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O'brien
O'brien
Contents
List of Boxes, Tables, Figures and Maps x Trends in Contemporary GPE Theory 32
Preface to the Fifth Edition xiii Consolidation 32
List of Abbreviations xiv Integration 33
Expansion 34
Introduction 1
Approach of the Book 36
Further Reading 38
Part 1 Theoretical Perspectives 5
1 Theories of Global Political Part 2 Evolution 39
Economy 6
3 Forging a World Economy:
Understanding the Global Political Economy 6
1400–1800 40
The Economic Nationalist Perspective 8
Regions of the World Economy 41
Key actors 8
The Middle East 42
Key dynamics 9
China 43
Conflict and cooperation 10
India 44
Economic nationalism today 10
Africa 45
The Liberal Perspective 12
The Americas 45
Key actors 13
Europe 46
Key dynamics 13
European Expansion 51
Conflict and cooperation 13
Into the Americas 51
Liberalism today 14
Along Africa: the triangular trade 54
The Critical Perspective 16
On the peripheries of Asia 56
Key actors 17
Conclusion 58
Key dynamics 17
Further Reading 62
Conflict and cooperation 18
Critical theory today 18 4 Industry, Empire and War:
Contending Perspectives: A Summary 19 1800–1945 63
Further Reading 21 The Industrial Revolution 64
What was the Industrial Revolution? 64
2 International Political Economy
Why Britain? Why then? 66
and its Methods 22
What did the others do? 67
Locating the Field 22
Pax Britannica 68
Economics 23
The gold standard and capital flows 68
Political science 24
Free trade 71
Political economy 24
Balance of power 71
International relations 25
Renewed Imperialism 74
Methodological Issues 26
War and Economic Disorder 77
Case studies and large n studies 26
The world wars 77
Rational choice 27
Interwar economic failure 79
Institutionalism 28
Conclusion 82
Constructivism 30
Further Reading 85
Chapter
Theories of Global
1 Political Economy
I
Understanding the Global
n its present form, the field of international political economy (IPE) or global
Political Economy 6 political economy (GPE) is a relatively new undertaking at universities. This
chapter introduces readers to three of its main theories. Chapter 2 gives read-
The Economic Nationalist
ers an overview of the relationship of IPE to other fields, considers some of the
Perspective8
methods used to study IPE and examines the future directions of GPE theory.
The Liberal Perspective 12
The Critical Perspective 16
Contending Perspectives: Understanding the Global Political
A Summary19
Economy
Further Reading 21
During 1996 and into 1997, a small number of investors and currency traders
began to have doubts about whether Thailand’s economy would be able to con-
tinue its record of remarkable growth. Fearing a reduction in economic prosperity
and profit, some of these investors began to withdraw their money and invest-
ments. The outflow of money forced the Thai central bank to devalue its currency,
the baht. This began a process which was later called the 1997 ‘Asian financial
crisis’. By the time the crisis had run its course, several Asian countries experi-
enced economic depression, the government of Indonesia was overthrown, coun-
tries previously labelled economic miracles, for example South Korea, were forced
to seek loans from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the viability of the
international financial system was called into question.
Although the 1997 Asian financial crisis was clearly a significant development
in the global political economy, it was not immediately apparent what caused the
events, what were its most significant aspects or what lessons might be drawn
from the crisis to prevent a similar event from occurring. Indeed, a number of
different stories are told about the crisis (see Table 1.1). One story, the liberal story,
locates the causes of the crisis primarily in the financial policies followed by Asian
states (McLeod and Garnaut, 1998). This view suggests that resources were
directed to inefficient uses because of corrupt business practices and political
influence over financial institutions. The term ‘crony capitalism’ was developed to
capture this inappropriate model of political economy. The lesson to be drawn
from the crisis is that financial markets will eventually punish economic activity
which violates or ignores liberal economic principles. The solution is for develop-
ing countries to have more transparent financial practices and follow a more lib-
eral economic model.
A second story stresses the significance of state power in creating and exploit-
ing the crisis (Weiss, 1999). In this view, the problem arose because developing
countries liberalized their economies prematurely and allowed large amounts of
money to flow into and out of their countries too quickly. This undermined the
East Asian model of political economy and caused a evelopments are interpreted through competing
d
crisis. This approach would stress how the US used the explanations. Facts do not exist independently of
Asian crisis as an opportunity to force some states to explanatory frameworks. Facts are pieces of informa-
restructure along lines that benefited American busi- tion that are thought to correspond to reality and be
ness. During the crisis, Asian states attempted to coun- true, but the way in which they are perceived and
ter American initiatives at the IMF and to continue to judged is influenced by theory. In order to make sense
resist the undermining of their particular form of capi- of the world and to enable us to take constructive
talism (Higgott, 1998). The lessons from the crisis are action, humans develop theories to help determine
that states need to be careful about liberalizing their which facts are most important and what significant
economic activity and must pay attention to guarding relationships there are between different events.
their national interest. Theories are used for a variety of purposes:
A third story (critical) focuses on the role of US pri-
vate business interests and the US government in creat- ◗ they can prioritize information and allow individu-
ing the conditions for a financial collapse. It suggests als to turn their attention to the most important
that the US government pressured developing states issues
into liberalizing their economies because this suited the ◗ they can be used to make predictions about the
interests of the US Treasury and leading financial firms future so that action can be taken to prepare for
on Wall Street (Wade and Veneroso, 1998). Once the upcoming events
crisis took place, the same interests pressed the IMF to ◗ they can be used to plan action or mobilize support
demand that Asian economies restructure in a way that for particular action
would open markets for US firms. This story also
stresses the high degree of suffering caused by the Every person utilizes theory to run their life even if
financial collapse and the fact that its costs were une- they do not engage in explicit theorizing. Actors in the
venly distributed. For example, the collapse of the Indo- global political economy and those studying it use a
nesian economy pushed millions further into poverty, variety of theories for a variety of purposes. Some peo-
but left wealthy financial interests in developed coun- ple are interested in prediction. For example, they
tries relatively untouched. In this view, the international would like to be able to predict what type of monetary
financial system facilitates the rapid movement of system would lead to stable economic growth, or to pre-
money between countries and contributes to the reoc- dict the likelihood of war between democratic states.
currence of financial crisis in many parts of the world Others believe that prediction is nearly impossible
(Walton, 2002). Action needs to be taken to curb finan- because so many factors come together to influence
cial speculation, such as a tax on large short-term for- events. These people are more likely to use theory in an
eign exchange transactions. States should also consider attempt to understand the world rather than to predict
restricting the ability of investors to move their funds what will happen next.
abroad rapidly. In this book, we use and describe a number of theo-
This brief example of the Asian financial crisis ries to guide us in understanding the world. The
demonstrates that the same event can be analysed in development of IPE is often presented as a debate
several different ways. Indeed, most major between three contending schools of thought,
A major assumption of economic nationalists is the pri- conceived as a struggle for power, international politi-
macy of the political over other aspects of social life. cal economy is a struggle for power and wealth. The
Statist writers focus on the group (the state or nation) determination of a state’s fate resides in its ability to
rather than the individual. Economic nationalist ensure that its citizens reap advantages from interna-
thought begins from two major assumptions. The first tional production and exchange. Market relations are
is that the inter-state system is anarchical and it is there- important indicators of power and wealth but the
fore the duty of each state to protect its own interests. At market is governed by the activities of states. Eco-
the core of the various historical versions of economic nomic activity is subordinate to political goals and
nationalism is the belief that an economic community objectives. Furthermore, economic actors are subject
persists and acts for the good of all its members. The to political authority. The consequence of the salience
second assumption concerns the primacy of the state in of the state is that international economic relations
political life. As the state is the central instrument are international political relations. The global econ-
through which people can fulfil their goals, it follows omy in this view is subordinate to the international
that the state remains the preeminent actor in the political system.
domestic and international domains. Economic policy IPE scholars working in this perspective argue that
should be used to build a more powerful state. the nature of the global economy reflects the interests
From this perspective, the state is prior to the mar- of the most powerful states. For example, Krasner
ket and market relations are shaped by political power. (1976) has suggested that systems of free trade are most
Economic nationalist thought is both descriptive and likely when a single power dominates the international
predictive. Descriptive economic nationalists maintain system. This dominant, or hegemonic, power is needed
that production, consumption, exchange and invest- to provide leadership and absorb the short-term costs
ment are all governed by political power. Markets are of maintaining a free-trade regime. Analysts such as
not ‘natural’; they can only exist within a social context. Gilpin (1981) have argued that changes in the distribu-
For mercantilists, political needs and purposes are seen tion of power between states increase the chances of
largely as being achieved through the form of the state. conflict in the international system. Because of this
It remains at the core of social life. But economic view, considerable time can be devoted to contemplat-
nationalists move beyond description and also provide ing the rise and fall of great powers (Gilpin, 1987; Ken-
policy advice. Given their analysis of the dynamics of nedy, 1987).
political economy, such advice is geared towards sup- In the heated debate over globalization, both defen-
porting and maintaining state power. sive and sceptical economic nationalist perspectives
Economic nationalists recognize the importance of can be heard. The defensive posture arises from a fear
market-based actors such as firms, but subordinate that globalization may prevent state actors from fulfill-
their importance to that of the state. Within this per- ing their goals. This is, of course, merely the continua-
spective, the economic power of transnational corpora- tion of the long-held suspicion of economic exchange
tions (TNCs) is acknowledged, but the overall power of held by economic nationalist thinkers. Unlike propo-
such firms remains limited. In the end, firms are subject nents of free trade, economic nationalists believe that
to the dictates of states. Insofar as firms have become the gains from trade are unequally distributed and
important economic actors, this is only because states favour those with greater economic and political power.
have abandoned regulation or lessened controls on the Thus, defensive economic nationalists can recognize
movement of capital. When firms encounter economic globalization as a threat and seek to counter its impacts.
or political trouble, they quickly turn to their home On the other hand, sceptical economic nationalists
states for protection. reject many of the current liberal arguments about glo-
balization. They contend that globalization is largely a
myth and that the power of the state remains undimin-
Key dynamics ished. Since economic actors are subordinate to politi-
cal power, these analysts argue that the policy
From an economic nationalist perspective, interna- environment conducive to globalization has been cre-
tional political economy is constituted through the ated by states. It therefore follows that states can alter
actions of rational states. If international relations are this environment by changing their policies. Moreover,
it can be claimed that since states remain powerful i ntroduction of foreign values. Whereas a liberal would
actors and the only legitimate centres of authority in argue that the sovereignty of the consumer is para-
the modern world, nothing significant has occurred in mount, economic nationalists maintain that the values
the global political economy. of the nation are more important. From the foregoing, it
is easy to see how, in the sphere of exchange, economic
nationalists support the protection of domestic indus-
Conflict and cooperation tries. Furthermore, economic nationalist thought is
behind arguments that seek to restrict foreign invest-
Within IR theory, realism, with its focus on the primacy ment, and supports the ‘rights’ of local investors over
of the state, the anarchical nature of international rela- foreigners.
tions and the inevitability of conflict, provides the foun-
dation for economic nationalist thought. If realism is
the perspective in international politics, economic Economic nationalism today
nationalism is its equivalent doctrine in political econ-
omy. Both share a commitment to the state and to the Although the dominant approach to global political
role of power in social life. Power-based theories such economy as espoused by the leading international insti-
as economic nationalism and realism view the world as tutions and economic theorists is liberalism, economic
anarchic – lacking any central authority. Relations nationalism continues to inform thinking and action.
between states are thus characterized by unending con- Countries continue to protect their markets from for-
flict and the pursuit of power. eign competition even though they have committed
International economic relations are therefore per- themselves to free trade. Although protectionism has
ceived as a zero-sum game where the gain of one party been reduced as countries have lowered tariffs, many
necessitates a loss for another party. The system’s struc- other mechanisms are used to keep out foreign prod-
ture is perceived in conflictual terms. While economic ucts. Chapter 6 reviews how states have used a variety
nationalists believe that market relations can be posi- of reasons to restrict trade, for example health and
tive, they think that such activity can also be negative. safety, environmental, cultural, employment, infant
Since participating in markets is potentially negative, industry. Trade in services such as education and
economic nationalists argue in favour of state control of healthcare is a particularly sensitive subject, with many
key economic activities or for state assistance to central states unwilling to open up to foreign competition.
economic sectors. The continued salience of economic States have actively involved themselves in support-
nationalist perspectives is easily visible today in pro- ing particular industries, contrary to liberal theory.
duction, consumption, trade and investment. In terms Many developing countries have relied on their states to
of production, economic nationalist sentiment is visible boost economic activity, shield domestic industries
in arguments concerning the continued production of from competition, and direct finance to selected indus-
some good or service within particular national bor- tries. China has enjoyed remarkable economic growth,
ders. This can be seen in terms of security concerns; but has imposed strict conditions on foreign invest-
that is, a state should not be reliant on the import of a ment, intervened to make sure its currency is relatively
specific good, because in times of conflict, this good cheap and guided finance into particular activities
may become unavailable. Some countries, such as through five-year plans. While benefiting from a gener-
France, protect their agricultural sector, while the US ally liberal and open economic system, China has
defends defence technology. It can also be seen in terms engaged in economic nationalist policies in pursuit of
of the preservation of the cultural values of the nation. development.
For example, many economic nationalists believe that it Concerns about economic nationalism increase in
is vital to maintain the production of certain cultural times of economic downturn. Politicians and the public
products, such as films and music, within national bor- may wish to increase discrimination against foreign
ders. In relation to consumption, economic nationalist economies and firms when growth slows in the belief
arguments have been made against cultural imperial- that steps should be taken to support national econo-
ism, that is, in favour of the view that the import of mies. Such an approach risks retaliation and the closing
some products pollutes the nation through the of world markets, which damages the interest of all
Susan Strange (2002) admitted that she never meant to become a professor, but ended up in the role after
stints in journalism (with the Observer and The Economist) and working at Chatham House, a British foreign
affairs research institute. She eventually became a professor at the London School of Economics and
Warwick University.
Strange’s theoretical approach is difficult to characterize neatly (Tooze and May, 2002). It contains a
strong element of power politics or economic nationalism because it focuses on the exercise of power
and pays considerable attention to key state policies in structuring the global economy. Strange takes a
realist approach by advising students to focus on the role of interests and to constantly ask the question
‘Who benefits?’ Yet, her work is also unorthodox because she urges observers to take account of the
role of markets, corporations and technological innovations in changing the environment in which the
state operates. In a series of exchanges with US IPE scholars, Strange continually went against the main-
stream by variously arguing that the study of regimes was faddish and mistaken (1982), that US hegem-
ony was not declining in the 1980s (1987) and that globalization was transforming the nature of state
authority (1996).
Strange viewed IPE as a method of understanding the world that focused on the relationship between
markets and authority. She argued that IPE should be an interdisciplinary area that brought together IR and
international economics. Her broad approach is set out in a 1988 textbook called States and Markets, which
argues that in addition to relational power (A forces B to do A’s will), power resides in structures. Structural
power is the ability to shape the rules of the game in a particular area. Those who create the operating
framework for everyone’s activities exercise power by eliminating some possibilities and making some out-
comes more likely than others. Strange maintained that there were four key structures of power (security,
production, finance, knowledge) and numerous secondary structures (transport, trade, energy, welfare).
Strange reasoned that since the US exercised considerable structural power in the key structures, talk of
decline was mistaken.
In the 1990s, Strange increasingly turned her attention to non-state actors. A major collaboration with a
business school professor (Stopford and Strange, 1991) argued that traditional notions of diplomacy being
an inter-state practice had to be expanded to include state–firm and firm–firm interactions. In a following
book, Strange (1996) identified other actors such as business associations, bureaucrats and even mafias that
were operating transnationally and undermining the authority of states. Most of Strange’s empirical work
was in the area of finance and credit. She argued that the creation and control of credit was a significant
source of power in the global economy. True to her realist roots, she traced the liberalization and globaliza-
tion of finance to particular decisions or non-decisions of the most powerful states. Finance was globalized
because it suited the interests of the most powerful states (principally the US and the UK). However,
Strange also worried that the failure of states to exercise proper regulatory control over financial flows was
turning the system into a form of ‘casino capitalism’ (1986). Her fear was that a widespread financial col-
lapse would lead to a closing of the global economy (1998).
Strange played a prominent role in founding and supporting the study of IPE as an interdisciplinary field
in Britain. Her pioneering studies in the field of finance inspired a new generation to examine the power
relations flowing around credit issues. Strange’s insistence that IPE be an open field of intellectual enquiry
influenced the development of the field in Britain by bringing in work from a number of different
disciplines. Her stinging criticism of US intellectual trends provided room for British scholars and students
to ask different types of questions and use different methodologies from their US counterparts.
states because it reduces the possibility of growth Visually, the economic nationalist approach can be
through trade. Protectionist policies of the 1930s are represented by a game of marbles (Figure 1.1). The
often blamed for worsening the Great Depression and marbles are states, with different attributes, varying in
this lesson is used against those advocating economic their design, size, strength and beauty. They crash into
nationalist policies. each other in a competition to determine a winner.
In many ways, disagreements between economic nationalists and liberals can be traced back to differences
over relative and absolute gains. Relative gains refer to one actor doing better or worse compared with
another actor. Absolute gains refer to whether an actor is better off compared with a previous point in time.
Economic nationalists and their international relations cousins (realists) argue that since states are in
competition with each other, their primary concern is how a state performs relative to its rivals. Does a
particular arrangement increase or decrease the gap between states? In contrast, liberals believe that states
are rational and will support measures that will increase their absolute wealth by the greatest amount.
As an example, imagine that the US and China were presented with two economic agreements that
would govern their relationship for 20 years. Under agreement A, which involves carefully managing trade
between the two countries, the US will grow at an annual rate of 2 per cent and China will grow at an
annual rate of 2 per cent. Under agreement B, which involves a broad free-trade deal, the US will grow at
an annual rate of 5 per cent and China will grow at an annual rate of 10 per cent.
An economic nationalist would opt for agreement A because it delivers similar benefits to both coun-
tries, whereas agreement B causes China to grow much faster than the US. Liberals would disagree, arguing
that the US should sign agreement B because it would increase growth by 5 per cent each year rather than
the meagre 2 per cent of agreement A. The free-trade arrangement will make the US richer and more pros-
perous than the managed trade agreement. A focus on relative gains would lead policy makers to prefer
agreement A, while a focus on absolute gains would lead policy makers to choose agreement B. Which do
you think the US should sign?
the goal of free trade, money flows into and out of most boost their economies through the transfer of capital,
countries without great difficulty and all forms of eco- technology and access to markets.
nomic activity are increasingly liberalized. However,
there is a wide variety of liberal thought. It ranges from
those who see the state fading away in an emerging bor- Key dynamics
derless world dominated by corporations (Ohmae,
1990) to liberal institutionalists (Keohane and Nye, For liberal theorists the market lies at the centre of eco-
1977), who stress the continuing importance of the nomic life. Economic progress results from the interac-
state, but see it enmeshed in webs of interdependence tion of diverse individuals pursuing their own ends.
and international organization. The book by Landes While liberals acknowledge that market relations are
(1998), mentioned in Chapter 3, takes a particular type not always optimal, they tend to argue that intervention
of liberal approach. It argues that those with liberal val- in the market is most likely to produce suboptimal out-
ues have been most successful in the global economy comes. There is, of course, a broad spectrum of liberal
and implies that these values were freely chosen by peo- thought. It ranges from John Maynard Keynes (1936),
ple in Europe and the West. However, Landes parts whose economic theories laid the foundation for inter-
ways with those liberals who argue that individual ventionist welfare governments in the immediate post-
choice is more significant than cultural institutions. war period, to Friedrich Hayek (1944), whose
free-market philosophy guided the neoliberal revolu-
tion of the 1980s. They both subscribe to a belief in the
Key actors positive role of markets and the ability of the market to
lead to prosperity. However, they differ over the impor-
Within the liberal perspective there are a number of key tance of market imperfections and the policies that
actors. For liberals, the starting point of analysis is the ought to be implemented to deal with market failure.
individual. Liberal economic theory, of which neoclassi- For liberal theorists, IPE is constituted by a search
cal economic theory is a variant, begins from the analysis for wealth. On the whole, open markets will enhance
of individual wants and preferences and constructs a growth and wealth, and firms will disseminate material
powerful explanatory framework on this basis. In the wealth across the globe. Economic failure in this per-
context of analysis of the global economy, liberal theo- spective is often the result of government intervention.
rists focus on the behaviour of individuals, firms and Many liberal theorists have been at the forefront of the
states. In contrast to economic nationalism, the key eco- debate on globalization. For what can be termed ‘hyper-
nomic actor is the individual rather than the state. liberals’, globalization is not only a reality (indeed, an
Individuals in pursuit of self-interest will maximize the inevitability), it is a positive force for good. Globaliza-
benefits of economic exchange for society. Within liberal tion breaks down artificial (for which read political)
theory the firm also plays an important role. Unlike barriers and by unleashing the force of production, it
mercantilists who view the firm with a degree of suspicion, can contribute to enhanced happiness for humankind.
liberals see the firm as a source of economic wealth. The Thus, hyper-liberals welcome globalization. Keynesian-
state is viewed with hostility by many liberals since it influenced liberals or those of a reformist stance per-
brings politics into the realm of economics. Liberals ceive certain problems with the unfettered operation of
believe that if individuals are left freely to engage in pro- the free market and are, therefore, sensitive to some
duction, exchange and consumption, all will benefit and unwanted consequences of globalization. They support
that the insertion of state control distorts benefits and globalization but emphasize the need for attention to
adds costs to participants in the market. People engaged market reform.
in free economic exchange pursuing their own interests
create a society-wide harmony of interest. From a liberal
perspective the transnational corporation (TNC) is a Conflict and cooperation
positive force. TNCs bring advantages to both home and
host countries. From the perspective of the home coun- Liberal theorists view international relations and the
try, the TNC represents an optimal mix of technology, international political economy as essentially coopera-
managerial skill and capital. For host countries, TNCs tive. Indeed, they believe that market relations will lead
to positive outcomes for all. In other words, economic nations after 1945. They echo classical liberal political
relations are positive sum. A standard liberal theory economy. These theories emphasized the economic and
that exemplifies this belief is the theory of comparative political benefits of economic interchange. Interde-
advantage, which shows that even in a situation where pendence was proffered as both a description of events
one country enjoys a superiority in the production of and a prescription for the solution of conflict.
all goods and services over a second country, trade In the 1980s and 90s, liberals continued to argue that
between the two countries will benefit both countries. international cooperation was both possible and desir-
This is explained in more detail in Chapters 4 and 6. able. In contrast to economic nationalists or realists,
One persistent liberal belief has been that economic liberals argued that international agreements or regimes
nationalist policies lead to conflict. Unlike Marxist would maintain international economic order even if
writers who denounce the growth of global capitalism hegemonic states declined (Keohane, 1984). With the
as a cause of war, liberal theorists view increased inter- end of the Cold War and the rapid spread of liberal eco-
national interaction as a source of prosperity and peace. nomic models to many states in the 1990s, it appeared
The liberal belief in the connection between protec- that the liberal faith in cooperation and progress was
tionist policies and conflict and the reverse argument, justified. Some even went so far as to claim that history
namely that capitalism favours peace, are central to lib- had ended because the liberal democratic model had
eral critiques of the international economic order. The triumphed over other forms of social organization
German philosopher Immanuel Kant ([1795]1991) (Fukuyama, 1992).
foresaw an era of perpetual peace when systems of free
trade, a coalition of republican states and the fear of
destructive warfare would bring about an era of calm Liberalism today
and prosperity. Towards the end of the First World War,
US president Woodrow Wilson ([1918]1986) advocated Liberal neoclassical economics, which stresses the
liberal principles of free trade, self-determination and importance of rational decision makers in free mar-
the use of international organizations to settle disputes kets, dominates the field of economics. International
between states. institutions such as the World Trade Organization
The framers of international economic institutions (WTO) are founded on liberal principles of free trade,
after the Second World War were supporters of this while the IMF and the World Bank preach liberal pre-
view. It was argued that the war had its origins in the scriptions to those seeking development funds or loans
economic nationalist policies of the 1930s. As a conse- to see them through financial crises. TNCs urge state
quence of the Great Depression, governments resorted leaders to open their markets to the free flow of invest-
to a series of protectionist measures that eroded confi- ment and many government officials eagerly comply.
dence in international cooperation. As a result of eco- Indeed, many states have bound themselves to an ever
nomic nationalist policies, the basis of collective more liberal economy through participation in inter-
security was shattered and an atmosphere conducive to national organizations and international economic
dictators was created. The shift from economic compe- agreements such as regional or bilateral free-trade
tition to military conflict was, in this view, inevitable. agreements. The market continues to expand by bring-
Hence, there was the need after the war to design insti- ing in more and more countries as participants (such
tutions to foster international economic cooperation as China) and by encompassing a wider range of activ-
and to include within those institutions mechanisms to ities such as services (healthcare, education, childcare,
prevent states from resorting to competitively national- housework).
ist policies. Despite the dominance of liberalism, there are chal-
Within the study of IR, liberal theories of world pol- lenges to liberal theory and practice from within and
itics and of political economy share assumptions con- without. Within liberalism, the 2008 financial crisis
cerning the pluralist nature of the international system reopened the debate among liberals about regulation
and the feasibility of cooperation. Theories of interde- and the role of government in economic crises. Does
pendence developed in the 1960s to explain the con- self-regulation of financial firms lead to economic effi-
nection between increased economic exchange and ciency or corruption and financial collapse? Should
interconnectedness and the long peace among Western governments bail out banks with taxpayers’ money or
Robert Keohane was born into an academic family and began a US teaching career after graduating from
Harvard in 1966 (Keohane, 1989a). His academic career has taken him to Stanford, Brandeis, Harvard, Duke
and Princeton universities. His research has had a major role in influencing the study of IPE and IR in the US
and beyond.
Keohane is a central figure in what has become known as the liberal institutionalist approach to IPE and
world politics (1989b). This approach suggests that institutions or sets of rules and norms can have a signifi-
cant effect upon state behaviour if they have mutual interests. Institutions include formal international
organizations, international regimes or conventions and customs. Liberal institutionalism was developed as
a critique of realist / power politics / economic nationalist approaches to IR and IPE. The emphasis is on
how institutions can help states overcome barriers to cooperation. Although Keohane himself prefers to be
known simply as an institutionalist (2002, p. 3), the adjective ‘liberal’ is still useful because it refers to some
of the liberal attributes that underlie his approach. These include a focus on the individual and a belief that
properly designed international institutions can go some way to creating a more humane global system.
Keohane’s first major work was written with Joseph Nye and it argued that there were certain times and
issue areas when the assumptions of realist or power politics approaches did not hold sway (Keohane and
Nye, 1977). They labelled these situations as ‘complex interdependence’ and suggested that under certain
circumstances states could use international institutions to bolster cooperation. They also argued that in
such situations cross-border links between officials could lead to outcomes different from those that power
politics approaches would have predicted.
In 1984 Keohane published After Hegemony. It sought to explain why, contrary to realist assumptions,
states continued to cooperate and participate in international agreements even after the major power that
sponsored the agreements entered a period of relative decline. This was a significant issue because many
analysts were worried about the decline of US power relative to that of other states and feared that this
would make the international political economy increasingly unstable. Keohane argued that the benefits of
arrangements in issue areas (such as money, oil or trade) or regimes continued independent of the rise or
decline of the power of particular states. Regimes exist because they facilitate negotiations between states
and allow states to overcome barriers to collective action such as uncertainty. Keohane’s work helped to
spark increasing attention to the issue of regime creation and maintenance. Indeed, regime theory became
a mainstay of US IPE scholarship.
Another important aspect of After Hegemony was Keohane’s use of economic theory to explain the
activity of states. Drawing inspiration from economic theories that claimed to explain the activity of corpo-
rations, Keohane analysed state behaviour in terms of market failure, transaction costs and uncertainty. Mar-
ket failure refers to a situation where transactions do not take place because the market is arranged in such
a way as to make otherwise rational activity irrational. In the case of IPE, states might not agree to cooper-
ate because they are unsure of the motives of other states. Regimes help to resolve this market failure by
providing information about other states’ behaviour and an element of predictability in inter-state interac-
tions. States cooperated in international regimes because these regimes solved particular problems such as
lack of information and uncertainty about other states’ intentions and behaviour. Keohane’s use of eco-
nomic models and theories of rational choice coincided and blended well with the importation of economic
models in other areas of US political science. The success of his book and persuasiveness of his argument
helped to bolster rational choice methodology in US IPE.
Keohane’s work has been important in the field of US IPE because it has advanced understanding of
how states are able to cooperate through international regimes.
should they be allowed to go bankrupt? How should There are also challenges to liberalism from those
governments respond to financial and economic crises? who do not accept its claims. States may be happy
Is government’s role to balance budgets or spend to to export into an open liberal market, but reluctant
jump-start economic growth? What should govern- to expose their own industry to competition, as we
ments do if economic growth stalls? will see in the chapters on international trade and
convincing people that neoliberal policies were actually Critical theory today
in their best interest. In this view, the hegemony of a
particular world order requires an ideological domi- With the demise of the Soviet Union and communism,
nance that secures the broad consent of those ruled in Marxist states ceased to exist. The critical perspective
an unequal and unjust manner. lives on in a number of areas, however. As a form of
analysis critical of capitalism’s inequalities and recur-
ring crises, Marxism continues to have adherents.
Conflict and cooperation Although Russia and China eventually embraced a cap-
italist model, many of the problems of capitalism have
Critical writers tend to perceive international economic not been resolved. The financial crisis and ongoing aus-
relations as a zero-sum game. The structure of global terity since 2008 have led to renewed interest in Marxist
capitalism is fundamentally conflictual. Two forms of critiques of capitalism, such as Harvey’s (2011) The
conflict are prevalent in the global economy. Within Enigma of Capital. In particular, the political power of
states, capitalists and workers have competing interests financial capital is a subject of vigorous debate, as finan-
and the state is the scene of a class struggle as the work- cial institutions have prospered in the face of the crisis,
ers and bourgeoisie clash. According to Marxists, this while populations have borne the brunt of austerity. To
conflict is objective and arises from the law of motion give just one example, many Wall Street bankers contin-
of capital. In the international arena, the clash between ued to receive financial bonuses on top of their salary,
workers and capitalists is often obscured by national- while the wealth of the average American family
ism and the intervention of the state. Through the declined by 40 per cent between 2007 and 2010 (Lee,
mechanism of imperialism, dominant states oppress 2012).
weaker ones and this sets up an international struggle Other groups that also question the power imbal-
between imperialists and their victims. ances and inequality in the global economy often draw
International conflict is inevitable because of the on some version of critical approaches. For example,
drive for profit. Different capitalists seek the protection development groups struggling against rules of trade
of their state and this leads to war. Marxist theories of or finance that disadvantage poor countries highlight
imperialism have, in different ways, accounted for the the rigged nature of the game. Social movements
tendency of capitalist states to go to war. Lenin’s theory organizing against the lack of education and employ-
of imperialism, the most well known of these theories, ment opportunities for girls can draw on a feminist
combined two different explanations of capitalist analysis. Environmentalists concerned about the dev-
development. One part of his theory focused on under- astating effects of economic growth and runaway con-
consumption in domestic markets. Because of under- sumption put the health of the planet ahead of
consumption, capitalists were compelled into overseas individuals or the state. We will return to these variants
adventures since they could not maintain their rates of later in the book.
profit on the basis of domestic demand. Another part of A visual representation of critical IPE theory is the
his theory focused on the growth of finance capital and layer cake (Figure 1.3), where groups are stacked in lay-
the merger between finance and industrial capital to ers across the global political economy with some
form monopoly capital that sought to gain profit classes (or genders, or races or species) on the top and
through overseas lending. He argued that conflict and others on the bottom.
war are a necessary end result of this competition.
At the turn of the 21st century, conflict between social
forces was also seen to take place on a global scale. Elites
attempting to constitutionalize neoliberal principles in
institutions such as the WTO and the IMF met with
opposition from social movements trying to safeguard
environmental regulation, raise labour standards, improve
gender equity and lobby for economic justice (O’Brien
et al., 2000). Critical analysts depict a global conflict that
takes place within, above and across states (Gill, 2003). Figure 1.3 Critical theory as a layer cake
For Canadian-born Robert Cox, academic life was a second career after spending 25 years in the
International Labour Organization (ILO). At the ILO, Cox served as a staff officer to the director general,
chief of the programme and planning division, and as director of the International Institute for Labour
Studies. After leaving the ILO, Cox took a teaching position at Columbia University in New York before
settling at Toronto’s York University in 1977.
Cox describes his approach to IPE and IR as historical materialist (2002a, pp. 27–9). The historical part
involves recognizing that each historical era has a particular sensibility and set of institutions and understand-
ings. This contrasts with approaches claiming that there are universal laws of human behaviour which apply
across time. The materialist part places the organization of production and the social relations around produc-
tion at the centre of analysis. In other words, class and class conflict play an important part in understanding
political economy. Central to Cox’s work has been the idea that ‘production generates the capacity to exer-
cise power, but power determines the manner in which production takes place’ (1987, p. 1). He takes a par-
ticular approach to historical materialism, which mixes theoretical insights from Marx with those of scholars
such as Vico, Sorel, Weber, Gramsci and Polanyi. The result is that many liberals and economic nationalists
label Cox a Marxist, while many Marxists argue that he has deviated from the Marxist path (Schechter, 2002).
As the title of a collection of Cox’s essays indicates, his primary interest has been Approaches to World
Order (1996). Cox’s experience at the ILO and his study of international organizations prompted him to
think about the nature of power and dominance in the global economy. Cox (1983) theorized that powerful
states exercise a form of hegemony that goes far beyond military strength. Hegemonic states, such as Brit-
ain in the 19th century or the US in the 20th century, drew their power from a particular form of production
and social relations. Hegemony requires dominance in the economic, political, social and ideological
realms. A hegemonic power is able to convince others that their interests are the same as those of the
dominant power. As a result, hegemonic states try to express their interests as universal norms and use
international organizations to influence other states.
Cox (1986) also argued that it was a mistake to focus on the state and ignore the role of social forces.
Social forces are groups of people who occupy a particular place in the global economy by virtue of their
role in the organization of production. Some social forces, such as the people who own or work in an inter-
nationally competitive industry, advocate free trade, while other social forces will oppose free trade as a
threat to their interests.
In the theoretical realm, Cox (1986) was significant for highlighting the differences between critical the-
ory and problem-solving theory. Problem-solving theory looks at the world as it is and concentrates on how
issues can be addressed in the existing system. Critical theory stands back from the existing order and asks
how that order came about and under what conditions it could be changed to a different form of order.
Critical theorists seek to contribute to a better social order, thus they embrace emancipatory strategies.
Problem-solving theory is about managing the system and critical theory is about changing the system.
Most radical analyses that call for major changes in the global political economy fit into this critical category.
Cox’s most significant impact in the study of IPE has been to raise critical questions about the system of
international order and to contemplate how one might achieve a more egalitarian and sustainable system.
This has led him to disagree with the normative and practical implications of economic liberalism, the fatal-
ity of economic nationalism and the dogma of fundamentalist Marxism.
Contending Perspectives: always for someone and for some purpose.’ Each theory
A Summary has a different goal in mind. For example, economic
nationalist theories are concerned with the security of
The question arises as to why there are so many theories the state, liberal theories with building wealth or coop-
and what the relationship is between various theories. eration and critical theories with pursuing economic,
There are several reasons for the existence of multiple gender or environmental equity. While they are all try-
theories. According to Cox (1986, p. 207): ‘Theory is ing to understand the world, they are looking at different
aspects of human existence. A second and related rea- have different basic assumptions about the units of
son is that a particular theory usually advances the analysis, the nature of the system and the motivation of
causes or interests of a particular group. Richer, more actors. Yet, each theory can point to some evidence to
satisfied people and states tend to favour liberal theo- support its existence and each seems to be useful in
ries that do not threaten their interests, while those dis- explaining some aspect of the global political economy.
advantaged by the system are more likely to espouse Some theorists (Strange, 1988) have suggested that peo-
critical theories. A third explanation is that it is impos- ple take an eclectic approach to theory – picking and
sible to prove a theory right or wrong. Evidence is often choosing as they wish. This can have some advantages,
disputed and interpreted in different ways. Moreover, but risks incoherence as one jumps from perspective to
unlike the laws of nature, people are able to reflect upon perspective. Readers should consider some systemized
their behaviour and change their form of organization form of integration, where various theories may be
and interaction. People may act according to mercantil- used under particular circumstances or in a hierarchy.
ist theories in some eras or situations and along liberal For example, one could have a general power politics
principles in others. approach while conceding that the system is also char-
Table 1.2 presents a summary of the perspectives. In acterized by class and gender exploitation and that
the discussion so far, our intention has been to high- there are times when cooperation can be more benefi-
light the existence of various interpretations. But what cial than conflict. Alternatively, some theories may be
is the relationship between various theories? Are they more applicable in selected time periods.
in conflict or can they be made compatible? At their IPE brings together knowledge from a number of
core, theories about IPE are incompatible because they fields and disciplines to increase our understanding of
the relationship between economics and politics across behaviour of actors and offer prescriptions about what
the national/international divide. Economic national- states and people should do in the global political econ-
ism, liberalism and critical theories are three broad omy. In Chapter 2, we turn our attention to the evolu-
schools of thought in the field, which both explain the tion of the field and methods used to study it.
Further Reading
A wide-ranging and eclectic collection of articles and State Power: Essays in International Relations
examining IPE theory can be found in Ronen Palan Theory (1989). Many of Robert Cox’s most influen-
(ed.) Global Political Economy: Contemporary tial writings are contained in (with T. Sinclair)
Theories, 2nd edn (2012). Susan Strange outlined Approaches to World Order (1996). A critical femi-
her critique of runaway finance in Mad Money: nist take on GPE is V. S. Peterson’s A Critical
When Markets Outgrow Governments (1998), Rewriting of Global Political Economy: Integrating
while an overview of her work is presented in Reproductive, Productive and Virtual Economies
Roger Tooze and Chris May (eds) Authority and (2003).
Markets: Susan Strange’s Writings on International
Political Economy (2002). Robert Keohane’s Two journals that publish a great deal of IPE analy-
groundbreaking work on regimes is found in After sis are Review of International Political Economy,
Hegemony (1984), while a collection of important and New Political Economy, both journals avail-
essays is contained in his International Institutions able at tandionline.com
Index
Abu-Lughod, Janet 25, 41–2, 43, 45, 62 Asia
absolute advantage 71, 72, 104 relations with Europe 1400–1800 56–8
absolute versus relative gains 12, 106 see also individual countries
Africa 41, 51, 52, 56, 61, 62, 64, 164, 183, 270, 283, 291, Asia Infrastructure and Investment Bank (AIIB) 235, 309,
307, 315 310
15th century 42, 43, 45, 47 Asian financial crisis 96, 141, 157, 158, 164, 171, 233, 269,
Cold War 87 300, 308, 309
decolonization 90 rival interpretations 7–8
debt 161–3, 236 Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation 121, 123
development 60, 70, 91, 92, 94, 136, 219, 220, 221, 223, Asian values 91, 226
226, 228, 234, 235, 238, 255, 260, 318 see also Confucianism
financial flows 144, 176, 187, 232, 233 Association of South East Asian Nations 97, 98, 120
gender 181, 203, 204 austerity 18, 91, 172, 173, 178, 194, 212, 270, 277, 278
health crisis 161, 273–4, 297–8 Australia 52, 57, 86, 147, 152, 164, 213, 220, 308
scramble for 73, 74, 75–6, 79, 84, 85 and asylum seekers 312
slave trade 53, 54–5, 58, 59 trade 103, 117, 120
technology gap 268 autonomy 37, 44, 66, 84, 294, 306, 316
trade 109, 116, 117, 118, 122 monetary 152, 155, 177
see also individual countries national 118, 142, 143–4, 151, 239, 300
After Hegemony 15, 21 Ayutthaya 57
agency Aztec Empire 42, 45–6, 61
and change 200
and structure 36, 37 balance of payments
Agenda 21, 250 confusion over 151
agrarian question 195–6 and debt 227
agriculture, 52, 53, 59, 89, 94, 180, 281, 303, 309 defined 152
development 57, 201, 203, 204, 211, 218, 228, 233, 259, 260 and gold standard 69
division of labour 98, 195–6 and IMF 149, 150
trade 97, 108, 112, 116–7 and TNCs 130, 139, 140
aid see economic aid balance of power 63, 64, 68, 78, 112, 132, 191, 216,
Algeria 74, 90, 181, 228 296, 301
Americas 41, 42, 43, 50 19th century 71–3, 84
15th century 45–46 ‘Bangalored’ 189
conquest of 51–4 Bank for International Settlements 97, 163, 164
dollarization 156–7 banks
see also individual countries, MERCOSUR, NAFTA and financial instability 49
anthropocene 242 types 48
anthropocentric 242, 243, 244 see also individual banks, finance
anti-dumping 111, 113 Baran, Paul 25
anti-globalization movement 97 Barings Bank 160
see also civil society, Occupy Barnett, Richard 128
Apple 94, 95, 126, 132, 190, 288, 294 Barraclough, Geoffrey 77
Argentina 65, 164, 225, 228 barter 48, 68, 103, 182
financial crisis 161, 163, 174, 221, 311 basic needs 31, 32, 228, 229, 230, 232, 233, 235, 305, 311
nationalization of oil industry 142 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 164
trade 117 Beckerman, Wilfred 247
China (Continued) climate change 218, 238, 243, 244, 261, 300, 311
economic nationalism 10 conflict 239, 264
environment 254, 257 finance 258
financial crisis 164, 167 negotiations 239, 256–8
and foreign investment 92, 93, 98 security 258–9, 280
and global division of labour 125, 180, 188–9, 190–1, significance 242
193, 195 Clinton, Bill 124, 193, 214, 257, 275, 276, 294
and global governance 116, 150, 164, 228, 300, 304 codes of conduct 145, 193
health issues 221, 296, 297 Cold War 131, 158, 195, 218, 280, 307
and Japan 79 confrontation 86–88, 134, 150, 229, 230–1, 283, 285–6,
and Latin America 174 291
opium wars 58 decolonization 90
remittances 187 end of 14, 96, 231, 251, 280–1, 286–7, 292, 293, 296, 301
security issues 292, 295 impact 99
sovereign wealth fund 159 see also security
Taiping rebellion 73, 84 Coleman, William 316
technology 273 Commodity Futures Trading Commission 275, 276
TNCs 126, 131 common sense 104, 263, 265, 278
trade 118, 120, 123 communication 82, 94, 103, 107, 127, 157, 158, 207, 233,
and US 12, 157, 169, 170 295, 306
Christianity 51, 53, 75 between people 95, 213, 266, 293, 315
cities 43, 45, 46, 49, 50, 52, 55, 56, 62, 63, 66, 84, 93, 127, 179, between states 73
218, 262, 302–3 infrastructure 26, 97, 129, 132–3, 144, 186, 272, 289
civic associations see also information technology
see civil society, nongovernmental organizations communism 18, 67, 89, 109, 194, 229, 230–1, 263, 285
civil society, 201, 221, 268 Chinese 89
debt relief and development 235–6, 237 Russian 81, 89, 219
environment 250, 258, 260 comparative advantage 24, 109, 110, 113, 116, 143, 116, 117,
gender 206, 207 118, 120, 124
global governance 305–7 criticisms of 105–8
international institutions 96, 234 and division of labour 183, 184
trade 122, 123 explained 72
TNCs 145, 146, 193, 295 and liberalism 12, 14, 71, 104–5
civilizations and TNCs 129, 130, 143
African 45 compliance 111, 192, 291, 292, 303
American 45–6 Concert of Europe 71, 301
Chinese 43–4, 307 Confucianism 44, 226
Indian 44–5, 54 see also Asian values
interaction 40, 41–2, 51–8, 58–62, 74–6, 102, 290 Congo 85, 117, 220, 228, 236
Middle Eastern 41–2 and colonialism 52, 55, 75
Western 16, 41, 46–51, 66 conflict minerals 288
class 20, 37, 180, 181, 219 under rubber terror 73, 74
capitalist 67, 245 constructivism 2, 30–1, 35, 38, 265
landholding 59 consumers 281
in Marxist theory 16–18, 25, 247, 265 and economic theory 23
merchant 66 and finance 153, 156, 160, 167, 168, 169
middle 163, 214, 251 and labour rights 189, 190, 193, 196
transnational 186 and TNCs 130, 132, 137, 295
under 312 and trade theory 104, 105, 106, 110, 111, 121
upper 54, 283 and women 203, 213
and women 200, 202, 211 consumption 196, 199, 267, 288
working 67, 69, 83, 85, 88, 194 pre-1900 45, 58, 70
see also division of labour, elites and development 218, 227
global environmental change 241–61 gross national product (GNP) 106, 162, 163, 219–20, 224, 255
see also environment growth
global financial system 148–78 and development 222–6
see also finance in India and China 188–90
global governance and industrial revolution 65–8
BRICS 307–10 in trade 113, 115
civic associations 305–6 limits to 45
corporations 97, 305–7 and protectionism 12, 108–112
defined 299 of TNCs 127–31
and democracy and regulation 100, 313–6 women’s contributions 203
and development and growth 310–11 see also austerity, development
developing states 235 Guinea 116, 228, 236, 259, 297
and equality and justice 311–3
and environment 241, 248 Haas, Peter 250, 278
expertise 263–4, 304 Hamilton, Alexander 8, 20, 282, 298
governance levels 302–3 Hanseatic League 49, 50, 57
and international organizations 304 harmony of interest 13
large-scale change 301–21 critique of 16, 78
morality 304 Hayek, Friedrich 13, 20
regimes 303–4 health 196, 307, 311
and states 300–1 and development 89, 162, 168, 169, 185, 188, 219, 221,
see also regimes, Global Compact 233, 235, 236
global political economy and environment 243, 250, 251, 252, 254, 255, 258, 259
use of the term 23 and indigenous people 51–2
see also international political economy MDGs 31, 218
Global South 222 products 128, 267
see also Third World, developing countries public good 23
global supply chains 137, 138, 146, 147, 192, 304 and safety 10, 110, 193
global value chains 138 and security 281, 282, 291, 294, 296–8
globalization standards 111, 204
defined 26 and trade 10, 14, 103, 111, 118, 119, 121, 273–4
impact on IPE research 2–3 and tax avoidance 173
project 93, 225 and TNCs 138, 145, 190
views of 8, 9, 11, 13, 17 women’s 199, 200, 204, 207, 209, 211, 212, 215
gold exchange system 149 see also disease, World Health Organization
gold standard 93, 105, 155 Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative 162, 236
19th century 61–3, 68–70 Heckscher-Ohlin theorem 105
interwar period 78, 79, 80–1, 88, 100, 149 hedge funds 159, 164, 166, 167, 174, 259, 275
governance 233, 234, 258, 284, 289, 291, 298 hegemony 20, 62
1400–1800 61–2 after 14, 15
19th century 85 British 63, 68–74
good 231, 236, 271, 293, 311 counter 241
post-1945 99 neo-Gramscian view 18, 19, 20, 265, 278
see also global governance, states US 11, 31, 91, 131, 194, 235
greed 24, 52, 60, 85 hegemonic stability theory 9, 82
Grieco, Joseph 32 historical materialism 19
Grameen Bank 165 see also Marxism
Gramsci, Antonio 19, 20 HIV/AIDS
see also neo-Gramscian approaches and debt 161–2
Greece 154 and development 218
financial crisis 150, 170, 171–3, 194, 277 and gender 208
Gresham, Thomas 48 and property rights 119, 272–4
Gresham’s law 48 and security 296, 297
Japan 34, 93, 99, 160, 175, 181, 188, 190, 212, 254, 273 organized 29, 30, 98, 177, 185, 193, 194, 195, 306
Cold War 86, 87, 88 post-1945 103
economic model 29, 70, 91, 185, 189, 283 rights 108, 121, 191–3
global governance 96, 304, 307, 310 standards 18, 113, 123, 189, 191–3, 195, 304, 313
imperialism 75, 77, 84 see also division of labour, migration, peasants, slavery,
IMS 153, 154 trade unions, work
Industrial Revolution 64, 68 land grabbing, see transnational land acquisitions
protectionism 8 Landes, David 13, 40, 62, 66, 85
Second World War 79, 90 Latin America 177, 194, 315
TNCs 125, 126, 127, 131, 136, 141, 185 compared with East Asia 195, 225–6, 227–8
trade 120, 121, 122 debt 161
Jubilee Debt Campaign 235, 313 development 204, 219, 223, 229, 232, 233, 238, 269
just in time production 136, 185 dollarization 156
environment 255
Kabeer, Naila 205 history 53, 59, 60, 74, 75, 78, 183
Kaldor, Mary 282, 287 industrialization 92, 112
Kant, Immanuel 14, 20, 285 remittances 187
Keohane, Robert 1, 15, 20, 21 trade 122, 165
Keynes, John Maynard 13, 20, 81 and US 58
Keynesian policies 13, 23, 24, 81, 88, 92, 98, 99, 227, 266 law 24, 26, 44, 62, 131, 156, 184, 215, 249, 276, 282, 300
Keynesianism state 37, 87 of capital 18
Kindleberger, Charles 80, 85 and cooperation 26
Kingsbury, Benedict 241 Corn Laws 71
Kirchner, Cristina 142 customary 50
Klein, Naomi 145 English 57
knowledge 51, 184, 226, 265 international 78, 82, 96, 315
defined 263 of nature 24
diffusion 26, 105, 271–2, 273 Poor Law 66
economy 266–7 property 260
and environment 249, 250–1 rule of 89, 233, 271
and global governance 275, 306 sources 44, 49
importance 2, 40, 263–4 tax 173, 174, 176
indigenous 277 trade 97, 111, 114, 119, 266
and Industrial Revolution 66, 67 universal 20
in IPE 34, 36 US 158, 189, 266
local 119, 137 Law, David 1, 304
and production 185 League of Nations 78, 79, 82, 87, 95, 292, 301
in social sciences 22–3, 31 legitimacy see democracy
structure 11, 61, 84, 129, 262, 277, 278 Lenin, V. I. 18, 20, 70, 76, 129, 283
TNCs, 119, 140, 141, 148 Leopold II of Belgium 73, 74, 85
see also epistemic communities, ideas, information revolu- Liberia 184, 228, 236, 297
tion, technology liberalism 84, 93, 194, 200
Krasner, Stephen 9, 20 19th century 51, 66, 71
Kuznets curve 219 absolute gains 12
Kyoto Protocol 84, 99, 245, 256, 257, 311 actors 13
as a cobweb 16
labour 17, 92 conflict and cooperation 13–4
1400–1800 53–4, 55, 57, 58–9 division of labour dynamics 14
19th century 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 74, 81, 83, 84 embedded 31, 88, 98, 100, 112, 266, 268, 271
child 192, 193 environment 247
forced 192, 194 institutionalism 15
informal 306 neo- 138, 211, 229–32, 266, 269
mobility 156 and peace 284–5
sovereignty 10, 34, 176, 227, 280, 287, 291 Mexico 229, 230
early states 49, 57 resistance to 235
global governance 315 see also Washington Consensus
selling 184 structure and agency debate 36–7, 165
TNCs 119, 127, 139, 145, 146 subsidy 103, 106, 108, 111, 115, 117, 118, 131, 161,
Soviet Union 76, 301, 306 211, 302
and Cold War 87–8, 96, 134, 150, 158, 280, 285–6, 291 sugar 40, 47, 52, 54, 55, 57, 60, 183
demise 18, 89, 269, 287, 298, 303 sustainable development 150, 231, 233, 241, 243, 246, 247,
Spain 154, 219 248, 250, 252, 253–6, 257, 258, 310
pre-1900 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 75, 96 defined 231
financial crisis 171, 173, 179 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) 208, 218
TNCs 142 sweatshops 154, 180, 193
special and differential treatment 115, 119–20 Sweezy, Paul 25
speculation 7, 60, 155, 165, 171, 276
Spero, Joan 1 Taiwan 75, 164, 170, 188
spices 43, 47, 52, 59 companies 118, 189, 190
state development 87, 90, 141, 186, 224, 270
authoritarian 87, 89, 92–3, 123, 193, 195, 226, 285, 291, tariffs 10, 27, 31, 106, 110, 124, 162, 225
300, 309 defined 103
communist 81, 89, 91, 93, 109, 140, 150, 188, 229, 231, historic 68, 82
254, 291, 293 reductions within GATT 97, 112–113, 114, 117
‘competition’ 92, 144, 300 Taylor, Fredrick 185
defined 49 Taylor, Ian 34
developmental 37, 92, 224, 225, 226, 269, 271 Taylorism 185
fascist 79, 81, 87 tax 53, 57, 67, 103, 140, 145, 150, 153, 162, 171, 185, 269,
and global governance 302–5 287, 288
liberal 66–7, 81, 84, 85, 98, 192 abuse 173–6, 94
national capitalism 227–9 currency 7
neoliberalism 229–32 cuts 154, 168, 169
origins 49–51 havens 93, 184
transformation 91–3 payers 14, 276
welfare 78, 91, 195, 300, 301, 307 TNCs 130, 134, 139, 140, 144, 145–6
see also embedded liberalism, Keynesianism, neoliberal- Tobin, 165
ism, offshore, security, Washington Consensus technology 74, 106, 196, 266, 275, 283, 293, 295, 315, 316
state–firm relations 11, 142–6, 191, 305 bubble 94, 166
state–society relations 37, 67, 69, 83, 96, 107, 122, 123, 145, change 66, 94, 103, 132, 137, 145, 186, 266, 267,
146, 183, 193, 194, 199, 201, 207, 216, 222–3, 234, 266–8, 293, 312
305–6 Chinese 43, 44
see also embedded liberalism, neoliberalism, social forces, defence 10
world order defined 262
statism see economic nationalism and development 94, 225
Steans, Jill 198 diffusion 94, 271–2, 273
Stiglitz, Joseph 314 European 51, 66–7, 84
stock market 29, 47, 91, 94, 127, 133, 158, 163, 165, 166, 167, environment 244, 248
270, 275, 314 gap 26, 267–8
Stopford, John 305 military 61, 89, 286
Strange, Susan 1, 11, 20, 21, 36, 129, 162, 178, 262, 305 TNCs 13, 127, 129, 130, 131, 132–3, 135, 136, 140, 141,
strategic trade theory 68, 107 143, 190
structural adjustment programmes (SAPS) 91, 143, 151, see also Industrial Revolution, information revolution,
195 knowledge, naval power
content 150, 183, 269 terror 105, 302, 303
gendered impact 202, 211, 212 nuclear 97
impact 233, 270, 297 rubber 74, 85
terrorism 199, 282, 292, 293, 296, 306, 307 trade unions 65, 67, 93, 188, 190, 196, 209, 215, 267
Middle Eastern 289–90 Trans - Atlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP)
nuclear 97 120
rubber 74, 81 Trans - Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPP) 120, 121, 122
textiles 105, 180, 186 transnational class 16, 25
pre-1900 47, 53, 54, 55, 64, 68, 183–4 transnational corporations (TNCs)
and development 110, 185 communication 132–3
and gender 135 costs and benefits 9, 13, 14, 17, 20, 130–1, 138–42
protectionism 113, 189 defined 127–8
Thailand finance 133
pre-1900 57 Fordism 136
development 225, 228 and gender 215–6
financial crisis 6, 161, 164 global governance 305
labour conditions 192 globalization of 131–5
sex trade 212 global supply chain 137–8
trade 117, 120 growth theories 128–31
theory importance 98, 125, 160, 186
contemporary GPE 32–6 labour 187, 189
explanation for diversity 19 largest 126
methods 26–31 mergers 136–7
purpose 7, 19 organizational principles 135–8
traditional IPE 8–21 power 9
Tilly, Charles 50 regulating 133–4, 142–6, 188, 192, 273
Third World self-regulation 97, 123, 193
coalition 238–9 and trade 110, 118
and Cold War 89–90 see also corporations, division of labour, state–firm
and FDI 134, 138–43 relations
use of term 86, 222–3 transnational land acquisitions 259–60
see also developing countries, development transnational networks 43, 45, 57, 88, 95, 97, 131, 132, 136,
Thomas, Caroline 219, 312 195, 205, 245, 289, 293, 306
Thomas, George 97 see also civil society, nongovernmental organizations
Touré, Samori 75 transparency 7, 95, 111, 112, 121, 122, 165, 175, 176, 236,
trade 271, 284, 306, 316
1400–1800 59 transportation 45, 46, 55, 67, 129, 186, 212, 233, 238, 303,
19th-century free trade 71, 82–3 311
barriers 8, 28, 82, 113, 124, 132 triangular trade 54–6, 183
defined 102 Triffin dilemma 149, 153
developing countries 115–20 Triffin, Robert 149
environmental degradation 248 Trilateral Commission 253
free 71, 104–8 Truman, Harry S. 112, 239
gains from 9, 105–6, 108, 192 tulip mania 60
growth of 108–12
institutional arrangements 112–5 underdevelopment 17, 222–3, 227–8, 282, 294
intra-Asian 52 unemployment 30, 91, 92, 152, 178, 185, 195, 230, 265
intra-firm 105, 109, 110 pre-1900 70
intra-industry 105, 109, 110 1970s 25, 110, 145
post-1945 97–8 2008–12 163, 173, 194, 231
regional agreements 120–2 female 203
terms of 228, 238 interwar 79, 80, 81
see also comparative advantage, protectionism, WTO United Kingdom 92, 259, 284, 294, 314
Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) 114, gender 182, 212, 213, 214
115, 116, 118, 119, 272–3, 274 global governance 154, 257, 292, 304, 310
see also intellectual property rights finance 152, 155, 158, 165, 167, 176, 270
Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMS) 114, 119 post-1945 order 88
Wolfensohn, James 195, 297 structural adjustment lending 229, 239, 269
Wolfowitz, Paul 210, 234 structure 232
Wollstonecraft, Mary 16, 67 and technology 268
women and women 159, 209–10
and colonialism 57, 60 see also Washington Consensus
and credit 159 World Conference on Women 206, 207
Decade for 206, 207, 208 World Development Report 258
employment trends 98–9, 180, 182, 184, 199, 200, 203–5, World Economic Forum 186, 200, 216
210–16 World Health Organization (WHO) 209, 297, 304
in factories 65, 83, 135, 181, 189, 192 world order 18, 37, 77, 107, 287, 300, 301, 316
progress 89 see also global governance
professional 214 World Social Forum 186, 278
and race 181 World Trade Organization (WTO)
UN Women 209 agreements 114
world conferences 206–9 beef dispute 111, 122, 264
see also division of labour, feminism, gender, work compared with GATT 96, 114
work and democracy 122, 123
domestic 213–14 developing countries 116–20, 240–1
sex 99, 212–3 dispute settlement 26, 97, 114, 303, 304
unpaid 180, 202 Doha Declaration/Round 115, 116, 239
see also division of labour, labour, slavery and environment 97
working class see class global governance 100, 146, 164, 301, 302, 303, 304, 305,
World Bank 232–5, 238 308, 314, 315
and basic needs 228, 229 governance 114
criticism of 97, 232–3, 234 IPR 272–4, 305
debt relief 162, 236 labour rights 191–2, 195
democracy 234 legitimacy 122–34
and East Asia 164, 235 liberalism orientation 14, 18, 28, 183, 191
and environment 233, 252, 253 new protectionism 111
and global governance 96, 99–100, 114, 161, 164–5, 228, origins 96, 114–5
237, 286, 301, 303, 304, 309, 310, 314, 316 principles 112, 124
and health 297 protests 97, 123, 196
inspection panel 236 regionalism 120
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development Seattle Ministerial Conference 123, 314
88, 149, 232, 233 see also process and production methods, Trade-Related
International Development Association 232 Intellectual Property Rights, Trade-Related Investment
and labour 164 Measures
liberal policies 14, 234, 301 world wars, 68, 77–9
origins 87, 88, 150, 156 lessons of 14, 25, 87, 280, 286
primary roles 232 worldviews 278
president 235 see also ideas
reforms 229, 233
social safety net 198, 233 zero-sum game 8, 10, 18, 20, 52, 104