Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 154380 October 5, 2005

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
CIPRIANO ORBECIDO III, Respondent.

DECISION

QUISUMBING, J.:

Given a valid marriage between two Filipino citizens, where one party is later
naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a valid divorce decree capacitating him or
her to remarry, can the Filipino spouse likewise remarry under Philippine law?

Before us is a case of first impression that behooves the Court to make a definite
ruling on this apparently novel question, presented as a pure question of law.

In this petition for review, the Solicitor General assails the Decision1 dated May 15,
2002, of the Regional Trial Court of Molave, Zamboanga del Sur, Branch 23 and
its Resolution2 dated July 4, 2002 denying the motion for reconsideration. The court a
quo had declared that herein respondent Cipriano Orbecido III is capacitated to
remarry. The fallo of the impugned Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, by virtue of the provision of the second paragraph of Art. 26 of the

Family Code and by reason of the divorce decree obtained against him by his
American wife, the petitioner is given the capacity to remarry under the Philippine
Law.

IT IS SO ORDERED.3

The factual antecedents, as narrated by the trial court, are as follows.

On May 24, 1981, Cipriano Orbecido III married Lady Myros M. Villanueva at the
United Church of Christ in the Philippines in Lam-an, Ozamis City. Their marriage
was blessed with a son and a daughter, Kristoffer Simbortriz V. Orbecido and Lady
Kimberly V. Orbecido.
In 1986, Cipriano’s wife left for the United States bringing along their son Kristoffer.
A few years later, Cipriano discovered that his wife had been naturalized as an
American citizen.

Sometime in 2000, Cipriano learned from his son that his wife had obtained a divorce
decree and then married a certain Innocent Stanley. She, Stanley and her child by him
currently live at 5566 A. Walnut Grove Avenue, San Gabriel, California.

Cipriano thereafter filed with the trial court a petition for authority to remarry
invoking Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code. No opposition was filed.
Finding merit in the petition, the court granted the same. The Republic, herein
petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), sought reconsideration
but it was denied.

In this petition, the OSG raises a pure question of law:

WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT CAN REMARRY UNDER ARTICLE 26 OF

THE FAMILY CODE4

The OSG contends that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code is not applicable
to the instant case because it only applies to a valid mixed marriage; that is, a
marriage celebrated between a Filipino citizen and an alien. The proper remedy,
according to the OSG, is to file a petition for annulment or for legal
separation.5Furthermore, the OSG argues there is no law that governs respondent’s
situation. The OSG posits that this is a matter of legislation and not of judicial
determination.6

For his part, respondent admits that Article 26 is not directly applicable to his case but
insists that when his naturalized alien wife obtained a divorce decree which
capacitated her to remarry, he is likewise capacitated by operation of law pursuant to
Section 12, Article II of the Constitution.7

At the outset, we note that the petition for authority to remarry filed before the trial
court actually constituted a petition for declaratory relief. In this connection, Section
1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court provides:

RULE 63

DECLARATORY RELIEF AND SIMILAR REMEDIES

Section 1. Who may file petition—Any person interested under a deed, will, contract
or other written instrument, or whose rights are affected by a statute, executive order
or regulation, ordinance, or other governmental regulation may, before breach or
violation thereof, bring an action in the appropriate Regional Trial Court to determine
any question of construction or validity arising, and for a declaration of his rights or
duties, thereunder.

...

The requisites of a petition for declaratory relief are: (1) there must be a justiciable
controversy; (2) the controversy must be between persons whose interests are adverse;
(3) that the party seeking the relief has a legal interest in the controversy; and (4) that
the issue is ripe for judicial determination. 8

This case concerns the applicability of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 to a marriage

between two Filipino citizens where one later acquired alien citizenship, obtained a
divorce decree, and remarried while in the U.S.A. The interests of the parties are also
adverse, as petitioner representing the State asserts its duty to protect the institution of
marriage while respondent, a private citizen, insists on a declaration of his capacity to
remarry. Respondent, praying for relief, has legal interest in the controversy. The issue
raised is also ripe for judicial determination inasmuch as when respondent remarries,
litigation ensues and puts into question the validity of his second marriage.

Coming now to the substantive issue, does Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family
Code apply to the case of respondent? Necessarily, we must dwell on how this
provision had come about in the first place, and what was the intent of the legislators
in its enactment?

Brief Historical Background

On July 6, 1987, then President Corazon Aquino signed into law Executive Order No.
209, otherwise known as the "Family Code," which took effect on August 3, 1988.
Article 26 thereof states:

All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force
in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid
in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35, 37, and 38.

On July 17, 1987, shortly after the signing of the original Family Code, Executive
Order No. 227 was likewise signed into law, amending Articles 26, 36, and 39 of the
Family Code. A second paragraph was added to Article 26. As so amended, it now
provides:
ART. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the
laws in force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall
also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and
(6), 36, 37 and 38.

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and
a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him
or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under
Philippine law. (Emphasis supplied)

On its face, the foregoing provision does not appear to govern the situation presented
by the case at hand. It seems to apply only to cases where at the time of the
celebration of the marriage, the parties are a Filipino citizen and a foreigner. The
instant case is one where at the time the marriage was solemnized, the parties were
two Filipino citizens, but later on, the wife was naturalized as an American citizen and
subsequently obtained a divorce granting her capacity to remarry, and indeed she
remarried an American citizen while residing in the U.S.A.

Noteworthy, in the Report of the Public Hearings 9 on the Family Code, the Catholic
Bishops’ Conference of the Philippines (CBCP) registered the following objections to
Paragraph 2 of Article 26:

1. The rule is discriminatory. It discriminates against those whose spouses are

Filipinos who divorce them abroad. These spouses who are divorced will not be able
to re-marry, while the spouses of foreigners who validly divorce them abroad can.

2. This is the beginning of the recognition of the validity of divorce even for Filipino
citizens. For those whose foreign spouses validly divorce them abroad will also be
considered to be validly divorced here and can re-marry. We propose that this be
deleted and made into law only after more widespread consultation. (Emphasis
supplied.)

Legislative Intent

Records of the proceedings of the Family Code deliberations showed that the intent of
Paragraph 2 of Article 26, according to Judge Alicia Sempio-Diy, a member of
the Civil Code Revision Committee, is to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino
spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer
married to the Filipino spouse.

Interestingly, Paragraph 2 of Article 26 traces its origin to the 1985 case of Van Dorn
v. Romillo, Jr.10 The Van Dorn case involved a marriage between a Filipino citizen and
a foreigner. The Court held therein that a divorce decree validly obtained by the alien
spouse is valid in the Philippines, and consequently, the Filipino spouse is capacitated
to remarry under Philippine law.

Does the same principle apply to a case where at the time of the celebration of the
marriage, the parties were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them obtains a foreign
citizenship by naturalization?

The jurisprudential answer lies latent in the 1998 case of Quita v. Court of
Appeals.11 In Quita, the parties were, as in this case, Filipino citizens when they got
married. The wife became a naturalized American citizen in 1954 and obtained a
divorce in the same year. The Court therein hinted, by way of obiter dictum, that a
Filipino divorced by his naturalized foreign spouse is no longer married under
Philippine law and can thus remarry.

Thus, taking into consideration the legislative intent and applying the rule of reason,
we hold that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 should be interpreted to include cases involving
parties who, at the time of the celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but
later on, one of them becomes naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a divorce
decree. The Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to remarry as if the other party
were a foreigner at the time of the solemnization of the marriage. To rule otherwise
would be to sanction absurdity and injustice. Where the interpretation of a statute
according to its exact and literal import would lead to mischievous results or
contravene the clear purpose of the legislature, it should be construed according to its
spirit and reason, disregarding as far as necessary the letter of the law. A statute may
therefore be extended to cases not within the literal meaning of its terms, so long as
they come within its spirit or intent.12

If we are to give meaning to the legislative intent to avoid the absurd situation where
the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce
is no longer married to the Filipino spouse, then the instant case must be deemed as
coming within the contemplation of Paragraph 2 of Article 26.

In view of the foregoing, we state the twin elements for the application of Paragraph 2
of Article 26 as follows:

1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a Filipino citizen and a
foreigner; and

2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to
remarry.
The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the celebration
of the marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad by
the alien spouse capacitating the latter to remarry.

In this case, when Cipriano’s wife was naturalized as an American citizen, there was
still a valid marriage that has been celebrated between her and Cipriano. As fate
would have it, the naturalized alien wife subsequently obtained a valid divorce
capacitating her to remarry. Clearly, the twin requisites for the application of
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 are both present in this case. Thus Cipriano, the "divorced"
Filipino spouse, should be allowed to remarry.

We are also unable to sustain the OSG’s theory that the proper remedy of the Filipino
spouse is to file either a petition for annulment or a petition for legal separation.
Annulment would be a long and tedious process, and in this particular case, not even
feasible, considering that the marriage of the parties appears to have all the badges of
validity. On the other hand, legal separation would not be a sufficient remedy for it
would not sever the marriage tie; hence, the legally separated Filipino spouse would
still remain married to the naturalized alien spouse.

However, we note that the records are bereft of competent evidence duly submitted by
respondent concerning the divorce decree and the naturalization of respondent’s wife.
It is settled rule that one who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it and mere
allegation is not evidence.13

Accordingly, for his plea to prosper, respondent herein must prove his allegation that
his wife was naturalized as an American citizen. Likewise, before a foreign divorce
decree can be recognized by our own courts, the party pleading it must prove the
divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it. 14Such
foreign law must also be proved as our courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign
laws. Like any other fact, such laws must be alleged and proved. 15 Furthermore,
respondent must also show that the divorce decree allows his former wife to remarry
as specifically required in Article 26. Otherwise, there would be no evidence sufficient
to declare that he is capacitated to enter into another marriage.

Nevertheless, we are unanimous in our holding that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the

Family Code (E.O. No. 209, as amended by E.O. No. 227), should be interpreted to
allow a Filipino citizen, who has been divorced by a spouse who had acquired foreign
citizenship and remarried, also to remarry. However, considering that in the present
petition there is no sufficient evidence submitted and on record, we are unable to
declare, based on respondent’s bare allegations that his wife, who was naturalized as
an American citizen, had obtained a divorce decree and had remarried an American,
that respondent is now capacitated to remarry. Such declaration could only be made
properly upon respondent’s submission of the aforecited evidence in his favor.

ACCORDINGLY, the petition by the Republic of the Philippines is GRANTED. The

assailed Decision dated May 15, 2002, and Resolution dated July 4, 2002, of the
Regional Trial Court of Molave, Zamboanga del Sur, Branch 23, are hereby SET
ASIDE.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR.

Chief Justice

Chairman

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO, ANTONIO T. CARPIO

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ADOLFO S. AZCUNA

Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the
conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR.

Chief Justice
 FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 133778 March 14, 2000

ENGRACE NIÑAL for Herself and as Guardian ad Litem of the minors

BABYLINE NIÑAL, INGRID NIÑAL, ARCHIE NIÑAL & PEPITO NIÑAL,
JR., petitioners,
vs.
NORMA BAYADOG, respondent.

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

May the heirs of a deceased person file a petition for the declaration of nullity of his
marriage after his death?

Pepito Niñal was married to Teodulfa Bellones on September 26, 1974. Out of their
marriage were born herein petitioners. Teodulfa was shot by Pepito resulting in her
death on April 24, 1985. One year and 8 months thereafter or on December 11, 1986,
Pepito and respondent Norma Badayog got married without any marriage license. In
lieu thereof, Pepito and Norma executed an affidavit dated December 11, 1986 stating
that they had lived together as husband and wife for at least five years and were thus
exempt from securing a marriage license. On February 19, 1997, Pepito died in a car
accident. After their father's death, petitioners filed a petition for declaration of nullity
of the marriage of Pepito to Norma alleging that the said marriage was void for lack of
a marriage license. The case was filed under the assumption that the validity or
invalidity of the second marriage would affect petitioner's successional rights. Norma
filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that petitioners have no cause of action since
they are not among the persons who could file an action for "annulment of marriage"
under Article 47 of the Family Code.

Judge Ferdinand J. Marcos of the Regional Trial Court of Toledo City, Cebu, Branch
59, dismissed the petition after finding that the Family Code is "rather silent, obscure,
insufficient" to resolve the following issues:

(1) Whether or not plaintiffs have a cause of action against defendant in asking
for the declaration of the nullity of marriage of their deceased father, Pepito G.
Niñal, with her specially so when at the time of the filing of this instant suit,
their father Pepito G. Niñal is already dead;
 (2) Whether or not the second marriage of plaintiffs' deceased father with
defendant is null and void ab initio;

(3) Whether or not plaintiffs are estopped from assailing the validity of the
second marriage after it was dissolved due to their father's death. 1

Thus, the lower court ruled that petitioners should have filed the action to declare null
and void their father's marriage to respondent before his death, applying by analogy
Article 47 of the Family Code which enumerates the time and the persons who could
initiate an action for annulment of marriage. 2 Hence, this petition for review with this
Court grounded on a pure question of law.

This petition was originally dismissed for non-compliance with Section 11, Rule 13 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, and because "the verification failed to state the
basis of petitioner's averment that the allegations in the petition are "true and
correct"." It was thus treated as an unsigned pleading which produces no legal effect
under Section 3, Rule 7, of the 1997 Rules. 3 However, upon motion of petitioners,
this Court reconsidered the dismissal and reinstated the petition for review. 4

The two marriages involved herein having been solemnized prior to the effectivity of
the Family Code (FC), the applicable law to determine their validity is the Civil Code
which was the law in effect at the time of their celebration. 5 A valid marriage license
is a requisite of marriage under Article 53 of the Civil Code, 6 the absence of which
renders the marriage void ab initio pursuant to Article 80(3) 7 in relation to Article
58. 8 The requirement and issuance of marriage license is the State's demonstration of
its involvement and participation in every marriage, in the maintenance of which the
general public is interested. 9 This interest proceeds from the constitutional mandate
that the State recognizes the sanctity of family life and of affording protection to the
family as a basic "autonomous social institution." 10 Specifically, the Constitution
considers marriage as an "inviolable social institution," and is the foundation of family
life which shall be protected by the State. 11 This is why the Family Code considers
marriage as "a special contract of permanent union" 12 and case law considers it "not
just an adventure but a lifetime commitment." 13

However, there are several instances recognized by the Civil Code wherein a marriage
license is dispensed with, one of which is that provided in Article 76, 14 referring to
the marriage of a man and a woman who have lived together and exclusively with
each other as husband and wife for a continuous and unbroken period of at least five
years before the marriage. The rationale why no license is required in such case is to
avoid exposing the parties to humiliation, shame and embarrassment concomitant with
the scandalous cohabitation of persons outside a valid marriage due to the publication
of every applicant's name for a marriage license. The publicity attending the marriage
license may discourage such persons from legitimizing their status. 15 To preserve
peace in the family, avoid the peeping and suspicious eye of public exposure and
contain the source of gossip arising from the publication of their names, the law
deemed it wise to preserve their privacy and exempt them from that requirement.

There is no dispute that the marriage of petitioners' father to respondent Norma was
celebrated without any marriage license. In lieu thereof, they executed an affidavit
stating that "they have attained the age of majority, and, being unmarried, have lived
together as husband and wife for at least five years, and that we now desire to marry
each other." 16 The only issue that needs to be resolved pertains to what nature of
cohabitation is contemplated under Article 76 of the Civil Code to warrant the
counting of the five year period in order to exempt the future spouses from securing a
marriage license. Should it be a cohabitation wherein both parties are capacitated to
marry each other during the entire five-year continuous period or should it be a
cohabitation wherein both parties have lived together and exclusively with each other
as husband and wife during the entire five-year continuous period regardless of
whether there is a legal impediment to their being lawfully married, which
impediment may have either disappeared or intervened sometime during the
cohabitation period?

Working on the assumption that Pepito and Norma have lived together as husband and
wife for five years without the benefit of marriage, that five-year period should be
computed on the basis of a cohabitation as "husband and wife" where the only missing
factor is the special contract of marriage to validate the union. In other words, the
five-year common-law cohabitation period, which is counted back from the date of
celebration of marriage, should be a period of legal union had it not been for the
absence of the marriage. This 5-year period should be the years immediately before
the day of the marriage and it should be a period of cohabitation characterized by
exclusivity — meaning no third party was involved at anytime within the 5 years and
continuity — that is unbroken. Otherwise, if that continuous 5-year cohabitation is
computed without any distinction as to whether the parties were capacitated to marry
each other during the entire five years, then the law would be sanctioning immorality
and encouraging parties to have common law relationships and placing them on the
same footing with those who lived faithfully with their spouse. Marriage being a
special relationship must be respected as such and its requirements must be strictly
observed. The presumption that a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband
and wife is based on the approximation of the requirements of the law. The parties
should not be afforded any excuse to not comply with every single requirement and
later use the same missing element as a pre-conceived escape ground to nullify their
marriage. There should be no exemption from securing a marriage license unless the
circumstances clearly fall within the ambit of the exception. It should be noted that a
license is required in order to notify the public that two persons are about to be united
in matrimony and that anyone who is aware or has knowledge of any impediment to
the union of the two shall make it known to the local civil registrar. 17 The Civil Code
provides:

Art. 63: . . . This notice shall request all persons having knowledge of any
impediment to the marriage to advice the local civil registrar thereof. . . .

Art. 64: Upon being advised of any alleged impediment to the marriage, the
local civil registrar shall forthwith make an investigation, examining persons
under oath. . . .

This is reiterated in the Family Code thus:

Art. 17 provides in part: . . . This notice shall request all persons having
knowledge of any impediment to the marriage to advise the local civil registrar
thereof. . . .

Art. 18 reads in part: . . . In case of any impediment known to the local civil
registrar or brought to his attention, he shall note down the particulars thereof
and his findings thereon in the application for a marriage license. . . .

This is the same reason why our civil laws, past or present, absolutely prohibited the
concurrence of multiple marriages by the same person during the same period. Thus,
any marriage subsequently contracted during the lifetime of the first spouse shall be
illegal and void, 18 subject only to the exception in cases of absence or where the
prior marriage was dissolved or annulled. The Revised Penal Code complements the
civil law in that the contracting of two or more marriages and the having of
extramarital affairs are considered felonies, i.e., bigamy and concubinage and
adultery. 19 The law sanctions monogamy.

In this case, at the time of Pepito and respondent's marriage, it cannot be said that they
have lived with each other as husband and wife for at least five years prior to their
wedding day. From the time Pepito's first marriage was dissolved to the time of his
marriage with respondent, only about twenty months had elapsed. Even assuming that
Pepito and his first wife had separated in fact, and thereafter both Pepito and
respondent had started living with each other that has already lasted for five years, the
fact remains that their five-year period cohabitation was not the cohabitation
contemplated by law. It should be in the nature of a perfect union that is valid under
the law but rendered imperfect only by the absence of the marriage contract. Pepito
had a subsisting marriage at the time when he started cohabiting with respondent. It is
immaterial that when they lived with each other, Pepito had already been separated in
fact from his lawful spouse. The subsistence of the marriage even where there was
actual severance of the filial companionship between the spouses cannot make any
cohabitation by either spouse with any third party as being one as "husband and wife".

Having determined that the second marriage involved in this case is not covered by
the exception to the requirement of a marriage license, it is void ab initio because of
the absence of such element.

The next issue to be resolved is: do petitioners have the personality to file a petition to
declare their father's marriage void after his death?

Contrary to respondent judge's ruling, Article 47 of the Family Code 20 cannot be

applied even by analogy to petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage. The second
ground for annulment of marriage relied upon by the trial court, which allows "the
sane spouse" to file an annulment suit "at anytime before the death of either party" is
inapplicable. Article 47 pertains to the grounds, periods and persons who can file an
annulment suit, not a suit for declaration of nullity of marriage. The Code is silent as
to who can file a petition to declare the nullity of a marriage. Voidable and void
marriages are not identical. A marriage that is annulable is valid until otherwise
declared by the court; whereas a marriage that is void ab initio is considered as having
never to have taken place 21 and cannot be the source of rights. The first can be
generally ratified or confirmed by free cohabitation or prescription while the other can
never be ratified. A voidable marriage cannot be assailed collaterally except in a direct
proceeding while a void marriage can be attacked collaterally. Consequently, void
marriages can be questioned even after the death of either party but voidable
marriages can be assailed only during the lifetime of the parties and not after death of
either, in which case the parties and their offspring will be left as if the marriage had
been perfectly valid. 22 That is why the action or defense for nullity is
imprescriptible, unlike voidable marriages where the action prescribes. Only the
parties to a voidable marriage can assail it but any proper interested party may attack a
void marriage. Void marriages have no legal effects except those declared by law
concerning the properties of the alleged spouses, regarding co-ownership or
ownership through actual joint contribution, 23 and its effect on the children born to
such void marriages as provided in Article 50 in relation to Article 43 and 44 as well
as Article 51, 53 and 54 of the Family Code. On the contrary, the property regime
governing voidable marriages is generally conjugal partnership and the children
conceived before its annulment are legitimate.

Contrary to the trial court's ruling, the death of petitioner's father extinguished the
alleged marital bond between him and respondent. The conclusion is erroneous and
proceeds from a wrong premise that there was a marriage bond that was dissolved
between the two. It should be noted that their marriage was void hence it is deemed as
if it never existed at all and the death of either extinguished nothing.

Jurisprudence under the Civil Code states that no judicial decree is necessary in order
to establish the nullity of a marriage. 24 "A void marriage does not require a judicial
decree to restore the parties to their original rights or to make the marriage void but
though no sentence of avoidance be absolutely necessary, yet as well for the sake of
good order of society as for the peace of mind of all concerned, it is expedient that the
nullity of the marriage should be ascertained and declared by the decree of a court of
competent jurisdiction." 25 "Under ordinary circumstances, the effect of a void
marriage, so far as concerns the conferring of legal rights upon the parties, is as
though no marriage had ever taken place. And therefore, being good for no legal
purpose, its invalidity can be maintained in any proceeding in which the fact of
marriage may be material, either direct or collateral, in any civil court between any
parties at any time, whether before or after the death of either or both the husband and
the wife, and upon mere proof of the facts rendering such marriage void, it will be
disregarded or treated as non-existent by the courts." It is not like a voidable marriage
which cannot be collaterally attacked except in direct proceeding instituted during the
lifetime of the parties so that on the death of either, the marriage cannot be impeached,
and is made good ab initio. 26 But Article 40 of the Family Code expressly provides
that there must be a judicial declaration of the nullity of a previous marriage, though
void, before a party can enter into a second marriage 27 and such absolute nullity can
be based only on a final judgment to that effect. 28 For the same reason, the law
makes either the action or defense for the declaration of absolute nullity of marriage
imprescriptible. 29 Corollarily, if the death of either party would extinguish the cause
of action or the ground for defense, then the same cannot be considered
imprescriptible.

However, other than for purposes of remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to

declare a marriage an absolute nullity.1âwphi1 For other purposes, such as but not
limited to determination of heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement
of estate, dissolution of property regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the court
may pass upon the validity of marriage even in a suit not directly instituted to question
the same so long as it is essential to the determination of the case. This is without
prejudice to any issue that may arise in the case. When such need arises, a final
judgment of declaration of nullity is necessary even if the purpose is other than to
remarry. The clause "on the basis of a final judgment declaring such previous
marriage void" in Article 40 of the Family Code connotes that such final judgment
need not be obtained only for purpose of remarriage.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Order of the Regional Trial
Court, Toledo City, Cebu, Branch 59, dismissing Civil Case No. T-639, is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The said case is ordered REINSTATED.1âwphi1.nêt

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno and Kapunan, JJ., concur.

Pardo, J., on official business abroad.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 108763 February 13, 1997

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and RORIDEL OLAVIANO MOLINA, respondents.

PANGANIBAN, J.:

The Family Code of the Philippines provides an entirely new ground (in addition to those enumerated in the Civil Code) to assail
the validity of a marriage, namely, "psychological incapacity." Since the Code's effectivity, our courts have been swamped with
various petitions to declare marriages void based on this ground. Although this Court had interpreted the meaning of
psychological incapacity in the recent case of Santos vs. Court of Appeals, still many judges and lawyers find difficulty in applying
said novel provision in specific cases. In the present case and in the context of the herein assailed Decision of the Court of
Appeals, the Solicitor General has labelled — exaggerated to be sure but nonetheless expressive of his frustration — Article 36 as
the "most liberal divorce procedure in the world." Hence, this Court in addition to resolving the present case, finds the need to lay
down specific guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36 of the Family Code.

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 challenging the January 25, 1993 Decision1 of the Court of
Appeals2 in CA-G.R. CV No. 34858 affirming in toto the May 14, 1991 decision of the Regional Trial Court of La Trinidad,3 Benguet,
which declared the marriage of respondent Roridel Olaviano Molina to Reynaldo Molina void ab initio, on the ground of "psychological
incapacity" under Article 36 of the Family Code.

The Facts

This case was commenced on August 16, 1990 with the filing by respondent Roridel O. Molina of a verified petition for declaration of nullity of
her marriage to Reynaldo Molina. Essentially, the petition alleged that Roridel and Reynaldo were married on April 14, 1985 at the San
Agustin Church4 in Manila; that a son, Andre O. Molina was born; that after a year of marriage, Reynaldo showed signs of "immaturity and
irresponsibility" as a husband and a father since he preferred to spend more time with his peers and friends on whom he squandered his
money; that he depended on his parents for aid and assistance, and was never honest with his wife in regard to their finances, resulting in
frequent quarrels between them; that sometime in February 1986, Reynaldo was relieved of his job in Manila, and since then Roridel had
been the sole breadwinner of the family; that in October 1986 the couple had a very intense quarrel, as a result of which their relationship
was estranged; that in March 1987, Roridel resigned from her job in Manila and went to live with her parents in Baguio City; that a few weeks
later, Reynaldo left Roridel and their child, and had since then abandoned them; that Reynaldo had thus shown that he was psychologically
incapable of complying with essential marital obligations and was a highly immature and habitually quarrel some individual who thought of
himself as a king to be served; and that it would be to the couple's best interest to have their marriage declared null and void in order to free
them from what appeared to be an incompatible marriage from the start.

In his Answer filed on August 28, 1989, Reynaldo admitted that he and Roridel could no longer live together as husband and wife, but
contended that their misunderstandings and frequent quarrels were due to (1) Roridel's strange behavior of insisting on maintaining her
group of friends even after their marriage; (2) Roridel's refusal to perform some of her marital duties such as cooking meals; and (3) Roridel's
failure to run the household and handle their finances.

During the pre-trial on October 17, 1990, the following were stipulated:

1. That the parties herein were legally married on April 14, 1985 at the Church of St. Augustine, Manila;

2. That out of their marriage, a child named Albert Andre Olaviano Molina was born on July 29, 1986;

3. That the parties are separated-in-fact for more than three years;

4. That petitioner is not asking support for her and her child;

5. That the respondent is not asking for damages;

6. That the common child of the parties is in the custody of the petitioner wife.

Evidence for herein respondent wife consisted of her own testimony and that of her friends Rosemarie Ventura and Maria Leonora Padilla as
well as of Ruth G. Lalas, a social worker, and of Dr. Teresita Hidalgo-Sison, a psychiatrist of the Baguio General Hospital and Medical Center.
She also submitted documents marked as Exhibits "A" to "E-1." Reynaldo did not present any evidence as he appeared only during the pre-
trial conference.

On May 14, 1991, the trial court rendered judgment declaring the marriage void. The appeal of petitioner was denied by the Court of Appeals
which affirmed in totothe RTC's decision. Hence, the present recourse.

The Issue

In his petition, the Solicitor General insists that "the Court of Appeals made an erroneous and incorrect interpretation of the phrase
'psychological incapacity' (as provided under Art. 36 of the Family Code) and made an incorrect application thereof to the facts of the case,"
adding that the appealed Decision tended "to establish in effect the most liberal divorce procedure in the world which is anathema to our
culture."

In denying the Solicitor General's appeal, the respondent Court relied5 heavily on the trial court's findings "that the marriage between the
parties broke up because of their opposing and conflicting personalities." Then, it added it sown opinion that "the Civil Code Revision
Committee (hereinafter referred to as Committee) intended to liberalize the application of our civil laws on personal and family rights. . . ." It
concluded that:

As ground for annulment of marriage, We view psychologically incapacity as a broad range of mental and behavioral
conduct on the part of one spouse indicative of how he or she regards the marital union, his or her personal
relationship with the other spouse, as well as his or her conduct in the long haul for the attainment of the principal
objectives of marriage. If said conduct, observed and considered as a whole, tends to cause the union to self-destruct
because it defeats the very objectives of marriage, then there is enough reason to leave the spouses to their individual
fates.

In the case at bar, We find that the trial judge committed no indiscretion in analyzing and deciding the instant case, as it
did, hence, We find no cogent reason to disturb the findings and conclusions thus made.

Respondent, in her Memorandum, adopts these discussions of the Court of Appeals.

The petitioner, on the other hand, argues that "opposing and conflicting personalities" is not equivalent to psychological incapacity, explaining
that such ground "is not simply the neglect by the parties to the marriage of their responsibilities and duties, but a defect in their
psychological nature which renders them incapable of performing such marital responsibilities and duties."

The Court's Ruling

The petition is meritorious.

In Leouel Santos vs. Court of Appeals6 this Court, speaking thru Mr. Justice Jose C. Vitug, ruled that "psychological incapacity should refer
to no less than a mental (nor physical) incapacity . . . and that (t)here is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine
the meaning of 'psychological incapacity' to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or
inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. This psychologic condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated." Citing
Dr. Gerardo Veloso, a former presiding judge of the Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal of the Catholic Archdiocese of Manila,7 Justice Vitug
wrote that "the psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability."

On the other hand, in the present case, there is no clear showing to us that the psychological defect spoken of is an incapacity. It appears to
us to be more of a "difficulty," if not outright "refusal" or "neglect" in the performance of some marital obligations. Mere showing of
"irreconciliable differences" and "conflicting personalities" in no wise constitutes psychological incapacity. It is not enough to prove that the
parties failed to meet their responsibilities and duties as married persons; it is essential that they must be shown to be incapable of doing so,
due to some psychological (nor physical) illness.

The evidence adduced by respondent merely showed that she and her husband could nor get along with each other. There had been no
showing of the gravity of the problem; neither its juridical antecedence nor its incurability. The expert testimony of Dr. Sison showed no
incurable psychiatric disorder but only incompatibility, not psychological incapacity. Dr. Sison testified:8

COURT

Q It is therefore the recommendation of the psychiatrist based on your findings that it is better for
the Court to annul (sic) the marriage?

A Yes, Your Honor.

Q There is no hope for the marriage?

A There is no hope, the man is also living with another woman.

Q Is it also the stand of the psychiatrist that the parties are psychologically unfit for each other but
they are psychologically fit with other parties?

A Yes, Your Honor.

Q Neither are they psychologically unfit for their professions?

A Yes, Your Honor.

The Court has no more questions.

In the case of Reynaldo, there is no showing that his alleged personality traits were constitutive of psychological incapacity existing at the
time of marriage celebration. While some effort was made to prove that there was a failure to fulfill pre-nuptial impressions of "thoughtfulness
and gentleness" on Reynaldo's part of being "conservative, homely and intelligent" on the part of Roridel, such failure of expectation is nor
indicative of antecedent psychological incapacity. If at all, it merely shows love's temporary blindness to the faults and blemishes of the
beloved.

During its deliberations, the Court decided to go beyond merely ruling on the facts of this case vis-a-vis existing law and jurisprudence. In
view of the novelty of Art. 36 of the Family Code and the difficulty experienced by many trial courts interpreting and applying it, the Court
decided to invite two amici curiae, namely, the Most Reverend Oscar V. Cruz,9 Vicar Judicial (Presiding Judge) of the National Appellate
Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, and Justice Ricardo C. Puno, 10 a member of the Family Code Revision
Committee. The Court takes this occasion to thank these friends of the Court for their informative and interesting discussions during the oral
argument on December 3, 1996, which they followed up with written memoranda.

From their submissions and the Court's own deliberations, the following guidelines in the interpretation and application of Art. 36 of the
Family Code are hereby handed down for the guidance of the bench and the bar:

(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and
continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish
the validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article on the Family, 11 recognizing it "as the
foundation of the nation." It decrees marriage as legally "inviolable," thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the
family and marriage are to be "protected" by the state.

The Family Code 12 echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and emphasizes the permanence, inviolability and solidarity
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently
proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological
— not physical. although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one
of them, was mentally or physically ill to such an extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing
them, could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the
application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis, 13 nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological
illness and its incapacitating nature explained. Expert evidence may be given qualified psychiatrist and clinical psychologists.

(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was
existing when the parties exchanged their "I do's." The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself
must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.

(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even
relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must
be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or
employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to cure them but
may not be psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as an essential obligation of marriage.

(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild
characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be
shown as downright incapacity or inability, nor a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening
disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really
accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage.

(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as
well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must
also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision.

(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or
decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. It is clear that Article 36 was taken by the Family Code Revision Committee from
Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon Law, which became effective in 1983 and which provides:

The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who are unable to assume the essential obligations of
marriage due to causes of psychological nature. 14

Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is to harmonize our civil laws with the religious faith of our people, it stands
to reason that to achieve such harmonization, great persuasive weight should be given to decision of such appellate tribunal. Ideally —
subject to our law on evidence — what is decreed as canonically invalid should also be decreed civilly void.

This is one instance where, in view of the evident source and purpose of the Family Code provision, contemporaneous religious
interpretation is to be given persuasive effect. Here, the State and the Church — while remaining independent, separate and apart from each
other — shall walk together in synodal cadence towards the same goal of protecting and cherishing marriage and the family as the inviolable
base of the nation.

(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall
he handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly staring therein his reasons for
his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to
the court such certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor
General shall discharge the equivalent function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095.

In the instant case and applying Leouel Santos, we have already ruled to grant the petition. Such ruling becomes even more cogent with the
use of the foregoing guidelines.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The marriage of Roridel Olaviano to
Reynaldo Molina subsists and remains valid.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Davide, Jr., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno Francisco, Hermosisima, Jr., and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.

Regalado, Kapunan and Mendoza, JJ., concurs in the result.

 THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 136490. October 19, 2000]

BRENDA B. MARCOS, petitioner, vs. WILSON G.

MARCOS, respondent.

DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:

Psychological incapacity, as a ground for declaring the nullity of a marriage, may be

established by the totality of evidence presented. There is no requirement, however,
that the respondent should be examined by a physician or a psychologist as a conditio
sine qua non for such declaration.

The Case

Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
assailing the July 24, 1998 Decision [1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR CV No.
55588, which disposed as follows:

"WHEREFORE, the contested decision is set aside and the marriage between the
parties is hereby declared valid."[2]

Also challenged by petitioner is the December 3, 1998 CA Resolution denying her

Motion for Reconsideration.
Earlier, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) had ruled thus:

"WHEREFORE, the marriage between petitioner Brenda B. Marcos and respondent

Wilson G. Marcos, solemnized on September 6, 1982 in Pasig City is declared null
and void ab initio pursuant to Art. 36 of the Family Code. The conjugal properties, if
any, is dissolved [sic] in accordance with Articles 126 and 129 of the same Code in
relation to Articles 50, 51 and 52 relative to the delivery of the legitime of [the]
parties' children. In the best interest and welfare of the minor children, their custody is
granted to petitioner subject to the visitation rights of respondent.

"Upon finality of this Decision, furnish copy each to the Office of the Civil Registrar
of Pasig City where the marriage was solemnized, the National Census and Statistics
Office, Manila and the Register of Deeds of Mandaluyong City for their appropriate
action consistent with this Decision.

"SO ORDERED."

The Facts

The facts as found by the Court of Appeals are as follows:

"It was established during the trial that the parties were married twice: (1) on
September 6, 1982 which was solemnized by Judge Eriberto H. Espiritu at the
Municipal Court of Pasig (Exh. A); and (2) on May 8, 1983 which was solemnized by
Rev. Eduardo L. Eleazar, Command Chaplain, at the Presidential Security Command
Chapel in Malacaang Park, Manila (Exh. A-1). Out of their marriage, five (5) children
were born (Exhs. B, C, D, E and F).

"Appellant Wilson G. Marcos joined the Armed Forces of the Philippines in

1973. Later on, he was transferred to the Presidential Security Command in
Malacaang during the Marcos Regime. Appellee Brenda B. Marcos, on the other
hand, joined the Women's Auxilliary Corps under the Philippine Air Force in
1978. After the Edsa Revolution, both of them sought a discharge from the military
service.

"They first met sometime in 1980 when both of them were assigned at the Malacaang
Palace, she as an escort of Imee Marcos and he as a Presidential Guard of President
Ferdinand Marcos. Through telephone conversations, they became acquainted and
eventually became sweethearts.

"After their marriage on September 6, 1982, they resided at No. 1702 Daisy Street,
Hulo Bliss, Mandaluyong, a housing unit which she acquired from the Bliss
Development Corporation when she was still single.

"After the downfall of President Marcos, he left the military service in 1987 and then
engaged in different business ventures that did not however prosper. As a wife, she
always urged him to look for work so that their children would see him, instead of her,
as the head of the family and a good provider. Due to his failure to engage in any
gainful employment, they would often quarrel and as a consequence, he would hit and
beat her. He would even force her to have sex with him despite her weariness. He
would also inflict physical harm on their children for a slight mistake and was so
severe in the way he chastised them. Thus, for several times during their cohabitation,
he would leave their house. In 1992, they were already living separately.
"All the while, she was engrossed in the business of selling "magic uling" and
chickens. While she was still in the military, she would first make deliveries early in
the morning before going to Malacaang.When she was discharged from the military
service, she concentrated on her business. Then, she became a supplier in the Armed
Forces of the Philippines until she was able to put up a trading and construction
company, NS Ness Trading and Construction Development Corporation.

"The 'straw that broke the camel's back' took place on October 16, 1994, when they
had a bitter quarrel. As they were already living separately, she did not want him to
stay in their house anymore. On that day, when she saw him in their house, she was so
angry that she lambasted him. He then turned violent, inflicting physical harm on her
and even on her mother who came to her aid. The following day, October 17, 1994,
she and their children left the house and sought refuge in her sister's house.

"On October 19, 1994, she submitted herself [to] medical examination at the
Mandaluyong Medical Center where her injuries were diagnosed as contusions (Exh.
G, Records, 153).

"Sometime in August 1995, she together with her two sisters and driver, went to him
at the Bliss unit in Mandaluyong to look for their missing child, Niko. Upon seeing
them, he got mad. After knowing the reason for their unexpected presence, he ran
after them with a samurai and even [beat] her driver.

"At the time of the filing of this case, she and their children were renting a house in
Camella, Paraaque, while the appellant was residing at the Bliss unit in Mandaluyong.

"In the case study conducted by Social Worker Sonia C. Millan, the children described
their father as cruel and physically abusive to them (Exh. UU, Records, pp. 85-100).

"The appellee submitted herself to psychologist Natividad A. Dayan, Ph.D., for

psychological evaluation (Exh. YY, Records, pp. 207-216), while the appellant on the
other hand, did not.

"The court a quo found the appellant to be psychologically incapacitated to perform

his marital obligations mainly because of his failure to find work to support his family
and his violent attitude towardsappellee and their children, x x x."[3]

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

Reversing the RTC, the CA held that psychological incapacity had not been
established by the totality of the evidence presented. It ratiocinated in this wise:
"Essential in a petition for annulment is the allegation of the root cause of the spouse's
psychological incapacity which should also be medically or clinically identified,
sufficiently proven by experts and clearly explained in the decision. The incapacity
must be proven to be existing at the time of the celebration of the marriage and shown
to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. It must also be grave enough to
bring about the disability of the parties to assume the essential obligations of marriage
as set forth in Articles 68 to 71 and Articles 220 to 225 of the Family Code and such
non-complied marital obligations must similarly be alleged in the petition, established
by evidence and explained in the decision.

"In the case before us, the appellant was not subjected to any psychological or
psychiatric evaluation. The psychological findings about the appellant by psychiatrist
Natividad Dayan were based only on the interviews conducted with the
appellee. Expert evidence by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists is
essential if only to prove that the parties were or any one of them was mentally or
psychically ill to be truly incognitive of the marital obligations he or she was
assuming, or as would make him or her x x x unable to assume them. In fact, he
offered testimonial evidence to show that he [was] not psychologically
incapacitated. The root cause of his supposed incapacity was not alleged in the
petition, nor medically or clinically identified as a psychological illness or sufficiently
proven by an expert.Similarly, there is no evidence at all that would show that the
appellant was suffering from an incapacity which [was] psychological or mental - not
physical to the extent that he could not have known the obligations he was
assuming: that the incapacity [was] grave, ha[d] preceded the marriage and [was]
incurable."[4]

Hence, this Petition.[5]

Issues

In her Memorandum,[6] petitioner presents for this Court's consideration the following issues:
"I. Whether or not the Honorable Court of Appeals could set aside the findings by the
Regional Trial Court of psychological incapacity of a respondent in a Petition for
declaration of nullity of marriage simply because the respondent did not subject
himself to psychological evaluation.
II. Whether or not the totality of evidence presented and the demeanor of all the
witnesses should be the basis of the determination of the merits of the Petition."[7]

The Court's Ruling

 We agree with petitioner that the personal medical or psychological examination of
respondent is not a requirement for a declaration of psychological
incapacity. Nevertheless, the totality of the evidence she presented does not show such
incapacity.

Preliminary Issue: Need for Personal Medical Examination

Petitioner contends that the testimonies and the results of various tests that were
submitted to determine respondent's psychological incapacity to perform the obligations
of marriage should not have been brushed aside by the Court of Appeals, simply
because respondent had not taken those tests himself. Petitioner adds that the CA
should have realized that under the circumstances, she had no choice but to rely on
other sources of information in order to determine the psychological capacity of
respondent, who had refused to submit himself to such tests.
In Republic v. CA and Molina,[8] the guidelines governing the application and the interpretation
of psychological incapacity referred to in Article 36 of the Family Code [9] were laid down by this
Court as follows:
"1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any
doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage
and against its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our
Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the
family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article on the Family, recognizing it
'as the foundation of the nation.' It decrees marriage as legally 'inviolable,' thereby
protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage
are to be 'protected' by the state.
xxxxxxxxx
2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or clinically
identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d)
clearly explained in the decision.Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the
incapacity must be psychological - not physical, although its manifestations and/or
symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the court that the parties,
or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person
could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not
have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need
be given here so as not to limit the application of the provision under the principle
of ejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a
psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence
may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.
3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at 'the time of the celebration' of the
marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties
exchanged their 'I do's.' The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at
such time, but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or
incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the
 other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same
sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage
obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a
profession or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in
diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to cure them but not be
psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as an
essential obligation of marriage.
5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to
assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, 'mild characteriological
peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts cannot be accepted as
root causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a
refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or
supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the
personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting
and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage.
6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of
the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and
225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied
marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and
included in the text of the decision.
7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic
Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great
respect by our courts.
xxxxxxxxx
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor
General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down
unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the
decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the
case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting
attorney, shall submit to the court such certification within fifteen (15) days from the
date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General
shall discharge the equivalent function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under
Canon 1095."[10]
The guidelines incorporate the three basic requirements earlier mandated by the
Court in Santos v. Court of Appeals:[11] "psychological incapacity must be characterized
by (a) gravity(b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability." The foregoing guidelines do
not require that a physician examine the person to be declared psychologically
incapacitated. In fact, the root cause may be "medically or clinically identified." What is
important is the presence of evidence that can adequately establish the
party's psychological condition. For indeed, if the totality of evidence presented is
enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then actual medical examination
of the person concerned need not be resorted to.

Main Issue: Totality of Evidence Presented

 The main question, then, is whether the totality of the evidence presented in the
present case -- including the testimonies of petitioner, the common children, petitioner's
sister and the social worker -- was enough to sustain a finding that respondent was
psychologically incapacitated.
We rule in the negative. Although this Court is sufficiently convinced that
respondent failed to provide material support to the family and may have resorted to
physical abuse and abandonment, the totality of his acts does not lead to a conclusion
of psychological incapacity on his part. There is absolutely no showing that his "defects"
were already present at the inception of the marriage or that they are incurable.
Verily, the behavior of respondent can be attributed to the fact that he had lost his
job and was not gainfully employed for a period of more than six years. It was during
this period that he became intermittently drunk, failed to give material and moral
support, and even left the family home.
Thus, his alleged psychological illness was traced only to said period and not to the
inception of the marriage. Equally important, there is no evidence showing that his
condition is incurable, especially now that he is gainfully employed as a taxi driver.
Article 36 of the Family Code, we stress, is not to be confused with a divorce law
that cuts the marital bond at the time the causes therefor manifest themselves. It refers
to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party even before the celebration of the
marriage. It is a malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive one of awareness of
the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume. These
marital obligations are those provided under Articles 68 to 71, 220, 221 and 225 of the
Family Code.
Neither is Article 36 to be equated with legal separation, in which the grounds need
not be rooted in psychological incapacity but on physical violence, moral pressure,
moral corruption, civil interdiction, drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity,
abandonment and the like.[12] At best, the evidence presented by petitioner refers only to
grounds for legal separation, not for declaring a marriage void.
Because Article 36 has been abused as a convenient divorce law, this Court laid
down the procedural requirements for its invocation in Molina. Petitioner, however, has
not faithfully observed them.
In sum, this Court cannot declare the dissolution of the marriage for failure of
petitioner to show that the alleged psychological incapacity is characterized by gravity,
juridical antecedence and incurability; and for her failure to observe the guidelines
outlined in Molina.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and assailed Decision AFFIRMED, except
that portion requiring personal medical examination as a conditio sine qua non to a
finding of psychological incapacity. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Melo, (Chairman), Vitug, Purisima, and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.
[1]
Penned by Justice Bernardo LL Salas with the concurrence of Justices Fermin A. Martin Jr. (Division
chairman) and Candido V. Rivera (member).
[2]
CA Decision, pp. 12-13; rollo, pp. 38-39.
[3]
CA Decision, pp. 5-7; rollo, pp. 31-33.
[4]
CA Decision, pp. 10-11; rollo, pp. 36-37.
[5]
This case was deemed submitted for resolution on February 24, 2000, upon receipt by this Court of
respondent's Memorandum, which was signed by Atty. Virgilio V. Macaraig. Petitioner's Memorandum,
signed by Atty. Rita Linda V. Jimeno, had been filed earlier on November 5, 1999.
[6]
Rollo, p. 70; original in upper case.
[7]
Memorandum for petitioner, p. 6; rollo, p. 70.
[8]
268 SCRA 198, February 13, 1997, per Panganiban, J.
[9]
"Article 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise
be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.
"The action for declaration of nullity of the marriage under this Article shall prescribe in ten years after its
celebration."
[10]
Supra, pp. 209-213.
[11]
240 SCRA 20, 34, January 4, 1995, per Vitug, J.
[12]
"Article 55. A petition for legal separation may be filed on any of the following grounds:
(1) Repeated physical violence or grossly abusive conduct directed against the petitioner, a common
child, or a child of the petitioner;
(2) Physical violence or moral pressure to compel the petitioner to change religious or political affiliation;
(3) Attempt of respondent to corrupt or induce the petitioner, a common child, or a child of the petitioner,
to engage in prostitution, or connivance in such corruption or inducement;
(4) Final judgment sentencing the respondent to imprisonment of more than six years, even if pardoned;
(5) Drug addiction or habitual alcoholism of the respondent;
(6) Lesbianism or homosexuality of the respondent;
(7) Contracting by the respondent of a subsequent bigamous marriage, whether in the Philippines or
abroad;
(8) Sexual infidelity or perversion;
(9) Attempt by the respondent against the life of the petitioner; or
(10) Abandonment of petitioner by respondent without justifiable cause for more than one year.
For purposes of this Article, the term 'child' shall include a child by nature or by adoption."
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 126010 December 8, 1999

LUCITA ESTRELLA HERNANDEZ, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and MARIO C. HERNANDEZ, respondents.

MENDOZA, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals, dated January 30,
1

1996, affirming the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 18, Tagaytay City, dated April 10,
1993, which dismissed the petition for annulment of marriage filed by petitioner.

Petitioner Lucita Estrella Hernandez and private respondent Mario C. Hernandez were married at
the Silang Catholic Parish Church in Silang, Cavite on January 1, 1981 (Exh. A). Three children
2

were born to them, namely, Maie, who was born on May 3, 1982 (Exh. B), Lyra, born on May 22,
3

1985
(Exh. C), and Marian, born on June 15, 1989 (Exh. D).
4 5

On July 10, 1992, petitioner filed before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 18, Tagaytay City, a petition
seeking the annulment of her marriage to private respondent on the ground of psychological
incapacity of the latter. She alleged that from the time of their marriage up to the time of the filing of
the suit, private respondent failed to perform his obligation to support the family and contribute to the
management of the household, devoting most of his time engaging in drinking sprees with his
friends. She further claimed that private respondent, after they were married, cohabited with another
woman with whom he had an illegitimate child, while having affairs with different women, and that,
because of his promiscuity, private respondent endangered her health by infecting her with a
sexually transmissible disease (STD). She averred that private respondent was irresponsible,
immature and unprepared for the duties of a married life. Petitioner prayed that for having
abandoned the family, private respondent be ordered to give support to their three children in the
total amount of P9,000.00 every month; that she be awarded the custody of their children; and that
she be adjudged as the sole owner of a parcel of land located at Don Gregorio Subdivision I in Bo.
Bucal, Dasmariñas, Cavite, purchased during the marriage, as well as the jeep which private
respondent took with him when he left the conjugal home on June 12, 1992. 6

On October 8, 1992, because of private respondent's failure to file his answer, the trial court issued
an order directing the assistant provincial prosecutor to conduct an investigation to determine if there
was collusion between the
parties. Only petitioner appeared at the investigation on November 5, 1992. Nevertheless, the
7

prosecutor found no evidence of collusion and recommended that the case be set for trial. 8

Based on the evidence presented by the petitioner, the facts are as follows: 9
Petitioner and private respondent met in 1977 at the Philippine Christian University in Dasmariñas,
Cavite. Petitioner, who is five years older than private respondent, was then in her first year of
teaching zoology and botany. Private respondent, a college freshman, was her student for two
consecutive semesters. They became sweethearts in February 1979 when she was no longer
private respondent's teacher. On January 1, 1981, they were married.

Private respondent continued his studies for two more years. His parents paid for his tuition fees,
while petitioner provided his allowances and other financial needs. The family income came from
petitioner's salary as a faculty member of the Philippine Christian University. Petitioner augmented
her earnings by selling "Tupperware" products, as well as engaging in the buy-and-sell of coffee, rice
and polvoron.

From 1983 up to 1986, as private respondent could not find a stable job, it was agreed that he would
help petitioner in her businesses by delivering orders to customers. However, because her husband
was a spendthrift and had other women, petitioner's business suffered. Private respondent often had
smoking and drinking sprees with his friends and betted on fighting cocks. In 1982, after the birth of
their first child, petitioner discovered two love letters written by a certain Realita Villena to private
respondent. She knew Villena as a married student whose husband was working in Saudi Arabia.
When petitioner confronted private respondent, he admitted having an extra-marital affair with
Villena. Petitioner then pleaded with Villena to end her relationship with private respondent. For his
part, private respondent said he would end the affairs, but he did not keep his promise. Instead, he
left the conjugal home and abandoned petitioner and their child. When private respondent came
back, however, petitioner accepted him, despite private respondent's infidelity in the hope of saving
their marriage.

Upon the recommendation of a family friend, private respondent was able to get a job at Reynolds
Philippines, Inc. in San Agustin, Dasmariñas, Cavite in 1986. However, private respondent was
employed only until March 31, 1991, because he availed himself of the early retirement plan offered
by the company. He received P53,000.00 in retirement pay, but instead of spending the amount for
the needs of the family, private respondent spent the money on himself and consumed the entire
amount within four months of his retirement.

While private respondent worked at Reynolds Philippines, Inc., his smoking, drinking, gambling and
womanizing became worse. Petitioner discovered that private respondent carried on relationships
with different women. He had relations with a certain Edna who worked at Yazaki; Angie, who was
an operator of a billiard hall; Tess, a "Japayuki"; Myrna Macatangay, a secretary at the Road Master
Driver's School in Bayan, Dasmariñas, Cavite, with whom he cohabited for quite a while; and, Ruth
Oliva, by whom he had a daughter named Margie P. Oliva, born on September 15, 1989 (Exh.
E). When petitioner confronted private respondent about his relationship with Tess, he beat her up,
10

as a result of which she was confined at the De la Salle University Medical Center in Dasmariñas,
Cavite on July 4-5, 1990 because of cerebral concussion (Exh. F). 11

According to petitioner, private respondent engaged in extreme promiscuous conduct during the
latter part of 1986. As a result, private respondent contracted gonorrhea and infected petitioner. They
both received treatment at the Zapote Medical Specialists Center in Zapote, Bacoor, Cavite from
October 22, 1986 until March 13, 1987 (Exhs. G & H). 12

Petitioner averred that on one occasion of a heated argument, private respondent hit their eldest
child who was then barely a year old. Private respondent is not close to any of their children as he
was never affectionate and hardly spent time with them.
On July 17, 1979, petitioner entered into a contract to sell (Exh. J) with F & C Realty Corporation
13

whereby she agreed to buy from the latter a parcel of land at the Don Gregorio Heights Subdivision I
in Bo. Bucal, Dasmariñas, Cavite and placed a partial payment of P31,330.00. On May 26, 1987,
after full payment of the amount of P51,067.10, inclusive of interests from monthly installments, a
deed of absolute sale(Exh. K) was executed in her favor and TCT No. T-221529 (Exh. M) was
14 15

duly issued.

According to petitioner, on August 1, 1992, she sent a handwritten

letter to private respondent expressing her frustration over the fact that her efforts to save their
16

marriage proved futile. In her letter, petitioner also stated that she was allowing him to sell their
owner-type jeepney and to divide the proceeds of the sale between the two of them. Petitioner also
17

told private respondent of her intention to fill a petition for the annulment of their marriage.

It does not appear that private respondent ever replied to petitioner's letter. By this time, he had
already abandoned petitioner and their children. In October 1992, petitioner learned that private
respondent left for the Middle East. Since then, private respondent's whereabouts had been
unknown.

Ester Alfaro, petitioner's childhood friend and co-teacher at the Philippine Christian University,
testified during the hearing on the petition for annulment. She said that sometime in June 1979,
petitioner introduced private respondent to her (Alfaro) as the former's sweetheart. Alfaro said she
was not impressed with private respondent who was her student in accounting. She observed
private respondent to be fun-loving, spending most of his time with campus friends. In November
1980, when petitioner asked Alfaro to be one of the secondary sponsors at her forthcoming wedding,
Alfaro wanted to dissuade petitioner from going through with the wedding because she thought
private respondent was not ready for married life as he was then unemployed. True enough,
although the couple appeared happy during the early part of their marriage, it was not long thereafter
that private respondent started drinking with his friends and going home late at night. Alfaro
corroborated petitioner's claim that private respondent was a habitual drunkard who carried on
relationships with different women and continued hanging out with his friends. She also confirmed
that petitioner was once hospitalized because she was beaten up by private respondent. After the
first year of petitioner's marriage, Alfaro tried to talk to private respondent, but the latter accused her
of meddling with their marital life. Alfaro said that private respondent was not close to his children
and that he had abandoned petitioner. 18

On April 10, 1993, the trial court rendered a decision dismissing the petition for annulment of
19

marriage filed by petitioner. The pertinent portion of the decision reads: 20

The Court can underscore the fact that the circumstances mentioned by the
petitioner in support of her claim that respondent was "psychologically incapacitated"
to marry her are among the grounds cited by the law as valid reasons for the grant of
legal separation (Article 55 of the Family Code) — not as grounds for a declaration of
nullity of marriages or annulment thereof. Thus, Article 55 of the same code reads as
follows:

Art. 55. A petition for legal separation may be filed on any of the
following grounds:

(1) Repeated physical violence or grossly abusive conduct directed

against the petitioner, a common child, or a child of the petitioner;

xxx xxx xxx

 (5) Drug addiction or habitual alcoholism of the respondent;

xxx xxx xxx

(8) Sexual infidelity or perversion;

xxx xxx xxx

(10) Abandonment of petitioner by respondent without justifiable

cause for more than one year.

xxx xxx xxx

If indeed Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines, which mentions

psychological incapacity as a ground for the declaration of the nullity of a marriage,
has intended to include the above-stated circumstances as constitutive of such
incapacity, then the same would not have been enumerated as grounds for legal
separation.

In the same manner, this Court is not disposed to grant relief in favor of the petitioner
under Article 46, paragraph (3) of the Family Code of the Philippines, as there is no
dispute that the "gonorrhea" transmitted to the petitioner by respondent occurred
sometime in 1986, or five (5) years after petitioner's marriage with respondent was
celebrated in 1981. The provisions of Article 46, paragraph (3) of the same law
should be taken in conjunction with Article 45, paragraph (3) of the same code, and a
careful reading of the two (2) provisions of the law would require the existence of this
ground (fraud) at the time of the celebration of the marriage. Hence, the annulment of
petitioner's marriage with the respondent on this ground, as alleged and proved in
the instant case, cannot be legally accepted by the Court.

Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals which, on January 30, 1996, rendered its decision
affirming the decision of the trial court. Citing the ruling in Santos v. Court of Appeals, the Court of
21

Appeals held: 22

It is clear in the above law and jurisprudence that the psychological incapacity of a
spouse, as a ground for declaration of nullify of marriage, must exist at the time of
the celebration of marriage. More so, chronic sexual infidelity, abandonment,
gambling and use of prohibited drugs are not grounds per se, of psychological
incapacity of a spouse.

We agree with the Solicitor General that petitioner-appellant failed to prove that her
respondent-husband was psychologically incapacitated at the time of the celebration
of the marriage. Certainly, petitioner-appellant's declaration that at the time of their
marriage her respondent-husband's character was on the "borderline between a
responsible person and the happy-go-lucky," could not constitute the psychological
incapacity in contemplation of Article 36 of the Family Code. In fact, petitioner-
appellant herself ascribed said attitude to her respondent-husband's youth and very
good looks, who was admittedly several years younger than petitioner-appellant who,
herself, happened to be the college professor of her respondent-husband. Petitioner-
appellant even described her respondent-husband not as a problem student but a
normal one (p. 24, tsn, Dec. 8, 1992).
 The acts and attitudes complained of by petitioner-appellant happened after the
marriage and there is no proof that the same have already existed at the time of the
celebration of the marriage to constitute the psychological incapacity under Article 36
of the Family Code.

Hence, this petition. Petitioner contends that the respondent Court of Appeals erred —

I. IN FINDING THAT THE PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY OF THE

PRIVATE RESPONDENT TO COMPLY WITH HIS ESSENTIAL
MARITAL OBLIGATIONS DID NOT EXIST FROM THE TIME OF THE
CELEBRATION OF THE MARRIAGE.

II. IN RULING THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENT WAS NOT

PSYCHOLOGICALLY INCAPACITATED TO COMPLY WITH HIS
ESSENTIAL MARITAL OBLIGATIONS.

III. IN AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT

DENYING THE AWARD OF PERMANENT CUSTODY OF THE
CHILDREN TO PETITIONER.

IV. IN AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT

DENYING THE PRAYER FOR ISSUANCE OF AN ORDER
REQUIRING PRIVATE RESPONDENT TO GIVE SUPPORT TO THE
THREE CHILDREN IN THE AMOUNT OF P3,000,00 PER CHILD.

V. IN NOT DECLARING THE REAL PROPERTY ACQUIRED BY

PETITIONER AS HER EXCLUSIVE PROPERTY.

The issue in this case is whether or not the marriage of petitioner and private respondent should be
annulled on the ground of private respondent's psychological incapacity.

Petitioner alleges that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that petitioner failed to show that private
respondent's psychological incapacity existed at the time of the celebration of the marriage. She
argues that the fact that the acts of incapacity of private respondent became manifest only after the
celebration of their marriage should not be a bar to the annulment of their marriage.

Art. 36 of the Family Code states:

A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of
marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after
its solemnization. 23

In Santos v. Court of Appeals, we held:

24

"Psychological incapacity" should refer to no less than a mental (not physical)

incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants
that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage
which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual
obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and
support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine
 the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality,
disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning
and significance to the marriage. This psychological condition must exist at the time
the marriage is celebrated. The law does not evidently envision, upon the other hand,
an inability of the spouse to have sexual relations with the other. This conclusion is
implicit under Article 54 of the Family Code which considers children conceived prior
to the judicial declaration of nullity of the void marriage to be "legitimate."

The other forms of psychoses, if existing at the inception of marriage, like the state of
a party being of unsound mind or concealment of drug addiction, habitual alcoholism,
homosexuality or lesbianism, merely renders the marriage contract voidable pursuant
to Article 46, Family Code. If drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, lesbianism or
homosexuality should occur only during the marriage, they become mere grounds for
legal separation under Article 55 of the Family Code. These provisions of the Code,
however, do not necessarily preclude the possibility of these various circumstances
being themselves, depending on the degree and severity of the disorder, indicia of
psychological incapacity.

Until further statutory and jurisprudential parameters are established, every

circumstance that may have some bearing on the degree, extent, and other
conditions of that incapacity must, in every case, be carefully examined and
evaluated so that no precipitate and indiscriminate nullity is peremptorily decreed.
The well-considered opinions of psychiatrists, psychologists, and persons with
expertise in psychological disciplines might be helpful or even desirable.

In the instant case, other than her self-serving declarations, petitioner failed to establish the fact that
at the time they were married, private respondent was suffering from a psychological defect which in
fact deprived him of the ability to assume the essential duties of marriage and its concomitant
responsibilities. As the Court of Appeals pointed out, no evidence was presented to show that private
respondent was not cognizant of the basic marital obligations. It was not sufficiently proved that
private respondent was really incapable of fulfilling his duties due to some incapacity of a
psychological nature, and not merely physical. Petitioner says that at the outset of their marriage,
private respondent showed lack of drive to work for his family. Private respondent's parents and
petitioner supported him through college. After his schooling, although he eventually found a job, he
availed himself of the early retirement plan offered by his employer and spent the entire amount he
received on himself. For a greater part of their marital life, private respondent was out of job and did
not have the initiative to look for another. He indulged in vices and engaged in philandering, and later
abandoned his family. Petitioner concludes that private respondent's condition is incurable, causing
the disintegration of their union and defeating the very objectives of marriage.

However, private respondent's alleged habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity or perversion, and
abandonment do not by themselves constitute grounds for finding that he is suffering from
psychological incapacity within the contemplation of the Family Code. It must be shown that these
acts are manifestations of a disordered personality which make private respondent completely
unable to discharge the essential obligations of the marital state, and not merely due to private
respondent's youth and self-conscious feeling of being handsome, as the appellate court held. As
pointed out in Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals: 25

The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or clinically
identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d)
clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the
incapacity must be psychological — not physical, although its manifestations and/or
 symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the court that the parties,
or one of them, was mentally or physically ill to such an extent that the obligations he
was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof.
Although no example of such incapacity need given here so as not to limit the
application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis (citing Salaita v.
Magtolis, supra) nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological
illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by
qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.

Moreover, expert testimony should have been presented to establish the precise cause of private
respondent's psychological incapacity, if any, in order to show that it existed at the inception of the
marriage. The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage rests upon rests petitioner. The
Court is mindful of the policy of the 1987 Constitution to protect and strengthen the family as the
basic autonomous social institution and marriage as the foundation of the
family. Thus, any doubt should be resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage.
26 27

We, therefore, find no reason to reverse the ruling of respondent Court of Appeals whose
conclusions, affirming the trial court's finding with regard to the non-existence of private respondent's
psychological incapacity at the time of the marriage, are entitled to great weight and even
finality. Only where it is shown that such findings are whimsical, capricious, and arbitrary can these
28

be overturned.

The conclusion we have reached makes it unnecessary for us to pass upon petitioner's contentions
on the issue of permanent custody of children, the amount for their respective support, and the
declaration of exclusive ownership of petitioner over the real property. These matters may more
appropriately be litigated in a separate proceeding for legal separation, dissolution of property
regime, and/or custody of children which petitioner may bring.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeal is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Bellosillo, Quisumbing, Buena and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 112019 January 4, 1995

LEOUEL SANTOS, petitioner,

vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS AND JULIA ROSARIO BEDIA-SANTOS, respondents.

VITUG, J.:

Concededly a highly, if not indeed the most likely, controversial provision introduced by the Family Code is Article 36 (as amended by E.O.
No. 227 dated 17 July 1987), which declares:

Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to
comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes
manifest only after its solemnization.

The present petition for review on certiorari, at the instance of Leouel Santos ("Leouel"), brings into fore the above provision which
is now invoked by him. Undaunted by the decisions of the court a quo1 and the Court of Appeal,2 Leouel persists in beseeching
its application in his attempt to have his marriage with herein private respondent, Julia Rosario Bedia-Santos ("Julia"), declared a
nullity.

It was in Iloilo City where Leouel, who then held the rank of First Lieutenant in the Philippine Army, first met Julia. The meeting later proved to
be an eventful day for Leouel and Julia. On 20 September 1986, the two exchanged vows before Municipal Trial Court Judge Cornelio G.
Lazaro of Iloilo City, followed, shortly thereafter, by a church wedding. Leouel and Julia lived with the latter's parents at the J. Bedia
Compound, La Paz, Iloilo City. On 18 July 1987, Julia gave birth to a baby boy, and he was christened Leouel Santos, Jr. The ecstasy,
however, did not last long. It was bound to happen, Leouel averred, because of the frequent interference by Julia's parents into the young
spouses family affairs. Occasionally, the couple would also start a "quarrel" over a number of other things, like when and where the couple
should start living independently from Julia's parents or whenever Julia would express resentment on Leouel's spending a few days with his
own parents.

On 18 May 1988, Julia finally left for the United Sates of America to work as a nurse despite Leouel's pleas to so dissuade her. Seven
months after her departure, or on 01 January 1989, Julia called up Leouel for the first time by long distance telephone. She promised to
return home upon the expiration of her contract in July 1989. She never did. When Leouel got a chance to visit the United States, where he
underwent a training program under the auspices of the Armed Forces of the Philippines from 01 April up to 25 August 1990, he desperately
tried to locate, or to somehow get in touch with, Julia but all his efforts were of no avail.

Having failed to get Julia to somehow come home, Leouel filed with the regional trial Court of Negros Oriental, Branch 30, a complaint for
"Voiding of marriage Under Article 36 of the Family Code" (docketed, Civil Case No. 9814). Summons was served by publication in a
newspaper of general circulation in Negros Oriental.

On 31 May 1991, respondent Julia, in her answer (through counsel), opposed the complaint and denied its allegations, claiming, in main, that
it was the petitioner who had, in fact, been irresponsible and incompetent.

A possible collusion between the parties to obtain a decree of nullity of their marriage was ruled out by the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor
(in its report to the court).

On 25 October 1991, after pre-trial conferences had repeatedly been set, albeit unsuccessfully, by the court, Julia ultimately filed a
manifestation, stating that she would neither appear nor submit evidence.

On 06 November 1991, the court a quo finally dismissed the complaint for lack of merit.3

Leouel appealed to the Court of Appeal. The latter affirmed the decision of the trial court.4
The petition should be denied not only because of its non-compliance with Circular 28-91, which requires a certification of non-shopping, but
also for its lack of merit.

Leouel argues that the failure of Julia to return home, or at the very least to communicate with him, for more than five years are
circumstances that clearly show her being psychologically incapacitated to enter into married life. In his own words, Leouel asserts:

. . . (T)here is no leave, there is no affection for (him) because respondent Julia Rosario Bedia-Santos failed all these
years to communicate with the petitioner. A wife who does not care to inform her husband about her whereabouts for a
period of five years, more or less, is psychologically incapacitated.

The family Code did not define the term "psychological incapacity." The deliberations during the sessions of the Family Code Revision
Committee, which has drafted the Code, can, however, provide an insight on the import of the provision.

Art. 35. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning:

xxx xxx xxx

Art. 36. . . .

(7) Those marriages contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was wanting in the sufficient use of
reason or judgment to understand the essential nature of marriage or was psychologically or mentally incapacitated to
discharge the essential marital obligations, even if such lack of incapacity is made manifest after the celebration.

On subparagraph (7), which as lifted from the Canon Law, Justice (Jose B.L.) Reyes suggested that they say "wanting
in sufficient use," but Justice (Eduardo) Caguioa preferred to say "wanting in the sufficient use." On the other hand,
Justice Reyes proposed that they say "wanting in sufficient reason." Justice Caguioa, however, pointed out that the
idea is that one is not lacking in judgment but that he is lacking in the exercise of judgment. He added that lack of
judgment would make the marriage voidable. Judge (Alicia Sempio-) Diy remarked that lack of judgment is more
serious than insufficient use of judgment and yet the latter would make the marriage null and void and the former only
voidable. Justice Caguioa suggested that subparagraph (7) be modified to read:

"That contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically
incapacitated to discharge the essential marital obligations, even if such lack of incapacity is
made manifest after the celebration."

Justice Caguioa explained that the phrase "was wanting in sufficient use of reason of judgment to understand the
essential nature of marriage" refers to defects in the mental faculties vitiating consent, which is not the idea in
subparagraph (7), but lack of appreciation of one's marital obligations.

Judge Diy raised the question: Since "insanity" is also a psychological or mental incapacity, why is "insanity" only a
ground for annulment and not for declaration or nullity? In reply, Justice Caguioa explained that in insanity, there is the
appearance of consent, which is the reason why it is a ground for voidable marriages, while subparagraph (7) does not
refer to consent but to the very essence of marital obligations.

Prof. (Araceli) Baviera suggested that, in subparagraph (7), the word "mentally" be deleted, with which Justice Caguioa
concurred. Judge Diy, however, prefers to retain the word "mentally."

Justice Caguioa remarked that subparagraph (7) refers to psychological impotence. Justice (Ricardo) Puno stated that
sometimes a person may be psychologically impotent with one but not with another. Justice (Leonor Ines-) Luciano
said that it is called selective impotency.

Dean (Fortunato) Gupit stated that the confusion lies in the fact that in inserting the Canon Law annulment in the
Family Code, the Committee used a language which describes a ground for voidable marriages under the Civil Code.
Justice Caguioa added that in Canon Law, there are voidable marriages under the Canon Law, there are no voidable
marriages Dean Gupit said that this is precisely the reason why they should make a distinction.

Justice Puno remarked that in Canon Law, the defects in marriage cannot be cured.

Justice Reyes pointed out that the problem is: Why is "insanity" a ground for void ab initio marriages? In reply, Justice
Caguioa explained that insanity is curable and there are lucid intervals, while psychological incapacity is not.

On another point, Justice Puno suggested that the phrase "even if such lack or incapacity is made manifest" be
modified to read "even if such lack or incapacity becomes manifest."
Justice Reyes remarked that in insanity, at the time of the marriage, it is not apparent.

Justice Caguioa stated that there are two interpretations of the phrase "psychological or mentally incapacitated" — in
the first one, there is vitiation of consent because one does not know all the consequences of the marriages, and if he
had known these completely, he might not have consented to the marriage.

xxx xxx xxx

Prof. Bautista stated that he is in favor of making psychological incapacity a ground for voidable marriages since
otherwise it will encourage one who really understood the consequences of marriage to claim that he did not and to
make excuses for invalidating the marriage by acting as if he did not understand the obligations of marriage. Dean
Gupit added that it is a loose way of providing for divorce.

xxx xxx xxx

Justice Caguioa explained that his point is that in the case of incapacity by reason of defects in the mental faculties,
which is less than insanity, there is a defect in consent and, therefore, it is clear that it should be a ground for voidable
marriage because there is the appearance of consent and it is capable of convalidation for the simple reason that there
are lucid intervals and there are cases when the insanity is curable. He emphasized that psychological incapacity does
not refer to mental faculties and has nothing to do with consent; it refers to obligations attendant to marriage.

xxx xxx xxx

On psychological incapacity, Prof. (Flerida Ruth P.) Romero inquired if they do not consider it as going to the very
essence of consent. She asked if they are really removing it from consent. In reply, Justice Caguioa explained that,
ultimately, consent in general is effected but he stressed that his point is that it is not principally a vitiation of consent
since there is a valid consent. He objected to the lumping together of the validity of the marriage celebration and the
obligations attendant to marriage, which are completely different from each other, because they require a different
capacity, which is eighteen years of age, for marriage but in contract, it is different. Justice Puno, however, felt that
psychological incapacity is still a kind of vice of consent and that it should not be classified as a voidable marriage
which is incapable of convalidation; it should be convalidated but there should be no prescription. In other words, as
long as the defect has not been cured, there is always a right to annul the marriage and if the defect has been really
cured, it should be a defense in the action for annulment so that when the action for annulment is instituted, the issue
can be raised that actually, although one might have been psychologically incapacitated, at the time the action is
brought, it is no longer true that he has no concept of the consequence of marriage.

Prof. (Esteban) Bautista raised the question: Will not cohabitation be a defense? In response, Justice Puno stated that
even the bearing of children and cohabitation should not be a sign that psychological incapacity has been cured.

Prof. Romero opined that psychological incapacity is still insanity of a lesser degree. Justice Luciano suggested that
they invite a psychiatrist, who is the expert on this matter. Justice Caguioa, however, reiterated that psychological
incapacity is not a defect in the mind but in the understanding of the consequences of marriage, and therefore, a
psychiatrist will not be a help.

Prof. Bautista stated that, in the same manner that there is a lucid interval in insanity, there are also momentary periods
when there is an understanding of the consequences of marriage. Justice Reyes and Dean Gupit remarked that the
ground of psychological incapacity will not apply if the marriage was contracted at the time when there is understanding
of the consequences of marriage.5

xxx xxx xxx

Judge Diy proposed that they include physical incapacity to copulate among the grounds for void marriages. Justice
Reyes commented that in some instances the impotence that in some instances the impotence is only temporary and
only with respect to a particular person. Judge Diy stated that they can specify that it is incurable. Justice Caguioa
remarked that the term "incurable" has a different meaning in law and in medicine. Judge Diy stated that "psychological
incapacity" can also be cured. Justice Caguioa, however, pointed out that "psychological incapacity" is incurable.

Justice Puno observed that under the present draft provision, it is enough to show that at the time of the celebration of
the marriage, one was psychologically incapacitated so that later on if already he can comply with the essential marital
obligations, the marriage is still void ab initio. Justice Caguioa explained that since in divorce, the psychological
incapacity may occur after the marriage, in void marriages, it has to be at the time of the celebration of marriage. He,
however, stressed that the idea in the provision is that at the time of the celebration of the marriage, one is
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations, which incapacity continues and later
becomes manifest.
Justice Puno and Judge Diy, however, pointed out that it is possible that after the marriage, one's psychological
incapacity become manifest but later on he is cured. Justice Reyes and Justice Caguioa opined that the remedy in this
case is to allow him to remarry.6

xxx xxx xxx

Justice Puno formulated the next Article as follows:

Art. 37. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated, to comply with the essential obligations of marriage shall likewise
be void from the beginning even if such incapacity becomes manifest after its solemnization.

Justice Caguioa suggested that "even if" be substituted with "although." On the other hand, Prof. Bautista proposed
that the clause "although such incapacity becomes manifest after its solemnization" be deleted since it may encourage
one to create the manifestation of psychological incapacity. Justice Caguioa pointed out that, as in other provisions,
they cannot argue on the basis of abuse.

Judge Diy suggested that they also include mental and physical incapacities, which are lesser in degree than
psychological incapacity. Justice Caguioa explained that mental and physical incapacities are vices of consent while
psychological incapacity is not a species of vice or consent.

Dean Gupit read what Bishop Cruz said on the matter in the minutes of their February 9, 1984 meeting:

"On the third ground, Bishop Cruz indicated that the phrase "psychological or mental impotence"
is an invention of some churchmen who are moralists but not canonists, that is why it is
considered a weak phrase. He said that the Code of Canon Law would rather express it as
"psychological or mental incapacity to discharge . . ."

Justice Caguioa remarked that they deleted the word "mental" precisely to distinguish it from vice of consent. He
explained that "psychological incapacity" refers to lack of understanding of the essential obligations of marriage.

Justice Puno reminded the members that, at the last meeting, they have decided not to go into the classification of
"psychological incapacity" because there was a lot of debate on it and that this is precisely the reason why they
classified it as a special case.

At this point, Justice Puno, remarked that, since there having been annulments of marriages arising from psychological
incapacity, Civil Law should not reconcile with Canon Law because it is a new ground even under Canon Law.

Prof. Romero raised the question: With this common provision in Civil Law and in Canon Law, are they going to have a
provision in the Family Code to the effect that marriages annulled or declared void by the church on the ground of
psychological incapacity is automatically annulled in Civil Law? The other members replied negatively.

Justice Puno and Prof. Romero inquired if Article 37 should be retroactive or prospective in application.

Justice Diy opined that she was for its retroactivity because it is their answer to the problem of church annulments of
marriages, which are still valid under the Civil Law. On the other hand, Justice Reyes and Justice Puno were
concerned about the avalanche of cases.

Dean Gupit suggested that they put the issue to a vote, which the Committee approved.

The members voted as follows:

(1) Justice Reyes, Justice Puno and Prof. Romero were for prospectivity.

(2) Justice Caguioa, Judge Diy, Dean Gupit, Prof. Bautista and Director Eufemio were for retroactivity.

(3) Prof. Baviera abstained.

Justice Caguioa suggested that they put in the prescriptive period of ten years within which the action for declaration of
nullity of the marriage should be filed in court. The Committee approved the suggestion.7
It could well be that, in sum, the Family Code Revision Committee in ultimately deciding to adopt the provision with less specificity than
expected, has in fact, so designed the law as to allow some resiliency in its application. Mme. Justice Alicia V. Sempio-Diy, a member of the
Code Committee, has been quoted by Mr. Justice Josue N. Bellosillo in Salita vs. Hon. Magtolis (G.R. No. 106429, 13 June 1994); thus:8

The Committee did not give any examples of psychological incapacity for fear that the giving of examples would limit
the applicability of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis. Rather, the Committee would like the judge to
interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis, guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in
psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals which, although not binding on the civil courts, may be
given persuasive effect since the provision was taken from Canon Law.

A part of the provision is similar to Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon Law,9 which reads:

Canon 1095. They are incapable of contracting marriage:

1. who lack sufficient use of reason;

2. who suffer from a grave defect of discretion of judgment concerning essentila matrimonial rights and duties, to be
given and accepted mutually;

3. who for causes of psychological nature are unable to assume the essential obligations of marriage. (Emphasis
supplied.)

Accordingly, although neither decisive nor even perhaps all that persuasive for having no juridical or secular effect, the jurisprudence under
Canon Law prevailing at the time of the code's enactment, nevertheless, cannot be dismissed as impertinent for its value as an aid, at least,
to the interpretation or construction of the codal provision.

One author, Ladislas Orsy, S.J., in his treaties, 10 giving an account on how the third paragraph of Canon 1095 has been framed, states:

The history of the drafting of this canon does not leave any doubt that the legislator intended, indeed, to broaden the
rule. A strict and narrow norm was proposed first:

Those who cannot assume the essential obligations of marriage because of a grave psycho-
sexual anomaly (ob gravem anomaliam psychosexualem) are unable to contract marriage
(cf. SCH/1975, canon 297, a new canon, novus);

then a broader one followed:

. . . because of a grave psychological anomaly (ob gravem anomaliam psychicam) . . . (cf. SCH/1980, canon 1049);

then the same wording was retained in the text submitted to the pope (cf. SCH/1982, canon 1095, 3);

finally, a new version was promulgated:

because of causes of a psychological nature (ob causas naturae psychiae).

So the progress was from psycho-sexual to psychological anomaly, then the term anomaly was altogether eliminated. it
would be, however, incorrect to draw the conclusion that the cause of the incapacity need not be some kind of
psychological disorder; after all, normal and healthy person should be able to assume the ordinary obligations of
marriage.

Fr. Orsy concedes that the term "psychological incapacity" defies any precise definition since psychological causes can be of an infinite
variety.

In a book, entitled "Canons and Commentaries on Marriage," written by Ignatius Gramunt, Javier Hervada and LeRoy Wauck, the following
explanation appears:

This incapacity consists of the following: (a) a true inability to commit oneself to the essentials of marriage. Some
psychosexual disorders and other disorders of personality can be the psychic cause of this defect, which is here
described in legal terms. This particular type of incapacity consists of a real inability to render what is due by the
contract. This could be compared to the incapacity of a farmer to enter a binding contract to deliver the crops which he
cannot possibly reap; (b) this inability to commit oneself must refer to the essential obligations of marriage: the conjugal
act, the community of life and love, the rendering of mutual help, the procreation and education of offspring; (c) the
inability must be tantamount to a psychological abnormality. The mere difficulty of assuming these obligations, which
 could be overcome by normal effort, obviously does not constitute incapacity. The canon contemplates a true
psychological disorder which incapacitates a person from giving what is due (cf. John Paul II, Address to R. Rota, Feb.
5, 1987). However, if the marriage is to be declared invalid under this incapacity, it must be proved not only that the
person is afflicted by a psychological defect, but that the defect did in fact deprive the person, at the moment of giving
consent, of the ability to assume the essential duties of marriage and consequently of the possibility of being bound by
these duties.

Justice Sempio-Diy 11 cites with approval the work of Dr. Gerardo Veloso, a former Presiding Judge of the Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal of
the Catholic Archdiocese of Manila (Branch 1), who opines that psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical
antecedence, and (c) incurability. The incapacity must be grave or serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary
duties required in marriage; it must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations may
emerge only after the marriage; and it must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party
involved.

It should be obvious, looking at all the foregoing disquisitions, including, and most importantly, the deliberations of the Family Code Revision
Committee itself, that the use of the phrase "psychological incapacity" under Article 36 of the Code has not been meant to comprehend all
such possible cases of psychoses as, likewise mentioned by some ecclesiastical authorities, extremely low intelligence, immaturity, and like
circumstances (cited in Fr. Artemio Baluma's "Void and Voidable Marriages in the Family Code and their Parallels in Canon Law," quoting
from the Diagnostic Statistical Manual of Mental Disorder by the American Psychiatric Association; Edward Hudson's "Handbook II for
Marriage Nullity Cases"). Article 36 of the Family Code cannot be taken and construed independently of, but must stand in conjunction with,
existing precepts in our law on marriage. Thus correlated, "psychological incapacity" should refer to no less than a mental (not physical)
incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by
the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe
love, respect and fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the
meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter intensitivity or
inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. This pschologic condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated. The
law does not evidently envision, upon the other hand, an inability of the spouse to have sexual relations with the other. This conclusion is
implicit under Article 54 of the Family Code which considers children conceived prior to the judicial declaration of nullity of the void marriage
to be "legitimate."

The other forms of psychoses, if existing at the inception of marriage, like the state of a party being of unsound mind or concealment of drug
addiction, habitual alcoholism, homosexuality or lesbianism, merely renders the marriage contract voidable pursuant to Article 46, Family
Code. If drug addiction, habitual alcholism, lesbianism or homosexuality should occur only during the marriage, they become mere grounds
for legal separation under Article 55 of the Family Code. These provisions of the Code, however, do not necessarily preclude the possibility of
these various circumstances being themselves, depending on the degree and severity of the disorder, indicia of psychological incapacity.

Until further statutory and jurisprudential parameters are established, every circumstance that may have some bearing on the degree, extent,
and other conditions of that incapacity must, in every case, be carefully examined and evaluated so that no precipitate and indiscriminate
nullity is peremptorily decreed. The well-considered opinions of psychiatrists, psychologists, and persons with expertise in psychological
disciplines might be helpful or even desirable.

Marriage is not an adventure but a lifetime commitment. We should continue to be reminded that innate in our society, then enshrined in our
Civil Code, and even now still indelible in Article 1 of the Family Code, is that —

Art. 1. Marriage is a special contract of permanent union between a man a woman entered into in accordance with law
for the establishment of conjugal and family life. It is the foundation of the family and an inviolable social
institution whose nature, consequences, and incidents are governed by law and not subject to stipulation, except that
marriage settlements may fix the property relations during the marriage within the limits provided by this Code.
(Emphasis supplied.)

Our Constitution is no less emphatic:

Sec. 1. The State recognizes the Filipino family as the foundation of the nation. Accordingly, it shall strengthen its
solidarity and actively promote its total development.

Sec. 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State.
(Article XV, 1987 Constitution).

The above provisions express so well and so distinctly the basic nucleus of our laws on marriage and the family, and they are doubt the
tenets we still hold on to.

The factual settings in the case at bench, in no measure at all, can come close to the standards required to decree a nullity of marriage.
Undeniably and understandably, Leouel stands aggrieved, even desperate, in his present situation. Regrettably, neither law nor society itself
can always provide all the specific answers to every individual problem.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Bidin, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Quiason, Puno Kapunan and Mendoza, JJ., concur.

Feliciano, J., is on leave.