[GR Nos.

132875-76, Feb 03, 2000]

PEOPLE v. ROMEO G. JALOSJOS
FACTS:
Congressman ROMEO JALOJOS was accused and convicted for statutory rape and acts of lasciviousness.
The accused-appellant filed a Motion to be Allowed to Discharge the Duties of Congressman, on the
contention that;
 Being voted via popular vote, he is obligated to do his functions, which the Government should
allow as it is the “mandate of the sovereign will”
ISSUES:

 W/N, acting a representative of the people, he is privileged from arrest and confinement?
HELD / RATIO:
NO. Immunity from arrest xxx arises from the provisions of the Constitution;
 S.15, Art. VI, 1935 – xxx members of the House of Representatives shall in all cases except treason,
felony and breach of peace, be privilege from arrest xxx
 S.9, Art. VII, 1973 (1987) – xxx in all offenses punishable by not more than six years imprisonment,
be privileged from arrest during his attendance at its sessions xxx.
The former covers the broad coverage of felony, and the latter limits the privilege to crimes punishable of
less than 6 years imprisonment. A Congressman is NOT immune from arrest under Title 11 of the Penal
Code, nor did the accused provide substantial reason to be exempted from the rule.
One rational behind confinement is public self-defence; society must defend itself and it also serves as a
warning to others. “It is the injury to the public which State action seeks to redress.”
All top officials of Government - executive, legislative, and judicial are subject to the majesty of law;
Privilege has to be granted by law, not inferred from the duties of a position. Lawful arrest and
confinement are germane to the purposes of the law (redress public injury) and apply to all those
belonging to the same class. The functions and duties of the office are not substantial distinctions which
lift him from the class of prisoners interrupted in their freedom and restricted in liberty of movement.
We, therefore, find that election to the position of Congressman is not a reasonable classification in
criminal law enforcement.
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CASE LAW;

Accused-appellant's reliance on the ruling in Aguinaldo v. Santos, which states, inter alia, that;

“The Court should never remove a public officer for acts done prior to his present term of office. To do otherwise
would be to deprive the people of their right to elect their officers xxx”

It can be readily seen in the above-quoted ruling that the Aguinaldo case involves the administrative removal of a
public officer for acts done prior to his present term of office. It does NOT apply to imprisonment arising from the
enforcement of criminal law. Moreover, in the same way that preventive suspension is not removal, confinement
pending appeal is not removal. He remains a congressman unless expelled by Congress or, otherwise, disqualified.