CONSTITUTIONAL LAW CASES

ARTICLE VI
Transcript of AQUINO V. COMELEC G.R. No. 189793
AQUINO V. COMELEC G.R. No.189793

FACTS:
Senator Benigno Simeon C. Aquino III and Mayor Jesse Robredo, as public officers, taxpayers and citizens, seek the
nullification as unconstitutional of Republic Act No. 9716, entitled "An Act Reapportioning the Composition of the First
(1st) and Second (2nd) Legislative Districts in the Province of Camarines Sur and Thereby Creating a New Legislative
District From Such Reapportionment."
Said law created an additional legislative district for the Province of Camarines Sur by reconfiguring the existing first and
second legislative districts of the province.
Art VI,Sec 5 (3) Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous, compact, and adjacent
territory.Each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least one
representative.
Requisites for Creation. – (a) A province may be created if it has an average annual income, as certified by the
Department of Finance, of not less than Twenty million pesos (P20,000,000.00) based on 1991 constant prices and either
of the following requisites:
(i) a contiguous territory of at least two thousand (2,000) square kilometers, as certified by the Lands Management
Bureau; or
(ii) a population of not less than two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) inhabitants as certified by the National Statistics
Office.

Laws are presumed constitutional. To justify nullification of law, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the
constitution.

ISSUES:
1. Republic Act 9716 is unconstitutional because the newly apportioned first district of Camarines Sur failed to meet the
population requirement for the creation of the legislative district as explicitly provided in Article VI, Section 5, Paragraphs
(1) and (3) of the Constitution and Section 3 of the Ordinance appended thereto; and

2. Republic Act 9716 violates the principle of proportional representation as provided in Article VI, Section 5 paragraphs
(1), (3) and (4) of the Constitution

HELD:
Any law duly enacted by Congress carries with it the presumption of constitutionality
The use by the subject provision of a comma to separate the phrase
The use of the word "or", which is merely an alternative addition to the indispensable income requirement.
DECISION:
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED. Republic Act No. 9716 entitled "An Act Reapportioning the
Composition of the First (1st) and Second (2nd) Legislative Districts in the Province of Camarines Sur and Thereby
Creating a New Legislative District From Such Reapportionment" is a VALID LAW.
BANAT VS. COMELEC
NOTE: This case is consolidated with BAYAN Muna vs COMELEC (G.R. No. 179295).
In July and August 2007, the COMELEC, sitting as the National Board of Canvassers, made a partial proclamation of the
winners in the party-list elections which was held in May 2007.
In proclaiming the winners and apportioning their seats, the COMELEC considered the following rules:
1. In the lower house, 80% shall comprise the seats for legislative districts, while the remaining 20% shall come from party-
list representatives (Sec. 5, Article VI, 1987 Constitution);
2. Pursuant to Sec. 11b of R.A. 7941 or the Party-List System Act, a party-list which garners at least 2% of the total votes
cast in the party-list elections shall be entitled to one seat;
3. If a party-list garners at least 4%, then it is entitled to 2 seats; if it garners at least 6%, then it is entitled to 3 seats – this
is pursuant to the 2-4-6 rule or the Panganiban Formula from the case of Veterans Federation Party vs COMELEC.
4. In no way shall a party be given more than three seats even if if garners more than 6% of the votes cast for the party-list
election (3 seat cap rule, same case).
The Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT), a party-list candidate, questioned the
proclamation as well as the formula being used. BANAT averred that the 2% threshold is invalid; Sec. 11 of RA 7941 is void
because its provision that a party-list, to qualify for a congressional seat, must garner at least 2% of the votes cast in the
party-list election, is not supported by the Constitution. Further, the 2% rule creates a mathematical impossibility to meet
the 20% party-list seat prescribed by the Constitution.
BANAT also questions if the 20% rule is a mere ceiling or is it mandatory. If it is mandatory, then with the 2% qualifying
vote, there would be instances when it would be impossible to fill the prescribed 20% share of party-lists in the lower house.
BANAT also proposes a new computation (which shall be discussed in the “HELD” portion of this digest).
On the other hand, BAYAN MUNA, another party-list candidate, questions the validity of the 3 seat rule (Section 11a of RA
7941). It also raised the issue of whether or not major political parties are allowed to participate in the party-list elections or
is the said elections limited to sectoral parties.
ISSUES:
I. How is the 80-20 rule observed in apportioning the seats in the lower house?
II. Whether or not the 20% allocation for party-list representatives mandatory or a mere ceiling.
III. Whether or not the 2% threshold to qualify for a seat valid.
IV. How are party-list seats allocated?
V. Whether or not major political parties are allowed to participate in the party-list elections.
VI. Whether or not the 3 seat cap rule (3 Seat Limit Rule) is valid.
HELD:
I. The 80-20 rule is observed in the following manner: for every 5 seats allotted for legislative districts, there shall be one
seat allotted for a party-list representative. Originally, the 1987 Constitution provides that there shall be not more than 250
members of the lower house. Using the 80-20 rule, 200 of that will be from legislative districts, and 50 would be from party-
list representatives. However, the Constitution also allowed Congress to fix the number of the membership of the lower
house as in fact, it can create additional legislative districts as it may deem appropriate. As can be seen in the May 2007
elections, there were 220 district representatives, hence applying the 80-20 rule or the 5:1 ratio, there should be 55 seats
allotted for party-list representatives.
How did the Supreme Court arrive at 55? This is the formula:
(Current Number of Legislative DistrictRepresentatives ÷ 0.80) x (0.20) = Number of Seats Available to Party-List
Representatives
Hence,
(220 ÷ 0.80) x (0.20) = 55
II. The 20% allocation for party-list representatives is merely a ceiling – meaning, the number of party-list representatives
shall not exceed 20% of the total number of the members of the lower house. However, it is not mandatory that the 20%
shall be filled.
III. No. Section 11b of RA 7941 is unconstitutional. There is no constitutional basis to allow that only party-lists which
garnered 2% of the votes cast are qualified for a seat and those which garnered less than 2% are disqualified. Further, the
2% threshold creates a mathematical impossibility to attain the ideal 80-20 apportionment. The Supreme Court explained:
To illustrate: There are 55 available party-list seats. Suppose there are 50 million votes cast for the 100 participants in
the party list elections. A party that has two percent of the votes cast, or one million votes, gets a guaranteed seat. Let
us further assume that the first 50 parties all get one million votes. Only 50 parties get a seat despite the availability of
55 seats. Because of the operation of the two percent threshold, this situation will repeat itself even if we increase the
available party-list seats to 60 seats and even if we increase the votes cast to 100 million. Thus, even if the maximum
number of parties get two percent of the votes for every party, it is always impossible for the number of occupied party-
list seats to exceed 50 seats as long as the two percent threshold is present.
It is therefore clear that the two percent threshold presents an unwarranted obstacle to the full implementation of Section
5(2), Article VI of the Constitution and prevents the attainment of “the broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or
group interests in the House of Representatives.”
IV. Instead, the 2% rule should mean that if a party-list garners 2% of the votes cast, then it is guaranteed a seat, and not
“qualified”. This allows those party-lists garnering less than 2% to also get a seat.
But how? The Supreme Court laid down the following rules:
1. The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the highest to the lowest based on the number of votes
they garnered during the elections.
2. The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the party-list
system shall be entitled to one guaranteed seat each.
3. Those garnering sufficient number of votes, according to the ranking in paragraph 1, shall be entitled to additional seats
in proportion to their total number of votes until all the additional seats are allocated.
4. Each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than three (3) seats.
In computing the additional seats, the guaranteed seats shall no longer be included because they have already been
allocated, at one seat each, to every two-percenter. Thus, the remaining available seats for allocation as “additional seats”
are the maximum seats reserved under the Party List System less the guaranteed seats. Fractional seats are disregarded
in the absence of a provision in R.A. No. 7941 allowing for a rounding off of fractional seats.
In short, there shall be two rounds in determining the allocation of the seats. In the first round, all party-lists which garnered
at least 2% of the votes cast (called the two-percenters) are given their one seat each. The total number of seats given to
these two-percenters are then deducted from the total available seats for party-lists. In this case, 17 party-lists were able to
garner 2% each. There are a total 55 seats available for party-lists hence, 55 minus 17 = 38 remaining seats. (Please refer
to the full text of the case for the tabulation).
The number of remaining seats, in this case 38, shall be used in the second round, particularly, in determining, first, the
additional seats for the two-percenters, and second, in determining seats for the party-lists that did not garner at least 2%
of the votes cast, and in the process filling up the 20% allocation for party-list representatives.
How is this done?
Get the total percentage of votes garnered by the party and multiply it against the remaining number of seats. The product,
which shall not be rounded off, will be the additional number of seats allotted for the party list – but the 3 seat limit rule shall
still be observed.
Example:
In this case, the BUHAY party-list garnered the highest total vote of 1,169,234 which is 7.33% of the total votes cast for the
party-list elections (15,950,900).
Applying the formula above: (Percentage of vote garnered) x (remaining seats) = number of additional seat
Hence, 7.33% x 38 = 2.79
Rounding off to the next higher number is not allowed so 2.79 remains 2. BUHAY is a two-percenter which means it has a
guaranteed one seat PLUS additional 2 seats or a total of 3 seats. Now if it so happens that BUHAY got 20% of the votes
cast, it will still get 3 seats because the 3 seat limit rule prohibits it from having more than 3 seats.
Now after all the tw0-percenters were given their guaranteed and additional seats, and there are still unoccupied seats,
those seats shall be distributed to the remaining party-lists and those higher in rank in the voting shall be prioritized until all
the seats are occupied.
V. No. By a vote of 8-7, the Supreme Court continued to disallow major political parties (the likes of UNIDO, LABAN, etc)
from participating in the party-list elections.
Although the ponencia (Justice Carpio) did point out that there is no prohibition either from the Constitution or from RA 7941
against major political parties from participating in the party-list elections as the word “party” was not qualified and that even
the framers of the Constitution in their deliberations deliberately allowed major political parties to participate in the party-list
elections provided that they establish a sectoral wing which represents the marginalized (indirect participation), Justice
Puno, in his separate opinion, concurred by 7 other justices, explained that the will of the people defeats the will of the
framers of the Constitution precisely because it is the people who ultimately ratified the Constitution – and the will of the
people is that only the marginalized sections of the country shall participate in the party-list elections. Hence, major political
parties cannot participate in the party-list elections, directly or indirectly.
VI. Yes, the 3 seat limit rule is valid. This is one way to ensure that no one party shall dominate the party-list system.

ATONG PAGLAUM, INC. VS COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

This case partially abandoned the rulings in Ang Bagong Bayani vs COMELEC and BANAT vs COMELEC.
Atong Paglaum, Inc. and 51 other parties were disqualified by the Commission on Elections in the May 2013 party-list
elections for various reasons but primarily for not being qualified as representatives for marginalized or underrepresented
sectors.
Atong Paglaum et al then filed a petition for certiorari against COMELEC alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of
COMELEC in disqualifying them.
ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in disqualifying the said party-lists.
HELD: No. The COMELEC merely followed the guidelines set in the cases of Ang Bagong Bayani and BANAT. However,
the Supreme Court remanded the cases back to the COMELEC as the Supreme Court now provides for new guidelines
which abandoned some principles established in the two aforestated cases. The new guidelines are as follows:
I. Parameters. In qualifying party-lists, the COMELEC must use the following parameters:
1. Three different groups may participate in the party-list system: (1) national parties or organizations, (2) regional
parties or organizations, and (3) sectoral parties or organizations.
2. National parties or organizations and regional parties or organizations do not need to organize along sectoral lines and
do not need to represent any “marginalized and underrepresented” sector.
3. Political parties can participate in party-list elections provided they register under the party-list system and do not field
candidates in legislative district elections. A political party, whether major or not, that fields candidates in legislative district
elections can participate in party-list elections only through its sectoral wing that can separately register under the party-list
system. The sectoral wing is by itself an independent sectoral party, and is linked to a political party through a coalition.
4. Sectoral parties or organizations may either be “marginalized and underrepresented” or lacking in “well-defined political
constituencies.” It is enough that their principal advocacy pertains to the special interest and concerns of their sector. The
sectors that are “marginalized and underrepresented” include labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, handicapped, veterans, and overseas workers. The sectors that lack “well-defined political constituencies”
include professionals, the elderly, women, and the youth.
5. A majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that represent the “marginalized and underrepresented”
must belong to the “marginalized and underrepresented” sector they represent. Similarly, a majority of the members of
sectoral parties or organizations that lack “well-defined political constituencies” must belong to the sector they represent.
The nominees of sectoral parties or organizations that represent the “marginalized and underrepresented,” or that represent
those who lack “well-defined political constituencies,” either must belong to their respective sectors, or must have a track
record of advocacy for their respective sectors. The nominees of national and regional parties or organizations must be
bona-fide members of such parties or organizations.
6. National, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations shall not be disqualified if some of their nominees are disqualified,
provided that they have at least one nominee who remains qualified.
II. In the BANAT case, major political parties are disallowed, as has always been the practice, from participating in the party-
list elections. But, since there’s really no constitutional prohibition nor a statutory prohibition, major political parties can now
participate in the party-list system provided that they do so through their bona fide sectoral wing (see parameter 3
above).
Allowing major political parties to participate, albeit indirectly, in the party-list elections will encourage them to work
assiduously in extending their constituencies to the “marginalized and underrepresented” and to those who “lack well-
defined political constituencies.”
Ultimately, the Supreme Court gave weight to the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission when they were drafting
the party-list system provision of the Constitution. The Commissioners deliberated that it was their intention to include all
parties into the party-list elections in order to develop a political system which is pluralistic and multiparty. (In
the BANAT case, Justice Puno emphasized that the will of the people should defeat the intent of the framers; and that the
intent of the people, in ratifying the 1987 Constitution, is that the party-list system should be reserved for the marginalized
sectors.)
III. The Supreme Court also emphasized that the party-list system is NOT RESERVED for the “marginalized and
underrepresented” or for parties who lack “well-defined political constituencies”. It is also for national or regional parties. It
is also for small ideology-based and cause-oriented parties who lack “well-defined political constituencies”. The common
denominator however is that all of them cannot, they do not have the machinery – unlike major political parties, to field or
sponsor candidates in the legislative districts but they can acquire the needed votes in a national election system like the
party-list system of elections.
If the party-list system is only reserved for marginalized representation, then the system itself unduly excludes other cause-
oriented groups from running for a seat in the lower house.
As explained by the Supreme Court, party-list representation should not be understood to include only labor, peasant,
fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, handicapped, veterans, overseas workers, and other sectors that
by their nature are economically at the margins of society. It should be noted that Section 5 of Republic Act 7941 includes,
among others, in its provision for sectoral representation groups of professionals, which are not per se economically
marginalized but are still qualified as “marginalized, underrepresented, and do not have well-defined political constituencies”
as they are ideologically marginalized.
 G.R. No. 147589 June 26, 2001
ANG BAGONG BAYANI vs. Comelec
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 147613 June 26, 2001
BAYAN MUNA vs. Comelec

Facts
Petitioners challenged the Comelec’s Omnibus Resolution No. 3785, which approved the participation of 154 organizations
and parties, including those herein impleaded, in the 2001 party-list elections. Petitioners sought the disqualification of
private respondents, arguing mainly that the party-list system was intended to benefit the marginalized and
underrepresented; not the mainstream political parties, the non-marginalized or overrepresented. Unsatisfied with the pace
by which Comelec acted on their petition, petitioners elevated the issue to the Supreme Court.

Issue:
1. Whether or not petitioner’s recourse to the Court was proper.
2. Whether or not political parties may participate in the party list elections.
3. Whether or not the Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in promulgating Omnibus Resolution No. 3785.

RULING:
1. The Court may take cognizance of an issue notwithstanding the availability of other remedies "where the issue raised is one
purely of law, where public interest is involved, and in case of urgency." Tha facts attendant to the case rendered it
justiciable.

2. Political Parties -- even the major ones -- may participate in the party-list elections subject to the requirements laid down in the
Constitution and RA 7941, which is the statutory law pertinent to the Party List System.

Under the Constitution and RA 7941, private respondents cannot be disqualified from the party-list elections, merely on the
ground that they are political parties. Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution provides that members of the House of
Representative may “be elected through a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or
organizations”. It is however, incumbent upon the Comelec to determine proportional representation of the marginalized
and underrepresented”, the criteria for participation in relation to the cause of the party lsit applicants so as to avoid
desecration of the noble purpose of the party-list system.

3. The Court acknowledged that to determine the propriety of the inclusion of respondents in the Omnibus Resolution No. 3785,
a study of the factual allegations was necessary which was beyond the pale of the Court. The Court not being a trier of
facts.

However, seeing that the Comelec failed to appreciate fully the clear policy of the law and the Consitution, the Court decided
to set some guidelines culled from the law and the Consitution, to assist the Comelec in its work. The Court ordered that
the petition be remanded in the Comelec to determine compliance by the party lists.
Romualdez-Marcos vs COMELEC
TITLE: Romualdez-Marcos vs. COMELEC
CITATION: 248 SCRA 300

FACTS:

Imelda, a little over 8 years old, in or about 1938, established her domicile in Tacloban, Leyte where she studied and
graduated high school in the Holy Infant Academy from 1938 to 1949. She then pursued her college degree, education, in
St. Paul’s College now Divine Word University also in Tacloban. Subsequently, she taught in Leyte Chinese School still in
Tacloban. She went to manila during 1952 to work with her cousin, the late speaker Daniel Romualdez in his office in the
House of Representatives. In 1954, she married late President Ferdinand Marcos when he was still a Congressman of
Ilocos Norte and was registered there as a voter. When Pres. Marcos was elected as Senator in 1959, they lived together
in San Juan, Rizal where she registered as a voter. In 1965, when Marcos won presidency, they lived in Malacanang
Palace and registered as a voter in San Miguel Manila. She served as member of the Batasang Pambansa and Governor
of Metro Manila during 1978.

Imelda Romualdez-Marcos was running for the position of Representative of the First District of Leyte for the 1995
Elections. Cirilo Roy Montejo, the incumbent Representative of the First District of Leyte and also a candidate for the
same position, filed a “Petition for Cancellation and Disqualification" with the Commission on Elections alleging that
petitioner did not meet the constitutional requirement for residency. The petitioner, in an honest misrepresentation, wrote
seven months under residency, which she sought to rectify by adding the words "since childhood" in her
Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy filed on March 29, 1995 and that "she has always maintained Tacloban City
as her domicile or residence. She arrived at the seven months residency due to the fact that she became a resident of
the Municipality of Tolosa in said months.

ISSUE: Whether petitioner has satisfied the 1year residency requirement to be eligible in running as representative of the
First District of Leyte.

HELD:

Residence is used synonymously with domicile for election purposes. The court are in favor of a conclusion supporting
petitoner’s claim of legal residence or domicile in the First District of Leyte despite her own declaration of 7 months
residency in the district for the following reasons:

1. A minor follows domicile of her parents. Tacloban became Imelda’s domicile of origin by operation of law when her
father brought them to Leyte;

2. Domicile of origin is only lost when there is actual removal or change of domicile, a bona fide intention of abandoning
the former residence and establishing a new one, and acts which correspond with the purpose. In the absence and
concurrence of all these, domicile of origin should be deemed to continue.

3. A wife does not automatically gain the husband’s domicile because the term “residence” in Civil Law does not mean
the same thing in Political Law. When Imelda married late President Marcos in 1954, she kept her domicile of origin and
merely gained a new home and not domicilium necessarium.

4. Assuming that Imelda gained a new domicile after her marriage and acquired right to choose a new one only after the
death of Pres. Marcos, her actions upon returning to the country clearly indicated that she chose Tacloban, her domicile of
origin, as her domicile of choice. To add, petitioner even obtained her residence certificate in 1992 in Tacloban, Leyte
while living in her brother’s house, an act, which supports the domiciliary intention clearly manifested. She even kept
close ties by establishing residences in Tacloban, celebrating her birthdays and other important milestones.

WHEREFORE, having determined that petitioner possesses the necessary residence qualifications to run for a seat in the
House of Representatives in the First District of Leyte, the COMELEC's questioned Resolutions dated April 24, May 7,
May 11, and May 25, 1995 are hereby SET ASIDE. Respondent COMELEC is hereby directed to order the Provincial
Board of Canvassers to proclaim petitioner as the duly elected Representative of the First District of Leyte.
AQUINO V COMELEC (1995)

Agapito A. Aquino, petitioner vs. Commission on Election, Move Makati, Mateo Bedon, and Juanito Icaro,
respondents
Sept, 18, 1995
Special Civil Action in the Supreme Court. Certiorari.

Relevant Provisions:
Section 6, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution
No person shall be a Member of the House of Representatives unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines and,
on the day of the election, is at least twenty-five years of age, able to read and write, and, except the party-list
representatives, a registered voter in the district in which he shall be elected, and a resident thereof for a period of not
less than one year immediately preceding the day of the election.

Facts:
On 20 March 1995, Agapito A. Aquino, the petitioner, filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the position of Representative
for the new (remember: newly created) Second Legislative District of Makati City. In his certificate of candidacy, Aquino
stated that he was a resident of the aforementioned district (284 Amapola Cor. Adalla Sts., Palm Village, Makati) for 10
months.
Move Makati, a registered political party, and Mateo Bedon, Chairman of LAKAS-NUCD-UMDP of Barangay Cembo,
Makati City, filed a petition to disqualify Aquino on the ground that the latter lacked the residence qualification as a
candidate for congressman which under Section 6, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, should be for a period not less than
one year preceding the (May 8, 1995) day of the election.
Faced with a petition for disqualification, Aquino amended the entry on his residency in his certificate of candidacy to 1
year and 13 days. The Commission on Elections passed a resolution that dismissed the petition on May 6 and allowed
Aquino to run in the election of 8 May. Aquino, with 38,547 votes, won against Augusto Syjuco with 35,910 votes.
Move Makati filed a motion of reconsideration with the Comelec, to which, on May 15, the latter acted with an order
suspending the proclamation of Aquino until the Commission resolved the issue. On 2 June, the Commission
on Electionsfound Aquino ineligible and disqualified for the elective office for lack of constitutional qualification of
residence.
Aquino then filed a Petition of Certiorari assailing the May 15 and June 2 orders.

Issue:
1. Whether “residency” in the certificate of candidacy actually connotes “domicile” to warrant the disqualification of Aquino
from the position in the electoral district.
2. WON it is proven that Aquino has established domicile of choice and not just residence (not in the sense of the COC)in
the district he was running in.

Held:
1. Yes, The term “residence” has always been understood as synonymous with “domicile” not only under the previous
constitutions but also under the 1987 Constitution. The Court cited the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission
wherein this principle was applied.
Mr. Nolledo:
I remember that in the 1971 Constitutional Convention, there was an attempt to require residence in the place not less
than one year immediately preceding the day of elections.
…
What is the Committee’s concept of residence for the legislature? Is it actual residence or is it the concept of domicile or
constructive residence?
Mr. Davide:
This is in the district, for a period of not less than one year preceding the day of election. This was in effect lifted from the
1973 constituition, the interpretation given to it was domicile.
Mrs. Braid:
On section 7, page2, Noledo has raised the same point that resident has been interpreted at times as a matter of intention
rather than actual residence.
…
Mr. De los Reyes
So we have to stick to the original concept that it should be by domicile and not physical and actual residence.
Therefore, the framers intended the word “residence” to have the same meaning of domicile.
The place “where a party actually or constructively has his permanent home,” where he, no matter where he may be
found at any given time, eventually intends to return and remain, i.e., his domicile, is that to which the Constitution refers
when it speaks of residence for the purposes of election law.
The purpose is to exclude strangers or newcomers unfamiliar with the conditions and needs of the community from taking
advantage of favorable circumstances existing in that community for electoral gain.
While there is nothing wrong with the purpose of establishing residence in a given area for meeting election
law requirements, this defeats the essence of representation, which is to place through assent of voters those
most cognizantand sensitive to the needs of a particular district, if a candidate falls short of the period of residency
mandated by law for him to qualify.
Which brings us to the second issue.

2. No, Aquino has not established domicile of choice in the district he was running in.
The SC agreed with the Comelec’s contention that Aquino should prove that he established a domicile of choice and not
just residence.
The Constitution requires a person running for a post in the HR one year of residency prior to the elections in the district in
which he seeks election to .
Aquino’s certificate of candidacy in a previous (May 11, 1992) election indicates that he was a resident and a registered
voter of San Jose, Concepcion, Tarlac for more than 52 years prior to that election. His birth certificate indicated that
Conception as his birthplace and his COC also showed him to be a registered voter of the same district. Thus
his domicile of origin (obviously, choice as well) up to the filing of his COC was in Conception, Tarlac.
Aquino’s connection to the new Second District of Makati City is an alleged lease agreement of a condominium unit in the
area. The intention not to establish a permanent home in Makati City is evident in his leasing a condominium unit instead
of buying one. The short length of time he claims to be a resident of Makati (and the fact of his stated domicile in Tarlac
and his claims of other residences in Metro Manila) indicate that his sole purpose in transferring his physical residence is
not to acquire a new, residence or domicile but only to qualify as a candidate for Representative of the Second District of
Makati City.
Aquino’s assertion that he has transferred his domicile from Tarlac to Makati is a bare assertion which is hardly supported
by the facts in the case at bench. To successfully effect a change of domicile, petitioner must prove an actual removal or
an actual change of domicile, a bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new
one and definite acts which correspond with the purpose.
Aquino was thus rightfully disqualified by the Commission on Elections due to his lack of one year residence in the district.
Decision
Instant petition dismissed. Order restraining respondent Comelec from proclaiming the candidate garnering the next
highest number of votes in the congressional elections of Second district of Makati City made permanent.
Dicta:
I. Aquino’s petition of certiorari contents were:
A. The Comelec’s lack of jurisdiction to determine the disqualification issue involving congressional candidates after the
May 8, 1995 elections, such determination reserved with the house of representatives electional tribunal
B. Even if the Comelec has jurisdiction, the jurisdiction ceased in the instant case after the elections and the remedy to
the adverse parties lies in another forum which is the HR Electoral Tribunal consistent with Section 17, Article VI of the
1987 Constitution.
C. The COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion when it proceeded to promulagate its questioned decision despite
its own recognition that a threshold issue of jurisdiction has to be judiciously reviewed again, assuming arguendo that the
Comelec has jurisdiction
D. The Comelec’s finding of non-compliance with the residency requirement of one year against the petitioner is contrary
to evidence and to applicable laws and jurisprudence.
E. The Comelec erred in failing to appreciate the legal impossibility of enforcing the one year residency requirement of
Congressional candidates in newly created political districts which were only existing for less than a year at the time of the
election and barely four months in the case of petitioner’s district in Makati.
F. The Comelec committed serious error amounting to lack of jurisdiction when it ordered the board of canvassers to
determine and proclaim the winner out of the remaining qualified candidates after the erroneous disqualification of the
petitioner in disregard of the doctrine that a second place candidate or a person who was repudiated by the electorate is a
loser and cannot be proclaimed as substitute winner.
II. Modern day carpetbaggers can’t be allowed to take advantage of the creation of new political districts by suddenly
transplanting themselves in such new districts, prejudicing their genuine residents in the process of taking advantage of
existing conditions in these areas.
III. according to COMELEC: The lease agreement was executed mainly to support the one year residence requirement as
a qualification for a candidate of the HR, by establishing a commencement date of his residence. If a oerfectly valid lease
agreement cannot, by itself establish a domicile of choice, this particular lease agreement cannot be better.
DOMINO VS. COMELEC G.R. NO. 134015, JULY 19, 1999
Labels: Case Digests, Political Law

Facts: Petitioner Domino filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of Representative of the lone legislative district
of the Province of Sarangani indicating that he has resided in the constituency where he seeks to be elected for 1 year
and 2 months. Private respondents filed a petition seeking to cancel the certificate of candidacy of Domino, alleging
that Domino, contrary to his declaration in the certificate of candidacy, is not a resident, much less a registered voter, of
the province of Sarangani where he seeks election. Thereafter, the COMELEC promulgated a resolution
declaring Domino disqualified as candidate for the position of representative of the lone district of Sarangani in the May
11, 1998 polls for lack of the one-year residency requirement and likewise ordered the cancellation of his certificate of
candidacy based on his own Voter’s Registration Record and his address indicated as 24 Bonifacio St., Ayala Hts., Old
Balara, Quezon City.

Issue: Whether or not petitioner has resided in Sarangani Province for at least 1 year immediately preceding the May 11,
1998 elections

Held: The term “residence,” as used in the law prescribing the qualifications for suffrage and for elective office, means the
same thing as “domicile,” which imports not only an intention to reside in a fixed place but also personal presence in that
place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention. “Domicile” denotes a fixed permanent residence to which,
whenever absent for business, pleasure, or some other reasons, one intends to return.

Records show that petitioner’s domicile of origin was Candon, Ilocos Sur and that sometime in 1991, he acquired a
new domicile of choice in Quezon City, as shown by his certificate of candidacy for the position of representative of the
Third District of Quezon City in the May 1995 election. Petitioner is now claiming that he had effectively abandoned his
residence in Quezon City and has established a new domicile of choice in the Province of Sarangani.

A person’s domicile, once established, is considered to continue and will not be deemed lost until a new one is
established. To successfully effect a change of domicile, one must demonstrate an actual removal or an actual change
of domicile; a bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one and definite
acts whichcorrespond with the purpose.

The contract of lease of a house and lot entered into sometime in January 1997 does not adequately support a change
of domicile. The lease contract may be indicative of Domino’s intention to reside in Sarangani, but it does not engender
the kind of permanency required to proveabandonment of one’s original domicile. The mere absence of individual from his
permanent residence, no matter how long, without the intention to abandon it does not result in loss or change of domicile.
Thus, the date of the contract of lease of a house and lot in Sarangani cannot be used, in the absence of other
circumstances, as the reckoning period of the one-year residence requirement. Further, Domino’s lack of intention to
abandon his residence in Quezon City is strengthened by his act of registering as voter in Quezon City. While voting is not
conclusive of residence, it does give rise to a strong presumption of residence especially in this case where Domino
registered in his former barangay.
DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO VS. GUINGONA G.R. NO. 134577, NOVEMBER 18, 1998
Labels: Case Digests, Political Law

Facts: During the first regular session of the eleventh Congress, Senator Fernan was declared the duly elected
President of the Senate by a vote of 20 to 2. Senator Tatad manifested that, with the agreement of Senator Santiago,
allegedly the only other member of the minority, he was assuming the position of minority leader. He explained that those
who had voted for Senator Fernan comprised the majority, while only those who had voted for him, the losing nominee,
belonged to the minority. Senator Flavier manifested that the senators belonging to the Lakas-NUCD-UMDP Party
numbering 7 and, thus, also a minority had chosen Senator Guingona as the minority leader. Thereafter, the majority
leader informed the body that he was in receipt of a letter signed by the 7 Lakas-NUCD-UMDP senators, stating that they
had elected Senator Guingona as the minority leader. By virtue thereof, the Senate President formally recognized Senator
Guingona as the minority leader of the Senate. Senators Santiago and Tatad filed a petition for quo warranto, alleging that
Senator Guingona had been usurping, unlawfully holding and exercising the position of Senate minority leader, a position
that, according to them, rightfully belonged to Senator Tatad.

Issues:
(1) Whether or not the Court has jurisdiction over the petition
(2) Whether or not there is an actual violation of the Constitution

Held: Regarding the first issue, jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is determined by the allegations of the
complaint or petition, regardless of whether the petitioner is entitled to the relief asserted. In light of the allegations of the
petitioners, it is clear that the Court hasjurisdiction over the petition. It is well within the power and jurisdiction of the Court
to inquire whether indeed the Senate or its officials committed a violation of the Constitution or gravely abused their
discretion in the exercise of their functions and prerogatives.

However, the interpretation proposed by petitioners finds no clear support from the Constitution, the laws, the Rules of the
Senate or even frompractices of the Upper House. The term “majority,” when referring to a certain number out of a total or
aggregate, it simply means the number greater than half or more than half of any total. In effect, while the Constitution
mandates that the President of the Senate must be elected by a number constituting more than one half of all the
members thereof, it does not provide that the members who will not vote for him shall ipsofacto constitute the minority,
who could thereby elect the minority leader. No law or regulation states that the defeated candidate shall automatically
become the minority leader.

While the Constitution is explicit in the manner of electing a Senate President and a House Speaker, it is, however, dead
silent on the manner of selecting the other officers in both chambers of Congress. All that the Charter says under Art. VI,
Sec. 16(1) is that “each House shall choose such other officers as it may deem necessary.” The method of choosing who
will be such other officers is merely a derivative of the exercise of theprerogative conferred by the said constitutional
provision. Therefore, such method must be prescribed by the Senate itself, not by the Court.
OSMENA V PENDATUN
G.R. No. L-17144 October 28, 1960
J. Bengzon

Facts:
On July 14, 1960, Congressman Sergio Osmeña, Jr., submitted to the Supreme Court a verified petition for "declaratory
relief, certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction" against Congressman Salapida K. Pendatun and fourteen other
congressmen in their capacity as members of the Special Committee created by House Resolution No. 59.
He asked for annulment of such Resolution on the ground of infringenment of his parliamentary immunity; he also asked,
principally, that said members of the special committee be enjoined from proceeding in accordance with it, particularly the
portion authorizing them to require him to substantiate his charges against the President with the admonition that
if he failed to do so, he must show cause why the House should not punish him.
The petition attached a copy of House Resolution No. 59, where it was stated that Sergio Osmeña, Jr., made a privilege
speech entitled a Message to Garcia. There, he claimed to have been hearing of ugly reports that the government has been
selling “free things” at premium prices. He also claimed that even pardons are for sale regardless of the gravity of the case.
The resolution stated that these charges, if made maliciously or recklessly and without basis in truth, would constitute a
serious assault upon the dignity of the presidential office and would expose it to contempt and disrepute.
The resolution formed a special committee of fifteen Members to investigate the truth of the charges against the President
of the Philippines made by Osmeña, Jr. It was authorized to summon him to appear before it to substantiate his charges,
as well as to require the attendance of witnesses and/or the production of pertinent papers before it, and if he fails to do so
he would be required to show cause why he should not be punished by the House. The special committee shall submit to
the House a report of its findings before the adjournment of the present special session of the Congress of the Philippines.
In support of his request, Osmeña alleged that the Resolution violated his constitutional absolute parliamentary immunity
for speeches delivered in the House; second, his words constituted no actionable conduct; and third, after his allegedly
objectionable speech and words, the House took up other business, and Rule XVII, sec. 7 of the Rules of House provides
that if other business has intervened after the member had uttered obnoxious words in debate, he shall not be held
to answer therefor nor be subject to censure by the House.
The Supreme Court decided to hear the matter further, and required respondents to answer, without issuing any preliminary
injunction.
The special committee continued to perform its task, and after giving Congressman Osmeña a chance to defend himself,
found him guilty of serious disorderly behavior and acting on such report, the House approved on the same day House
Resolution No. 175, declaring him guilty as recommended, and suspending him from office for fifteen months.
The respondents filed their answer where they challenged the jurisdiction of this Court to entertain the petition, defended
the power of Congress to discipline its members with suspension and then invited attention to the fact that Congress having
ended its session, the Committee had thereby ceased to exist.
After the new resolution, Osmena added that the House has no power under the Constitution, to suspend one of its
members.
Issue:
Can Osmena be held liable for his speech?
Held: Yes. Petition dismissed.
Ratio:
Section 15, Article VI of our Constitution provides that "for any speech or debate" in Congress, the Senators or Members of
the House of Representative "shall not be questioned in any other place." The provision has always been understood to
mean that although exempt from prosecution or civil actions for their words uttered in Congress, the members of
Congress may, nevertheless, be questioned in Congress itself.
Furthermore, the Rules of the House which petitioner himself has invoked (Rule XVII, sec. 7), recognize the House's power
to hold a member responsible "for words spoken in debate."
Our Constitution enshrines parliamentary immunity whose purpose "is to enable and encourage a representative of the
public to discharge his public trust with firmness and success" for "it is indispensably necessary that he should enjoy the
fullest liberty of speech, and that he should be protected from the resentment of every one it may offend."
It guarantees the legislator complete freedom of expression without fear of being made responsible in criminal or civil actions
before the courts or any other forum outside of the Congressional Hall. But it does not protect him from responsibility
before the legislative body itself whenever his words and conduct are considered by the latter disorderly or
unbecoming a member.
For unparliamentary conduct, members of Parliament or of Congress have been censured, committed to prison, and even
expelled by the votes of their colleagues. This was the traditional power of legislative assemblies to take disciplinary action
against its members, including imprisonment, suspension or expulsion. For instance, the Philippine Senate, in April 1949,
suspended a senator for one year.
Needless to add, the Rules of Philippine House of Representatives provide that the parliamentary practices of the Congress
of the United States shall apply in a supplementary manner to its proceedings.
This brings up the third point of petitioner: the House may no longer take action against him, because after his speech it
had taken up other business. Respondents answer that Resolution No. 59 was unanimously approved by the House, that
such approval amounted to a suspension of the House Rules, which according to standard parliamentary practice may done
by unanimous consent.
Granted that the House may suspended the operation of its Rules, it may not, however, affect past acts or renew its rights
to take action which had already lapsed.
The situation might thus be compared to laws extending the period of limitation of actions and making them
applicable to actions that had lapsed. At any rate, courts are subject to revocation modification or waiver at the
pleasure of the body adopting them. Mere failure to conform to parliamentary usage will not invalidate the action
taken by a deliberative body when the required number of members have agreed to a particular measure.
The following is quoted from a reported decision of the Supreme court of Tennessee:
The rule here invoked is one of parliamentary procedure, and it is uniformly held that it is within the power of all deliberative
bodies to abolish, modify, or waive their own rules of procedure, adopted for the orderly con duct of business, and as security
against hasty action. (Certain American cases)
In the case of Congressman Stanbery of Ohio, who insulted the Speaker, was censured by the House, despite the argument
that other business had intervened after the objectionable remarks.
On the question whether delivery of speeches attacking the Chief Executive constitutes disorderly conduct for which
Osmeña may be disciplined, the court believed that the House is the judge of what constitutes disorderly behaviour, not
only because the Constitution has conferred jurisdiction upon it, but also because the matter depends mainly on
factual circumstances of which the House knows best but which can not be depicted in black and white for
presentation to, and adjudication by the Courts. For one thing, if this Court assumed the power to determine whether
Osmeña conduct constituted disorderly behaviour, it would thereby have assumed appellate jurisdiction, which the
Constitution never intended to confer upon a coordinate branch of the Government. This was due to the theory of
separation of powers fastidiously observed by this. Each department, it has been said, had exclusive cognizance of matters
within its jurisdiction and is supreme within its own sphere. (Angara vs. Electoral Commission.)
The general rule has been applied in other cases to cause the courts to refuse to intervene in what are exclusively legislative
functions. Thus, where the stated Senate is given the power to example a member, the court will not review its action or
revise even a most arbitrary or unfair decision.
Clifford vs. French- several senators who had been expelled by the State Senate of California for having taken a bribe, filed
mandamus proceeding to compel reinstatement, alleging the Senate had given them no hearing, nor a chance to make
defense, besides falsity of the charges of bribery. The Supreme Court of California declined to interfere:
Under our form of government, the judicial department has no power to revise even the most arbitrary and unfair action of
the legislative department, due to the Constitution. Every legislative body in which is vested the general legislative power of
the state has the implied power to expel a member for any cause which it may deem sufficient.
In Hiss. vs. Barlett, it was said that this power is inherent in every legislative body; that it is necessary to the to enable the
body 'to perform its high functions, and is necessary to the safety of the state; That it is a power of self-protection, and that
the legislative body must necessarily be the sole judge of the exigency which may justify and require its exercise. Given the
exercise of the power committed to it, the senate is supreme. An attempt by this court to direct or control the legislature, or
either house, in the exercise of the power, would be an attempt to exercise legislative functions, which it is expressly
forbidden to do.
The Court merely refuses to disregard the allocation of constitutional functions which it is our special duty to maintain.
Indeed, in the interest of comity, we found the House of Representatives of the United States taking the position upon at
least two occasions.
Petitioner's principal argument against the House's power to suspend is the Alejandrino precedent. In 1924, Senator
Alejandrino was, by resolution of Senate, suspended from office for 12 months because he had assaulted another member
of that Body. The Senator challenged the validity of the resolution. Although this Court held that in view of the separation of
powers, it had no jurisdiction to compel the Senate to reinstate petitioner, it nevertheless went on to say the Senate had no
power to adopt the resolution because suspension for 12 months amounted to removal, and the Jones Law gave the
Senate no power to remove an appointive member, like Senator Alejandrino. The Jones Law specifically provided that
"each house may punish its members for disorderly behaviour, and, with the concurrence of two-thirds votes, expel
an elective member. The Jones Law empowered the Governor General to appoint Senators. Alejandrino was one.
The opinion in that case stated that "suspension deprives the electoral district of representation without that district being
afforded any means by which to fill that vacancy." But that remark should be understood to refer particularly to the appointive
senator who was then the affected party.
Now the Congress has the full legislative powers and prerogatives of a sovereign nation, except as restricted by the
Constitution. In the Alejandrino case, the Court reached the conclusion that the Jones Law did not give the Senate the
power it then exercised—the power of suspension for one year. Now. the Congress has the inherent legislative prerogative
of suspension which the Constitution did not impair.
The Legislative power of the Philippine Congress is plenary, limited by the Republic's Constitution. So that any power
deemed to be legislative by usage or tradition, is necessarily possessed by the Philippine Congress, unless the Constitution
provides otherwise.
In any event, petitioner's argument as to the deprivation of the district's representation can not be weighty, becuase
deliberative bodies have the power in proper cases, to commit one of their members to jail.
Now come questions of procedure and jurisdiction. The petition intended to prevent the Special Committee from acting
tin pursuance of House Resolution No. 59. Because no preliminary injunction had been issued, the Committee performed
its task, reported to the House, and the latter approved the suspension order. The House had closed it session, and the
Committee has ceased to exist as such. It would seem, therefore, the case should be dismissed for having become moot
or academic.
Of course, there is nothing to prevent petitioner from filing new pleadings. But the most probable outcome of such reformed
suit, however, will be a pronouncement of lack of jurisdiction.
CEFERINO PAREDES, JR. VS SANDIGANBAYAN
In January 1990, Teofilo Gelacio, the then vice mayor of San Francisco, Agusan del Sur filed a case against Ceferino
Paredes, Jr. (who was then the governor of the same province), Atty. Generoso Sansaet (counsel of Paredes), and
Mansueto Honrada (a clerk of court). The three allegedly conspired to falsify a copy of a Notice of Arraignment and of the
Transcript of Stenographic Notes. Gelacio claimed that, in fact, no arraignment notice had ever been issued against him in
a criminal proceeding against him. Gelacio was able to produce a certification from the judge handling the case himself that
the criminal case against him never reached the arraignment stage because the prosecution was dismissed. Atty. Sansaet
on his part maintained that there was indeed a Notice of Arraignment but he later retracted his testimonies. Paredes claimed
that Sansaet only changed his side because of political realignment. Subsequently, the Office of the Ombudsman
recommended that Paredes et al be charged with Falsification of Public Documents. Paredes appealed but was eventually
denied by the Sandiganbayan.
ISSUE: Whether or not Paredes, now a member of Congress, may be suspended by order of the Sandiganbayan.
HELD: Yes. The Supreme Court affirmed the order of suspension of Congressman Paredes by the Sandiganbayan, despite
his protestations on the encroachment by the court on the prerogatives of congress. The SC ruled:
“x x x. Petitioner’s invocation of Section 16 (3), Article VI of the Constitution – which deals with the power of each
House of Congress inter alia to ‘punish its Members for disorderly behavior,’ and ‘suspend or expel a Member’ by a vote
of two-thirds of all its Members subject to the qualification that the penalty of suspension, when imposed, should not
exceed sixty days – is unavailing, as it appears to be quite distinct from the suspension spoken of in Section 13 of RA
3019, which is not a penalty but a preliminary, preventive measure, prescinding from the fact that the latter is not being
imposed on petitioner for misbehavior as a Member of the House of Representatives.”

ALEJO MABANAG VS JOSE LOPEZ VITO

Petitioners include 3 senators and 8 representatives. The three senators were suspended by senate due to election
irregularities. The 8 representatives were not allowed to take their seat in the lower House except in the election of the
House Speaker. They argued that some senators and House Reps were not considered in determining the required ¾ vote
(of each house) in order to pass the Resolution (proposing amendments to the Constitution) – which has been considered
as an enrolled bill by then. At the same time, the votes were already entered into the Journals of the respective House. As
a result, the Resolution was passed but it could have been otherwise were they allowed to vote. If these members of
Congress had been counted, the affirmative votes in favor of the proposed amendment would have been short of the
necessary three-fourths vote in either branch of Congress. Petitioners filed or the prohibition of the furtherance of the said
resolution amending the constitution. Respondents argued that the SC cannot take cognizance of the case because the
Court is bound by the conclusiveness of the enrolled bill or resolution.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Court can take cognizance of the issue at bar. Whether or not the said resolution was duly
enacted by Congress.
HELD: As far as looking into the Journals is concerned, even if both the journals from each House and an authenticated
copy of the Act had been presented, the disposal of the issue by the Court on the basis of the journals does not imply
rejection of the enrollment theory, for, as already stated, the due enactment of a law may be proved in either of the two
ways specified in section 313 of Act No. 190 as amended. The SC found in the journals no signs of irregularity in the
passage of the law and did not bother itself with considering the effects of an authenticated copy if one had been introduced.
It did not do what the opponents of the rule of conclusiveness advocate, namely, look into the journals behind the enrolled
copy in order to determine the correctness of the latter, and rule such copy out if the two, the journals and the copy, be
found in conflict with each other. No discrepancy appears to have been noted between the two documents and the court
did not say or so much as give to understand that if discrepancy existed it would give greater weight to the journals,
disregarding the explicit provision that duly certified copies “shall be conclusive proof of the provisions of such Acts and of
the due enactment thereof.”
**Enrolled Bill – that which has been duly introduced, finally passed by both houses, signed by the proper officers of each,
approved by the president and filed by the secretary of state.
Section 313 of the old Code of Civil Procedure (Act 190), as amended by Act No. 2210, provides: “Official documents may
be proved as follows: . . . (2) the proceedings of the Philippine Commission, or of any legislatives body that may be provided
for in the Philippine Islands, or of Congress, by the journals of those bodies or of either house thereof, or by published
statutes or resolutions, or by copies certified by the clerk of secretary, or printed by their order; Provided, That in the case
of Acts of the Philippine Commission or the Philippine Legislature, when there is an existence of a copy signed by the
presiding officers and secretaries of said bodies, it shall be conclusive proof of the provisions of such Acts and of the due
enactment thereof.”
The SC is bound by the contents of a duly authenticated resolution (enrolled bill) by the legislature. In case of
conflict, the contents of an enrolled bill shall prevail over those of the journals.
Emigdio Bondoc vs Marciano Pineda
Emigdio Bondoc and Marciano Pineda were rivals for a Congressional seat in the 4thDistrict of Pampanga. Pineda was a
member of the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP). While Bondoc was a member of the Nacionalista Party (NP). Pineda
won in that election. However, Bondoc contested the result in the HRET (House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal).
Bondoc won in the protest and he was subsequently declared as the winner by the HRET.
Meanwhile, one member of the HRET, Congressman Juanito Camasura, Jr. who was a member of LDP confessed to Rep.
Jose Cojuangco (LDP’s leader) that he voted for Bondoc even though Bondoc was a member of the NP. He confessed that
he believed in his conscience that Bondoc truly won the election. This resulted to Camasura’s expulsion from the LDP.
Pineda then moved that they withdraw Camasura from the HRET. They further prayed that a new election be held and that
the new LDP representative be appointed in the HRET. This new representative will be voting for Pineda in the reopening
of the election contest. Camasura was then removed by HRET’s chairwoman Justice Ameurfina Herrera. Naturally, Bondoc
questioned such action before the Supreme Court (SC).
Pineda contends that the issue is already outside the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court because Camasura’s removal is an
official act of Congress and by virtue of the doctrine of separation of powers, the judiciary may not interfere.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Supreme Court may inquire upon the validity of the said act of the HRET without violating the
doctrine of separation of powers.
HELD: Yes. The SC can settle the controversy in the case at bar without encroaching upon the function of the legislature
particularly a part thereof, HRET. The issue here is a judicial question. It must be noted that what is being complained of is
the act of HRET not the act of Congress. In here, when Camasura was rescinded by the tribunal, a decision has already
been made, members of the tribunal have already voted regarding the electoral contest involving Pineda and Bondoc
wherein Bondoc won. The LDP cannot withdraw their representative from the HRET after the tribunal has already reached
a decision. They cannot hold the same election since the issue has already become moot and academic. LDP is merely
changing their representative to change the outcome of the election. Camasura should be reinstated because his removal
was not due to a lawful or valid cause. Disloyalty to party is not a valid cause for termination of membership in the HRET.
Expulsion of Camasura violates his right to security of tenure.
**HRET is composed of 9 members. 3 members coming from the SC. 5 coming from the majority party (LDP). And 1 coming
from the minority.
Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution provides:
“Sec. 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole
judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of their respective members. Each Electoral
Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated by
the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be members of the Senate or House of Representatives, as the case may be,
who shall be chosen on the basis of proportional representation from the political parties and the parties or
organizations registered under the party list system represented therein. The senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall
be its Chairman.”
TEOFISTO GUINGONA VS NEPTALI GONZALES
After the May 11, 1992 elections, the senate was composed of 15 LDP senators, 5 NPC senators, 3 LAKAS-NUCD senators,
and 1 LP-PDP-LABAN senator. To suffice the requirement that each house must have 12 representatives in the CoA, the
parties agreed to use the traditional formula: (No. of Senators of a political party) x 12 seats) ÷ Total No. of Senators elected.
The results of such a formula would produce 7.5 members for LDP, 2.5 members for NPC, 1.5 members for LAKAS-NUCD,
and 0.5 member for LP-PDP-LABAN. Romulo, as the majority floor leader, nominated 8 senators from their party because
he rounded off 7.5 to 8 and that Taňada from LP-PDP-LABAN should represent the same party to the CoA. This is also
pursuant to the proposition compromise by Sen Tolentino who proposed that the elected members of the CoA should
consist of eight LDP, one LP-PDP-LABAN, two NPC and one LAKAS-NUCD. Guingona, a member of LAKAS-NUCD,
opposed the said compromise. He alleged that the compromise is against proportional representation.
ISSUE: Whether or not rounding off is allowed in determining a party’s representation in the CoA.
HELD: It is a fact accepted by all such parties that each of them is entitled to a fractional membership on the basis of the
rule on proportional representation of each of the political parties. A literal interpretation of Section 18 of Article VI of the
Constitution leads to no other manner of application. The problem is what to do with the fraction of .5 or 1/2 to which each
of the parties is entitled. The LDP majority in the Senate converted a fractional half membership into a whole membership
of one senator by adding one half or .5 to 7.5 to be able to elect Romulo. In so doing one other party’s fractional membership
was correspondingly reduced leaving the latter’s representation in the Commission on Appointments to less than their
proportional representation in the Senate. This is clearly a violation of Section 18 because it is no longer in compliance with
its mandate that membership in the Commission be based on the proportional representation of the political parties. The
election of Senator Romulo gave more representation to the LDP and reduced the representation of one political
party either the LAKAS NUCD or the NPC. A party should have at least 1 seat for every 2 duly elected senators-members
in the CoA. Where there are more than 2 parties in Senate, a party which has only one member senator cannot
constitutionally claim a seat. In order to resolve such, the parties may coalesce with each other in order to come up with
proportional representation especially since one party may have affiliations with the other party.

SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY ERMITA

In 2005, scandals involving anomalous transactions about the North Rail Project as well as the Garci tapes surfaced. This
prompted the Senate to conduct a public hearing to investigate the said anomalies particularly the alleged overpricing in the
NRP. The investigating Senate committee issued invitations to certain department heads and military officials to speak
before the committee as resource persons. Ermita submitted that he and some of the department heads cannot attend the
said hearing due to pressing matters that need immediate attention. AFP Chief of Staff Senga likewise sent a similar letter.
Drilon, the senate president, excepted the said requests for they were sent belatedly and arrangements were already made
and scheduled. Subsequently, GMA issued EO 464 which took effect immediately.
EO 464 basically prohibited Department heads, Senior officials of executive departments who in the judgment of the
department heads are covered by the executive privilege; Generals and flag officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines
and such other officers who in the judgment of the Chief of Staff are covered by the executive privilege; Philippine National
Police (PNP) officers with rank of chief superintendent or higher and such other officers who in the judgment of the Chief of
the PNP are covered by the executive privilege; Senior national security officials who in the judgment of the National Security
Adviser are covered by the executive privilege; and Such other officers as may be determined by the President, from
appearing in such hearings conducted by Congress without first securing the president’s approval.
The department heads and the military officers who were invited by the Senate committee then invoked EO 464 to except
themselves. Despite EO 464, the scheduled hearing proceeded with only 2 military personnel attending. For defying
President Arroyo’s order barring military personnel from testifying before legislative inquiries without her approval, Brig.
Gen. Gudani and Col. Balutan were relieved from their military posts and were made to face court martial proceedings. EO
464’s constitutionality was assailed for it is alleged that it infringes on the rights and duties of Congress to conduct
investigation in aid of legislation and conduct oversight functions in the implementation of laws.
ISSUE: Whether or not EO 464 is constitutional.
HELD: The SC ruled that EO 464 is constitutional in part. To determine the validity of the provisions of EO 464, the SC
sought to distinguish Section 21 from Section 22 of Art 6 of the 1987 Constitution. The Congress’ power of inquiry is
expressly recognized in Section 21 of Article VI of the Constitution. Although there is no provision in the Constitution
expressly investing either House of Congress with power to make investigations and exact testimony to the end that it may
exercise its legislative functions advisedly and effectively, such power is so far incidental to the legislative function as to be
implied. In other words, the power of inquiry – with process to enforce it – is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the
legislative function. A legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of information respecting the
conditions which the legislation is intended to affect or change; and where the legislative body does not itself possess the
requisite information – which is not infrequently true – recourse must be had to others who do possess it.
Section 22 on the other hand provides for the Question Hour. The Question Hour is closely related with the legislative power,
and it is precisely as a complement to or a supplement of the Legislative Inquiry. The appearance of the members of
Cabinet would be very, very essential not only in the application of check and balance but also, in effect, in aid of legislation.
Section 22 refers only to Question Hour, whereas, Section 21 would refer specifically to inquiries in aid of legislation, under
which anybody for that matter, may be summoned and if he refuses, he can be held in contempt of the House. A distinction
was thus made between inquiries in aid of legislation and the question hour. While attendance was meant to be
discretionary in the question hour, it was compulsory in inquiries in aid of legislation. Sections 21 and 22, therefore, while
closely related and complementary to each other, should not be considered as pertaining to the same power of
Congress. One specifically relates to the power to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation, the aim of which is to elicit
information that may be used for legislation, while the other pertains to the power to conduct a question hour, the objective
of which is to obtain information in pursuit of Congress’ oversight function. Ultimately, the power of Congress to compel the
appearance of executive officials under Section 21 and the lack of it under Section 22 find their basis in the principle of
separation of powers.
While the executive branch is a co-equal branch of the legislature, it cannot frustrate the power of Congress to legislate by
refusing to comply with its demands for information. When Congress exercises its power of inquiry, the only way for
department heads to exempt themselves therefrom is by a valid claim of privilege. They are not exempt by the mere fact
that they are department heads. Only one executive official may be exempted from this power — the President on whom
executive power is vested, hence, beyond the reach of Congress except through the power of impeachment. It is based
on her being the highest official of the executive branch, and the due respect accorded to a co-equal branch of government
which is sanctioned by a long-standing custom. The requirement then to secure presidential consent under Section 1,
limited as it is only to appearances in the question hour, is valid on its face. For under Section 22, Article VI of the
Constitution, the appearance of department heads in the question hour is discretionary on their part. Section 1 cannot,
however, be applied to appearances of department heads in inquiries in aid of legislation. Congress is not bound in such
instances to respect the refusal of the department head to appear in such inquiry, unless a valid claim of privilege is
subsequently made, either by the President herself or by the Executive Secretary.
When Congress merely seeks to be informed on how department heads are implementing the statutes which it has issued,
its right to such information is not as imperative as that of the President to whom, as Chief Executive, such department
heads must give a report of their performance as a matter of duty. In such instances, Section 22, in keeping with the
separation of powers, states that Congress may only request their appearance. Nonetheless, when the inquiry in which
Congress requires their appearance is ‘in aid of legislation’ under Section 21, the appearance is mandatory for the same
reasons stated in Arnault.
NOTES: The SC ruled that Section 1 and Section 2a are valid. The rest invalid.
On March 6, 2008, President Arroyo issued Memorandum Circular No. 151, revoking Executive Order No. 464 and
Memorandum Circular No. 108. She advised executive officials and employees to follow and abide by the Constitution,
existing laws and jurisprudence, including, among others, the case of Senate v. Ermita when they are invited to legislative
inquiries in aid of legislation.
RANDOLF DAVID VS PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO
In February 2006, due to the escape of some Magdalo members and the discovery of a plan (Oplan Hackle I) to assassinate
the president, then president Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (GMA) issued Presidential Proclamation 1017 (PP1017) and is to
be implemented by General Order No. 5 (GO 5). The said law was aimed to suppress lawlessness and the connivance of
extremists to bring down the government.
Pursuant to such PP, GMA cancelled all plans to celebrate EDSA I and at the same time revoked all permits issued for
rallies and other public organization/meeting. Notwithstanding the cancellation of their rally permit, Kilusang Mayo Uno
(KMU) head Randolf David proceeded to rally which led to his arrest.
Later that day, the Daily Tribune, which Cacho-Olivares is the editor, was raided by the CIDG and they seized and
confiscated anti-GMA articles and write ups. Later still, another known anti-GMA news agency (Malaya) was raided and
seized. On the same day, Beltran of Anakpawis, was also arrested. His arrest was however grounded on a warrant of arrest
issued way back in 1985 for his actions against Marcos. His supporters cannot visit him in jail because of the current
imposition of PP 1017 and GO 5.
In March, GMA issued PP 1021 which declared that the state of national emergency ceased to exist. David and some
opposition Congressmen averred that PP1017 is unconstitutional for it has no factual basis and it cannot be validly declared
by the president for such power is reposed in Congress. Also such declaration is actually a declaration of martial law.
Olivares-Cacho also averred that the emergency contemplated in the Constitution are those of natural calamities and that
such is an overbreadth. Petitioners claim that PP 1017 is an overbreadth because it encroaches upon protected and
unprotected rights. The Sol-Gen argued that the issue has become moot and academic by reason of the lifting of PP 1017
by virtue of the declaration of PP 1021. The Sol-Gen averred that PP 1017 is within the president’s calling out power, take
care power and take over power.
ISSUE: Whether or not PP 1017 and GO 5 is constitutional.
HELD: PP 1017 and its implementing GO are partly constitutional and partly unconstitutional.
The issue cannot be considered as moot and academic by reason of the lifting of the questioned PP. It is still in fact operative
because there are parties still affected due to the alleged violation of the said PP. Hence, the SC can take cognition of the
case at bar. The SC ruled that PP 1017 is constitutional in part and at the same time some provisions of which are
unconstitutional. The SC ruled in the following way;
Resolution by the SC on the Factual Basis of its declaration
The petitioners were not able to prove that GMA has no factual basis in issuing PP 1017 and GO 5. A reading of the Solicitor
General’s Consolidated Comment and Memorandum shows a detailed narration of the events leading to the issuance of
PP 1017, with supporting reports forming part of the records. Mentioned are the escape of the Magdalo Group, their
audacious threat of the Magdalo D-Day, the defections in the military, particularly in the Philippine Marines, and the
reproving statements from the communist leaders. There was also the Minutes of the Intelligence Report and Security Group
of the Philippine Army showing the growing alliance between the NPA and the military. Petitioners presented nothing to
refute such events. Thus, absent any contrary allegations, the Court is convinced that the President was justified in issuing
PP 1017 calling for military aid. Indeed, judging the seriousness of the incidents, GMA was not expected to simply fold her
arms and do nothing to prevent or suppress what she believed was lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. However, the
exercise of such power or duty must not stifle liberty.
Resolution by the SC on the Overbreadth Theory
First and foremost, the overbreadth doctrine is an analytical tool developed for testing ‘on their faces’ statutes in free speech
cases. The 7 consolidated cases at bar are not primarily ‘freedom of speech’ cases. Also, a plain reading of PP 1017 shows
that it is not primarily directed to speech or even speech-related conduct. It is actually a call upon the AFP to prevent or
suppress all forms of lawless violence. Moreover, the overbreadth doctrine is not intended for testing the validity of a law
that ‘reflects legitimate state interest in maintaining comprehensive control over harmful, constitutionally unprotected
conduct.’ Undoubtedly, lawless violence, insurrection and rebellion are considered ‘harmful’ and ‘constitutionally
unprotected conduct.’ Thus, claims of facial overbreadth are entertained in cases involving statutes which, by their terms,
seek to regulate only ‘spoken words’ and again, that ‘overbreadth claims, if entertained at all, have been curtailed when
invoked against ordinary criminal laws that are sought to be applied to protected conduct.’ Here, the incontrovertible fact
remains that PP 1017 pertains to a spectrum of conduct, not free speech, which is manifestly subject to state regulation.
Resolution by the SC on the Calling Out Power Doctrine
On the basis of Sec 17, Art 7 of the Constitution, GMA declared PP 1017. The SC considered the President’s ‘calling-out’
power as a discretionary power solely vested in his wisdom, it stressed that ‘this does not prevent an examination of whether
such power was exercised within permissible constitutional limits or whether it was exercised in a manner constituting grave
abuse of discretion. The SC ruled that GMA has validly declared PP 1017 for the Constitution grants the President, as
Commander-in-Chief, a ‘sequence’ of graduated powers. From the most to the least benign, these are: the calling-out
power, the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, and the power to declare Martial Law. The only
criterion for the exercise of the calling-out power is that ‘whenever it becomes necessary,’ the President may call the armed
forces ‘to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion.’ And such criterion has been met.
Resolution by the SC on the Take Care Doctrine
Pursuant to the 2nd sentence of Sec 17, Art 7 of the Constitution (He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.) the
president declared PP 1017. David et al averred that PP 1017 however violated Sec 1, Art 6 of the Constitution for it
arrogated legislative power to the President. Such power is vested in Congress. They assail the clause ‘to enforce obedience
to all the laws and to all decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my direction.’ The SC noted
that such provision is similar to the power that granted former President Marcos legislative powers (as provided in PP
1081). The SC ruled that the assailed PP 1017 is unconstitutional insofar as it grants GMA the authority to promulgate
‘decrees.’ Legislative power is peculiarly within the province of the Legislature. Sec 1, Article 6 categorically states that
‘[t]he legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House of
Representatives.’ To be sure, neither Martial Law nor a state of rebellion nor a state of emergency can justify GMA’[s
exercise of legislative power by issuing decrees. The president can only “take care” of the carrying out of laws but cannot
create or enact laws.
Resolution by the SC on the Take Over Power Doctrine
The president cannot validly order the taking over of private corporations or institutions such as the Daily Tribune without
any authority from Congress. On the other hand, the word emergency contemplated in the constitution is not limited to
natural calamities but rather it also includes rebellion. The SC made a distinction; the president can declare the state of
national emergency but her exercise of emergency powers does not come automatically after it for such exercise needs
authority from Congress. The authority from Congress must be based on the following:
(1) There must be a war or other emergency.
(2) The delegation must be for a limited period only.
(3) The delegation must be subject to such restrictions as the Congress may prescribe.
(4) The emergency powers must be exercised to carry out a national policy declared by Congress.
Resolution by the SC on the Issue that PP 1017 is a Martial Law Declaration
The SC ruled that PP 1017 is not a Martial Law declaration and is not tantamount to it. It is a valid exercise of the calling
out power of the president by the president.

ARTURO TOLENTINO VS SECRETARY OF FINANCE

Arturo Tolentino et al are questioning the constitutionality of RA 7716 otherwise known as the Expanded Value Added Tax
(EVAT) Law. Tolentino averred that this revenue bill did not exclusively originate from the House of Representatives as
required by Section 24, Article 6 of the Constitution. Even though RA 7716 originated as HB 11197 and that it passed the 3
readings in the HoR, the same did not complete the 3 readings in Senate for after the 1st reading it was referred to the
Senate Ways & Means Committee thereafter Senate passed its own version known as Senate Bill 1630. Tolentino averred
that what Senate could have done is amend HB 11197 by striking out its text and substituting it with the text of SB 1630 in
that way “the bill remains a House Bill and the Senate version just becomes the text (only the text) of the HB”. (It’s
ironic however to note that Tolentino and co-petitioner Raul Roco even signed the said Senate Bill.)
ISSUE: Whether or not the EVAT law is procedurally infirm.
HELD: No. By a 9-6 vote, the Supreme Court rejected the challenge, holding that such consolidation was consistent with
the power of the Senate to propose or concur with amendments to the version originated in the HoR. What the Constitution
simply means, according to the 9 justices, is that the initiative must come from the HoR. Note also that there were several
instances before where Senate passed its own version rather than having the HoR version as far as revenue and other
such bills are concerned. This practice of amendment by substitution has always been accepted. The proposition of
Tolentino concerns a mere matter of form. There is no showing that it would make a significant difference if Senate were to
adopt his over what has been done.
JEAN ARNAULT VS NAZARENO
This case arose from the legislative inquiry into the acquisition by the Philippine Government of the Buenavista and
Tambobong estates sometime in 1949. Among the witnesses called to be examined by the special committee created by a
Senate resolution was Jean L. Arnault, a lawyer who delivered a partial of the purchase price to a representative of the
vendor. During the Senate investigation, Arnault refused to reveal the identity of said representative, at the same time
invoking his constitutional right against self-incrimination. The Senate adopted a resolution committing Arnault to the custody
of the Sergeant-at-Arms and imprisoned “until he shall have purged the contempt by revealing to the Senate . . . the name
of the person to whom he gave the P440,000, as well as answer other pertinent questions in connection therewith.” Arnault
petitioned for a writ of Habeas Corpus
ISSUE: Can the senate impose penalty against those who refuse to answer its questions in a congressional hearing in aid
of legislation.
HELD: It is the inherent right of the Senate to impose penalty in carrying out their duty to conduct inquiry in aid of legislation.
But it must be herein established that a witness who refuses to answer a query by the Committee may be detained during
the term of the members imposing said penalty but the detention should not be too long as to violate the witness’ right to
due process of law.

JOSE BENGZON, JR. VS SENATE BLUE RIBBON COMMITTEE

It was alleged that Benjamin “Kokoy” Romualdez and his wife together with the Marcoses unlawfully and unjustly enriched
themselves at the expense of the Filipino people. That they obtained with the help of the Bengzon Law Office and Ricardo
Lopa – Cory’s brother in law, among others, control over some of the biggest business enterprises in the country including
MERALCO, PCI Bank, Shell Philippines and Benguet Consolidated Mining Corporation.
Senator Juan Ponce Enrile subsequently delivered a privilege speech alleging that Lopa took over various government
owned corporations which is in violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Contained in the speech is a motion to
investigate on the matter. The motion was referred to the Committee on Accountability of Public Officers or the Blue Ribbon
Committee. After committee hearing, Lopa refused to testify before the committee for it may unduly prejudice a pending civil
case against him. Bengzon likewise refused invoking his right to due process. Lopa however sent a letter to Enrile
categorically denying his allegations and that his allegations are baseless and malicious.
Enrile subsequently took advantage of the Senate’s privilege hour upon which he insisted to have an inquiry regarding the
matter. The SBRC rejected Lopa’s and Bengzon’s plea.
Claiming that the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee is poised to subpoena them and require their attendance and testimony
in proceedings before the Committee, in excess of its jurisdiction and legislative purpose, in clear and blatant disregard of
their constitutional rights, and to their grave and irreparable damage, prejudice and injury, and that there is no appeal nor
any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, Bengzon et al filed a petition for prohibition with
a prayer for temporary restraining order and/or injunctive relief against the SBRC.
ISSUE: Whether or not the inquiry sought by the SBRC be granted.
HELD: No, the inquiry cannot be given due course. The speech of Enrile contained no suggestion of contemplated
legislation; he merely called upon the Senate to look into a possible violation of Sec. 5 of RA No. 3019, otherwise known as
“The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.” In other words, the purpose of the inquiry to be conducted by the Blue Ribbon
Committee was to find out whether or not the relatives of Cory, particularly Lopa, had violated the law in connection with
the alleged sale of the 36 or 39 corporations belonging to Kokoy to the Lopa Group. There appears to be, therefore, no
intended legislation involved. Hence, the contemplated inquiry by the SBRC is not really “in aid of legislation” because it is
not related to a purpose within the jurisdiction of Congress, since the aim of the investigation is to find out whether or not
the relatives of the President or Mr. Ricardo Lopa had violated Section 5 of RA No. 3019, the “Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act”, a matter that appears more within the province of the courts rather than of the legislature. Besides, the Court
may take judicial notice that Mr. Ricardo Lopa died during the pendency of this case.
MARIA CAROLINA ARAULLO VS BENIGNO AQUINO III
When President Benigno Aquino III took office, his administration noticed the sluggish growth of the economy. The World
Bank advised that the economy needed a stimulus plan. Budget Secretary Florencio “Butch” Abad then came up with a
program called the Disbursement Acceleration Program (DAP).
The DAP was seen as a remedy to speed up the funding of government projects. DAP enables the Executive to realign
funds from slow moving projects to priority projects instead of waiting for next year’s appropriation. So what happens under
the DAP was that if a certain government project is being undertaken slowly by a certain executive agency, the funds allotted
therefor will be withdrawn by the Executive. Once withdrawn, these funds are declared as “savings” by the Executive and
said funds will then be reallotted to other priority projects. The DAP program did work to stimulate the economy as economic
growth was in fact reported and portion of such growth was attributed to the DAP (as noted by the Supreme Court).
Other sources of the DAP include the unprogrammed funds from the General Appropriations Act (GAA). Unprogrammed
funds are standby appropriations made by Congress in the GAA.
Meanwhile, in September 2013, Senator Jinggoy Estrada made an exposé claiming that he, and other Senators, received
Php50M from the President as an incentive for voting in favor of the impeachment of then Chief Justice Renato Corona.
Secretary Abad claimed that the money was taken from the DAP but was disbursed upon the request of the Senators.
This apparently opened a can of worms as it turns out that the DAP does not only realign funds within the Executive. It turns
out that some non-Executive projects were also funded; to name a few: Php1.5B for the CPLA (Cordillera People’s
Liberation Army), Php1.8B for the MNLF (Moro National Liberation Front), P700M for the Quezon Province, P50-P100M for
certain Senators each, P10B for Relocation Projects, etc.
This prompted Maria Carolina Araullo, Chairperson of the Bagong Alyansang Makabayan, and several other concerned
citizens to file various petitions with the Supreme Court questioning the validity of the DAP. Among their contentions was:
DAP is unconstitutional because it violates the constitutional rule which provides that “no money shall be paid out of the
Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law.”
Secretary Abad argued that the DAP is based on certain laws particularly the GAA (savings and augmentation provisions
thereof), Sec. 25(5), Art. VI of the Constitution (power of the President to augment), Secs. 38 and 49 of Executive Order
292 (power of the President to suspend expenditures and authority to use savings, respectively).
Issues:
I. Whether or not the DAP violates the principle “no money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an
appropriation made by law” (Sec. 29(1), Art. VI, Constitution).
II. Whether or not the DAP realignments can be considered as impoundments by the executive.
III. Whether or not the DAP realignments/transfers are constitutional.
IV. Whether or not the sourcing of unprogrammed funds to the DAP is constitutional.
V. Whether or not the Doctrine of Operative Fact is applicable.
HELD:
I. No, the DAP did not violate Section 29(1), Art. VI of the Constitution. DAP was merely a program by the Executive and is
not a fund nor is it an appropriation. It is a program for prioritizing government spending. As such, it did not violate the
Constitutional provision cited in Section 29(1), Art. VI of the Constitution. In DAP no additional funds were withdrawn from
the Treasury otherwise, an appropriation made by law would have been required. Funds, which were already appropriated
for by the GAA, were merely being realigned via the DAP.
II. No, there is no executive impoundment in the DAP. Impoundment of funds refers to the President’s power to refuse to
spend appropriations or to retain or deduct appropriations for whatever reason. Impoundment is actually prohibited by the
GAA unless there will be an unmanageable national government budget deficit (which did not happen). Nevertheless,
there’s no impoundment in the case at bar because what’s involved in the DAP was the transfer of funds.
III. No, the transfers made through the DAP were unconstitutional. It is true that the President (and even the heads of the
other branches of the government) are allowed by the Constitution to make realignment of funds, however, such transfer or
realignment should only be made “within their respective offices”. Thus, no cross-border transfers/augmentations may be
allowed. But under the DAP, this was violated because funds appropriated by the GAA for the Executive were being
transferred to the Legislative and other non-Executive agencies.
Further, transfers “within their respective offices” also contemplate realignment of funds to an existing project in the GAA.
Under the DAP, even though some projects were within the Executive, these projects are non-existent insofar as the GAA
is concerned because no funds were appropriated to them in the GAA. Although some of these projects may be legitimate,
they are still non-existent under the GAA because they were not provided for by the GAA. As such, transfer to such projects
is unconstitutional and is without legal basis.
On the issue of what are “savings”
These DAP transfers are not “savings” contrary to what was being declared by the Executive. Under the definition of
“savings” in the GAA, savings only occur, among other instances, when there is an excess in the funding of a certain project
once it is completed, finally discontinued, or finally abandoned. The GAA does not refer to “savings” as funds withdrawn
from a slow moving project. Thus, since the statutory definition of savings was not complied with under the DAP, there is
no basis at all for the transfers. Further, savings should only be declared at the end of the fiscal year. But under the DAP,
funds are already being withdrawn from certain projects in the middle of the year and then being declared as “savings” by
the Executive particularly by the DBM.
IV. No. Unprogrammed funds from the GAA cannot be used as money source for the DAP because under the law, such
funds may only be used if there is a certification from the National Treasurer to the effect that the revenue collections have
exceeded the revenue targets. In this case, no such certification was secured before unprogrammed funds were used.
V. Yes. The Doctrine of Operative Fact, which recognizes the legal effects of an act prior to it being declared as
unconstitutional by the Supreme Court, is applicable. The DAP has definitely helped stimulate the economy. It has funded
numerous projects. If the Executive is ordered to reverse all actions under the DAP, then it may cause more harm than
good. The DAP effects can no longer be undone. The beneficiaries of the DAP cannot be asked to return what they received
especially so that they relied on the validity of the DAP. However, the Doctrine of Operative Fact may not be applicable to
the authors, implementers, and proponents of the DAP if it is so found in the appropriate tribunals (civil, criminal, or
administrative) that they have not acted in good faith.

PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION VS SALVADOR ENRIQUEZ

This is a consolidation of cases which sought to question the veto authority of the president involving the General
Appropriations Bill of 1994 as well as the constitutionality of the pork barrel. The Philippine Constitution Association
(PHILCONSA) questions the countrywide development fund. PHILCONSA said that Congress can only allocate funds but
they cannot specify the items as to which those funds would be applied for since that is already the function of the executive.
In G.R. No. 113766, after the vetoing by the president of some provisions of the GAB of 1994, neither house of congress
took steps to override the veto. Instead, Senators Wigberto Tañada and Alberto Romulo sought the issuance of the writs of
prohibition and mandamus against Executive Secretary Teofisto Guingona et al. Tañada et al contest the constitutionality
of: (1) the veto on four special provisions added to items in the GAB of 1994 for the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP)
and the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH); and (2) the conditions imposed by the President in the
implementation of certain appropriations for the CAFGU’s, the DPWH, and the National Housing Authority (NHA).
ISSUE: Whether or not the President’s veto is valid.
HELD: In the PHILCONSA petition, the SC ruled that Congress acted within its power and that the CDF is constitutional. In
the Tañada petitions the SC dismissed the other petitions and granted the others.
Veto on special provisions
The president did his veto with certain conditions and compliant to the ruling in Gonzales vs Macaraig. The president
particularly vetoed the debt reduction scheme in the GAA of 1994 commenting that the scheme is already taken cared of
by other legislation and may be more properly addressed by revising the debt policy. He, however did not delete the
P86,323,438,000.00 appropriation therefor. Tañada et al averred that the president cannot validly veto that provision w/o
vetoing the amount allotted therefor. The veto of the president herein is sustained for the vetoed provision is considered
“inappropriate”; in fact the Sc found that such provision if not vetoed would in effect repeal the Foreign Borrowing Act making
the legislation as a log-rolling legislation.
Veto of provisions for revolving funds of SUCs
The appropriation for State Universities and Colleges (SUC’s), the President vetoed special provisions which authorize the
use of income and the creation, operation and maintenance of revolving funds was likewise vetoed. The reason for the veto
is that there were already funds allotted for the same in the National expenditure Program. Tañada et al claimed this as
unconstitutional. The SC ruled that the veto is valid for it is in compliant to the “One Fund Policy” – it avoided double funding
and redundancy.
Veto of provision on 70% (administrative)/30% (contract) ratio for road maintenance
The President vetoed this provision on the basis that it may result to a breach of contractual obligations. The funds if allotted
may result to abandonment of some existing contracts. The SC ruled that this Special Provision in question is not an
inappropriate provision which can be the subject of a veto. It is not alien to the appropriation for road maintenance, and on
the other hand, it specifies how the said item shall be expended – 70% by administrative and 30% by contract. The 1987
Constitution allows the addition by Congress of special provisions, conditions to items in an expenditure bill, which cannot
be vetoed separately from the items to which they relate so long as they are “appropriate” in the budgetary sense. The veto
herein is then not valid.
Veto of provision on prior approval of Congress for purchase of military equipment
As reason for the veto, the President stated that the said condition and prohibition violate the Constitutional mandate of
non-impairment of contractual obligations, and if allowed, “shall effectively alter the original intent of the AFP Modernization
Fund to cover all military equipment deemed necessary to modernize the AFP”. The SC affirmed the veto. Any provision
blocking an administrative action in implementing a law or requiring legislative approval of executive acts must be
incorporated in a separate and substantive bill. Therefore, being “inappropriate” provisions.
Veto of provision on use of savings to augment AFP pension funds
According to the President, the grant of retirement and separation benefits should be covered by direct appropriations
specifically approved for the purpose pursuant to Section 29(1) of Article VI of the Constitution. Moreover, he stated that
the authority to use savings is lodged in the officials enumerated in Section 25(5) of Article VI of the Constitution. The SC
retained the veto per reasons provided by the president.
Condition on the deactivation of the CAFGU’s
Congress appropriated compensation for the CAFGU’s including the payment of separation benefits. The President
declared in his Veto Message that the implementation of this Special Provision to the item on the CAFGU’s shall be subject
to prior Presidential approval pursuant to P.D. No. 1597 and R.A. No. 6758. The SC ruled to retain the veto per reasons
provided by the president. Further, if this provision is allowed the it would only lead to the repeal of said existing laws.
Conditions on the appropriation for the Supreme Court, etc
In his veto message: “The said condition is consistent with the Constitutional injunction prescribed under Section 8, Article
IX-B of the Constitutional which states that ‘no elective or appointive public officer or employee shall receive additional,
double, or indirect compensation unless specifically authorized by law.’ I am, therefore, confident that the heads of the said
offices shall maintain fidelity to the law and faithfully adhere to the well-established principle on compensation
standardization. Tañada et al claim that the conditions imposed by the President violated the independence and fiscal
autonomy of the Supreme court, the Ombudsman, the COA and the CHR. The SC sustained the veto: In the first place, the
conditions questioned by petitioners were placed in the GAB by Congress itself, not by the President. The Veto Message
merely highlighted the Constitutional mandate that additional or indirect compensation can only be given pursuant to law.
In the second place, such statements are mere reminders that the disbursements of appropriations must be made in
accordance with law. Such statements may, at worse, be treated as superfluities.
Pork Barrel Constitutional
The pork barrel makes the unequal equal. The Congressmen, being representatives of their local districts know more about
the problems in their constituents areas than the national government or the president for that matter. Hence, with that
knowledge, the Congressmen are in a better position to recommend as to where funds should be allocated.