SPOUSES VERGARA VS TORRECAMPO
Victoria Mendoza, considered an expert witness, who categorically declared that
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari are the Decision dated
February 24, 2010 and the Resolution dated September 2, 2010 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 89357, which reversed and set aside the
Decision dated January 4, 2007 of the Regional Trial Court of Malolos City,
Bulacan, Branch 19 (RTC) in Civil Case No. 900-M-2002 and entered a new one
in its stead.
The Facts
Petitioners-spouses Fernando Vergara and Herminia Vergara (Sps.
Vergara) and Spouses Ronald Mark Sonkin and Erlinda Torrecampo Sonkin
(Sps. Sonkin) are adjoining landowners in Poblacion, Norzagaray, Bulacan. In
view of the geographical configuration of the adjoining properties, the property
owned by Sps. Sonkin (Sonkin Property) is slightly lower in elevation than that
owned by Sps. Vergara (Vergara Property).
When Sps. Sonkin bought the Sonkin Property sometime in 1999, they
raised the height of the partition wall and caused the construction of their house
thereon. The house itself was attached to the partition wall such that a portion
thereof became part of the wall of the master's bedroom and bathroom. 6
Sometime in 2001, Sps. Vergara levelled the uneven portion of the
Vergara Property by filling it with gravel, earth, and soil. As a result, the level of
the Vergara Property became even higher than that of the Sonkin Property by a
third of a meter. Eventually, Sps. Sonkin began to complain that water coming
from the Vergara Property was leaking into their bedroom through the partition
wall, causing cracks, as well as damage, to the paint and the wooden parquet
floor. Sps. Sonkin repeatedly demanded that Sps. Vergara build a retaining wall
on their property in order to contain the landfill that they had dumped thereon,
but the same went unheeded. 7 Hence, Sps. Sonkin filed the instant complaint
for damages and injunction with prayer for preliminary mandatory injunction and
issuance of a temporary restraining order against Sps. Vergara, as well as Sps.
Rowena Santiago and Harold Santiago, Dolores Vergara-Orbistondo, and
Rosario Vergara-Payumo, the other possessors of the Vergara
Property. 8 HCaDIS
In defense, Sps. Vergara, in their Answer with Compulsory
Counterclaim, claimed that Sps. Sonkin's act of raising the partition wall made
the same susceptible to breakage, which therefore cannot be attributed to them
(Sps. Vergara). They likewise claimed that when they levelled their own property
by filling it with gravel and soil, they left a distance of one (1) meter from the
partition wall such that the edge of the landfill did not breach it, asserting further
that there was no valid and legal reason why they should be enjoined from
exercising their proprietary rights.
During the trial, Sps. Sonkin presented the testimony of Engineer Ma.
in view of the sloping terrain and the Sonkin Property being lower in elevation
than that of the Vergara Property, the Sps. Vergara were then duty bound to
provide a retaining wall because they were the ones who caused the landfill,
citing Section 1202 11 of Presidential Decree No. 1096, 12 otherwise known as
the "National Building Code of the Philippines" (National Building Code).
Likewise, citing Sections 3.2.1, 3.2.3, and 3.2.4 of Section 3.2, Rule XV of the
original Implementing Rules and Regulations 13 of the National Building Code,
she explained that it was Sps. Vergara's duty to provide safety requirements for
the landfill they made on their property to prevent any danger to life or property.
Moreover, Sps. Vergara failed to provide a sewerage line to divert the flow of
the water into the adjoining property, in violation of Section 901 14 of
the National Building Code. 15
Finally, the Provincial Engineer of Bulacan, Romeo S. Castro, who
was appointed as Commissioner by the RTC to conduct his own investigation,
likewise found, inter alia, that the introduction of filling materials on the Vergara
Property has "affected" the house of Sps. Sonkin. 16
The RTC Ruling
In a Decision 17 dated January 4, 2007, the RTC found Sps. Vergara
civilly liable to Sps. Sonkin for damages and directed them: (a) to scrape the
earth and other filling materials dumped in the adjacent perimeter wall of the
Sonkin Property and erect a retaining wall in accordance with the standards of
theNational Building Code; (b) to install and provide an adequate drainage
system in accordance with the same Code; and (c) to jointly and severally pay
Sps. Sonkin P300,000.00 as actual damages, P50,000.00 as moral damages,
P50,000.00 as exemplary damages, P100,000.00 as attorney's fees, and costs of
suit. It dismissed all other claims of the Sps. Sonkin, as well as the counterclaims
of Sps. Vergara, for lack of merit. 18
The RTC found that the earth dumped on the Vergara Property pushed
back the perimeter wall, causing cracks on Sps. Sonkin's bedroom wall and water
to seep through the floor of the house. Moreover, the water seepage could only
have come from the Vergara Property which was higher in elevation, as Sps.
Vergara have failed to provide any drainage to divert the flow of water. Given
the foregoing, the RTC concluded that Sps. Vergara's act of dumping earth, soil,
and other materials in their property directly caused the damage to the house of
Sps. Sonkin and, thus, they should be held liable for damages in favor of the
latter. Needless to state, Sps. Vergara's co-defendants were exculpated from
liability since they were not shown to have participated in the former's act. 19
Aggrieved, Sps. Vergara appealed 20 the entire RTC Decision to the
CA. They reiterated that they were merely exercising their proprietary rights over
their property, i.e., the Vergara Property, when they filled the area with soil and
gravel, and that it was Sps. Sonkin who transgressed the National Building
Code when they failed to leave a setback of two (2) meters between their house
and the property line. 21
On the other hand, Sps. Sonkin filed only a partial appeal, 22 assailing
the amount of actual, moral, and exemplary damages.
The CA Ruling
In a Decision 23 dated February 24, 2010, the CA reversed and set
aside the assailed RTC Decision and entered a new one: (a) ordering the Sps.
Vergara to install and provide an adequate drainage system on their property to
prevent the flow of water into the Sonkin Property, and to pay Sps. Sonkin the
amounts of P50,000.00 as moral damages and P100,000.00 as attorney's
fees; (b) setting aside the directive to Sps. Vergara to remove the landfill and
build a retaining wall on their property; (c) deleting the award of actual damages,
as well as exemplary damages; and (d) dismissing the separate appeal of the Sps.
Sonkin for lack of merit. 24
While the CA concurred with the finding of the RTC that the cause of
the water seepage into the Sonkin Property was the act of Sps. Vergara in
elevating their own property by filling it with gravel and soil, it ascribed error
upon the RTC in not finding that Sps. Sonkin were likewise guilty of contributory
negligence in building their house directly abutting the perimeter wall. 25 The
CA explained that despite the fact that under Article 637 of theCivil Code,the
Sonkin Property is legally obliged to receive any water from higher estates such
as the Vergara Property, it being the lower estate, the Sps. Sonkin still built their
house with parts thereof directly abutting the perimeter wall and, in the process,
violated the two (2)-meter setback rule under Section 708 26 of the National
Building Code. 27 Thus, the CA deduced that had Sps. Sonkin followed such
rule, then their house would not have sustained any damage from water coming
from the Vergara property. 28 Proceeding from such ratiocination, the CA
deleted the award of actual damages in the absence of evidence, i.e., actual
receipts, showing the amount actually spent by Sps. Sonkin in the repairs or
renovation of their property. Similarly, it deleted the award of exemplary
damages, as Sps. Vergara was not proven to have acted with gross negligence in
levelling their property with the landfill and in mitigation of their liability in light
of Sps. Sonkin's contributory negligence. The award of moral damages and
attorney's fees, however, were affirmed. 29 AHCETa
Finally, the CA found the order directing Sps. Vergara to remove the
landfill on their property to be unreasonable and an interference on their
proprietary rights. It considered the order to provide an adequate drainage system
on their property to be sufficient under the circumstances. Neither did it find the
need to build a retaining wall on the Vergara Property for the purpose of
containing the landfill thereon, opining that if it was Sps. Vergara's obligation to
prevent damage to Sps. Sonkin's house by erecting a retaining wall, then it was
the latter's concomitant obligation to detach their house from the perimeter wall
in order to prevent any future damage or injury. 30
Only Sps. Vergara sought reconsideration 31 from the CA Decision,
which was denied in a Resolution 32 dated September 2, 2010. Hence, this
petition impleading only respondent Erlinda Torrecampo Sonkin (Erlinda),
essentially arguing that Sps. Sonkin: (a) are not entitled to damages;
and (b) should be ordered to demolish the parts of their house directly abutting
the perimeter wall in compliance with Section 708 (a) of the National Building
Code. 33Records are bereft of showing that Sps. Sonkin made a further appeal
to the Court.
The Issue Before the Court
The issues for the Court's resolution are (a) whether or not the CA
erred in upholding the award of moral damages and attorney's fees;
and (b)whether or not it should have ordered the demolition of the portion of the
Sps. Sonkin's house that adjoins the partition wall.
The Court's Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
Article 2179 of the Civil Code reads:
Art. 2179. When the plaintiff's own negligence
was the immediate and proximate cause of his injury, he
cannot recover damages. But if his negligence was only
contributory, the immediate and proximate cause of the
injury being the defendant's lack of due care, the plaintiff
may recover damages, but the courts shall mitigate the
damages to be awarded.
Verily, contributory negligence is conduct on the part of the injured
party, contributing as a legal cause to the harm he has suffered, which falls below
the standard to which he is required to conform for his own protection. 34
In the case at bar, it is undisputed that the Sonkin property is lower in
elevation than the Vergara property, and thus, it is legally obliged to receive the
waters that flow from the latter, pursuant to Article 637 of the Civil Code.This
provision refers to the legal easement pertaining to the natural drainage of lands,
which obliges lower estates to receive from the higher estates water which
naturally and without the intervention of man descends from the latter, i.e., not
those collected artificially in reservoirs, etc., and the stones and earth carried by
the waters, 35 viz.:
Art. 637. Lower estates are obliged to receive
the waters which naturally and without the intervention
 of man descend from the higher estates, as well as the
stones or earth which then carry with them.
The owner of the lower estate cannot construct
works which will impede this easement; neither can the
owner of the higher estate make works which will increase
the burden. 36 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
In this light, Sps. Sonkin should have been aware of such circumstance
and, accordingly, made the necessary adjustments to their property so as to
minimize the burden created by such legal easement. Instead of doing so, they
disregarded the easement and constructed their house directly against the
perimeter wall which adjoins the Vergara property, thereby violating
the National Building Code in the process, specifically Section 708 (a) thereof
which reads:
Section 708. Minimum Requirements for Group A
Dwellings.
(a) Dwelling Location and Lot Occupancy.
The dwelling shall occupy not more than ninety percent of a
corner lot and eighty percent of an inside lot, and subject to
the provisions on Easement on Light and View of the Civil
Code of the Philippines, shall be at least 2 meters from the
property line.
. . . . (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Hence, the CA correctly held that while the proximate cause of the
damage sustained by the house of Sps. Sonkin was the act of Sps. Vergara in
dumping gravel and soil onto their property, thus, pushing the perimeter wall
back and causing cracks thereon, as well as water seepage, the former is
nevertheless guilty of contributory negligence for not only failing to observe the
two (2)-meter setback rule under the National Building Code, but also for
disregarding the legal easement constituted over their property. As such, Sps.
Sonkin must necessarily and equally bear their own loss.
In view of Sps. Sonkin's contributory negligence, the Court deems it
appropriate to delete the award of moral damages in their favor. While moral
damages may be awarded whenever the defendant's wrongful act or omission is
the proximate cause of the plaintiff's physical suffering, mental anguish, fright,
serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social
humiliation and similar injury in the cases specified or analogous to those
provided in Article 2219 37 of the Civil Code,38 they are only given to ease the
defendant's grief and suffering and should, therefore, reasonably approximate the
extent of hurt caused and the gravity of the wrong done. 39
Anent the issue on attorney's fees, the general rule is that the same
cannot be recovered as part of damages because of the policy that no premium
should be placed on the right to litigate. They are not to be awarded every time a
party wins a suit. The power of the court to award attorney's fees under Article
2208 40 of the Civil Code demands factual, legal, and equitable justification.
Even when a claimant is compelled to litigate with third persons or to incur
expenses to protect his rights, still attorney's fees may not be awarded where no
sufficient showing of bad faith could be reflected in a party's persistence in a case
other than an erroneous conviction of the righteousness of his cause. 41 In this
case, the Court observes that neither Sps. Sonkin nor Sps. Vergara (thru their
compulsory counterclaim) were shown to have acted in bad faith in pursuing their
respective claims against each other. The existence of bad faith is negated by the
fact that both parties have valid contentions against each other. Thus, absent
cogent reason to hold otherwise, the Court deems it inappropriate to award
attorney's fees in favor of either party. 42 ScHADI
Finally, in view of Sps. Sonkin's undisputed failure to observe the two
(2)-meter setback rule under the National Building Code, and in light of the order
of the courts a quo directing Sps. Vergara to provide an adequate drainage
system within their property, the Court likewise deems it proper, equitable, and
necessary to order Erlinda, who is solely impleaded as respondent before the
Court, to comply with the aforesaid rule by the removal of the portion of her
house directly abutting the partition wall. The underlying precept on contributory
negligence is that a plaintiff who is partly responsible for his own injury should
not be entitled to recover damages in full but must bear the consequences of his
own negligence. The defendant must therefore be held liable only for the
damages actually caused by his negligence. 43
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated
February 24, 2010 and the Resolution dated September 2, 2010 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 89357 are
hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS. The awards of moral damages
and attorney's fees are DELETED and respondent Erlinda Torrecampo Sonkin
is DIRECTED to strictly comply with Section 708 (a) of the National Building
Code by removing or demolishing the portion of her house that occupies the two-
meter easement from the property line. The rest of the CA Decision stands.
SO ORDERED.
RUKS KONSULT CONSTRUCTION VS ADWORLD SIGN AND
AVERTISING CORPORATION
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari 1 are the
Decision 2 dated February 24, 2010 and the Resolution 3 dated September 2,
2010 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 89357, which reversed
and set aside the Decision 4 dated January 4, 2007 of the Regional Trial Court of
Malolos City, Bulacan, Branch 19 (RTC) in Civil Case No. 900-M-2002 and
entered a new one in its stead.
The Facts
Petitioners-spouses Fernando Vergara and Herminia Vergara (Sps.
Vergara) and Spouses Ronald Mark Sonkin and Erlinda Torrecampo Sonkin
(Sps. Sonkin) are adjoining landowners in Poblacion, Norzagaray, Bulacan. In
view of the geographical configuration of the adjoining properties, the property
owned by Sps. Sonkin (Sonkin Property) is slightly lower in elevation than that
owned by Sps. Vergara (Vergara Property). 5
When Sps. Sonkin bought the Sonkin Property sometime in 1999, they
raised the height of the partition wall and caused the construction of their house
thereon. The house itself was attached to the partition wall such that a portion
thereof became part of the wall of the master's bedroom and bathroom. 6
Sometime in 2001, Sps. Vergara levelled the uneven portion of the
Vergara Property by filling it with gravel, earth, and soil. As a result, the level of
the Vergara Property became even higher than that of the Sonkin Property by a
third of a meter. Eventually, Sps. Sonkin began to complain that water coming
from the Vergara Property was leaking into their bedroom through the partition
wall, causing cracks, as well as damage, to the paint and the wooden parquet
floor. Sps. Sonkin repeatedly demanded that Sps. Vergara build a retaining wall
on their property in order to contain the landfill that they had dumped thereon,
but the same went unheeded. 7 Hence, Sps. Sonkin filed the instant complaint
for damages and injunction with prayer for preliminary mandatory injunction and
issuance of a temporary restraining order against Sps. Vergara, as well as Sps.
Rowena Santiago and Harold Santiago, Dolores Vergara-Orbistondo, and
Rosario Vergara-Payumo, the other possessors of the Vergara
Property. 8 HCaDIS
In defense, Sps. Vergara, in their Answer with Compulsory
Counterclaim, 9 claimed that Sps. Sonkin's act of raising the partition wall made
the same susceptible to breakage, which therefore cannot be attributed to them
(Sps. Vergara). They likewise claimed that when they levelled their own property
by filling it with gravel and soil, they left a distance of one (1) meter from the
partition wall such that the edge of the landfill did not breach it, asserting further
that there was no valid and legal reason why they should be enjoined from
exercising their proprietary rights. 10
During the trial, Sps. Sonkin presented the testimony of Engineer Ma.
Victoria Mendoza, considered an expert witness, who categorically declared that
in view of the sloping terrain and the Sonkin Property being lower in elevation
than that of the Vergara Property, the Sps. Vergara were then duty bound to
provide a retaining wall because they were the ones who caused the landfill,
citing Section 1202 11 of Presidential Decree No. 1096, 12 otherwise known as
the "National Building Code of the Philippines" (National Building Code).
Likewise, citing Sections 3.2.1, 3.2.3, and 3.2.4 of Section 3.2, Rule XV of the
original Implementing Rules and Regulations 13 of the National Building Code,
she explained that it was Sps. Vergara's duty to provide safety requirements for
the landfill they made on their property to prevent any danger to life or property.
Moreover, Sps. Vergara failed to provide a sewerage line to divert the flow of
the water into the adjoining property, in violation of Section 901 14 of
the National Building Code. 15
Finally, the Provincial Engineer of Bulacan, Romeo S. Castro, who
was appointed as Commissioner by the RTC to conduct his own investigation,
likewise found, inter alia, that the introduction of filling materials on the Vergara
Property has "affected" the house of Sps. Sonkin. 16
The RTC Ruling
In a Decision 17 dated January 4, 2007, the RTC found Sps. Vergara
civilly liable to Sps. Sonkin for damages and directed them: (a) to scrape the
earth and other filling materials dumped in the adjacent perimeter wall of the
Sonkin Property and erect a retaining wall in accordance with the standards of
theNational Building Code; (b) to install and provide an adequate drainage
system in accordance with the same Code; and (c) to jointly and severally pay
Sps. Sonkin P300,000.00 as actual damages, P50,000.00 as moral damages,
P50,000.00 as exemplary damages, P100,000.00 as attorney's fees, and costs of
suit. It dismissed all other claims of the Sps. Sonkin, as well as the counterclaims
of Sps. Vergara, for lack of merit. 18
The RTC found that the earth dumped on the Vergara Property pushed
back the perimeter wall, causing cracks on Sps. Sonkin's bedroom wall and water
to seep through the floor of the house. Moreover, the water seepage could only
have come from the Vergara Property which was higher in elevation, as Sps.
Vergara have failed to provide any drainage to divert the flow of water. Given
the foregoing, the RTC concluded that Sps. Vergara's act of dumping earth, soil,
and other materials in their property directly caused the damage to the house of
Sps. Sonkin and, thus, they should be held liable for damages in favor of the
latter. Needless to state, Sps. Vergara's co-defendants were exculpated from
liability since they were not shown to have participated in the former's act. 19
Aggrieved, Sps. Vergara appealed 20 the entire RTC Decision to the
CA. They reiterated that they were merely exercising their proprietary rights over
their property, i.e., the Vergara Property, when they filled the area with soil and
gravel, and that it was Sps. Sonkin who transgressed the National Building
Code when they failed to leave a setback of two (2) meters between their house
and the property line. 21
 On the other hand, Sps. Sonkin filed only a partial appeal, 22 assailing
the amount of actual, moral, and exemplary damages.
The CA Ruling
In a Decision 23 dated February 24, 2010, the CA reversed and set
aside the assailed RTC Decision and entered a new one: (a) ordering the Sps.
Vergara to install and provide an adequate drainage system on their property to
prevent the flow of water into the Sonkin Property, and to pay Sps. Sonkin the
amounts of P50,000.00 as moral damages and P100,000.00 as attorney's
fees; (b) setting aside the directive to Sps. Vergara to remove the landfill and
build a retaining wall on their property; (c) deleting the award of actual damages,
as well as exemplary damages; and (d) dismissing the separate appeal of the Sps.
Sonkin for lack of merit. 24
While the CA concurred with the finding of the RTC that the cause of
the water seepage into the Sonkin Property was the act of Sps. Vergara in
elevating their own property by filling it with gravel and soil, it ascribed error
upon the RTC in not finding that Sps. Sonkin were likewise guilty of contributory
negligence in building their house directly abutting the perimeter wall. 25 The
CA explained that despite the fact that under Article 637 of theCivil Code,the
Sonkin Property is legally obliged to receive any water from higher estates such
as the Vergara Property, it being the lower estate, the Sps. Sonkin still built their
house with parts thereof directly abutting the perimeter wall and, in the process,
violated the two (2)-meter setback rule under Section 708 26 of the National
Building Code. 27 Thus, the CA deduced that had Sps. Sonkin followed such
rule, then their house would not have sustained any damage from water coming
from the Vergara property. 28 Proceeding from such ratiocination, the CA
deleted the award of actual damages in the absence of evidence, i.e., actual
receipts, showing the amount actually spent by Sps. Sonkin in the repairs or
renovation of their property. Similarly, it deleted the award of exemplary
damages, as Sps. Vergara was not proven to have acted with gross negligence in
levelling their property with the landfill and in mitigation of their liability in light
of Sps. Sonkin's contributory negligence. The award of moral damages and
attorney's fees, however, were affirmed. 29 AHCETa
Finally, the CA found the order directing Sps. Vergara to remove the
landfill on their property to be unreasonable and an interference on their
proprietary rights. It considered the order to provide an adequate drainage system
on their property to be sufficient under the circumstances. Neither did it find the
need to build a retaining wall on the Vergara Property for the purpose of
containing the landfill thereon, opining that if it was Sps. Vergara's obligation to
prevent damage to Sps. Sonkin's house by erecting a retaining wall, then it was
the latter's concomitant obligation to detach their house from the perimeter wall
in order to prevent any future damage or injury. 30
Only Sps. Vergara sought reconsideration 31 from the CA Decision,
which was denied in a Resolution 32 dated September 2, 2010. Hence, this
petition impleading only respondent Erlinda Torrecampo Sonkin (Erlinda),
essentially arguing that Sps. Sonkin: (a) are not entitled to damages;
and (b) should be ordered to demolish the parts of their house directly abutting
the perimeter wall in compliance with Section 708 (a) of the National Building
Code. 33Records are bereft of showing that Sps. Sonkin made a further appeal
to the Court.
The Issue Before the Court
The issues for the Court's resolution are (a) whether or not the CA
erred in upholding the award of moral damages and attorney's fees;
and (b)whether or not it should have ordered the demolition of the portion of the
Sps. Sonkin's house that adjoins the partition wall.
The Court's Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
Article 2179 of the Civil Code reads:
Art. 2179. When the plaintiff's own negligence
was the immediate and proximate cause of his injury, he
cannot recover damages. But if his negligence was only
contributory, the immediate and proximate cause of the
injury being the defendant's lack of due care, the plaintiff
may recover damages, but the courts shall mitigate the
damages to be awarded.
Verily, contributory negligence is conduct on the part of the injured
party, contributing as a legal cause to the harm he has suffered, which falls below
the standard to which he is required to conform for his own protection. 34
In the case at bar, it is undisputed that the Sonkin property is lower in
elevation than the Vergara property, and thus, it is legally obliged to receive the
waters that flow from the latter, pursuant to Article 637 of the Civil Code.This
provision refers to the legal easement pertaining to the natural drainage of lands,
which obliges lower estates to receive from the higher estates water which
naturally and without the intervention of man descends from the latter, i.e., not
those collected artificially in reservoirs, etc., and the stones and earth carried by
the waters, 35 viz.:
Art. 637. Lower estates are obliged to receive
the waters which naturally and without the intervention
of man descend from the higher estates, as well as the
stones or earth which then carry with them.
 The owner of the lower estate cannot construct
works which will impede this easement; neither can the
owner of the higher estate make works which will increase
the burden. 36 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
In this light, Sps. Sonkin should have been aware of such circumstance
and, accordingly, made the necessary adjustments to their property so as to
minimize the burden created by such legal easement. Instead of doing so, they
disregarded the easement and constructed their house directly against the
perimeter wall which adjoins the Vergara property, thereby violating
the National Building Code in the process, specifically Section 708 (a) thereof
which reads:
Section 708. Minimum Requirements for Group A Finally, in view of Sps. Sonkin's undisputed failure to observe the two
Dwellings.
(a) Dwelling Location and Lot Occupancy.
The dwelling shall occupy not more than ninety percent of a
corner lot and eighty percent of an inside lot, and subject to
the provisions on Easement on Light and View of the Civil
Code of the Philippines, shall be at least 2 meters from the
property line.
. . . . (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Hence, the CA correctly held that while the proximate cause of the
damage sustained by the house of Sps. Sonkin was the act of Sps. Vergara in
dumping gravel and soil onto their property, thus, pushing the perimeter wall
back and causing cracks thereon, as well as water seepage, the former is
nevertheless guilty of contributory negligence for not only failing to observe the
two (2)-meter setback rule under the National Building Code, but also for
disregarding the legal easement constituted over their property. As such, Sps.
Sonkin must necessarily and equally bear their own loss.
In view of Sps. Sonkin's contributory negligence, the Court deems it
appropriate to delete the award of moral damages in their favor. While moral
damages may be awarded whenever the defendant's wrongful act or omission is
the proximate cause of the plaintiff's physical suffering, mental anguish, fright,
serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social
humiliation and similar injury in the cases specified or analogous to those
provided in Article 2219 37 of the Civil Code,38 they are only given to ease the
defendant's grief and suffering and should, therefore, reasonably approximate the
extent of hurt caused and the gravity of the wrong done. 39
Anent the issue on attorney's fees, the general rule is that the same
cannot be recovered as part of damages because of the policy that no premium
should be placed on the right to litigate. They are not to be awarded every time a
party wins a suit. The power of the court to award attorney's fees under Article
2208 40 of the Civil Code demands factual, legal, and equitable justification.
Even when a claimant is compelled to litigate with third persons or to incur
expenses to protect his rights, still attorney's fees may not be awarded where no
sufficient showing of bad faith could be reflected in a party's persistence in a case
other than an erroneous conviction of the righteousness of his cause. 41 In this
case, the Court observes that neither Sps. Sonkin nor Sps. Vergara (thru their
compulsory counterclaim) were shown to have acted in bad faith in pursuing their
respective claims against each other. The existence of bad faith is negated by the
fact that both parties have valid contentions against each other. Thus, absent
cogent reason to hold otherwise, the Court deems it inappropriate to award
attorney's fees in favor of either party. 42 ScHADI
(2)-meter setback rule under the National Building Code, and in light of the order
of the courts a quo directing Sps. Vergara to provide an adequate drainage
system within their property, the Court likewise deems it proper, equitable, and
necessary to order Erlinda, who is solely impleaded as respondent before the
Court, to comply with the aforesaid rule by the removal of the portion of her
house directly abutting the partition wall. The underlying precept on contributory
negligence is that a plaintiff who is partly responsible for his own injury should
not be entitled to recover damages in full but must bear the consequences of his
own negligence. The defendant must therefore be held liable only for the
damages actually caused by his negligence. 43
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated
February 24, 2010 and the Resolution dated September 2, 2010 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 89357 are
hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS. The awards of moral damages
and attorney's fees are DELETED and respondent Erlinda Torrecampo Sonkin
is DIRECTED to strictly comply with Section 708 (a) of the National Building
Code by removing or demolishing the portion of her house that occupies the two-
meter easement from the property line. The rest of the CA Decision stands.
SO ORDERED.
CAGAYAN II ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC. VS RAPANAN
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure, as amended, assailing the December 8, 2011 Decision 1 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in C.A. G.R. CV No. 77659. The appellate court granted the
appeal of respondents Allan Rapanan and Mary Gine Tangonan and held petitioner
Cagayan II Electric Cooperative, Inc. liable for quasi-delict resulting in the death of
Camilo Tangonan and physical injuries of Rapanan, and ordering it to pay respondents
damages and attorney's fees.
The antecedents of the case follow:
 On October 31, 1998, around 9:00 p.m., a motorcycle with three passengers
figured in a mishap along the National Highway of Maddalero, Buguey, Cagayan. It
was driven by its owner Camilo Tangonan who died from the accident, while his
companions respondent Rapanan and one Erwin Coloma suffered injuries. IcHSCT
On March 29, 2000, Rapanan and Camilo's common law wife, respondent
Mary Gine Tangonan, filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Aparri, Cagayan
a complaint 2 for damages against petitioner. They alleged that while the victims were
traversing the national highway, they were struck and electrocuted by a live tension
wire from one of the electric posts owned by petitioner. They contended that the
mishap was due to petitioner's negligence when it failed to fix and change said live
tension wire despite being immediately informed by residents in the area that it might
pose an immediate danger to persons, animals and vehicles passing along the national
highway.
Mary Gine prayed that she be awarded P50,000 civil indemnity, P25,000
burial expenses, P1,584,000 indemnity for loss of earning capacity and P100,000
moral and exemplary damages. Rapanan, on the other hand, prayed for P10,000 for
his medical treatment and P50,000 moral and exemplary damages. Both Mary Gine
and Rapanan prayed for 30% of the total award representing attorney's fees.
In its Answer, 3 petitioner alleged that the typhoons that struck its areas of
responsibility caused some of its electric poles to fall and high tension wires to snap
or cut-off which caused brownouts in said areas. It claimed that they cannot be faulted
for negligence if there were electric wires dangling along the national road since they
were caused by typhoons which are fortuitous events. It also alleged that it was able
to clear the said areas of fallen electric poles and dangling or hanging high tension
wires immediately after the typhoons, to secure the safety of persons and vehicles
traveling in said areas. It likewise contended that the proximate cause of the mishap
was the victims' negligence and imprudence in operating and driving the motorcycle
they were riding on.
During the trial, respondents testified and also presented Dr. Triffany C.
Hasim as witness.
Mary Gine testified 4 that she is not married to Camilo but they are living
together and that they have one child. She also testified that she spent P20,776 for the
funeral expenses of Camilo. She herself prepared an itemized list and computation of
said expenses. She also claimed that Camilo worked as a jeepney driver earning P150
per day and that as a result of Camilo's death, she suffered sleepless nights and lost
weight.
Rapanan testified 5 that he, Camilo and one Erwin Coloma were riding a
motorcycle along the National Highway of Maddalero, Buguey, Cagayan on October
31, 1998, around 9:00 in the evening. He claimed that they saw a wire dangling from
an electric post and because of a strong wind that blew, they got wound by said
dangling wire. He suffered physical injuries and electric burns and was hospitalized
for seven days. He claimed to have spent around P10,000 for his medicines, and also
complained of sleepless nights because of the mishap. CEaDAc
Dr. Triffany C. Hasim, the physician who attended to the victims when they
were rushed to the Alfonso Ponce Enrile Memorial District Hospital, also
testified 6 for the respondents. According to Dr. Hasim, the abrasions of Rapanan
were caused by pressure when the body was hit by a hard object or by friction but she
is uncertain as to whether a live electric wire could have caused them. She further said
that she did not find any electrical burns on Rapanan. As with Camilo, she found
abrasions and hematoma on his body and that the cause of death was due to "cardio
respiratory arrest secondary to strangulation." She also opined that the strangulation
could have been caused by an electric wire entangled around Camilo's neck.
Petitioner, for its part, presented four witnesses among whom were SPO2
Pedro Tactac, Tranquilino Rasos and Rodolfo Adviento.
SPO2 Tactac, who investigated the incident, testified 7 that there was a skid
mark on the cemented portion of the road caused by the motorycle's foot rest which
was about 30 meters long. According to him, it appears that the motorcycle was
overspeeding because of said skid mark.
Rasos and Adviento, employees of petitioner, both testified 8 that as a result
of the onslaught of typhoons Iliang and Loleng in Buguey and Sta. Ana, Cagayan, the
power lines were cut off because the electric wires snapped and the electric poles were
destroyed. After the said typhoons, petitioner's employees inspected the affected
areas. The dangling wires were then removed from the electric poles and were placed
at the foot of the poles which were located four to five meters from the road.
On December 9, 2002, the RTC rendered a decision 9 in favor of petitioner
and dismissed the complaint for damages of respondents. It held that the proximate
cause of the incident is the negligence and imprudence of Camilo in driving the
motorcycle. It further held that respondent Mary Gine has no legal personality to
institute the action since such right is only given to the legal heir of the deceased.
Mary Gine is not a legal heir of Camilo since she is only his common law wife.
On appeal, the CA reversed the RTC and held petitioner liable for quasi-
delict. The fallo reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present
appeal is GRANTED. The assailed decision dated December
9, 2002 of the Regional Trial Court of Appari, Cagayan, Branch
10 in Civil Case No. 10-305 is hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE and a NEW ONE ENTERED holding the defendant-
appellee CAGEL[C]O II liable for quasi-delict which resulted
in the death of Camilo Tangonan and the physical injuries of
Allan Rapanan, and ordering the payment of 50% of the
 following damages, except the attorney's fees which should be The appellate court nevertheless ruled that the victims were partly
borne by the defendant-appellant: responsible for the injuries they sustained. At the time of the mishap, they were over-
speeding and were not wearing protective helmets. Moreover, the single motorcycle
To the plaintiff-appellant Allan Rapanan: being driven carried three persons. While said circumstances were not the proximate
cause of Camilo's death and Rapanan's injuries, they contributed to the occurrence of
1. temperate damages in the amount of
the unfortunate event.
P10,000.00; and
Hence this petition raising the following arguments for this Court's
2. moral damages in the amount of
consideration:
P50,000.00;
1. THE CONCLUSION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS
To the legal heirs of the deceased Camilo Tangonan:
THAT PETITIONER WAS NEGLIGENT IN THE
1. indemnity for death in the amount of MAINTENANCE OF ITS POWER LINES IS
P50,000.00; MANIFESTLY ABSURD AND PREMISED ON A
SERIOUS MISAPPREHENSION OF
2. indemnity for loss of earning capacity FACTS. cIACaT
in the amount of P1,062,000.00;
2. THE COURT OF APPEALS DISREGARDED THE
3. temperate damages in the amount of EVIDENCE ON RECORD AND COMMITTED
P20,000.00; and SERIOUS MISAPPREHENSION OF FACTS AND
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN IT
[4.] moral damages in the amount of CONCLUDED THAT THE CAUSE OF THE
P50,000.00. MISHAP WAS A DANGLING ELECTRIC WIRE
To both the plaintiff-appellant Allan Rapanan and the legal THAT STRUCK AND WOUND UPON THE
heirs of the deceased Camilo Tangonan: VICTIMS.

1. exemplary damages in the amount 3. THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED AND
[of] P50,000.00; and COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
IN AWARDING DAMAGES TO THE HEIRS OF
2. attorney's fees amounting to 20% of CAMILO TANGONAN NOTWITHSTANDING
the total amount adjudged. THE FACT THAT THEY WERE NEVER
IMPLEADED AS PARTIES TO THE ACTION.
SO ORDERED. 10
4. ASSUMING, FOR ARGUMENT'S SAKE, THAT THE
In ruling against petitioner, the CA found that despite the different versions PETITIONER CAN BE HELD LIABLE FOR THE
of how the incident occurred, one fact was consistent — the protruding or dangling MISHAP, DAMAGES AND ATTORNEY'S FEES
CAGELCO wire to which the victims were strangled or trapped. It likewise ruled that COULD NOT BE AWARDED TO THE HEIRS OF
the police blotter and medical certificates together with the testimony of one of the CAMILO TANGONAN; AND THE AWARD OF
passengers of the motorcycle, respondent Rapanan, was able to establish the truth of MORAL, TEMPERATE AND EXEMPLARY
the allegations of respondents — all of which were not controverted by petitioner. The DAMAGES, AS WELL AS ATTORNEY'S FEES,
appellate court held that clearly, the cause of the mishap which claimed the life of TO ALLAN RAPANAN IS WITHOUT BASIS. 11
Camilo and injured Rapanan was the dangling wire which struck them. Without the
dangling wire which struck the victims, the CA held that they would not have fallen Thus, there are two main issues that need to be resolved by this Court: (1)
down and sustained injuries. The CA found that if petitioner had not been negligent Was petitioner's negligence in maintenance of its facilities the proximate cause of the
in maintaining its facilities, and making sure that every facility needing repairs had death of Camilo and the injuries of Rapanan? and (2) In the event that petitioner's
been repaired, the mishap could have been prevented.
negligence is found to be the proximate cause of the accident, should damages be testified that after the typhoons hit Cagayan, he together with his co-employees, after
awarded in favor of Camilo's heirs even if they were not impleaded? checking the damage to the electric lines, rolled the fallen electric wires and placed
them at the foot of the electric poles so as to prevent mishaps to pedestrians and
Petitioner contends that it cannot be accused of negligence as its crew vehicles passing by. Their testimonies were corroborated by what was recorded in the
cleared the roads of fallen electric poles and snapped wires to ensure the safety of Police Blotter of the Buguey Police Station, Buguey, Cagayan after SPO2 Tactac
motorists and pedestrians. They rolled the snapped wires and placed them behind investigated on the incident. The pertinent excerpt from the blotter is quoted verbatim:
nearby electric poles away from the roads as temporary remedy considering that the
snapped wires could not be collected all at once. It cites the report of SPO2 Pedro xxx xxx xxx
Tactac and testimony of Tranquilino Rasos stating that the electric wire was placed at
the shoulder of the road. The photograph of the wire also shows that it was placed TEAM LED BY SPO2 PEDRO R TACTAC
among banana plants which petitioner submits to be a clear indication that it was JUMPED OFF AND PROCEEDED TO BRGY
safely tucked away from the road. Petitioner contends that the trial court correctly MADDALERO, BUGUEY, CAGAYAN TO CONDUCT
observed that Camilo drove the motorcycle at a high speed causing it to careen to the INVEST AT THE SAID VEHICULAR ACCIDENT AT THE
shoulder of the road where the electric wire was and had Camilo driven the motorcycle SAME PLACE AND RET STN WITH THE REPT THAT ON
at an average speed, that would not have happened. Thus, petitioner submits, as found OR ABOUT 8:45 PM 31 OCTOBER 98 ONE
by the trial court, the proximate cause of the mishap was due to recklessness and MOTORCYCLE SUZUKI X4 WITH TEMPORARY PLATE
imprudence of Camilo and not of petitioner. NUMBER 14592 DRIVEN BY ONE CAMILO TANGONAN
y ROSETE 21 years old, MARRIED, DRIVER AND A
Respondents, for their part, insist that the appellate court erred in ruling that RESIDENT OF BRGY MASI, STA TERESITA, CAGAYAN
it was petitioner's negligence that caused the mishap resulting to the death of Camilo (DEAD ON THE SPOT) AND TWO COMPANIONS EDWIN
and injuries of Rapanan. They argued that had petitioner properly maintained its COLOMA y MABANAG, 23 YEARS OLD, MARRIED,
facilities by making sure that every facility needing restoration is repaired, the mishap DRIVER AND A RESIDENT OF MASI AND ALLAN
could have been prevented. RAFANAN y GUILLERMO, 19 YEARS OLD, SINGLE,
CONDUCTOR AND A RESIDENT OF BRGY BUYUN STA
The petition is meritorious. TERESITA CAGAYAN WASACCIDENTALLY
Negligence is defined as the failure to observe for the protection of the TRAPPED BY A PROTRUDING CAGELCO WIRE AT
interest of another person that degree of care, precaution, and vigilance which the THE SHOULDER OF THE ROAD WHILE THEY WERE
BOUND TO STA TERESITA FROM APARRI THIS
circumstances justly demand, whereby such other person suffers injury. 12 Article
PROVINCE DUE TO THE OVER SPEED OF MOTOR
2176 of the Civil Code provides that "[w]hoever by act or omission causes damage to
VEHICLE THE WIRE STRANGLED THE NECK OF THE
another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such
VICTIMS WHICH CAUSED THE INSTANTANEOUS
fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties,
DEATH OF THE DRIVER, CAMILO TANGONAN AND
is a quasi-delict." Under this provision, the elements necessary to establish a quasi-
ABRASIONS ON DIFFERENT PARTS OF THE BODY OF
delict case are: (1) damages to the plaintiff; (2) negligence, by act or omission, of the
THE TWO OTHER VICTIMS THE SAID TWO OTHER
defendant or by some person for whose acts the defendant must respond, was guilty;
VICTIMS WERE BROUGHT TO ALFONSO ENRILE
and (3) the connection of cause and effect between such negligence and the
HOSPITAL, GONZAGA, CAGAYAN FOR MEDICAL
damages. 13 TEAcCD
TREATMENT. 14 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The presence of the first element is undisputed because the unfortunate
Thus, there is no negligence on the part of petitioner that was allegedly the
incident brought about the death of Camilo and physical injuries to Rapanan. This
proximate cause of Camilo's death and Rapanan's injuries. From the testimonies of
Court, however, finds that the second and third elements are lacking thus precluding
petitioner's employees and the excerpt from the police blotter, this Court can
the award of damages in favor of respondents.
reasonably conclude that, at the time of that fatal mishap, said wires were quietly
Adviento, petitioner's employee testified that their electric poles along the sitting on the shoulder of the road, far enough from the concrete portion so as not to
highways, including the one where the mishap took place, were erected about four to pose any threat to passing motor vehicles and even pedestrians. Hence, if the victims
five meters from the shoulder of the road. Another employee of petitioner, Rasos, of the mishap were strangled by said wires, it can only mean that either the motorcycle
careened towards the shoulder or even more likely, since the police found the
motorcycle not on the shoulder but still on the road, that the three passengers were ATTY. TUMARU:
thrown off from the motorcycle to the shoulder of the road and caught up with the
wires. As to how that happened cannot be blamed on petitioner but should be Q: And did you try to investigate what was the cause [of death]
attributed to Camilo's over speeding as concluded by the police after it investigated of the victim?
the mishap. SPO2 Tactac, in his testimony, explained how they made such conclusion:
ATTY. RAPANAN:
ATTY. TUMARU:
Incompetent, your honor.
Q: . . . My question is, you said that the motor vehicle was
ATTY. TUMARU:
overspeeding, when you went to the place, what
made you conclude that the motor vehicle where the Q: Per your investigation, did you find out the cause of death
three rode which caused the death of Camilo of the victim and the others (sic)?
Tangonan, was overspeeding? Please explain that
before this court[.] A: There was abrasion at the neck of the victim, sir.

ATTY. RAPANAN: COURT:

Incompetent, you honor. Q: Who among the victims?

COURT: A: The driver Camilo Tangonan, sir.

Answer. Q: What about the two others?

A: I stated in the police blotter over speeding when we went to A: When we arrived at the scene, the two companions of the
investigate. We reflected in the report/police blotter victim were brought to the Gonzaga Alfonso Ponce
that there was over speeding because of the skid mark Enrile hospital by the PNP of Sta. Teresita police
that lasted up to 30 meters from the start to the place station, sir.
where the motorcycle fell, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: In this skid mark that you have seen, at the point of the start
of the skid mark to the place where you found the ATTY. RAPANAN:
motor vehicle, where was the motor vehicle that Q: Do you know that a motorcycle is provided with the
time? speedometer?
A: It was at the road, sir. A: Yes, sir.
Q: What road? Q: When you arrived at the scene, you no longer bother
A: At the edge of the cemented pavement, sir. yourself to see the speedometer of the motorcycle, is
that correct?
Q: Where was the victim found?
ATTY. TUMARU:
ATTY. RAPANAN:
Incompetent, your honor.
Immaterial, your honor.
COURT:
COURT:
Answer.
Sustained.
A: I did not bother to see the speedometer, sir.
Q: You only conclude in saying that the driver of the
motorcycle was running his motorcycle in a very
speed[y] manner because of the skid mark measuring
30 meters, you did not include that in your report?
ATTY. TUMARU:
The document is the best evidence, your honor.
ATTY. RAPANAN:
This is a new matter, your honor.
COURT:
Answer.
A: We saw the skid mark so we concluded that there was an
over speeding due to the skid mark, sir.
Q: Do you know that a skid on the surface of a cemented road
shows that something happened to the motorcycle
o[r] its [d]river?
ATTY. TUMARU:
That calls for an opinion, your honor.
COURT:
Answer.
A: There was an accident, sir.
Q: Do you know that when a vehicle even if running with slow
speed if a driver suddenly applied a break, there was
always a skid mark on the road?
A: It is the footrest of the motorcycle that caused the skid mark,
sir.
COURT:
Q: Which is which now, you found a skid mark of the tire and
footrest or only the skid mark of the footrest?
A: The footrest, sir.
Q: How do you know that the skid mark was caused by the
footrest?
A: Because the skid mark was caused by the footrest because
the place where the motorcycle fell (sic), the footrest
was still pointing [to] the skid mark [on] the
cemented road, sir. 15
The foregoing shows that the motorcycle was probably running too fast that
it lost control and started tilting and sliding eventually which made its foot rest cause
the skid mark on the road. Therefore, the mishap already occurred even while they
were on the road and away from petitioner's electric wires and was not caused by the
latter as alleged by respondents. It just so happened that after the motorcycle tilted
and slid, the passengers were thrown off to the shoulder where the electric wires were.
This Court hence agrees with the trial court that the proximate cause of the mishap
was the negligence of Camilo. Had Camilo driven the motorcycle at an average speed,
the three passengers would not have been thrown off from the vehicle towards the
shoulder and eventually strangulated by the electric wires sitting thereon. Moreover,
it was also negligent of Camilo to have allowed two persons to ride with him and for
Rapanan to ride with them when the maximum number of passengers of a motorcycle
is two including the driver. This most likely even aggravated the situation because the
motorcycle was overloaded which made it harder to drive and control. When the
plaintiff's own negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of his injury, he
cannot recover damages. 16 CAaEDH
As to the second issue, assuming arguendo that petitioner was indeed
negligent, the appellate court erred in awarding damages in favor of Camilo's legal
heirs since they were not impleaded in the case. It should be noted that it was Mary
Gine, the common law wife of Camilo, who is the complainant in the case. As a mere
common law wife of Camilo, she is not considered a legal heir of the latter, and hence,
has no legal personality to institute the action for damages due to Camilo's death.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The December 8, 2011
Decision of the Court of Appeals in C.A. G.R. CV No. 77659 is hereby REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. The December 9, 2002 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Aparri, Cagayan, Branch 10 in Civil Case No. 10-305 dismissing the complaint for
damages of respondents Allan Rapanan and Mary Gine Tangonan is REINSTATED.
PHOENIX CONSTRUCTION VS IAC
In the early morning of 15 November 1975— at about 1:30 a.m. — private
respondent Leonardo Dionisio was on his way home — he lived in 1214-B Zamora
Street, Bangkal, Makati — from a cocktails-and-dinner meeting with his boss, the
general manager of a marketing corporation. During the cocktails phase of the
evening, Dionisio had taken "a shot or two" of liquor. Dionisio was driving his
Volkswagen car and had just crossed the intersection of General Lacuna and General
Santos Streets at Bangkal, Makati, not far from his home, and was proceeding down
General Lacuna Street, when his car headlights (in his allegation) suddenly failed.
He switched his headlights on "bright" and thereupon he saw a Ford dump truck
looming some 2-1/2 meters away from his car. The dump truck, owned by and
registered in the name of petitioner Phoenix Construction Inc. ("Phoenix"), was
parked on the right hand side of General Lacuna Street (i.e., on the right hand side of
a person facing in the same direction toward which Dionisio's car was proceeding),
facing the oncoming traffic. The dump truck was parked askew (not parallel to the
street curb) in such a manner as to stick out onto the street, partly blocking the way
of oncoming traffic. There were no lights nor any so-called "early warning" reflector
devices set anywhere near the dump truck, front or rear. The dump truck had earlier
that evening been driven home by petitioner Armando U. Carbonel, its regular
driver, with the permission of his employer Phoenix, in view of work scheduled to
be carried out early the following morning, Dionisio claimed that he tried to avoid a
collision by swerving his car to the left but it was too late and his car smashed into
the dump truck. As a result of the collision, Dionisio suffered some physical injuries
including some permanent facial scars, a "nervous breakdown" and loss of two gold
bridge dentures. LLpr
Dionisio commenced an action for damages in the Court of First Instance of
Pampanga basically claiming that the legal and proximate cause of his injuries was
the negligent manner in which Carbonel had parked the dump truck entrusted to him
by his employer Phoenix. Phoenix and Carbonel, on the other hand, countered that
the proximate cause of Dionisio's injuries was his own recklessness in driving fast at
the time of the accident, while under the influence of liquor, without his headlights
on and without a curfew pass. Phoenix also sought to establish that it had exercised
due care in the selection and supervision of the dump truck driver.
The trial court rendered judgment in favor of Dionisio and against Phoenix and
Carbonel and ordered the latter:
"(1) To pay plaintiff jointly and severally the sum of
P15,000.00 for hospital bills and the replacement of
the lost dentures of plaintiff;
(2) To pay plaintiff jointly and severally the sum of
P150,000.00 as loss of expected income for plaintiff
brought about the accident in controversy and which
is the result of the negligence of the defendants;
(3) To pay the plaintiff jointly and severally the sum
of P100,000.00 as moral damages for the unexpected
and sudden withdrawal of plaintiff from his lifetime
career as a marketing man; mental anguish, wounded
feeling, serious anxiety, social humiliation,
besmirched reputation, feeling of economic insecurity,
and the untold sorrows and frustration in life
experienced by plaintiff and his family since the
accident in controversy up to the present time;
(4) To pay plaintiff jointly and severally the sum of
P10,000.00 as exemplary damages for the wanton
disregard of defendants to settle amicably this case
with the plaintiff before the filing of this case in court
for a smaller amount.
(5) To pay the plaintiff jointly and severally the sum
of P4,500.00 due as and for attorney's fees; and
(6) The cost of suit." (Emphasis supplied).
Phoenix and Carbonel appealed to the Intermediate Appellate Court. That court in
CA-G.R. No. 65476 affirmed the decision of the trial court but modified the award
of damages to the following extent:
1. The award of P15,000.00 as compensatory damages was
reduced to P6,460.71, the latter being the only amount that the
appellate court found the plaintiff to have proved as actually
sustained by him;
2. The award of P150,000.00 as loss of expected income was
reduced to P100,000.00, basically because Dionisio had
voluntarily resigned his job such that, in the opinion of the
appellate court, his loss of income "was not solely attributable
to the accident in question;" and
3. The award of P100,000.00 as moral damages was held by
the appellate court as excessive and unconscionable and hence
reduced to P50,000.00.
The award of P10,000.00 as exemplary damages and P4,500.00 as attorney's fees
and costs remained untouched.
This decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court is now before us on a petition
for review.
Both the trial court and the appellate court had made fairly explicit findings of fact
relating to the manner in which the dump truck was parked along General Lacuna
Street on the basis of which both courts drew the inference that there was negligence
on the part of Carbonel, the dump truck driver, and that this negligence was the
proximate cause of the accident and Dionisio's injuries. We note, however, that both
courts failed to pass upon the defense raised by Carbonel and Phoenix that the true
legal and proximate cause of the accident was not the way in which the dump truck
had been parked but rather the reckless way in which Dionisio had driven his car
that night when he smashed into the dump truck. The Intermediate Appellate Court
in its questioned decision casually conceded that Dionisio was "in some way,
negligent" but apparently failed to see the relevance of Dionisio's negligence and
made no further mention of it. We have examined the record both before the trial
court and the Intermediate Appellate Court and we find that both parties had placed
into the record sufficient evidence on the basis of which the trial court and the
appellate court could have and should have made findings of fact relating to the
alleged reckless manner in which Dionisio drove his car that night. The
petitioners Phoenix and Carbonel contend that if there was negligence in the manner
in which the dump truck was parked, that negligence was merely a "passive and
static condition" and that private respondent Dionisio's recklessness constituted an
intervening, efficient cause determinative of the accident and the injuries he
sustained. The need to administer substantial justice as between the parties in this
case, without having to remand it back to the trial court after eleven years, compels
us to address directly the contention put forward by the petitioners and to examine
for ourselves the record pertaining to Dionisio's alleged negligence which must bear
upon the liability, or extent of liability, ofPhoenix and Carbonel. llcd
There are four factual issues that need to be looked into: (a) whether or not private
respondent Dionisio had a curfew pass valid and effective for that eventful night; (b)
whether Dionisio was driving fast or speeding just before the collision with the
dump truck; (c) whether Dionisio had purposely turned off his car's headlights
before contact with the dump truck or whether those headlights accidentally
malfunctioned moments before the collision; and (d) whether Dionisio was
intoxicated at the time of the accident.
As to the first issue relating to the curfew pass, it is clear that no curfew pass was
found on the person of Dionisio immediately after the accident nor was any found in
his car. Phoenix's evidence here consisted of the testimony of Patrolman Cuyno who
had taken Dionisio, unconscious, to the Makati Medical Center for emergency
treatment immediately after the accident. At the Makati Medical Center, a nurse
took off Dionisio's clothes and examined them along with the contents of pockets
together with Patrolman Cuyno. 1 Private respondent Dionisio was not able to
produce any curfew pass during the trial. Instead, he offered the explanation that his
family may have misplaced his curfew pass. He also offered a certification (dated
two years after the accident) issued by one Major Benjamin N. Libarnes of the Zone
Integrated Police Intelligence Unit of Camp Olivas, San Fernando, Pampanga, which
was said to have authority to issue curfew passes for Pampanga and Metro Manila.
This certification was to the effect that private respondent Dionisio had a valid
curfew pass. This certification did not, however, specify any pass serial number or
date or period of effectivity of the supposed curfew pass. We find that private
respondent Dionisio was unable to prove possession of a valid curfew pass during
the night of the accident and that the preponderance of evidence shows that he did
not have such a pass during that night. The relevance of possession or non-
possession of a curfew pass that night lies in the light it tends to shed on the other
related issues: whether Dionisio was speeding home and whether he had indeed
purposely put out his headlights before the accident, in order to avoid detection and
possibly arrest by the police in the nearby police station for travelling after the onset
of curfew without a valid curfew pass. LibLex
On the second issue — whether or not Dionisio was speeding home that night —
both the trial court and the appellate court were completely silent.
The defendants in the trial court introduced the testimony of Patrolman Cuyno who
was at the scene of the accident almost immediately after it occurred, the police
station where he was based being barely 200 meters away. Patrolman Cuyno
testified that people who had gathered at the scene of the accident told him that
Dionisio's car was "moving fast" and did not have its headlights on. 2 Dionisio, on
the other hand, claimed that he was travelling at a moderate speed at 30 kilometers
per hour and had just crossed the intersection of General Santos and General Lacuna
Streets and had started to accelerate when his headlights failed just before the
collision took place. 3
Private respondent Dionisio asserts that Patrolman Cuyno's testimony was hearsay
and did not fall within any of the recognized exceptions to the hearsay rule since the
facts he testified to were not acquired by him through official information and had
not been given by the informants pursuant to any duty to do so. Private respondent's
objection fails to take account of the fact that the testimony of Patrolman Cuyno is
admissible not under the official records exception to the hearsay rule 4 but rather as
part of the res gestae. 5 Testimonial evidence under this exception to the hearsay
rule consists of excited utterances made on the occasion of an occurrence or event
sufficiently startling in nature so as to render in-operative the normal reflective
thought processes of the observer and hence made as a spontaneous reaction to the
occurrence or event, and not the result of reflective thought. 6
We think that an automobile speeding down a street and suddenly smashing into a
stationary object in the dead of night is a sufficiently startling event as to evoke
spontaneous, rather than reflective, reactions from observers who happened to be
around at that time. The testimony of Patrolman Cuyno was therefore admissible as
part of the res gestae and should have been considered by the trial court. Clearly,
substantial weight should have been ascribed to such testimony, even though it did
not, as it could not, have purported to describe quantitatively the precise velocity at
which Dionisio was travelling just before impact with the Phoenix dump truck.
A third related issue is whether Dionisio purposely turned off his headlights, or
whether his headlights accidentally malfunctioned, just moments before the
accident. The Intermediate Appellate Court expressly found that the headlights of
Dionisio's car went off as he crossed the intersection but was non-committal as to
why they did so. It is the petitioners' contention that Dionisio purposely shut off his
headlights even before he reached the intersection so as not to be detected by the
police in the police precinct which he (being a resident in the area) knew was not far
away from the intersection. We believe that the petitioners' theory is a more credible
explanation than that offered by private respondent Dionisio — i.e., that he had his
headlights on but that, at the crucial moment, these had in some mysterious if
convenient way malfunctioned and gone off, although he succeeded in switching his
lights on again at "bright" split seconds before contact with the dump truck. prcd
A fourth and final issue relates to whether Dionisio was intoxicated at the time of the
accident. The evidence here consisted of the testimony of Patrolman Cuyno to the
effect that private respondent Dionisio smelled of liquor at the time he was taken
from his smashed car and brought to the Makati Medical Center in an unconscious
condition. 7 This testimony has to be taken in conjunction with the admission of
Dionisio that he had taken "a shot or two" of liquor before dinner with his boss that
night. We do not believe that this evidence is sufficient to show that Dionisio was so
heavily under the influence of liquor as to constitute his driving a motor vehicle per
se an act of reckless imprudence. 8 There simply is not enough evidence to show
how much liquor he had in fact taken and the effects of that upon his physical
faculties or upon his judgment or mental alertness. We are also aware that "one shot
or two" of hard liquor may affect different people differently.
The conclusion we draw from the factual circumstances outlined above is that
private respondent Dionisio was negligent the night of the accident. He was hurrying
home that night and driving faster than he should have been. Worse, he extinguished
his headlights at or near the intersection of General Lacuna and General Santos
Streets and thus did not see the dump truck that was parked askew and sticking out
onto the road lane.
Nonetheless, we agree with the Court of First Instance and
the Intermediate Appellate Court that the legal and proximate cause of the accident
and of Dionisio's injuries was the wrongful or negligent manner in which the dump
truck was parked — in other words, the negligence of petitioner Carbonel. That
there was a reasonable relationship between petitioner Carbonel's negligence on the
one hand and the accident and respondent's injuries on the other hand, is quite clear.
Put in a slightly different manner, the collision of Dionisio's car with the dump truck
was a natural and foreseeable consequence of the truck driver's negligence.
The petitioners, however, urge that the truck driver's negligence was merely a
"passive and static condition" and that private respondent Dionisio's negligence was
an "efficient intervening cause," and that consequently Dionisio's negligence must
be regarded as the legal and proximate cause of the accident rather than the earlier
negligence of Carbonel. We note that the petitioners' arguments are drawn from a
reading of some of the older cases in various jurisdictions in the United States but
we are unable to persuade ourselves that these arguments have any validity for our
jurisdiction. We note, firstly, that even in the United States, the distinctions between
"cause" and "condition" which the petitioners would have us adopt have already
been "almost entirely discredited." Professors Prosser and Keeton make this quite
clear: LibLex
"Cause and condition. Many courts have sought to distinguish
between the active "cause" of the harm and the existing
"conditions" upon which that cause operated. If the defendant
has created only a passive static condition which made the
damage possible, the defendant is said not to be liable. But so
far as the fact of causation is concerned, in the sense of
necessary antecedents which have played an important part in
producing the result, it is quite impossible to distinguish
between active forces and passive situations, particularly
since, as is invariably the case, the latter are the result of
other active forces which have gone before. The defendant
who spills gasoline about the premises creates a "condition,"
but the act may be culpable because of the danger of fire.
When a spark ignites the gasoline, the condition has done
quite as much to bring about the fire as the spark; and since
that is the very risk which the defendant has created, the
defendant will not escape responsibility. Even the lapse of a
considerable time during which the "condition" remains static
will not necessarily affect liability; one who digs a trench in
the highway may still be liable to another who falls into it a
month afterward. "Cause" and "condition" still find
occasional mention in the decisions; but the distinction is now
almost entirely discredited. So far as it has any validity at all,
it must refer to the type of case where the forces set in
operation by the defendant have come to rest in a position of
apparent safety, and some new force intervenes.But even in
such cases, it is not the distinction between "cause" and
"condition" which is important, but the nature of the risk and
the character of the intervening cause." 9
We believe, secondly, that the truck driver's negligence far from being a "passive
and static condition" was rather an indispensable and efficient cause. The collision
between the dump truck and the private respondent's car would in all probability not
have occurred had the dump truck not been parked askew without any warning lights
or reflector devices. The improper parking of the dump truck created an
unreasonable risk of injury for anyone driving down General Lacuna Street and for
having so created this risk, the truck driver must be held responsible. In our view,
Dionisio's negligence, although later in point of time than the truck driver's
negligence and therefore closer to the accident, was not an efficient intervening or
independent cause. What the petitioners describe as an "intervening cause" was no
more than a foreseeable consequence of the risk created by the negligent manner in
which the truck driver had parked the dump truck. In other words, the petitioner
truck driver owed a duty to private respondent Dionisio and others similarly situated
not to impose upon them the very risk the truck driver had created. Dionisio's
negligence was not of an independent and overpowering nature as to cut, as it were,
the chain of causation in fact between the improper parking of the dump truck and
the accident, nor to sever the juris vinculum of liability. It is helpful to quote once
more from Prosser and Keeton: prLL
"Foreseeable Intervening Causes. If the intervening cause is
one which in ordinary human experience is reasonably to be
anticipated, or one which the defendant has reason to
anticipate under the particular circumstances, the defendant
may be negligent, among other reasons, because of failure to
guard against it; or the defendant may be negligent only for
that reason. Thus one who sets a fire may be required to
foresee that an ordinary, usual and customary wind arising
later will spread it beyond the defendant's own property, and
therefore to take precautions to prevent that event. The person
who leaves the combustible or explosive material exposed in a
public place may foresee the risk of fire from some
independent source. . . . In all of these cases there is an
intervening cause combining with the defendant's conduct to
produce the result, and in each case the defendant's negligence
consists in failure to protect the plaintiff against that very risk.
Obviously the defendant cannot be relieved from liability by
the fact that the risk or a substantial and important part of the
risk, to which the defendant has subjected the plaintiff has
indeed come to pass. Foreseeable intervening forces are
within the scope of the original risk, and hence of the
defendant's negligence. The courts are quite generally agreed
that intervening causes which fall fairly in this category will
not supersede the defendant's responsibility.
Thus it has been held that a defendant will be required to
anticipate the usual weather of the vicinity, including all
ordinary forces of nature such as usual wind or rain, or snow
or frost or fog or even lightning; that one who leaves an
obstruction on the road or a railroad track should foresee
that a vehicle or a train will run into it; . . . .
The risk created by the defendant may include the
intervention of the foreseeable negligence of others. . . . [T]he
standard of reasonable conduct may require the defendant to
protect the plaintiff against `that occasional negligence which
is one of the ordinary incidents of human life, and therefore to
be anticipated.' Thus, a defendant who blocks the sidewalk
and forces the plaintiff to walk in a street where the plaintiff
will be exposed to the risks of heavy traffic becomes liable
when the plaintiff is run down by a car, even though the car is
negligently driven; and one who parks an automobile on the
highway without lights at night is not relieved of
responsibility when another negligently drives into it. ---" 10
We hold that private respondent Dionisio's negligence was "only contributory," that
the "immediate and proximate cause" of the injury remained the truck driver's "lack
of due care" and that consequently respondent Dionisio may recover damages
though such damages are subject to mitigation by the courts (Article 2179, Civil
Code of the Philippines). LexLib
Petitioners also ask us to apply what they refer to as the "last clear chance" doctrine.
The theory here of petitioners is that while the petitioner truck driver was negligent,
private respondent Dionisio had the "last clear chance" of avoiding the accident and
hence his injuries, and that Dionisio having failed to take that "last clear chance"
must bear his own injuries alone. The last clear chance doctrine of the common law
was imported into our jurisdiction by Picart vs. Smith 11 but it is a matter for debate
whether, or to what extent, it has found its way into the Civil Code of the
Philippines. The historical function of that doctrine in the common law was to
mitigate the harshness of another common law doctrine or rule — that of
contributory negligence. 12 The common law rule of contributory negligence
prevented any recovery at all by a plaintiff who was also negligent, even if the
plaintiff's negligence was relatively minor as compared with the wrongful act or
omission of the defendant. 13 The common law notion of last clear chance permitted
courts to grant recovery to a plaintiff who had also been negligent provided that the
defendant had the last clear chance to avoid the casualty and failed to do
so. 14 Accordingly, it is difficult to see what role, if any, the common law last clear
chance doctrine has to play in a jurisdiction where the common law concept of
contributory negligence as an absolute bar to recovery by the plaintiff, has itself
been rejected, as it has been in Article 2179 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. 15
Is there perhaps a general concept of "last clear chance" that may be extracted from
its common law matrix and utilized as a general rule in negligence cases in a civil
law jurisdiction like ours? We do not believe so. Under Article 2179, the task of a
court, in technical terms, is to determine whose negligence — the plaintiff's or the
defendant's — was the legal or proximate cause of the injury. That task is not simply
or even primarily an exercise in chronology or physics, as the petitioners seem to
imply by the use of terms like "last" or "intervening" or "immediate." The relative
location in the continuum of time of the plaintiff's and the defendant's negligent acts
or omissions, is only one of the relevant factors that may be taken into account. Of
more fundamental importance are the nature of the negligent act or omission of each
party and the character and gravity of the risks created by such act or omission for
the rest of the community. The petitioners urge that the truck driver (and therefore
his employer) should be absolved from responsibility for his own prior negligence
because the unfortunate plaintiff failed to act with that increased diligence which
had become necessary to avoid the peril precisely created by the truck driver's own
wrongful act or omission. To accept this proposition is to come too close to wiping
out the fundamental principle of law that a man must respond for the foreseeable
consequences of his own negligent act or omission. Our law on quasi-delicts seeks
to reduce the risks and burdens of living in society and to allocate them among the
members of society. To accept the petitioners' proposition must tend to weaken the
very bonds of society. cdll
Petitioner Carbonel's proven negligence creates a presumption of negligence on the
part of his employer Phoenix 16 in supervising its employees properly and
adequately. The respondent appellate court in effect found, correctly in our opinion,
that Phoenix was not able to overcome this presumption of negligence. The
circumstance that Phoenix had allowed its truck driver to bring the dump truck to his
home whenever there was work to be done early the following morning, when
coupled with the failure to show any effort on the part of Phoenix to supervise the
manner in which the dump truck is parked when away from company premises, is an
affirmative showing of culpa in vigilando on the part of Phoenix.
Turning to the award of damages and taking into account the comparative
negligence of private respondent Dionisio on one hand and petitioners Carbonel
and Phoenix upon the other hand, 17 we believe that the demands of substantial
justice are satisfied by allocating most of the damages on a 20-80 ratio. Thus, 20%
of the damages awarded by the respondent appellate court, except the award of
P10,000.00 as exemplary damages and P4,500.00 as attorney's fees and costs, shall
be borne by private respondent; only the balance of 80% needs to be paid by
petitioners Carbonel and Phoenix who shall be solidarily liable therefor to the
former. The award of exemplary damages and attorney's fees and costs shall be
borne exclusively by the petitioners. Phoenix is of course entitled to reimbursement
from Carbonel. 18 We see no sufficient reason for disturbing the reduced award of
damages made by the respondent appellate court.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the respondent appellate court is modified by
reducing the aggregate amount of compensatory damages, loss of expected income
and moral damages private respondent Dionisio is entitled to by 20% of such
amount. Costs against the petitioners.
MENDOZA VS SPOUSES GOMEZ
Assailed in the present appeal by certiorari is the Decision 1 dated 29
September 2003 of the Special Fourth Division of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-
G.R. CV No. 71877, which affirmed with modification the Decision 2 dated 31
January 2001 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 172, Valenzuela City in Civil
Case No. 5352-V-97, and which effectively allowed the award of actual, moral, and
exemplary damages, as well as attorney's fees and costs of the suit in favor of
respondent Spouses Leonora and Gabriel Gomez (respondents).
Antecedent Facts
On 7 March 1997, an Isuzu Elf truck (Isuzu truck) with plate number UAW
582, 3 owned by respondent Leonora J. Gomez (Leonora) 4 and driven by
Antenojenes Perez (Perez), 5 was hit by a Mayamy Transportation bus (Mayamy bus)
with temporary plate number 1376-1280, 6 registered under the name of petitioner
Elvira Lim (Lim) 7 and driven by petitioner Mariano C. Mendoza (Mendoza). 8
Owing to the incident, an Information for reckless imprudence resulting in
damage to property and multiple physical injuries was filed against
Mendoza. 9 Mendoza, however, eluded arrest, thus, respondents filed a separate
complaint for damages against Mendoza and Lim, seeking actual damages,
compensation for lost income, moral damages, exemplary damages, attorney's fees
and costs of the suit. 10 This was docketed as Civil Case No. 5352-V-97. ECAaTS
According to PO1 Melchor F. Rosales (PO1 Rosales), investigating officer
of the case, at around 5:30 a.m., the Isuzu truck, coming from Katipunan Road and
heading towards E. Rodriguez, Sr. Avenue, was travelling along the downward
portion of Boni Serrano Avenue when, upon reaching the corner of Riviera Street,
fronting St. Ignatius Village, its left front portion was hit by the Mayamy
bus. 11 According to PO1 Rosales, the Mayamy bus, while traversing the opposite
lane, intruded on the lane occupied by the Isuzu truck. 12
PO1 Rosales also reported that Mendoza tried to escape by speeding away,
but he was apprehended in Katipunan Road corner C. P. Garcia Avenue by one Traffic
Enforcer Galante and a security guard of St. Ignatius Village. 13
As a result of the incident, Perez, as well as the helpers on board the Isuzu
truck, namely Melchor V. Anla (Anla), Romeo J. Banca (Banca), and Jimmy Repisada
(Repisada), sustained injuries necessitating medical treatment amounting to
P11,267.35, which amount was shouldered by respondents. Moreover, the Isuzu truck
sustained extensive damages on its cowl, chassis, lights and steering wheel, amounting
to P142,757.40. 14
Additionally, respondents averred that the mishap deprived them of a daily
income of P1,000.00. Engaged in the business of buying plastic scraps and delivering
them to recycling plants, respondents claimed that the Isuzu truck was vital in the
furtherance of their business.
For their part, petitioners capitalized on the issue of ownership of the bus in
question. Respondents argued that although the registered owner was Lim, the actual
owner of the bus was SPO1 Cirilo Enriquez (Enriquez), who had the bus attached with
Mayamy Transportation Company (Mayamy Transport) under the so-called
"kabit system". Respondents then impleaded both Lim and Enriquez.
Petitioners, on the other hand, presented Teresita Gutierrez (Gutierrez),
whose testimony was offered to prove that Mayamy Bus or Mayamy Transport is a
business name registered under her name, and that such business is a sole
proprietorship. Such was presented by petitioners to rebut the allegation of
respondents that Mayamy Transport is a corporation; 15 and to show, moreover, that
although Gutierrez is the sole proprietor of Mayamy Transport, she was not impleaded
by respondents in the case at bar. 16
After weighing the evidence, the RTC found Mendoza liable for direct
personal negligence under Article 2176 of the Civil Code, and it also found Lim
vicariously liable under Article 2180 of the same Code.
As regards Lim, the RTC relied on the Certificate of Registration issued by
the Land Transportation Office on 9 December 1996 17 in concluding that she is the
registered owner of the bus in question. Although actually owned by Enriquez,
following the established principle in transportation law, Lim, as the registered owner,
is the one who can be held liable.
Thus, the RTC disposed of the case as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in
favor of the [respondents] and against the [petitioners]:
1. Ordering the [petitioners] except Enriquez to pay
[respondents], jointly and severally, the costs of
repair of the damaged vehicle in the amount of
P142,757.40;
2. Ordering the defendants except Enriquez to pay
[respondents], jointly and severally, the amount of
P1,000.00 per day from March 7, 1997 up to
November 1997 representing the unrealized income
of the [respondents] when the incident transpired up
to the time the damaged Isuzu truck was repaired;
3. Ordering the [petitioners] except Enriquez to pay
[respondents], jointly and severally, the amount of
P100,000.00 as moral damages, plus a separate
amount of P50,000.00 as exemplary
damages; DISEaC
4. Ordering the [petitioners] except Enriquez to pay
[respondents], jointly and severally, the amount of
P50,000.00 as attorney's fees;
5. Ordering the [petitioners] except Enriquez to pay
[respondents] the costs of suit. 18
Displeased, petitioners appealed to the CA, which appeal was docketed as
CA-G.R. CV No. 71877. After evaluating the damages awarded by the RTC, such
were affirmed by the CA with the exception of the award of unrealized income which
the CA ordered deleted, viz.:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal
is PARTLY GRANTED. The judgment of the Regional Trial
Court of Valenzuela City, Branch 172 dated January 31, 2001,
is MODIFIED, in that the award of P1,000.00 per day from
March 1997 up to November 1997 representing unrealized
income is DELETED. The award of P142,757.40 for the cost
of repair of the damaged vehicle, the award of P100,000.00 as
moral damages, the award of P50,000.00 as exemplary
damages, the award of P50,000.00 as attorney's fees and the
costs of the suit are hereby MAINTAINED. 19
The Present Petition
Unsatisfied with the CA ruling, petitioners filed an appeal
by certiorari before the Court, raising the following issues: 20
1. The court a quo has decided questions of substance in a way
not in accord with law or with the applicable
decisions of the Supreme Court when it awarded:
a. Moral damages in spite of the fact that
the [respondents'] cause of action is clearly based
on quasi-delict and [respondents] did not sustain
physical injuries to be entitled thereto pursuant to
Article 2219 (2) of the New Civil Code and pertinent
decisions of the Supreme Court to that effect. The
court a quo erroneously concluded that the driver
acted in bad faith and erroneously applied the
provision of Article 21 of the same code to justify the
award for bad faith is not consistent with quasi-delict
which is founded on fault or negligence.
b. Exemplary damages in spite of the fact
that there is no finding that the vehicular accident
was due to petitioner-driver's gross negligence to be
entitled thereto pursuant to Article 2231 of the New
Civil Code and pertinent decisions of the Supreme
Court to that effect. The factual basis of the court a
quo that "the act of the driver of the bus in attempting
to escape after causing the accident in wanton
disregard of the consequences of his negligent act is
such gross negligence that justifies an award of
exemplary damages" is an act after the fact which is
 not within the contemplation of Article 2231 of
the New Civil Code.
c. Attorney's fees in spite of the fact that
the assailed decisions of the trial court and the court a
quo are bereft with jurisdictions for the award of
attorney's fees pursuant to the pertinent decisions of
the Supreme Court on the matter and provision
Article 2208 of the New Civil Code. The court a
quo erroneously applied the decision of the Supreme
Court in Bañas, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals, 325 SCRA
259.
The Court's Ruling
The petition is partially meritorious.
Respondents anchor their claim for damages on Mendoza's negligence,
banking on Article 2176 of the Civil Code, to wit:
Whoever by act or omission causes damage to
another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for
the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-
existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a
quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
In impleading Lim, on the other hand, respondents invoke the latter's
vicarious liability as espoused in Article 2180 of the same Code:
The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is
demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions, but also
for those of persons for whom one is responsible.
xxx xxx xxx
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by
their employees and household helpers acting within the scope
of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged
in any business or industry.
The first question to address, then, is whether or not Mendoza's negligence
was duly proven. Negligence is defined as the failure to observe for the protection of
the interests of another person, that degree of care, precaution and vigilance which the
circumstances justly demand, whereby such other person suffers injury. 21
As found by the RTC, and affirmed by the CA, Mendoza was negligent in
driving the subject Mayamy bus, as demonstrated by the fact that, at the time of the
collision, the bus intruded on the lane intended for the Isuzu truck. Having encroached
on the opposite lane, Mendoza was clearly in violation of traffic laws. Article 2185 of
the Civil Code provides that unless there is proof to the contrary, it is presumed that a
person driving a motor vehicle has been negligent if at the time of the mishap, he was
violating any traffic regulation. In the case at bar, Mendoza's violation of traffic laws
was the proximate cause of the harm.CAIHaE
Proximate cause is defined as that cause, which, in natural and continuous
sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and
without which the result would not have occurred. And more comprehensively, the
proximate legal cause is that acting first and producing the injury, either immediately
or by setting other events in motion, all constituting a natural and continuous chain of
events, each having a close causal connection with its immediate predecessor, the final
event in the chain immediately effecting the injury as a natural and probable result of
the cause which first acted, under such circumstances that the person responsible for
the first event should, as an ordinary prudent and intelligent person, have reasonable
ground to expect at the moment of his act or default that an injury to some person
might probably result therefrom. 22
The evidence on record shows that before the collision, the Isuzu truck was
in its rightful lane, and was even at a stop, having been flagged down by a security
guard of St. Ignatius Village. 23 The mishap occurred when the Mayamy bus,
travelling at a fast speed as shown by the impact of the collision, and going in the
opposite direction as that of the Isuzu truck, encroached on the lane rightfully
occupied by said Isuzu truck, and caused the latter to spin, injuring Perez, Anla, Banca,
and Repisada, and considerably damaging the Isuzu truck.
Having settled the fact of Mendoza's negligence, then, the next question that
confronts us is who may be held liable. According to Manresa, liability for personal
acts and omissions is founded on that indisputable principle of justice recognized by
all legislations that when a person by his act or omission causes damage or prejudice
to another, a juridical relation is created by virtue of which the injured person acquires
a right to be indemnified and the person causing the damage is charged with the
corresponding duty of repairing the damage. The reason for this is found in the
obvious truth that man should subordinate his acts to the precepts of prudence and if
he fails to observe them and causes damage to another, he must repair the
damage. 24 His negligence having caused the damage, Mendoza is certainly liable to
repair said damage.
Additionally, Mendoza's employer may also be held liable under the
doctrine of vicarious liability or imputed negligence. Under such doctrine, a person
who has not committed the act or omission which caused damage or injury to another
may nevertheless be held civilly liable to the latter either directly or subsidiarily under
certain circumstances. 25 In our jurisdiction, vicarious liability or imputed negligence
is embodied in Article 2180 of the Civil Code and the basis for damages in the action
under said article is the direct and primary negligence of the employer in the selection
or supervision, or both, of his employee. 26
 In the case at bar, who is deemed as Mendoza's employer? Is it Enriquez,
the actual owner of the bus or Lim, the registered owner of the bus?
In Filcar Transport Services v. Espinas, 27 we held that the registered
owner is deemed the employer of the negligent driver, and is thus vicariously liable
under Article 2176, in relation to Article 2180, of the Civil Code.Citing Equitable
Leasing Corporation v. Suyom, 28 the Court ruled that in so far as third persons are
concerned, the registered owner of the motor vehicle is the employer of the negligent
driver, and the actual employer is considered merely as an agent of such owner. Thus,
whether there is an employer-employee relationship between the registered owner and
the driver is irrelevant in determining the liability of the registered owner who the law
holds primarily and directly responsible for any accident, injury or death caused by
the operation of the vehicle in the streets and highways. 29
As early as Erezo v. Jepte, 30 the Court, speaking through Justice Alejo
Labrador summarized the justification for holding the registered owner directly liable,
to wit:
. . . The main aim of motor vehicle registration is to identify
the owner so that if any accident happens, or that any damage
or injury is caused by the vehicles on the public highways,
responsibility therefore can be fixed on a definite individual,
the registered owner. Instances are numerous where vehicle
running on public highways caused accidents or injuries to
pedestrians or other vehicles without positive identification
of the owner or drivers, or with very scant means of
identification. It is to forestall these circumstances, so
inconvenient or prejudicial to the public, that the motor
vehicle registration is primarily ordained, in the interest of
the determination of persons responsible for damages or
injuries caused on public highways.
"One of the principal purposes of motor vehicles
legislation is identification of the vehicle and of the operator,
in case of accident; and another is that the knowledge that
means of detection are always available may act as a deterrent
from lax observance of the law and of the rules of conservative
and safe operation. Whatever purpose there may be in these
statutes, it is subordinate at the last to the primary purpose of
rendering it certain that the violator of the law or of the rules of
safety shall not escape because of lack of means to discover
him." The purpose of the statute is thwarted, and the displayed
number becomes a "snare and delusion", if courts will entertain
such defenses as that put forward by appellee in this case. No
responsible person or corporation could be held liable for the
most outrageous acts of negligence, if they should be allowed
to place a "middleman" between them and the public, and
escape liability by the manner in which they recompense their
servants. 31
Generally, when an injury is caused by the negligence of a servant or
employee, there instantly arises a presumption of law that there was negligence on the
part of the master or employer either in the selection of the servant or employee (culpa
in eligiendo) or in the supervision over him after the selection(culpa vigilando), or
both. The presumption is juris tantum and not juris et de jure; consequently, it may
be rebutted. Accordingly, the general rule is that if the employer shows to the
satisfaction of the court that in the selection and supervision of his employee he has
exercised the care and diligence of a good father of a family, the presumption is
overcome and he is relieved of liability. 32 However, with the enactment of the motor
vehicle registration law, the defenses available under Article 2180 of the Civil
Code — that the employee acts beyond the scope of his assigned task or that it
exercised the due diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage — are no
longer available to the registered owner of the motor vehicle, because the motor
vehicle registration law, to a certain extent, modified Article 2180. 33
As such, there can be no other conclusion but to hold Lim vicariously liable
with Mendoza. TAcSaC
This does not mean, however, that Lim is left without any recourse against
Enriquez and Mendoza. Under the civil law principle of unjust enrichment, the
registered owner of the motor vehicle has a right to be indemnified by the actual
employer of the driver; and under Article 2181 of the Civil Code, whoever pays for
the damage caused by his dependents or employees may recover from the latter what
he has paid or delivered in satisfaction of the claim.
Having identified the persons liable, our next question is what may be
awarded.
Actual or Compensatory Damages. Actual or compensatory damages are
those awarded in satisfaction of, or in recompense for, loss or injury sustained. They
simply make good or replace the loss caused by the wrong. 34
Article 2202 of the Civil Code provides that in crimes and quasi-delicts, the
defendant shall be liable for all damages which are the natural and probable
consequences of the act or omission complained of. It is not necessary that such
damages have been foreseen or could have reasonably been foreseen by the defendant.
Article 2199 of the same Code, however, sets the limitation that, except as provided
by law or by stipulation, one is entitled to an adequate compensation only for such
pecuniary loss suffered by him as he has duly proved. As such, to warrant an award
of actual or compensatory damages, the claimant must prove that the damage
sustained is the natural and probable consequences of the negligent act and, moreover,
the claimant must adequately prove the amount of such damage.
 In the case at bar, the RTC, basing on the receipts submitted by respondents
and which receipts petitioners had the opportunity to examine, found that the total
repairs on the Isuzu truck amounted to P142,757.40, and that the full hospitalization
and medical expenses of Perez, Anla, Banca, and Repisada amounted to P11,267.35.
As such, these are the amounts that respondents are entitled to as actual and
compensatory damages.
Although respondents alleged in their complaint that the damage to their
Isuzu truck caused them the loss of a daily income of P1,000.00, such claim was not
duly substantiated by any evidence on record, and thus cannot be awarded in their
favor.
Moral Damages. Moral damages are awarded to enable the injured party to
obtain means, diversions or amusements that will serve to alleviate the moral suffering
he has undergone, by reason of the defendant's culpable action. 35
In prayers for moral damages, however, recovery is more an exception
rather than the rule. Moral damages are not meant to be punitive but are designed to
compensate and alleviate the physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious
anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation,
and similar harm unjustly caused to a person. To be entitled to such an award, the
claimant must satisfactorily prove that he has suffered damages and that the injury
causing it has sprung from any of the cases listed in Articles 2219 and 2220 of
the Civil Code.Moreover, the damages must be shown to be the proximate result of a
wrongful act or omission. The claimant must thus establish the factual basis of the
damages and its causal tie with the acts of the defendant. 36
In fine, an award of moral damages calls for the presentation of 1) evidence
of besmirched reputation or physical, mental or psychological suffering sustained by
the claimant; 2) a culpable act or omission factually established; 3) proof that the
wrongful act or omission of the defendant is the proximate cause of the damages
sustained by the claimant; and 4) the proof that the act is predicated on any of the
instances expressed or envisioned by Article 2219 and Article 2220 of the Civil
Code.37
A review of the complaint and the transcript of stenographic notes yields
the pronouncement that respondents neither alleged nor offered any evidence of
besmirched reputation or physical, mental or psychological suffering incurred by
them. All that Leonora and her counsel had to say on the matter of damages other than
actual or compensatory damages is this: 38 ASEIDH
Q: Did you ever spend covering attorney's fees?
A: Yes, sir. P50,000.00.
Q: Aside from the actual damage that you have mentioned . . .,
how much more would you like this Court to award
you by way of moral damages?
A: P100,000.00, sir.
Q: How about exemplary damages?
A: P50,000.00, sir.
Q: What happened to you, what did you feel when the
defendants failed to immediately repair your vehicle
that was damaged Madam Witness?
A: I have incurred expenses and I was forced to apply for a
loan, sir.
In Kierulf v. CA, 39 we observed that this Court cannot remind the bench
and the bar often enough that in order that moral damages may be awarded, there must
be pleading and proof of moral suffering, mental anguish, fright and the like.
Citing Francisco v. GSIS, 40 the Court held that there must be clear testimony on the
anguish and other forms of mental suffering. Thus, if the plaintiff fails to take the
witness stand and testify as to his social humiliation, wounded feelings and anxiety,
moral damages cannot be awarded.
Moreover, respondents were not able to show that their claim properly falls
under Articles 2219 and 2220 of the Civil Code.Respondents cannot rely on Article
2219 (2) of the Civil Code which allows moral damages in quasi-delicts causing
physical injuries because in physical injuries, moral damages are recoverable only by
the injured party, 41 and in the case at bar, herein respondents were not the ones who
were actually injured.
In B.F. Metal (Corp.) v. Sps. Lomotan, et al., 42 the Court, in a claim for
damages based on quasi-delict causing physical injuries, similarly disallowed an
award of moral damages to the owners of the damaged vehicle, when neither of them
figured in the accident and sustained injuries.
Neither can respondents rely on Article 21 of the Civil Code as the RTC
erroneously did. Article 21 deals with acts contra bonus mores, and has the following
elements: (1) There is an act which is legal; (2) but which is contrary to morals, good
custom, public order, or public policy; (3) and it is done with intent to injure. 43 In
the present case, it can hardly be said that Mendoza's negligent driving and violation
of traffic laws are legal acts. Moreover, it was not proven that Mendoza intended to
injure Perez, et al. Thus, Article 21 finds no application to the case at bar.
All in all, we find that the RTC and the CA erred in granting moral damages
to respondents. CHDAEc
 Exemplary Damages. Article 2229 of the Civil Code provides that
exemplary or corrective damages are imposed, by way of example or correction for
the public good, in addition to moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages.
Article 2231 of the same Code further states that in quasi-delicts, exemplary damages
may be granted if the defendant acted with gross negligence.
Our jurisprudence sets certain conditions when exemplary damages may be
awarded: First, they may be imposed by way of example or correction only in addition,
among others, to compensatory damages, and cannot be recovered as a matter of right,
their determination depending upon the amount of compensatory damages that may
be awarded to the claimant. Second, the claimant must first establish his right to moral,
temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages. Third, the wrongful act must be
accompanied by bad faith, and the award would be allowed only if the guilty party
acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive or malevolent manner. 44
In motor vehicle accident cases, exemplary damages may be awarded where
the defendant's misconduct is so flagrant as to transcend simple negligence and be
tantamount to positive or affirmative misconduct rather than passive or negative
misconduct. In characterizing the requisite positive misconduct which will support a
claim for punitive damages, the courts have used such descriptive terms as willful,
wanton, grossly negligent, reckless, or malicious, either alone or in combination. 45
Gross negligence is the absence of care or diligence as to amount to a
reckless disregard of the safety of persons or property. It evinces a thoughtless
disregard of consequences without exerting any effort to avoid them. 46
In the case at bar, having established respondents' right to compensatory
damages, exemplary damages are also in order, given the fact that Mendoza was
grossly negligent in driving the Mayamy bus. His act of intruding or encroaching on
the lane rightfully occupied by the Isuzu truck shows his reckless disregard for safety.
In Baño v. Bachelor Express, Inc., et al., 47 where an erring bus, in the
process of overtaking a jeepney, also encroached on the opposite lane, and
consequently collided with a dump truck, the Court held the driver of the bus grossly
negligent and affirmed the award of exemplary damages.
Attorney's Fees. Article 2208 of the Civil Code enumerates the instances
when attorney's fees may be recovered:
Art. 2208. In the absence of stipulation, attorney's
fees and expenses of litigation, other than judicial costs, cannot
be recovered, except:
(1) When exemplary damages are awarded;
(2) When the defendant's act or omission has
compelled the plaintiff to litigate with third
persons or to incur expenses to protect his
interest;
(3) In criminal cases of malicious prosecution
against the plaintiff;
(4) In case of a clearly unfounded civil action or
proceeding against the plaintiff;
(5) Where the defendant acted in gross and evident
bad faith in refusing to satisfy the
plaintiff's valid and demandable claim;
(6) In actions for legal support;
(7) In actions for the recovery of wages of household
helpers, laborers and skilled workers;
(8) In actions for indemnity under workmen's
compensation and employer's liability
laws;
(9) In a separate civil action to recover civil liability
arising from a crime;
(10) When at least double judicial costs are awarded;
(11) In any other case where the court deems it just
and equitable that attorney's fees and
expenses of litigation should be recovered;
In all cases, the attorney's fees and expenses of
litigation must be reasonable.
From the very opening sentence of Article 2208 of the Civil Code, it is
clearly intended to retain the award of attorney's fees as the exception in our law, as
the general rule remains that attorney's fees are not recoverable in the absence of a
stipulation thereto, the reason being that it is not sound policy to set a premium on the
right to litigate. 48
As such, in Spouses Agustin v. CA, 49 we held that, the award of attorney's
fees being an exception rather than the general rule, it is necessary for the court to
make findings of facts and law that would bring the case within the exception and
justify the grant of such award. Thus, the reason for the award of attorney's fees must
be stated in the text of the court's decision; otherwise, if it is stated only in the
dispositive portion of the decision, the same must be disallowed on appeal. SaIACT
 In the case at bar, the RTC Decision had nil discussion on the propriety of WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court Resolves
attorney's fees, and it merely awarded such in the dispositive. The CA Decision, on to PARTIALLY GRANT the appeal by certiorari, as follows:
the other hand, merely stated that the award of attorney's fees is merited as such is
allowed when exemplary damages are awarded. 50Following established 1) DECLARE Mariano Mendoza and Elvira Lim solidarily
jurisprudence, 51 however, the CA should have disallowed on appeal said award of liable to respondent Spouses Leonora and Gabriel
attorney's fees as the RTC failed to substantiate said award. Gomez;

Costs of suit. The Rules of Court provide that, generally, costs shall be 2) MAINTAIN the award of actual or compensatory damages
allowed to the prevailing party as a matter of course, thus: 52 in the amount of P142,757.40 for the repair of the
Isuzu Elf truck, with legal interest beginning 31
Section 1. Costs ordinarily follow results of suit. — Unless January 2001 until fully paid;
otherwise provided in these rules, costs shall be allowed to
the prevailing party as a matter of course, but the court shall 3) GRANT additional actual or compensatory damages in the
have power, for special reasons, to adjudge that either party amount of P11,267.35 for the medical expenses
shall pay the costs of an action, or that the same be divided, shouldered by respondent Spouses Leonora and
as may be equitable. No costs shall be allowed against the Gabriel Gomez, with legal interest beginning 31
Republic of the Philippines, unless otherwise provided by January 2001 until fully paid;
law.
4) DELETE the award of moral damages; ICAcaH
In the present case, the award of costs of suit to respondents, as the
5) MAINTAIN the award of exemplary damages at
prevailing party, is in order.
P50,000.00;
Interests. Interest by way of damages has been defined as interest allowed
6) DELETE the award of attorney's fees; and
in actions for breach of contract or tort for the unlawful detention of money already
due. This type of interest is frequently called "moratory interest". Interest as a part of 7) MAINTAIN the award of costs of suit.
damage, is allowed, not by application of arbitrary rules, but as a result of the justice
of the individual case and as compensation to the injured party. 53 ST. MARY’S ACADEMY VS CARPITANOS

The legal provision on interests in quasi-delicts is Article 2211 of the Civil

Code which provides that in crimes and quasi-delicts, interest as part of the damage,
may, in a proper case, be adjudicated in the discretion of the court.
Generally, interest is allowed as a matter of right for failure to pay liquidated
claims when due. 54 For unliquidated claims, however, Article 2213 of theCivil
Code provides that interest cannot be recovered upon unliquidated claims or damages,
except when the demand can be established with reasonable certainty.
In the case at bar, although the award of exemplary damages is unliquidated
in the sense that petitioners cannot know for sure, before judgment, the exact amount
that they are required to pay to respondents, the award of actual or compensatory
damages, however, such as the truck repairs and medical expenses, is arguably
liquidated in that they can be measured against a reasonably certain
standard. 55 Moreover, justice would seem to require that the delay in paying for past
losses which can be made reasonably certain should be compensated through an award
of interest. 56
SYNOPSIS
Sherwin Carpitanos, son of respondents Carpitanos, died in an accident
caused by the detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep owned by respondent
Villanueva. The vehicle was then driven by James Daniel II, a minor. The incident
occurred during an enrollment drive conducted by petitioner academy where Sherwin
was a student. Sherwin's parents filed an action for damages against petitioner and the
other respondents. The trial court ruled in favor of Sherwin's parents ordering
petitioner to pay civil indemnity for the loss of life of Sherwin, actual and moral
damages, and attorney's fees under Articles 218 and 219 of the Family Code, and
declared respondents Daniel subsidiarily liable. Respondent Villanueva was absolved
from any liability.
Under Articles 218 and 219 of the Family Code, for the school to be
principally and solidarily liable for the acts of its students, the latter's negligence must
be the proximate cause of the injury. In this case, there was no evidence that petitioner
allowed the minor to drive the jeep and that the proximate cause of the accident was
a mechanical defect in the vehicle, thus, petitioner may not be held liable for the death
of Sherwin. However, as the registered owner of the vehicle, Villanueva was held
primarily liable for the death of Sherwin.
SYLLABUS
1. CIVIL LAW; FAMILY CODE; SPECIAL PARENTAL AUTHORITY
OVER A MINOR CHILD. — Under Article 218 of the Family Code, the following
shall have special parental authority over a minor child while under their supervision,
instruction or custody: (1) the school, its administrators and teachers; or (2) the
individual, entity or institution engaged in child care. This special parental authority
and responsibility applies to all authorized activities, whether inside or outside the
premises of the school, entity or institution. Thus, such authority and responsibility
applies to field trips, excursions and other affairs of the pupils and students outside
the school premises whenever authorized by the school or its teachers.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; PRINCIPAL AND SOLIDARY LIABILITY OF
PERSONS EXERCISING PARENTAL AUTHORITY. — Under Article 219 of the
Family Code, if the person under custody is a minor, those exercising special parental
authority are principally and solidarily liable for damages caused by the acts or
omissions of the unemancipated minor while under their supervision, instruction, or
custody.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; REQUISITE. — However, for petitioner to be liable,
there must be a finding that the act or omission considered as negligent was the
proximate cause of the injury caused because the negligence must have a causal
connection to the accident.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; CASE AT BAR. — In this case, the respondents
failed to show that the negligence of petitioner was the proximate cause of the death
of the victim. Respondents Daniel spouses and Villanueva admitted that the
immediate cause of the accident was not the negligence of petitioner or the reckless
driving of James Daniel II, but the detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep.
Further, there was no evidence that petitioner school allowed the minor James Daniel
II to drive the jeep of respondent Vivencio Villanueva. It was Ched Villanueva,
grandson of respondent Vivencio Villanueva, who had possession and control of the
jeep. He was driving the vehicle and he allowed James Daniel II, a minor, to drive the
jeep at the time of the accident. Considering that the negligence of the minor driver or
the detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep owned by respondent
Villanueva was an event over which petitioner St. Mary's Academy had no control,
and which was the proximate cause of the accident, petitioner may not be held liable
for the death resulting from such accident. Consequently, we find that petitioner
likewise cannot be held liable for moral damages in the amount of P500,000.00
awarded by the trial court and affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Though incapable of
pecuniary computation, moral damages may be recovered if they are the proximate
result of the defendant's wrongful act or omission. In this case, the proximate cause of
the accident was not attributable to petitioner. For the reason that petitioner was not
directly liable for the accident, the decision of the Court of Appeals ordering petitioner
to pay death indemnity to respondent Carpitanos must be deleted. Moreover, the grant
of attorney's fees as part of damages is the exception rather than the rule. The power
of the court to award attorney's fees under Article 2208 of the Civil Code demands
factual, legal and equitable justification. Thus, the grant of attorney's fees against the
petitioner is likewise deleted. aESICD
5. ID.; DAMAGES; REGISTERED OWNER OF VEHICLE PRIMARILY
RESPONSIBLE FOR INJURIES CAUSED TO THE PUBLIC OR TO THIRD
PERSONS WHILE VEHICLE WAS BEING DRIVEN ON THE HIGHWAYS OR
STREETS. — We have held that the registered owner of any vehicle, even if not used
for public service, would primarily be responsible to the public or to third persons for
injuries caused the latter while the vehicle was being driven on the highways or streets.
Hence, with the overwhelming evidence presented by petitioner and the respondent
Daniel spouses that the accident occurred because of the detachment of the steering
wheel guide of the jeep, it is not the school, but the registered owner of the vehicle
who shall be held responsible for damages for the death of Sherwin Carpitanos.
DECISION
PARDO, J p:
The Case
The case is an appeal via certiorari from the decision 1 of the Court of
Appeals as well as the resolution denying reconsideration, holding petitioner liable
for damages arising from an accident that resulted in the death of a student who had
joined a campaign to visit the public schools in Dipolog City to solicit enrollment.
The Facts
The facts, as found by the Court of Appeals, are as follows:
"Claiming damages for the death of their only son,
Sherwin Carpitanos, spouses William Carpitanos and Lucia
Carpitanos filed on June 9, 1995 a case against James Daniel II
and his parents, James Daniel Sr. and Guada Daniel, the vehicle
owner, Vivencio Villanueva and St. Mary's Academy before
the Regional Trial Court of Dipolog City.
"On 20 February 1997, Branch 6 of the Regional
Trial Court of Dipolog City rendered its decision the
dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
"'WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED,
judgment is hereby rendered in the following manner:
1. Defendant St. Mary's Academy of Dipolog City, is
hereby ordered to pay plaintiffs William
Carpitanos and Luisa Carpitanos, the
following sums of money:
a. FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS
(P50,000.00) indemnity for the
loss of life of Sherwin S.
Carpitanos;
b. FORTY THOUSAND PESOS
(P40,000.00) actual damages
incurred by plaintiffs for burial
and related expenses;
c. TEN THOUSAND PESOS
(P10,000.00) for attorney's fees;
d. FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND
PESOS (P500,000.00) for moral
damages; and to pay costs.
2. Their liability being only subsidiary, defendants
James Daniel, Sr. and Guada Daniel are
hereby ordered to pay herein plaintiffs the
amount of damages above-stated in the
event of insolvency of principal obligor St.
Mary's Academy of Dipolog City;
3. Defendant James Daniel II, being a minor at the
time of the commission of the tort and who
was under special parental authority of
defendant St. Mary's Academy, is
ABSOLVED from paying the above-stated
damages, same being adjudged against
defendants St. Mary's Academy, and
subsidiarily, against his parents;
4. Defendant Vivencio Villanueva is hereby
ABSOLVED of any liability. His
counterclaim not being in order as earlier
discussed in this decision, is hereby
DISMISSED.
IT IS SO ORDERED."' (Decision, pp. 32-33;
Records, pp. 205-206)."
"From the records it appears that from 13 to 20
February 1995, defendant-appellant St. Mary's Academy of
Dipolog City conducted an enrollment drive for the school year
1995-1996. A facet of the enrollment campaign was the
visitation of schools from where prospective enrollees were
studying. As a student of St. Mary's Academy, Sherwin
Carpitanos was part of the campaigning group. Accordingly,
on the fateful day, Sherwin, along with other high school
students were riding in a Mitsubishi jeep owned by defendant
Vivencio Villanueva on their way to Larayan Elementary
School, Larayan, Dapitan City. The jeep was driven by James
Daniel II then 15 years old and a student of the same school.
Allegedly, the latter drove the jeep in a reckless manner and as
a result the jeep turned turtle.
"Sherwin Carpitanos died as a result of the injuries
he sustained from the accident." 2
In due time, petitioner St. Mary's Academy appealed the decision to the
Court of Appeals. 3
On February 29, 2000, the Court of Appeals promulgated a decision
reducing the actual damages to P25,000.00 but otherwise affirming the decision a quo,
in toto. 4
On February 29, 2000, petitioner St. Mary's Academy filed a motion for
reconsideration of the decision. However, on May 22, 2000, the Court of Appeals
denied the motion. 5
Hence, this appeal. 6
The Issues
1) Whether the Court of Appeals erred in holding the
petitioner liable for damages for the death of
Sherwin Carpitanos.
2) Whether the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the award
of moral damages against the petitioner.
 The Court's Ruling
We reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals.
The Court of Appeals held petitioner St. Mary's Academy liable for the
death of Sherwin Carpitanos under Articles 218 7 and 219 8 of the Family Code,
pointing out that petitioner was negligent in allowing a minor to drive and in not
having a teacher accompany the minor students in the jeep.
Under Article 218 of the Family Code, the following shall have special
parental authority over a minor child while under their supervision, instruction or
custody: (1) the school, its administrators and teachers; or (2) the individual, entity or
institution engaged in child care. This special parental authority and responsibility
applies to all authorized activities, whether inside or outside the premises of the
school, entity or institution. Thus, such authority and responsibility applies to field
trips, excursions and other affairs of the pupils and students outside the school
premises whenever authorized by the school or its teachers. 9
Under Article 219 of the Family Code, if the person under custody is a
minor, those exercising special parental authority are principally and solidarily liable
for damages caused by the acts or omissions of the unemancipated minor while under
their supervision, instruction, or custody. 10
However, for petitioner to be liable, there must be a finding that the act or
omission considered as negligent was the proximate cause of the injury caused
because the negligence, must have a causal connection to the accident. 11
“In order that there may be a recovery for an injury,
however, it must be shown that the ‘injury for which recovery
is sought must be the legitimate consequence of the wrong
done; the connection between the negligence and the injury
must be a direct and natural sequence of events, unbroken by
intervening efficient causes.’ In other words, the negligence
must be the proximate cause of the injury. For, ‘negligence, no
matter in what it consists, cannot create a right of action unless
it is the proximate cause of the injury complained of.’ And ‘the
proximate cause of an injury is that cause, which, in natural and
continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening
cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would
not have occurred.”’ 12
In this case, the respondents failed to show that the negligence of petitioner
was the proximate cause of the death of the victim.
Respondents Daniel spouses and Villanueva admitted that the immediate
cause of the accident was not the negligence of petitioner or the reckless driving of
James Daniel II, but the detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep.
In their comment to the petition, respondents Daniel spouses and Villanueva
admitted the documentary exhibits, establishing that the cause of the accident was the
detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep. Hence, the cause of the accident
was not the recklessness of James Daniel II but the mechanical defect in the jeep of
Vivencio Villanueva. Respondents, including the spouses Carpitanos, parents of the
deceased Sherwin Carpitanos, did not dispute the report and testimony of the traffic
investigator who stated that the cause of the accident was the detachment of the
steering wheel guide that caused the jeep to turn turtle.
Significantly, respondents did not present any evidence to show that the
proximate cause of the accident was the negligence of the school authorities, or the
reckless driving of James Daniel II. Hence, the respondents’ reliance on Article 219
of the Family Code that “those given the authority and responsibility under the
preceding Article shall be principally and solidarily liable for damages caused by acts
or omissions of the unemancipated minor” was unfounded.
Further, there was no evidence that petitioner school allowed the minor
James Daniel II to drive the jeep of respondent Vivencio Villanueva. It was Ched
Villanueva, grandson of respondent Vivencio Villanueva, who had possession and
control of the jeep. He was driving the vehicle and he allowed James Daniel II, a
minor, to drive the jeep at the time of the accident.
Hence, liability for the accident, whether caused by the negligence of the
minor driver or mechanical detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep, must
be pinned on the minor's parents primarily. The negligence of petitioner St. Mary's
Academy was only a remote cause of the accident. Between the remote cause and the
injury, there intervened the negligence of the minor's parents or the detachment of the
steering wheel guide of the jeep.
"The proximate cause of an injury is that cause,
which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any
efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without
which the result would not have occurred." 13
Considering that the negligence of the minor driver or the detachment of the
steering wheel guide of the jeep owned by respondent Villanueva was an event over
which petitioner St. Mary's Academy had no control, and which was the proximate
cause of the accident, petitioner may not be held liable for the death resulting from
such accident.
Consequently, we find that petitioner likewise cannot be held liable for
moral damages in the amount of P500,000.00 awarded by the trial court and affirmed
by the Court of Appeals.
Though incapable of pecuniary computation, moral damages may be
recovered if they are the proximate result of the defendant's wrongful act or
omission. 14 In this case, the proximate cause of the accident was not attributable to
petitioner.
For the reason that petitioner was not directly liable for the accident, the
decision of the Court of Appeals ordering petitioner to pay death indemnity to
respondent Carpitanos must be deleted. Moreover, the grant of attorney's fees as part
of damages is the exception rather than the rule. 15 The power of the court to award
attorney's fees under Article 2208 of the Civil Code demands factual, legal and
equitable justification. 16 Thus, the grant of attorney's fees against the petitioner is
likewise deleted.
Incidentally, there was no question that the registered owner of the vehicle
was respondent Villanueva. He never denied and in fact admitted this fact. We have
held that the registered owner of any vehicle, even if not used for public service, would
primarily be responsible to the public or to third persons for injuries caused the latter
while the vehicle was being driven on the highways or streets." 17 Hence, with the
overwhelming evidence presented by petitioner and the respondent Daniel spouses
that the accident occurred because of the detachment of the steering wheel guide of
the jeep, it is not the school, but the registered owner of the vehicle who shall be held
responsible for damages for the death of Sherwin Carpitanos.
The Fallo
WHEREFORE, the Court REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the decision of
the Court of Appeals 18 and that of the trial court. 19 The Court remands the case to
the trial court for determination of the liability of defendants, excluding petitioner St.
Mary's Academy, Dipolog City.
SABIDO VS CUSTODIO
Prospero Sabido and Aser Lagunda seek the review by certiorari of a
decision of the Court of Appeals, affirming that of the Court of First Instance of
Laguna, sentencing the Laguna-Tayabas Bus Co., Nicasio Mudales, and herein
petitioners, Prospero Sabido and Aser Lagunda, to jointly and severally
indemnify Belen Makabuhay Custodio and her son, Agripino Custodio, Jr., in
the sum of P6,000 and to pay the costs of the suit.
The facts are set forth in the decision of the Court of Appeals from
which we quote:
"Upon a careful study and judicious examining of
the evidence on record, we are inclined to concur in the
findings made by the trial court. Here is how the Court a quo
analyzed the facts of this case:
'In Barrio Halang, Municipality of
Lumban, Province of Laguna, two trucks, one
driven by Nicasio Mudales and belonging to Laguna
Tayabas Bus Company, and the other driven by
Aser Lagunda and owned by Prospero Sabido,
going in opposite directions met each other in a road
curve. Agripino Custodio, a passenger of LTB bus,
who was hanging on the left side as truck was full
of passengers was sideswiped by the truck driven by
Aser Lagunda. As a result, Agripino Custodio was
injured and died (Exhibit A)
'It appears clear from the evidence that
Agripino Custodio was hanging in the left side of
the LTB Bus. Otherwise, were he sitting inside the
truck, he could not have been struck by the six by
six truck driven by Aser Lagunda. This fact alone,
of allowing Agripino Custodio to hang on the side
of the truck, makes the defendant Laguna Tayabas
Bus Company liable for damages. For certainly its
employees, who are the driver and conductor were
negligent. They should not have allowed
Agripino Custodio to ride their truck in that manner.
'To avoid any liability, Aser Lagunda and
Prospero Sabido throw all the blame on Nicasio
Mudales. From the testimony, however, of Belen
Makabuhay, Agripino Custodio's widow, we can
deduce that Aser Lagunda was equally negligent as
Nicasio Mudales. Belen testified that the 6 x 6 truck
was running fast when it met the LTB Bus. And
Aser Lagunda had time and opportunity to avoid the
mishap if he had been sufficiently careful and
cautious because the two trucks never collided with
each other. By simply swerving to the right side of
the road, the 6 x 6 truck could have avoided hitting
Agripino Custodio. It is incredible that the LTB was
running on the middle of the road when passing a
curve. He knows it is dangerous to do so. We are
rather of the belief that both trucks did not keep
close to the right side of the road so they sideswiped
each other and thus AgripinoCustodio was injured
and died. In other words, both drivers must have
driven their trucks not in the proper line and are,
therefore, both reckless and negligent'.
"We might state by way of additional observations
that the sideswiping of the deceased and his two fellow
passengers took place on broad daylight at about 9:30 in the
 morning of June 9, 1955 when the LTB bus with full load of
passengers was negotiating a sharp curve of a bumpy and
sliding downward a slope, whereas the six by six truck was
climbing up with no cargoes or passengers on board but for
three helpers, owner Sabido and driver Lagunda (tsn. 308-
309, Mendoza). Under the above-stated condition, there exists
strong persuasion to accept what Belen Makabuhay and Sofia
Mesina, LTB passengers, had testified to the effect that the 6
x 6 cargo truck was running at a fast rate of speed (tsn. 15, 74,
175 Mendoza). From the lips of no less than driver Lagunda
himself come the testimonial admission that the presence of
three hanging passengers located at the left side of the bus
was noted when his vehicle was still at a distance of 5 or 7
meters from the bus, and yet despite the existence of a
shallow canal on the right side of the road which he could
pass with ease, Lagunda did not care to exercise prudence to
avert the accident simply because to use his own language the
canal 'is not a passage of trucks.'"
Based upon these facts, the Court of First Instance of Laguna and the
Court of Appeals concluded that the Laguna-Tayabas Bus Co. — hereinafter
referred to as the carrier — and its driver Nicasio Mudales (none of whom has
appealed), had violated the contract of carriage with Agripino Custodio, whereas
petitioners Sabido and Lagunda were guilty of a quasi delict, by reason of which
all of them were held solidarily liable in the manner above indicated.
Petitioners now maintain: (1) that the death of Agripino Custodio was
due exclusively to the negligence of the carrier and its driver; (2) that petitioners
were not guilty of negligence in connection with the matter under consideration;
(3) that petitioners cannot be held solidarily liable with the carrier and its driver;
and (4) that the complaint against petitioners herein should be dismissed.
With respect to the first two (2) points, which are interrelated, it is
urged that the carrier and its driver were clearly guilty of negligence for having
allowed Agripino Custodio to ride on the running board of the bus, in violation
of Section 42 of Act No. 3992, and that this negligence was the proximate cause
of Agripino's death. It should be noted, however, that the lower court had,
likewise, found the petitioners guilty of contributory negligence, which was as
much a proximate cause of the accident as the carrier's negligence, for petitioners'
truck was running at a considerable speed, despite the fact that it was negotiating
a sharp curve, and, instead of being close to its right side of the road, said truck
was driven on its middle portion and so near the passenger bus coming from the
opposite direction as to sideswipe a passenger riding on its running board.
The views of the Court of Appeals on the speed of the truck and its
location at the time of the accident are in the nature of findings of fact, which we
cannot disturb in a petition for review by certiorari, such as the one at bar. At any
rate, the correctness of said finding is borne out by the very testimony of
petitioner Lagunda to the effect that he saw the passengers riding on the running
board of the bus while the same was still five (5) or seven (7) meters away from
the truck driven by him. Indeed, the distance between the two (2) vehicles was
such that he could have avoided sideswiping said passengers if his truck were
not running at a great speed.
Although the negligence of the carrier and its driver is independent, to
its execution, of the negligence of the truck driver and its owner, both acts of
negligence are the proximate cause of the death of Agripino Custodio. In fact,
the negligence of the first two (2) would not have produced this result without
the negligence of petitioners' herein. What is more, petitioners' negligence was
the last, in point of time, for Custodio was on the running board of the carrier's
bus sometime before petitioners' truck came from the opposite direction, so that,
in this sense, petitioners' truck had the last clear chance.
Petitioners contend that they should not be held solidarily liable with
the carrier and its driver, because the latter's liability arises from a breach of
contract, whereas that of the former springs from a quasi-delict. The rule is,
however, that.
"According to the great weight of authority, where
the concurrent or successive negligent acts or omission of two
or more persons, although acting independently of each other,
are, in combination, the direct and proximate cause of a single
injury to a third person and it is impossible to determine in
what proportion each contributed to the injury, either is
responsible for the whole injury, even though his act alone
might not have caused the entire injury, or the same damage
might have resulted from the acts of the other tort-feasor. . . ."
(38 Am. Jur. 946, 947.)
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed, with
costs against the petitioners herein. It is so ordered.
TEAGUE VS FERNANDEZ
The facts are stated in the decision of the Court of Appeals as follows:
"The Realistic Institute, admittedly owned and operated by
defendant-appellee Mercedes M. Teague, was a vocational
school for hair and beauty culture situated on the second floor
of the Gil-Armi Building, a two-storey, semi-concrete edifice
(Exhs. "C", "C-1" to "C-5" and "4") located at the corner of
Quezon Boulevard and Soler Street, Quiapo, Manila. The said
second floor was unpartitioned, had a total area of about 400
 square meters, and although it had only one stairway, of about
1.50 meters in width, it had eight windows, each of which was
provided with two fire-escape ladders (Exh. "4"), and the
presence of each of said fire-exits was indicated on the wall
(Exh. "5").
"At about four o'clock in the afternoon of October 24, 1955, a
fire broke out in a store for surplus materials located about ten
meters away from the institute. Soler Street lay between that
store and the institute. Upon seeing the fire, some of the
students in the Realistic Institute shouted 'Fire! Fire!' and
thereafter, a panic ensued. Four instructresses and six assistant
instructresses of the Institute were present and they, together
with the registrar, tried to calm down the students, who
numbered about 180 at the time, telling them not to be afraid
because the Gil-Armi Building would not get burned as it is
made of concrete, and that the fire was anyway, across the
street. They told the students not to rush out but just to go
down the stairway two by two, or to use the fire-escapes. Mrs.
Justina Prieto, one of the instructresses, took to the
michrophone so as to convey to the students the above
admonitions more effectively, and she even slapped three
students in order to quiet them down. Miss Frino Meliton, the
registrar, whose desk was near the stairway, stood up and
tried with outstretched arms to stop the students from rushing
and pushing their way to the stairs. The panic, however, could
not be subdued and the students, with the exception of the few
who made use of fire-escapes, kept on rushing and pushing
their way through the stairs, thereby causing stampede
therein.
"Indeed, no part of the Gil-Armi Building caught fire. But,
after the panic was over, four students, including
Lourdes Fernandez, a sister of plaintiffs-appellants, were
found dead and several others injured on account of the
stampede.
"xxx xxx xxx."
The injuries sustained by Lourdes Fernandez consisted of lacerations in both eyes
and on the upper lip, contused abrasions in different parts of the body, internal
hemorrhage and fractures in the second and third right ribs. The cause of death,
according to the autopsy report, was "Shock due to traumatic fractures of the ribs
with perinephric hematoma and lacerations of the conjunctiva of both eyes."
The deceased's five brothers and sisters filed an action for damages against
Mercedes M. Teague, as owner and operator of Realistic Institute. The Court of First
Instance of Manila found for the defendant and dismissed the case. The plaintiffs
thereupon appealed to the Court of Appeals, which by a divided vote of 3 to 2 (a
special division of five members having been constituted) rendered a judgment of
reversal and sentenced the defendant to pay damages to the plaintiffs in the sum of
P11,000.00, plus interest at the legal rate from the date the complaint was filed.
The case came up to this Court on a petition for review filed by the defendant below.
The decision of the appellate court declared that the defendant, hereinafter to be
referred to as the petitioner, was negligent and that such negligence was the
proximate cause of the death of Lourdes Fernandez. This finding of negligence is
based primarily on the fact that the provision of Section 491 of the Revised
Ordinances of the City of Manila had not been complied with in connection with the
construction and use of the Gil-Armi building where the petitioner's vocational
school was housed. This provision reads as follows:
"Sec. 491. Fireproof partitions exits and stairways. — . . . All
buildings and separate sections of buildings or buildings
otherwise known as accessories having less than three stories,
having one or more persons domiciled therein either
temporarily or permanently, and all public or quasi-public
buildings having less than three stories, such as hospitals,
sanitarium, schools, reformatories, places of human detention,
assembly halls, clubs, restaurants or panciterias, and the like,
shall be provided with at least two unobstructed stairways of
not less than one meter and twenty centimeters in width and
an inclination of not less than forty degrees from the
perpendicular, in case of large buildings more than two
stairways shall likewise be provided when required by the
chief of the fire department, said stairways shall be placed as
far apart as possible."
The alleged violation of the ordinance above-quoted consisted in the fact that the
second storey of the Gil-Armi building had only one stairway 1.5 meters wide,
instead of two of at least 1.2 meters each, although at the time of the fire the owner
of the building had a second stairway under construction.
In ruling that such non-compliance with the City Ordinances was an act of
negligence and that such negligence was the proximate cause of the death of
Lourdes Fernandez, reliance is based on a number of authorities in the American
jurisdiction, thus:
"The mere fact of violation of a statute is
not sufficient basis for an inference that such violation
was the proximate cause of the injury
complained. However, if the very injury has happened
which was intended to be prevented by the statute, it
has been held that violation of the statute will be
deemed to be the proximate cause of the injury." (65
C.J.S. 1156).
"The generally accepted view is that violation of a statutory
duty constitutes negligence, negligence as a matter or law, or,
according to the decisions on the question, negligence per
se for the reason that non-observance of what the legislature
has prescribed as a suitable precaution is failure to observe
that care which an ordinarily prudent man would observe,
and, when the state regards certain acts as so liable to injure
others as to justify their absolute prohibition, doing the
forbidden act is a breach of duty with respect to those who
may be injured thereby; or, as it has been otherwise
expressed, when the standard of care is fixed by law, failure to
conform to such standard is negligence, negligence per se or
negligence in and of itself, in the absence of a legal
excuse.According to this view it is immaterial, where a statue
has been violated, whether the act or omission constituting
such violation would have been regarded as negligence in the
absence of any statute on the subject or whether there was, as
a matter of fact, any reason to anticipate that injury would
result from such violation, . . ." (65 C.J.S. pp. 623-628).
"But the existence of an ordinance changes the situation. If a
driver causes an accident by exceeding the speed limit, for
example, we do not inquire whether his prohibited conduct
was unreasonably dangerous. It is enough that it was
prohibited. Violation of an ordinance intended to promote
safety is negligence. If by creating the hazard which the
ordinance was intended to avoid it brings about the harm
which the ordinance was intended to prevent, it is a legal
cause of the harm. This comes only to saying that in such
circumstances the law has no reason to ignore the causal
relation which obviously exists in fact. The law has excellent
reason to recognize it, since it is the very relation which the
makers of the ordinance anticipated. This court has applied
these principles to speed limits and other regulations of the
manner of driving." (Ross vs. Hartman, 139 Fed. 2d 14 at 15).
". . . However, the fact that other happenings causing or
contributing toward an injury intervened between the
violation of a statute or ordinance and the injury does not
necessarily make the result so remote that no action can be
maintained. The test is to be found not in the number of
intervening events or agents, but in their character and in the
natural and probable connection between the wrong done and
the injurious consequence. The general principle is that the
violation of a statute or ordinance is not rendered remote as
the cause of an injury by the intervention of another agency if
the occurrence of the accident, in the manner in which it
happened, was the very thing which the statute or ordinance
was intended to prevent." (38 Am Jur 841).
The petitioner has raised a number of issues. The first is that Section 491 of the
Revised Ordinances of the City of Manila refers to public buildings and hence did
not apply to the Gil-Armi building which was of private ownership. It will be noted
from the text of the ordinance, however, that it is not ownership which determines
the character of buildings subject to its requirements, but rather the use or the
purpose for which a particular building is utilized. Thus the same may be privately
owned, but if it is devoted to any one of the purposes mentioned in the ordinance —
for instance as a school, which the Realistic Institute precisely was — then the
building is within the coverage of the ordinance. Indeed the requirement that such a
building should have two (2) separate stairways instead of only one (1) has no
relevance or reasonable relation to the fact of ownership, but does have such relation
to the use or purpose for which the building is devoted.
It is next contended that the obligation to comply with the ordinance devolved upon
the owners of the building and therefore it is they and not the petitioner herein, who
is a mere lessee, who should be liable for the violation. The contention ignores the
fact that it was the use of the building for school purposes which brought the same
within the coverage of the ordinance; and it was the petitioner and not the owners
who was responsible for such use.
The next issue, indeed the basic one, raised by the petitioner is whether or not the
failure to comply with the requirement of the ordinance w as the proximate cause of
the death of Lourdes Fernandez. The case of Villanueva Vda. de Bataclan, et al. vs.
Medina, G. R. No. L-10126, October 22, 1957, is cited in support of the contention
that such failure was not the proximate cause. It is there stated by this Court:
"The proximate legal cause is that acting first and producing
the injury, either immediately or by settling other events in
motion, all constituting a natural and continuous chain of
events, each having a close causal connection with its
immediate predecessor, the final event in the chain
immediately affecting the injury as a natural and probable
result of the cause which first acted, under such circumstances
 that the person responsible for the first event should, as an
ordinarily prudent and intelligent person, have reasonable
ground to expect at the moment of his act or default that an
injury to some person might probably result therefrom."
Having in view the decision just quoted, the petitioner relates the chain of events
that resulted in the death of Lourdes Fernandez as follows: (1) violation of
ordinance; (2) fire at a neighboring place; (3) shouts of "Fire!, Fire!"; (4) panic in the
Institute; (5) stampede; and (6) injuries and death.
As thus projected the violation of the ordinance, it is argued, was only a remote
cause, if at all, and cannot be the basis of liability since there intervened a number of
independent causes which produced the injury complained of. A statement of the
doctrine relied upon is found in Manila Electric Co. vs. Remoquillo, L-8328, May
18, 1956, wherein this Court, citing Corpus Juris, said:
"A prior and remote cause cannot be made the basis of an
action if such remote cause did nothing more than furnish the
condition or give rise to the occasion by which the injury was
made possible, if there intervened between such prior or
remote cause and the injury a distinct, successive unrelated,
and efficient cause of the injury, even though such injury
would not have happened but for such condition or occasion.
If no danger existed in the condition except because of the
independent cause, such condition was not the proximate
cause. And if an independent negligent act or defective
condition sets into operation the circumstances which result in
injury because of the prior defective condition, such
subsequent act or condition is the proximate cause. (45 C.J. p.
931.)"
According to the petitioner "the events of fire, panic and stampede were independent
causes with no causal connection at all with the violation of the ordinance." The
weakness in the argument springs from a faulty juxtaposition of the events which
formed a chain and resulted in the injury. It is true that the petitioner's non-
compliance with the ordinance in question was ahead of and prior to the other events
in point of time, in the sense that it was coetaneous with its occupancy of the
building. But the violation was a continuing one, since the ordinance was a measure
of safety designed to prevent a specific situation which would pose a danger to the
occupants of the building. That situation was undue overcrowding in case it should
become necessary to evacuate the building, which, it could be reasonably foreseen,
was bound to happen under emergency conditions if there was only one stairway
available. It is true that in this particular case there would have been no
overcrowding in the single stairway if there had not been a fire in the neighborhood
which caused the students to panic and rush headlong for the stairs in order to go
down. But it was precisely such contingencies or events that the authors of the
ordinance had in mind, for under normal conditions one stairway would be adequate
for the occupants of the building. Thus, as stated in 38 American Jurisprudence,
page 841: "The general principle is that the violation of a statute or ordinance is not
rendered remote as the cause of an injury by the intervention of another agency if the
occurrence of the accident, in the manner in which it happened, was the very thing
which the statute or ordinance was intended to prevent." To consider the violation of
the ordinance as the proximate cause of the injury does not portray the situation in
its true perspective; it would be more accurate to say that the overcrowding at the
stairway was the proximate cause and that it was precisely what the ordinance
intended to prevent by requiring that there be two stairways instead of only one.
Under the doctrine of the cases cited by the respondents, the principle of proximate
cause applies to such violation.
A procedural point mentioned by the petitioner is that the complaint did not
specifically allege that the ordinance in question had been violated. The violation,
however, as an act of negligence which gave rise to liability, was sufficiently
comprehended within paragraph 7 of the complaint, which reads:
"Par. 7. That the death of Lourdes Fernandez was due to the
gross negligence of the defendant who failed to exercise due
care and diligence for the safety of its student in not providing
the building with adequate fire exits and in not practicing fire
drill exercises to avoid the stampede, aside from the fact that
the defendant did not have a permit to use the building as a
school-house.
The decision appealed from is affirmed, with costs.
URBANO VS IAC
1. CRIMINAL LAW; CRIMINAL LIABILITY; LIABILITY OF ACCUSED FOR
NATURAL CONSEQUENCES RESULTING FROM CRIME. — Article 4 of the
Revised Penal Code which provides that "Criminal liability shall be incurred: (1) By
any person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be different
from that which he intended . . ." Pursuant to this provision "an accused is criminally
responsible for acts committed by him in violation of law and for all the natural and
logical consequences resulting therefrom." (People v. Cardenas, 56 SCRA 631)
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ACCUSED IN CASE AT BAR NOT LIABLE FOR
SUBSEQUENT DEATH OF HACKING VICTIM DUE TO TETANUS NOT
PRESENT AT TIME OF INFLICTION OF WOUND. — In the case at bar, Javier
suffered a 2-inch incised wound on his right palm when he parried the bolo which
Urbano used in hacking him. This incident took place on October 23, 1980. After 22
days, or on November 14, 1980, he suffered the symptoms of tetanus, like lockjaw
and muscle spasms. The following day, November 15, 1980, he died. If, therefore,
the wound of Javier inflicted by the appellant was already infected by tetanus germs
at the time, it is more medically probable that Javier should have been infected with
only a mild cause of tetanus because the symptoms of tetanus appeared on the 22nd
day after the hacking incident or more than 14 days after the infliction of the wound.
Therefore, the onset time should have seen more than six days. Javier, however, died
on the second day from the onset time. The more credible conclusion is that at the
time Javier's wound was inflicted by the appellant, the severe form of tetanus that
killed him was not yet present. Consequently, Javier's wound could have been
infected with tetanus after the hacking incident. Considering the circumstance
surrounding Javier's death, his wound could have been infected by tetanus 2 or 3 or a
few but not 20 to 22 days before he died.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; CONVICTION TO HOMICIDE REQUIRES PROOF BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT THAT WOUND WAS PROXIMATE CAUSE OF
DEATH. — The rule is that the death of the victim must be the direct, natural, and
logical consequence of the wounds inflicted upon him by the accused. (People v.
Cardenas,supra) And since we are dealing with a criminal conviction, the proof that
the accused caused the victim's death must convince a rational mind beyond
reasonable doubt. The medical findings, however, lead us to a distinct possibility
that the infection of the wound by tetanus was an efficient intervening cause later or
between the time Javier was wounded to the time of his death. The infection was,
therefore, distinct and foreign to the crime. (People v. Rellin, 77 Phil. 1038). Doubts
are present. There is a likelihood that the wound was but the remote cause and its
subsequent infection, for failure to take necessary precautions, with tetanus may
have been the proximate cause of Javier's death with which the petitioner had
nothing to do.
4. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; SETTLEMENT OF MINOR OFFENSES
ALLOWED UNDER P.D. 1508. — It strains the judicial mind to allow a clear
aggressor to go scot free of criminal liability. At the very least, the records show he
is guilty of inflicting slight physical injuries. However, the petitioner's criminal
liability in this respect was wiped out by the victim's own act. After the hacking
incident, Urbano and Javier used the facilities of barangay mediators to effect a
compromise agreement where Javier forgave Urbano while Urbano defrayed the
medical expenses of Javier. This settlement of minor offenses is allowed under the
express provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1508, Section 2(3). (See also People
v. Caruncho, 127 SCRA 16).
5. ID.; CIVIL LIABILITY; JUDGMENT OF ACQUITTAL DOES NOT
NECESSARILY EXTINGUISH CIVIL LIABILITY. — It does not necessarily
follow that the petitioner is also free of civil liability. The well-settled doctrine is
that a person, while not criminally liable, may still be civilly liable. Thus, in the
recent case of People v. Rogelio Ligon y Tria, et al. (G.R. No. 74041, July 29, 1987),
we said: . . . ". . . While the guilt of the accused in a criminal prosecution must be
established beyond reasonable doubt, only a preponderance of evidence is required
in a civil action for damages. (Article 29, Civil Code). The judgment of acquittal
extinguishes the civil liability of the accused only when it includes a declaration that
the facts from which the civil liability might arise did not exist. (Padilla v. Court of
Appeals, 129 SCRA 559)
DECISION
GUTIERREZ, JR., J p:
This is a petition to review the decision of the then Intermediate Appellate Court
which affirmed the decision of the then Circuit Criminal Court of Dagupan City
finding petitioner Filomeno Urban guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
homicide.
The records disclose the following facts of the case.
At about 8:00 o'clock in the morning of October 23, 1980, petitioner Filomeno
Urbano went to his ricefield at Barangay Anonang, San Fabian, Pangasinan located
at about 100 meters from the tobacco seedbed of Marcelo Javier. He found the place
where he stored his palay flooded with water coming from the irrigation canal
nearby which had overflowed. Urbano went to the elevated portion of the canal to
see what happened and there he saw Marcelo Javier and Emilio Erfe cutting grass.
He asked them who was responsible for the opening of the irrigation canal and
Javier admitted that he was the one. Urbano then got angry and demanded that Javier
pay for his soaked palay. A quarrel between them ensued. Urbano unsheathed his
bolo (about 2 feet long, including the handle, by 2 inches wide) and hacked Javier
hitting him on the right palm of his hand, which was used in parrying the bolo hack.
Javier who was then unarmed ran away from Urbano but was overtaken by Urbano
who hacked him again hitting Javier on the left leg with the back portion of said
bolo, causing a swelling on said leg. When Urbano tried to hack and inflict further
injury, his daughter embraced and prevented him from hacking Javier.
Immediately thereafter, Antonio Erfe, Emilio Erfe, and Felipe Erfe brought Javier to
his house about 50 meters away from where the incident happened. Emilio then
went to the house of Barangay Captain Menardo Soliven but not finding him there,
Emilio looked for barrio councilman Felipe Solis instead. Upon the advice of Solis,
the Erfes together with Javier went to the police station of San Fabian to report the
incident. As suggested by Corporal Torio, Javier was brought to a physician. The
group went to Dr. Guillermo Padilla, rural health physician of San Fabian, who did
not attend to Javier but instead suggested that they go to Dr. Mario Meneses because
Padilla had no available medicine.
After Javier was treated by Dr. Meneses, he and his companions returned to Dr.
Guillermo Padilla who conducted a medico-legal examination. Dr. Padilla issued a
medico-legal certificate (Exhibit "C" dated September 28, 1981) which reads:
"TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
"This is to certify that I have examined the would of Marcelo
Javier, 20 years of age, married, residing at Barangay
Anonang, San Fabian, Pangasinan on October 23, 1980 and
found the following:
"1-Incised wound 2 inches in length at the upper portion of
the lesser palmar prominence, right.
"As to my observation the incapacitation is from (7-9) days
period. This would was presented to me only for medico-legal
examination, as it was already treated by the other doctor. (p.
88, Original Records)
Upon the intercession of Councilman Solis, Urbano and Javier agreed to settle their
differences. Urbano promised to pay P700.00 for the medical expenses of Javier.
Hence, on October 27, 1980, the two accompanied by Solis appeared before the San
Fabian Police to formalize their amicable settlement. Patrolman Torio recorded the
event in the police blotter (Exhibit "A"), to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
"Entry Nr 599/27 Oct '80/1030H/ Re entry Nr 592 on page
257 both parties appeared before this Station accompanied by
brgy councilman Felipe Solis and settled their case amicably,
for they are neighbors and close relatives to each other.
Marcelo Javier accepted and granted forgiveness to Filomeno
Urbano who shoulder (sic) all the expenses in his medical
treatment, and promising to him and to this Office that this
will never be repeated anymore and not to harbour any grudge
against each other." (p. 87, Original Records.)
Urbano advanced P400.00 to Javier at the police station. On November 3, 1980, the
additional P300.00 was given to Javier at Urbano's house in the presence of
barangay captain Soliven. prLL
At about 1:30 a.m. on November 14, 1980, Javier was rushed to the Nazareth
General Hospital in a very serious condition. When admitted to the hospital, Javier
had lockjaw and was having convulsions. Dr. Edmundo Exconde who personally
attended to Javier found that the latter's serious condition was caused by tetanus
toxin. He noticed the presence of a healing wound in Javier's palm which could have
been infected by tetanus.
On November 15, 1980 at exactly 4:18 p.m., Javier died in the hospital. The medical
findings of Dr. Exconde are as follows:
"Date Diagnosis
11-14-80 ADMITTED due to trismus
adm. at DX: TETANUS
1:30 AM Still having frequent muscle spasm.
With
difficulty opening his mouth.
#35, 421 Restless at times. Febrile
11-15-80 Referred. Novaldin 1 amp. inj. IM.
Sudden
cessation of respiration and HR after
muscular spasm. O2 inhalation
administered. Ambo bag resuscitation and
cardiac massage done but to no avail.
Pronounced dead by Dra. Cabugao at 4:18
P.M. PMC done and cadaver brought
home by relatives." (p. 100, Original
Records)
In an information dated April 10, 1981, Filomeno Urbano was charged with the
crime of homicide before the then Circuit Criminal Court of Dagupan City, Third
Judicial District.
Upon arraignment, Urbano pleaded "not guilty." After trial, the trial court found
Urbano guilty as charged. He was sentenced to suffer an indeterminate prison term
of from TWELVE (12) YEARS of prision mayor, as minimum to SEVENTEEN
(17) years, FOUR (4) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of reclusion temporal, as
maximum, together with the accessories of the law, to indemnify the heirs of the
victim, Marcelo Javier, in the amount of P12,000.00 without subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs. He was ordered confined
at the New Bilibid Prison, in Muntinlupa, Rizal upon finality of the decision, in view
of the nature of his penalty.
The then Intermediate Appellate Court affirmed the conviction of Urbano on appeal
but raised the award of indemnity to the heirs of the deceased to P30,000.00 with
costs against the appellant. prcd
The appellant filed a motion for reconsideration and/or new trial. The motion for
new trial was based on an affidavit of Barangay Captain Menardo Soliven (Annex
"A") which states:
 "That in 1980, I was the barrio captain of Barrio Anonang,
San Fabian, Pangasinan, and up to the present having been re-
elected to such position in the last barangay elections on May
17, 1982;
"That sometime in the first week of November, 1980, there
was a typhoon that swept Pangasinan and other places of
Central Luzon including San Fabian, a town of said province;
"That during the typhoon, the sluice or control gates of the
Bued-irrigation dam which irrigates the ricefields of San
Fabian were closed and/or controlled so much so that water
and its flow to the canals and ditches were regulated and
reduced;
"That due to the locking of the sluice or control gates of the
dam leading to the canals and ditches which will bring water
to the ricefields, the water in said canals and ditches become
shallow which was suitable for catching mudfishes;
"That after the storm, I conducted a personal survey in the
area affected, with my secretary Perfecto Jaravata;
"That on November 5, 1980, while I was conducting survey, I
saw the late Marcelo Javier catching fish in the shallow
irrigation canals with some companions;
"That few days thereafter, or on November 15, 1980, I came
to know that said Marcelo Javier died of tetanus." (p. 33,
Rollo)
The motion was denied. Hence, this petition.
In a resolution dated July 16, 1986, we gave due course to the petition.
The case involves the application of Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code which
provides that "Criminal liability shall be incurred: (1) By any person committing a
felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be different from that which he
intended . . ." Pursuant to this provision "an accused is criminally responsible for
acts committed by him in violation of law and for all the natural and logical
consequences resulting therefrom." (People v. Cardenas, 56 SCRA 631)
The record is clear that Marcelo Javier was hacked by the petitioner who used a bolo
as a result of which Javier suffered a 2-inch incised wound on his right palm; that on
November 14, 1981 which was the 22nd day after the incident, Javier was rushed to
the hospital in a very serious condition and that on the following day, November 15,
1981, he died from tetanus.
Under these circumstances, the lower courts ruled that Javier's death was the natural
and logical consequence of Urbano's unlawful act. Hence, he was declared
responsible for Javier's death. Thus, the appellate court said:
"The claim of appellant that there was an efficient cause
which supervened from the time the deceased was wounded to
the time of his death, which covers a period of 23 days does
not deserve serious consideration. True, that the deceased did
not die right away from his wound, but the cause of his death
was due to said wound which was inflicted by the appellant.
Said wound which was in the process of healing got infected
with tetanus which ultimately caused his death.
"Dr. Edmundo Exconde of the Nazareth General Hospital
testified that the victim suffered lockjaw because of the
infection of the wound with tetanus. And there is no other
way by which he could be infected with tetanus except
through the wound in his palm (tsn., p. 78, Oct. 5, 1981).
Consequently, the proximate cause of the victim's death was
the wound which got infected with tetanus. And the settled
rule in this jurisdiction is that an accused is liable for all the
consequences of his unlawful act. (Article 4, par. 1, R.P.C.;
People v. Red, CA 43 O.G. 5072; People v. Cornel, 78 Phil.
418)
"Appellant's allegation that the proximate cause of the
victim's death was due to his own negligence in going back to
work without his wound being properly healed, and lately,
that he went to catch fish in dirty irrigation canals in the first
week of November, 1980, is an afterthought, and a desperate
attempt by appellant to wiggle out of the predicament he
found himself in. If the wound had not yet healed, it is
impossible to conceive that the deceased would be reckless
enough to work with a disabled hand." (pp. 20-21, Rollo)
The petitioner reiterates his position that the proximate cause of the death of
Marcelo Javier was due to his own negligence, that Dr. Mario Meneses found no
tetanus in the injury, and that Javier got infected with tetanus when after two weeks
he returned to his farm and tended his tobacco plants with his bare hands exposing
the wound to harmful elements like tetanus germs. LLpr
The evidence on record does not clearly show that the wound inflicted by Urbano
was infected with tetanus at the time of the infliction of the wound. The evidence
merely confirms that the wound, which was already healing at the time Javier
suffered the symptoms of the fatal ailment, somehow got infected with tetanus
However, as to when the wound was infected is not clear from the record.
In Vda. de Bataclan, et al. v. Medina (102 Phil. 1181), we adopted the following
definition of proximate cause:
xxx xxx xxx
". . . A satisfactory definition of proximate cause is
found in Volume 38, pages 695-696 of American
Jurisprudence, cited by plaintiffs-appellants in their
brief. It is as follows:
". . . 'that cause, which, in natural and continuous
sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening
cause, produces the injury, and without which the
result would not have occurred.' And more
comprehensively, 'the proximate legal cause is that
acting first and producing the injury, either
immediately or by setting other events in motion, all
constituting a natural and continuous chain of events,
each having a close causal connection with its
immediate predecessor, the final event in the chain
immediately effecting the injury as a natural and
probable result of the cause which first acted, under
such circumstances that the person responsible for the
first event should, as an ordinarily prudent and
intelligent person, have reasonable ground to expect at
the moment of his act or default that an injury to some
person might probably result therefrom." (at pp. 185-
186)
The issue, therefore, hinges on whether or not there was an efficient intervening
cause from the time Javier was wounded until his death which would exculpate
Urbano from any liability for Javier's death.
We look into the nature of tetanus —
"The incubation period of tetanus, i.e., the time between
injury and the appearance of unmistakable symptoms, ranges
from 2 to 56 days. However, over 80 percent of patients
become symptomatic within 14 days. A short incubation
period indicates severe disease, and when symptoms occur
within 2 or 3 days of injury, the mortality rate approaches
100 percent.
"Nonspecific premonitory symptoms such as restlessness,
irritability, and headache are encountered occasionally, but
Therefore, medically speaking, the reaction to tetanus found inside a man's
the commonest presenting complaints are pain and stiffness in
body depends on the incubation period of the disease.
the jaw, abdomen, or back and difficulty swallowing. As the
disease progresses, stiffness gives way to rigidity, and patients
often complain of difficulty opening their mouths. In fact,
trismus is the commonest manifestation of tetanus and is
responsible for the familiar descriptive name of lockjaw. As
more muscles are involved, rigidity becomes generalized, and
sustained contractions called risus sardonicus. The intensity
and sequence of muscle involvement is quite variable. In a
small proportion of patients, only local signs and symptoms
develop in the region of the injury. In the vast majority,
however, most muscles are involved to some degree, and the
signs and symptoms encountered depend upon the major
muscle groups affected.
Reflex spasm usually occur within 24 to 72 hours of the first
symptoms, on interval referred to as the onset time. As in the
case of the incubation period, a short onset time is associated
with a poor prognosis. Spasms are caused by sudden
intensification of afferent stimuli arising in the periphery,
which increases rigidity and causes simultaneous and
excessive contraction of muscles and their antagonists.
Spasms may be both painful and dangerous. As the disease
progresses, minimal or inapparent stimuli produce more
intense and longer-lasting spasms with increasing frequency.
Respiration may be impaired by laryngospasm or tonic
contraction of respiratory muscles which prevent adequate
ventilation. Hypoxia may then lead to irreversible central
nervous system damage and death.
Mild tetanus is characterized by an incubation period of at
least 14 days and an onset time of more than 6 days. Trismus
is usually present, but dysphagia is absent and generalized
spasms are brief and mild. Moderately severe tetanus has a
somewhat shorter incubation period and onset time; trismus is
marked, dysphagia and generalized rigidity are present, but
ventilation remains adequate even during spasms. The criteria
for severe tetanus include a short incubation time, and an
onset time of 72 hrs., or less, severe trismus, dysphagia and
rigidity and frequent prolonged, generalized convulsive
spasms. (Harrison's Principle of Internal Medicine, 1983
Edition, pp. 1004-1005; Emphasis supplied)
In the case at bar, Javier suffered a 2-inch incised wound on his right palm when he
parried the bolo which Urbano used in hacking him. This incident took place on
October 23, 1980. After 22 days, or on November 14, 1980, he suffered the
symptoms of tetanus, like lockjaw and muscle spasms. The following day,
November 15, 1980, he died.
If, therefore, the wound of Javier inflicted by the appellant was already infected by
tetanus germs at the time, it is more medically probable that Javier should have been
infected with only a mild cause of tetanus because the symptoms of tetanus appeared
on the 22nd day after the hacking incident or more than 14 days after the infliction
of the wound. Therefore, the onset time should have seen more than six days. Javier,
however, died on the second day from the onset time. The more credible conclusion
is that at the time Javier's wound was inflicted by the appellant, the severe form of
tetanus that killed him was not yet present. Consequently, Javier's wound could have
been infected with tetanus after the hacking incident. Considering the circumstance
surrounding Javier's death, his wound could have been infected by tetanus 2 or 3 or a
few but not 20 to 22 days before he died. prcd
The rule is that the death of the victim must be the direct, natural, and logical
consequence of the wounds inflicted upon him by the accused. (People v.
Cardenas, supra) And since we are dealing with a criminal conviction, the proof that
the accused caused the victim's death must convince a rational mindbeyond
reasonable doubt. The medical findings, however, lead us to a distinct possibility
that the infection of the wound by tetanus was an efficient intervening cause later or
between the time Javier was wounded to the time of his death. The infection was,
therefore, distinct and foreign to the crime. (People v. Rellin, 77 Phil. 1038)
Doubts are present. There is a likelihood that the wound was but the remote cause
and its subsequent infection, for failure to take necessary precautions, with tetanus
may have been the proximate cause of Javier's death with which the petitioner had
nothing to do. As we ruled in Manila Electric Co. v. Remoquillo, et al. (99 Phil. 118)
"'A prior and remote cause cannot be made the basis of an
action if such remote cause did nothing more than furnish the
condition or give rise to the occasion by which the injury was
made possible, if there intervened between such prior or
remote cause and the injury a distinct, successive, unrelated,
and efficient cause of the injury, even though such injury
would not have happened but for such condition or occasion.
If no danger existed in the condition except because of the
independent cause, such condition was not the proximate
cause. And if an independent negligent act or defective
condition sets into operation the circumstances, which result
in injury because of the prior defective condition, such
subsequent act or condition is the proximate cause.' (45 C.J.
pp. 931-932)." (at p. 125)
It strains the judicial mind to allow a clear aggressor to go scot free of criminal
liability. At the very least, the records show he is guilty of inflicting slight physical
injuries. However, the petitioner's criminal liability in this respect was wiped out by
the victim's own act. After the hacking incident, Urbano and Javier used the facilities
of barangay mediators to effect a compromise agreement where Javier forgave
Urbano while Urbano defrayed the medical expenses of Javier. This settlement of
minor offenses is allowed under the express provisions of Presidential Decree No.
1508, Section 2(3). (See also People v. Caruncho, 127 SCRA 16)
We must stress, however, that our discussion of proximate cause and remote cause is
limited to the criminal aspects of this rather unusual case. It does not necessarily
follow that the petitioner is also free of civil liability. The well-settled doctrine is
that a person, while not criminally liable, may still be civilly liable. Thus, in the
recent case of People v. Rogelio Ligon y Tria, et al. (G.R. No. 74041, July 29, 1987),
we said:
xxx xxx xxx
". . . While the guilt of the accused in a criminal
prosecution must be established beyond reasonable
doubt, only a preponderance of evidence is required in
a civil action for damages. (Article 29, Civil Code).
The judgment of acquittal extinguishes the civil
liability of the accused only when it includes a
declaration that the facts from which the civil liability
might arise did not exist. (Padilla v. Court of Appeals,
129 SCRA 559)
"The reason for the provisions of Article 29 of the Civil Code,
which provides that the acquittal of the accused on the ground
that his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt
does not necessarily exempt him from civil liability for the
same act or omission, has been explained by the Code
Commission as follows:
"The old rule that the acquittal of
the accused in a criminal case also releases
him from civil liability is one of the most
serious flaws in the Philippine legal system.
It has given rise to numberless instances of
miscarriage of justice, where the acquittal
was due to a reasonable doubt in the mind of
the court as to the guilt of the accused. The
reasoning followed is that inasmuch as the
civil responsibility is derived from the
 criminal offense, when the latter is not
proved, civil liability cannot be demanded.
"'This is one of those causes where
confused thinking leads to unfortunate and
deplorable consequences. Such reasoning
fails to draw a clear line of demarcation
between criminal liability and civil
responsibility, and to determine the logical
result of the distinction. The two liabilities
are separate and distinct from each other.
One affects the social order and the other,
private rights. One is for the punishment or
correction of the offender while the other is
for reparation of damages suffered by the
aggrieved party. The two responsibilities are
so different from each other that article 1813
of the present (Spanish) Civil Code reads
thus: 'There may be a compromise upon the
civil action arising from a crime; but the
public action for the imposition of the legal
penalty shall not thereby be extinguished.' It
is just and proper that, for the purposes of
the imprisonment of or fine upon the
accused, the offense should be proved
beyond reasonable doubt. But for the
purpose of indemnifying the complaining
party, why should the offense also be
proved beyond reasonable doubt? Is not the
invasion or violation of every private right
to be proved only by a preponderance of
evidence? Is the right of the aggrieved
person any less private because the
wrongful act is also punishable by the
criminal law?
"'For these reasons, the
Commission recommends the adoption of
the reform under discussion. It will correct a
serious defect in our law. It will close up an
inexhaustible source of injustice — a cause
for disillusionment on the part of the
innumerable persons injured or wronged.'"
The respondent court increased the P12,000.00 indemnification imposed by the trial
court to P30,000.00. However, since the indemnification was based solely on the
finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt in the homicide case, the civil liability of
the petitioner was not thoroughly examined. This aspect of the case calls for fuller
development if the heirs of the victim are so minded.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. The questioned decision
of the then Intermediate Appellate Court, now Court of Appeals, is REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. The petitioner is ACQUITTED of the crime of homicide. Costs de
oficio.
ENGADA VS CA
SYLLABUS
1. CIVIL LAW; TRANSPORTATION; RESTRICTIONS ON
OVERTAKING AND PASSING. — It is a settled rule that a driver abandoning his
proper lane for the purpose of overtaking another vehicle in an ordinary situation has
the duty to see to it that the road is clear and he should not proceed if he cannot do so
in safety. This rule is consistent with Section 41, paragraph (a) of R.A. 4136 as
amended, otherwise known as The Land Transportation and Traffic Code, which
provides: Sec. 41. Restrictions on overtaking and passing. — (a) The driver of a
vehicle shall not drive to the left side of the center line of a highway in overtaking or
passing another vehicle proceeding in the same direction, unless such left side is
clearly visible and is free of oncoming traffic for a sufficient distance ahead to permit
such overtaking or passing to be made in safety. THEDcS
2. ID.; ID.; DOCTRINE OF LAST CLEAR CHANCE; CONSTRUED,
NOT APPLICABLE IN CASE AT BAR. — The doctrine of last clear chance states
that a person who has the last clear chance or opportunity of avoiding an accident,
notwithstanding the negligent acts of his opponent, is considered in law solely
responsible for the consequences of the accident. But as already stated on this point,
no convincing evidence was adduced by petitioner to support his invocation of the
abovecited doctrine. Instead, what has been shown is the presence of an emergency
and the proper application of the emergency rule. Petitioner's act of swerving to the
Tamaraw's lane at a distance of 30 meters from it and driving the Isuzu pick-up at a
fast speed as it approached the Tamaraw, denied Iran time and opportunity to ponder
the situation at all. There was no clear chance to speak of. ADSTCa
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J p:
This petition for review seeks the reversal of the decision 1 dated May 31,
1999 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 18358, which affirmed with
modification the judgment 2 dated August 25, 1994, of the Regional Trial Court of
Iloilo City, Branch 29, in Criminal Case No. 36223. The RTC found petitioner guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of simple imprudence resulting in physical injuries and
damage to property, and sentenced him to (a) suffer imprisonment for one month and
one day of arresto mayor; (b) pay private complainant, Mrs. Sheila Seyan, the amount
of fifty one thousand pesos (P51,000) for the total destruction of the Toyota Tamaraw
jeepney, and one hundred ten thousand pesos (P110,000) for her hospital and medical
expenses, and (c) pay the costs of suit. The CA increased the prison term imposed on
petitioner to four months of arresto mayor.
The facts culled from the records are as follows:
On November 29, 1989, at about 1:30 in the afternoon, Edwin Iran was
driving a blue Toyota Tamaraw jeepney bound for Iloilo City. On board was Sheila
Seyan, the registered owner of the Tamaraw. While traversing the road along
Barangay Acquit, Barotac Nuevo, the Tamaraw passengers allegedly saw from the
opposite direction a speeding Isuzu pick-up, driven by petitioner Rogelio Engada. The
pick-up had just negotiated a hilly gradient on the highway. When it was just a few
meters away from the Tamaraw, the Isuzu pick-up's right signal light flashed, at the
same time, it swerved to its left, encroaching upon the lane of the Tamaraw and headed
towards a head-on collision course with it. Seyan shouted at Iran to avoid the pick-up.
Iran swerved to his left but the pick-up also swerved to its right. Thus, the pick-up
collided with the Tamaraw, hitting the latter at its right front passenger side. The
impact caused the head and chassis of the Tamaraw to separate from its body. Seyan
was thrown out of the Tamaraw and landed on a ricefield. The pick-up stopped
diagonally astride the center of the road.
Seyan and Iran were brought to Barotac Nuevo Medicare Hospital. 3 Seyan
was profusely bleeding from her nose and was in a state of shock with her eyes closed.
In the afternoon of the same day, November 29, 1989, she was transferred to St. Paul's
Hospital in Iloilo City where she was confined. Her medical certificate revealed that
she suffered a fracture on the right femur, lacerated wound on the right foot, multiple
contusions, abrasions, blunt abdominal injury, and lacerations of the upper-lower pole
of the right kidney. 4 She was discharged from the hospital only on January 15, 1990.
Seyan incurred P130,000 in medical expenses. The Toyota Tamaraw
jeepney ended up in the junk heap. Its total loss was computed at P80,000.
A criminal complaint for damage to property through reckless imprudence
with serious physical injuries was filed with the Municipal Trial Court of Barotac
Nuevo against petitioner Rogelio Engada and Edwin Iran. 5 Probable cause was found
against petitioner, while the complaint against Iran was dismissed. 6
Consequently, an Information was filed against petitioner charging him
with serious physical injuries and damage to property through reckless imprudence,
thus:
That on or about November 29, 1989, in the
Municipality of Barotac Nuevo, Province of Iloilo, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused Rogelio Engada driving an Isuzu Pick-up with
Plate No. SAR 117 owned by the Land Bank of the Philippines,
did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and with reckless
imprudence drive said pick-up in a careless, reckless and
imprudent manner with disregard of traffic laws and
regulations, and as a result of such negligent and reckless
driving the ISUZU Pick-up driven by the accused bumped a
Toyota Tamaraw jeep with Plate No. FBF 601 owned by Joelito
and Sheila Seyan and driven by Edwin Iran thereby causing
damage to the Toyota Tamaraw in the amount of P80,000.00
and serious physical injuries to Mrs. Sheila Seyan who was
riding said vehicle, the injuries barring complications will heal
in more than 30 days.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 7
After trial, the court rendered on August 25, 1994 a decision, disposing as
follows:
WHEREFORE, the Court, finding the accused guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of Simple Imprudence resulting [in]
physical injuries and damage to property defined and penalized
in Article 263, paragraph 4 and in relation with Article 365,
paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code, hereby sentences the
accused Rogelio Engada to suffer imprisonment of ONE (1)
MONTH and ONE (1) DAY of arresto mayor.
Accused is further ordered to pay complainant Mrs.
Sheila Seyan the amount of P51,000.00 for the total destruction
of the Toyota Tamaraw Jeepney and P110,000.00 for
indemnification of hospital and medical expenses, and to pay
the cost of the suit.
SO ORDERED. 8
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals. On May 31, 1999, the CA
dismissed the appeal and affirmed with modification the trial court's decision, thus:
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is hereby
DISMISSED. Accordingly, the appealed decision is hereby
 AFFIRMED with modification as to the penalty imposed upon
the accused who is hereby sentenced to suffer imprisonment of
FOUR (4) MONTHS of arresto mayor.
SO ORDERED. 9
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied. Hence, the
instant petition, wherein petitioner raises the issue of:
WHETHER OR NOT THE FINDINGS OF RESPONDENT
COURT OF APPEALS ARE SUPPORTED BY THE
EVIDENCE OR BASED ON A MISAPPREHENSION OF
FACTS RESULTING IN A MANIFESTLY MISTAKEN
INFERENCE SPECIFICALLY ON WHAT WAS THE
PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE ACCIDENT AND WHOSE
ACT WAS IT. 10
Petitioner claims innocence and seeks acquittal. He contends that in this
case we should relax the rule that only legal questions can be raised in a petition for
review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. According to him, the Court of Appeals
misapprehended the facts, and erred in its conclusion as to the proximate cause of the
collision. He insists that the Court of Appeals erred when it found him negligent for
occupying the lane of the Tamaraw jeepney, and then failing to return to his original
lane at the safest and earliest opportunity.
Petitioner further contends that the CA failed to consider that he already
relayed his intention to go back to his lane by flashing the pick-up's right signal light.
He submits that at that moment Iran, the driver of the Tamaraw, had no more reason
to swerve to his left. Had Iran not swerved to the left, according to petitioner, the
collision would have been avoided. It was Iran who was clearly negligent, says
petitioner. Citing our ruling in McKee v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 11 petitioner
avers that although his act of occupying the Tamaraw's lane was the initial act in the
chain of events, Iran's swerving to the left after petitioner flashed his right turn signal,
constituted a sufficient intervening event, which proximately caused the eventual
injuries and damages to private complainant.
Petitioner also claims that the Court of Appeals erred when it found that the
pick-up approached the Tamaraw at a fast speed. He maintains that this was not borne
by the evidence on record.
The Office of the Solicitor General, as counsel for the state, counters that
the Court of Appeals did not err in convicting the accused, now petitioner herein.
Petitioner's negligence was the proximate cause of the accident, according to the OSG,
for the following reasons: First, petitioner for no justifiable reason occupied the
opposite lane. Second, while on the wrong lane, petitioner was driving the ISUZU
pick-up fast, and he returned to his own lane only at the last minute. This left Iran, the
driver of the Tamaraw, with no opportunity to reflect on the safest way to avoid the
accident. Iran's swerving to the left was his reaction to petitioner's wrongful act, which
appropriately calls for the application of the emergency rule. The rationale of this rule
is that a person who is confronted with a sudden emergency might have no time for
thought, and he must make a prompt decision based largely upon impulse or instinct.
Thus, he cannot be held to the same standard of conduct as one who had an opportunity
to reflect, even though it later appears that he made the wrong decision. Clearly, under
the emergency rule petitioner cannot shift the blame to Iran, concludes the OSG.
As to petitioner's claim that there was no evidence showing that the pick-up
was running very fast, the OSG avers that this is rebutted by the testimony of Seyan
and Iran who both testified that petitioner drove the pick-up at a fast speed when it
encroached on their lane immediately before the collision.
Did the Court of Appeals err in finding that the action of petitioner, Rogelio
Engada, was the proximate cause of the collision? This is the crux of the present
petition.
In our view, petitioner's attempt to pin the blame on Edwin Iran, the driver
of the Tamaraw, for the vehicular collision is unfounded. Iran swerved to the left only
to avoid petitioner's pick-up, which was already on a head to head position going
against Iran's Tamaraw jeepney immediately before the vehicles collided. This fact
has been established by the evidence on record. No convincing proof was adduced by
petitioner that the driver of the Tamaraw, Iran, could have avoided a head-on collision.
We note that petitioner admitted his Isuzu pick-up intruded into the lane of
the Tamaraw jeepney. Prosecution witness Nelson Alobin, one of those who went to
the scene of the incident immediately, testified that when he arrived at the place where
the collision took place, he saw the pick-up positioned diagonally at the center of the
road. 12 Its head was towards the direction of Barotac Nuevo and the rear tires were
just a few inches beyond the center of the lane. 13 Moving backwards facing Barotac
Nuevo, at two arms length away from the pick-up, Alobin also saw a tire mark, 12
inches long and located at the left side of the center line going to the right side. 14
The above circumstance corroborates the testimony of both Seyan and Iran
that, immediately before the collision, the pick-up was not on its proper lane but on
the other lane (the left lane rather than the right) directly on collision course with the
Tamaraw jeepney. The tire mark reveals the short distance between the two vehicles
when the ISUZU pick-up attempted to return to its proper lane.
It is a settled rule that a driver abandoning his proper lane for the purpose
of overtaking another vehicle in an ordinary situation has the duty to see to it that the
road is clear and he should not proceed if he cannot do so in safety. 15 This rule is
consistent with Section 41, paragraph (a) of R.A. 4136 as amended, otherwise known
as The Land Transportation and Traffic Code, which provides:
Sec. 41. Restrictions on overtaking and passing. —
(a) The driver of a vehicle shall not drive to the left side of the
 center line of a highway in overtaking or passing another
vehicle proceeding in the same direction, unless such left side
is clearly visible and is free of oncoming traffic for a sufficient
distance ahead to permit such overtaking or passing to be made
in safety.
In the present case, there was only a distance of 30 meters from the Tamaraw
jeepney when the Isuzu pick-up abandoned its lane and swerved to the left of the
center line. 16 In addition, petitioner was running at a fast clip while traversing this
lane. This was testified to by Seyan and Iran, unrebutted by petitioner. The resulting
damage to the Tamaraw jeepney, at the point where the head and chassis were
separated from the body, bolsters this conclusion that petitioner was speeding. In our
view, petitioner was negligent in several ways, and his negligence was the proximate
cause of the collision. In abandoning his lane, he did not see to it first that the opposite
lane was free of oncoming traffic and was available for a safe passage. Further, after
seeing the Tamaraw jeepney ahead, petitioner did not slow down, contrary to the rule
set in Batangas Laguna Tayabas Bus Co. v. IAC, 17 thus:
. . . [O]r if, after attempting to pass, the driver of the
overtaking vehicle finds that he cannot make the passage in
safety, the latter must slacken his speed so as to avoid the
danger of a collision, even bringing his car to a stop if
necessary.
For failing to observe the duty of diligence and care imposed on drivers of
vehicles abandoning their lane, petitioner must be held liable.
Iran could not be faulted when in his attempt to avoid the pick-up, he
swerved to his left. Petitioner's acts had put Iran in an emergency situation which
forced him to act quickly. An individual who suddenly finds himself in a situation of
danger and is required to act without much time to consider the best means that may
be adopted to avoid the impending danger, is not guilty of negligence if he fails to
undertake what subsequently and upon reflection may appear to be a better solution,
unless the emergency was brought by his own negligence.
Petitioner tries to extricate himself from liability by invoking the doctrine
of last clear chance. He avers that between him and Iran, the latter had the last clear
chance to avoid the collision, hence Iran must be held liable.
The doctrine of last clear chance states that a person who has the last clear
chance or opportunity of avoiding an accident, notwithstanding the negligent acts of
his opponent, is considered in law solely responsible for the consequences of the
accident. But as already stated on this point, no convincing evidence was adduced by
petitioner to support his invocation of the abovecited doctrine. Instead, what has been
shown is the presence of an emergency and the proper application of the emergency
rule. Petitioner's act of swerving to the Tamaraw's lane at a distance of 30 meters from
it and driving the Isuzu pick-up at a fast speed as it approached the Tamaraw, denied
Iran time and opportunity to ponder the situation at all. There was no clear chance to
speak of. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals did not err in holding petitioner
responsible for the vehicular collision and the resulting damages, including the
injuries suffered by Mrs. Sheila Seyan and the total loss of the Tamaraw jeepney. It
also did not err in imposing on petitioner the sentence of four (4) months of arresto
mayor.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The
assailed decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 18358 is AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioner.
CONSOLIDATED BANK AND TRUST CORPORATION VS CA
The Case
Before us is a petition for review of the Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals
dated 27 October 1998 and its Resolution dated 11 May 1999. The assailed decision
reversed the Decision 2 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 8, absolving
petitioner Consolidated. Bank and Trust Corporation, now known as Solidbank
Corporation ("Solidbank"), of any liability. The questioned resolution of the appellate
court denied the motion for reconsideration of Solidbank but modified the decision by
deleting the award of exemplary damages, attorney's fees, expenses of litigation and
cost of suit.
The Facts
Solidbank is a domestic banking corporation organized and existing under
Philippine laws. Private respondent L.C. Diaz and Company, CPA's ("L.C. Diaz"), is
a professional partnership engaged in the practice of accounting.
Sometime in March 1976, L.C. Diaz opened a savings account with
Solidbank, designated as Savings Account No. S/A 200-16872-6.
On 14 August 1991, L.C. Diaz through its cashier, Mercedes Macaraya
("Macaraya"), filled up a savings (cash) deposit slip for P990 and a savings (checks)
deposit slip for P50. Macaraya instructed the messenger of L.C. Diaz, Ismael Calapre
("Calapre"), to deposit the money with Solidbank. Macaraya also gave Calapre the
Solidbank passbook.
Calapre went to Solidbank and presented to Teller No. 6 the two deposit
slips and the passbook. The teller acknowledged receipt of the deposit by returning to
Calapre the duplicate copies of the two deposit slips. Teller No. 6 stamped the deposit
slips with the words "DUPLICATE" and "SAVING TELLER 6 SOLIDBANK HEAD
OFFICE." Since the transaction took time and Calapre had to make another deposit
for L.C. Diaz with Allied Bank, he left the passbook with Solidbank. Calapre then
went to Allied Bank. When Calapre returned to Solidbank to retrieve the passbook,
Teller No. 6 informed him that "somebody got the passbook. 3 Calapre went back to On 11 May 1999, the Court of Appeals issued its Resolution denying the
L.C. Diaz and reported the incident to Macaraya. motion for reconsideration of Solidbank. The appellate court, however, modified its
decision by deleting the award of exemplary damages and attorney's fees.
Macaraya immediately prepared a deposit slip in duplicate copies with a
check of P200,000. Macaraya, together with Calapre, went to Solidbank and presented The Ruling of the Trial Court
to Teller No. 6 the deposit slip and check. The teller stamped the words
In absolving Solidbank, the trial court applied the rules on savings account
"DUPLICATE" and "SAVING TELLER 6 SOLIDBANK HEAD OFFICE" on the
written on the passbook. The rules state that "possession of this book shall raise the
duplicate copy of the deposit slip. When Macaraya asked for the passbook, Teller No.
presumption of ownership and any payment or payments made by the bank upon the
6 told Macaraya that someone got the passbook but she could not remember to whom
production of the said book and entry therein of the withdrawal shall have the same
she gave the passbook. When Macaraya asked Teller No. 6 if Calapre got the
effect as if made to the depositor personally." 9
passbook, Teller No. 6 answered that someone shorter than Calapre got the passbook.
Calapre was then standing beside Macaraya. At the time of the withdrawal, a certain Noel Tamayo was not only in
possession of the passbook, he also presented a withdrawal slip with the signatures of
Teller No. 6 handed to Macaraya a deposit slip dated 14 August 1991 for
the authorized signatories of L.C. Diaz. The specimen signatures of these persons
the deposit of a check for P90,000 drawn on Philippine Banking Corporation ("PBC").
were in the signature cards. The teller stamped the withdrawal slip with the words
This PBC check of L.C. Diaz was a check that it had "long closed." 4 PBC
"Saving Teller No. 5." The teller then passed on the withdrawal slip to Genere Manuel
subsequently dishonored the check because of insufficient funds and because the
("Manuel") for authentication. Manuel verified the signatures on the withdrawal slip.
signature in the check differed from PBC's specimen signature. Failing to get back the
The withdrawal slip was then given to another officer who compared the signatures
passbook, Macaraya went back to her office and reported the matter to the Personnel
on the withdrawal slip with the specimen on the signature cards. The trial court
Manager of L.C. Diaz, Emmanuel Alvarez.
concluded that Solidbank acted with care and observed the rules on savings account
The following day, 15 August 1991, L.C. Diaz through its Chief Executive when it allowed the withdrawal of P300,000 from the savings account of L.C. Diaz.
Officer, Luis C. Diaz ("Diaz"), called up Solidbank to stop any transaction using the
The trial court pointed out that the burden of proof now shifted to L.C. Diaz
same passbook until L.C. Diaz could open a new account. 5 On the same day, Diaz
to prove that the signatures on the withdrawal slip were forged. The trial court
formally wrote Solidbank to make the same request. It was also on the same day that
admonished L.C. Diaz for not offering in evidence the National Bureau of
L.C. Diaz learned of the unauthorized withdrawal the day before, 14 August 1991, of
Investigation ("NBI") report on the authenticity of the signatures on the withdrawal
P300,000 from its savings account. The withdrawal slip for the P300,000 bore the
slip for P300,000. The trial court believed that L.C. Diaz did not offer this evidence
signatures of the authorized signatories of L.C. Diaz, namely Diaz and Rustico L.
because it is derogatory to its action.
Murillo. The signatories, however, denied signing the withdrawal slip. A certain Noel
Tamayo received the P300,000. IaSCTE Another provision of the rules on savings account states that the depositor
must keep the passbook "under lock and key." 10 When another person presents the
In an Information 6 dated 5 September 1991, L.C. Diaz charged its
passbook for withdrawal prior to Solidbank's receipt of the notice of loss of the
messenger, Emerano Ilagan ("Ilagan") and one Roscon Verdazola with Estafa through
passbook, that person is considered as the owner of the passbook. The trial court ruled
Falsification of Commercial Document. The Regional Trial Court of Manila
that the passbook presented during the questioned transaction was "now out of the
dismissed the criminal case after the City Prosecutor filed a Motion to Dismiss on 4
lock and key and presumptively ready for a business transaction." 11
August 1992.
Solidbank did not have any participation in the custody and care of the
On 24 August 1992, L.C. Diaz through its counsel demanded from
passbook. The trial court believed that Solidbank's act of allowing the withdrawal of
Solidbank the return of its money. Solidbank refused.
P300,000 was not the direct and proximate cause of the loss. The trial court held that
On 25 August 1992, L.C. Diaz filed a Complaint 7 for Recovery of a Sum L.C. Diaz's negligence caused the unauthorized withdrawal. Three facts establish L.C.
of Money against Solidbank with the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 8. After Diaz's negligence: (1) the possession of the passbook by a person other than the
trial, the trial court rendered on 28 December 1994 a decision absolving Solidbank depositor L.C. Diaz; (2) the presentation of a signed withdrawal receipt by an
and dismissing the complaint. unauthorized person; and (3) the possession by an unauthorized person of a PBC
check "long closed" by L.C. Diaz, which check was deposited on the day of the
L.C. Diaz then appealed 8 to the Court of Appeals. On 27 October 1998, the fraudulent withdrawal.
Court of Appeals issued its Decision reversing the decision of the trial court.
 The trial court debunked L.C. Diaz's contention that Solidbank did not
follow the precautionary procedures observed by the two parties whenever L.C. Diaz
withdrew significant amounts from its account. L.C. Diaz claimed that a letter must
accompany withdrawals of more than P20,000. The letter must request Solidbank to
allow the withdrawal and convert the amount to a manager's check. The bearer must
also have a letter authorizing him to withdraw the same amount. Another person
driving a car must accompany the bearer so that he would not walk from Solidbank to
the office in making the withdrawal. The trial court pointed out that L.C. Diaz
disregarded these precautions in its past withdrawal. On 16 July 1991, L.C. Diaz
withdrew P82,554 without any separate letter of authorization or any communication
with Solidbank that the money be converted into a manager's check.
The trial court further justified the dismissal of the complaint by holding
that the case was a last ditch effort of L.C. Diaz to recover P300,000 after the dismissal
of the criminal case against Ilagan.
The dispositive portion of the decision of the trial court reads:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, judgment is
hereby rendered DISMISSING the complaint.
The Court further renders judgment in favor of
defendant bank pursuant to its counterclaim the amount of
Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00) as attorney's fees.
With costs against plaintiff.
SO ORDERED. 12
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The Court of Appeals ruled that Solidbank's negligence was the proximate
cause of the unauthorized withdrawal of P300,000 from the savings account of L.C.
Diaz. The appellate court reached this conclusion after applying the provision of the
Civil Code on quasi-delict, to wit:
Article 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes
damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged
to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there
is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is
called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this
chapter.
The appellate court held that the three elements of a quasi-delict are present in
this case, namely: (a) damages suffered by the plaintiff; (b) fault or negligence
of the defendant, or some other person for whose acts he must respond; and (c)
the connection of cause and effect between the fault or negligence of the
defendant and the damage incurred by the plaintiff.
The Court of Appeals pointed out that the teller of Solidbank who received
the withdrawal slip for P300,000 allowed the withdrawal without making the
necessary inquiry. The appellate court stated that the teller, who was not presented by
Solidbank during trial, should have called up the depositor because the money to be
withdrawn was a significant amount. Had the teller called up L.C. Diaz, Solidbank
would have known that the withdrawal was unauthorized. The teller did not even
verify the identity of the impostor who made the withdrawal. Thus, the appellate court
found Solidbank liable for its negligence in the selection and supervision of its
employees.
The appellate court ruled that while L.C. Diaz was also negligent in
entrusting its deposits to its messenger and its messenger in leaving the passbook with
the teller, Solidbank could not escape liability because of the doctrine of "last clear
chance." Solidbank could have averted the injury suffered by L.C. Diaz had it called
up L.C. Diaz to verify the withdrawal.
The appellate court ruled that the degree of diligence required from
Solidbank is more than that of a good father of a family. The business and functions
of banks are affected with public interest. Banks are obligated to treat the accounts of
their depositors with meticulous care, always having in mind the fiduciary nature of
their relationship with their clients. The Court of Appeals found Solidbank remiss in
its duty, violating its fiduciary relationship with L.C. Diaz.
The dispositive portion of the decision of the Court of Appeals reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision
appealed from is hereby REVERSED and a new one entered.
1. Ordering defendant-appellee Consolidated Bank
and Trust Corporation. to pay plaintiff-
appellant the sum of Three Hundred
Thousand Pesos (P300,000.00), with
interest thereon at the rate of 12% per
annum from the date of filing of the
complaint until paid, the sum of
P20,000.00 as exemplary damages, and
P20,000.00 as attorney's fees and expenses
of litigation as well as the cost of suit; and
2. Ordering the dismissal of defendant-appellee's
counterclaim in the amount of P30,000.00
as attorney's fees.
SO ORDERED. 13
Acting on the motion for reconsideration of Solidbank, the appellate court
affirmed its decision but modified the award of damages. The appellate court
 deleted the award of exemplary damages and attorney's fees. Invoking Article
2231 14 of the Civil Code, the appellate court ruled that exemplary damages
could be granted if the defendant acted with gross negligence. Since Solidbank
was guilty of simple negligence only, the award of exemplary damages was not
justified. Consequently, the award of attorney's fees was also disallowed
pursuant to Article 2208 of the Civil Code. The expenses of litigation and cost
of suit were also not imposed on Solidbank.
The dispositive portion of the Resolution reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, foregoing considered, our decision
dated October 27, 1998 is affirmed with modification by
deleting the award of exemplary damages and attorney's fees,
expenses of litigation and cost of suit.
SO ORDERED. 15
Hence, this petition.
The Issues
Solidbank seeks the review of the decision and resolution of the Court of
Appeals on these grounds:
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT
PETITIONER BANK SHOULD SUFFER THE
LOSS BECAUSE ITS TELLER SHOULD HAVE
FIRST CALLED PRIVATE RESPONDENT BY
TELEPHONE BEFORE IT ALLOWED THE
WITHDRAWAL OF P300,000.00 TO
RESPONDENT'S MESSENGER EMERANO
ILAGAN, SINCE THERE IS NO AGREEMENT
BETWEEN THE PARTIES IN THE OPERATION
OF THE SAVINGS ACCOUNT, NOR IS THERE
ANY BANKING LAW, WHICH MANDATES
THAT A BANK TELLER SHOULD FIRST CALL
UP THE DEPOSITOR BEFORE ALLOWING A
WITHDRAWAL OF A BIG AMOUNT IN A
SAVINGS ACCOUNT.
II. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN APPLYING THE
DOCTRINE OF LAST CLEAR CHANCE AND IN
HOLDING THAT PETITIONER BANK'S
TELLER HAD THE LAST OPPORTUNITY TO
WITHHOLD THE WITHDRAWAL WHEN IT IS
UNDISPUTED THAT THE TWO SIGNATURES
OF RESPONDENT ON THE WITHDRAWAL
SLIP ARE GENUINE AND PRIVATE
RESPONDENT'S PASSBOOK WAS DULY
PRESENTED, AND CONTRARIWISE
RESPONDENT WAS NEGLIGENT IN THE
SELECTION AND SUPERVISION OF ITS
MESSENGER EMERANO ILAGAN, AND IN
THE SAFEKEEPING OF ITS CHECKS AND
OTHER FINANCIAL DOCUMENTS.
III. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT FINDING
THAT THE INSTANT CASE IS A LAST DITCH
EFFORT OF PRIVATE RESPONDENT TO
RECOVER ITS P300,000.00 AFTER FAILING IN
ITS EFFORTS TO RECOVER THE SAME FROM
ITS EMPLOYEE EMERANO ILAGAN.
IV. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT
MITIGATING THE DAMAGES AWARDED
AGAINST PETITIONER UNDER ARTICLE 2197
OF THE CIVIL CODE, NOTWITHSTANDING
ITS FINDING THAT PETITIONER BANK'S
NEGLIGENCE WAS ONLY
CONTRIBUTORY. 16
The Ruling of the Court
The petition is partly meritorious.
Solidbank's Fiduciary Duty under the Law
The rulings of the trial court and the Court of Appeals conflict on the
application of the law. The trial court pinned the liability on L.C. Diaz based on the
provisions of the rules on savings account, a recognition of the contractual relationship
between Solidbank and L.C. Diaz, the latter being a depositor of the former. On the
other hand, the Court of Appeals applied the law on quasi-delict to determine who
between the two parties was ultimately negligent. The law on quasi-delict or culpa
aquiliana is generally applicable when there is no pre-existing contractual
relationship between the parties.
We hold that Solidbank is liable for breach of contract due to negligence,
or culpa contractual.
The contract between the bank and its depositor is governed by the
provisions of the Civil Code on simple loan. 17 Article 1980 of the Civil Code
expressly provides that ". . . savings . . . deposits of money in banks and similar
institutions shall be governed by the provisions concerning simple loan." There is a
debtor-creditor relationship between the bank and its depositor. The bank is the debtor
and the depositor is the creditor. The depositor lends the bank money and the bank
agrees to pay the depositor on demand. The savings deposit agreement between the
bank and the depositor is the contract that determines the rights and obligations of the
parties.
The law imposes on banks high standards in view of the fiduciary nature of
banking. Section 2 of Republic Act No. 8791 ("RA 8791"), 18 which took effect on
13 June 2000, declares that the State recognizes the "fiduciary nature of banking that
requires high standards of integrity and performance." 19 This new provision in
the general banking law, introduced in 2000, is a statutory affirmation of Supreme
Court decisions, starting with the 1990 case of Simex International v. Court of
Appeals, 20 holding that "the bank is under obligation to treat the accounts of its
depositors with meticulous care, always having in mind the fiduciary nature of their
relationship. 21
This fiduciary relationship means that the bank's obligation to observe "high
standards of integrity and performance" is deemed written into every deposit
agreement between a bank and its depositor. The fiduciary nature of banking requires
banks to assume a degree of diligence higher than that of a good father of a family.
Article 1172 of the Civil Code states that the degree of diligence required of an obligor
is that prescribed by law or contract, and absent such stipulation then the diligence of
a good father of a family. 22 Section 2 of RA 8791 prescribes the statutory diligence
required from banks — that banks must observe "high standards of integrity and
performance" in servicing their depositors. Although RA 8791 took effect almost nine
years after the unauthorized withdrawal of the P300,000 from L.C. Diaz's savings
account, jurisprudence 23 at the time of the withdrawal already imposed on banks the
same high standard of diligence required under RA No. 8791.
However, the fiduciary nature of a bank-depositor relationship does not
convert the contract between the bank and its depositors from a simple loan to a trust
agreement, whether express or implied. Failure by the bank to pay the depositor is
failure to pay a simple loan, and not a breach of trust. 24 The law simply imposes on
the bank a higher standard of integrity and performance in complying with its
obligations under the contract of simple loan, beyond those required of non-bank
debtors under a similar contract of simple loan.
The fiduciary nature of banking does not convert a simple loan into a trust
agreement because banks do not accept deposits to enrich depositors but to earn
money for themselves. The law allows banks to offer the lowest possible interest rate
to depositors while charging the highest possible interest rate on their own borrowers.
The interest spread or differential belongs to the bank and not to the depositors who
are not cestui que trust of banks. If depositors arecestui que trust of banks, then the
interest spread or income belongs to the depositors, a situation that Congress certainly
did not intend in enacting Section 2 of RA 8791.
Solidbank's Breach of its Contractual Obligation
Article 1172 of the Civil Code provides that "responsibility arising from
negligence in the performance of every kind of obligation is demandable." For breach
of the savings deposit agreement due to negligence, or culpa contractual, the bank is
liable to its depositor.
Calapre left the passbook with Solidbank because the "transaction took
time" and he had to go to Allied Bank for another transaction. The passbook was still
in the hands of the employees of Solidbank for the processing of the deposit when
Calapre left Solidbank. Solidbank's rules on savings account require that the "deposit
book should be carefully guarded by the depositor and kept under lock and key, if
possible." When the passbook is in the possession of Solidbank's tellers during
withdrawals, the law imposes on Solidbank and its tellers an even higher degree of
diligence in safeguarding the passbook.
Likewise, Solidbank's tellers must exercise a high degree of diligence in
insuring that they return the passbook only to the depositor or his authorized
representative. The tellers know, or should know, that the rules on savings account
provide that any person in possession of the passbook is presumptively its owner. If
the tellers give the passbook to the wrong person, they would be clothing that person
presumptive ownership of the passbook, facilitating unauthorized withdrawals by that
person. For failing to return the passbook to Calapre, the authorized representative of
L.C. Diaz, Solidbank and Teller No. 6 presumptively failed to observe such high
degree of diligence in safeguarding the passbook, and in insuring its return to the party
authorized to receive the same.
In culpa contractual, once the plaintiff proves a breach of contract, there is
a presumption that the defendant was at fault or negligent. The burden is on the
defendant to prove that he was not at fault or negligent. In contrast, in culpa
aquiliana the plaintiff has the burden of proving that the defendant was negligent. In
the present case, L.C. Diaz has established that Solidbank breached its contractual
obligation to return the passbook only to the authorized representative of L.C. Diaz.
There is thus a presumption that Solidbank was at fault and its teller was negligent in
not returning the passbook to Calapre. The burden was on Solidbank to prove that
there was no negligence on its part or its employees.
Solidbank failed to discharge its burden. Solidbank did not present to the
trial court Teller No. 6, the teller with whom Calapre left the passbook and who was
supposed to return the passbook to him. The record does not indicate that Teller No.
6 verified the identity of the person who retrieved the passbook. Solidbank also failed
to adduce in evidence its standard procedure in verifying the identity of the person
retrieving the passbook, if there is such a procedure, and that Teller No. 6 implemented
this procedure in the present case.
Solidbank is bound by the negligence of its employees under the principle
of respondeat superior or command responsibility. The defense of exercising the
required diligence in the selection and supervision of employees is not a complete parties must observe whenever withdrawals of large amounts are made does not direct
defense in culpa contractual, unlike in culpa aquiliana. 25 Solidbank to call up L.C. Diaz.

The bank must not only exercise "high standards of integrity and There is no law mandating banks to call up their clients whenever their
performance," it must also insure that its employees do likewise because this is the representatives withdraw significant amounts from their accounts. L.C. Diaz therefore
only way to insure that the bank will comply with its fiduciary duty. Solidbank failed had the burden to prove that it is the usual practice of Solidbank to call up its clients
to present the teller who had the duty to return to Calapre the passbook, and thus failed to verify a withdrawal of a large amount of money. L.C. Diaz failed to do so.
to prove that this teller exercised the "high standards of integrity and performance"
required of Solidbank's employees. ETHCDS Teller No. 5 who processed the withdrawal could not have been put on guard
to verify the withdrawal. Prior to the withdrawal of P300,000, the impostor deposited
Proximate Cause of the Unauthorized Withdrawal with Teller No. 6 the P90,000 PBC check, which later bounced. The impostor
apparently deposited a large amount of money to deflect suspicion from the
Another point of disagreement between the trial and appellate courts is the
withdrawal of a much bigger amount of money. The appellate court thus erred when
proximate cause of the unauthorized withdrawal. The trial court believed that L.C.
it imposed on Solidbank the duty to call up L.C. Diaz to confirm the withdrawal when
Diaz's negligence in not securing its passbook under lock and key was the proximate
no law requires this from banks and when the teller had no reason to be suspicious of
cause that allowed the impostor to withdraw the P300,000. For the appellate court, the
the transaction.
proximate cause was the teller's negligence in processing the withdrawal without first
verifying with L.C. Diaz. We do not agree with either court. Solidbank continues to foist the defense that Ilagan made the withdrawal.
Solidbank claims that since Ilagan was also a messenger of L.C. Diaz, he was familiar
Proximate cause is that cause which, in natural and continuous sequence,
with its teller so that there was no more need for the teller to verify the withdrawal.
unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury and without which
Solidbank relies on the following statements in the Booking and Information Sheet of
the result would not have occurred. 26 Proximate cause is determined by the facts of
Emerano Ilagan:
each case upon mixed considerations of logic, common sense, policy and
precedent. 27 . . . Ilagan also had with him (before the withdrawal)
a forged check of PBC and indicated the amount of P90,000
L.C. Diaz was not at fault that the passbook landed in the hands of the
which he deposited in favor of L.C. Diaz and Company. After
impostor. Solidbank was in possession of the passbook while it was processing the
successfully withdrawing this large sum of money, accused
deposit. After completion of the transaction, Solidbank had the contractual obligation
Ilagan gave alias Rey (Noel Tamayo) his share of the loot.
to return the passbook only to Calapre, the authorized representative of L.C. Diaz.
Ilagan then hired a taxicab in the amount of P1,000 to transport
Solidbank failed to fulfill its contractual obligation because it gave the passbook to
him (Ilagan) to his home province at Bauan, Batangas. Ilagan
another person.
extravagantly and lavishly spent his money but a big part of his
Solidbank's failure to return the passbook to Calapre made possible the loot was wasted in cockfight and horse racing. Ilagan was
withdrawal of the P300,000 by the impostor who took possession of the passbook. apprehended and meekly admitted his guilt. 28 (Emphasis
Under Solidbank's rules on savings account, mere possession of the passbook raises supplied.)
the presumption of ownership. It was the negligent act of Solidbank's Teller No. 6 that
L.C. Diaz refutes Solidbank's contention by pointing out that the person who
gave the impostor presumptive ownership of the passbook. Had the passbook not
withdrew the P300,000 was a certain Noel Tamayo. Both the trial and appellate courts
fallen into the hands of the impostor, the loss of P300,000 would not have happened.
stated that this Noel Tamayo presented the passbook with the withdrawal slip.
Thus, the proximate cause of the unauthorized withdrawal was Solidbank's negligence
in not returning the passbook to Calapre. We uphold the finding of the trial and appellate courts that a certain Noel
Tamayo withdrew the P300,000. The Court is not a trier of facts. We find no justifiable
We do not subscribe to the appellate court's theory that the proximate cause
reason to reverse the factual finding of the trial court and the Court of Appeals. The
of the unauthorized withdrawal was the teller's failure to call up L.C. Diaz to verify
tellers who processed the deposit of the P90,000 check and the withdrawal of the
the withdrawal. Solidbank did not have the duty to call up L.C. Diaz to confirm the
P300,000 were not presented during trial to substantiate Solidbank's claim that Ilagan
withdrawal. There is no arrangement between Solidbank and L.C. Diaz to this effect.
deposited the check and made the questioned withdrawal. Moreover, the entry quoted
Even the agreement between Solidbank and L.C. Diaz pertaining to measures that the
by Solidbank does not categorically state that Ilagan presented the withdrawal slip and
the passbook.
Doctrine of Last Clear Chance
The doctrine of last clear chance states that where both parties are negligent
but the negligent act of one is appreciably later than that of the other, or where it is
impossible to determine whose fault or negligence caused the loss, the one who had
the last clear opportunity to avoid the loss but failed to do so, is chargeable with the
loss. 29 Stated differently, the antecedent negligence of the plaintiff does not preclude
him from recovering damages caused by the supervening negligence of the defendant,
who had the last fair chance to prevent the impending harm by the exercise of due
diligence. 30
We do not apply the doctrine of last clear chance to the present case.
Solidbank is liable for breach of contract due to negligence in the performance of its
contractual obligation to L.C. Diaz. This is a case of culpa contractual, where neither
the contributory negligence of the plaintiff nor his last clear chance to avoid the loss,
would exonerate the defendant from liability. 31 Such contributory negligence or last
clear chance by the plaintiff merely serves to reduce the recovery of damages by the
plaintiff but does not exculpate the defendant from his breach of contract. 32
Mitigated Damages
Under Article 1172, "liability (for culpa contractual) may be regulated by
the courts, according to the circumstances." This means that if the defendant exercised
the proper diligence in the selection and supervision of its employee, or if the plaintiff
was guilty of contributory negligence, then the courts may reduce the award of
damages. In this case, L.C. Diaz was guilty of contributory negligence in allowing a
withdrawal slip signed by its authorized signatories to fall into the hands of an
impostor. Thus, the liability of Solidbank should be reduced.

In Philippine Bank of Commerce v. Court of Appeals, 33 where the Court

held the depositor guilty of contributory negligence, we allocated the damages
between the depositor and the bank on a 40-60 ratio. Applying the same ruling to this
case, we hold that L.C. Diaz must shoulder 40% of the actual damages awarded by
the appellate court. Solidbank must pay he other 60% of the actual damages.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION. Petitioner Solidbank Corporation shall pay private respondent
L.C. Diaz and Company, CPA's only 60% of the actual damages awarded by the Court
of Appeals. The remaining 40% of the actual damages shall be borne by private
respondent L.C. Diaz and Company, CPA's. Proportionate costs.