Daniel Changyan Wang

Causes of the Crimean War: A Rational-Choice Perspective

In Diplomacy, Henry Kissinger points to the Crimean War as the end of the Concert of
Europe. Indeed, the Crimean War broke the alliance between Austria and Russia, led to huge loss
of life, was the first major war between great powers since the Concert began, and set the stage
for WWI by leaving behind high tension in the Balkans. Given the negative consequences of the
war, why did Britain, France, and Russia choose to participate in the war? In answer, Kissinger
presents a variety of reasons spanning realist, non-rational, and liberal theories. He concludes
that Austria’s diplomatic failure was a prime culprit in starting the war. I summarize Kissinger’s
points. Then, I provide an institutionalist view that both clarifies why the countries entered the
war, and complements Kissinger’s critique of Austrian diplomacy.
Kissinger describes the underlying causes of the Crimean War as power-related, in a
realist or liberal lens. Due to its navy, Britain held a large amount of power in the Eastern
Mediterranean, and did not want Russia to gain relative power in the region. From a liberal lens,
British voters also strongly supported a realist foreign policy. Either way, Britain entered the war
to preserve its power in the region. On the surface, France entered the Crimean War to protect
Ottoman Christians. However, fundamentally, France entered the war to assert its power. France
had no prior stake in the Balkans, so Napoleon III’s provocative behavior in the region was an
attempt to project French power in a new location. Russia had a long-standing interest in the
Balkans, as Russian monarchs had long hoped to control the region. (Kissinger 92-94)
Kissinger criticizes Austrian diplomacy with Russia in the lead-up to the war. He claims
that “[Metternich’s] successors, unable to adapt Austria's domestic institutions to the times, tried
to compensate by bringing Austrian diplomacy into line with the emerging trend of power
politics, unrestrained by a concept of legitimacy”. (Kissinger 92) Kissinger identifies
Metternich’s “appeals to the Tsar’s conservative principles” (Kissinger 91) as the factor that held
back the Russian Tsar Nicholas’ ambitions in the Balkans. In sum, Kissinger accuses Austrian
diplomats of failing to emphasize conservative values, leading to Russia’s aggression in the
Crimean War.
However, Kissinger’s explanation is incomplete. Kissinger shows the countries’
conflicting interests, but conflicting interests do not automatically lead to war. War usually
requires two more conditions: both sides think they will win, and the incentives for peace are less
than the incentives to fight. Keohane’s rational-choice perspective helps clarify these questions
in the Crimean War.
Keohane emphasizes how barriers to information can lead to conflict, even if all parties
have shared interests (Keohane 69). In this case, both sides of the Crimean problem would prefer
to avoid the outright costs of war, but neither party wishes to give up its interests. This is similar
to Prisoner’s Dilemma: if both sides are conciliatory, both sides give up their interests while
avoiding war. If both sides are aggressive, both sides must face war, and only one side can win.
If only one side is aggressive, it achieves its aims while avoiding war. Unlike Prisoner’s
Dilemma, the case of mutual aggression (war) is favorable for the stronger party, so the stronger
party is more incentivized to be aggressive.
Given that Russia lost the war (was the weaker party), why did Russia fight? Barriers to
information prevented it from correctly predicting the outcome. Most importantly, Russia was
unable to predict the behavior of its allies, Prussia and Austria. In the buildup to the Crimean
War, the Tsar claimed “I can count on Berlin and Vienna.” (Kissinger 93) He was incorrect:
these allies did not support him in the Crimean War. Austria even issued an ultimatum ordering
Daniel Changyan Wang

the Tsar to withdraw. In short, inability to predict allies’ behavior helped precipitate the war.
(We won’t discuss other relevant barriers to information, such as information about the relative
strength of each army.)
Thus, Kissinger’s criticism of Austria’s diplomacy is incomplete. Rational-choice
analysis suggests that Russia’s entering the Crimean War was fueled by misinformation about
their allies’ intentions. This misunderstanding is precisely what an institution could have
prevented. Thus, the Austrians’ primary error occurred long before the Crimean War, during the
foundation of the Concert of Europe. If the Concert of Europe had included a provision
discouraging European intervention in the Balkans, then Russia would have known that Austria
and Prussia would not support its Crimean War. This could have dissuaded Russia from entering
the Crimean War, thereby preserving the Concert of Europe.

Counterarguments
My characterization of the Crimean War as a Prisoner’s Dilemma-like problem is
questionable. In some cases, both sides may want war, for the sake of honing military prowess or
sending a message about the country’s willingness to fight for its interests. In the Crimean War,
this may well have been Napoleon III’s motive. Since he was a new monarch, it is plausible that
he wished to send a statement to other countries about his willingness to wage war.
Would it have been politically feasible to include a Balkan clause in the original Concert
of Europe? Critics of my proposed solution might argue that Russia would never agree to this,
since that would directly contradict Russia’s interests. However, as Frieden, Lake, and Schultz
argue (70), oftentimes states are willing to accept unfavorable aspects of an agreement so long as
the overall agreement is beneficial. Given the critical nature of the Concert of Europe to
European stability, it is plausible that Russia could have been persuaded to agree.