“I love Kuwait.

In the name of Allah the compassionate, oh Arabs, oh brothers, oh

Muslims; your brother Arabs are calling you. Rush to their help, this is Kuwait.”

Final broadcast of Kuwait Radio, 2 August 1990

INTRODUCTION

Nearly a decade ago, Saddam Hussein’s Iraqi forces rolled into Kuwait and

invaded the country, effectively taking control of nearly a fifth of the world’s oil reserves.

With Iraqi forces possibly poised to move into Saudi Arabia next, the prospect of Saddam

Hussein controlling nearly half of the world’s oil reserves – and with it, the possibility of

exerting massive influence on the global economy – galvanized the rest of the economic

world into action. An emergency session of the Security Council was convened hours

after the invasion and a resolution passed, condemning the invasion and demanding the

immediate and unconditional withdrawal of Iraqi troops from Kuwait1. This was followed

shortly after on 3 August 1990 by a similar resolution from the League of Arab States.

Following several months of diplomatic exchanges to try and broker a non-

confrontational resolution of the situation, Iraq could not find a compromise with the

emissaries of the U.N and the other countries sent to negotiate with Iraq. On 29

November 1990, the U.N Security Council passed a resolution sanctioning U.N member

states cooperating with Kuwait to use “all necessary means” to uphold Resolution 660

(part of which had demanded the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of Iraqi forces

from Kuwait) if the Iraqis did not withdraw from Kuwait by 15 January 19912.
1
UN Security Council, Resolution 660 (1990) Adopted by the Security Council at its 2932nd meeting, on 2
August 1990, 2 August 1990, S/RES/660 (1990), available at:
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3b00f12240.html [accessed 4 July 2010]
2
UN Security Council, Resolution 678 (1990) Adopted by the Security Council at its 2963rd meeting, on
29 November 1990, 29 November 1990, S/RES/678 (1990), available at:
 Iraq rejected the ultimatum given for it to withdraw and continued to maintain its

forces in Kuwait even after the deadline had passed. The United States-led coalition

forces that had been assembling since shortly after the Iraqi invasion on 2 August 1990

for Operation Desert Shield3 and to enforce a maritime blockade4 of Iraq, responded by

launching Operation Desert Storm to liberate Kuwait from the Iraqi invaders.

This essay will examine the roles and contributions of the various coalition

members aside from the United States and United Kingdom and how these influenced the

outcome of the war. It classifies coalition member countries as those that have

contributed in some way or another such as financially, or allowing the use of their

infrastructure for operations staging, and does not restrict the definition of coalition

member countries to those that contributed military personnel or equipment (which is

generally how a lot of literature on the First Persian Gulf War defines coalition members

when stating the list of countries in the coalition).

ROLES AND CONTRIBUTIONS: AN OVERVIEW

The roles that the various countries played will be derived out of the contributions

that each made to the war effort. The contributions of coalition countries to the war can

http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3b00f16760.html [accessed 4 July 2010]

3
Operation Desert Shield was launched by the United States to defend Saudi Arabia against Iraqi invasion.
Egyptian, Syrian, and Moroccan troops later joined the US forces following a vote by the Arab League to
send Arab forces to defend Saudi Arabia against Iraqi invasion.
4
UN Security Council, Resolution 665 (1990) Adopted by the Security Council at its 2938th meeting, on
25 August 1990, 25 August 1990, S/RES/665 (1990), available at:
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3b00f16428.html [accessed 4 July 2010]
vary over a large spectrum. From examining some of the existing literature on the First

Persian Gulf War, the general trends that emerge on the subject of contributions seem to

separate them into two main categories: direct material contributions in the form of

financial contributions, or military troops and equipment, allowing the military force

usage of existing infrastructure; and indirect contributions in the form of diplomatic and

political contributions to influence the positions of countries involved in the conflict. This

essay will briefly touch on the direct contributions (whose impact is fairly evident and

straightforward, and it will take a closer look at the intangibles arising from the indirect

contributions (whose effects may not be so readily apparent to a casual reader on the

subject).

DIRECT CONTRIBUTIONS

The main things that one would think of when forming an armed force would be

men and machinery. Next, food and water would be needed to sustain the men; fuel and

spare parts to keep the machinery operating; and if the equipment is not in place,

infrastructure to move it where it will be of the best use. Lastly, cold, hard finance would

be required to fund such an adventure.

The total cost of the First Persian Gulf War was estimated to be US$56 billion.

Coalition countries contributed US$54 billion of this cost 5. The key contributors were

Saudi Arabia and Kuwait (contributing US$16 billion each), as well as Germany and

Japan, who contributed US$10 billion and US$6.6 billion respectively 6. War is an

5
United States. Office of Management and Budget. United States Costs in the Persian Gulf Conflict and
Foreign Contributions to Offset Such Costs, by Richard Darman, United States Department of Defense,
1992.
6
ibid
expensive adventure and in this case, required a large amount of troops and equipment as

well as logistics deployed over a substantial period of time, hence the large bill for the

conflict.

In terms of troop numbers, aside from the United States and United Kingdom, the

largest contributors were Saudi Arabia – who sent 52000-100000 troops (actually more

than the United Kingdom) – and Egypt – who deployed 33600-35000 troops. Other

significant contributors of military personnel were France, Syria and Morocco who each

contributed tens of thousands of troops. The majority of the military equipment and

hardware such as planes and tanks or heavy weapons were all contributed largely by the

United States who is not the subject of this essay.

Another key direct contribution was the offering of infrastructure and logistics

facilities. Whilst the United States had massive men and machinery it could bring to bear

on the war effort, a lot of these resources were spread out across the globe for strategic

reasons. For it to mobilize them and concentrate it all in a single theatre of war would

require massive strategic lift capability. Already the limits of what sealift or air lift assets

the United States owned were committed to transporting their forces from the Continental

United States. Other American units such as those stationed in Europe for the defence of

NATO were able to make use of the European rail and sea networks belonging to the

European members of the coalition to be moved expeditiously to the scene of the action 7.

In theatre, the Saudis provided a vast amount of fuel, spare parts and other logistical

elements crucial to the war, supplying up to 20.4 million barrels of oil in total8.

7
Mazarr, Snider, and Blackwell Jr. 1993, Desert Storm: The Gulf War and What We Learned, Boulder.
Westview, 1993, p58.
8
ibid, p58.
INDIRECT CONTRIBUTIONS

Now that the tangible contributions are out of the way, the main crux of the essay

can come into focus. Whilst money and men, or logistics supplies are vital, the true value

of the contributions that the other coalition members made lay in the diplomatic and

political moves of the international relations game. There are several key factors that this

essay will flesh out from the various indirect contributions.

The first of these is political legitimacy. For the purposes of this essay, political

legitimacy shall be taken to refer to the belief and faith in a government’s method and

policies of its domestic policy (by its own citizens) and international foreign policy (by

other countries around the world)9.

Domestically, with the majority of the coalition countries boasting democratically

elected governments, the decision to send their individual countries’ troops into harm’s

way in the cause of another country is usually a divisive and difficult issue to gain

support for. It is an issue that can sometimes have ramifications for the political future of

a government, as evidenced by the Vietnam War and its impact on the 1968 American

Presidential Election.

In the case of the First Persian Gulf War, the key coalition country that sent the

majority of men and machinery as well as coordinated the coalition forces was with little

doubt, the United States. However, the way the American political system works means

that the United States President cannot just wage war on the first upstart rouge country

that threatens American interests at his whim and fancy; he actually needs to obtain the

9
Derived from the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy’s definition of political legitimacy.
support of the Congress and Senate whose members represent the various citizens across

the fifty American states. In order for the United States to be able to enter the war without

the spectre of a second Vietnam looming over it, the coalition effort had to be seen to be

genuine. This meant that it could not be simply an American force backed up by token

pockets of foreign troops that went in to liberate Kuwait. This would be without doubt a

conflict that would see lives lost and if blood were to be spilt, it had to be more than just

American blood. After all, the economic freedom offered by the oil reserves Iraq stood to

gain control of concerned many more countries, so why should it only be America that

was the world’s sole policeman having to go and confront a dangerous criminal? This

was a point that was raised by numerous Congress members as the withdrawal deadline

for Iraq to pull out of Kuwait drew closer10. The contribution of significant numbers of

troops by other coalition countries – regardless of the effectiveness they would eventually

have – went a long way toward lending some political legitimacy on the domestic front

for the United States. Without this legitimacy, it would have hurt American morale and

also made it difficult for the Americans to continue supporting the war if it turned into a

prolonged affair.

On the foreign policy front, Middle Eastern politics have long been a complicated

quagmire of relations bound by history. The United States needed to balance the US-Arab

axis extremely carefully in order to gain political legitimacy for the coalition to be able to

take action against Iraq rather than be forced to possibly leave the resolution of the

problem to the Arab world to solve internally 11. The general Arab sensitivity regarding

external (particularly Western) intervention in Arab affairs could have been regarded as

10
ibid, p84.
11
Matthews, The Gulf Conflict and International Relations, New York, Routledge, 1993, p64.
another manifestation of “Western Imperialism” without the support of major Arab

states12.

In this respect, Saudi Arabia merits a mention. Despite the direct threat that Iraq

posed to Saudi Arabia with its annexation of Kuwait, it had to tread carefully in bringing

the US-led coalition comprising numerous western powers into the crisis. It could not be

seen to be too enthusiastic in laying out the welcome mat due to domestic pressures

internally within the country and the Arab world. With its position as a major western-

backed stabilizing power in the Arab region, any military action against Iraq would have

to be mounted from Saudi Arabia13. Fortunately for the coalition and for Kuwait, Saddam

Hussein’s belligerence and intransigence forced Egypt and Syria to also lend their

support to further consolidate the Arab League’s eventual decision to sanction the

presence of the coalition in the region to free Kuwait and make it tenable for the Saudi

government to make a formal request for the United States-led coalition to commence

Operation Desert Shield. The resolutions of the Arab League in tandem with those of the

U.N regarding the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait helped to lend some form of international

political legitimacy to the entire crisis and facilitated the United States-led military action

in Desert Storm. These Arab League resolutions were further backed up with the

despatch of large numbers of troops from Egypt and Syria. This also allowed the

remaining Arab countries that ended up joining the coalition, a more domestically

politically legitimate mandate to commit troops and equipment or make available their

infrastructure for the use of coalition forces.

12
ibid, p64.
13
ibid, p64.
 Syria’s contribution in the political perspective can thus be viewed as possibly

more significant than the Saudis political contribution. Syria had been traditionally pro-

Soviet and strongly opposed to the western interference with Middle Eastern politics, and

was more importantly viewed as a leader of sorts of the more radical Arab states and a

sometimes-sponsor of terrorism activities14.

A second aspect of the Middle Eastern political situation was the Israel-Arab axis.

Saddam’s decision to threaten Israel and goad them into offensive action and the eventual

restraint that Israel showed by remaining passive made a significant difference to the

outcome of the war. The traditional anti-Israeli stance that the majority of the Arab world

maintains had to be carefully approached due to the strong US-Israeli ties. Any retaliation

on Israel’s part would have made it difficult politically for Egypt, Syria, and Saudi Arabia

to support the US-led coalition action15. Israel’s role as a dormant member of the

coalition was undoubtedly difficult on them but a crucial one for the coalition.

The second intangible contribution in international relations is the role of the

members of the U.N Security Council at the time. In 1990, the non-permanent members

were: Canada, Ivory Coast, Colombia, Cuba, Ethiopia, Finland, Malaysia, Romania,

Yemen, and the Democratic Republic of Congo. The permanent members were: China,

the then-Soviet Union, the United States, the United Kingdom, and France. A simplified

explanation of how the Security Council works is that it needs nine votes in order to

reach a decision on procedural matters whilst for all other matters, the nine votes must at

least include concurrence votes (including abstention) from all the permanent members.

14
ibid, p67-68.
15
ibid, p64.
Each permanent member has the right to veto any decision and a single veto is all that is

needed to torpedo any decision.

China’s acquiescence with the Security Council resolutions and the then-Soviet

Union’s unequivocal condemnation of the Iraqi invasion 16 played a key role in securing

the votes needed to pass the resolutions through and also demonstrated further, the

political legitimacy that the coalition was steadily gaining. After all, if China and the

then-Soviet Union (who were America’s traditional counter-parts in the Cold War that

was ending) could step forward to offer a stance in favour of the coalition, then what

other doubts could there be as to the legitimacy of the war.

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, this essay has broadly grouped the contributions by various nations

into direct and indirect contributions. It has accorded due recognition to the role of the

tangible direct contributions towards the eventual outcome of the war. The crux of the

essay highlighted the far-reaching impacts of the various foreign policy decisions that the

main actors in the coalition made, especially the Arab states in particular, and also the

domestic impact in the United States of the decisions by other coalition members to

commit troops to the war effort. It is fairly clear that without the combination of decisions

that the Arab states and the permanent Security Council members eventually made, all

the men and machinery that the American and its western coalition partners could have

16
ibid, p79-83.
mustered would not have allowed them the impunity to operate as necessary to reverse

the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in such a short period. While physically, the coalition forces

and equipment or simply the American forces alone, could have certainly effected the

Iraqi defeat, they might have met with Arab armed resistance. The direct result of any

large-scale Arab resistance would have meant more money would have had to be spent,

efficiency and morale would have been compromised to some extent, and potentially,

more lives would have been lost had the Arab states instead chosen to take an anti-

western or anti-United States stance and settled the matter within the Arab world.

Bibliography

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