SANLAKAS Vs.

Executive Secretary Case Digest

SANLAKAS Vs. Executive Secretary

421 SCRA 656 G.R. No. 159085

February 3, 2004

Facts: During the wee hours of July 27, 2003, some three-hundred junior officers and enlisted men of
the AFP, acting upon instigation, command and direction of known and unknown leaders have seized
the Oakwood Building in Makati. Publicly, they complained of the corruption in the AFP and declared
their withdrawal of support for the government, demanding the resignation of the President, Secretary
of Defense and the PNP Chief. These acts constitute a violation of Article 134 of the Revised Penal
Code, and by virtue of Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4, the Philippines was declared
under the State of Rebellion. Negotiations took place and the officers went back to their barracks in
the evening of the same day. On August 1, 2003, both the Proclamation and General Orders were
lifted, and Proclamation No. 435, declaring the Cessation of the State of Rebellion was issued.

In the interim, however, the following petitions were filed: (1) SANLAKAS AND PARTIDO NG
MANGGAGAWA VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, petitioners contending that Sec. 18 Article VII of the
Constitution does not require the declaration of a state of rebellion to call out the AFP, and that there
is no factual basis for such proclamation. (2)SJS Officers/Members v. Hon. Executive Secretary, et al,
petitioners contending that the proclamation is a circumvention of the report requirement under the
same Section 18, Article VII, commanding the President to submit a report to Congress within 48 hours
from the proclamation of martial law. Finally, they contend that the presidential issuances cannot be
construed as an exercise of emergency powers as Congress has not delegated any such power to the
President. (3) Rep. Suplico et al. v. President Macapagal-Arroyo and Executive Secretary Romulo,
petitioners contending that there was usurpation of the power of Congress granted by Section 23 (2),
Article VI of the Constitution. (4) Pimentel v. Romulo, et al, petitioner fears that the declaration of a
state of rebellion "opens the door to the unconstitutional implementation of warrantless arrests" for the
crime of rebellion.

Issue:

Whether or Not Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4 are constitutional?

Whether or Not the petitioners have a legal standing or locus standi to bring suit?

Held: The Court rendered that the both the Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4 are
constitutional. Section 18, Article VII does not expressly prohibit declaring state or rebellion. The
President in addition to its Commander-in-Chief Powers is conferred by the Constitution executive
powers. It is not disputed that the President has full discretionary power to call out the armed forces
and to determine the necessity for the exercise of such power. While the Court may examine whether
the power was exercised within constitutional limits or in a manner constituting grave abuse of
discretion, none of the petitioners here have, by way of proof, supported their assertion that the
President acted without factual basis. The issue of the circumvention of the report is of no merit as
there was no indication that military tribunals have replaced civil courts or that military authorities have
taken over the functions of Civil Courts. The issue of usurpation of the legislative power of the
Congress is of no moment since the President, in declaring a state of rebellion and in calling out the
armed forces, was merely exercising a wedding of her Chief Executive and Commander-in-Chief
powers. These are purely executive powers, vested on the President by Sections 1 and 18, Article VII,
as opposed to the delegated legislative powers contemplated by Section 23 (2), Article VI. The fear
on warrantless arrest is unreasonable, since any person may be subject to this whether there is
rebellion or not as this is a crime punishable under the Revised Penal Code, and as long as a valid
warrantless arrest is present.

Legal standing or locus standi has been defined as a personal and substantial interest in the case
such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is
being challenged. The gist of the question of standing is whether a party alleges "such personal stake
in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the
presentation of Issue upon which the court depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.
Based on the foregoing, petitioners Sanlakas and PM, and SJS Officers/Members have no legal
standing to sue. Only petitioners Rep. Suplico et al. and Sen. Pimentel, as Members of Congress,
have standing to challenge the subject issuances. It sustained its decision in Philippine Constitution
Association v. Enriquez, that the extent the powers of Congress are impaired, so is the power of each
member thereof, since his office confers a right to participate in the exercise of the powers of that
institution.

Saguisag v. Exec Secretary Ochoa July 26,

2016 G.R. No. 212426 EDCA, Treaty,
Executive Agreement, International
Agreement
AUGUST 22, 2018

FACTS:

This is a Resolution on the Motion for Reconsideration seeking to reverse the Decision of this
Court in Saguisag et. al., v. Executive Secretary dated 12 January 2016.

Petitioners claim this Court erred when it ruled that the Enhanced Defense Cooperation
Agreement (EDCA) between the Philippines and the US was not a treaty. In connection to this,
petitioners move that EDCA must be in the form of a treaty in order to comply with the
constitutional restriction under Section 25, Article· XVIII of the 1987 Constitution on foreign
military bases, troops, and facilities. Additionally, they reiterate their arguments on the issues of
telecommunications, taxation, and nuclear weapons.

The principal reason for the Motion for Reconsideration is evidently petitioners’ disagreement
with the Decision that EDCA implements the VFA and Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT).

Petitioners argue that EDCA’s provisions fall outside the allegedly limited scope of the VFA and
MDT because it provides a wider arrangement than the VFA for military bases, troops, and
facilities, and it allows the establishment of U.S. military bases.
ISSUE:

Whether or not EDCA is a treaty.

RULING:

Petitioners detail their objections to EDCA in a similar way to their original petition, claiming
that the VFA and MDT did not allow EDCA to contain the following provisions:

1. Agreed Locations

2. Rotational presence of personnel

3. U.S. contractors

4. Activities of U.S. contractors

We ruled in Saguisag, et. al. that the EDCA is not a treaty despite the presence of these
provisions. The very nature of EDCA, its provisions and subject matter, indubitably categorize it
as an executive agreement – a class of agreement that is not covered by the Article XVIII Section
25 restriction – in painstaking detail. To partially quote the Decision:

Executive agreements may dispense with the requirement of Senate concurrence because of the
legal mandate with which they are concluded.

As culled from the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, past Supreme Court
Decisions, and works of noted scholars, executive agreements merely involve arrangements on
the implementation of existing policies, rules, laws, or agreements.

They are concluded

(1) to adjust the details of a treaty;

(2) pursuant to or upon confirmation by an act of the Legislature; or

(3) in the exercise of the President’s independent powers under the Constitution.

The raison d’etre of executive agreements hinges on prior constitutional or legislative

authorizations.
The special nature of an executive agreement is not just a domestic variation in international
agreements.

International practice has accepted the use of various forms and designations of international
agreements, ranging from the traditional notion of a treaty – which connotes a formal, solemn
instrument – to engagements concluded in modern, simplified forms that no longer necessitate
ratification.

An international agreement may take different forms: treaty, act, protocol, agreement, concordat,
compromis d’arbitrage, convention, covenant, declaration, exchange of notes, statute, pact,
charter, agreed minute, memorandum of agreement, modus vivendi, or some other form.

Consequently, under international law, the distinction between a treaty and an international
agreement or even an executive agreement is irrelevant for purposes of determining international
rights and obligations.

However, this principle does not mean that the domestic law distinguishing treaties,
international agreements, and executive agreements is relegated to a mere variation in form, or
that the constitutional requirement of Senate concurrence is demoted to an optional constitutional
directive. There remain two very important features that distinguish treaties from executive
agreements and translate them into terms of art in the domestic setting.

First, executive agreements must remain traceable to an express or implied authorization under
the Constitution, statutes, or treaties. The absence of these precedents puts the validity and
effectivity of executive agreements under serious question for the main function of the Executive
is to enforce the Constitution and the laws enacted by the Legislature, not to defeat or interfere in
the performance of these rules. In turn, executive agreements cannot create new international
obligations that are not expressly allowed or reasonably implied in the law they purport to
implement.

Second, treaties are, by their very nature, considered superior to executive agreements. Treaties
are products of the acts of the Executive and the Senate unlike executive agreements, which are
solely executive actions. Because of legislative participation through the Senate, a treaty is
regarded as being on the same level as a statute. If there is an irreconcilable conflict, a later law
or treaty takes precedence over one that is prior. An executive agreement is treated differently.
Executive agreements that are inconsistent with either a law or a treaty are considered
ineffective. Both types of international agreement are nevertheless subject to the supremacy of
the Constitution.

Subsequently, the Decision goes to great lengths to illustrate the source of EDCA’s validity, in
that as an executive agreement it fell within the parameters of the VFA and MDT, and
seamlessly merged with the whole web of Philippine law. We need not restate the arguments
here. It suffices to state that this Court remains unconvinced that EDCA deserves treaty status
under the law.
 We find no reason for EDCA to be declared unconstitutional. It fully conforms to the
Philippines’ legal regime through the MDT and VFA. It also fully conforms to the government’s
continued policy to enhance our military capability in the face of various military and
humanitarian issues that may arise.

PARTIES:
Petitioner: WILFREDO TORRES Y SUMULONG
Respondents: HON. NEPTALI A. GONZALES, THE CHAIRMAN, BOARD OF PARDONS AND PAROLE, and THE
DIRECTOR, BUREAU OF PRISONS

FACTS:
1978, Torres was convicted of estafa. In 1979, he was pardoned by the president w/ the condition that he
shall not violate any penal laws again. Should this condition be violated, he will be proceeded against in
the manner prescribed by law. Petitioner accepted the conditional pardon and was consequently released
from confinement. In 1982, Torres was charged with multiple crimes of estafa. In 1986, Gonzales
petitioned for the cancellation of Torres’ pardon. Hence, the president cancelled the pardon. Torres
appealed the issue before the SC averring that the Exec Dep’t erred in convicting him for violating the
conditions of his pardon because the estafa charges against him were not yet final and executory as they
were still on appeal.

Conditional pardon is in the nature of a contract between the sovereign power or the Chief
Executive and the convicted criminal to the effect that the former willrelease the latter subject
to the condition that if he does not comply with theterms of the pardon, he will be recommitted
to prison to serve the unexpiredportion of the sentence or an additional one. By the pardonee’s
consent to the terms stipulated in the contract, the pardonee has placed himself under the
supervision of the Chief Executive or his delegate who is duty bound to see to it that the
pardonee complies with the conditions of the pardon.

Under Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code, the Chief Executive is authorized to
order "the arrest and re-incarceration of any such person who, in his judgment, shall fail to
comply with the condition, or conditions of his pardon, parole, or suspension of sentence." It
is now a well-entrenched rule in this jurisdiction that this exercise of presidential judgment is
beyond judicial scrutiny. The determination of the violation of the conditional pardon rests
exclusively in the sound judgment of the Chief Executive, and the pardonee, having consented
to place his liberty on conditional pardon upon the judgment of the power that has granted
it, cannot invoke the aid of the courts, however erroneous the findings may be upon which
his recommitment was ordered. (In Re: Petition for Habeas Corpus of Wilfredo S. Sumulong,
G.R. No. 122338, December 29, 1995)

Risos-Vidal vs. Comelec

Facts:
In September 12, 2007, the Sandiganbayan convicted former President Estrada for the crime of
plunder and was sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua and the accessory
penalties of civil interdiction during the period of sentence and perpetual absolute disqualification.
On October 25, 2007, however, former President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo extended executive
clemency, by way of pardon, to former President Estrada, explicitly stating that he is restored to
his civil and political rights.

In 2009, Estrada filed a Certificate of Candidacy for the position of President. None of the
disqualification cases against him prospered but he only placed second in the results.

In 2012, Estrada once more ventured into the political arena, and filed a Certificate of Candidacy,
this time vying for a local elective post, that of the Mayor of the City of Manila.

Petitioner Risos-Vidal filed a Petition for Disqualification against Estrada before

the Comelec stating that Estrada is disqualified to run for public office because of his conviction
for plunder sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua with perpetual absolute
disqualification. Petitioner relied on Section 40 of the Local Government Code (LGC), in relation
to Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code (OEC).

The Comelec dismissed the petition for disqualification holding that President Estrada’s right to
seek public office has been effectively restored by the pardon vested upon him by former
President Gloria M. Arroyo.

Estrada won the mayoralty race in May 13, 2013 elections. Alfredo Lim, who garnered the second
highest votes, intervened and sought to disqualify Estrada for the same ground as the contention
of Risos-Vidal and praying that he be proclaimed as Mayor of Manila.

Issue:
May former President Joseph Estrada run for public office despite having been convicted of the
crime of plunder which carried an accessory penalty of perpetual disqualification to hold public
office?

Held:

Yes. Estrada was granted an absolute pardon that fully restored all his civil and political rights,
which naturally includes the right to seek public elective office, the focal point of this controversy.
The wording of the pardon extended to former President Estrada is complete, unambiguous, and
unqualified. It is likewise unfettered by Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code. The only
reasonable, objective, and constitutional interpretation of the language of the pardon is that the
same in fact conforms to Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code.

It is insisted that, since a textual examination of the pardon given to and accepted by former
President Estrada does not actually specify which political right is restored, it could be inferred
that former President Arroyo did not deliberately intend to restore former President Estrada’s
rights of suffrage and to hold public office, orto otherwise remit the penalty of perpetual absolute
disqualification. Even if her intention was the contrary, the same cannot be upheld based on the
pardon’s text.

The pardoning power of the President cannot be limited by legislative action.

The 1987 Constitution, specifically Section 19 of Article VII and Section 5 of Article IX-C, provides
that the President of the Philippines possesses the power to grant pardons, along with other acts
of executive clemency, to wit:

Section 19. Except in cases of impeachment, or as otherwise provided in this Constitution, the

President may grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures, after

conviction by final judgment.

He shall also have the power to grant amnesty with the concurrence of a majority of all the

Members of the Congress.

xxxx

Section 5. No pardon, amnesty, parole, or suspension of sentence for violation of election laws,

rules, and regulations shall be granted by the President without the favorable recommendation of

the Commission.

It is apparent from the foregoing constitutional provisions that the only instances in which the
President may not extend pardon remain to be in: (1) impeachment cases; (2) cases that have
not yet resulted in a final conviction; and (3) cases involving violations of election laws, rules and
regulations in which there was no favorable recommendation coming from the COMELEC.
Therefore, it can be argued that any act of Congress by way of statute cannot operate to delimit
the pardoning power of the President.

The proper interpretation of Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code.

A close scrutiny of the text of the pardon extended to former President Estrada shows that both
the principal penalty of reclusion perpetua and its accessory penalties are included in the pardon.
The sentence which states that “(h)e is hereby restored to his civil and political rights,” expressly
remitted the accessory penalties that attached to the principal penalty of reclusion perpetua.
Hence, even if we apply Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code, it is indubitable from the
text of the pardon that the accessory penalties of civil interdiction and perpetual absolute
disqualification were expressly remitted together with the principal penalty of reclusion perpetua.

The disqualification of former President Estrada under Section 40 of the LGC in relation to
Section 12 of the OEC was removed by his acceptance of the absolute pardon granted to
him
While it may be apparent that the proscription in Section 40(a) of the LGC is worded in absolute
terms, Section 12 of the OEC provides a legal escape from the prohibition – a plenary pardon or
amnesty. In other words, the latter provision allows any person who has been granted plenary
pardon or amnesty after conviction by final judgment of an offense involving moral turpitude, inter
alia, to run for and hold any public office, whether local or national position.

The third preambular clause of the pardon did not operate to make the pardon conditional.

Contrary to Risos-Vidal’s declaration, the third preambular clause of the pardon, i.e., "[w]hereas,
Joseph Ejercito Estrada has publicly committed to no longer seek any elective position or office,"
neither makes the pardon conditional, nor militate against the conclusion that former President
Estrada’s rights to suffrage and to seek public elective office have been restored.

This is especially true as the pardon itself does not explicitly impose a condition or limitation,
considering the unqualified use of the term "civil and political rights"as being restored.
Jurisprudence educates that a preamble is not an essential part of an act as it is an introductory
or preparatory clause that explains the reasons for the enactment, usually introduced by the word
"whereas." Whereas clauses do not form part of a statute because, strictly speaking, they are not
part of the operative language of the statute. In this case, the whereas clause at issue is not an
integral part of the decree of the pardon, and therefore, does not by itself alone operate to make
the pardon conditional or to make its effectivity contingent upon the fulfilment of the
aforementioned commitment nor to limit the scope of the pardon.

Besides, a preamble is really not an integral part of a law. It is merely an introduction to show its
intent or purposes. It cannot be the origin of rights and obligations. Where the meaning of a statute
is clear and unambiguous, the preamble can neither expand nor restrict its operation much less
prevail over its text.

If former President Arroyo intended for the pardon to be conditional on Respondent’s promise
never to seek a public office again, the former ought to have explicitly stated the same in the text
of the pardon itself. Since former President Arroyo did not make this an integral part of the decree
of pardon, the Commission is constrained to rule that the 3rd preambular clause cannot be
interpreted as a condition to the pardon extended to former President Estrada. (Risos-Vidal vs.
Comelec, G.R. No. 206666, January 21, 2015)