PHIL. RABBIT v.

PP

FACTS:
Napoleon Roman y Macadangdang was found guilty and convicted of the crime of reckless imprudence resulting to triple
homicide, multiple physical injuries and damage to property. Evidently, the judgment against accused had become final and
executory. Accused has jumped bail and remained at large. It is worth to mention that Section 8, Rule 124 of the Rules of Court
authorizes the dismissal of appeal when appellant jumps bail. Counsel for accused, also admittedly hired by Rabbit Bus and
provided by petitioner filed a notice of appeal which was denied by the trial court and affirmed by the CA.

ISSUE:
Whether an employer, who dutifully participated in the defense of its accused-employee, may appeal the judgment of
conviction independently of the accused.

HELD:
When the accused-employee absconds or jumps bail, the judgment meted out becomes final and executory. The employer
cannot defeat the finality of the judgment by filing a notice of appeal on its own behalf in the guise of asking for a review of its
subsidiary civil liability. Both the primary civil liability of the accused-employee and the subsidiary civil liability of the
employer are carried in one single decision that has become final and executory.
Section 1 of Rule 122 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure states that, "Any party may appeal from a judgment or
final order, unless the accused will be placed in double jeopardy."
As to when a judgment of conviction attains finality is explained in Section 7 of Rule 120 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal
Procedure where, "A judgment of conviction may, upon motion of the accused, be modified or set aside before it becomes final
or before appeal is perfected. Except where the death penalty is imposed, a judgment becomes final after the lapse of the
period for perfecting an appeal, or when the sentence has been partially or totally satisfied or served, or when the accused has
waived in writing his right to appeal, or has applied for probation."
In the case before us, the accused-employee has escaped and refused to surrender to the proper authorities, impliedly
withdrawing his appeal by jumping bail and he is deemed to have his right to appeal waived, thus conviction is now final and
executory.

SPS. NESTOR & DADIZON v. CA

FACTS:
The Mocorros spouses filed a case in the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Naval, Biliran against the Dadizons to recover a parcel
of land with an area of 78 square meters and to cancel the latter's tax declaration.
Because of a judgment unfavorable to them, the Dadizons filed a notice of appeal. The Mocorros moved to dismiss the
Dadizons' appeal on the ground that the mode of appeal they had adopted was erroneous. Agreeing with the Mocorros, the CA
dismissed the Dadizons' appeal through its resolution dated February 26, 2003.11 The CA denied the Dadizons' motion for
reconsideration on June 30, 2003.
Hence, the Dadizons have come to the Supreme Court to assail the dismissal of their appeal and the denial of their motion for
reconsideration.

ISSUE:
Whether the mode appeal of the Dadizon’s was erroneous.

HELD:
The mode of appeal from the decision of the RTC via a notice of appeal adopted by the Dadizons was undoubtedly wrong. They
should have filed a Petition for Review in accordance with Rule 42, Rules of Court, which was the correct mode of appeal,
considering that the RTC had rendered the decision in question in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction.

IRENORIO BALABA v. PP
FACTS:
Accused Balaba, Assistant Municipal Treasurer of Guindulman, Bohol, was charged and convicted with Malversation of Public
Funds by the RTC on it’s decision dated December 9, 2002. On January 14, 2003 filed his Notice of Appeal before the CA which
was dismissed on its December 14, 2004 decision on the ground that it had no jurisdiction to act on the appeal because
SB has exclusive appellate jurisdiction over the case. Hence this appeal on the ground that CA erred in dismissing his appeal
instead of certifying the case to the proper court.

ISSUE:
Whether the CA erred in dismissing his appeal instead of certifying the case to the proper court?

HELD:
No. RA 8249 states that the Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive appellate jurisdiction over final judgments, resolutions or
orders of the regional trial courts whether in the exercise of their own original jurisdiction or of their appellate jurisdiction. An
error in designating the appellate court is not fatal to the appeal. However, the correction in designating the proper appellate
court should be made within the 15-day period to appeal. Once made within the said period, the designation of the correct
appellate court may be allowed even if the records of the case are forwarded to the Court of Appeals. An appeal erroneously
taken to the Court of Appeals shall not be transferred to the appropriate court but shall be dismissed outright. In this case,
Balaba sought the correction of the error in filing the appeal only after the expiration of the period to appeal.

EDGARDO ESTARIJA v. PP

FACTS:
An Information was filed before the RTC of Davao City against Estarija, then Harbor Master of the Philippine Ports Authority,
for violating Section 3, paragraph b of Republic Act No. 3019 and the RTC rendered a decision convicting Estarija of the crime
charged and imposing upon him a straight penalty of seven years. Estarija filed his notice of appeal before the Court of
Appeals, which affirmed the findings of RTC.

ISSUE:
Whether the notice of appeal is correctly appealed before the Court of Appeals.

HELD:
Under RA 8249, the Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive appellate jurisdiction over final judgments, resolutions or orders
of regional trial courts whether in the exercise of their own original jurisdiction or of their appellate jurisdiction. Thus, the
decisions of the Regional Trial Court convicting an accused who occupies a position lower than that with salary grade 27 or
those not otherwise covered by the enumeration of certain public officers in Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 1606 as
amended by Republic Act No. 8249 are to be appealed exclusively to the Sandiganbayan. Time and again, it has been held that
the right to appeal is not a natural right or a part of due process, but merely a statutory privilege and may be exercised only in
the manner and in accordance with the provisions of the law. The party who seeks to avail himself of the same must comply
with the requirements of the rules, failing in which the right to appeal is lost. In the instant case, instead of appealing his
conviction to the Sandiganbayan, Estarija erroneously filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals, in utter disregard of
paragraph 3, Section 4(c) of Republic Act No. 8249. This fatal flaw committed by Estarija did not toll the running of the period
for him to perfect his appeal to the Sandiganbayan. Because of Estarija’s failure to perfect his appeal to the Sandiganbayan
within the period granted therefor, the Decision of the RTC convicting him of violating Section 3(a) of Republic Act No. 3019
has thus become final and executory.

FILOMENA VILLANUEVA v. PP

FACTS:
Petra Martinez filed a civil action for collection of sum of money before the Regional Trial Court against Armando Villanueva,
the husband of the Assistant Regional Director of the Cooperative Development Authority (CDA) Filomena Villanueva. The trial
court declared Armando in default and ordered him to pay plus fine and interest. Armando filed a petition for prohibition
before the Court of Appeals alleging that he should not be made to pay said loan as the same had long been fully paid as shown
by an official receipt evidencing his payment, thus the CA nullified the RTC decision on the ground that the obligation has been
settled. Martinez filed an administrative case with the Office of the Ombudsman which resulted in a decision finding petitioner
guilty of Grave Misconduct and denied the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration. The petitioner then filed a petition for
review before the Court of Appeals and the petition reversed and set aside the assailed decision of the Ombudsman. Thus,
Martinez filed a motion for reconsideration while the Ombudsman filed an Omnibus Motion to Intervene and for
Reconsideration to which the CA denied both motions.
Aside from those cases, a criminal case was filed against the petitioner for violation R.A No. 6713 before the Municipal Circuit
Trial Court and were convicted. Petitioner appealed to the RTC but the MCTC decision was upheld, thus the Petitioner filed a
petition for review before the CA.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed a Manifestation and Motion contending that the Sandiganbayan had exclusive
appellate jurisdiction over the petition. The petitioner argued that the issue of jurisdiction could not be raised for the first time
before the CA in view of the failure of the Provincial Prosecutor to bring out the same when she appealed the MCTC Decision to
the RTC. She claimed to have availed of the remedy provided under Rule 122 of the Rules of Court in good faith. The CA agreed
with the OSG and the CA dismissed the petition.

ISSUE:
Whether the Office of the Solicitor General has the exclusive appellate jurisdiction over the petition.

HELD:
In this case, the CA was correct in dismissing the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Section 2 of Rule 50 of the 1997 Revised Rules
of Court provides, among others, that “an appeal erroneously taken to the Court of Appeals shall not be transferred to the
appropriate court but shall be dismissed outright.”
Records also bear out that the earlier civil case against Armando, the petitioner’s husband, was also finally resolved in his
favor since the obligation had already been settled. This civil case is also intertwined with the administrative and criminal
cases filed against petitioner. Thus, it appears that the filing of the criminal case against petitioner was merely an afterthought
considering that the civil case against her husband and the administrative case against her were resolved in the couple’s favor.
With the dismissal of the administrative case against the petitioner, it is in the interest of substantial justice that the criminal
case against her should be reviewed on the merits by the proper tribunal following the appropriate procedures under the
rules. Our legal culture requires the presentation of proof beyond reasonable doubt before any person may be convicted of any
crime and deprived of his life, liberty or even property, not merely substantial evidence. It is not enough that the evidence
establishes a strong suspicion or a probability of guilt. The primary consideration is whether the guilt of an accused has been
proven beyond reasonable doubt.

PP v. ROMEO PARADEZA

FACTS:
On June 7, 2000, Romeo F. Paradeza was found guilty of rape and sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. Romeo
then filed his notice of appeal anchored on the sole assignment of error that the Court a quo gravely erred in finding him guilty
beyond reasonable doubt. However, Romeos counsel filed a motion to withdraw his appeal. The Brief for the appellant was
filed on June 1, 2001, and the Brief for the appellee was filed on November 20, 2001. The Office of the Solicitor General, in its
comment seeking stiffer penalties, pointed out that since the appellee as well as the appellant already filed briefs, under the
Rules of Court, the approval of appellant’s motion to withdraw his appeal is now a matter of discretion on the part of the Court.

ISSUE:
Whether the Court could grant the motion to withdraw the appeal filed by accused-appellant.

HELD:
The right to appeal is a mere statutory privilege and is not a natural right or part of the due process. Like any other right or
privilege, it may be waived. A person accused and convicted of an offense may withdraw his appeal not only because he is
guilty as charged. Regardless of his reasons, he is within his rights to seek the withdrawal of his appeal. This option should not
be closed to herein accused-appellant except for clearly important substantial reasons of law and policy. Appellant in
withdrawing his appeal has accepted and recognized that the trial court’s judgment of conviction and his sentence thereunder
is conclusive upon him. His exercise of the option to withdraw appeal before the case is submitted for this Court’s decision, but
fully cognizant of its legal consequences at this stage of the case, not only saves the Court precious time and resources. It also
opens soonest the path for the reformation of the contrite offender, pursuant to the ideal of a just and compassionate society
envisioned in our fundamental law. Considering the particular circumstances of this case, this Court is not without justifiable
reasons to act favorably on his motion.

IN RE: THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS FOR REYNALDO DE VILLA

FACTS:
Reynaldo De Villa was charged with the crime of rape by his niece Aileen Mendoza and the trial court found Reynaldo guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of qualified rape. Three years after the decision, June (the son of Reynaldo) alleged that
during the trial of the case, he was unaware that there was a scientific test that could determine whether Reynaldo was
Leahlyn’s (the child born of the rape) father. They sought for DNA testing to resolve the issue of paternity, but the same was
denied. At the petitioner’s insistence, they gathered samples from Leahlyn, from the grandchildren of Reynaldo, and from
Reynaldo himself and was submitted to the DNA Laboratory. The DNA Laboratory rendered a preliminary report showing that
there was no match between the DNA samples.

ISSUE:
Whether the presentation of newly-discovered evidence be allowed through a petition to grant new trial.

HELD:
A motion for new trial based on newly-discovered evidence may be granted only if the following requisites are met: (a) that
the evidence was discovered after trial; (b) that said evidence could not have been discovered and produced at the trial even
with the exercise of reasonable diligence; (c) that it is material, not merely cumulative, corroborative or impeaching; and (d)
that the evidence is of such weight that that, if admitted, it would probably change the judgment. It is essential that the offering
party exercised reasonable diligence in seeking to locate the evidence before or during trial but nonetheless failed to secure it.
Although the DNA evidence was undoubtedly discovered after the trial, the court nonetheless find that it does not meet the
criteria for "newly-discovered evidence" that would merit a new trial. Such evidence disproving paternity could have been
discovered and produced at trial with the exercise of reasonable diligence.
Regardless, the court is not convinced that Reynaldo de Villa is entitled to outright acquittal. As correctly pointed out by the
Solicitor General, even if it is conclusively proven that Reynaldo de Villa is not the father of Leahlyn Mendoza, his conviction
could, in theory, still stand, with Aileen Mendoza's testimony and positive identification as its bases. The Solicitor General
reiterates, and correctly so, that the pregnancy of the victim has never been an element of the crime of rape. Therefore, the
DNA evidence has failed to conclusively prove to this Court that Reynaldo de Villa should be discharged. Although petitioner
claims that conviction was based solely on a finding of paternity of the child Leahlyn, this is not the case. The conviction was
based on the clear and convincing testimonial evidence of the victim, which, given credence by the trial court, was affirmed on
appeal.

PP v. EMMA MAQUILAN

FACTS:
Accused-appellant Emma Maquilan was found guilty of drug-pushing in violation of R.A. No. 6425 and sentenced to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua.
Emma filed a notice of appeal however, before the Court could act on the appeal, Emma moved to withdraw her appeal, as she
was going to file a petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. The Solicitor General was ordered by the Supreme Court
to comment on said withdrawal and required Emmas counsel to confer with her and to determine whether the filing of the
motion was voluntarily. The Solicitor General stated he had no objection to the motion and Emmas counsel informed the
Court that she had been released from prison by virtue of an order of the Regional Trial Court issued in a habeas corpus case.
Subsequently, the Court required of the Regional Trial Court to show cause why he should not be held in contempt of court for
granting the petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, considering that the appeal in this case was still pending.

ISSUE:
May an accused-appellant file for habeas corpus after withdrawal of their appeal but, without waiting for the resolution of
their motion?
HELD:
The release of Emma constitutes an unlawful interference with the proceedings of the Court. The trial court’s order granting
release on habeas corpus, based as it is on the erroneous assumption that the decision in the criminal case had become final, is
void. The trial court had no jurisdiction to issue the order in question.
This case is analogous to People v. Bacang where the accused-appellants moved for the withdrawal of their appeal but, without
waiting for the resolution of their motion, they applied for and were granted pardon by the President and released from
confinement. What was said in Bacang applies mutatis mutandis to this case. The use of the high prerogative writ as a post-
conviction remedy presupposes a final judgment by virue of which accused is detained for the service of his sentence. As a
matter of fact, however, that is not the case here as accused-appellant’s appeal is still pending.

SUSAN GO v. DIMAGIBA

FACTS:
Fernando Dimagiba issued to Susan Go thirteen checks which, when presented to the drawee bank for encashment on the due
dates, were dishonored for the reason “account closed.” Subqequently, Dimagiba was prosecuted for 13 counts of violation of
BP 22 (An Act Penalizing the Making or Drawing and Issuance of a Check Without Sufficient Funds or Credit and for Other
Purposes). He was found guilty by the MTCC, was sentenced to three months imprisonment, and was ordered to pay the
offended party the amount he owed plus interest. Threafter, Dimagiba filed a Motion for Reconsideration and a Motion for the
Partial Quashal of the Writ of Execution, praying for the recall of the Order of Arrest and the modification of the final decision.
Citing SC-AC No. 12-2000, he pointed out that the penalty of fine only, instead of imprisonment also, should have been
imposed on him. The MTCC denied the motion for reconsideration; Dimagiba was arrested and imprisoned and thereafter,
Dimagiba filed with the RTC of Baguio city a petition for writ of habeas corpus which was granted by the said court after
hearing the case.

ISSUE:
Whether the petition for writ of habeas corpus is the proper remedy.

HELD:
No. The respondent had previously sought the modification of his sentence in a Motion for Reconsideration and in a Motion for
the Partial Quashal of the Writ of Execution. The remedy should have been an appeal of the MTCC Order denying these
motions. His petition for writ of habeas corpus was clearly an attempt to reopen a case that had already become final and
executory, an action deplorably amounting to forum shopping.

LUZ TAN v. CA

FACTS:
A criminal charge for illegal recruitment was filed against petitioner Tan where she pleaded “not guilty”. The prosecution then
presented all its witnesses but the defense wasn’t able to present its witness, thus the trial court declared Tan to have lost her
right to present evidence and the case submitted for decision which later on found Tan guilty as charged. Tan then filed for a
Notice of Appeal with the CA and when she could not file her brief within the 30-day reglamentary period, she moved and was
granted a 90-day extension. Afterwards, Tan filed an Urgent Manifestation and motion praying that the period for the filing of
Appellant’s Brief be suspended, and that she be given five days to file a Motion for New Trial. The CA denied aforesaid
Manifestation but granted the filing of a Motion for New Trial provided that the decision of the trial court had not yet become
final on account of Tan’s failure to file her brief. Luz Tan filed a Motion for New Trial which was denied by the court then filed a
motion for leave to admit Appellant’s Brief which was also denied.

ISSUE:
Whether the Court of Appeals is correct in dismissing the case for an error in the procedure in the Court of Appeals.

HELD:
The petition is devoid of merit as petitioners filing of the Motion for New Trial did not suspend the period for filing appellant’s
brief which was due to expire. Such assumption is not supported by the Rules of Court or any other authority. When Tan filed
her Motion for New Trial, she did not take any step to file her brief, but simply waited for the resolution of said motion, such
being subsequently denied. Petitioner was grossly negligent and had no one to blame but herself in losing her right to appeal
since “the right to appeal is a statutory right and the party who seeks to avail the same must comply with the requirements of
the Rules. Failing to do so, the right to appeal is lost.