G.R. No. L-15499 February 28, 1962 property for the sum of P500,000.00.
property for the sum of P500,000.00. Said letter was received by the bank on December 15,
ANGELA M. BUTTE, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
MANUEL UY and SONS, INC., defendant-appellee.
Delgado, Flores and Macapagal for plaintiff-appellant.
Pelaez and Jalandoni for defendant-appellee.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
Appeal from a decision of the Court of First instance of Manila dismissing the action for legal
redemption filed by plaintiff-appellant.
It appears that Jose V. Ramirez, during his lifetime, was a co-owner of a house and lot
located at Sta. Cruz, Manila, as shown by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 52789, issued in
the name of the following co-owners: Marie Garnier Vda. de Ramirez, 1/6; Jose V. Ramirez,
1/6; Jose E. Ramirez, 1/6; Rita de Ramirez, 1/6; and Jose Ma. Ramirez, 1/6.
On October 20, 1951, Jose V. Ramirez died. Subsequently, Special Proceeding No. 15026
was instituted to settle his estate, that included the one-sixth (1/6) undivided share in the
aforementioned property. And although his last will and testament, wherein he bequeathed
his estate to his children and grandchildren and one-third (1/3) of the free portion to Mrs.
Angela M. Butte, hereinafter referred to as plaintiff-appellant, has been admitted to probate,
the estate proceedings are still pending up to the present on account of the claims of
creditors which exceed the assets of the deceased. The Bank of the Philippine Islands was
appointed judicial administrator.
Meanwhile, on December 9, 1958, Mrs. Marie Garnier Vda. de Ramirez, one of the co-
owners of the late Jose V. Ramirez in the Sta. Cruz property, sold her undivided 1/6 share to
Manuel Uy & Sons, Inc. defendant-appellant herein, for the sum of P500,000.00. After the
execution by her attorney-in-fact, Mrs. Elsa R. Chambers, of an affidavit to the effect that
formal notices of the sale had been sent to all possible redemptioners, the deed of sale was
duly registered and Transfer Certificate of Title No. 52789 was cancelled in lieu of which a
new one was issued in the name of the vendee and the other-co-owners.
On the same day (December 9, 1958), Manuel Uy & Sons, Inc. sent a letter to the Bank of
the Philippine Islands as judicial administrator of the estate of the late Jose V. Ramirez
informing it of the above-mentioned sale. This letter, together with that of the bank, was
forwarded by the latter to Mrs. Butte c/o her counsel Delgado, Flores & Macapagal, Escolta,
Manila, and having received the same on December 10, 1958, said law office delivered them
to plaintiff-appellant's son, Mr. Miguel Papa, who in turn personally handed the letters to his
mother, Mrs. Butte, on December 11 and 12, 1958. Aside from this letter of defendant-
appellant, the vendor, thru her attorney-in-fact Mrs. Chambers, wrote said bank on December
11, 1958 confirming vendee's letter regarding the sale of her 1/6 share in the Sta. Cruz
1958 and having endorsed it to Mrs. Butte's counsel, the latter received the same on
December 16, 1958. Appellant received the letter on December 19, 1958.
On January 15, 1959, Mrs. Angela M. Butte, thru Atty. Resplandor Sobretodo, sent a letter
and a Philippine National Bank cashier's check in the amount of P500,000.00 to Manuel Uy &
Sons, Inc. offering to redeem the 1/6 share sold by Mrs. Marie Garnier Vda. de Ramirez. This
tender having been refused, plaintiff on the same day consigned the amount in court and filed
the corresponding action for legal redemption. Without prejudice to the determination by the
court of the reasonable and fair market value of the property sold which she alleged to be
grossly excessive, plaintiff prayed for conveyance of the property, and for actual, moral and
exemplary damages.
After the filing by defendant of its answer containing a counterclaim, and plaintiff's reply
thereto, trial was held, after which the court rendered decision on May 13, 1959, dismissing
plaintiff's complaint on the grounds that she has no right to redeem the property and that, if
ever she had any, she exercised the same beyond the statutory 30-day period for legal
redemptions provided by the Civil Code. The counterclaim of defendant for damages was
likewise dismissed for not being sufficiently established. Both parties appealed directly to this
Court.
Based on the foregoing facts, the main issues posed in this appeal are: (1) whether or not
plaintiff-appellant, having been bequeathed 1/3 of the free portion of the estate of Jose V.
Ramirez, can exercise the right of legal redemption over the 1/6 share sold by Mrs. Marie
Garnier Vda. de Ramirez despite the presence of the judicial administrator and pending the
final distribution of her share in the testate proceedings; and (2) whether or not she exercised
the right of legal redemption within the period prescribed by law.
The applicable law involved in the present case is contained in Articles 1620, p. 1, and 1623
of the Civil Code of the Philippines, which read as follows:
ART. 1620. A co-owner of a thing may exercise the right of redemption in case the
shares of all the other-co-owners or of any of them, are sold to a third person. If the
price of the alienation is grossly excessive, the redemptioner shall pay only a
reasonable one.
Should two or more co-owners desire to exercise the right of redemption, they may
only do so in proportion to the share they may respectively have in the thing owned in
common. (1522a)
ART. 1623. The right of legal predemption or redemption shall not be exercised
except within thirty days from the notice in writing by the respective vendor, or by the
vendor, as the case may be. The deed of sale shall not be accorded in the Registry
of Property, unless accompanied by an affidavit of the vendor that he has given
written notice thereof at all possible redemptioners.
 The right of redemption of co-owners excludes that of adjoining owners. (1524a)
That the appellant Angela M. Butte is entitled to exercise the right of legal redemption is
clear. As testamentary heir of the estate of J.V. Ramirez, she and her co-heirs acquired an
interest in the undivided one-sixth (1/6) share owned by her predecessor (causante) in the
Santa Cruz property, from the moment of the death of the aforesaid co-owner, J.V. Ramirez.
By law, the rights to the succession of a deceased persons are transmitted to his heirs from
the moment of his death, and the right of succession includes all property rights and
obligations that survive the decedent.
ART. 776. The inheritance includes all the property, rights and obligations of a person
which are not extinguished by his death. (659)
ART. 777. The rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of the death
of the decedent. (657a)
ART. 947. The legatee or devisee acquires a right to the pure and simple legacies or
devisees from the death of the testator, and transmits it to his heirs. (881a)
The principle of transmission as of the time of the predecessor's death is basic in our Civil
Code, and is supported by other related articles. Thus, the capacity of the heir is determined
as of the time the decedent died (Art. 1034); the legitime is to be computed as of the same
moment(Art. 908), and so is the in officiousness of the donation inter vivos (Art. 771).
Similarly, the legacies of credit and remission are valid only in the amount due and
outstanding at the death of the testator (Art. 935),and the fruits accruing after that instant are
deemed to pertain to the legatee (Art. 948).
As a consequence of this fundamental rule of succession, the heirs of Jose V. Ramirez
acquired his undivided share in the Sta. Cruz property from the moment of his death, and
from that instant, they became co-owners in the aforesaid property, together with the original
surviving co-owners of their decedent (causante). A co-owner of an undivided share is
necessarily a co-owner of the whole. Wherefore, any one of the Ramirez heirs, as such co-
owner, became entitled to exercise the right of legal redemption (retracto de comuneros) as
soon as another co-owner (Maria Garnier Vda. de Ramirez) had sold her undivided share to
a stranger, Manuel Uy & Sons, Inc. This right of redemption vested exclusively in
consideration of the redemptioner's share which the law nowhere takes into account.
The situation is in no wise altered by the existence of a judicial administrator of the estate of
Jose V. Ramirez while under the Rules of Court the administrator has the right to the
possession of the real and personal estate of the deceased, so far as needed for the
payment of the decedent's debts and the expenses of administration (sec. 3, Rule 85), and
the administrator may bring or defend actions for the recovery or protection of the property or
rights of the deceased (sec. 2, Rule 88), such rights of possession and administration do not
include the right of legal redemption of the undivided share sold to Uy & Company by Mrs.
Garnier Ramirez. The reason is obvious: this right of legal redemption only came into
existence when the sale to Uy & Sons, Inc. was perfected, eight (8) years after the death of
Jose V. Ramirez, and formed no part of his estate. The redemption right vested in the heirs
originally, in their individual capacity, they did not derivatively acquire it from their decedent,
for when Jose V. Ramirez died, none of the other co-owners of the Sta. Cruz property had as
yet sold his undivided share to a stranger. Hence, there was nothing to redeem and no right
of redemption; and if the late Ramirez had no such right at his death, he could not transmit it
to his own heirs. Much less could Ramirez acquire such right of redemption eight years after
his death, when the sale to Uy & Sons, Inc. was made; because death extinguishes civil
personality, and, therefore, all further juridical capacity to acquire or transmit rights and
obligations of any kind (Civil Code of the Phil., Art. 42).
It is argued that the actual share of appellant Mrs. Butte in the estate of Jose V. Ramirez has
not been specifically determined as yet, that it is still contingent; and that the liquidation of
estate of Jose V. Ramirez may require the alienation of the decedent's undivided portion in
the Sta. Cruz property, in which event Mrs. Butte would have no interest in said undivided
portion. Even if it were true, the fact would remain that so long as that undivided share
remains in the estate, the heirs of Jose V. Ramirez own it, as the deceased did own it before
his demise, so that his heirs are now as much co-owners of the Sta. Cruz property as Jose V.
Ramirez was himself a co-owner thereof during his lifetime. As co-owners of the property, the
heirs of Jose V. Ramirez, or any one of them, became personally vested with right of legal
redemption as soon as Mrs. Garnier sold her own pro-indiviso interest to Uy & Sons. Even if
subsequently, the undivided share of Ramirez (and of his heirs) should eventually be sold to
satisfy the creditors of the estate, it would not destroy their ownership of it before the sale, but
would only convey or transfer it as in turn sold (of it actually is sold) to pay his creditors.
Hence, the right of any of the Ramirez heirs to redeem the Garnier share will not be
retroactively affected. All that the law requires is that the legal redemptioner should be a co-
owner at the time the undivided share of another co-owner is sold to a stranger. Whether or
not the redemptioner will continue being a co-owner after exercising the legal redemptioner is
irrelevant for the purposes of law.
Nor it can be argued that if the original share of Ramirez is sold by the administrator, his heirs
would stand in law as never having acquired that share. This would only be true if the
inheritance is repudiated or the heir's quality as such is voided. But where the heirship is
undisputed, the purchaser of hereditary property is not deemed to have acquired the title
directly from the deceased Ramirez, because a dead man can not convey title, nor from the
administrator who owns no part of the estate; the purchaser can only derive his title from the
Ramirez heirs, represented by the administrator, as their trustee or legal representative.
The right of appellant Angela M. Butte to make the redemption being established, the next
point of inquiry is whether she had made or tendered the redemption price within the 30 days
from notices as prescribed by law. This period, be it noted, is peremptory, because the policy
of the law is not to leave the purchaser's title in uncertainty beyond the established 30-day
period. In considering whether or not the offer to redeem was timely, we think that the notice
given by the vendee (buyer) should not be taken into account. The text of Article 1623 clearly
and expressly prescribes that the thirty days for making the redemption are to be counted
from notice in writing by the vendor. Under the old law (Civ. Code of 1889, Art. 1524), it was
immaterial who gave the notice; so long as the redeeming co-owner learned of the alienation (a) Declaring the consignation of P500,000,00 made by appellant Angela M. Butte
in favor of the stranger, the redemption period began to run. It is thus apparent that the duly and properly made;
Philippine legislature in Article 1623 deliberately selected a particular method of giving notice,
and that method must be deemed exclusive (39 Am. Jur., 237; Payne vs. State, 12 S.W. [2d] (b) Declaring that said appellant properly exercised in due time the legal redemption
528). As ruled in Wampler vs. Lecompte, 150 Atl. 458 (affd. in 75 Law Ed. [U.S.] 275) — of the one-sixth (1/6) undivided portion of the land covered by Certificate of Title No.
59363 of the Office of the Register of Deeds of the City of Manila, sold on December
Why these provisions were inserted in the statute we are not informed, but we may 9, 1958 by Marie Garnier Vda. de Ramirez to appellant Manuel Uy & Sons, Inc.
assume until the contrary is shown, that a state of facts in respect thereto existed,
which warranted the legislature in so legislating. (c) Ordering appellant Manuel Uy & Sons, Inc. to accept the consigned price and to
convey to Angela M. Butte the undivided portion above referred to, within 30 days
The reasons for requiring that the notice should be given by the seller, and not by the buyer, from the time our decision becomes final, and subsequently to account for the rentals
are easily divined. The seller of an undivided interest is in the best position to know who are and fruits of the redeemed share from and after January 15, 1958, until its
his co-owners that under the law must be notified of the sale. Also, the notice by the seller conveyance; and.
removes all doubts as to the fact of the sale, its perfection; and its validity, the notice being a
reaffirmation thereof, so that the party need not entertain doubt that the seller may still (d) Ordering the return of the records to the court of origin for further proceedings
contest the alienation. This assurance would not exist if the notice should be given by the conformable to this opinion.
buyer.
Without finding as to costs.
The notice which became operative is that given by Mrs. Chambers, in her capacity as
attorney-in-fact of the vendor Marie Garnier Vda. de Ramirez. Under date of December 11, Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Barrera and Dizon, JJ.,
1958, she wrote the Administrator Bank of the Philippine Islands that her principal's one-sixth concur.
(1/6) share in the Sta. Cruz property had been sold to Manuel Uy & Sons, Inc. for Paredes and De Leon, JJ., took no part.
P500,000.00. The Bank received this notice on December 15, 1958, and on the same day
endorsed it to Mrs. Butte, care of Delgado, Flores and Macapagal (her attorneys), who
received the same on December 16, 1958. Mrs. Butte tendered redemption and upon the
vendee's refusal, judicially consigned the price of P500,000.00 on January 15, 1959. The
latter date was the last one of the thirty days allowed by the Code for the redemption,
counted by excluding December 16, 1958 and including January 15, 1959, pursuant to Article
13 of the Civil Code. Therefore, the redemption was made in due time.

The date of receipt of the vendor's notice by the Administrator Bank (December 15) can not
be counted as determining the start of thirty days; for the Administrator of the estate was not
a proper redemptioner, since, as previously shown, the right to redeem the share of Marie
Garnier did not form part of the estate of Jose V. Ramirez.

We find no jurisdiction for appellant's claim that the P500,000,00. paid by Uy & Sons, Inc. for
the Garnier share is grossly excessive. Gross excess cannot be predicated on mere
individual estimates of market price by a single realtor.

The redemption and consignation having been properly made, the Uy counterclaim for
damages and attorney's fees predicated on the assumption that plaintiff's action was clearly
unfounded, becomes untenable.

PREMISES CONSIDERED, the judgment appealed from is hereby reversed and set aside,
and another one entered:
G.R. No. 145545 June 30, 2008
PAZ SAMANIEGO-CELADA, petitioner,
vs.
LUCIA D. ABENA, respondent.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure seeking to
reverse the Decision1dated October 13, 2000 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
41756, which affirmed the Decision2 dated March 2, 1993 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 66, Makati City. The RTC had declared the last will and testament of Margarita S.
Mayores probated and designated respondent Lucia D. Abena as the executor of her will. It
also ordered the issuance of letters testamentary in favor of respondent.
The facts are as follows:
Petitioner Paz Samaniego-Celada was the first cousin of decedent Margarita S. Mayores
(Margarita) while respondent was the decedent’s lifelong companion since 1929.
On April 27, 1987, Margarita died single and without any ascending nor descending heirs as
her parents, grandparents and siblings predeceased her. She was survived by her first
cousins Catalina Samaniego-Bombay, Manuelita Samaniego Sajonia, Feliza Samaniego, and
petitioner.
Before her death, Margarita executed a Last Will and Testament 3 on February 2, 1987 where
she bequeathed one-half of her undivided share of a real property located at Singalong
Manila, consisting of 209.8 square meters, and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT)
No. 1343 to respondent, Norma A. Pahingalo, and Florentino M. Abena in equal shares or
one-third portion each. She likewise bequeathed one-half of her undivided share of a real
property located at San Antonio Village, Makati, consisting of 225 square meters, and
covered by TCT No. 68920 to respondent, Isabelo M. Abena, and Amanda M. Abena in equal
shares or one-third portion each. Margarita also left all her personal properties to respondent
whom she likewise designated as sole executor of her will.
On August 11, 1987, petitioner filed a petition for letters of administration of the estate of
Margarita before the RTC of Makati. The case was docketed as SP Proc. No. M-1531.
On October 27, 1987, respondent filed a petition for probate of the will of Margarita before the
RTC of Makati. The case was docketed as SP Proc. No. M-1607 and consolidated with SP
Proc. No. M-1531.
On March 2, 1993, the RTC rendered a decision declaring the last will and testament of
Margarita probated and respondent as the executor of the will. The dispositive portion of the
decision states:
In view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered:
1) declaring the will as probated;
2) declaring Lucia Abena as the executor of the will who will serve as such without a
bond as stated in paragraph VI of the probated will;
3) ordering the issuance of letters testamentary in favor of Lucia Abena.
So ordered.4
Petitioner appealed the RTC decision to the Court of Appeals. But the Court of Appeals, in a
decision dated October 13, 2000, affirmed in toto the RTC ruling. The dispositive portion of
the Court of Appeals’ decision states:
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the appeal having no merit in fact
and in law, is hereby ORDERED DISMISSED and the appealed Decision of the trial
court AFFIRMED IN TOTO, with cost to oppositors-appellants.
SO ORDERED.5
Hence, the instant petition citing the following issues:
I.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE
ERROR IN NOT INVALIDATING THE WILL SINCE IT DID NOT CONFORM TO THE
FORMALITIES REQUIRED BY LAW;
II.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED ERROR IN NOT
INVALIDATING THE WILL BECAUSE IT WAS PROCURED THROUGH UNDUE
INFLUENCE AND PRESSURE[;] AND
III.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT
DECLARING PETITIONER, HER SIBLINGS AND COUSIN AS THE LEGAL HEIRS
 OF MARGARITA S. MAYORES AND IN NOT ISSUING LETTERS OF This Court does not resolve questions of fact in a petition for review under Rule 45 of the
ADMINISTRATION TO HER.6 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Section 1 12 of Rule 45 limits this Court’s review to questions of
law only.
Briefly stated, the issues are (1) whether the Court of Appeals erred in not declaring the will
invalid for failure to comply with the formalities required by law, (2) whether said court erred in Well-settled is the rule that the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts. When supported by
not declaring the will invalid because it was procured through undue influence and pressure, substantial evidence, the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are conclusive and binding
and (3) whether it erred in not declaring petitioner and her siblings as the legal heirs of on the parties and are not reviewable by this Court, unless the case falls under any of the
Margarita, and in not issuing letters of administration to petitioner. following recognized exceptions:

Petitioner, in her Memorandum,7 argues that Margarita’s will failed to comply with the (1) When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises and
formalities required under Article 8058 of the Civil Code because the will was not signed by conjectures;
the testator in the presence of the instrumental witnesses and in the presence of one another.
She also argues that the signatures of the testator on pages A, B, and C of the will are not (2) When the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible;
the same or similar, indicating that they were not signed on the same day. She further argues
that the will was procured through undue influence and pressure because at the time of
(3) Where there is a grave abuse of discretion;
execution of the will, Margarita was weak, sickly, jobless and entirely dependent upon
respondent and her nephews for support, and these alleged handicaps allegedly affected her
freedom and willpower to decide on her own. Petitioner thus concludes that Margarita’s total (4) When the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts;
dependence on respondent and her nephews compelled her to sign the will. Petitioner
likewise argues that the Court of Appeals should have declared her and her siblings as the (5) When the findings of fact are conflicting;
legal heirs of Margarita since they are her only living collateral relatives in accordance with
Articles 10099 and 101010 of the Civil Code. (6) When the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the
case and the same is contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee;
Respondent, for her part, argues in her Memorandum 11 that the petition for review raises
questions of fact, not of law and as a rule, findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are final (7) When the findings are contrary to those of the trial court;
and conclusive and cannot be reviewed on appeal to the Supreme Court. She also points out
that although the Court of Appeals at the outset opined there was no compelling reason to (8) When the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on
review the petition, the Court of Appeals proceeded to tackle the assigned errors and rule which they are based;
that the will was validly executed, sustaining the findings of the trial court that the formalities
required by law were duly complied with. The Court of Appeals also concurred with the
(9) When the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioners’ main and reply
findings of the trial court that the testator, Margarita, was of sound mind when she executed
briefs are not disputed by the respondents; and
the will.

(10) When the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the supposed
After careful consideration of the parties’ contentions, we rule in favor of respondent.
absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record.13
We find that the issues raised by petitioner concern pure questions of fact, which may not be
We find that this case does not involve any of the abovementioned exceptions.
the subject of a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

Nonetheless, a review of the findings of the RTC as upheld by the Court of Appeals, reveal
The issues that petitioner is raising now i.e., whether or not the will was signed by the testator
that petitioner’s arguments lack basis. The RTC correctly held:
in the presence of the witnesses and of one another, whether or not the signatures of the
witnesses on the pages of the will were signed on the same day, and whether or not undue
influence was exerted upon the testator which compelled her to sign the will, are all questions With [regard] to the contention of the oppositors [Paz Samaniego-Celada, et al.] that
of fact. the testator [Margarita Mayores] was not mentally capable of making a will at the time
of the execution thereof, the same is without merit. The oppositors failed to establish,
by preponderance of evidence, said allegation and contradict the presumption that
the testator was of sound mind (See Article 800 of the Civil Code). In fact, witness for In fine, the court finds that the testator was mentally capable of making the will at the
the oppositors, Dr. Ramon Lamberte, who, in some occasions, attended to the time of its execution, that the notarial will presented to the court is the same notarial
testator months before her death, testified that Margarita Mayores could engage in a will that was executed and that all the formal requirements (See Article 805 of the
normal conversation and he even stated that the illness of the testator does not Civil Code) in the execution of a will have been substantially complied with in the
warrant hospitalization…. Not one of the oppositor’s witnesses has mentioned any subject notarial will.14 (Emphasis supplied.)
instance that they observed act/s of the testator during her lifetime that could be
construed as a manifestation of mental incapacity. The testator may be admitted to Thus, we find no reason to disturb the abovementioned findings of the RTC. Since, petitioner
be physically weak but it does not necessarily follow that she was not of sound mind. and her siblings are not compulsory heirs of the decedent under Article 887 15 of the Civil
[The] testimonies of contestant witnesses are pure aforethought. Code and as the decedent validly disposed of her properties in a will duly executed and
probated, petitioner has no legal right to claim any part of the decedent’s estate.
Anent the contestants’ submission that the will is fatally defective for the reason that
its attestation clause states that the will is composed of three (3) pages while in truth WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision dated October 13, 2000 of the
and in fact, the will consists of two (2) pages only because the attestation is not a part Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 41756 is AFFIRMED.
of the notarial will, the same is not accurate. While it is true that the attestation clause
is not a part of the will, the court, after examining the totality of the will, is of the
Costs against petitioner.
considered opinion that error in the number of pages of the will as stated in the
attestation clause is not material to invalidate the subject will. It must be noted that
the subject instrument is consecutively lettered with pages A, B, and C which is a SO ORDERED
sufficient safeguard from the possibility of an omission of some of the pages. The
error must have been brought about by the honest belief that the will is the whole
instrument consisting of three (3) pages inclusive of the attestation clause and the
acknowledgement. The position of the court is in consonance with the "doctrine of
liberal interpretation" enunciated in Article 809 of the Civil Code which reads:

"In the absence of bad faith, forgery or fraud, or undue [and] improper
pressure and influence, defects and imperfections in the form of
attestation or in the language used therein shall not render the will
invalid if it is proved that the will was in fact executed and attested in
substantial compliance with all the requirements of Article 805."

The court also rejects the contention of the oppositors that the signatures of the
testator were affixed on different occasions based on their observation that the
signature on the first page is allegedly different in size, texture and appearance as
compared with the signatures in the succeeding pages. After examination of the
signatures, the court does not share the same observation as the oppositors. The
picture (Exhibit "H-3") shows that the testator was affixing her signature in the
presence of the instrumental witnesses and the notary. There is no evidence to show
that the first signature was procured earlier than February 2, 1987.

Finally, the court finds that no pressure nor undue influence was exerted on the
testator to execute the subject will. In fact, the picture reveals that the testator was in
a good mood and smiling with the other witnesses while executing the subject will
(See Exhibit "H").
G.R. No. 155555. August 16, 2005
ISABEL P. PORTUGAL and JOSE DOUGLAS PORTUGAL JR., Petitioners,
vs.
LEONILA PORTUGAL-BELTRAN, Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Petitioners Isabel P. Portugal and her son, Jose Douglas Portugal Jr., assail the September
24, 20021 Decision of the Court of Appeals affirming that of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Caloocan City, Branch 1242 which dismissed, after trial, their complaint for annulment of
title for failure to state a cause of action and lack of jurisdiction.
From the records of the case are gathered the following material allegations claims of the
parties which they sought to prove by testimonial and documentary evidence during the trial
of the case:
On November 25, 1942, Jose Q. Portugal (Portugal) married Paz Lazo.3
On May 22, 1948, Portugal married petitioner Isabel de la Puerta.4
On September 13, 1949, petitioner Isabel gave birth to a boy whom she named Jose Douglas
Portugal Jr., her herein co-petitioner.5
On April 11, 1950, Paz gave birth to a girl, Aleli,6 later baptized as Leonila Perpetua Aleli
Portugal, herein respondent.7
On May 16, 1968, Portugal and his four (4) siblings executed a Deed of Extra-Judicial
Partition and Waiver of Rights8 over the estate of their father, Mariano Portugal, who died
intestate on November 2, 1964.9 In the deed, Portugal’s siblings waived their rights, interests,
and participation over a 155 sq. m. parcel of land located in Caloocan in his favor. 10
On January 2, 1970, the Registry of Deeds for Caloocan City issued Transfer Certificate of
Title (TCT) No. 34292 covering the Caloocan parcel of land in the name of "Jose Q.
Portugal, married to Paz C. Lazo."11
On February 18, 1984, Paz died.
On April 21, 1985, Portugal died intestate.
On February 15, 1988, respondent executed an "Affidavit of Adjudication by Sole Heir of
Estate of Deceased Person"12 adjudicating to herself the Caloocan parcel of land. TCT No.
34292/T-17213 in Portugal’s name was subsequently cancelled and in its stead TCT No.
15981314 was issued by the Registry of Deeds for Caloocan City on March 9, 1988 in the
name of respondent, "Leonila Portugal-Beltran, married to Merardo M. Beltran, Jr."
Later getting wind of the death in 1985 of Portugal and still later of the 1988 transfer by
respondent of the title to the Caloocan property in her name, petitioners filed before the RTC
of Caloocan City on July 23, 1996 a complaint15against respondent for annulment of the
Affidavit of Adjudication executed by her and the transfer certificate of title issued in her
name.
In their complaint, petitioners alleged that respondent is not related whatsoever to the
deceased Portugal, hence, not entitled to inherit the Caloocan parcel of land and that she
perjured herself when she made false representations in her Affidavit of Adjudication.
Petitioners accordingly prayed that respondent’s Affidavit of Adjudication and the TCT in her
name be declared void and that the Registry of Deeds for Caloocan be ordered to cancel the
TCT in respondent’s name and to issue in its stead a new one in their (petitioners’) name,
and that actual, moral and exemplary damages and attorney’s fees and litigation expenses
be awarded to them.
Following respondent’s filing of her answer, the trial court issued a Pre-Trial Order
chronicling, among other things, the issues as follows:
a. Which of the two (2) marriages contracted by the deceased Jose Q. Portugal Sr., is valid?
b. Which of the plaintiff . . . Jose Portugal Jr. and defendant Leonila P. Beltran is the legal
heir of the deceased Jose Q. Portugal Sr.?
c. Whether or not TCT No. 159813 was issued in due course and can still be contested by
plaintiffs.
d. Whether or not plaintiffs are entitled to their claims under the complaint. 16 (Underscoring
supplied)
After trial, the trial court, by Decision of January 18, 2001, 17 after giving an account of the
testimonies of the parties and their witnesses and of their documentary evidence, without
resolving the issues defined during pre-trial, dismissed the case for lack of cause of
action on the ground that petitioners’ status and right as putative heirs had not been
established before a probate (sic) court, and lack of jurisdiction over the case, citing Heirs
of Guido and Isabel Yaptinchay v. Del Rosario.18
In relying on Heirs of Guido and Isabel Yaptinchay, the trial court held:
The Heirs of Yaptinchay case arose from facts not dissimilar to the case at bar.
xxx
In the instant case, plaintiffs presented a Marriage Contract, a Certificate of Live Birth,
pictures (sic) and testimonial evidence to establish their right as heirs of the decedent. Thus,
the preliminary act of having a status and right to the estate of the decedent, was sought to
be determined herein. However, the establishment of a status, a right, or a particular fact
is remedied through a special proceeding (Sec. 3(c), Rule 1, 1997 Rules of Court), not an
ordinary civil action whereby a party sues another for the enforcement or protection of a right,
or the protection or redress of a wrong (ibid, a). The operative term in the former is "to
establish", while in the latter, it is "to enforce", a right. Their status and right as putative heirs
of the decedent not having been established, as yet, the Complaint failed to state a cause of
action.
The court, not being a probate (sic) court, is without jurisdiction to rule on plaintiffs’ cause to
establish their status and right herein. Plaintiffs do not have the personality to sue (Secs. 1
and 2, Rule 3, in relation to Secs. 1 and 2, Rule 2, supra).19 (Italics in the original; emphasis
and underscoring supplied).
Petitioners thereupon appealed to the Court of Appeals, questioning the trial court’s ratio
decedendi in dismissing the case as diametrically opposed to this Court’s following ruling
in Cariño v. Cariño,20 viz:
Under Article 40 of the Family Code, the absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be
invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such
previous marriage void. Meaning, where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought
to be invoked for purposes of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in
law, for said projected marriage to be free from legal infirmity, is a final judgment declaring
the previous void. (Domingo v. Court of Appeals, 226 SCRA 572, 579 [1993]) However, for
purposes other than remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare a marriage an
absolute nullity. For other purposes, such as but not limited to the determination of heirship,
legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate, dissolution of property regime, or a
criminal case for that matter, the court may pass upon the validity of marriage even after the
death of the parties thereto, and even in a suit not directly instituted to question the validity of
said marriage, so long as it is essential to the determination of the case. (Niñal, et al. v.
Bayadog, GR No. 13378, March 14, 2000). In such cases, evidence must be adduced,
testimonial or documentary, to prove the existence of grounds rendering such a previous
marriage an absolute nullity. These need not be limited solely to an earlier final judgment of a
court declaring such previous marriage void. (Domingo v. Court of Appeals, supra)
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied).
Conceding that the ruling in Cariño was promulgated (in 2001) subsequent to that of Heirs of
Guido and Isabel Yaptinchay (in 1999), the appellate court found Cariño to be inapplicable,
however, to the case in this wise:
To be borne in mind is the fact that the main issue in the Cariño case was the validity of the
two marriages contracted by the deceased SPO4 Santiago Cariño, whose death benefits was
the bone of contention between the two women both named Susan (viz., Susan Nicdao
Cariño and Susan Yee Cariño) both of whom he married. It is not disputed in said case that
SPO4 S. Cariño contracted two marriages with said two women during his lifetime, and the
only question was: which of these two marriages was validly celebrated? The award of the
death benefits of the deceased Cariño was thus, merely an incident to the question of which
of the two marriages was valid. Upon the other hand, the case at bench is of a different
milieu. The main issue here is the annulment of title to property. The only undisputed fact
in this case is that the deceased Jose Portugal, during his lifetime, owned a parcel of land
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-34292. However, here come two
contending parties, — herein plaintiffs-appellants and defendant-appellee, — both now
insisting to be the legal heir(s) of the decedent. x x x. The status and rights of the parties
herein have not, therefore, been definitively established, as yet. x x x. Necessarily and
naturally, such questions as to such status or right must be properly ventilated in an
appropriate special proceeding, not in an ordinary civil action, whereunder a party sues
another for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the protection or redress of a
wrong. The institution of an ordinary civil suit for that purpose in the present case is thus
impermissible. For it is axiomatic that what the law prohibits or forbids directly, it cannot
permit or allow indirectly. To permit, or allow, a declaration of heirship, or the establishment of
the legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child to be determined in an ordinary civil action, not in an
appropriate special proceeding brought for that purpose, is thus to impinge upon this axiom. x
x x21 (Emphasis in the original, underscoring supplied).
The appellate court, by Decision of September 24, 2002, 22 thus affirmed the trial court’s
dismissal of the case.
Hence, the present Petition for Review on Certiorari,23 faulting the appellate court to have
erred when
I.
. . . it affirmed the RTC decision dismissing the initiatory complaint as it failed to state a cause
of action.
II.
. . . (i) it applied the ruling in Heirs of Guido [and Isabel] Yaptingchay despite the existence of
a later and contrary ruling in Cariño, and (ii) when the Honorable CA and the lower
court failed to render judgment based on the evidence presented relative to
the issues raised during pre-trial, . . .24 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied).
Petitioners thus prayed as follows:
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed of this Honorable Supreme Court that the questioned
CA decision be reversed, and a new one entered in accordance with the prayers set forth in
the instant complaint based on the above disquisition and evidence adduced by petitioners in
the court a quo.
IN THE ALTERNATIVE, should the Honorable Supreme Court find that the pronouncements
in Cariño apply, a decision be entered remanding to the court a quo the determination of the
issues of which of the two marriages is valid, and the determination of "heirship" and
legitimacy of Jose Jr. and Leonila preparatory to the determination of the annulment of title
issued in the name of Leonila.
Other relief and remedy just and equitable in the premises are likewise prayed
for.25 (Underscoring supplied).
Petitioners, in the main, argue that the appellate court misapplied Heirs of Guido and Isabel
Yaptinchay and in effect encouraged multiplicity of suits which is discouraged by this Court as
a reading of Cariño shows; that Cariño allows courts to pass on the determination of heirship
and the legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child so long as it is necessary to the determination of
the case; and that contrary to the appellate court’s ruling, they had established their status as
compulsory heirs.
In the main, the issue in the present petition is whether petitioners have to institute a special
proceeding to determine their status as heirs before they can pursue the case for annulment
of respondent’s Affidavit of Adjudication and of the TCT issued in her name.
In the above-cited case of Heirs of Guido and Isabel Yaptinchay,26 the therein petitioners
executed on March 17, 1994 an extrajudicial settlement of the estate of the deceased Guido
and Isabel Yaptinchay, "owners-claimants" of the two lots mentioned therein. They later
discovered on August 26, 1994 that a portion, if not all, of the two lots had been titled in the
name of the therein respondent Golden Bay Realty and Development Corporation which in
turn sold portions thereof to the therein individual respondents. The therein
petitioners Heirs thus filed a complaint for annulment of titles. The therein respondents
moved to dismiss the case for failure of the therein petitioners to, inter alia, state a cause of
action and prove their status as heirs. The trial court granted the motion to dismiss in this
wise:
But the plaintiffs who claimed to be the legal heirs of the said Guido and Isabel
Yaptinchay have not shown any proof or even a semblance of it—except the allegations that
they are the legal heirs of the aforementioned Yaptinchays—that they have been declared
the legal heirs of the deceased couple. Now, the determination of who are the legal heirs of
the deceased couple must be made in the proper special proceedings in court, and not in an
ordinary suit for reconveyance of property. This must take precedence over the action for
reconveyance . . .27 (Italics in the original; underscoring supplied).
On petition for certiorari by the Heirs, this Court, albeit holding that the petition was an
improper recourse, found that the trial court did not commit grave abuse of discretion in
dismissing the case. Citing Litam et al. v. Rivera28 and Solivio v. Court of Appeals,29 this Court
held that "the declaration of heirship can be made only in a special proceeding inasmuch as
the petitioners here are seeking the establishment of a status or right."
In the above-cited case of Litam,30 Gregorio Dy Tam instituted a special proceeding for
issuance of letters of administration before the then Court of First Instance (CFI) of Rizal,
alleging in his petition that he is the son of Rafael Litam who died in Manila on January 10,
1951 and is survived by him and his therein named seven (7) siblings who are children of the
decedent by his marriage to Sia Khin celebrated in China in 1911; that the decedent
contracted in 1922 in the Philippines another marriage with Marcosa Rivera; and that the
decedent left neither a will nor debt. Dy Tam thus prayed for the issuance of letters of
administration to Marcosa Rivera, "the surviving spouse of the decedent." The CFI granted
the petition and issued letters of administration to, on Marcosa’s request, her nephew Arminio
Rivera.
While the special proceeding was pending, Dy Tam and his purported siblings filed a civil
case before the same court, against the estate of Rafael Litam administrator Arminio Rivera
and Remedios R. Espiritu, duly appointed guardian of Marcosa. In their complaint, Dy Tam
and his purported siblings substantially reproduced the allegations made in his petition in the
special proceeding, with the addition of a list of properties allegedly acquired during the
marriage of the decedent and Marcosa.
Finding the issue raised in the civil case to be identical to some unresolved incidents in the
special proceeding, both were jointly heard by the trial court, following which it rendered a
decision in the civil case dismissing it, declaring, inter alia, that the plaintiffs Dy Tam et al. are
not the children of the decedent whose only surviving heir is Marcosa.
On appeal to this Court by Dy Tam et al., one of the two issues raised for determination was
whether they are the legitimate children of Rafael Litam.
This Court, holding that the issue hinged on whether Rafael Litam and Sia Khin were married
in 1911, and whether Rafael Litam is the father of appellants Dy Tam et al., found
"substantially correct" the trial court’s findings of fact and its conclusion that, among other
things, the birth certificates of Dy Tam et al. "do not establish the identity of the deceased
Rafael Litam and the persons named therein as father [and] it does not appear in the said
certificates of birth that Rafael Litam had in any manner intervened in the preparation and
filing thereof"; and that "[t]he other documentary evidence presented by [them] [is] entirely
immaterial and highly insufficient to prove the alleged marriage between the deceased Rafael
Litam and Sia Khin and [their] alleged status . . . as children of said decedent."
This Court went on to opine in Litam, however, that "the lower court should not have
declared, in the decision appealed from, that Marcosa is the only heir of the decedent,
for such declaration is improper in the [civil case], it being within the exclusive competence of
the court in [the] [s]pecial [p]roceeding."
In Solivio,31 also cited in Heirs of Guido and Isabel Yaptinchay, there was a special
proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased, who was a soltero, filed before
the RTC of Iloilo. In the special proceeding, Branch 23 of said court declared as sole heir
Celedonia Solivio, the decedent’s maternal aunt-half sister of his mother. Concordia
Javellana-Villanueva, the decedent‘s paternal aunt-sister of his father, moved to reconsider
the court’s order declaring Celedonia Solivio as sole heir of the decedent, she claiming that
she too was an heir. The court denied the motion on the ground of tardiness. Instead of
appealing the denial of her motion, Concordia filed a civil case against Celedonia before the
same RTC, for partition, recovery of possession, ownership and damages. The civil case was
raffled to Branch 26 of the RTC, which rendered judgment in favor of Concordia. On appeal
by Celedonia, the appellate court affirmed the said judgment.
On petition for review filed before this Court by Celedonia who posed, among other issues,
"whether Branch 26 of the RTC of Iloilo had jurisdiction to entertain [the civil action] for
partition and recovery of Concordia Villanueva’s share of the estate of [the deceased] while
the [estate] proceedings . . . were still pending . . . in Branch 23 of the same court," this Court
held that "[i]n the interest of orderly procedure and to avoid confusing and conflicting
dispositions of a decedent’s estate, a court should not interfere with [estate]
proceedings pending in a co-equal court," citing Guilas v. CFI Judge of Pampanga.32
This Court, however, in Solivio, upon "[c]onsidering that the estate proceedings are still
pending, but nonetheless [therein private respondent-Concordia Villanueva] had lost her right
to have herself declared as co-heir in said proceedings, opted to proceed to discuss the
merits of her claim in the interest of justice," and declared her an heir of the decedent.
In Guilas33 cited in Solivio, a project of partition between an adopted daughter, the therein
petitioner Juanita Lopez Guilas (Juanita), and her adoptive father was approved in
the proceedings for the settlement of the testate estate of the decedent-adoptive mother,
following which the probate court directed that the records of the case be archived.
Juanita subsequently filed a civil action against her adoptive father to annul the project of
partition on the ground of lesion, preterition and fraud, and prayed that her adoptive father
immediately deliver to her the two lots allocated to her in the project of partition. She
subsequently filed a motion in the testate estate proceedings for her adoptive father to deliver
to her, among other things, the same two lots allotted to her.
After conducting pre-trial in the civil case, the trial court, noting the parties’ agreement to
suspend action or resolution on Juanita’s motion in the testate estate proceedings for the
delivery to her of the two lots alloted to her until after her complaint in the civil case had been
decided, set said case for trial.
Juanita later filed in the civil case a motion to set aside the order setting it for trial on the
ground that in the amended complaint she, in the meantime, filed, she acknowledged the
partial legality and validity of the project of partition insofar as she was allotted the two lots,
the delivery of which she was seeking. She thus posited in her motion to set aside the April
27, 1966 order setting the civil case for hearing that there was no longer a prejudicial
question to her motion in the testate estate proceedings for the delivery to her of the actual
possession of the two lots. The trial court, by order of April 27, 1966, denied the motion.
Juanita thereupon assailed the April 27, 1966 order before this Court.
The probate court’s approval of the project of partition and directive that the records of the
case be sent to the archives notwithstanding, this Court held that the testate estate
proceedings had not been "legally terminated" as Juanita’s share under the project of
partition had not been delivered to her. Explained this Court:
As long as the order of the distribution of the estate has not been complied with, the probate
proceedings cannot be deemed closed and terminated (Siguiong vs. Tecson, supra.);
because a judicial partition is not final and conclusive and does not prevent the heir from
bringing an action to obtain his share, provided the prescriptive period therefor has not elapse
(Mari vs. Bonilla, 83 Phil., 137). The better practice, however, for the heir who has not
received his share, is to demand his share through a proper motion in the same probate
or administration proceedings,or for re-opening of the probate or administrative
proceedings if it had already been closed, and not through an independent action, which
would be tried by another court or Judge which may thus reverse a decision or order
of the probate o[r] intestate court already final and executed and re-shuffle properties
long ago distributed and disposed of (Ramos vs. Ortuzar, 89 Phil. 730, 741-742; Timbol vs.
Cano, supra,; Jingco vs. Daluz, L-5107, April 24, 1953, 92 Phil. 1082; Roman Catholic vs.
Agustines, L-14710, March 29, 1960, 107 Phil., 455, 460-461).34 (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied).
This Court thus set aside the assailed April 27, 1966 order of the trial court setting the civil
case for hearing, but allowed the civil case to continue because it "involves no longer" the two
lots adjudicated to Juanita.
The common doctrine in Litam, Solivio and Guilas in which the adverse parties are putative
heirs to the estate of a decedent or parties to the special proceedings for its settlement is that
if the special proceedings are pending, or if there are no special proceedings filed but there
is, under the circumstances of the case, a need to file one, then the determination of, among
other issues, heirship should be raised and settled in said special proceedings. Where
special proceedings had been instituted but had been finally closed and terminated, however,
or if a putative heir has lost the right to have himself declared in the special proceedings as
co-heir and he can no longer ask for its re-opening, then an ordinary civil action can be filed
for his declaration as heir in order to bring about the annulment of the partition or distribution
or adjudication of a property or properties belonging to the estate of the deceased.
In the case at bar, respondent, believing rightly or wrongly that she was the sole heir to SO ORDERED.
Portugal’s estate, executed on February 15, 198835 the questioned Affidavit of Adjudication
under the second sentence of Rule 74, Section 1 of the Revised Rules of Court. 36 Said rule is
an exception to the general rule that when a person dies leaving a property, it should be
judicially administered and the competent court should appoint a qualified administrator, in
the order established in Sec. 6, Rule 78 in case the deceased left no will, or in case he did,
he failed to name an executor therein.37

Petitioners claim, however, to be the exclusive heirs of Portugal. A probate or intestate court,
no doubt, has jurisdiction to declare who are the heirs of a deceased.

It appearing, however, that in the present case the only property of the intestate estate of
Portugal is the Caloocan parcel of land,38 to still subject it, under the circumstances of the
case, to a special proceeding which could be long, hence, not expeditious, just to establish
the status of petitioners as heirs is not only impractical; it is burdensome to the estate with the
costs and expenses of an administration proceeding. And it is superfluous in light of the fact
that the parties to the civil case – subject of the present case, could and had already in fact
presented evidence before the trial court which assumed jurisdiction over the case upon the
issues it defined during pre-trial.

In fine, under the circumstances of the present case, there being no compelling reason to still
subject Portugal’s estate to administration proceedings since a determination of petitioners’
status as heirs could be achieved in the civil case filed by petitioners, 39 the trial court should
proceed to evaluate the evidence presented by the parties during the trial and render a
decision thereon upon the issues it defined during pre-trial, which bear repeating, to wit:

1. Which of the two (2) marriages contracted by the deceased Jose Q. Portugal, is valid;

2. Which of the plaintiff, Jose Portugal Jr. and defendant Leonila P. Beltran is the legal heir of
the deceased Jose Q. Portugal (Sr.);

3. Whether or not TCT No. 159813 was issued in due course and can still be contested by
plaintiffs;

4. Whether or not plaintiffs are entitled to their claim under the complaint.40

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed September 24, 2002 Decision
of the Court of Appeals is hereby SET ASIDE.

Let the records of the case be REMANDED to the trial court, Branch 124 of the Regional Trial
Court of Caloocan City, for it to evaluate the evidence presented by the parties and render a
decision on the above-enumerated issues defined during the pre-trial.

No costs.
G.R. No. 93980 June 27, 1994 A Yes, sir.

CLEMENTE CALDE, petitioner, Q And when you were all signing this Exhibit "B" and "B-1",
vs. Exhibit "B" and "B-1" which is the testament was passed
THE COURT OF APPEALS, PRIMO AGAWIN and DOMYAAN APED, respondents. around all of you so that each of you will sign consecutively?

Nestor P. Mondok for petitioner. A Yes, sir.

Lazaro Padong for private respondents. Q Who was the first to sign?

A Calibia Lingdan Bulanglang.

PUNO, J.: Q After Calibia Lingdan Bulanglang was made to sign — I

withdraw the question. How did Calibia Lingdan Bulanglang
This is a petition for review by certiorari of the Decision, dated March 27, 1990, of the Court sign the last will and testament?
of appeals 1 in CA-G.R. CV No. 19071, disallowing probate of the Last Will and Codicil
executed by Calibia Lingdan Bulanglang, who died on March 20, 1976. A She asked Judge Tolete the place where she will affix her
thumbmark so Judge Tolete directed her hand or her thumb
The records show that decedent left behind nine thousand pesos (P9,000.00) worth of to her name.
property. She also left a Last Will and Testament, dated October 30, 1972, and a Codicil
thereto, dated July 24, 1973. Both documents contained the thumbmarks of decedent. They Q After she signed, who was the second to sign allegedly all
were also signed by three (3) attesting witnesses each, and acknowledged before Tomas A. of you there present?
Tolete, then the Municipal Judge and Notary Public Ex-Officio of Bauko, Mt. Province.
A Jose Becyagen.
Nicasio Calde, the executor named in the will, filed a Petition for its allowance before the RTC
of Bontoc, Mt. Province, Br. 36. 2 He died during the pendency of the proceedings, and was Q With what did Jose Becyagen sign the testament, Exhibit
duly substituted by petitioner. Private respondents, relatives of decedent, opposed the "B" and "B-1"?
Petitioner filed by Calde, on the following grounds: that the will and codicil were written in
Ilocano, a dialect that decedent did not know; that decedent was mentally incapacitated to
A Ballpen.
execute the two documents because of her advanced age, illness and deafness; that
decedent’s thumbmarks were procured through fraud and undue influence; and that the
codicil was not executed in accordance with law. Q And after Jose Becyagen signed his name with the
ballpen, who was the next to sign?
On June 23, 1988, the trial court rendered judgment on the case, approving and allowing
decedent’s will and its codicil. The decision was appealed to and reversed by the respondent A Me, sir.
Court of Appeals. It held:
Q And Jose Becyagen passed you the paper and the
. . . (T)he will and codicil could pass the safeguards under Article 805 of the ballpen, Exhibit "B" and "B-1" plus the ballpen which used to
New Civil Code but for one crucial factor of discrepancy in the color of ink sign so that you could sign your name, is that correct?
when the instrumental witnesses affixed their respective signatures. When
subjected to cross-examination, Codcodio Nacnas as witness testified as A Yes, sir.
follows:
Q And then after you signed, who was the next to sign the
Q And all of you signed on the same table? document, Exhibit "B" and "B-1"?
 A Hilario Coto-ong.
Q So you passed also to Hilario Coto-ong the same Exhibit
"B" and "B-1" and the ballpen so that he could sign his name
as witness to the document, is it not?
A Yes, sir.
Q And that is the truth and you swear that to be the truth
before the Honorable Court?
ATTY. DALOG:
He already testified under oath, Your Honor.
COURT:
Witness may answer
A Yes, sir.
For his part, Obanan Ticangan likewise admitted during cross-examination in
regard to the codicil that:
Q When you signed Exhibit "D" and "D-1", did you all sign
with the same ballpen?
A One.
Such admissions from instrumental witnesses are indeed significant since
they point to no other conclusion than that the documents were not signed by
them in their presence but on different occasions since the same ballpen
used by them supposedly in succession could not have produced a different
color from blue to black and from black to blue. In fact, the attestation clause
followed the same pattern. The absurd sequence was repeated when they
signed the codicil, for which reason, We have no other alternative but to
disallow the Last Will and Codicil. Verily, if the witnesses and testatrix used
the same ballpen, then their signatures would have been in only one color,
not in various ones as shown in the documents. Moreover, the signatures, in
different colors as they are, appear to be of different broadness, some being
finer than the others, indicating that, contrary to what the testamentary
witnesses declared on the witness stand, not only one ballpen was used,
and, therefore, showing that the documents were not signed by the testatrix
and instrumental witnesses in the presence of one another. . . " (Rollo, pp.
44-46. Citations omitted.)
Petitioner unsuccessfully moved for reconsideration of the impugned Decision. His motion
was denied by the respondent court in its Order, dated May 24, 1990.
Thus, this appeal by petitioner who now puts in issue the correctness of the respondent
court’s conclusion that both decedent’s will and codicil were not subscribed by the witnesses
in the presence of the testator and of one another, contrary to the requirements of Article 805
of the Civil Code. He contends that:
1. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS HAS DECIDED A QUESTION
OF SUBSTANCE IN A WAY NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW OR WITH THE
APPLICABLE DECISION OF THE SUPREME COURT BY CONCLUDING
BASED ON PURE SPECULATION OR SURMISES AND WITHOUT
REGARD TO THE TESTIMONY OF JUDGE TOLETE WHICH IS AN
EVIDENCE OF SUBSTANCE THAT THE WILL AND THE CODICIL OF THE
LATE CALIBIA LINGDAN BULANGLANG WERE SIGNED BY HER AND BY
HER INSTRUMENTAL WITNESSES ON DIFFERENT OCCASIONS;
2. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS HAS DECIDED A QUESTION
OF SUBSTANCE IN A WAY NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW OR WITH THE
APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT BY
DISREGARDING THE PROBATIVE VALUE OF THE ATTESTATION
CLAUSES OF THE LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT AND THE CODICIL OF
THE LATE CALIBIA LINGDAN BULANGLANG.
The petition must fail.
The question in the case at bench is one of fact: whether or not, based on the evidence
submitted, respondent appellate court erred in concluding that both decedent’s Last Will and
Testament, and its Codicil were subscribed by the instrumental witnesses on separate
occasions. As a general rule, factual findings of the Court of Appeals are considered final and
conclusive, and cannot be reviewed on appeal to this court. In the present instance, however,
there is reason to make an exception to that rule, since the finding of the respondent court is
contrary to that of the trial court, viz.:
. . . (Private respondents) pointed out however, that the assertions of
petitioner’s witnesses are rife with contradictions, particularly the fact that the
latter’s signatures on the documents in issue appear to have been written in
ballpens of different colors contrary to the statements of said witnesses that
all of them signed with only one ballpen. The implication is that the
subscribing witnesses to the Will and Codicil, and the testatrix did not
simultaneously sign each of the documents in one sitting but did it piecemeal
— a violation of Art. 805 of the Code. This conclusion of the (private
 respondents) is purely circumstantial. From this particular set of facts,
numerous inferences without limits can be drawn depending on which side of
the fence one is on. For instance, considering the time interval that elapsed
between the making of the Will and Codicil, and up to the filing of the petition
for probate, the possibility is not remote that one or two of the attesting
witnesses may have forgotten certain details that transpired when they
attested the documents in question . . . (Rollo, pp. 36-37.)
A review of the facts and circumstances upon which respondent Court of Appeals based its
impugned finding, however, fails to convince us that the testamentary documents in question
were subscribed and attested by the instrumental witnesses during a single occasion.
As sharply noted by respondent appellate court, the signatures of some attesting witnesses in
decedent’s will and its codicil were written in blue ink, while the others were in black. This
discrepancy was not explained by petitioner. Nobody of his six (6) witnesses testified that two
pens were used by the signatories on the two documents. In fact, two (2) of petitioner’s
witnesses even testified that only one (1) ballpen was used in signing the two testamentary
documents.
It is accepted that there are three sources from which a tribunal may properly acquire
knowledge for making its decisions, namely: circumstantial evidence, testimonial evidence,
and real evidence or autoptic proference. Wigmore explains these sources as follows:
If, for example, it is desired to ascertain whether the accused has lost his
right hand and wears an iron hook in place of it, one source of belief on the
subject would be the testimony of a witness who had seen the arm; in
believing this testimonial evidence, there is an inference from the human
assertion to the fact asserted. A second source of belief would be the mark
left on some substance grasped or carried by the accused; in believing this
circumstantial evidence, there is an inference from the circumstance to the
thing producing it. A third source of belief remains, namely, the inspection by
the tribunal of the accused’s arm. This source differs from the other two in
omitting any step of conscious inference or reasoning, and in proceeding by
direct self-perception, or autopsy.
It is unnecessary, for present purposes, to ask whether this is not, after all, a
third source of inference, i.e., an inference from the impressions or
perceptions of the tribunal to the objective existence of the thing perceived.
The law does not need and does not attempt to consider theories of
psychology as to the subjectivity of knowledge or the mediateness of
perception. It assumes the objectivity of external nature; and, for the
purposes of judicial investigation, a thing perceived by the tribunal as existing
does exist.
There are indeed genuine cases of inference by the tribunal from things
perceived to other things unperceived — as, for example, from a person’s
size, complexion, and features, to his age; these cases of a real use of
inference can be later more fully distinguished . . . But we are here
concerned with nothing more than matters directly perceived — for example,
that a person is of small height or is of dark complexion; as to such matters,
the perception by the tribunal that the person is small or large, or that he has
a dark or light complexion, is a mode of acquiring belief which is independent
of inference from either testimonial or circumstantial evidence. It is the
tribunal’s self-perception, or autopsy, of the thing itself.
From the point of view of the litigant party furnishing this source of belief, it
may be termed Autoptic Proference. 3 (Citations omitted.)
In the case at bench, the autoptic proference contradicts the testimonial evidence produced
by petitioner. The will and its codicil, upon inspection by the respondent court, show in black
and white — or more accurately, in black and blue — that more than one pen was used by
the signatories thereto. Thus, it was not erroneous nor baseless for respondent court to
disbelieve petitioner’s claim that both testamentary documents in question were subscribed to
in accordance with the provisions of Art. 805 of the Civil Code.
Neither did respondent court err when it did not accord great weight to the testimony of Judge
Tomas A. Tolete. It is true that his testimony contains a narration of how the two testamentary
documents were subscribed and attested to, starting from decedent’s thumbmarking thereof,
to the alleged signing of the instrumental witnesses thereto in consecutive order.
Nonetheless, nowhere in Judge Tolete’s testimony is there any kind of explanation for the
different-colored signatures on the testaments.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the instant Petition for Review is DENIED. The Decision of respondent
Court of Appeals, dated March 27, 1988, in CA-G.R. CV No. 19071 disallowing the Last Will
and Testament, and the Codicil thereto, of the decedent Calibia Lingdan Bulanglang is
AFFIRMED IN TOTO. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 162421 August 31, 2007
NELSON CABALES and RITO CABALES, Petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, JESUS FELIANO and ANUNCIACION FELIANO, Respondents.
DECISION
PUNO, C.J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking the reversal of the decision 1 of the Court of
Appeals dated October 27, 2003, in CA-G.R. CV No. 68319 entitled "Nelson Cabales and
Rito Cabales v. Jesus Feliano and Anunciacion Feliano," which affirmed with modification the
decision2 of the Regional Trial Court of Maasin, Southern Leyte, Branch 25, dated August 11,
2000, in Civil Case No. R-2878. The resolution of the Court of Appeals dated February 23,
2004, which denied petitioners’ motion for reconsideration, is likewise herein assailed.
The facts as found by the trial court and the appellate court are well established.
Rufino Cabales died on July 4, 1966 and left a 5,714-square meter parcel of land located in
Brgy. Rizal, Sogod, Southern Leyte, covered by Tax Declaration No. 17270 to his surviving
wife Saturnina and children Bonifacio, Albino, Francisco, Leonora, Alberto and petitioner Rito.
On July 26, 1971, brothers and co-owners Bonifacio, Albino and Alberto sold the subject
property to Dr. Cayetano Corrompido for ₱2,000.00, with right to repurchase within eight (8)
years. The three (3) siblings divided the proceeds of the sale among themselves, each
getting a share of ₱666.66.
The following month or on August 18, 1971, Alberto secured a note ("vale") from Dr.
Corrompido in the amount of ₱300.00.
In 1972, Alberto died leaving his wife and son, petitioner Nelson.
On December 18, 1975, within the eight-year redemption period, Bonifacio and Albino
tendered their payment of ₱666.66 each to Dr. Corrompido. But Dr. Corrompido only
released the document of sale with pacto de retro after Saturnina paid for the share of her
deceased son, Alberto, including his "vale" of ₱300.00.
On even date, Saturnina and her four (4) children Bonifacio, Albino, Francisco and Leonora
sold the subject parcel of land to respondents-spouses Jesus and Anunciacion Feliano for
₱8,000.00. The Deed of Sale provided in its last paragraph, thus:
It is hereby declared and understood that the amount of TWO THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED
EIGHTY SIX PESOS (P2,286.00) corresponding and belonging to the Heirs of Alberto
Cabales and to Rito Cabales who are still minors upon the execution of this instrument are
held
in trust by the VENDEE and to be paid and delivered only to them upon reaching the age of
21.
On December 17, 1985, the Register of Deeds of Southern Leyte issued Original Certificate
of Title No. 17035 over the purchased land in the names of respondents-spouses.
On December 30, 1985, Saturnina and her four (4) children executed an affidavit to the effect
that petitioner Nelson would only receive the amount of ₱176.34 from respondents-spouses
when he reaches the age of 21 considering that Saturnina paid Dr. Corrompido ₱966.66 for
the obligation of petitioner Nelson’s late father Alberto, i.e., ₱666.66 for his share in the
redemption of the sale with pacto de retro as well as his "vale" of ₱300.00.
On July 24, 1986, 24-year old petitioner Rito Cabales acknowledged receipt of the sum of
₱1,143.00 from respondent Jesus Feliano, representing the former’s share in the proceeds of
the sale of subject property.
In 1988, Saturnina died. Petitioner Nelson, then residing in Manila, went back to his father’s
hometown in Southern Leyte. That same year, he learned from his uncle, petitioner Rito, of
the sale of subject property. In 1993, he signified his intention to redeem the subject land
during a barangay conciliation process that he initiated.
On January 12, 1995, contending that they could not have sold their respective shares in
subject property when they were minors, petitioners filed before the Regional Trial Court of
Maasin, Southern Leyte, a complaint for redemption of the subject land plus damages.
In their answer, respondents-spouses maintained that petitioners were estopped from
claiming any right over subject property considering that (1) petitioner Rito had already
received the amount corresponding to his share of the proceeds of the sale of subject
property, and (2) that petitioner Nelson failed to consign to the court the total amount of the
redemption price necessary for legal redemption. They prayed for the dismissal of the case
on the grounds of laches and prescription.
No amicable settlement was reached at pre-trial. Trial ensued and on August 11, 2000, the
trial court ruled against petitioners. It held that (1) Alberto or, by his death, any of his heirs
including petitioner Nelson lost their right to subject land when not one of them repurchased it
from Dr. Corrompido; (2) Saturnina was effectively subrogated to the rights and interests of
Alberto when she paid for Alberto’s share as well as his obligation to Dr. Corrompido; and (3)
petitioner Rito had no more right to redeem his share to subject property as the sale by
Saturnina, his legal guardian pursuant to Section 7, Rule 93 of the Rules of Court, was
perfectly valid; and it was shown that he received his share of the proceeds of the sale on
July 24, 1986, when he was 24 years old.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals modified the decision of the trial court. It held that the sale
by Saturnina of petitioner Rito’s undivided share to the property was unenforceable for lack of
authority or legal representation but that the contract was effectively ratified by petitioner
Rito’s receipt of the proceeds on July 24, 1986. The appellate court also ruled that petitioner
Nelson is co-owner to the extent of one-seventh (1/7) of subject property as Saturnina was
not subrogated to Alberto’s rights when she repurchased his share to the property. It further
directed petitioner Nelson to pay the estate of the late Saturnina Cabales the amount of
₱966.66, representing the amount which the latter paid for the obligation of petitioner
Nelson’s late father Alberto. Finally, however, it denied petitioner Nelson’s claim for
redemption for his failure to tender or consign in court the redemption money within the
period prescribed by law.
In this petition for review on certiorari, petitioners contend that the Court of Appeals erred in
(1) recognizing petitioner Nelson Cabales as co-owner of subject land but denied him the
right of legal redemption, and (2) not recognizing petitioner Rito Cabales as co-owner of
subject land with similar right of legal redemption.
First, we shall delineate the rights of petitioners to subject land.
When Rufino Cabales died intestate, his wife Saturnina and his six (6) children, Bonifacio,
Albino, Francisco, Leonora, Alberto and petitioner Rito, survived and succeeded him. Article
996 of the New Civil Code provides that "[i]f a widow or widower and legitimate children or
descendants are left, the surviving spouse has in the succession the same share as that of
each of the children." Verily, the seven (7) heirs inherited equally on subject property.
Petitioner Rito and Alberto, petitioner Nelson’s father, inherited in their own rights and with
equal shares as the others.
But before partition of subject land was effected, Alberto died. By operation of law, his rights
and obligations to one-seventh of subject land were transferred to his legal heirs – his wife
and his son petitioner Nelson.
We shall now discuss the effects of the two (2) sales of subject land to the rights of the
parties.
The first sale with pacto de retro to Dr. Corrompido by the brothers and co-owners Bonifacio,
Albino and Alberto was valid but only as to their pro-indiviso shares to the land. When Alberto
died prior to repurchasing his share, his rights and obligations were transferred to and
assumed by his heirs, namely his wife and his son, petitioner Nelson. But the records show
that it was Saturnina, Alberto’s mother, and not his heirs, who repurchased for him. As
correctly ruled by the Court of Appeals, Saturnina was not subrogated to Alberto’s or his
heirs’ rights to the property when she repurchased the share.
In Paulmitan v. Court of Appeals,3 we held that a co-owner who redeemed the property in its
entirety did not make her the owner of all of it. The property remained in a condition of co-
ownership as the redemption did not provide for a mode of terminating a co-ownership.4 But
the one who redeemed had the right to be reimbursed for the redemption price and until
reimbursed, holds a lien upon the subject property for the amount due.5 Necessarily, when
Saturnina redeemed for Alberto’s heirs who had then acquired his pro-indiviso share in
subject property, it did not vest in her ownership over the pro-indiviso share she redeemed.
But she had the right to be reimbursed for the redemption price and held a lien upon the
property for the amount due until reimbursement. The result is that the heirs of Alberto, i.e.,
his wife and his son petitioner Nelson, retained ownership over their pro-indiviso share.
Upon redemption from Dr. Corrompido, the subject property was resold to respondents-
spouses by the co-owners. Petitioners Rito and Nelson were then minors and as indicated in
the Deed of Sale, their shares in the proceeds were held in trust by respondents-spouses to
be paid and delivered to them upon reaching the age of majority.
As to petitioner Rito, the contract of sale was unenforceable as correctly held by the Court of
Appeals. Articles 320 and 326 of the New Civil Code6 state that:
Art. 320. The father, or in his absence the mother, is the legal administrator of the property
pertaining to the child under parental authority. If the property is worth more than two
thousand pesos, the father or mother shall give a bond subject to the approval of the Court of
First Instance.
Art. 326. When the property of the child is worth more than two thousand pesos, the father or
mother shall be considered a guardian of the child’s property, subject to the duties and
obligations of guardians under the Rules of Court.
In other words, the father, or, in his absence, the mother, is considered legal administrator of
the property pertaining to the child under his or her parental authority without need of giving a
bond in case the amount of the property of the child does not exceed two thousand
pesos.7 Corollary to this, Rule 93, Section 7 of the Revised Rules of Court of 1964, applicable
to this case, automatically designates the parent as legal guardian of the child without need
of any judicial appointment in case the latter’s property does not exceed two thousand
pesos,8 thus:
Sec. 7. Parents as guardians. – When the property of the child under parental authority is
worth two thousand pesos or less, the father or the mother, without the necessity of court
appointment, shall be his legal guardian x x x x9
Saturnina was clearly petitioner Rito’s legal guardian without necessity of court appointment
considering that the amount of his property or one-seventh of subject property was
₱1,143.00, which is less than two thousand pesos. However, Rule 96, Sec. 110 provides that:
Section 1. To what guardianship shall extend. – A guardian appointed shall have the care
and custody of the person of his ward, and the management of his estate, or the
management of the estate only, as the case may be. The guardian of the estate of a
nonresident shall have the management of all the estate of the ward within the Philippines,
and no court other than that in which such guardian was appointed shall have jurisdiction
over the guardianship.
Indeed, the legal guardian only has the plenary power of administration of the minor’s
property. It does not include the power of alienation which needs judicial authority.11 Thus,
when Saturnina, as legal guardian of petitioner Rito, sold the latter’s pro-indiviso share in
subject land, she did not have the legal authority to do so.
Article 1403 of the New Civil Code provides, thus:
Art. 1403. The following contracts are unenforceable, unless they are ratified:
(1) Those entered into in the name of another person by one who has been given no
authority or legal representation, or who has acted beyond his powers;
xxxx
Accordingly, the contract of sale as to the pro-indiviso share of petitioner Rito was
unenforceable. However, when he acknowledged receipt of the proceeds of the sale on July
24, 1986, petitioner Rito effectively ratified it. This act of ratification rendered the sale valid
and binding as to him.
With respect to petitioner Nelson, on the other hand, the contract of sale was void. He was a
minor at the time of the sale. Saturnina or any and all the other co-owners were not his legal
guardians with judicial authority to alienate or encumber his property. It was his mother who
was his legal guardian and, if duly authorized by the courts, could validly sell his undivided
share to the property. She did not. Necessarily, when Saturnina and the others sold the
subject property in its entirety to respondents-spouses, they only sold and transferred title to
their pro-indiviso shares and not that part which pertained to petitioner Nelson and his
mother. Consequently, petitioner Nelson and his mother retained ownership over their
undivided share of subject property.12
But may petitioners redeem the subject land from respondents-spouses? Articles 1088 and
1623 of the New Civil Code are pertinent:
Art. 1088. Should any of the heirs sell his hereditary rights to a stranger before the partition,
any or all of the co-heirs may be subrogated to the rights of the purchaser by reimbursing him
for the price of the sale, provided they do so within the period of one month from the time
they were notified in writing of the sale by the vendor.
Art. 1623. The right of legal pre-emption or redemption shall not be exercised except within
thirty days from the notice in writing by the prospective vendor, or by the vendor, as the case
may be. The deed of sale shall not be recorded in the Registry of Property, unless
accompanied by an affidavit of the vendor that he has given written notice thereof to all
possible redemptioners.
The right of redemption of co-owners excludes that of adjoining owners.
Clearly, legal redemption may only be exercised by the co-owner or co-owners who did not
part with his or their pro-indiviso share in the property held in common. As demonstrated, the
sale as to the undivided share of petitioner Rito became valid and binding upon his ratification
on July 24, 1986. As a result, he lost his right to redeem subject property.
However, as likewise established, the sale as to the undivided share of petitioner Nelson and
his mother was not valid such that they were not divested of their ownership thereto.
Necessarily, they may redeem the subject property from respondents-spouses. But they must
do so within thirty days from notice in writing of the sale by their co-owners vendors. In
reckoning this period, we held in Alonzo v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 13 thus:
x x x we test a law by its results; and likewise, we may add, by its purposes. It is a cardinal
rule that, in seeking the meaning of the law, the first concern of the judge should be to
discover in its provisions the intent of the lawmaker. Unquestionably, the law should never be
interpreted in such a way as to cause injustice as this is never within the legislative intent. An
indispensable part of that intent, in fact, for we presume the good motives of the legislature, is
to render justice.
Thus, we interpret and apply the law not independently of but in consonance with justice. Law
and justice are inseparable, and we must keep them so. x x x x
x x x x While we may not read into the law a purpose that is not there, we nevertheless have
the right to read out of it the reason for its enactment. In doing so, we defer not to "the letter
that killeth" but to "the spirit that vivifieth," to give effect to the lawmaker’s will.
In requiring written notice, Article 1088 (and Article 1623 for that matter)14 seeks to ensure
that the redemptioner is properly notified of the sale and to indicate the date of such notice as
the starting time of the 30-day period of redemption. Considering the shortness of the period,
it is really necessary, as a general rule, to pinpoint the precise date it is supposed to begin, to
obviate the problem of alleged delays, sometimes consisting of only a day or two.1awph!1
In the instant case, the right of redemption was invoked not days but years after the sale was
made in 1978. We are not unmindful of the fact that petitioner Nelson was a minor when the
sale was perfected. Nevertheless, the records show that in 1988, petitioner Nelson, then of
majority age, was informed of the sale of subject property. Moreover, it was noted by the
appellate court that petitioner Nelson was likewise informed thereof in 1993 and he signified
his intention to redeem subject property during a barangay conciliation process. But he only
filed the complaint for legal redemption and damages on January 12, 1995, certainly more
than thirty days from learning about the sale.
In the face of the established facts, petitioner Nelson cannot feign ignorance of the sale of
subject property in 1978. To require strict proof of written notice of the sale would be to
countenance an obvious false claim of lack of knowledge thereof, thus commending the letter
of the law over its purpose, i.e., the notification of redemptioners.

The Court is satisfied that there was sufficient notice of the sale to petitioner Nelson. The
thirty-day redemption period commenced in 1993, after petitioner Nelson sought the
barangay conciliation process to redeem his property. By January 12, 1995, when petitioner
Nelson filed a complaint for legal redemption and damages, it is clear that the thirty-day
period had already expired.

As in Alonzo, the Court, after due consideration of the facts of the instant case, hereby
interprets the law in a way that will render justice.15

Petitioner Nelson, as correctly held by the Court of Appeals, can no longer redeem subject
property. But he and his mother remain co-owners thereof with respondents-spouses.
Accordingly, title to subject property must include them.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is DENIED. The assailed decision and resolution of the
Court of Appeals of October 27, 2003 and February 23, 2004 are AFFIRMED WITH
MODIFICATION. The Register of Deeds of Southern Leyte is ORDERED to cancel Original
Certificate of Title No. 17035 and to issue in lieu thereof a new certificate of title in the name
of respondents-spouses Jesus and Anunciacion Feliano for the 6/7 portion, and petitioner
Nelson Cabales and his mother for the remaining 1/7 portion, pro indiviso.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 83484 February 12, 1990
CELEDONIA SOLIVIO, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and CONCORDIA JAVELLANA
VILLANUEVA, respondents.
Rex Suiza Castillon for petitioner.
Salas & Villareal for private respondent.
MEDIALDEA, J.:
This is a petition for review of the decision dated January 26, 1988 of the Court of Appeals in
CA GR CV No. 09010 (Concordia Villanueva v. Celedonia Solivio) affirming the decision of
the trial court in Civil Case No. 13207 for partition, reconveyance of ownership and
possession and damages, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered for the plaintiff and against
defendant:
a) Ordering that the estate of the late Esteban Javellana, Jr. be divided into
two (2) shares: one-half for the plaintiff and one-half for defendant. From both
shares shall be equally deducted the expenses for the burial, mausoleum
and related expenditures. Against the share of defendants shall be charged
the expenses for scholarship, awards, donations and the 'Salustia Solivio
Vda. de Javellana Memorial Foundation;'
b) Directing the defendant to submit an inventory of the entire estate
property, including but not limited to, specific items already mentioned in this
decision and to render an accounting of the property of the estate, within
thirty (30) days from receipt of this judgment; one-half (1/2) of this produce
shall belong to plaintiff;
c) Ordering defendant to pay plaintiff P5,000.00 as expenses of litigation;
P10,000.00 for and as attorney's fees plus costs.
SO ORDERED. (pp. 42-43, Rollo)
This case involves the estate of the late novelist, Esteban Javellana, Jr., author of the first
post-war Filipino novel "Without Seeing the Dawn," who died a bachelor, without
descendants, ascendants, brothers, sisters, nephews or nieces. His only surviving relatives
are: (1) his maternal aunt, petitioner Celedonia Solivio, the spinster half-sister of his mother,
Salustia Solivio; and (2) the private respondent, Concordia Javellana-Villanueva, sister of his
deceased father, Esteban Javellana, Sr.
He was a posthumous child. His father died barely ten (10) months after his marriage in
December, 1916 to Salustia Solivio and four months before Esteban, Jr. was born.
Salustia and her sister, Celedonia (daughter of Engracio Solivio and his second wife Josefa
Fernandez), a teacher in the Iloilo Provincial High School, brought up Esteban, Jr.
Salustia brought to her marriage paraphernal properties (various parcels of land in Calinog,
Iloilo covered by 24 titles) which she had inherited from her mother, Gregoria Celo, Engracio
Solivio's first wife (p. 325, Record), but no conjugal property was acquired during her short-
lived marriage to Esteban, Sr.
On October 11, 1959, Salustia died, leaving all her properties to her only child, Esteban, Jr.,
including a house and lot in La Paz, Iloilo City, where she, her son, and her sister lived. In
due time, the titles of all these properties were transferred in the name of Esteban, Jr.
During his lifetime, Esteban, Jr. had, more than once, expressed to his aunt Celedonia and
some close friends his plan to place his estate in a foundation to honor his mother and to help
poor but deserving students obtain a college education. Unfortunately, he died of a heart
attack on February 26,1977 without having set up the foundation.
Two weeks after his funeral, Concordia and Celedonia talked about what to do with Esteban's
properties. Celedonia told Concordia about Esteban's desire to place his estate in a
foundation to be named after his mother, from whom his properties came, for the purpose of
helping indigent students in their schooling. Concordia agreed to carry out the plan of the
deceased. This fact was admitted by her in her "Motion to Reopen and/or Reconsider the
Order dated April 3, 1978" which she filed on July 27, 1978 in Special Proceeding No. 2540,
where she stated:
4. That petitioner knew all along the narrated facts in the immediately
preceding paragraph [that herein movant is also the relative of the deceased
within the third degree, she being the younger sister of the late Esteban
Javellana, father of the decedent herein], because prior to the filing of the
petition they (petitioner Celedonia Solivio and movant Concordia Javellana)
have agreed to make the estate of the decedent a foundation, besides they
have closely known each other due to their filiation to the decedent and they
have been visiting each other's house which are not far away for (sic) each
other. (p. 234, Record; Emphasis supplied.)
Pursuant to their agreement that Celedonia would take care of the proceedings leading to the
formation of the foundation, Celedonia in good faith and upon the advice of her counsel, filed
on March 8, 1977 Spl. Proceeding No. 2540 for her appointment as special administratrix of
the estate of Esteban Javellana, Jr. (Exh. 2). Later, she filed an amended petition (Exh. 5)
praying that letters of administration be issued to her; that she be declared sole heir of the
deceased; and that after payment of all claims and rendition of inventory and accounting, the
estate be adjudicated to her (p. 115, Rollo).
After due publication and hearing of her petition, as well as her amended petition, she was
declared sole heir of the estate of Esteban Javellana, Jr. She explained that this was done for
three reasons: (1) because the properties of the estate had come from her sister, Salustia
Solivio; (2) that she is the decedent's nearest relative on his mother's side; and (3) with her as
sole heir, the disposition of the properties of the estate to fund the foundation would be
facilitated.
On April 3, 1978, the court (Branch II, CFI, now Branch 23, RTC) declared her the sole heir of
Esteban, Jr. Thereafter, she sold properties of the estate to pay the taxes and other
obligations of the deceased and proceeded to set up the "SALUSTIA SOLIVIO VDA. DE
JAVELLANA FOUNDATION" which she caused to be registered in the Securities and
Exchange Commission on July 17,1981 under Reg. No. 0100027 (p. 98, Rollo).
Four months later, or on August 7, 1978, Concordia Javellana Villanueva filed a motion for
reconsideration of the court's order declaring Celedonia as "sole heir" of Esteban, Jr.,
because she too was an heir of the deceased. On October 27, 1978, her motion was denied
by the court for tardiness (pp. 80-81, Record). Instead of appealing the denial, Concordia filed
on January 7, 1980 (or one year and two months later), Civil Case No. 13207 in the Regional
Trial Court of Iloilo, Branch 26, entitled "Concordia Javellana- Villanueva v. Celedonia
Solivio" for partition, recovery of possession, ownership and damages.
On September 3, 1984, the said trial court rendered judgment in Civil Case No. 13207, in
favor of Concordia Javellana-Villanueva.
On Concordia's motion, the trial court ordered the execution of its judgment pending appeal
and required Celedonia to submit an inventory and accounting of the estate. In her motions
for reconsideration of those orders, Celedonia averred that the properties of the deceased
had already been transferred to, and were in the possession of, the 'Salustia Solivio Vda. de
Javellana Foundation." The trial court denied her motions for reconsideration.
In the meantime, Celedonia perfected an appeal to the Court of Appeals (CA GR CV No.
09010). On January 26, 1988, the Court of Appeals, Eleventh Division, rendered judgment
affirming the decision of the trial court in toto.Hence, this petition for review wherein she
raised the following legal issues:
1. whether Branch 26 of the RTC of Iloilo had jurisdiction to entertain Civil
Case No. 13207 for partition and recovery of Concordia Villanueva's share of
the estate of Esteban Javellana, Jr. even while the probate proceedings (Spl.
Proc. No. 2540) were still pending in Branch 23 of the same court;
2. whether Concordia Villanueva was prevented from intervening in Spl.
Proc. No. 2540 through extrinsic fraud;
3. whether the decedent's properties were subject to reserva troncal in favor
of Celedonia, his relative within the third degree on his mother's side from
whom he had inherited them; and
4. whether Concordia may recover her share of the estate after she had
agreed to place the same in the Salustia Solivio Vda. de Javellana
Foundation, and notwithstanding the fact that conformably with said
agreement, the Foundation has been formed and properties of the estate
have already been transferred to it.
I. The question of jurisdiction—
After a careful review of the records, we find merit in the petitioner's contention that the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 26, lacked jurisdiction to entertain Concordia Villanueva's action
for partition and recovery of her share of the estate of Esteban Javellana, Jr. while the
probate proceedings (Spl, Proc. No. 2540) for the settlement of said estate are still pending in
Branch 23 of the same court, there being as yet no orders for the submission and approval of
the administratix's inventory and accounting, distributing the residue of the estate to the heir,
and terminating the proceedings (p. 31, Record).
It is the order of distribution directing the delivery of the residue of the estate to the persons
entitled thereto that brings to a close the intestate proceedings, puts an end to the
administration and thus far relieves the administrator from his duties (Santiesteban v.
Santiesteban, 68 Phil. 367, Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank v. Escolin, et al., L-
27860, March 29, 1974, 56 SCRA 266).
The assailed order of Judge Adil in Spl. Proc. No. 2540 declaring Celedonia as the sole heir
of the estate of Esteban Javellana, Jr. did not toll the end of the proceedings. As a matter of
fact, the last paragraph of the order directed the administratrix to "hurry up the settlement of
the estate." The pertinent portions of the order are quoted below:
2. As regards the second incident [Motion for Declaration of Miss Celedonia
Solivio as Sole Heir, dated March 7, 1978], it appears from the record that
despite the notices posted and the publication of these proceedings as
required by law, no other heirs came out to interpose any opposition to the
instant proceeding. It further appears that herein Administratrix is the only
claimant-heir to the estate of the late Esteban Javellana who died on
February 26, 1977.
During the hearing of the motion for declaration as heir on March 17, 1978, it
was established that the late Esteban Javellana died single, without any
known issue, and without any surviving parents. His nearest relative is the
 herein Administratrix, an elder [sic] sister of his late mother who reared him
and with whom he had always been living with [sic] during his lifetime.
xxxxxxxxx
2. Miss Celedonia Solivio, Administratrix of this estate, is hereby declared as
the sole and legal heir of the late Esteban S. Javellana, who died intestate on
February 26, 1977 at La Paz, Iloilo City.
The Administratrix is hereby instructed to hurry up with the settlement of this
estate so that it can be terminated. (pp, 14-16, Record)
In view of the pendency of the probate proceedings in Branch 11 of the Court of First
Instance (now RTC, Branch 23), Concordia's motion to set aside the order declaring
Celedonia as sole heir of Esteban, and to have herself (Concordia) declared as co-heir and
recover her share of the properties of the deceased, was properly filed by her in Spl. Proc.
No. 2540. Her remedy when the court denied her motion, was to elevate the denial to the
Court of Appeals for review on certiorari. However, instead of availing of that remedy, she
filed more than one year later, a separate action for the same purpose in Branch 26 of the
court. We hold that the separate action was improperly filed for it is the probate court that
has exclusive jurisdiction to make a just and legal distribution of the estate.
In the interest of orderly procedure and to avoid confusing and conflicting dispositions of a
decedent's estate, a court should not interfere with probate proceedings pending in a co-
equal court. Thus, did we rule in Guilas v. Judge of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga,
L-26695, January 31, 1972, 43 SCRA 111, 117, where a daughter filed a separate action to
annul a project of partition executed between her and her father in the proceedings for the
settlement of the estate of her mother:
The probate court loses jurisdiction of an estate under administration only
after the payment of all the debts and the remaining estate delivered to the
heirs entitled to receive the same. The finality of the approval of the project of
The probate court, in the exercise of its jurisdiction to make distribution, has
power to determine the proportion or parts to which each distributed is
entitled. ... The power to determine the legality or illegality of the
testamentary provision is inherent in the jurisdiction of the court making a just
and legal distribution of the inheritance. ... To hold that a separate and
independent action is necessary to that effect, would be contrary to the
general tendency of the jurisprudence of avoiding multiplicity of suits; and is
further, expensive, dilatory, and impractical. (Marcelino v. Antonio, 70 Phil.
388)
A judicial declaration that a certain person is the only heir of the decedent is
exclusively within the range of the administratrix proceedings and can not
properly be made an independent action. (Litam v. Espiritu, 100 Phil. 364)
A separate action for the declaration of heirs is not proper. (Pimentel v.
Palanca, 5 Phil. 436)
partition by itself alone does not terminate the probate proceeding (Timbol v.
Cano, 1 SCRA 1271, 1276, L-15445, April 29, 1961; Siguiong v. Tecson, 89
Phil. pp. 28, 30). As long as the order of the distribution of the estate has not
been complied with, the probate proceedings cannot be deemed closed and
terminated Siguiong v. Tecson, supra); because a judicial partition is not final
and conclusive and does not prevent the heirs from bringing an action to
obtain his share, provided the prescriptive period therefore has not elapsed
(Mari v. Bonilia, 83 Phil. 137). The better practice, however, for the heir who
has not received his share, is to demand his share through a proper motion
in the same probate or administration proceedings, or for reopening of the
probate or administrative proceedings if it had already been closed, and not
through an independent action, which would be tried by another court or
Judge which may thus reverse a decision or order of the probate or intestate
court already final and executed and re-shuffle properties long ago
distributed and disposed of. (Ramos v. Ortuzar, 89 Phil. 730, 741-742;
Timbol v. Cano, supra; Jingco v. Daluz, L-5107, April 24, 1953, 92 Phil. 1082;
Roman Catholic v. Agustines, L-14710, March 29, 1960, 107 Phil. 455, 460-
461; Emphasis supplied)
In Litam et al., v. Rivera, 100 Phil. 364, where despite the pendency of the special
proceedings for the settlement of the intestate estate of the deceased Rafael Litam the
plaintiffs-appellants filed a civil action in which they claimed that they were the children by a
previous marriage of the deceased to a Chinese woman, hence, entitled to inherit his one-
half share of the conjugal properties acquired during his marriage to Marcosa Rivera, the trial
court in the civil case declared that the plaintiffs-appellants were not children of the
deceased, that the properties in question were paraphernal properties of his wife, Marcosa
Rivera, and that the latter was his only heir. On appeal to this Court, we ruled that "such
declarations (that Marcosa Rivera was the only heir of the decedent) is improper, in Civil
Case No. 2071, it being within the exclusive competence of the court in Special Proceedings
No. 1537, in which it is not as yet, in issue, and, will not be, ordinarily, in issue until the
presentation of the project of partition. (p. 378).
However, in the Guilas case, supra, since the estate proceedings had been closed and
terminated for over three years, the action for annulment of the project of partition was
allowed to continue. Considering that in the instant case, the estate proceedings are still
pending, but nonetheless, Concordia had lost her right to have herself declared as co-heir in
said proceedings, We have opted likewise to proceed to discuss the merits of her claim in the
interest of justice.
The orders of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 26, in Civil Case No. 13207 setting aside the
probate proceedings in Branch 23 (formerly Branch 11) on the ground of extrinsic fraud, and
declaring Concordia Villanueva to be a co-heir of Celedonia to the estate of Esteban, Jr.,
ordering the partition of the estate, and requiring the administratrix, Celedonia, to submit an
inventory and accounting of the estate, were improper and officious, to say the least, for
these matters he within the exclusive competence of the probate court.
II. The question of extrinsic fraud—
Was Concordia prevented from intervening in the intestate proceedings by extrinsic
fraud employed by Celedonia? It is noteworthy that extrinsic fraud was not alleged in
Concordia's original complaint in Civil Case No. 13207. It was only in her amended complaint
of March 6, 1980, that extrinsic fraud was alleged for the first time.
Extrinsic fraud, as a ground for annulment of judgment, is any act or conduct
of the prevailing party which prevented a fair submission of the controversy
(Francisco v. David, 38 O.G. 714). A fraud 'which prevents a party from
having a trial or presenting all of his case to the court, or one which operates
upon matters pertaining, not to the judgment itself, but to the manner by
which such judgment was procured so much so that there was no fair
submission of the controversy. For instance, if through fraudulent
machination by one [his adversary], a litigant was induced to withdraw his
defense or was prevented from presenting an available defense or cause of
action in the case wherein the judgment was obtained, such that the
aggrieved party was deprived of his day in court through no fault of his own,
the equitable relief against such judgment may be availed of. (Yatco v.
Sumagui, 44623-R, July 31, 1971). (cited in Philippine Law Dictionary, 1972
Ed. by Moreno; Varela v. Villanueva, et al., 96 Phil. 248)
A judgment may be annulled on the ground of extrinsic or collateral fraud, as
distinguished from intrinsic fraud, which connotes any fraudulent scheme
executed by a prevailing litigant 'outside the trial of a case against the
defeated party, or his agents, attorneys or witnesses, whereby said defeated
party is prevented from presenting fully and fairly his side of the case. ... The
overriding consideration is that the fraudulent scheme of the prevailing
litigant prevented a party from having his day in court or from presenting his
case. The fraud, therefore, is one that affects and goes into the jurisdiction of
the court. (Libudan v. Gil, L-21163, May 17, 1972, 45 SCRA 17, 27-29;
Sterling Investment Corp. v. Ruiz, L-30694, October 31, 1969, 30 SCRA 318,
323)
The charge of extrinsic fraud is, however, unwarranted for the following reasons:
1. Concordia was not unaware of the special proceeding intended to be filed
by Celedonia. She admitted in her complaint that she and Celedonia had
agreed that the latter would "initiate the necessary proceeding" and pay the
taxes and obligations of the estate. Thus paragraph 6 of her complaint
alleged:
6. ... for the purpose of facilitating the settlement of the estate of the late
Esteban Javellana, Jr. at the lowest possible cost and the least effort, the
plaintiff and the defendant agreed that the defendant shall initiate the
necessary proceeding, cause the payment of taxes and other obligations,
and to do everything else required by law, and thereafter, secure the partition
of the estate between her and the plaintiff, [although Celedonia denied that
they agreed to partition the estate, for their agreement was to place the
estate in a foundation.] (p. 2, Record; emphasis supplied)
Evidently, Concordia was not prevented from intervening in the proceedings. She stayed
away by choice. Besides, she knew that the estate came exclusively from Esteban's mother,
Salustia Solivio, and she had agreed with Celedonia to place it in a foundation as the
deceased had planned to do.
2. The probate proceedings are proceedings in rem. Notice of the time and
place of hearing of the petition is required to be published (Sec. 3, Rule 76 in
relation to Sec. 3, Rule 79, Rules of Court). Notice of the hearing of
Celedonia's original petition was published in the "Visayan Tribune" on April
25, May 2 and 9, 1977 (Exh 4, p. 197, Record). Similarly, notice of the
hearing of her amended petition of May 26, 1977 for the settlement of the
estate was, by order of the court, published in "Bagong Kasanag" (New
Light) issues of May 27, June 3 and 10, 1977 (pp. 182-305, Record). The
publication of the notice of the proceedings was constructive notice to the
whole world. Concordia was not deprived of her right to intervene in the
proceedings for she had actual, as well as constructive notice of the same.
As pointed out by the probate court in its order of October 27, 1978:
... . The move of Concordia Javellana, however, was filed about five months
after Celedonia Solivio was declared as the sole heir. ... .
Considering that this proceeding is one in rem and had been duly published
as required by law, despite which the present movant only came to court
now, then she is guilty of laches for sleeping on her alleged right. (p. 22,
Record)
The court noted that Concordia's motion did not comply with the requisites of a petition for
relief from judgment nor a motion for new trial.
The rule is stated in 49 Corpus Juris Secundum 8030 as follows:
Where petition was sufficient to invoke statutory jurisdiction of probate court
and proceeding was in rem no subsequent errors or irregularities are
available on collateral attack. (Bedwell v. Dean 132 So. 20)
Celedonia's allegation in her petition that she was the sole heir of Esteban within the third
degree on his mother's side was not false. Moreover, it was made in good faith and in the
honest belief that because the properties of Esteban had come from his mother, not his
father, she, as Esteban's nearest surviving relative on his mother's side, is the rightful heir to
them. It would have been self-defeating and inconsistent with her claim of sole heirship if she
stated in her petition that Concordia was her co-heir. Her omission to so state did not
constitute extrinsic fraud.
Failure to disclose to the adversary, or to the court, matters which would
defeat one's own claim or defense is not such extrinsic fraud as will justify or
require vacation of the judgment. (49 C.J.S. 489, citing Young v. Young, 2
SE 2d 622; First National Bank & Trust Co. of King City v. Bowman, 15 SW
2d 842; Price v. Smith, 109 SW 2d 1144, 1149)
It should be remembered that a petition for administration of a decedent's estate may be filed
by any "interested person" (Sec. 2, Rule 79, Rules of Court). The filing of Celedonia's petition
did not preclude Concordia from filing her own.
III. On the question of reserva troncal—
We find no merit in the petitioner's argument that the estate of the deceased was subject
to reserva troncal and that it pertains to her as his only relative within the third degree on his
mother's side. The reserva troncal provision of the Civil Code is found in Article 891 which
reads as follows:
ART. 891. The ascendant who inherits from his descendant any property
which the latter may have acquired by gratuitous title from another
ascendant, or a brother or sister, is obliged to reserve such property as he
may have acquired by operation of law for the benefit of relatives who are
within the third degree and who belong to the line from which said property
came.
The persons involved in reserva troncal are:
1. The person obliged to reserve is the reservor (reservista)—the ascendant
who inherits by operation of law property from his descendants.
2. The persons for whom the property is reserved are the
reservees (reservatarios)—relatives within the third degree counted from the
descendant (propositus), and belonging to the line from which the property
came.
3. The propositus—the descendant who received by gratuitous title and died
without issue, making his other ascendant inherit by operation of law. (p. 692,
Civil Law by Padilla, Vol. II, 1956 Ed.)
Clearly, the property of the deceased, Esteban Javellana, Jr., is not reservable property, for
Esteban, Jr. was not an ascendant, but the descendant of his mother, Salustia Solivio, from
whom he inherited the properties in question. Therefore, he did not hold his inheritance
subject to a reservation in favor of his aunt, Celedonia Solivio, who is his relative within the
third degree on his mother's side. The reserva troncal applies to properties inherited by an
ascendant from a descendant who inherited it from another ascendant or 9 brother or sister.
It does not apply to property inherited by a descendant from his ascendant, the reverse of the
situation covered by Article 891.
Since the deceased, Esteban Javellana, Jr., died without descendants, ascendants,
illegitimate children, surviving spouse, brothers, sisters, nephews or nieces, what should
apply in the distribution of his estate are Articles 1003 and 1009 of the Civil Code which
provide:
ART. 1003. If there are no descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, or
a surviving spouse, the collateral relatives shall succeed to the entire estate
of the deceased in accordance with the following articles.
ART. 1009. Should there be neither brothers nor sisters, nor children of
brothers or sisters, the other collateral relatives shall succeed to the estate.
The latter shall succeed without distinction of lines or preference among
them by reason of relationship by the whole blood.
Therefore, the Court of Appeals correctly held that:
Both plaintiff-appellee and defendant-appellant being relatives of the
decedent within the third degree in the collateral line, each, therefore, shall
succeed to the subject estate 'without distinction of line or preference among
them by reason of relationship by the whole blood,' and is entitled one-half
(1/2) share and share alike of the estate. (p. 57, Rollo)
IV. The question of Concordia's one-half share—
However, inasmuch as Concordia had agreed to deliver the estate of the deceased to the
foundation in honor of his mother, Salustia Solivio Vda. de Javellana (from whom the estate
came), an agreement which she ratified and confirmed in her "Motion to Reopen and/or
Reconsider Order dated April 3, 1978" which she filed in Spl. Proceeding No. 2540:
4. That ... prior to the filing of the petition they (petitioner Celedonia Solivio
and movant Concordia Javellana) have agreed to make the estate of the
decedent a foundation, besides they have closely known each other due to
their filiation to the decedent and they have been visiting each other's house
which are not far away for (sic) each other. (p. 234, Record; Emphasis
supplied)
she is bound by that agreement. It is true that by that agreement, she did not waive her
inheritance in favor of Celedonia, but she did agree to place all of Esteban's estate in the
"Salustia Solivio Vda. de Javellana Foundation" which Esteban, Jr., during his lifetime,
planned to set up to honor his mother and to finance the education of indigent but deserving
students as well.
Her admission may not be taken lightly as the lower court did. Being a judicial admission, it is
conclusive and no evidence need be presented to prove the agreement (Cunanan v. Amparo,
80 Phil. 227; Granada v. Philippine National Bank, L-20745, Sept. 2, 1966, 18 SCRA 1; Sta.
Ana v. Maliwat, L-23023, Aug. 31, 1968, 24 SCRA 1018; People v. Encipido, G.R.70091,
Dec. 29, 1986, 146 SCRA 478; and Rodillas v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. 58652, May 20, 1988,
161 SCRA 347).
The admission was never withdrawn or impugned by Concordia who, significantly, did not
even testify in the case, although she could have done so by deposition if she were
supposedly indisposed to attend the trial. Only her husband, Narciso, and son-in-law, Juanito
Domin, actively participated in the trial. Her husband confirmed the agreement between his
wife and Celedonia, but he endeavored to dilute it by alleging that his wife did not intend to
give all, but only one-half, of her share to the foundation (p. 323, Record).
The records show that the "Salustia Solivio Vda. de Javellana Foundation" was established
and duly registered in the Securities and Exchange Commission under Reg. No. 0100027 for
the following principal purposes:
1. To provide for the establishment and/or setting up of scholarships for such
deserving students as the Board of Trustees of the Foundation may decide of
at least one scholar each to study at West Visayas State College, and the
University of the Philippines in the Visayas both located in Iloilo City.
2. To provide a scholarship for at least one scholar for St. Clements
Redemptorist Community for a deserving student who has the religious
vocation to become a priest.
3. To foster, develop, and encourage activities that will promote the
advancement and enrichment of the various fields of educational endeavors,
especially in literary arts. Scholarships provided for by this foundation may be
named after its benevolent benefactors as a token of gratitude for their
contributions.
4. To direct or undertake surveys and studies in the community to determine
community needs and be able to alleviate partially or totally said needs.
5. To maintain and provide the necessary activities for the proper care of the
Solivio-Javellana mausoleum at Christ the King Memorial Park, Jaro, Iloilo
City, and the Javellana Memorial at the West Visayas State College, as a
token of appreciation for the contribution of the estate of the late Esteban S.
Javellana which has made this foundation possible. Also, in perpetuation of
his Roman Catholic beliefs and those of his mother, Gregorian masses or
their equivalents will be offered every February and October, and Requiem
masses every February 25th and October llth, their death anniversaries, as
part of this provision.
6. To receive gifts, legacies, donations, contributions, endowments and
financial aids or loans from whatever source, to invest and reinvest the funds,
collect the income thereof and pay or apply only the income or such part
thereof as shall be determined by the Trustees for such endeavors as may
be necessary to carry out the objectives of the Foundation.
7. To acquire, purchase, own, hold, operate, develop, lease, mortgage,
pledge, exchange, sell, transfer, or otherwise, invest, trade, or deal, in any
manner permitted by law, in real and personal property of every kind and
description or any interest herein.
8. To do and perform all acts and things necessary, suitable or proper for the
accomplishments of any of the purposes herein enumerated or which shall at
any time appear conducive to the protection or benefit of the corporation,
including the exercise of the powers, authorities and attributes concerned
upon the corporation organized under the laws of the Philippines in general,
and upon domestic corporation of like nature in particular. (pp. 9-10, Rollo)
As alleged without contradiction in the petition' for review:
The Foundation began to function in June, 1982, and three (3) of its eight
Esteban Javellana scholars graduated in 1986, one (1) from UPV graduated
Cum Laude and two (2) from WVSU graduated with honors; one was a Cum
Laude and the other was a recipient of Lagos Lopez award for teaching for
being the most outstanding student teacher.
The Foundation has four (4) high school scholars in Guiso Barangay High
School, the site of which was donated by the Foundation. The School has
been selected as the Pilot Barangay High School for Region VI.
The Foundation has a special scholar, Fr. Elbert Vasquez, who would be
ordained this year. He studied at St. Francis Xavier Major Regional Seminary
at Davao City. The Foundation likewise is a member of the Redemptorist
Association that gives yearly donations to help poor students who want to
become Redemptorist priests or brothers. It gives yearly awards for Creative
writing known as the Esteban Javellana Award.
 Further, the Foundation had constructed the Esteban S. Javellana Multi-
purpose Center at the West Visayas State University for teachers' and
students' use, and has likewise contributed to religious civic and cultural
fund-raising drives, amongst other's. (p. 10, Rollo)

Having agreed to contribute her share of the decedent's estate to the Foundation, Concordia
is obligated to honor her commitment as Celedonia has honored hers.

WHEREFORE, the petition for review is granted. The decision of the trial court and the Court
of Appeals are hereby SET ASIDE. Concordia J. Villanueva is declared an heir of the late
Esteban Javellana, Jr. entitled to one-half of his estate. However, comformably with the
agreement between her and her co-heir, Celedonia Solivio, the entire estate of the deceased
should be conveyed to the "Salustia Solivio Vda. de Javallana Foundation," of which both the
petitioner and the private respondent shall be trustees, and each shall be entitled to nominate
an equal number of trustees to constitute the Board of Trustees of the Foundation which shall
administer the same for the purposes set forth in its charter. The petitioner, as administratrix
of the estate, shall submit to the probate court an inventory and accounting of the estate of
the deceased preparatory to terminating the proceedings therein.

SO ORDERED.