Vidyā and Avidyā in the Īśa Upaniṣad

Author(s): Richard H. Jones

Source: Philosophy East and West, Vol. 31, No. 1 (Jan., 1981), pp. 79-87
Published by: University of Hawai'i Press
Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/1399068
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Richard H. Jones Vidya and avidya in the Isa Upanisad

Translating Isa Upanisad 9-11 is not difficult to do:

9 They enter blind darkness who worship nescience
(avidyi), and into even (iva) greater darkness than that
[enter they] who delight in knowledge (vidya).
10 Other indeed, they say, than knowledge; other, they
say, than nescience. Thus we have heard from the
wise ones who have announced it to us.
11 Knowledge and nescience: who knows (veda) both
together, having crossed over death (mrtyum ttrtvi)
by means of nescience (avidyayd), he reaches
immortality (amrtam) by means of knowledge (vidyaya).

Understanding this passage, however, is difficult. "Vidya" in the Upanisads

is usually taken to mean in every instance knowledge of Brahman or the self
(itman), that is, final and unalterable knowledge of reality, unless it is explicitly
connected to a more limited topic. "Avidya" in Indian thought in general
usually means either (1) absence of knowledge, that is, ignorance of some
doctrine or fact (as is the most natural interpretation of "avidya" in Chdndogya
Upanisad I.1.10), or (2) an active falsification impeding vidyi (as in Yoga Sitra
11.5 or Anguttara Nikiya IV.52).1 It has been variously translated as "igno-
rance," "blindness," "unwisdom," "no-knowledge," "non-knowledge," "un-
knowledge," and "nescience"-all with negative connotations. But employing
these definitions here leads only to problems: How can knowledge of Brahman
lead to darkness (v. 9)? Why is the result of nescience needed too (v. 11)? Why
can we not be satisfied with the result of knowledge alone? Letting "vidyd"
mean everyday knowledge (thereby coming close to the second variety of
avidya) does no better: How does this mundane knowledge effect immortality?
And again, why is the result of nescience needed?
For Samkara, vidyi here cannot be brahmavidya since knowledge of Brahman
cannot lead to any darkness, let alone a greater darkness than that connected
with nescience. In his commentaries upon these verses, he equates avidyi with
rituals (karman), as does Ramanuja, and vidya only with knowledge of the
gods (devas).2 The immortality obtained is not true immortality; it is only
becoming one with these gods. Samkara has to give different meanings to
"nescience," "knowledge," and "immortality" to reconcile this passage with
his nondualistic system; but equating avidya with the Vedic sense of karman
does show that he saw a positive, if limited, intent of avidyi here.
Contemporary commentators have tried other ploys to show that both
knowledge and nescience alone are insufficient. For example, Paul Thieme
sees ignorance serving a purpose too: for living our mortal lives, we need to
acknowledge separateness, as it were.3 This would be the only instance in the
Upanisads which stressed needing separation. Also this gives a new meaning
to "avidyd." Nescience is not simply making distinctions. The "wise ones"

Richard H. Jones is a graduate student at Columbia University, New York.

Philosophy East and West 31, no. 1 (January, 1981). C by The University Press of Hawaii. All rights reserved.

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80 Jones

who know how to communicate needed to make (linguistic) distinctions.

tinctions per se are not nescience, but the misreading of their status, tha
being unaware of a reality behind the surface appearances or taking the
pearances as the final reality. Vidya, to use the Advaitic explanation, sho
distinctions to be similar in status to the images in dreams: they occur,
are not indicative of reality. No endorsement of the nescience-governed l
a life without vidya--occurs anywhere else in Indian literature. Nor do
Thieme's interpretation explain how knowledge leads to darkness, unless s
an endorsement is to be implied.
In the standard English translations of the Upanisads, the problems of unde
standing this passage are indicated but not resolved. Thus Robert Hu
translates "avidya" in verse 9 as "ignorance" (his customary translation
the term), but in verses 10 and 11 he switches to "non-knowledge" as t
translation.4 This clearly suggests that he thinks the usual sense of the te
is not intended. Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan and Charles Moore leave the tra
lation unaltered.5
In general, the established understandings of this passage by both West
and Indian scholars can be summarized along these lines: The problems w
verse 9 are neutralized in the following ways: (1) by construing "vidya
"brahmavidya" and "iva" (following Sarhkara) as "as it were" (that is, th
who are attached to brahmavidya enter a realm which only seems like gre
darkness to someone within the realm of nescience), or (2) by rendering "vidy
as "sophistry" (that is, an erroneous "knowledge" of some kind). If "vid
is meant to denote any sort of sophistry, then "iva" need not be interpre
in the preceding manner: for those persons who are aware of their own ig
rance of something may not go as far wrong as those who are actually wr
but think they are correct. Still, how this flawed "knowledge" is to be differ
entiated from avidyi is never explained.6 The Katha Upanisad 1.2.5 (as w
as Mundaka Up. 1.2.8, MaitrT Up. VII.9) refers to those people who thin
themselves to be wise (dhfra) and learned (pandita), but it does not expli
the role of avidya or this sophistry in attaining immortality. (3) Anoth
maneuver is to maintain that the sense of "vidya" changes from verse 9
verse 11 (from sophistry to brahmavidyi). This sounds like an ad hoc reaction
but may be correct. (4) Finally, this passage is sometimes taken as a conde
nation of one-sidedness, as the first half of the Isa can also be understood
need both brahmavidyd and everyday knowledge or works (avidyd)-know
edge both of the one and the many-to function properly. Again, this wo
go directly against the other strands of Upanisadic thought.
In addition to problems already mentioned, the stumbling block for
these interpretations is verse 11. When "crossing over death" (mrtyum ttrtvi
was discussed in the Brhaddranyaka Upanisad (1.3.11-16), it was conside
to be something positive occurring as part of a process of transformat
accomplished by knowledge, as is true too in the images contained in Chindog

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81

Upanisad VIII. 1.3 and VIII.4.1,2. That is to say, there is an at least temporary
transcendence, overcoming, or escape from the power of death. Here, crossing
death cannot be equivalent to gaining immortality, or else why would both
be mentioned and connected with different operations (that of avidya and of
vidya); but it is part of the process of gaining immortality. Within the context
of Upanisadic thought, how could ignorance, the falsification hiding knowl-
edge, or acknowledging apparent separateness succeed in achieving this? If
"crossing over death" is meant to convey a continuation of the process of
rebirth by means of a "redeath" (that is, crossing over the intermediate state
to a new rebirth), then such nescience would certainly accomplish this. But
how is it to be coupled with knowledge in reaching immortality? Why would
such nescience be needed? And why is "crossing over death" said to be acom-
plished by destruction (vinasa) in verse 14, if the continuance of the cycle of
rebirths is intended?
Verse 11 cannot mean simply that we need to know two facts-that by
nescience the cycle of rebirths continues and that by knowledge one attains
immortality. This is so because the verse tells how one person reaches im-
mortality: (1) crossing over (tTrtva, in form an indeclinable participle) mortality
by means of nescience (avidyayi, the instrumental case), he reaches (asnute,
finite verbal form) immortality by means of knowledge (vidyaya, instrumental
again). If two isolated processes were merely being mentioned, the verbs would
be of the same grammatical form, not of forms connecting them. Knowing
(veda) vidya and avidya may mean: (1) knowing their nature, (2) controlling
them, or (3) knowing what is knowledge and what is not; but nevertheless,
the verse says death is crossed not by knowledge of avidya, but by avidyi itself,
and immortality is gained by knowledge, not knowledge of knowledge.
I would now like to advance an alternative possibility based upon the follow-
ing premises: vidyi is brahmavidya throughout the passage and of utmost
importance; escaping the cycle of rebirths and attaining immortality is the
goal, as it is in the rest of the Upanisads; "crossing over death" is positive;
and the ITa means what it says in claiming that both knowledge and nescience
are necessary.7
This alternative interpretation is suggested by the works of a middle Eastern
Christian Neo-Platonist. In De mystica theologia, Dionysius the Pseudo-
Areopagite spoke of a "divine ignorance" (Greek, agnosia), whereby we
"un-know" the normal content of our awareness in order that an awareness
of God may flow in.8 In Dionysius' words, we need to unknow "this" and
"that," thereby permitting God's "ray of darkness" to enter in. To apply
this to the IJa, we need to empty ourselves of all dualistic understanding (the
a-vidya phase), and to be filled by the knowledge of Brahman (the vidyd phase).
Each phase has its unique result, and both are required. Emptying does not
itself achieve immortality, and if we become attached to the knowledge without
seeing the necessary role avidya plays, we shall end up in greater darkness:

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82 Jones

without the emptying phase, the knowledge would only add to the duali
clutter in our minds, if it is possible at all, and thus would not be the require
knowledge. Unknowing (emptying the mind of all normal content) and knowl
edge (the positive replacement) lead to immortality only together.
The key to the justification of this interpretation lies in Brhaddrany
Upanisad IV.4. That there is a close relationship between the whole of t
early Upanisad and the later Isa is undeniable: both belong to the Satap
Brihmana; two of the Isa's seventeen or eighteen verses (verses 12, 15)
found in the Brhadiranyaka (IV.4.10 and V.15.1 respectively) and a thir
(verse 3) is very close (to IV.4.11). No other such correlation can be mad
between the Isa and another Upanisad.
In the Brhaddra.nyaka Upanisad IV.4.1-2, an instance of the emptying
phase is discussed. When the inner self turns away from sense-experie
at death, there is an unknowing or nondistinguishing of forms (arupajn
The next verses make it clear that the compound "a-rupa-jna" is not to
interpreted to mean "knowing the formless" (arupa): the dying person
becoming one (ekT-bhavati); he cannot sense, think, or understand. He
becoming one with understanding (vijnana) itself, and consequently one w
Brahman (IV.4.4-5). Upon death, one throws away this body and dis
ignorance (aviddlavidya) (IV.4.3-4). Thereupon one's knowledge determin
what occurs (in conjunction with one's previous actions for those perso
without vidya). If a dead person does not know Brahman, he is returne
to the cycle of rebirths; he is not tranquil and his desires create a n
rebirth (a reemergence from Brahman), just as on a larger scale desire (ka
was a creative force for the emergence of the entire cosmos in some Ved
speculation. But knowers of Brahman (brahmavidas) are not reborn (IV.4
Those who know Brahman before death become immortal, while the de
truction (vinasti) is great for those who do not (IV.4.14), that is, the latt
are reembodied out of the merging with Brahman. Brahman can only b
seen by the mind because there is no diversity there: he goes from dea
to death who sees diversity (IV.4.19). This is to say, an unknowing of diversit
is necessary for the filling by the knowledge of Brahman. At death, for such
person there is immortality, not rebirth. Having understood (vijniya) Brahma
a wise Brahmana cultivates discernment (prajhi) (IV.4.21) for, as the disco
ends, "who knows thus (ya evam veda) becomes (bhavati) fearless Brahma
(IV.4.25).
That this passage in the Brhaddranyaka is relevant to vidyi and avidyi
the Isa may be revealed by the fact that verse 9 of the Isa is found he
(Brhaddranyaka Up. IV.4.10). More particularly, this is one of only thr
occurrences of "avidya" in the whole Brhadiranyaka (the others are in IV
and IV.4.4), although it does employ other forms of the prefix "a-" plus
root "vid" to indicate the lack of knowledge elsewhere. Thus perhaps a c
nection of the two ideas was noticed.

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83

This section of the Brhadaranyaka also helps clarify the passage following
Isa Up. 9-11:
12 They enter blind darkness who worship destruction
(asambhuti), and into even greater darkness than that
[enter they] who delight in merging (sambhuti).
13 Other indeed, they say, than merging (sambhava); other,
they say, than destruction (asambhava). Thus we have
heard from the wise ones who have announced it to us.
14 Merging and destruction (vindaa): who knows (veda)
both together, having crossed over death by means of
destruction, he reaches immortality by means of merging.

The passage is exactly the same as 9-11, except for the substitutions for
"vidya" and "avidyd." "Sambhuti" is sometimes translated as "rebirth" and
"asambhuti" as "lack of rebirth." 10 But the same sort of problems as with
verses 9-1 1 recur: Why do those who worship a lack of rebirths enter darkness?
Is that not the objective?1" And again why are both rebirth and a lack of
rebirths necessary? The primary meaning of "sam-" affixed to the root "bhu"
is "coming together," "meeting," or "merging." "Vindsa" in verse 14 makes
clear the intended meaning of "asambhfiti" and "asambhava": the dissolution
of the individual as a separate unit. "Sambhfiti" should be construed as
"merging with Brahman," if the treatment in Brhadara.nyaka Up. IV.4.14 of
destruction (vinasti) of the person as a unit and the subsequent becoming what
we know is a trustworthy guide: merging with Brahman occurs routinely in
dreamless sleep and after death, but only one who knows Brahman remains
immortal, and conversely remaining merged with Brahman is the only route of
becoming open to one who knows.
The Brhadara.nyaka Up. IV.4 and Isa Up. 12-14 deal with the unknowing of
forms (arupajha/avidya) which occurs naturally at death with the dissolution
of the bodily unit. But to bring knowledge to this event, we would need to see
no diversity beforehand. The Brhadara.nyaka Up. IV.4.19 claims we should
see no diversity here (iha, in this world), and verse 14 confirms that knowledge
is possible here (iha). Thus an unknowing of diversity or an emptying of this
or that is possible in this life too.
With all this in mind, we can make a structural study of verses 9-14 of the
Isa. Looking at the structure of 9-11 and 12-14, we see that vidyi is correlated
with sambhuiti (sambhava), and avidya with asambhuti (asambhava, vinasa).
In addition, by looking at verses 11 and 14, we see that "crossing death" is
accomplished by nescience and dissolution, while immortality is achieved by
knowledge and becoming/merging. These findings can be summarized in a table:

emptying phase: filling phase:

unknowing of forms (avidyi) knowledge of Brahma
dissolution merging
1 I
crossin
immortality

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84 Jones

The results of each process (the emptying and the filling) are different
both are necessary. The middle entries (dissolution and merging) occur
matically at death, but the others must be accomplished. The entry i
left column is the prerequisite for the occurrence of the event in the
column on the same line, but it does not bring it about: only with unknowi
is one in a position to gain knowledge, and only by escaping the pow
death can one become immortal.

Therefore, the intent of Isa Up. 9-14 as one unit, with Brhadiranyaka Up.
IV.4 as the key, is this: There must first be an unknowing of forms (arupajhii/
avidya) so that knowledge of Brahman (vidya) may occur; if this happens,
then with the automatic destruction of the bodily unit and merging with
Brahman, death will be escaped by the unknowing and dissolution, and immor-
tality will be gained by the knowledge and merging. "Crossing death" means
one is in a position to escape rebirth if one has the knowledge: to gain immor-
tality knowledge and merging are necessary, and to achieve these unknowing
and dissolution must occur first. Both phases are required-attachment to
only one will not succeed.
Other passages in the Brhaddranyaka lend some support to aspects of this
analysis. A common formula throughout the book is "who knows thus (ya
evam veda) becomes (bhavati)": who knows x or the nature of x becomes or
obtains x. Thus, for example, Brhaddnyaka Up. 1.4.9: by the knowledge of
Brahman (brahmavidya), they become all. The Brhaddranyaka in contrast to
the Chandogya has much that is negative in tone (asat versus sat more often
beginning the cosmogony, "great sayings" of "neti neti" versus "tat tvam asi,"
being desireless versus having all mundane desires fulfilled, etc.) and more on
the process of becoming/merging. The Brhaddranyaka Up. IV.3.19-32 asserts
that in deep, dreamless sleep, we cannot sense, think about, or understand
because there is no duality there; but the self which understands is still there-
indeed, we have become the nondual seer. An unknowing of objects has
occurred, but the knowledge of Brahman is not present when we are in that
state.

To deal with another passage, Brhaddra.nyaka Up. 11.4.12-14 says that the
self (itman, the Lord or One of the Isa) consists of nothing but understanding
(vijhina-ghana): We arise out of it and at death vanish into it. After death,
there is no ideation (samjnfi), since all ideas are of a dualistic nature. Where there
is duality (dvaita), one senses, thinks about, and understands another. Where
everything has become the self, there is nothing by which one can sense or
understand. An unknowing of forms has again occurred. By what can one
understand the one who understands (the inner controller, the self)? The words
for understanding come from "vi-" plus forms from the root "jhn." "Jnhna"
without a prefix does not occur in the Brhaddra.nyaka; it means to know by
acquaintance (Fr. connaitre, Ger. kennen).'2 The prefix "vi-" emphasizes the
separation: "x understands y" conveys this. Vidyi, cognate with the Latin

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85

"video," contrasts with this as direct, nonreflective knowledge gained in ex-

periences. It also has the power to transform the experiencer: whether ignorance
of deisre is the cause of rebirth, vidyi (and only vidyd) will end the process.
It is the ability to realize, in the sense of accomplish or obtain, something:
One becomes what one knows. The difference between the two concepts is
roughly equivalent to discriminating (understanding) the meaning of a claim,
and seeing (knowing) that the claim is true. When there is a merging with
understanding itself (II.4. 12,14), that is, where everything has become the self,
the space required for understanding (or sensing) is obliterated. The self is
beyond the dualistic situation (compare, Isa Up. 4). Thus the connection be-
tween merging and the absence of awareness of this or that is again reiterated.13
Even the famous passage concerning becoming like a child has, at least,
limited relevance (Brhaddra.nyaka Up. III.5.1): To become a true Brahmana, one
must become disenchanted (nirvidya) with learning (panditya, not vidya, but
"pedantic" worldly wisdom again), and desire to become like a child; having
become disenchanted with the learned and childlike states, one becomes a
silent one (muni); having become disenchanted with the nonsilence and silence,
one becomes a Brahmana. The roles of unlearning and silence, and the need
to go beyond them are what is of significance from this passage for the purpose
at hand.

Whatever support or complications the rest of the Brhadiranyaka and Isa

may bring, the connection between Isa Up. 9-14 and Brhaddranyaka Up. IV.4
still remains illuminating. Giving avidya a positive role in the process leading
to immortality should not appear too radical or startling. There was no fixed
religious vocabulary at the time of the Isa's composition, the more established
uses of the term "avidyd" coming only later. Furthermore, the Upanisads
themselves had no settled way to indicate a lack of knowledge-the Kena,
even in a verse almost identical to Isa Up. 10, used another word (avidita, 1.4).
The Isa's attempt to give avidyd anything other than a totally negative role
may have been the only such attempt-it is certainly not easily understood
and easily leads to confusion. In the West, Dionysius' effort to give "agnosia"
a meaning, other than its established one, never became overly popular in
mystical circles.
But in defense of the suggestion, it must be pointed out that it is the Isa
itself which ascribes avidyi a necessary function in conjunction with vidya.
The question is how to interpret this function. Pointing out fatal difficulties
in past attempts to understand this passage adds nothing to the plausibility
of the alternative offered here, but it should make us more open to new
possible interpretations of the familiar. In the work of Dionysius and in the
Brhaddra.nyaka, unknowing has a positive role in the mystical process. If we
make the problematic, but not innately implausible, assumption that the same
holds here (coupled with the less controversial assumptions stated earlier and
the value of consistency of meaning throughout the passages under study),

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86 Jones

everything within the passage at issue falls into place, and the passage i
to be consistent with the more common Upanisadic doctrines.

NOTES

1. S. N. Dasgupta says avidyi in the Upanisads is ignorance of the dtman-doctrine and co

with knowledge (A History of Indian Philosophy [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
p. 111). See Alex Wayman, "The Meaning of Unwisdom (Avidya)." Philosophy East and
7, nos. 142 (1957): 21-25, for distinctions concerning "avidyd."
2. Deeds or rituals may enable one to cross over death, and knowledge, complete the pr
But actually finding an Upanisadic warrant for equating avidya and karman is difficu
Brhadaranyaka Up. IV.4.2 states that knowledge and deeds (karmani) both play roles in dete
one's future rebirth; and Brhaddranyaka Up. 1.5.16 comes close to contrasting karman and
Mundaka Up. 1.2.9 also connects avidyi and karman. But this cannot justify equating t
And in the case of the Mundaka passage, both are considered quite negatively (and thu
not play a role in the attainment of immortality). Further complications also arise: (1)
2 discusses deeds (karmini) without any indication that a connection with avidya is in
neither vidya nor avidya is mentioned until verse 9. (2) It may be that deeds or rituals aid in r
immortality (if they do at all) only when the acts are informed by vidya-Chindogya U
I.1.10 (after contrasting vidya and avidyi) and IV. 14.1,3 reveal that vidya can be connected
acts (confer Samkara's Brahmasitrabh.sya III. 1.7 on joining knowledge to works).
3. P. Thieme, "Isopanisad 1-14," Journal of the American Oriental Society 85 (1965)
shall not question Thieme's total interpretation of the Isa here. But how the first half of this U
is to be understood and how the two halves fit together seem more difficult than unders
verses 9-14 treated separately.
4. Robert E. Hume, The Thirteen Principal Upanishads (New York: Oxford University
1971), pp. 363-364.
5. Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan and Charles A. Moore, ed., A Sourcebook in Indian Phil
(Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1957), pp. 40-41. Throughout his own
lation, Radhakrishnan uses "ignorance" (The Principal Upanisads [London: George A
Unwin Ltd., 1953 ], pp. 573-575).
6. Faulty "knowledge" is an error, not even lower knowledge (a para vidyd), the sc
connected to the Vedas (Mundaka Upanisad 1.1.4).
7. Verse 10 (and 13) will not be discussed much. The contrast of vidya and avidyi is also p
in Katha Up. 1.2.4. It could mean (1) that Brahman/atman contains and controls both know
and nescience (following Svetasvatara Up. V.1), and thus is other than either-neither al
accomplish immortality. Or (2) that the results of knowledge and nescience are distinct
interpretation amounts to the same point: knowledge and nescience are both required
immortality.
8. This idea was later picked up by the medieval English contemplative who author
Cloud of Unknowing, by Meister Eckhart, and by a few other. Nicholas of Cusa's De docta ig
speaks of "learned ignorance" more in a Socratic than Dionysian sense; learned ignora
knowing that we are ignorant.
9. The Isa may have used "avidyi" rather than "ajhinna" to contrast with "vidyi" be
there was no fixed vocabulary at the time or to maintain the contrasts between pairs of x
non-x's occurring throughout the text ("vidyd" is more common than "jn~na" in these tex
10. Sarhkara understood these terms as meaning "the manifest" and "the unmanifest (avya
respectively. This enabled him to maintain his nondualism. But he still had difficulties: he a
the text (changing "sambhuiti" to "asambhiuti"), and altered his understanding of immortali
what he had given in his commentary upon verse 11.
11. If "worship destruction" means simply "deny the existence of rebirth" (compare Kat
1.2.6), then "delight in rebirth" must mean "accept the existence of rebirth." This latter d

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87

lead to darkness, nor do these definitions explain why both knowledge and nescience are necessary.
Mixing denial of rebirth and craving for rebirth would destroy the parallel structure.
12. For a discussion of jinna, vijn~na, and vidya based primarily upon Buddhist texts, see Alex
Wayman, "Notes on the Sanskrit Term Jnana," Journal of the American Oriental Society 75 (1955):
253-268.
13. There is a problematic passage in the Brhadiranyaka Up. 11.4.5 where it is said that the self
should be sensed and thought about, and that by understanding and sensing the self, all this is
known (idam sarvam viditam). Perhaps this is merely the first step in a graduated teaching that
Yajniavalkya is giving to his wife Maitreyi. Or perhaps this means that to one who even understands
the self all more mundane matters become known. The Brhadiranyaka Up. 11.3 may have been
added as a preface to explain this. There are two forms (rupas) of Brahman: the fixed (marta) and
the nonfixed (amurta), the mortal and immortal, the unmoving and the moving, the phenomenal
reality (sat) and that beyond (tyat) (compare Isa Up. 4-5). With regard to the world, the nonfixed
Brahman is the air and the sky, and the fixed the rest. With regard to the person, the nonfixed
Brahman is the breath and the inner space, and the fixed the rest. It is not clear where the inner
controller, the one who understands, is to fit into this scheme. In Samkara's commentary upon
11.3.1, he said the two forms of Brahman are superimposed images of the formless (arupa) Brahman,
that is, the self or inner controller. The alternative interpretation is that the nonfixed Brahman
is the inner self. Usually the inner self is said to lie within the space of the heart, indicating that the
rest is set in opposition to this. The picture is further complicated by the fact that each form here
is just as real as the other, while elsewhere it is said that the self within everything is Brahman or
is everything (11.5.1; compare Tsa Up. 6, 8); this led to considering only the nonfixed form as real,
the fixed being unreal (asatya), as in the Maitri Up. VI.3, and Samkara's nondualism. Under this
interpretation, the fixed Brahman can be understood as objects are, and with this understanding,
all phenomena are known (viditam): one becomes what one knows. (Tsa Up. 7 affirms that all beings
become the self of one who understands.) The nonfixed self, however, cannot be understood (II.
4.14), because it cannot be presented as an object: when we are one with understanding, there is
nothing to understand. This self is "not this, not this" (na iti na iti), the reality of the real (satyasya
satyam) (11.3.6). One can thus know/become the inner self only through this knowledge and an
unknowing of the objects of understanding.

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