial court rendered its decision, the dispositive portion of
which reads:
1.) In Criminal Case No. Q-97-73195[,] the Court finds the accused Ireneo Corral y
Paladio guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape committed against Jobell
Galang y Bucalig, and hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of death.
2.) In Criminal Case No. Q-98-75096, the Court finds the same accused guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of rape committed against the same complainant, and
likewise sentences him to suffer the penalty of death.
3.) In Criminal Case No. Q-98-75097, the Court finds the same accused guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of acts of lasciviousness in relation to Republic Act No.
7610 committed against the same complainant and hereby sentences him to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of 12 years and 1 day to 18 years, 2 months and 20 days
of reclusion temporal.
The Court hereby orders the accused to indemnify the private complainant the amount
of P75,000 as civil indemnity and P50,000 as moral damages.
SO ORDERED. [9]
Appellant submits the following assignments of errors for the consideration of this
Court:
I.
Under the first and second informations, the trial court erred in imposing the death
penalty despite the fact that the qualifying circumstance of use of deadly weapon was not
alleged in the informations.
II.
Under the first and second informations, the trial court erred in imposing the death
penalty despite the fact that the qualifying circumstance that the accused is the common-
law spouse of the parent of the victim was not alleged in the informations.[10]
Conviction or acquittal in a rape case more often than not depends almost entirely on
the credibility of the complainants testimony because, by the very nature of this crime, it
is usually only the victim who can testify as to its occurrence. In rape cases, certain well-
established principles and precepts are controlling. These are (a) an accusation of rape
can be made with facility; it is difficult to prove but more difficult for the person accused,
though innocent, to disprove; (b) due to the nature of the crime of rape where only two
persons are usually involved, the testimony of the complainant must be scrutinized with
extreme caution, and (c) the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own
merits and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the
defense.[11] The determination of the outcome of every rape case hinges upon the
credibility of the complainants testimony. If the complainant testified in a categorical,
straightforward, spontaneous, and consistent manner, then she is considered a credible
witness and her testimony is worthy of judicial acceptance.[12] The assessment of the
credibility of witnesses and their testimonies is a matter best undertaken by the trial court
because of its unique opportunity to observe the witnesses firsthand and to note their
demeanor, conduct, and attitude under grueling examination.[13]
In the case at bar, the trial court found the testimony of complainant to be
straightforward, sincere, candid, and very consistent.
In Criminal Case No. Q-97-73195, complainant testified, as follows:
Q: On November 30, 1996 at around past 10:00 oclock in the evening, what did the
accused do to you if there was any?
A: He forcibly took off my shorts and panty.
Q: What did you do when he was forcibly removing your shorts and panty?
A: I resisted but he slapped me hard 3 times.
Q: And what happened to you when he slapped you?
A: I became unconscious.
Q: And when you woke up what did you observe if any?
A: I had no more shorts and panty on.
Q: And what did you do after that?
A: I cant do anything, I just cried and just covered myself with a blanket.
Q: What did you feel when you woke up?
A: When I woke up, I urinated, I felt pain in my vagina and I saw a smear [of] blood.
Q: Do you know the accused in this case?
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: Kindly pinpoint.
A: (INTERPRETER) Witness eyeing a person who gave his name as Ireneo Corral, the
accused in this case.
Q: Was he the one who abused you?
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: When did you report this incident?
A: On September 20, 1997.
Q: Why did it take almost a year before you reported the matter to the police?
A: Because he was threatening me not to report because he will kill my mother, and my
brothers and sister.
FISCAL SEMANA: That would be all for the witness.[14]
In Criminal Case No. Q-98-75096, the complainant testified, as follows:
Q: Sometime in November 1996 but prior to November 30, 1996, do you remember
where were you?
ATTY. VENTURANZA: We just like to repeat our objection, that it be noted.
COURT: The objection is duly noted by the Court.
A: I was at home.
Q: Do you remember of any unusual incident that happened?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What was that all about?
A: It happened in our house in Fairview when my brothers and sister were the[re],
including myself. We were 3 in all and my stepfather was also there and something
happened.
Q: What is that unusual incident that took place?
A: What happened between me and my stepfather was, when he inserted his penis into
my vagina.
Q: How was he able to do that?
A: He was already naked during that time, he already removed his underwear.
Q: What about you, what did he do to you if there was any?
A: He told me to remove my shorts, my panty.
Q: Did you comply with his demand?
A: Because of fear I obeyed him.
Q: Why, what frightened you?
A: Because he also pointed a knife at me, (balisong).
Q: When you were asked to remove your garments what did he do thereafter?
A: After he ordered me to remove my shorts and panty[,] he told me to lie down.
Q: [On] [w]hat part of the house did you lie down?
A: On the floor.
Q: And after you [lay] down on the floor, what did your stepfather do to you?
A: He went on top of me.
Q: And after he went on top of you[,] what else did he do thereafter?
A: He inserted his penis into my vagina.
Q: When he went on top of you and thereafter he inserted his private part into your
private part, what did you do?
A: I resisted.
Q: And when you resisted[,] what did he do?
A: He was forcing me to spread my legs and when I refused he tried to strike me or hit
me.
Q: In what part of your body?
A: On my legs.
Q: And after he hit you on the legs what did he do thereafter?
A: After he hit my legs and after my legs were spread, he inserted his penis into my
vagina.
Q: And when he was able to insert his penis into your private part[,] what did he do?
A: That is all, he just inserted his penis.
Q: If you remember, how long did his penis stay or inserted into your private part?
A: I cannot remember anymore.
Q: After having inserted his penis into your private part, what did he do thereafter?
A: Because after he used me somebody knocked [on] the door and after that he told me
to dress up. So I did what he told me.
Q: And after having dressed up what else happened?
A: After I dressed up, he talked to that person who knocked at the door.[15]
During the trial, appellant interposed a denial as his defense. His denial, however,
could not prevail over complainants direct, positive and categorical assertion. As between
a positive and categorical testimony which has the ring of truth on one hand and a bare
denial on the other, the former is generally held to prevail.[16]
Appellant now does not challenge the findings of the court a quo and in fact adopts
the same in his Statement of Facts.[17] He, however, argues that the two informations for
rape were silent as to the relationship of complainant and appellant. Hence, he claims,
the crimes committed were only simple rape, punishable by reclusion perpetua and not
death.
The relationship of complainant to the accused is a special qualifying circumstance
in the crime of rape and may raise the penalty from reclusion perpetua to that of
death.Hence, this circumstance must be alleged in the criminal complaint or information
and proved by the same quantum of proof as the crime itself. If these special qualifying
circumstances are not alleged, the crime committed would be simple rape and the penalty
to be imposed should be reclusion perpetua.
A stepdaughter is a daughter of ones spouse by a previous marriage. A stepfather-
stepdaughter relationship presupposes a valid marriage between the mother of
complainant and appellant.[18] The failure to allege the relationship between appellant and
the complainant in the information bars the formers conviction of rape in its qualified
form.[19]
Appellant testified that he was not legally married to Amalia Galang:
Q: Can you tell us the date of your marriage with your wife Amalia Galang?
A: We are not legally married.
Q: You are telling us that you are only common-law spouses?
A: Yes, sir.[20]
The best evidence to prove the marriage between appellant and complainants mother
is a marriage contract.[21] In the case at bar, the prosecution failed to prove a legitimate
marital relationship between appellant and Amalia Galang, complainants mother.
Amalia Galangs claim during trial that appellant is her husband is
inconsequential. This claim did not dispense with the burden of the prosecution to adduce
in evidence the marriage contract of appellant and complainants mother. Neither may the
prosecution rely solely on the disputable presumption that when a man and a woman who
live together as husband and wife are presumed to be married. Again, relationship is a
qualifying circumstance in rape. Therefore, it must not only be alleged in the information,
but must also be proved beyond reasonable doubt in the same way as the crime itself. [22]
Appellant further claims that the information in Criminal Case No. Q-98-75096 did not
allege that he employed a deadly weapon in forcing complainant to submit to his
will.Hence, the penalty should be reclusion perpetua and not death.
This argument is correct. Under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, simple rape
is punishable by reclusion perpetua:
Art. 335. When and how rape is committed. --- Rape is committed by having carnal
knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances:
Whenever the crime of rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon x x x the
penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death.
[1]
RTC Decision, pp. 16-17; rollo, pp. 119-120.
[2]
Id., p. 6.
[3]
Id., p. 1.
[4]
TSN, June 28, 1998, pp. 4-5.
[5]
TSN, June 29, 1998, pp. 7-8.
[6]
TSN, February 23, 1998, pp. 7-9.
[7]
TSN, May 15, 1998, pp. 2-5.
[8]
Records, p. 7.
[9]
RTC Decision, supra at 1.
[10]
Appellants Brief, p. 10; rollo, p. 92. Original in upper case.
[11]
People v. Gabris, 258 SCRA 663 (1996).
[12]
People v. Perez, 270 SCRA 526 (1997).
[13]
People v. Pontilar, 275 SCRA 338 (1997).
[14]
TSN, February 23, 1998, pp. 7-9.
[15]
TSN, June 29, 1998, pp. 7-8.
[16]
People v. Biago, 182 SCRA 411 (1990).
[17]
Appellants Brief, pp. 5-10; rollo, pp. 87-92.
[18]
People v. Esteban, G.R. No. 127904, December 5, 2002; People v. Villaraza, 339 SCRA 666 (2000).
[19]
People v. Poado, 311 SCRA 529 (1999); People v. Tolentino, 308 SCRA 485
(1999); People v. Manggasin, 306 SCRA 228 (1999); People v. Dimapilis, 300 SCRA 279 (1998).
[20]
TSN, August 5, 1999, p. 3.
[21]
People v. Silvano, 309 SCRA 485 (1999).
[22]
People v. Yonto, G.R. No. 148917-18, March 30, 2002; People v. Alconza, G.R. No. 135452-53, October
5, 2001.
[23]
People v. Fraga, 330 SCRA 669 (2000).
[24]
Rule 110, Sec. 8. Designation of the offense --- The complaint or information shall state the designation
of the offense given by the statute, aver the acts or omissions constituting the offense, and specify
its qualifying and aggravating circumstances. If there is no designation of the offense, reference
shall be made to the section or subsection of the statute punishing it.
Sec. 9. Cause of the accusation --- The acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense and
the qualifying and aggravating circumstances must be stated in ordinary and concise language and
not necessarily in the language used in the statute but in terms sufficient to enable a person of
common understanding to know what offense is being charged as well as its qualifying and
aggravating circumstances and for the court to pronounce judgment.
[25]
People v. Emperador, G.R. No. 132669, September 25, 2002.
[26]
People v. Catubig, G.R. No. 137842, August 23, 2001.
EN BANC
The record shows that the conditional pardon whose conditions were
violated by the accused referred to a penalty of six years and one
day of prision, of which two years, five months and twenty-two days
had been served by the accused. The penalty remitted by the
pardon was, therefore, three years, seven months and eight days.
These facts appear in the information the material allegations of
which have been admitted by the accused by virtue of' his plea of
guilty (U.S. vs.Burlado, 42 Phil., 72; U.S vs. Barba, 29 Phil., 206;
People vs. Cabral, G.R. No. 39200 [58 Phil., 930]). chanroble svi rtualaw lib rary ch anroble s virtual law l ib rary
Article 159 of the Revised Penal Code provides that the penalty of
prision correccional in its minimum period shall be imposed upon
the convict who, having been granted conditional pardon by the
Chief Executive, shall violate any of the conditions of such pardon.
However, if the Penalty remitted by the granting of such pardon be
higher than six years, the convict shall then suffer the unexpired
portion of his original sentence." chanrobles vi rtua l law lib rary
The second part of the article just quoted is inapplicable to the case
at bar because the unexpired portion of the penalty remitted by
reason of the condition pardon granted the accused does not exceed
six years. The first part thereof, which imposes the penalty
or prision correccional in its minimum period upon the convict who,
having been granted conditional pardon, shall violated any of its
conditions, is, therefore, applicable. The duration of this penalty is
from six months and one day to two years and four months.
Inasmuch as the mitigating circumstance of having pleaded guilty
should be considered in favor of the accused, and there being no
aggravating circumstance, the penalty should be imposed in its
minimum period which ranges from six months and one day to one
year, one month and ten days of prision correccional. The benefits
afforded by the Indeterminate Sentence Law are not applicable to
the accused, by express provision thereof. chanroblesv irt ualawli bra ry chan robles v irt ual law l ibra ry
EN BANC
SYLLABUS
2. CRIMINAL LAW; QUASI-RECIDIVISM; IMMATERIAL WHETHER CRIME FOR WHICH ACCUSED IS SERVING
SENTENCE FALLS UNDER THE REVISED PENAL CODE OR UNDER A SPECIAL LAW. — It makes no difference,
for the purposes of the effect of quasi-recidivism, under Article 160 of the Revised Penal Code, whether the
crime for which an accused is serving sentence at the time of the commission of the offense charged, falls
under said Code or under a special law.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
This case is before us en consulta, insofar as defendants Alfredo Peralta and Roman Fernando are
concerned, both having been sentenced by the Court of First Instance of Rizal to suffer the death penalty
and to jointly and severally indemnify the heirs of Guillermo Lutero in the sum of P3,000.00, as well as to
pay each one-sixth (1/6) of the costs.
Said defendants were accused, together with Marcial Ama, Conrado Medina, Alfredo Cariño and Rolando
Pangcubit, of the crime of murder, the information alleging: jgc:chan roble s.com.p h
"That on or about the 26th day of December, 1958, in the New Bilibid Prison, municipality of Muntinlupa,
province of Rizal, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, the above-named accused
conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping one another, with intent to kill, with treachery
and evident premeditation, armed with wooden club, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
attack, assault, hit one Guillermo Lutero on the different parts of his body and by strangling the neck of said
Guillermo Lutero thereby inflicting several wounds on the latter’s body which caused the death of said
Guillermo Lutero.
"That the accused are quasi-recidivists having committed the above-mentioned felony while serving their
respective sentence after having been convicted of final judgment." cralaw virtua1aw l ibra ry
Upon arraignment, the six (6) defendants entered a plea of not guilty. However, when the case was called
for trial, on August 24, 1959, defendants Alfredo Peralta and Roman Fernando, assisted by their counsel de
oficio withdrew their aforementioned plea and entered, in lieu thereof, that of guilty. Thereupon, the lower
court set the case for promulgation of the decision on September 1, 1959. Prior thereto, however, the
prosecution had filed a motion to dismiss the case as regards the other defendants, namely, Marcial Ama,
Conrado Medina, Alfredo Cariño and Rolando Pangcubit, upon the ground that a reinvestigation of the case
as regards these defendants had revealed the insufficiency of the evidence to establish their participation in
the commission of the crime charged. Hence, on September 1, 1959, the lower court issued an order
dismissing the case, insofar as Marcial Ama, Conrado Medina, Alfredo Cariño and Rolando Pangcubit are
concerned, with the proportionate part of the costs de oficio. On the same date, the court rendered its
decision finding Alfredo Peralta and Roman Fernando guilty of the crime of murder, committed with evident
premeditation, as qualifying circumstance, as well as with the generic aggravating circumstance of
treachery, offset by their voluntary plea of guilty, and the special circumstance of quasi-recidivism, and,
accordingly, imposing, pursuant of Article 160 of the Revised Penal Code, the maximum penalty prescribed
by law for the aforementioned crime, namely, the death penalty.
Counsel de oficio for these two (2) defendants maintains that the decision appealed from should be reversed
and the case remanded to the lower court for a new trial, upon the ground that said court should have taken
such evidence as was available to assure itself that Alfredo Peralta and Roman Fernando had understood
fully and completely the precise nature of the charge against them and the consequences of their plea of
guilty. Upon the other hand, Attorneys Orteza and Orteza, as counsel departe for Alfredo Peralta, contend
that the allegation of quasi-recidivism in the above information is ambiguous, in that it fails to state whether
the offenses for which the defendants were serving sentence at the time of the commission of the crime
charged were penalized by the Revised Penal Code, or by a special law.
We find no merit in either pretense. With respect to counsel de oficio’s contention, the transcript of the
proceedings in the lower court on August 24, 1959, shows that defendants Alfredo Peralta and Roman
Fernando insisted on pleading guilty to the charge, although their counsel de oficio had advised them that
the maximum penalty for the crime of murder would, as a consequence, be imposed upon them. As regards
the contention of Attys. Orteza and Orteza, it makes no difference, for purposes of the effect of quasi-
recidivism, under Article 160 of the Revised Penal Code, whether the crime for which an accused is serving
sentence at the time of the commission of the offense charged, falls under said Code or under a special law.
At any rate, we have examined the records of said defendants in the Bureau of Prisons and found that, at
the time of the commission of the crime of murder charged in the case at bar, they were serving sentences
for violations of the Revised Penal Code. More specifically, Alfredo Peralta was serving two (2) sentences,
namely: (a) one for robbery, by virtue of a final judgment of the Court of First Instance of Manila, in
Criminal Case No. 25676 thereof, rendered on April 1, 1954. which, furthermore declared him a habitual
delinquent, he having been previously convicted of theft, on September 6, 1952, and of attempted robbery
with physical injuries, on December 6, 1953; and (b) another for frustrated homicide, by virtue of a final
judgment of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, in Criminal Case No. 263-R thereof, dated November 14,
1957. Similarly, Roman Fernando was serving a sentence for homicide by virtue of a final judgment of the
Court of First Instance of Sulu, in Criminal Case No. 1168 thereof, dated March 24, 1955.
WHEREFORE, the aforementioned decision of the lower court is hereby affirmed, with costs against
defendants Alfredo Peralta and Roman Fernando. It is so ordered.
Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Paredes and De Leon, JJ.,
concur.
EN BANC
BUTTE, J.:
This is an appeal from the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Manila, convicting the appellant
of the crime of murder and assessing the death penalty.
The appellant, Yabut, was charged in the Court of First Instance of Manila with the crime of murder
upon the following information:
That on or about the 1st day of August, 1932, in the City of Manila, Philippine Islands, the
accused Antonio Yabut, then a prisoner serving sentence in the Bilibid Prison, in said city,
did then and there, with intent to kill, wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and treacherously,
assault, beat and use personal violence upon one Sabas Aseo, another prisoner also serving
sentence in Bilibid, by then and there hitting the said Sabas Aseo suddenly and
unexpectedly from behind with a wooden club, without any just cause, thereby fracturing the
skull of said Sabas Aseo and inflicting upon him various other physical injuries on different
parts of the body which caused the death of the latter about twenty-four (24) hours
thereafter.
That at the time of the commission of this offense, the said Antonio Yabut was a recidivist, he
having previously been convicted twice of the crime of homicide and once of serious physical
injuries, by virtue of final sentences rendered by competent tribunals.
Upon arraignment, the accused plead not guilty. The court below made the following findings of fact
which, from an independent examination of the entire testimony, we are convinced, are supported by
the evidence beyond reasonable doubt:
La brigada de presos, conocida como Brigada 8-A Carcel, el 1.º de agosto de 1932, estaba
compuesta de unos 150 o mas penados, de largas condenas, al mando del preso Jose
Villafuerte, como Chief Squad Leader, y del preso Vicente santos, como su auxiliar. forman
parte de esta brigada el occiso Sabas Aseo, o Asayo, el acusado Antonio Yabut y los presos
llamados Apolonio Saulo, Isaias Carreon, Melecio Castro, Mateo Bailon y los moros Taladie
y Hasan.
Entre siete y media y ocho de la noche de la fecha de autos, estando ya cerrado el pabellon
de la brigada, pues se aproximaba la hora del descanso y silencio dentro de la prision,
mientras el jefe bastonero Villafuerte se hallaba sentado sobre su mesa dentro de la
brigada, vio al preso Carreon cerca de el, y en aquel instante el acusado Yabut, dirigiendose
a Carreon, le dijo que, si no cobrada a uno que la debia, el (Yabut) le abofetearia. El jefe
bastonero Villafuerte trato de imponer silencio y dijo a los que hablaban que se apaciguaran;
pero, entre tanto, el preso Carreon se encaro con el otro preso Saulo cobrandole dos
cajetillas de cigarillos de diez centimos cada una que le debia. Saulo contesto que ya le
pagaria, pero Carreon, por toda contestacion, pego en la cara a saulo y este quedo
desvanecido. En vista de esto, el jefe bastonero se dirigio a su cama para sacar la porra que
estaba autorizado a llevar. Simultaneamente Villafuerte vio que el preso Yabut pegaba con
un palo (Exhibit C) al otro preso Sabas Aseo, o Asayo, primeramente en la nuca y despues
en la cabeza, mientras estaba de espaldas el agregido Sabas, quien, al recibir el golpe en la
nuca, se inclino hacia delante, como si se agachara, y en ese momento el acusado Yabut
dio un paso hacia delante y con el palo de madera que portaba dio otro golpe en la cabeza a
Sabas Aseo, quien cayo al suelo.
El jefe bastonero Villafuerte se acerco al agresor Yabut para desarmarle, pero este le dijo:
"No te acerques; de otro modo, moriras." No obstante la actitud amenazadora de Yabut,
Villafuerte se acerco y Yabut quiso darle un golpe que iba dirigido a la cabeza, pero
Villafuerte lo pudo desviar pcon la porra que Ilevaba. Los dos lucharon y Ilegaron a
abrazarse hasta que se le deslizo a Villafuerte la porra que llevaba. Continuaron luchando
ambos y el acusado Yabut llego a soltar el palo Exhibit C con que acometia a Villafuerte y
habia malherido al preso Sabas Aseo. Despues de aquello, Yabut consiguio zafarse de
Villafuerte y se dirigio al otro extremo de la brigada, escondiendose dentro del baño y alli fue
cogido inmediatamente despues del suceso por el preso Proceso Carangdang, que
desempenaba el cargo de sargento de los policias de la prision.
We reject, as unworthy of belief, the testimony of Yabut that it was Villafuerte, not he, who gave the
fatal blow to the deceased Aseo. The testimonies of Santiago Estrada, resident physician of the
Bureau of Prisons and Dr. Pablo Anzures of the Medico Legal Department of the University of the
Philippines, clearly establish that the death of Aseo was caused by subdural and cerebral
hemorrhages following the fracture of the skull resulting from the blow on the head of Aseo. They
further confirm the testimony of the four eyewitnesses that the deceased was struck from behind.
On appeal to this court, the appellant advances the following assignments of error:
1. The lower court erred in applying article 160 of the Revised Penal Code.
2. The lower court erred in holding that the evidence of the defense are contradictory and not
corroborated.
3. The lower court erred in holding that the crime of murder was established by appreciating
the qualifying circumstance of alevosia.
4. The lower court erred in finding the accused guilty of the crime of murder beyond
reasonable doubt.
In connection with the first assignment of error, we quote article 160 of the Revised Penal Code, in
the Spanish text, which is decisive:
Comision de un nuevo delito durante el tiempo de la condena por otro anterior — Pena. —
Los que comentieren algun delito despues de haber sino condenados por sentencia firme no
empezada a cumpir, o durante el tiempo de su condena, seran castigados con la pena
señalada por la ley para el nuevo delito, en su grado maximo, sin perjuicio de lo dispuesto
en la regla 5.a del articulo 62.
Commission of another crime during service of penalty imposed for another previous
offense — Penalty. — Besides the provisions of rule 5 of article 62, any person who shall
commit a felony after having been convicted by final judgment, before beginning to serve
such sentence, or while serving the same, shall be punished by the maximum period of the
penalty prescribed by law for the new felony.
Any convict of the class referred to in this article, who is not a habitual criminal, shall be
pardoned at the age of seventy years if he shall have already served out his original
sentence, or when he shall complete it after reaching said age, unless by reason of his
conduct or other circumstances he shall not be worthy of such clemency.
The appellant places much stress upon the word "another" appearing in the English translation of the
headnote of article 160 and would have us accept his deduction from the headnote that article 160 is
applicable only when the new crime which is committed by a person already serving sentence is
different from the crime for which he is serving sentence. Inasmuch as the appellant was serving
sentence for the crime of homicide, the appellant contends the court below erred in applying article
160 in the present case which was a prosecution for murder (involving homicide). While we do not
concede that the appellant is warranted in drawing the deduction mentioned from the English
translation of the caption of article 160, it is clear that no such deduction could be drawn from the
caption. Apart from this, however, there is no warrant whatever for such a deduction (and we do not
understand the appellant to assert it) from the text itself of article 160. The language is plain and
unambiguous. There is not the slightest intimation in the text of article 160 that said article applies
only in cases where the new offense is different in character from the former offense for which the
defendant is serving the penalty.
It is familiar law that when the text itself of a statute or a treaty is clear and unambiguous, there is
neither necessity nor propriety in resorting to the preamble or headings or epigraphs of a section of
interpretation of the text, especially where such epigraphs or headings of sections are mere
catchwords or reference aids indicating the general nature of the text that follows. (Cf. In re Estate of
Johnson, 39 Phil., 156, 166.) A mere glance at the titles to the articles of the Revised Penal code will
reveal that they were not intended by the Legislature to be used as anything more than catchwords
conveniently suggesting in a general way the subject matter of each article. Being nothing more than
a convenient index to the contents of the articles of the Code, they cannot, in any event have the
effect of modifying or limiting the unambiguous words of the text. Secondary aids may be consulted
to remove, not to create doubt.
The remaining assignments of error relate to the evidence. We have come to the conclusion, after a
thorough examination of the record, that the findings of the court below are amply sustained by the
evidence, except upon the fact of the existence of treachery (alevosia). As some members of the
court entertain a reasonable doubt that the existence of treachery (alevosia) was established, it
results that the penalty assessed by the court below must be modified. We find the defendant guilty
of homicide and, applying article 249 of the Revised Penal Code in connection with article 160 of the
same, we sentence the defendant- appellant to the maximum degree of reclusion temporal, that is to
say, to twenty years of confinement and to indemnify the heirs of the deceased Sabas Aseo
(alias Sabas Asayo), in the sum of P1,000. Costs de oficio.
Avanceña, C.J., Street, Malcolm, Villa-Real, Abad Santos, Hull, Vickers, and Imperial, JJ., concur.
46. People v. Walpan M. Ladjaalam, G.R. Nos. 136149- 51. September 19, 2000)
THIRD DIVISION
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Republic Act No. 8294 penalizes simple illegal possession of firearms, provided that
the person arrested committed no other crime. Furthermore, if the person is held liable
for murder or homicide, illegal possession of firearms is an aggravating circumstance, but
not a separate offense. Hence, where an accused was convicted of direct assault with
multiple attempted homicide for firing an unlicensed M-14 rifle at several policemen who
were about to serve a search warrant, he cannot be held guilty of the separate offense of
illegal possession of firearms. Neither can such unlawful act be considered to have
aggravated the direct assault.
The Case
That on or about September 24, 1997, in the City of Zamboanga, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, Walpan
Ladjaalam being then the owner of a residential house located at Rio Hondo,[4] this
City, conspiring and confederating together, mutually aiding and assisting x x
x his co-accused wife Nur-in Ladjaalam and Ahmad Sailabbi y Hajaraini, did
then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, maintain said house as a
den, where regulated drug [was] used in any form.[5]
The second Information[6] charged appellant with illegal possession of firearms and
ammunition. We quote it below:
That on or about September 24, 1997, in the City of Zamboanga, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring
and confederating together, mutually aiding and assisting with one another, without
any justifiable reason or purpose other than to use it in the commission of crime, did
then and there, wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously have in their possession and
under their custody and control, the following weapons, to wit: one (1) M14 rifle with
SN 1555225 with magazines and seven (7) rounds of live ammunition; two (2)
magazines with twenty (20) and twenty[-one] (21) rounds of live [ammunition]; one
(1) homemade caliber .38 revolver with five (5) live ammunition; one (1) M-79
(single) rifle with pouch and with five (5) empty shell[s]; one (1) home made caliber
.38 with SN-311092 with five live ammunition and one empty shell of [a] cal. 38 x x
x Smith and Wesson; two (2) .38 Caliber paltik revolver with Serial Number 311092
and one defaced M79 grenade launcher paltik, without first having obtained the
necessary license and or permit therefor from authorities concerned, in flagrant
violation of the aforementioned law.[7]
The third Information,[8] for multiple attempted murder with direct assault, was worded
thus:
That on or about September 24, 1997, in the City of Zamboanga, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused being then
armed with M-14 Armalite Rifles, M-16 Armalite Rifles and other assorted firearms
and explosives, conspiring and confederating together, mutually aiding and assisting x
x x one another and with intent to kill, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously try and attempt to kill SPO1 WILLIAM B. JONES, JR., PO3 ENRIQUE
C. RIVERA[,] SPO1 AMADO A. MIRASOL, JR., and SPO1 RICARDO J.
LACASTESANTOS, in the following manner, to wit: by then and there firing their
M-14 x x x Armalite Rifles, M-16 Armalite Rifles and other assorted firearms and
explosives, aimed and directed at the fatal parts of the bodies of the above-named
police officers, well known to the accused as members of the Philippine National
Police, Zamboanga City Police Office, and as such, agents of a person in authority,
who at the time of the attack were engaged in the performance of their duties, that is,
on the occasion when said officers were about to serve the Search Warrant legally
issued by the Regional Trial Court, this City, to the person of the accused thus
commencing the commission of crime of multiple murder directly by overt acts, and if
the accused did not accomplish their unlawful purpose, that is, to kill the above-
named Police Officers, it was not by reason of their own voluntary desistance but
rather because of the fact that all the above-named police officers were able to seek
cover during the firing and were not hit by the bullets and explosives fired by the
accused and also by the fact said police officers were able to wrestle with two (2) of
the accused namely: Walpan Ladjaalam y Mihajil a.k.a. Warpan and Ahmad Sailabbi
y Hajairani, who were subdued and subsequently placed under arrest; whereas
accused PO2 Nurhakim T. Hadjula was able to make good his escape and has
remained at-large.[9]
In the fourth Information, appellant was charged with illegal possession of drugs. [10]
On December 21, 1997, the cases against Nur-in Ladjaalam and Ahmad
Sailabbi y Hajaraini were dismissed upon motion of the Office of the City Prosecutor,
which had conducted a reinvestigation of the cases as ordered by the lower court. The
accused were consequently released from jail.
The arraignment of appellant on all four (4) charges took place on January 6, 1998,
during which he entered a plea of not guilty. [11] After pretrial, the assailed Decision was
rendered, the dispositive part of which reads:
2. In Criminal Case No. 14637, NOT GUILTY of Violation of Section 16, Article III,
in relation to Section 21, Article IV, of Republic Act No. 6425, otherwise known as
the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended, and ACQUITS him of said crime
with costs de oficio;
The Facts
Prosecutions Version
In its Brief,[13] the Office of the Solicitor General presents the facts in this wise:
At 1:45 p.m. of September 24, 1997, PO3 Allan Marcos Obut filed an application for
the issuance of a search warrant against appellant, his wife and some John Does (Exh.
C). After the search warrant was issued about 2:30 p.m. of the same day, a briefing
was conducted inside the office of the Anti-Vice/Narcotics Unit of the Zamboanga
City Police Office in connection with the service of the search warrant. The briefing
was conducted by SPO2 Felipe Gaganting, Chief of the Anti-Vice/Narcotics
Unit. During the briefing, PO3 Renato Dela Pea was assigned as presentor of the
warrant. SPO1 Ricardo Lacastesantos and PO3 Enrique Rivera were designated to
conduct the search. Other policemen were assigned as perimeter guards (TSN, March
3, 1998, pp. 33-36).
After the briefing, more than thirty (30) policemen headed by Police Superintendent
Edwin Soledad proceeded to the house of appellant and his wife at Rio Hondo on
board several police vehicles (TSN, March 4, 1998, p. 32; April 22, 1998, p.
54). Before they could reach appellants house, three (3) persons sitting at a nearby
store ran towards the house shouting, [P]olice, raid, raid (Ibid., March 3, 1998, pp. 41,
43-44; April 23, 1998, p. 4). When the policemen were about ten (10) meters from the
main gate of the house, they were met by a rapid burst of gunfire coming from the
second floor of the house. There was also gunfire at the back of the house (Ibid.,
March 5, 1998, pp. 14-16).
SPO1 Mirasol, SPO2 Lacastesantos, PO3 Rivera, and PO3 Dela Pea who were with
the first group of policemen saw appellant fire an M14 rifle towards them. They all
knew appellant. When they were fired upon, the group, together with SPO2
Gaganting, PO3 Obut and Superintendent Soledad, sought cover at the concrete fence
to observe the movements at the second floor of the house while other policemen
surrounded the house (Ibid., March 4, 1998, pp. 50-51).
In front of the house was an extension building connected to the concrete fence (Ibid.,
pp. 45-46, 57-59, 73-76). Gaganting, Mirasol, Lacastesantos, Gregorio, and Obut
entered the door of the extension building. Gaganting opened the main (steel) gate of
the house. The other members of the team then entered. Lacastesantos and Mirasol
entered the house through the main door and went inside the sala of the ground floor
while other policemen surrounded the house. Two (2) old women were in the sala
together with a young girl and three (3) children. One of the old women took the
children to the second floor while the young girl remained seated at the corner (Ibid.,
pp. 19-21).
Lacastesantos and Mirasol proceeded to the second floor where they earlier saw
appellant firing an M14 rifle at them through the window. While they were going
upstairs, appellant noticed their presence. He went inside the bedroom and, after
breaking and removing the jalousies, jumped from the window to the roof of a
neighboring house. Seeing this, Mirasol rushed downstairs and asked help from the
other members of the raiding team to arrest appellant. Lacastesantos went to the
second floor and shouted to the policemen outside not to fire in the direction of the
second floor because there were children. Mirasol and SPO1 Cesar Rabuya arrested
appellant at the back of his house after a brief chase (Ibid., pp. 21-23).
At the second floor, Lacastesantos saw an M14 rifle (Exh. B-3) with magazine on top
of the sofa at the sala on the second floor (Ibid., P. 27). The rifle bore Serial No.
1555225. He removed the magazine from the rifle and the bullet inside the chamber of
the rifle. He counted seventeen (17) live ammunition inside the magazine. He saw two
(2) more M14 rifle magazines on the sofa, one with twenty (20) live ammunition
(Exh. G-3) and another with twenty-one (21) live ammunition (Exh. G-4). He likewise
saw three (3) M16 rifle magazines (Exh. G-2) in a corner at the second floor (TSN,
March 5, 1998, pp. 23-32, 53-57).
After Lacastesantos and Mirasol entered appellants house, Rivera, Dela Pea, Gregorio
and Obut followed and entered the house. After identifying themselves as members of
the PNP Anti-Vice/Narcotics Unit, Obut presented to the old women a copy of the
search warrant. Dela Pea and Rivera then searched appellants room on the ground
floor in the presence of Punong Barangay Elhano (TSN, March 3, 1998, pp. 41-
43). On top of a table was a pencil case (Exh. J) with fifty (50) folded aluminum foils
inside (Exhs. J-1 to J-50), each containing methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu.
Other items were found during the search, namely, assorted coins in different
denominations (Exh. W; TSN, April 28, 1998, pp. 23-25), one (1) homemade .38
caliber revolver (Exh. B-2) with five (5) live [ammunition], one (1) M79 single rifle
with [a] pouch containing five (5) empty shells of an M79 rifle (Exh. B-4), and one
(1) empty shell of an M14 rifle (TSN, April 23, 1998, pp. 30-32).
While they were smoking shabu, Locson heard gunfire coming from appellants
house. They all stood and entered appellants compound but were instructed to pass
[through] the other side. They met appellant at the back of his house. Appellant told
them to escape because the police are already here. They scampered and ran away
because there were already shots. Locson jumped over the fence and ran towards the
seashore. Upon reaching a place near the Fisheries School, he took a tricycle and went
home (Ibid., pp. 17-19).
The following day, September 25, 1997, he went to the police station and executed an
affidavit (Exh. M) narrating what transpired at appellants house [o]n the afternoon of
September 24, 1997.
After the search and before returning to the police station, P03 Dela Pea prepared a
Receipt for Property Seized (Exh. P & 3) listing the properties seized during the
search. The receipt was signed by Dela Pea as the seizure officer, and by Punong
Barangay Hadji Hussin Elhano and radio reporter Jun Cayona as witnesses. A copy of
the receipt was given to appellant but he refused to acknowledge the properties seized
(TSN, April 23, 1998, pp. 11-12).
The records of the Regional Operation and Plans Division of the PNP Firearm and
Explosive Section show that appellant had not applied/filed any application for license
to possess firearm and ammunition or x x x been given authority to carry [a] firearm
outside of his residence (Exh. X)[14]
Defenses Version
Appellant Ladjaalam agrees with the narration of facts given by the lower
court.[15] Hence, we quote the pertinent parts of the assailed Decision:
Accused Walpan Ladjaalam y Mihajil a.k.a. Warpan, 30 years old, married, gave his
occupation as smuggling (tsn, p. 2, May 4, 1998). He used to go to Labuan in
Malaysia and bring cigarettes to the Philippines without paying taxes (tsn, pp. 40-41,
id). He said that his true name [was] Abdul Nasser Abdurakman and that Warpan or
Walpan Ladjaalam [was] only his alias. However, he admitted that more people
kn[e]w him as Walpan Ladjaalam rather than Abdul Nasser Abdurakman (tsn. pp. 39-
40; 46-47, id). He testified that [o]n the afternoon of September 24, 1997, when he
was arrested by the police, he was sleeping in the house of Dandao, a relative of his
wife. He was alone. He slept in Dandaos house and not in his house because they
ha[d] a sort of a conference as Dandaos daughter was leaving for Saudi Arabia. He
noticed the presence of policemen in his neighborhood at Aplaya, Rio Hondo when he
heard shots. He woke up and went out of the house and that was the time that he was
arrested. He said he was arrested xxx [at] the other side of my house; at the other side
of the fence where I was sleeping. xxx. At the back of my house (tsn, p. 7, id.). He does
not know who arrested him considering that the one who arrested me does not have
nameplate. He was arrested by four (4) persons. Not one of those who arrested him
testified in Court. He was handcuffed and placed inside a jeep parked at Rio Hondo
Elementary School. According to him, he did not fire a gun at the policemen from
[t]he second floor of his house. He said the policemen [were] the one[s] who fire[d] at
us (tsn, p. 5, id.). If he fired a gun at the policemen for sure they [would]
die [b]ecause the door is very near x x x the vicinity of my house. He does not own the
M14 rifle (Exh. B-3) which according to policemen, he used in firing at them. The
gun does not belong to him. He does not have a gun like that (tsn, p. 15, id.). A
policeman also owns an M14 rifle but he does not know the policeman (tsn, pp. 16-17,
id). He said that the M79 rifle (Exh. B-4), the three (3) empty M16 rifle magazines
(Exh. G; G-1 to G-2), the two (2) M14 magazines with live ammunition (Exh. G-3; G-
4); the two (2) caliber .38 revolvers (Exhs. B-1; B-2), the fifty (50) aluminum foils
each containing shabu (Exhs. J-1 to J-50) placed inside a pencil case (Exh. J, the
assorted coins placed inside a blue bag (Exh. W) and the white crystalline stone (Exh.
K) all do not belong to him. He said that the policemen just produced those things as
their evidence. The firearms do not belong to him. They were brought by the
policemen (tsn, p. 43, May 4, 1998). Regarding the blue bag containing assorted
coins, he said: that is not ours, I think this (is) theirs, xxx they just brought that as
their evidence (tsn, pp. 15-24, id.)
Walpan Ladjaalam declared there were occupants who were renting his extension
house. He affirmed that he owns that house. Four (4) persons were staying in the
extension house. He could only recognize the husband whose name is Momoy. They
are from Jolo. They left the place already because they were afraid when the police
raided the place. (tsn, pp. 8-10, May 4, 1998). He does not know prosecution witness
Rino Locson y Bartolome. Although Locson recognized him, in his case he does not
know Locson and he does not recognize him (tsn, p.11, id). He did not sell anything to
Locson and did not entertain him. He is not selling shabu but he knows for a fact that
there are plenty of person who are engaged in selling shabu in that place, in that area
known as Aplaya, Rio Hondo. One of them is Hadji Agbi (tsn, pp.11-14, id).
After his arrest Walpan Ladjaalam was brought to the police station where he stayed
for one day and one night before he was transferred to the City jail. While at the
police station, he was not able to take a bath. He smokes two packs of cigarette a
day. While he was at the police station, he smoked [a] cigarette given to him by his
younger sister. He lighted the cigarettes with [a] match. From the police station, he
was brought to the PNP Regional Office at R.T. Lim Boulevard where he was subject
to paraffin examination (tsn, pp. 24-26, May 4, 1998).
During the raid conducted on his house, his cousin Boy Ladjaalam, Ating Sapadi, and
Jecar (Sikkal) Usman, the younger brother of his wife were killed. Walpan Ladjaalam
said that he saw that it was the policeman who shot them[,] only I do not know his
name. They were killed at the back of his house. He said that no charges were filed
against the one responsible for their death (tsn, pp. 30-33- May 4, 1998).
Anilhawa Ahamad, more or less 80 years old, a widow was in the house of Walpan
Ladjaalam whom he calls Hadji Id at the time the police raided the house. She is the
mother of Ahma Sailabbi.She was together with Babo Dandan, two small children and
a helper when soldiers entered the house. (W)hen they arrived, they kept on firing
(their guns) even inside the house (tsn, p.5, May 5, 1998). They were armed with short
and long firearms. They searched the house and scattered things and got what they
wanted. They entered the room of Walpan Ladjaalam. They tried to open a bag
containing jewelry. When Anilhawa tried to bring the bag outside the room, they
grabbed the bag from her and poked a gun at her. At that time Walpan Ladjaalam was
not in the house.Ahamad Sailabbi was also not in the house. A Search Warrant was
shown to Anilhawa after the search was conducted and just before the policemen left
the place. Anilhawa Ahamad said that it was already late in the afternoon[;] before
they left that was the time the Search Warrant (was) given to us by xxx Barangay
Captain Hussin Elhano (tsn, pp.6-8, May 5, 1998). Barangay Chairman Elhano
arrived already late in the afternoon, almost sundown (tsn, p. 9, id). Anilhaw declared
that aside from a bag containing jewelry and a bag full of money, she had not seen
anything else that was taken from Walpan Ladjaalams house (tsn, pp. 9-12, id).
Akmad (Ahmad) Sailabbi, 37 years old, married testified that about 4:00 oclock [o]n
the afternoon of September 24, 1997, ha was standing in front of his house when
policemen arrived and immediately arrested him. He was about to go to the City
Proper to buy articles he was intending to bring to Sabah. He had around
P50,000.00 placed inside a waist bag tied around his waist. The policemen told him to
lie down in prone position and a policeman searched his back. They pulled his waist
bag and took his DiaStar wrist watch. He was shot three times and was hit on the
forehead leaving a scar. His injury was not treated. He was taken to the police station
where he was detained for one day and one night. He was detained at the City Jail for
three months and five days after which he was released (tsn, pp. 25-29, May 5, 1998).
Melba Usma, 20 years old, a widow, testified that [o]n the afternoon of September 24,
1997, she was in the house of her parents lying together with her husband Sikkal
Usma. There is only one house between her parents house and the house of Walpan
Ladjaalam. Her husband Sikkal Usman is the brother of Nur-in Ladjaalam, Walpans
wife. When Melba heard shots, she went downstairs. A policeman was looking for her
husband. The policeman called her husband. When her husband went down, he was
instructed by the policeman to lie down in prone position. Then the policeman shot
her husband. The policeman had two other companions who also shot her husband
while he was lying down in prone position (tsn, pp.2-7, May 5, 1998).
Murkisa Usman, 30 years old, married, declared that [o]n the afternoon of September
24, 1997, she was sitting at the door of her house watching her children playing when
a motorcyle, driven by a person, stopped near her house. The driver was Gaganting
whom she called a soldier. He went down from his motorcycle, pulled a gun and
poked it at Murkisa. Murkisa stood up and raised her hands. She got her children and
when she was about to enter the room of her house, Gaganting again poked a gun at
her and there was a shot. As a result of firing, three persons died, namely, Sikkal
Usman, Boy Ladjaalam and Atip Sapali Sali (tsn, pp. 8-10, May 5, 1998).
Barangay Captain Hadji Hussin Elhano, 51 years old, testified that about 4:00 o clock
[o]n the afternoon of September 24, 1997, he was fetched by two policemen at
Catabangan where he was attending a seminar. Because of traffic along the way, they
arrived at the Rio Hondo already late in the afternoon. He saw policemen were
already inside the house. Upon entering the gate, he saw Walpan at the gate already
handcuffed. Walpan called him but the police advised him not to approach
Walpan. The search was already over and things were already taken inside the house.
When he went inside the house, he saw the things that they (policemen) searched, the
firearms and the shabu (tsn, p. 17. May 8, 1998). He did not see the Search
Warrant. What was shown to him were the things recovered during the search which
were being listed. They were being counted and placed on a table. Upon seeing the
things that were recovered during the search, I just signed the receipt (Exh. P; P-1) of
the things x x x taken during the search (tsn, pp. 17-18. May 8, 1998). He saw three
dead bodies at the side of the fence when he went to the other side of the house. The
three persons were killed outside the fence of Walpan Ladjaalam (tsn, p. 18, id). [16]
The trial court observed that the house of appellant was raided on September 24,
1997 by virtue of Search Warrant No. 20 issued on the same day. However, the lower
court nullified the said Warrant because it had been issued for more than one specific
offense,[17] in violation of Section 3, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court.[18] The court a
quo ruled:
It should be stated at the outset that Search Warrant No. 20 is totally null and
void because it was issued for more than one specific offense x x x contrary to Section
3, Rule 1[2]6 of the Rules of Court which provides that A search warrant shall not
issue but upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense xxx. In
Tambasan vs. People, 246 SCRA 184 (1995), the Supreme Court ruled that a search
warrant for more than one offense - a scatter shot warrant - violates Section 3, Rule
126 of the [R]evised Rules of Court and is totally null and void.[19] (emphasis in the original)
Nevertheless, the trial court deemed appellants arrest as valid. It emphasized that he
had shot at the officers who were trying to serve the void search warrant. This fact was
established by the testimonies of several police officers,[20] who were participants in the
raid, and confirmed by the laboratory report on the paraffin tests conducted on the
firearms and appellant.[21] Additionally, the judge noted that Appellant Ladjaalam, based
on his statements in his Counter Affidavit, impliedly contradicted his assertions in open
court that there had been no exchange of gunfire during the raid. [22] The trial court
concluded that the testimonies of these officers must prevail over appellants narration
that he was not in his house when the raid was conducted.
Prescinding from this point, the court a quo validated the arrest of appellant,
reasoning thus:
Under the circumstances, the policemen had authority to pursue and arrest Walpan
Ladjaalam and confiscate the firearm he used in shooting at the policemen and to
enter his house to effect said arrest and confiscation of the firearm. Under Rule 113,
Section 5 (a), of the Rules of Court, A peace officer or a private person may, without
a warrant, arrest a person xxx (w)hen in his presence, the person to be arrested has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense. An offense
is committed in the presence or within the view of an officer, within the meaning of
the rule authorizing an arrest without a warrant, when the officer sees the offense,
although at a distance, or hears the disturbances created thereby and proceeds at once
to the scene thereof. At the time the policemen entered the house of accused Walpan
Ladjaalam after he had fired shots at the policemen who intended to serve the Search
Warrant to him, the accused was engaged in the commission of a crime, and was
pursued and arrested after he committed the crime of shooting at the policemen who
were about to serve the Search Warrant.[23]
As a consequence of the legal arrest, the seizure of the following was also deemed
valid: the M14 rifle (with a magazine containing seventeen live ammunition) [24] used by
appellant against the police elements, two M14 magazines, and three other M16 rifle
magazines.[25] The trial court observed that these items were in plain view of the pursuing
police officers. Moreover, it added that these same items were evidence [of] the
commission of a crime and/or contraband and therefore, subject to seizure [26] since
appellant had not applied for a license to possess firearm and had not been given
authority to carry firearm outside his residence.[27]
For being incredible and unsupported by evidence, appellants claim that the items
that were seized by the police officers had been planted was disbelieved by the trial
court.It ruled that if the police officers wanted to plant evidence to incriminate him, they
could have done so during the previous raids or those conducted after his arrest. To its
mind, it was unbelievable that they would choose to plant evidence, when they were
accompanied by the barangay chairman and a radio reporter who might testify against
them. It then dismissed these allegations, saying that frame-up, like alibi, was an
inherently weak defense.[28]
The trial court also convicted the accused of the crime of maintaining a drug den. It
reasoned as follows:
x x x. The act of the accused in firing an M14 rifle to the policemen who were about
to enter his house to serve a search warrant constitutes the crime of direct assault with
multiple attempted homicide[,] not multiple attempted murder with direct assault[,]
considering that no policeman was hit and injured by the accused and no circumstance
was proved to qualify the attempted killing to attempted murder.
The accused Walpan Ladjaalam a.k.a. Warpan cannot be held liable [for] the crime of
Violation of Section 16, Article III, in relation to Section 21, Article IV, of Republic
Act 6425 otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1992, as amended, because
the fifty (50) pieces of folded aluminum foils having a total weight of 1.7426 grams
all containing methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu allegedly found in his house
are inadmissible as evidence against him considering that they were seized after [a]
search conducted by virtue of Search Warrant No. 20 which is totally null and void as
it was issued for more than one offense, and were not found in plain view of the police
officers who seized them. Neither could the accused be held liable for illegal
possession of firearms and ammunition except for the (1) M14 rifle with Serial
Number 1555225 and with magazine containing fifteen (15) live ammunition and two
more M14 rifle magazines with twenty (20) and twenty-one (21) live ammunition
respectively considering that the policemen who recovered or seized the other
firearms and ammunition did not testify in court.The blue bag containing assorted
coins cannot be returned to the accused Walpan Ladjaalam a.k.a. Warpan because
according to the accused the blue bag and assorted coins do not belong to him[;]
instead the said assorted coins should be turned over to the National Treasury. [30]
The Issues
The trial court erred when it concluded that appellant Walpan Ladjaalam y Mihajil
[had] fired first at the police officers who went to his house to serve a search warrant
upon him which led to an exchange of fire between Ladjaalam and the police officer.
II
The trial court erred when it denied the appellant the right and opportunity for an
ocular inspection of the scene of the firefight and where the house of the appellant
[was] located.
III
The trial court erred when it ruled that the presumption of regularity in the
performance of their duties [excluded] the claim of the appellant that the firearms and
methamphetamine hydrochloride (i.e. shabu) were planted by the police.[31]
In the interest of simplicity, we shall take up these issues seriatim: (a) denial of the
request for ocular inspection, (b) credibility of the prosecution witnesses, and (c) the
defense of frame-up. In addition, we shall also discuss the proper crimes and penalties
to be imposed on appellant.
Appellant insists that the trial court erred in denying his request for an ocular
inspection of the Ladjaalam residence. He argues that an ocular inspection would have
afforded the lower court a better perspective and an idea with respect to the scene of the
crime.[32] We do not agree.
We fail to see the need for an ocular inspection in this case, especially in the light of
the clear testimonies of the prosecution witnesses.[33] We note in particular that the
defense had even requested SPO1 Amado Mirasol Jr. to sketch the subject premises to
give the lower court a fairly good idea of appellants house.[34] Viewing the site of the raid
would have only delayed the proceedings.[35] Moreover, the question whether to view the
setting of a relevant event has long been recognized to be within the discretion of the trial
judge.[36] Here, there is no reason to disturb the exercise of that discretion. [37]
We agree with the trial court that appellant was guilty of maintenance of a drug den,
an offense for which he was correctly sentenced to reclusion perpetua. His guilt was
clearly established by the testimony of Prosecution Witness Rino Bartolome Locson, who
himself had used the extension house of appellant as a drug den on several occasions,
including the time of the raid. The formers testimony was corroborated by all the raiding
police officers who testified before the court. That appellant did not deny ownership of the
house and its extension lent credence to the prosecutions story.
The trial court was also correct in convicting appellant of direct assault[55] with multiple
counts of attempted homicide. It found that [t]he act of the accused [of] firing an M14 rifle
[at] the policemen[,] who were about to enter his house to serve a search warrant x x x
constituted such complex crime.[56]
We note that direct assault with the use of a weapon carries the penalty of prision
correccional in its medium and maximum periods, while attempted homicide carries the
penalty of prision correccional.[57] Hence, for the present complex crime, the penalty for
direct assault, which constitutes the most serious crime, should be imposed and applied
in its maximum period.[58]
Aside from finding appellant guilty of direct assault with multiple attempted homicide,
the trial court convicted him also of the separate offense of illegal possession of firearms
under PD 1866, as amended by RA 8294, and sentenced him to 6 years of prision
correccional to 8 years of prision mayor.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) disagrees, on the ground that the trial court
should not have applied the new law. It contends that under the facts of the case, the
applicable law should have been PD 1866, as worded prior to its amendment by RA 8294.
The trial courts ruling and the OSGs submission exemplify the legal communitys
difficulty in grappling with the changes brought about by RA 8294. Hence, before us now
are opposing views on how to interpret Section 1 of the new law, which provides as
follows:
SECTION 1. Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 1866, as amended, is hereby further
amended to read as follows:
The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period and a fine of Thirty thousand
pesos (P30,000) shall be imposed if the firearm is classified as high powered firearm
which includes those with bores bigger in diameter than .30 caliber and 9 millimeter
such as caliber .40, .41, .44, .45 and also lesser calibered firearms but considered
powerful such as caliber .357 and caliber .22 centerfire magnum and other firearms
with firing capability of full automatic and by burst of two or three: Provided,
however, That no other crime was committed by the person arrested.
If homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, such use of
an unlicensed firearm shall be considered as an aggravating circumstance.
The same penalty shall be imposed upon the owner, president, manager, director or
other responsible officer of any public or private firm, company, corporation or entity,
who shall willfully or knowingly allow any of the firearms owned by such firm,
company, corporation or entity to be used by any person or persons found guilty of
violating the provisions of the preceding paragraphs or willfully or knowingly allow
any of them to use unlicensed firearms or firearms without any legal authority to be
carried outside of their residence in the course of their employment.
The penalty of arresto mayor shall be imposed upon any person who shall carry any
licensed firearm outside his residence without legal authority therefor.
Citing People v. Jayson,[59] the OSG argues that the foregoing provision does not
cover the specific facts of this case. Since another crime -- direct assault with multiple
unlawful homicide -- was committed, appellant cannot be convicted of simple illegal
possession of firearms under the second paragraph of the aforecited
provision. Furthermore, since there was no killing in this case, illegal possession cannot
be deemed as an aggravating circumstance under the third paragraph of the
provision. Based on these premises, the OSG concludes that the applicable law is not RA
8294, but PD 1866 which, as worded prior the new law, penalizes simple illegal
possession of firearms even if another crime is committed at the same time.[60]
Applying a different interpretation, the trial court posits that appellant should be
convicted of illegal possession of firearms, in addition to direct assault with multiple
attempted homicide. It did not explain its ruling, however. Considering that it could not
have been ignorant of the proviso[61] in the second paragraph, it seemed to have
construed no other crime as referring only to homicide and murder, in both of which illegal
possession of firearms is an aggravating circumstance. In other words, if a crime other
than murder or homicide is committed, a person may still be convicted of illegal
possession of firearms. In this case, the other crime committed was direct assault with
multiple attempted homicide; hence, the trial court found appellant guilty of illegal
possession of firearms.
We cannot accept either of these interpretations because they ignore the plain
language of the statute. A simple reading thereof shows that if an unlicensed firearm is
used in the commission of any crime, there can be no separate offense of simple illegal
possession of firearms. Hence, if the other crime is murder or homicide, illegal possession
of firearms becomes merely an aggravating circumstance, not a separate offense. Since
direct assault with multiple attempted homicide was committed in this case, appellant can
no longer be held liable for illegal possession of firearms.
Moreover, penal laws are construed liberally in favor of the accused. [62] In this case,
the plain meaning of RA 8294s simple language is most favorable to herein
appellant.Verily, no other interpretation is justified, for the language of the new law
demonstrates the legislative intent to favor the accused.[63] Accordingly, appellant cannot
be convicted of two separate offenses of illegal possession of firearms and direct assault
with attempted homicide. Moreover, since the crime committed was direct assault and not
homicide or murder, illegal possession of firearms cannot be deemed an aggravating
circumstance.
We reject the OSGs contention that PD 1866, as worded prior to its amendment by
RA 8294, should be applied in this case. When the crime was committed on September
24, 1997, the original language of PD 1866 had already been expressly superseded by
RA 8294 which took effect on July 6, 1997.[64] In other words, no longer in existence was
the earlier provision of PD 1866, which justified a conviction for illegal possession of
firearms separate from any other crime. It was replaced by RA 8294 which, among other
amendments to PD 1866, contained the specific proviso that no other crime was
committed.
Furthermore, the OSGs reliance on People v. Jayson[65] is misplaced. True, this Court
sustained the conviction of appellant for illegal possession of firearms, although he had
also committed homicide. We explained, however, that the criminal case for homicide
[was] not before us for consideration.
Just as unacceptable is the interpretation of the trial court. We find no justification for
limiting the proviso in the second paragraph to murder and homicide. The law is clear:the
accused can be convicted of simple illegal possession of firearms, provided that no other
crime was committed by the person arrested. If the intention of the law in the second
paragraph were to refer only to homicide and murder, it should have expressly said so,
as it did in the third paragraph. Verily, where the law does not distinguish, neither should
we.
The Court is aware that this ruling effectively exonerates appellant of illegal
possession of an M-14 rifle, an offense which normally carries a penalty heavier than that
for direct assault. While the penalty for the first is prision mayor, for the second it is
only prision correccional. Indeed, the accused may evade conviction for illegal
possession of firearms by using such weapons in committing an even lighter
offense,[66] like alarm and scandal[67] or slight physical injuries,[68] both of which are
punishable by arresto menor.[69] This consequence, however, necessarily arises from the
language of RA 8294, whose wisdom is not subject to the Courts review. Any perception
that the result reached here appears unwise should be addressed to Congress. Indeed,
the Court has no discretion to give statutes a new meaning detached from the manifest
intendment and language of the legislature. Our task is constitutionally confined only to
applying the law and jurisprudence[70] to the proven facts, and we have done so in this
case.
WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision is hereby AFFIRMED with
the MODIFICATION that appellant is found guilty only of two offenses: (1) direct assault
and multiple attempted homicide with the use of a weapon, for which he is sentenced to
2 years and 4 months to 6 years of prision correccional; and (2) maintaining a drug den,
for which he was correctly sentenced by the trial court to reclusion perpetua. Costs
against appellant.
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Congress of the Philippines for a possible
review, at its sound discretion, of RA 8294.
SO ORDERED.
Melo, (Chairman), Vitug, Purisima, and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.
Sailabbi y Hajaraini. Charges against Sailabbi were later dropped; Hadjula still remains at large.
[9] Rollo, pp. 14-15.
[10] No copy of the fourth Information was attached to the records. In any event, the trial court acquitted him
of this charge.
[11] Assisted by counsel de parte, Atty. Jose E. Fernandez.
[12] Notice
of Appeal was filed on September 25, 1998. This case was deemed submitted for resolution after
the Courts receipt of the Brief for the Appellee on May 19, 2000. The filing of a reply brief was deemed
waived, as none was submitted within the reglementary period.
[13] Signed by Solicitor General Ricardo P. Galvez, Assistant Solicitor General Carlos N. Ortega and
1990.
[61] That no other crime was committed by the person arrested.
[62]
See People v. Atop, 286 SCRA 157, February 10, 1998; People v. Deleverio, 289 SCA 547, April 24,
1998.
[63] See Tanada v. Yulo, 61 Phil. 515, May 31, 1935; Regalado v. Yulo, 61 Phil. 173, February 15, 1935.
[64] People v. Jayson, supra.
[65] Supra at p. 177, per Mendoza, J.
[66]
Offenses under the Revised Penal Code which carry a penalty lighter than that for illegal possession of
a high-powered firearm include (1) indirect assault (Article 149), (2) tumults and other disturbances (Article
153), (3) discharge of firearms (Article 254), (4) light threats (Article 285), and (5) light coercion (Article
287).
[67] Article 155 (1) of the Revised Penal code provides the penalty of arresto menor or fine not exceeding
200 pesos upon "[a]ny person who within any town or public place, shall discharge any firearm, rocket,
firecracker or other explosive calculated to cause alarm or danger."
[68]Article 266 (1) imposes the penalty of arresto menor "when an offender has inflicted physical injuries
which shall incapacitate the offended party for labor from one to nine days, or shall require medical attention
during the same period." For example, when a person hits the head of another with the butt of an unlicensed
M-14 rifle, thereby incapacitating the latter for one to nine days, the accused may be charged only with
slight physical injuries, not illegal possession of firearms.
[69] Under Article 27 of the Revised Penal Code, the duration of arresto menor is one to thirty days.
[70] That penal laws should be liberally interpreted in favor of the accused.