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CONTENTS
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

LGBT Rights & International Law Principles 3

Political Questions & International Law Obligations 4
Doctrine of State Immunity from Suit 6
Right to Information 8
Admissibility of Written Confession 9
Right to Privacy (CCTV Camera) 10
Police Power (20% Senior Citizen Discount) 11
Writ of Amparo 12

CITIZENSHIP

Naturalization - C.A. 473 14

Derivative Naturalization 14
Naturalization (Full & Complete Compliance) 15

LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS/ADMIN. LAW

Direct Dismissal Power of the Ombudsman 16

Civil Service Commission - Mass Appointments 17
Grave Misconduct 18
Civil Service Examination Irregularities (Jurisdiction) 18
Reorganization & Demotion 19
Doctrine of Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies 20

ELECTION LAW

Pre-Proclamation Controversy 21
Discrepancies in Election Returns 22
Use of Foreign Passport 23

LOCAL GOVERNMENT

No Legal Right to Operate a Cockpit 25

Sanggunian Members as Counsel 25

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 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
LGBT RIGHTS & INTERNATIONAL LAW PRINCIPLES

Ang Ladlad Party v. COMELEC

G.R. No. 190582 – April 8, 2010

In this case the Supreme Court ruled in favor of the party-list accreditation of the Ang Ladlad Party,
an organization composed of men and women who identify themselves as lesbian, gays, bisexuals, or
transgendered individuals (LGBTs). In ruling against the COMELEC, the Supreme Court based its
decision on the following Constitutional and International Law principles:

Violation of the Non-Establishment Clause: Our Constitution provides in Article III, Section 5
that "no law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof."
At bottom, what our non-establishment clause calls for is "government neutrality in religious matters."
Clearly, "governmental reliance on religious justification is inconsistent with this policy of neutrality." We
thus find that it was grave violation of the non-establishment clause for the COMELEC to utilize the Bible
and the Koran to justify the exclusion of Ang Ladlad.

Violation of the Equal Protection Clause: The equal protection clause guarantees that no person
or class of persons shall be deprived of the same protection of laws which is enjoyed by other persons or
other classes in the same place and in like circumstances. From the standpoint of the political process, the
lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender have the same interest in participating in the party-list system on the
same basis as other political parties similarly situated. State intrusion in this case is equally burdensome.
Hence, laws of general application should apply with equal force to LGBTs, and they deserve to participate
in the party-list system on the same basis as other marginalized and under-represented sectors.

NOTE: In this case the Supreme Court held that they are not prepared to single out homosexuals as a
separate class meriting special or differentiated treatment. This means that homosexuals cannot be
categorized as a separate group of people from which a valid classification may be made.

Freedom of Expression and Assocaition: Freedom of expression constitutes one of the essential
foundations of a democratic society, and this freedom applies not only to those that are favorably received
but also to those that offend, shock, or disturb. Any restriction imposed in this sphere must be
proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued. Absent any compelling state interest, it is not for the
COMELEC or this Court to impose its views on the populace. Otherwise stated, the COMELEC is
certainly not free to interfere with speech for no better reason than promoting an approved message or
discouraging a disfavored one. This position gains even more force if one considers that homosexual
conduct is not illegal in this country. It follows that both expressions concerning one's homosexuality and
the activity of forming a political association that supports LGBT individuals are protected as well.

Non-Discrimination and International Law: Ruling in favor of Ang Ladlad Party is fully in accord
with our international law obligations to protect and promote human rights. As the court explicitly
recognizes the principle of non-discrimination as it relates to the right to electoral participation, enunciated
in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (ICCPR). Specifically Article 21 of the UDHR and Article 25 and 26 of the ICCPR.

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*Potential Bar Exam Question: Yogyakarta Principle

In this case the petitioner invoked the Yogyakarta Principle, alleging that such is a binding principle in
International Law, which the Philippines is obligated to uphold.

The Yogyakarta Principle, is a document about human rights in the areas of sexual orientation and
gender identity, published as the outcome of an international meeting of human rights groups in
Yogyakarta, Indonesia in November 2006. The Principles are a set of precepts intended to apply the
standards of international human rights law to address the abuse of human rights of lesbian, gay, bisexual,
transgender and intersex people.

The Supreme Court held at the time (2010), it is not prepared to declare that these Yogyakarta
Principles contain norms that are obligatory on the Philippines. Adding that, not everything that society - or
a certain segment of society - wants or demands is automatically a human right. This is not an arbitrary
human intervention that may be added to or subtracted from at will. It is unfortunate that much of what
passes for human rights today is a much broader context of needs that identifies many social desires as
rights in order to further claims that international law obliges states to sanction these innovations. This has
the effect of diluting real human rights, and is a result of the notion that if "wants" are couched in "rights"
language, then they are no longer controversial.

Using even the most liberal of lenses, these  Yogyakarta Principles, consisting of a declaration
formulated by various international law professors, are - at best -  de lege ferenda  - and do not constitute
binding obligations on the Philippines. Indeed, so much of contemporary international law is characterized
by the "soft law" nomenclature,  i.e., international law is full of principles that promote international
cooperation, harmony, and respect for human rights, most of which amount to no more than well-meaning
desires, without the support of either State practice or opinio juris.

NOTE: There has been an evolution of Human Rights Law since this 2010 ruling, especially with regard to
sexual orientation and gender identity rights around the world. I believe there will be a LGBT Rights
question in the bar exam.

POLITICAL QUESTIONS & INTERNATIONAL LAW OBLIGATIONS

Vinuya v. Romulo
G.R. No. 162230 – April 28, 2010

In this case the Supreme Court ruled agains the petitioners, who were all members of the
MALAYA LOLAS, a non-stock, non-profit organization, established for the purpose of providing aid to
the victims of rape by Japanese military forces in the Philippines during the Second World War.

Petitioners claim that since 1998, they have approached the Executive Department through the
DOJ, DFA, and OSG, requesting assistance in filing a claim against the Japanese officials and military
officers who ordered the establishment of the “comfort women” stations in the Philippines. However,
officials of the Executive Department declined to assist the petitioners, and took the position that the
individual claims of the comfort women for compensation had already been fully satisfied by Japan’s
compliance with the Peace Treaty between the Philippines and Japan.

The petitioners prayed for the (a) declaration that respondents committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of discretion in refusing to espouse their claims for the crimes against
humanity and war crimes committed against them; and (b) compel the respondents to espouse their claims

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for official apology and other forms of reparations against Japan before the International Court of Justice
(ICJ) and other international tribunals.

Domestic Law Perspective – The Executive Department has the Exclusive

Prerogative to Determine whether to espouse petitioners’ claims against Japan;
Political Question: Certain types of cases often have been found to present political questions. One
such category involves questions of foreign relations. It is well-established that "the conduct of the foreign
relations of our government is committed by the Constitution to the executive and legislative 'the political’
departments of the government, and the propriety of what may be done in the exercise of this political
power is not subject to judicial inquiry or decision.

To be sure, not all cases implicating foreign relations present political questions, and courts
certainly possess the authority to construe or invalidate treaties and executive agreements.  However, the
question whether the Philippine government should espouse claims of its nationals against a foreign
government is a foreign relations matter, the authority for which is demonstrably committed by our
Constitution not to the courts but to the political branches. In this case, the Executive Department has
already decided that it is to the best interest of the country to waive all claims of its nationals for
reparations against Japan in the Treaty of Peace of 1951. The wisdom of such decision is not for the
courts to question. Neither could petitioners herein assail the said determination by the Executive
Department via the instant petition for certiorari.

International Law Perspective – The Philippines is Not under any International

Obligation to espouse petitioners’ claims: In the international sphere, traditionally, the only
means available for individuals to bring a claim within the international legal system has been when the
individual is able to persuade a government to bring a claim on the individual's behalf. Even then, it is not
the individual's rights that are being asserted, but rather, the state's own rights. Since the exercise of
diplomatic protection is the right of the State, reliance on the right is within the absolute discretion of
states, and the decision whether to exercise the discretion may invariably be influenced by political
considerations other than the legal merits of the particular claim. The State, therefore, is the sole judge to
decide whether its protection will be granted, to what extent it is granted, and when will it cease. It retains,
in this respect, a discretionary power the exercise of which may be determined by considerations of a
political or other nature, unrelated to the particular case.

*Invocation of “jus cogens” norms and “erga omnes” obligations: Even the invocation of jus
cogens  norms and  erga omnes  obligations will not alter this analysis. Even if we sidestep the question of
whether jus cogens norms existed in 1951, petitioners have not deigned to show that the crimes committed
by the Japanese army violated jus cogens prohibitions at the time the Treaty of Peace was signed, or that the
duty to prosecute perpetrators of international crimes is an erga omnes obligation or has attained the status
of jus cogens.

The term  erga omnes  (Latin:  in relation to everyone) in international law has been used as a legal
term describing obligations owed by States towards the community of states as a whole. The Latin phrase,
`erga omnes,' has since become one of the rallying cries of those sharing a belief in the emergence of a
value-based international public order. However, as is so often the case, the reality is neither so clear nor so
bright. Whatever the relevance of obligations erga omnes as a legal concept, its full potential remains to be
realized in practice.

The term is closely connected with the international law concept of jus cogens. In international law,
the term "jus cogens" (literally, "compelling law") refers to norms that command peremptory authority,
superseding conflicting treaties and custom. Jus cogens norms are considered peremptory in the sense that

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they are mandatory, do not admit derogation, and can be modified only by general international norms of
equivalent authority.

Though there was a consensus that certain international norms had attained the status of jus cogens,
the ILC was unable to reach a consensus on the proper criteria for identifying peremptory norms. After an
extended debate over these and other theories of jus cogens, the ILC concluded ruefully in 1963 that "there is
not as yet any generally accepted criterion by which to identify a general rule of international law as having
the character of  jus cogens." In a commentary accompanying the draft convention, the ILC indicated that
"the prudent course seems to be to x x x leave the full content of this rule to be worked out in State
practice and in the jurisprudence of international tribunals." Thus, while the existence of  jus cogens  in
international law is undisputed, no consensus exists on its substance, beyond a tiny core of principles and
rules.

DOCTRINE OF STATE IMMUNITY FROM SUIT

Secretary of Health v. Phil Pharmawealth, Inc.

G.R. No. 182358 – February 20, 2013

In this case the Supreme Court upheld the Doctrine of Non-Suability of the State. Here the DOH
issued Administrative Orders which set the guidelines and procedure for the accreditation of government
suppliers of pharmaceutical products for sale or distribution to the public, as well as, the accreditation
period, which may be recalled, suspended or revoked only after due deliberation, hearing and notice.

A “Report for Violation of Products” was issued to Phil Pharmawealth for violations or adverse
findings on their products. After their failure to submit an explanation, their accreditation was suspended
for two-years. Phil Pharmawealth then filed suit declaring null and void the DOH issuances with a prayer
for damages.

The Doctrine of Non-Suability: The basic postulate enshrined in the constitution that 'the State may
not be sued without its consent,' reflects nothing less than a recognition of the sovereign character of the
State and an express affirmation of the unwritten rule effectively insulating it from the jurisdiction of
courts.  It is based on the very essence of sovereignty. As a sovereign is exempt from suit, not because of
any formal conception or obsolete theory, but on the logical and practical ground that there can be no legal
right as against the authority that makes the law on which the right depends.

The rule, in any case, is not really absolute for it does not say that the state may not be sued under
any circumstance.  On the contrary, as correctly phrased, the doctrine only conveys, 'the state may not be
sued without its consent;' its clear import then is that the State may at times be sued.  The State's consent
may be given either expressly or impliedly.  Express consent may be made through a general law or a
special law. Implied consent, on the other hand, is conceded when the State itself commences litigation,
thus opening itself to a counterclaim or when it enters into a contract.  In this situation, the government is
deemed to have descended to the level of the other contracting party and to have divested itself of its
sovereign immunity.  This rule, is not, however, without qualification.  Not all contracts entered into by the
government operate as a waiver of its non-suability; distinction must still be made between one which is
executed in the exercise of its sovereign function and another which is done in its proprietary capacity.

As a general rule, a state may not be sued.  However, if it consents, either expressly or impliedly,
then it may be the subject of a suit.  There is express consent when a law, either special or general, so
provides.  On the other hand, there is implied consent when the state "enters into a contract or it itself
commences litigation." However, it must be clarified that when a state enters into a contract, it does not

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automatically mean that it has waived its non-suability. The State "will be deemed to have impliedly waived
its non-suability only if it has entered into a contract in its proprietary or private capacity. However, when
the contract involves its sovereign or governmental capacity, no such waiver may be implied." "Statutory
provisions waiving state immunity are construed in strictissimi juris.  For, waiver of immunity is in derogation
of sovereignty."

The DOH can validly invoke State Immunity:

(a) DOH is an Unincorporated Agency which performs sovereign or governmental

functions: In this case, the DOH, being an "unincorporated agency of the government" can validly
invoke the defense of immunity from suit because it has not consented, either expressly or impliedly, to be
sued.  Significantly, the DOH is an unincorporated agency which performs functions of governmental
character.

An unincorporated government agency without any separate juridical personality of its own enjoys
immunity from suit because it is invested with an inherent power of sovereignty. Accordingly, a claim for
damages against the agency cannot prosper; otherwise, the doctrine of sovereign immunity is violated. 
However, the need to distinguish between an unincorporated government agency performing
governmental function and one performing proprietary functions has arisen.  The immunity has been
upheld in favor of the former because its function is governmental or incidental to such function; it has
not been upheld in favor of the latter whose function was not in pursuit of a necessary function of
government but was essentially a business.

(b) The Complaint seeks to hold DOH solidarily and jointly liable with the other
defendants for damages which constitutes a charge or financial liability against the
state: Moreover, it is settled that if a Complaint seeks to "impose a charge or financial liability against the
state," the defense of non-suability may be properly invoked.  In this case, PPI specifically prayed, in its
Complaint and Amended and Supplemental Complaint, for the DOH, together with Secretaries
Romualdez and Dayrit as well as Undersecretary Galon, to be held jointly and severally liable for moral
damages, exemplary damages, attorney's fees and costs of suit. Undoubtedly, in the event that PPI
succeeds in its suit, the government or the state through the DOH would become vulnerable to an
imposition or financial charge in the form of damages.  This would require an appropriation from the
national treasury which is precisely the situation which the doctrine of state immunity aims to protect the
state from.

The mantle for Non-Suability extends to Complaints filed against Public Officials for
acts done in Performance of their Official Functions: As regards the other petitioners, to wit,
Secretaries Romualdez and Dayrit, and Undersecretary Galon, it must be stressed that the doctrine of state
immunity extends its protective mantle also to complaints filed against state officials for acts done in the
discharge and performance of their duties. "The suability of a government official depends on whether the
official concerned was acting within his official or jurisdictional capacity, and whether the acts done in the
performance of official functions will result in a charge or financial liability against the government."
Otherwise stated, "public officials can be held personally accountable for acts claimed to have been
performed in connection with official duties where they have acted ultra vires or where there is showing of
bad faith." Moreover, "the rule is that if the judgment against such officials will require the state itself to
perform an affirmative act to satisfy the same, such as the appropriation of the amount needed to pay the
damages awarded against them, the suit must be regarded as against the state. In such a situation, the state
may move to dismiss the Complaint on the ground that it has been filed without its consent."

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 RIGHT TO INFORMATION
Right to Information (Article III, Sec. 7 in relation to Article II, Sec. 28)

Antolin v. Domondon
G.R. No. 165036 – July 5, 2010

In this case the petitioner failed her accountancy licensure examination. Convinced that she
deserved to pass the examinations, she requested that her answer sheet be re-corrected. She requested for
copies of: (a) the questionnaire in each of the seven subjects; (b) her answer sheets; (c) the answer keys to
the questionnaires; and (d) an explanation of the grading system used in each subject. Her requests were
denied. She then filed a petition for mandamus based on her constitutional right to information and the
states policy of full public disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest.

Matters of Public Concern: Like all the constitutional guarantees, the right to information is not
absolute. The people's right to information is limited to "matters of public concern," and is further
"subject to such limitations as may be provided by law."  Similarly, the State's policy of full disclosure is
limited to "transactions involving public interest," and is "subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by
law". The Court has always grappled with the meanings of the terms "public interest" and "public
concern."  As observed in Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission:

In determining whether a particular information is of public concern there is no rigid test which
can be applied. "Public concern" like "public interest" is a term that eludes exact definition. Both terms
embrace a broad spectrum of subjects which the public may want to know, either because these directly
affect their lives, or simply because such matters naturally arouse the interest of an ordinary citizen. In the
final analysis, it is for the courts to determine on a case by case basis whether the matter at issue is of
interest or importance, as it relates to or affects the public.

We have also recognized the need to preserve a measure of confidentiality on some matters, such
as national security, trade secrets and banking transactions, criminal matters, and other confidential matters.

CPA Board Exams is a Matter of Public Concern: We are prepared to concede that national
board examinations such as the CPA Board Exams are matters of public concern.  The populace in
general, and the examinees in particular, would understandably be interested in the fair and competent
administration of these exams in order to ensure that only those qualified are admitted into the accounting
profession. And as with all matters pedagogical, these examinations could be not merely quantitative means
of assessment, but also means to further improve the teaching and learning of the art and science of
accounting.

On the other hand, we do realize that there may be valid reasons to limit access to the Examination
Papers in order to properly administer the exam.  More than the mere convenience of the examiner, it may
well be that there exist inherent difficulties in the preparation, generation, encoding, administration, and
checking of these multiple choice exams that require that the questions and answers remain confidential
for a limited duration.  However, the PRC is not a party to these proceedings.  They have not been given an
opportunity to explain the reasons behind their regulations or articulate the justification for keeping the
Examination Documents confidential.  In view of the far-reaching implications of this case, which may
impact on every board examination administered by the PRC, and in order that all relevant issues may be
ventilated, we deem it best to remand these cases to the RTC for further proceedings.

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 ADMISSIBILITY OF A WRITTEN CONFESSION
(Administrative Investigation)

Tanenggee v. People
G.R. No. 179448 – June 26, 2013

The petitioner in this case was a branch manager of a bank who, taking advantage of his position,
falsified several commercial documents. During the internal (administrative) investigation by the bank
officials, the petitioner allegedly made and signed a written confession of the alleged offenses. The petition
was then convicted of the alleged crimes and questions the admissibility of the written and signed
statements. The Supreme Court upheld the admissibility of the written and signed statements of the
petitioner on the following grounds:

The Constitutional Proscription against the Admissibility of Admission or Confession

of Guilt obtained in Violation of Section 12, Article III of the Constitution is Applicable
ONLY in Custodial Interrogation: Custodial interrogation means any questioning initiated by law
enforcement authorities after a person is taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of
action in any significant manner.  Indeed, a person under custodial investigation is guaranteed certain rights
which attach upon the commencement thereof,  viz: (1) to remain silent, (2) to have competent and
independent counsel preferably of his own choice, and (3) to be informed of the two other rights above.
In the present case, while it is undisputed that petitioner gave an uncounselled written statement regarding
an anomaly discovered in the branch he managed, the following are clear: (1) the questioning was not
initiated by a law enforcement authority but merely by an internal affairs manager of the bank; and, (2)
petitioner was neither arrested nor restrained of his liberty in any significant manner during the
questioning.  Clearly, petitioner cannot be said to be under custodial investigation and to have been
deprived of the constitutional prerogative during the taking of his written statement.

Moreover, in Remolona v. Civil Service Commission, we declared that the right to counsel "applies only
to admissions made in a criminal investigation but not to those made in an administrative investigation."

Here, petitioner's written statement was given during an administrative inquiry conducted by his
employer in connection with an anomaly/irregularity he allegedly committed in the course of his
employment.  No error can therefore be attributed to the courts below in admitting in evidence and in
giving due consideration to petitioner's written statement as there is no constitutional impediment to its
admissibility.

Confession/Admission is Presumed Voluntary until the Contrary is Proved: In  People v.

Muit,  it was held that "one of the indicia of voluntariness in the execution of [petitioner's] extrajudicial
statement is that it contains many details and facts which the investigating officers could not have known
and could not have supplied without the knowledge and information given by him."

Also, the fact that petitioner did not raise a whimper of protest and file any charges, criminal or
administrative, against the investigator and the two policemen present who allegedly intimidated him and
forced him to sign negate his bare assertions of compulsion and intimidation.  It is a settled rule that where
the defendant did not present evidence of compulsion, where he did not institute any criminal or
administrative action against his supposed intimidators, where no physical evidence of violence was
presented, his extrajudicial statement shall be considered as having been voluntarily executed.

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 RIGHT TO PRIVACY
(Installation of CCTV Cameras Facing and Capturing anothers Property – Violation of the Right to Privacy)

Sps. Hing v. Choachuy

G.R. No. 179736 – June 26, 2013

In this case the Supreme Court ruled in favor of the petitioners, ruling that the installation of
surveillance cameras facing the property of the petitioners, without their consent, violate the petitioners’
right to privacy.

The Right to Privacy is the Right to be Let Alone: The right to privacy is enshrined in our
Constitution and in our laws.  It is defined as "the right to be free from unwarranted exploitation of one's
person or from intrusion into one's private activities in such a way as to cause humiliation to a person's
ordinary sensibilities." It is the right of an individual "to be free from unwarranted publicity, or to live
without unwarranted interference by the public in matters in which the public is not necessarily
concerned." Simply put, the right to privacy is "the right to be let alone."

The Bill of Rights guarantees the people's right to privacy and protects them against the State's
abuse of power.  In this regard, the State recognizes the right of the people to be secure in their houses. 
No one, not even the State, except "in case of overriding social need and then only under the stringent
procedural safeguards," can disturb them in the privacy of their homes.

The Right to Privacy under Article 26(1) extends to Places where One has the Right to
Exclude the Public or Deny them Access: Article 26(1) of the Civil Code, on the other hand,
protects an individual's right to privacy and provides a legal remedy against abuses that may be committed
against him by other individuals. This provision recognizes that a man's house is his castle, where his right
to privacy cannot be denied or even restricted by others. It includes "any act of intrusion into, peeping or
peering inquisitively into the residence of another without the consent of the latter." The phrase "prying
into the privacy of another's residence," however, does not mean that only the residence is entitled to
privacy. 

Thus, an individual's right to privacy under Article 26(1) of the Civil Code should not be confined
to his house or residence as it may extend to places where he has the right to exclude the public or deny
them access.  The phrase "prying into the privacy of another's residence," therefore, covers places,
locations, or even situations which an individual considers as private.  And as long as his right is recognized
by society, other individuals may not infringe on his right to privacy.

The “Reasonable Expectation of Privacy” Test is used to Determine whether there is a

Violation of the Right to Privacy: In ascertaining whether there is a violation of the right to privacy,
courts use the "reasonable expectation of privacy" test.  This test determines whether a person has a
reasonable expectation of privacy and whether the expectation has been violated. In  Ople v. Torres,  we
enunciated that "the reasonableness of a person's expectation of privacy depends on a two-part test: (1)
whether, by his conduct, the individual has exhibited an expectation of privacy; and (2) this expectation is
one that society recognizes as reasonable."  Customs, community norms, and practices may, therefore, limit
or extend an individual's "reasonable expectation of privacy." Hence, the reasonableness of a person's
expectation of privacy must be determined on a case-to-case basis since it depends on the factual
circumstances surrounding the case.

In this day and age, video surveillance cameras are installed practically everywhere for the
protection and safety of everyone.  The installation of these cameras, however, should not cover places
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where there is reasonable expectation of privacy, unless the consent of the individual, whose right to
privacy would be affected, was obtained.  Nor should these cameras be used to pry into the privacy of
another's residence or business office as it would be no different from eavesdropping, which is a crime
under Republic Act No. 4200 or the Anti-Wiretapping Law.

The petitioners in this case have a "reasonable expectation of privacy" in their property, whether
they use it as a business office or as a residence and that the installation of video surveillance cameras
directly facing petitioners' property or covering a significant portion thereof, without their consent, is a
clear violation of their right to privacy.

POLICE POWER
(20% Senior Citizen Discount)

Manila Memorial Park v. Secretary of DSWD

G.R. No. 175356 – December 3, 2013

In this case the petitioners assailed the constitutionality of Section 4 of R.A. No. 7432, as amended
by R.A. No. 9257, and the implementing rules and regulations issued by the DSWD and DOF insofar as
they allow business establishments to claim the 20% discount given to senior citizens as a tax deduction.
The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the 20% discounts based on the following principles:

Police Power v. Eminent Domain: Police power is the inherent power of the State to regulate or to
restrain the use of liberty and property for public welfare. The only limitation is that the restriction
imposed should be reasonable, not oppressive. In other words, to be a valid exercise of police power, it
must have a lawful subject or objective and a lawful method of accomplishing the goal. Under the police
power of the State, "property rights of individuals may be subjected to restraints and burdens in order to
fulfill the objectives of the government." The State "may interfere with personal liberty, property, lawful
businesses and occupations to promote the general welfare [as long as] the interference [is] reasonable and
not arbitrary." Eminent domain, on the other hand, is the inherent power of the State to take or
appropriate private property for public use. The Constitution, however, requires that private property shall
not be taken without due process of law and the payment of just compensation.

Traditional distinctions exist between police power and eminent domain: In the exercise of police
power, a property right is impaired by regulation, or the use of property is merely prohibited, regulated or
restricted to promote public welfare. In such cases, there is no compensable taking, hence, payment of just
compensation is not required. Examples of these regulations are property condemned for being noxious or
intended for noxious purposes (e.g., a building on the verge of collapse to be demolished for public safety,
or obscene materials to be destroyed in the interest of public morals)  as well as zoning ordinances
prohibiting the use of property for purposes injurious to the health, morals or safety of the community
(e.g., dividing a city's territory into residential and industrial areas). It has, thus, been observed that, in the
exercise of police power (as distinguished from eminent domain), although the regulation affects the right
of ownership, none of the bundle of rights which constitute ownership is appropriated for use by or for
the benefit of the public.

On the other hand, in the exercise of the power of eminent domain, property interests are
appropriated and applied to some public purpose which necessitates the payment of just compensation
therefor. Normally, the title to and possession of the property are transferred to the expropriating
authority. Examples include the acquisition of lands for the construction of public highways as well as
agricultural lands acquired by the government under the agrarian reform law for redistribution to qualified
farmer beneficiaries. However, it is a settled rule that the acquisition of title or total destruction of the

11
property is not essential for "taking" under the power of eminent domain to be present. Examples of these
include establishment of easements such as where the land owner is perpetually deprived of his proprietary
rights because of the hazards posed by electric transmission lines constructed above his property or the
compelled interconnection of the telephone system between the government and a private company.  In
these cases, although the private property owner is not divested of ownership or possession, payment of
just compensation is warranted because of the burden placed on the property for the use or benefit of the
public.

The 20% senior citizen discount is an exercise of police power: The 20% discount is
intended to improve the welfare of senior citizens who, at their age, are less likely to be gainfully employed,
more prone to illnesses and other disabilities, and, thus, in need of subsidy in purchasing basic
commodities.

As to its nature and effects, the 20% discount is a regulation affecting the ability of private
establishments to price their products and services relative to a special class of individuals, senior citizens,
for which the Constitution affords preferential concern.  In turn, this affects the amount of profits or
income/gross sales that a private establishment can derive from senior citizens. In other words, the subject
regulation affects the pricing, and, hence, the profitability of a private establishment. However, it does not
purport to appropriate or burden specific properties, used in the operation or conduct of the business of
private establishments, for the use or benefit of the public, or senior citizens for that matter, but merely
regulates the pricing of goods and services relative to, and the amount of profits or income/gross sales
that such private establishments may derive from, senior citizens.

The subject regulation may be said to be similar to, but with substantial distinctions from, price
control or rate of return on investment control laws which are traditionally regarded as police power
measures. These laws generally regulate public utilities or industries/enterprises imbued with public interest
in order to protect consumers from exorbitant or unreasonable pricing as well as temper corporate greed
by controlling the rate of return on investment of these corporations considering that they have a
monopoly over the goods or services that they provide to the general public. The subject regulation differs
therefrom in that (1) the discount does not prevent the establishments from adjusting the level of prices of
their goods and services, and (2) the discount does not apply to all customers of a given establishment but
only to the class of senior citizens. Nonetheless, to the degree material to the resolution of this case, the
20% discount may be properly viewed as belonging to the category of price regulatory measures which
affect the profitability of establishments subjected thereto. On its face, therefore, the subject regulation is a
police power measure.

WRIT OF AMPARO

Navia v. Pardico
G.R. No. 190582 – April 8, 2010

In denying the petition for a Writ of Amparo, the Supreme Court held that proof of disappearance
is not enough. It is essential to establish that such disappearance was carried out with the direct or indirect
authorization, support, or acquiescence of the government. The element of State participation is essential
for a petition for Writ of Amparo to prosper.

Writ of Amparo - Definition of Enforced Disappearances: The Rule on the Writ of Amparo was
promulgated to arrest the rampant extralegal killings and enforced disappearances in the country.  Its
purpose is to provide an expeditious and effective relief to any person whose right to life, liberty and
security is violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or

12
employee, or of a private individual or entity. While Section 1 provides A.M. No. 07-9-12-SCs coverage,
said Rules does not, however, define extralegal killings and enforced disappearances.  This omission was
intentional as the Committee on Revision of the Rules of Court which drafted A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC chose
to allow it to evolve through time and jurisprudence and through substantive laws as may be promulgated
by Congress.

Then, the budding jurisprudence on  amparo  blossomed in  Razon, Jr. v. Tagitis  when this Court
defined enforced disappearances.  The Court in that case applied the generally accepted principles of
international law and adopted the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from
Enforced Disappearances definition of enforced disappearances, as the arrest, detention, abduction or any
other form of deprivation of liberty  by agents of the State or by persons or groups of persons acting with the
authorization, support or acquiescence of the State, followed by a refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of liberty
or by concealment of the fate or whereabouts of the disappeared person, which place such a person
outside the protection of the law.

Not long thereafter, another significant development affecting A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC came about
after Congress enacted Republic Act (RA) No. 9851 (Philippine Act on Crimes Against International
Humanitarian Law, Genocide, and Other Crimes Against Humanity) on December 11, 2009. Section 3(g)
thereof defines enforced or involuntary disappearances as follows:
 
(g) "Enforced or involuntary disappearance of persons" means the arrest, detention, or abduction of
persons by, or with the authorization, support or acquiescence of, a State or a political organization
followed by a refusal to acknowledge that deprivation of freedom or to give information on the fate
or whereabouts of those persons, with the intention of removing from the protection of the law for
a prolonged period of time.

Then came Rubrico v. Macapagal-Arroyo where Justice Arturo D. Brion wrote in his Separate Opinion
that with the enactment of RA No. 9851, the Rule on the Writ of  Amparo  is now a procedural law
anchored, not only on the constitutional rights to the rights to life, liberty and security, but on a concrete
statutory definition as well of what an enforced or involuntary disappearance is. Therefore, A.M. No.
07-9-12-SCs reference to enforced disappearances should be construed to mean the enforced or
involuntary disappearance of persons contemplated in Section 3(g) of RA No. 9851. Meaning, in probing
enforced disappearance cases, courts should read A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC in relation to RA No. 9851.

From the statutory definition of enforced disappearance, thus, we can derive the following
elements that constitute it:

(a) That there be an arrest, detention, abduction or any form of deprivation of liberty;
(b) That it be carried out by, or with the authorization, support or acquiescence of, the
State or a political organization;
(c) That it be followed by the State or political organizations refusal to acknowledge or give
information on the fate or whereabouts of the person subject of the  amparo  petition;
and
(d) That the intention for such refusal is to remove subject person from the protection of
the law for a prolonged period of time.

Writ of Amparo - Government Participation is Indispensable: As thus dissected, it is now

clear that for the protective writ of amparo to issue, allegation and proof that the persons subject thereof
are missing are not enough.  It must also be shown and proved by substantial evidence that the
disappearance was carried out by, or with the authorization, support or acquiescence of, the State or a
political organization, followed by a refusal to acknowledge the same or give information on the fate or
whereabouts of said missing persons, with the intention of removing them from the protection of the law
13
for a prolonged period of time. Simply put, the petitioner in an amparo case has the burden of proving by
substantial evidence the indispensable element of government participation. This hallmark of State
participation differentiates an enforced disappearance case from an ordinary case of missing persons.

CITIZENSHIP
NATURALIZATION - C.A. 473
(Lucrative Trade, Profession, or Lawful Occupation)

Republic v. Kerry Lao Ong

G.R. No. 175430 – June 18, 2012

In this case the Supreme Court denied the petition of Naturalization of Kerry Lao Ong, despite
the fact that he was born, raised, fully educated and residing in the Philippines on the ground that he failed
to show full and complete compliance with the requirements of the law.

Revised Naturalization Law, Section 2(4), requires the applicant must have some
known lucrative trade, profession, or lawful occupation: Naturalization laws should be rigidly
enforced and strictly construed in favor of the government and against the applicant. The  burden  of 
proof   rests   upon  the  applicant  to  show  full   and complete compliance with the requirements of law.

Based on jurisprudence, the qualification of  "some known lucrative trade, profession, or lawful
occupation"  means "not only that the person having the employment gets enough for his ordinary
necessities in life.  It must be shown that the employment gives one an income such that  there is an
appreciable margin of his income over his expenses as to be able to provide for an adequate support in the
event of unemployment, sickness, or disability to work and thus avoid one's becoming the object of charity
or a public charge." His income should permit "him and the members of his family to live with reasonable
comfort, in accordance with the prevailing standard of living, and consistently with the demands of human
dignity, at this stage of our civilization." Moreover,  it has been held that in determining  the existence of 
a  lucrative income, the courts should consider only the applicant's income; his or her spouse's income
should not be included in the assessment.  The spouse's additional income is immaterial "for under the law
the petitioner should be the one to possess 'some known lucrative trade, profession or lawful occupation'
to qualify him to become a Filipino citizen." Lastly, the Court has consistently held that the applicant's
qualifications must be determined as of the time of the filing of his petition.

DERIVATIVE NATURALIZATION

Republic v. Batuigas
G.R. No. 183110 – October 7, 2013

In this case, even after the denial of Philippine citizenship through administrative naturalization
proceedings, the Supreme Court ruled in favor of the grant of Philippine citizenship through judicial
naturalization.

Ways to acquire Philippine citizenship through Naturalization: Under existing laws, an alien
may acquire Philippine citizenship through either judicial naturalization under C.A. 473 or administrative
naturalization under R.A. No. 9139 (the “Administrative Naturalization Law of 2000”). A third option,
14
called derivative naturalization, is available to alien women married to Filipino husbands, which is found
under Section 15 of C.A. 473, which provides that: “any woman who is now or may hereafter be married to a citizen
of the Philippines and who might herself be lawfully naturalized shall be deemed a citizen of the Philippines.”

*Potential Bar Exam Question: Derivative Naturalization: The Court categorically declared
in Moy Ya Lim Yao v. Commissioner of Immigration: Accordingly, We now hold, all previous decisions of this
Court indicating otherwise notwithstanding, that under Section 15 of Commonwealth Act 473, an alien
woman marrying a Filipino, native born or naturalized, becomes ipso facto a Filipina provided she is not
disqualified to be a citizen of the Philippines under Section 4 of the same law. Likewise, an alien woman
married to an alien who is subsequently naturalized here follows the Philippine citizenship of her husband
the moment he takes his oath as Filipino citizen, provided that she does not suffer from any of the
disqualifications under said Section 4.

As stated in  Moy Ya Lim Yao, the procedure for an alien wife to formalize the conferment of
Filipino citizenship is as follows: Regarding the steps that should be taken by an alien woman married to a
Filipino citizen in order to acquire Philippine citizenship, the procedure followed in the Bureau of
Immigration is as follows: The alien woman must file a petition for the cancellation of her alien certificate
of registration alleging, among other things, that she is married to a Filipino citizen and that she is not
disqualified from acquiring her husband's citizenship pursuant to Section 4 of Commonwealth Act No.
473, as amended. Upon the filing of said petition, which should be accompanied or supported by the joint
affidavit of the petitioner and her Filipino husband to the effect that the petitioner does not belong to any
of the groups disqualified by the cited section from becoming naturalized Filipino citizen x x x, the Bureau
of Immigration conducts an investigation and thereafter promulgates its order or decision granting or
denying the petition.

Denial of Administrative Naturalization does not preclude Judicial Naturalization:

When an applicant is denied naturalization through administrative proceedings, there is nothing that
prevents him from seeking acquisition of Philippine citizenship through regular naturalization proceedings
available to all qualified foreign nationals. The choice of what option to take in order to acquire Philippine
citizenship rests with the applicant. Even if the denial was based on other grounds, it is proper, in a judicial
naturalization proceeding, for the courts to determine whether there are in fact grounds to deny her of
Philippine citizenship based on regular judicial naturalization proceedings. If the applicant has clearly
proven, under strict judicial scrutiny, that she is qualified for the grant of that privilege, and this court will
not stand in the way of making her a part of a truly Filipino family.

FULL & COMPLETE COMPLIANCE WITH NATURALIZATION LAWS

Republic v. Huang Te Fu
G.R. No. 200983 – March 18, 2015

In this case the Supreme Court ruled against the application for naturalization on the ground that
there was no full and complete compliance with the requirements of the naturalization law. As the
applicant did not prove to have some known lucrative trade, profession, or lawful occupation.

Applicant for Naturalization must show full and complete compliance with the
requirements of the Naturalization Law: The courts must always be mindful that naturalization
proceedings are imbued with the highest public interest. Naturlization laws should be rigidly enforced and
strictly construed in favor of the government and against the applicant. The burden of proof rests upon
the applicant to show full and complete compliance with the requirements of the law.

15
Meaning of “ some known lucrative trade, profession, or lawful occupation.”: Section 2
of the Revised Naturalization Law or CA 473 requires, among others, that an applicant for naturalization
must be of good moral character and must have some known lucrative trade, profession, or lawful
occupation.  In regard to the requirement that the applicant must have a known lucrative trade,
this ponente declared:

Based on jurisprudence, the qualification of "some known lucrative trade, profession, or lawful
occupation" means  "not only that the person having the employment gets enough for his ordinary
necessities in life.  It must be shown that the employment gives one an income such that there is an
appreciable margin of his income over his expenses as to be able to provide for an adequate support in the
event of unemployment, sickness, or disability to work and thus avoid one's becoming the object of charity
or a public charge." His income should permit "him and the members of his family to live with reasonable
comfort, in accordance with the prevailing standard of living, and consistently with the demands of human
dignity, at this stage of our civilization."


Moreover, it has been held that in determining the existence of a lucrative income, the courts should
consider only the applicant's income; his or her spouse's income should not be included in the assessment. 
The spouse's additional income is immaterial "for under the law the petitioner should be the one to possess
'some known lucrative trade, profession or lawful occupation' to qualify him to become a Filipino citizen."
Lastly, the Court has consistently held that the applicant's qualifications must be determined as of the time
of the filing of his petition.

LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS/ADMIN. LAW

DIRECT DISMISSAL POWER OF THE OMBUDSMAN

Fajardo v. Office of the Ombudsman

G.R. No. 173268 – August 23, 2012

In this case the Ombudsman dismissed the petitioner, who was an employee of the Bureau of
Customs, from government service on the grounds of dishonesty and grave misconduct, for the
misappropriation of public funds. The petitioner, questioned the power of the Ombudsman in dismissing
him from service, as he claims the constitution and related laws only vests in the Ombudsman the power to
recommend the removal of public officials or employees. The Supreme Court held in favor of the
Ombudsman.

The Ombudsman has the Power to Dismiss erring Public Officials or Employees: It is
already well-settled that "the power of the Ombudsman to determine and impose administrative liability is
not merely recommendatory but actually mandatory."  As we have explained in  Atty. Ledesma v. Court of
Appeals, the fact "that the refusal, without just cause, of any officer to comply with the order of the
Ombudsman to penalize  an erring officer or employee is a ground for discipilinary action [under Section
15(3) of RA No. 6770]; is a strong indication that the Ombudsman's 'recommendation' is not merely
advisory in nature but is actually mandatory within the bounds of law.”

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 CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION - MASS APPOINTMENTS
Civil Service Commission has Authority to Issue Regulations Prohibiting Mass Appointments at the Local
Government Level

Nazareno v. City of Dumaguete

G.R. No. 181559 – October 2, 2009

In this case an incumbent Mayor lost his re-election bid, but before the newly elected Mayor was to
assume office, he promoted 15 city hall employees, and regularized another 74 city hall employees. The
CSC revoked all the appointments. The Supreme Court upheld the authority of the CSC in issuing a
regulation prohibiting mass appointments at the local government level.

CSC has Authority to Establish Rules to Promote Efficiency in the Civil Service: The
Commission, as the central personnel agency of the government, has statutory authority to establish rules
and regulations to promote efficiency and professionalism in the civil service. Presidential Decree No. 807,
or the Civil Service Decree of the Philippines, provides for the powers of the Commission, including the
power to issue rules and regulations and to review appointments. The Administrative Code of 1987 also
authorizes the Commission to “prescribe, amend, and enforce” rules to cover the civil service. The
legislative standards to be observed and respected in the exercise of such delegated authority are set out in
the statutes, to wit: to promote “economical, efficient, and effective personnel administration.”

Prohibition of Mass Appointments at the Local Government Level: It is true that there is no
constitutional prohibition against the issuance of "mass appointments" by defeated local government
officials prior to the expiration of their terms. Clearly, this is not the same as a "midnight appointment,"
proscribed by the Constitution, which refers to those appointments made within two months immediately
prior to the next presidential election. As we ruled in De Rama v. Court of Appeals:

The records reveal that when the petitioner brought the matter of recalling the appointments of
the fourteen (14) private respondents before the CSC, the only reason he cited to justify his action was that
these were midnight appointments that are forbidden under Article VII, Section 15 of the Constitution.
However, the CSC ruled, and correctly so, that the said prohibition applies only to presidential
appointments. In truth and in fact, there is no law that prohibits local elective officials from making
appointments during the last days of his or her tenure.

However, even while affirming De Rama, we explained in Quirog v. Aumentado, that: We, however,
hasten to add that the aforementioned ruling does not mean that the raison d' etre behind the prohibition
against midnight appointments may not be applied to those made by chief executives of local government
units, as here.  Indeed, the prohibition is precisely designed to discourage, nay, even preclude, losing
candidates from issuing appointments merely for partisan purposes thereby depriving the incoming
administration of the opportunity to make the corresponding appointments in line with its new policies. 

Not All Mass Appointments are Prohibited: Indeed, not all appointments issued after the elections
by defeated officials are invalid. However, it must be shown that the appointments have undergone the
regular screening process, that the appointee is qualified, that there is a need to fill up the vacancy
immediately, and that the appointments are not in bulk. the validity of an appointment issued immediately
before and after elections by an outgoing local chief executive is to be  determined on the basis of the
nature, character, and merit of the individual appointment and the particular circumstances surrounding
the same.

17
 Each appointment must be judged on the basis of the nature, character, and merits of the
individual appointment and the circumstances surrounding the same. It is only when the appointments
were made en masse by the outgoing administration and shown to have been made through hurried
maneuvers and under circumstances departing from good faith, morality, and propriety that this Court has
struck down "midnight" appointments.

GRAVE MISCONDUCT

Hallasgo v. COA Regional Office No. X

G.R. No. 171340 – September 11, 2009

The petitioner was the Municipal Treasurer of the Municipality of Dumalog, Bukidnon. She was
accused before the Ombudsman of “unauthorized withdrawal of monies of the public treasury amounting
to malversation of public funds” by outgoing and incumbent officials of the Municipality. The Supreme
Court upheld her dismissal from service on the ground of Grave Misconduct.

Gross Misconduct; Definition and Penalty: Misconduct generally means wrongful, improper or
unlawful conduct motivated by a premeditated, obstinate or intentional purpose.  It is a transgression of
some established and definite rule of action, a forbidden act, a dereliction of duty. Qualified by the term
gross, it means conduct that is "out of all measure beyond allowance; flagrant; shameful; such conduct as is
not to be excused."

Pursuant to Section 52, Rule IV of the Civil Service Rules, gross misconduct is a grave offense
punishable with dismissal for the first offense, without prejudice to the Ombudsmans right to file the
appropriate criminal case against the petitioner or other responsible individuals. We are, of course, aware
that in several administrative cases, this Court has refrained from strictly imposing the penalties provided
by the law, in light of mitigating factors such as the offending employees length of service,
acknowledgment of his or her infractions and feeling of remorse, family circumstances, advanced age, and
other equitable considerations.

“Public Office is a Public Trust”: The oft-repeated phrase, “public office is a public trust” is not -
and should not be - mere hortatory cliché. A public servant is expected to exhibit, at all times, the highest
degree f honesty and integrity, and is accountable to all those he or she serves. Public officers - particularly
those in custody of public funds - are held to the highest standards of ethical behaviour in both their
public and private conduct, and are expected to uphold the public interest over personal interest at all
times. It is in this spirit that we convey our deep disdain for all those whose actions betray the trust and
confidence reposed in public officers, and those who attempt to conceal wrongdoing through misdirection
and blatantly belated explanations.

CSC - JURISDICTION OVER CS EXAMINATION IRREGULARITIES

Capablanca v. Civil Service Commission
G.R. No. 179370 – November 18, 2009

The petitioner was appointed into the PNP service with the rank of Policer Officer 1 (PO1) with a
temporary status. He then took the PNP entrance exam conducted by the National Police Commission
(NAPOLCOM) and passed. He then took the Career Service Professional Examination-Computer
Assisted Test (CSP-CAT) given by the Civil Service Commission (CSC) and likewise passed the same.

18
 Due to certain irregularities relative to his CSP-CAT examination, the CSC conducted a preliminary
investigation, which showed the commission of the offense of dishonesty. The petitioner questions the
jurisdiction of the CSC, alleging that in cases of administrative discipline over police officers only falls
under the jurisdiction of the PNP and/or NAPOLCOM. The Supreme Court upheld the jurisdiction of
the CSC to conduct the preliminary investigation of a possible case of dishonesty for an alleged CSP-CAT
examination irregularity.

Civil Service Commission; Jurisdiction: The CSC, as the central personnel agency of the
Government, is mandated to establish a career service, to strengthen the merit and reward system, and to
adopt measures to promote morale, efficiency and integrity in the civil service. The civil service embraces
all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the government, including government-owned
or controlled corporations with original charters.Specifically, Section 91 of R.A. No. 6975 or the
“Department of Interior Local Government Act of 1990” provides that the “Civil Service Law and its
implementing rules and regulations shall apply to al personnel of the Department,” to which herein
petitioner belongs.

Civil Service Commission; Powers and Functions; Jurisdiction over Civil Service
Examinations: Section 12 of E.O. No. 292 or the “Administrative Code of 1987,” enumerates the
powers and functions of the CSC. The Commission shall have the following powers and functions: Sec.
12(1) Administer and enforce the constitutional and statutory provisions on the merit system for all levels
and ranks in the Civil Service; Sec. 12(7) Control, supervise and coordinate Civil Service examinations; Sec.
12(11) Hear and decide administrative cases instituted by or brought before it directly or on appeal,
including contested appointments, and review decisions and actions of its offices and of the agencies
attached to it.

In addition, Section 28, Rule XIV of the Omnibus Civil Service Rules and Regulations specifically
confers upon the CSC the authority to take cognizance over any irregularities or anomalies connected with
the examinations, thus: Sec. 28. The Commission shall have original disciplinary jurisdiction over all its
officials and employees and over all cases involving civil service examination anomalies or irregularities. To
carry out this mandate, the CSC issued Resolution No. 991936, or the Uniform Rules on Administrative
Cases in the Civil Service, empowering its Regional Offices to take cognizance of cases involving CSC
examinations anomalies.

Based on the foregoing, it is clear that the CSC acted within its jurisdiction when it initiated the
conduct of a preliminary investigation on the alleged civil service examination irregularity committed by
the petitioner.

*NOTE: If the issue in the case is in connection with the duties and functions of their office, and not in a
case where the acts arose from cheating in the civil service examination, the CSC only has appellate
jurisdiction.

REORGANIZATION & DEMOTION

Bautista v. CSC
G.R. No. 185215 – July 22, 2010

In this case, the petitioner began her career in the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP) as
Chief of Division, she was then promoted to the position of Technical Assistant. In pursuant to E.O. No.
81, which authorized the reorganization of the DBP, the petitioner was temporarily appointed as Account
Officer with an annual salary of P62,640 (equivalent to Salary Grade 20). This appointment was made
permanent as a result of the approval of the reorganization of the DBP by the CSC.
19
 Upon the implementation of R.A. No. 6758, or the “The Compensation and Classification Act of
1989”, the DBP adopted a uniform set of position titles in their plantilla. As a consequence, petitioner was
appointed on a permanent status as BEO II with an annual salary of P131,250 (Salary Grade 24). Prior to
her appointment, she occupied the position of Account Officer with an annual salary of P102,000.

Reorganization made in Good Faith is Valid: In this jurisdiction, a reorganization is valid

provided that it is done in good faith. As a general rule, the test of good faith lies in whether the purpose
of the reorganization is for economy or to make the bureaucracy more efficient. Removal from office as a
result of reorganization must, thus, pass the test of good faith. A demotion in office, i.e., the movement
from one position to another involving the issuance of an appointment with diminution in duties,
responsibilities, status or rank which may or may not involve a reduction in salary,  is tantamount to
removal, if no cause is shown for it. Consequently, before a demotion may be effected pursuant to a
reorganization, the observance of the rules on bona fide abolition of public office is essential.

There is NO Demotion when the appointment is to a position comparable to the

position previously occupied: There is a demotion when an employee is appointed to a position
resulting to a diminution in duties, responsibilities, status or rank which may or may not involve a reduction
in salary. Where an employee is appointed to a position with the same duties and responsibilities but a rank
and salary higher than those enjoyed in his previous position, there is no demotion and the appointment is
valid.

DOCTRINE OF EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES

University of Santo Tomas v. Sanchez

G.R. No. 165569 – July 29, 2010

In this case, a complaint was filed against the University of Santo Tomas (UST) for its alleged
unjustified refusal to release the respondents Transcript of Records (ToR), which deprived him of the
opportunity to take the nursing board examinations and depriving him of the opportunity to make a living.
UST filed a motion to dismiss alleging the failure to exhaust administrative remedies, alleging the CHED
exercises quasi-judicial power over controversies involving school matters and has primary jurisdiction over
the demand for the release of ToRs. The Supreme Court held that the doctrine does not apply in this case
as recourse to CHED is not mandatory or even possible.

Doctrine of Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies: The doctrine of exhaustion of

administrative remedies requires that where a remedy before an administrative agency is provided, the
administrative agency concerned must be given the opportunity to decide a matter within its jurisdiction
before an action is brought before the courts. Failure to exhaust administrative remedies is a ground for
dismissal of the action.

Exceptions to the Doctrine of Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies; Purely Legal

and well within the Jurisdiction of the Trial Court: The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative
remedies admits of numerous exceptions, one of which is where the issues are purely legal and well within
the jurisdiction of the trial court, as in the present case. Petitioners' liability - if any - for damages will have
to be decided by the courts, since any judgment inevitably calls for the application and the interpretation of
the Civil Code. As such, exhaustion of administrative remedies may be dispensed with.  As we held
in Regino v. Pangasinan Colleges of Science and Technology:

20
 Exhaustion of administrative remedies is applicable when there is competence on the part of the
administrative body to act upon the matter complained of. Administrative agencies are not courts; neither
are they part of the judicial system, or deemed judicial tribunals. Specifically, the CHED does not have the
power to award damages. Hence, petitioner could not have commenced her case before the Commission.

Rule on Primary Jurisdiction applies only where the Administrative Agency Exercises
Quasi-Judicial or Adjudicatory Functions: Thus, an essential requisite for this doctrine to apply is
the actual existence of quasi-judicial power. In this case, the petitioners have not shown that the CHED
possesses any such power to “investigate facts or ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, weigh
evidence, and draw conclusions.” CHED remains without authority to adjudicate an action for damages.

ELECTION LAW
PRE-PROCLAMATION CONTROVERSY

Saño v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 182221 – February 3, 2010

Pre-Proclamation Controversy: A pre-proclamation controversy, as defined in Batas Pambansa (BP)

Blg. 881, otherwise known as the Omnibus Election Code of the Philippines, is: Any question pertaining to
or affecting the proceeding of the board of canvassers which may be rasied by any candidate or by any
registered political party or coalition of political parties before the board or directly with the Commission,
or any matter raised under Sections 233, 234, 235, and 236 in relation to the preparation, transmission,
receipt, custody and appearance of the election returns.

Pre-Proclamation Controversy; Procedural Matters: It is settled that a pre-proclamation

controversy is summary in character; indeed, it is the policy of the law that pre-proclamation controversies
be promptly decided, so as not to delay canvass and proclamation. The Board of Canvassers (BOC) will
not look into allegations of irregularity that are not apparent on the face of ERs that appear otherwise
authentic and duly accomplished.

Consistent with the summary character and limited scope of a pre-proclamation controversy, Sec.
20 of R.A. 7166 lays down the procedure to be followed when ERs are contested before the BOC.
Compliance with this procedure is mandatory, so as to permit the BOC to resolve the objections s quickly
as possible. Thus, we held in Siquian, Jr. v. Commission on Elections that:

“Compliance with the period set for objections on exclusions and inculsion of election returns is
mandatory. Otherwise, to allow objections after the canvassing would be to open the floodgates to schemes
designed to delay the proclamation and frustrate the electorate’s will by some candidates who feel that the
only way to fight for a lost cause is to delay the proclamation of the winner. It should be noted that
proceedings before the Board of Canvassers is summary in nature which is why the law grants the parties a
short period to submit objections and the Board a short period to rule on matters brought to them.”

Sec. 20 of R.A. 7166 and Sec. 36 of COMELEC Resolution 2962 provide that any candidate may
contest the inclusion of an ER by making an oral objection at the tie the questioned return is submitted for
canvass; the objecting party shall also submit his objections in writing simultaneously with the oral
objections. The BOC shall consider the written objections and opposition, if any, and summarily rule on

21
the petition for exclusion. Any party adversely affected by such ruling must immediately inform the BOC
if he intends to appeal such ruling.

After the BOC rules on the contested returns and canvasses all the uncontested returns, it shall
suspend the canvass. Any party adversely affected by the ruling has 48 hours to file a Notice of Appeal; the
appeal shall be filed within five (5) days. Upon receipt of the notice of appeal, the BOC will make its
report to the COMELEC, and elevate the records and evidence.

Cases where the ERs appear to have been Tampered with, Altered or Falsified: Pursuant
to Sec. 235 of the Omnibus Election Code, in cases where the ERs appear to have been tampered with,
altered or falsified, the COMELEC shall examine the other copies of the questioned returns and, if the
other copies are likewise tampered with, altered or falsified, or otherwise spurious, after having given notice
to all candidates and satisfied itself that the integrity of the ballot box and of the ballots therein have been
duly preserved, shall order a recount of the votes cast, prepare a new return which shall be used by the
BOC as basis for the canvass, and direct the proclamation of the winner accordingly.

CERTIFICATE OF VOTES & DISCREPANCIES IN ELECTION RETURNS

Discrepancies in the other Authentic Copies of an Election Return; Section 236 of the Omnibus Election
Code

Doromal v. Biron
G.R. No. 181809 – February 17, 2010

In this case the Supreme Court held that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in ordering
the exclusion of the subject election returns. The proper procedure in case of discrepancy in the other
authentic copies of the election returns is clearly spelled out in Section 236 of the Omnibus Election
Code. For contravening this legal provision, the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

Certificate of Votes: After the counting of the votes case in the precinct and announcement of the
results of the election, and before leaving the polling place, the board of election inspectors shall issue a
certificate of votes upon request of the duly accredited watchers. The certificate shall contain the number
of voted obtained by each candidate written in words and figures, the number of the precinct, the
name of the city or municipality and province, the total number of voters who voted in the
precinct and the date and time issued, and shall be signed and thumbmarked by each members of
the board. (Section 16 of R.A. 6646)

Certificate of Votes is Inadmissible to prove Tampering, Alteration or Falsification for

Failure to comply with Section 16 and 17 of R.A. 6646: The certificate of votes, which contains
the number of votes obtained by each candidate, is issued by the BEI upon the request of a duly
accredited watcher pursuant to Section 16 of R.A. 6646. Relative to its evidentiary value, Section 17 of the
said law provides:

Sec. 17.  Certificate of Votes as Evidence. - The provisions of Sections 235 and 236 of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 881 notwithstanding, the certificate of votes shall be admissible in evidence to prove
tampering, alteration, falsification or any anomaly committed in the election returns concerned, when duly
authenticated by testimonial or documentary evidence presented to the board of canvassers by at least two
members of the board of election inspectors who issued the certificate: Provided, That failure to present
any certificate of votes shall not be a bar to the presentation of other evidence to impugn the authenticity
of the election returns.

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 While the above-quoted provision authorizes the COMELEC to make use of the certificate of
votes to prove tampering, alteration, falsification or any anomaly committed in the election returns, this
presupposes that the certificate of votes was accomplished in accordance with Section 16 of the said law.
In order for the certificate of votes to be admissible it has to contain all the required elements prescribed
in Section 16.

Discrepancy in other Authentic Copies of an Election Return; Section 236 of the

Omnibus Election Code should be Followed: In case it appears to the board of canvassers that
there exists discrepancies in the other authentic copies of the election returns from a polling place or
discrepancies in the votes of any candidate in words and figures in the same return, and in either case the
difference affects the results of the election, the Commission, upon motion of the board of canvassers or
any candidate affected and after due notice to all candidates concerned shall proceed summarily to
determine whether the integrity of the ballot box had been preserved, and once satisfied thereof shall
order the opening of the ballot box to recount the votes cast in the polling place solely for the purpose of
determining the true result of the count of votes of the candidates concerned. However, if the integrity of
the ballots has been violated, the COMELEC need not recount the ballots but should seal the ballot box
and order its safekeeping in accordance with Section 237 of the Omnibus Election Code.

USE OF FOREIGN PASSPORT AFTER RENUNCIATION OF FOREIGN CITIZENSHIP

Arando v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 210164 – August 18, 2005

In this case, the petitioner is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines who lost his Philippine
citizenship after he was naturalised as a citizen of the United States of America (USA). Subsequently, and
in preparation for his plans to run for public office in the Philippines, Arnado applied for repatriation
under Republic Act No. 9225[5] (RA 9225) before the Consul General of the Philippines in San Franciso,
USA. He took an Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines on July 10, 2008 and, on even
date, an Order of Approval of Citizenship Retention and Re acquisition was issued in his favor. On April
3, 2009, Arnado executed an Affidavit of Renunciation of his foreign citizenship. On November 30, 2009,
Arnado filed his Certificate of Candidacy (CoC) for the mayoralty post of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte
for the May 10, 2010 national and local elections.

Another mayoralty candidate, however, filed a petition to disqualify Arnado and/or to cancel his
CoC on the ground, among others, that Arnado remained a US citizen because he continued to use his US
passport for entry to and exit from the Philippines after executing aforesaid Affidavit of Renunciation.
After arduous litigations the Supreme Court held in favour of his disqualification as his continued use of
his US passport negated his Affidavit of Renunciation.

Twin requirements of Section 5(2) of R.A. 9225 must be satisfied at the time of filing a
Certificate of Candidacy; Subsequent compliance does not suffice: Under Section 4(d) of
the Local Government Code, a person with "dual citizenship" is disqualified from running for any elective
local position. In Mercado v. Manzano, it was clarified that the phrase "dual citizenship" in said Section 4(d)
must be understood as referring to "dual allegiance.'' Subsequent, Congress enacted RA 9225 allowing
natural-born citizens of the Philippines who have lost their Philippine citizenship by reason of their
naturalization abroad to reacquire Philippine citizenship and to enjoy full civil and political rights upon
compliance with the requirements of the law. They may now run for public office in the Philippines
provided that they: (1) meet the qualifications for holding such public office as required by the Constitution
and existing laws; and, (2) make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenships

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before any public officer authorized to administer an oath prior to or at the time of filing of their CoC.
Thus:

Section 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities - Those who retain or re-acquire Philippine
citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil and political rights and be subject to all attendant liabilities
and responsibilities under existing laws of the Philippines and the following conditions: x x x (2) Those
seeking elective public office in the Philippines shall meet the qualification for holding such public office as
required by the Constitution and existing laws and, at the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy,
make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any public officer
authorized to administer an oath.

In the case at bench, the Comelec Second Division, as affirmed by the Comelec En Banc, ruled
that Arnado failed to comply with the second requisite of Section 5 (2) of RA 9225 because, as held in
Maquiling v. Commission on Elections, his April 3, 2009 Affidavit of Renunciation was deemed withdrawn
when he used his US passport after executing said affidavit. The Comelec En Banc did not err, nor did it
commit grave abuse of discretion, in upholding the Resolution of the Comelec Second Division
disqualifying Arnado from running for public office. It is worth noting that the reason for Arnado's
disqualification to run for public office during the 2010 elections — being a candidate without total and
undivided allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines - still subsisted when he filed his CoC for the 2013
elections on October 1, 2012. The Comelec En Banc merely adhered to the ruling of this Court in
Maquiling lest it would be committing grave abuse of discretion had it departed therefrom.

The circumstances surrounding the qualification of Arnado to run for public office during the May
10, 2010 and May 13, 2013 elections, to reiterate for emphasis, are the same. Arnado's use of his US
passport in 2009 invalidated his oath of renunciation resulting in his disqualification to run for mayor of
Kauswagan in the 2010 elections. Since then and up to the time he filed his CoC for the 2013 elections,
Arnado had not cured the defect in his qualification. Maquiling, therefore, is binding on and applicable to
this case following the salutary doctrine of stare decisis et non quieta movere, which means to adhere to
precedents, and not to unsettle things which are established. Under the doctrine, "[w]hen the court has
once laid down a principle of law as applicable to a certain state of facts, it will adhere to that principle and
apply it to all future cases where facts are substantially the same.” It enjoins adherence to judicial
precedents and bars relitigation of the same issue.

Landslide election victory cannot override eligibility requirements: In Maquiling, this Court
emphasized that popular vote does not cure the ineligibility of a candidate. Thus, while in this case Arnado
won by landslide majority during the 2013 elections, garnering 84% of the total votes cast, the same
"cannot override the constitutional and statutory requirements for qualifications and disqualifications.” In
Velasco v. Comelec, this Court pronounced that election victory cannot be used as a magic formula to bypass
election eligibility requirements; otherwise, certain provisions of laws pertaining to elections will become
toothless. One of which is Section 39 of the Local Government Code of 1991, which specifies the basic
positive qualifications of local government officials. If in Velasco the Court ruled that popular vote cannot
override the required qualifications under Section 39, a fortiori, there is no reason why the Court should
not follow the same policy when it comes to disqualifications enumerated under Section 40 of the same
law. After all, "[t]he qualifications set out in [Section 39] are roughly half of the requirements for election
to local public offices. The other half is contained in the succeeding section which lays down the
circumstances that disqualify local candidates."

As in Lopez v. Comlec, the Supreme Court held that: While it is true that petitioner won the elections,
took his oath and began to discharge the functions of Barangay Chairman, his victory cannot cure the
defect of his candidacy. Garnering the most number of votes does not validate the election of a

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disqualified candidate because the application of the constitutional and statutory provisions on
disqualification is not a matter of popularity.

LOCAL GOVERNMENT
NO LEGAL RIGHT TO OPERATE A COCKPIT
Du v. Jayoma
G.R. No. 175042 - April 23, 2012

There is NO Legal Right to Operate a Cockpit; License to Operate a Cockpit is a mere

Privilege: It is well enshrined in out jurisprudence that “a license authorizing the operation and
exploitation of a cockpit is not property of which the holder may not be deprived without due process of
law, but a mere privilege that may be revoked when public interests so require.” An allegation that one is
deprived of due process in this case has no leg to stand on.

Under Section 447(a)(3)(v) of the LGC, it is the Sangguniang Bayan which is empowered to
"authorize and license the establishment, operation and maintenance of cockpits, and regulate cockfighting
and commercial breeding of gamecocks." Considering that no public bidding was conducted for the
operation of a cockpit from January 1, 1993 to December 31, 1997, petitioner cannot claim that he was
duly authorized by the Sangguniang Bayan to operate his cockpit in the municipality for the period January
1, 1997 to December 31, 1997. Respondent members of the Sangguniang Bayan, therefore, had every
reason to suspend the operation of petitioner's cockpit by enacting Municipal Resolution No. 065, series
of 1997. As the chief executive of the municipal government, respondent mayor was duty-bound to
enforce the suspension of the operation of petitioner's cockpit pursuant to the said Resolution.

SANGGUNIAN MEMBERS AS COUNSEL

Republic v. Atty. Rambuyong

G.R. No. 167810 - October 4, 2010

In this case, a case for collection of sum of money was filed agains the National Power
Corporation (NPC) with the RTC of Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay. The Atty. Rambuyong was the counsel of
the claimant, who was the incumbent Vice-Mayor of Ipil. The NPC filed a motion for the inhibition of
Atty. Rambuyong arguing that under Section 90(b)(1) of R.A. 7160, or the Local Government Code,
Sanggunian Members are prohibited to appear as counsel before any court where any office, agency, or
instrumentality of the government is the adverse party. The NPC claiming that being a Government-
Owned or Controlled Corporation (GOCC), it is covered by the term instrumentality.

Agency of the Government; Instrumentality - Defined: Section 2(4) of the Administrative

Code of 1987 defines an “Agency of the Government” as referring to any of the various units of
Government, including a department, bureau, office, instrumentality, or government-owned or controlled
corporation, or a local government or a distinct unit therein. Section 2(10) defines “Instrumentality” as
referring to any agency of the National Government, not integrated within the department framework,
vested with special functions or jurisdiction by law, endowed with some if not all corporate powers,
administering special funds, and enjoying operational autonomy, usually through a charter. This term
includes regulatory agencies, chartered institutions and government-owned or controlled corporations.
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National Power Corporation is a Government-Owned or Controlled Corporation: Section
2 of the Administrative Code of 1987 is clear and unambiguous. It categorically provides that the term
"instrumentality" includes government-owned or controlled corporations. Hence there is no room for
construction. All that has to be done is to apply the law as called for by the circumstances of the case. It is
not disputed that the NPC is a government-owned or controlled corporation. Therefore following Section
2 of the Administrative Code of 1987, the NPC is clearly an instrumentality of the government.

It is also significant to point out that in Maceda v. Macaraig, Jr. the Court stated that "[t]he NPC is a
government instrumentality with the enormous task of undertaking development of hydroelectric
generation of power and production of electricity from other sources, as well as the transmission of
electric power on a nationwide basis, to improve the quality of life of the people pursuant to the State
policy embodied in Section [9], Article II of the 1987 Constitution."

Given the categorical words of both the law and jurisprudence, to still go to extra-ordinary lengths
to interpret the intention of the lawmakers and come out with the construction that a government-owned
or controlled corporation like the NPC is not included within the term "instrumentality of the
government" is grave abuse of discretion.

Sanggunian Members cannot appear as counsel adverse to government: Finally, Section

446 of the Local Government Code provides that "[t]he sangguniang bayan, the legislative body of the
municipality, shall be composed of the municipal vice mayor as the presiding officer x x x." Thus, pursuant
to Sec. 90 (b), (1) of the Local Government Code, Atty. Rambuyong, as sanggunian member, cannot
appear as counsel of a party adverse to the NPC, which is an instrumentality of government.

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