7/18/2018 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 392

VOL. 392, NOVEMBER 26, 2002 687

Mercado vs. People

*
G.R. No. 149375. November 26, 2002.

MARVIN MERCADO, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE

PHILIPPINES, respondent.

Criminal Law; Criminal Procedure; Penalties; Court of Appeals

correctly held that the provision of Sec. 13, Rule 124 was applicable only
when the penalty imposed was reclusion perpetua or higher as a single
indivisible penalty.—In denying the prayer of petitioner, the Court of
Appeals correctly held that the provision of Sec. 13, Rule 124, relied upon
by petitioner, was applicable only when the penalty imposed was reclusion
perpetua or higher as a single indivisible penalty, i.e., the penalty was at
least reclusion perpetua. Hence, the penalty imposed by the appellate court
on the accused was clearly in accordance with Sec. 14 of RA 6538, which is
not considered reclusion perpetua for purposes of Sec. 13, Rule 124.
Same; Same; Same; The thirty (30)-year period for reclusion perpetua
is only for purposes of successive service of sentence under Art. 70 of the
Revised Penal Code.—Article 27 of The Revised Penal Code states that the
penalty of reclusion perpetua shall be from twenty (20) years and one (1)
day to, forty (40) years. While the thirty (30)-year period falls within that
range, reclusion perpetua nevertheless is a single indivisible penalty which
cannot be divided into different periods. The thirty (30)-year period for
reclusion perpetua is only for purposes of successive service of sentence
under Art. 70 of The Revised Penal Code.
Same; Same; Same; Special laws provide their own specific penalties
for the offenses they punish, which penalties are not taken from nor refer to
those in the Revised Penal Code.—More importantly, the crime committed
by petitioner is one penalized under RA 6538 or The Anti-Carnapping Act
of 1972 which is a special law and not under The Revised Penal Code.
Unless otherwise specified, if the special penal law imposes such penalty, it
is error to designate it with terms provided for in The Revised Penal Code
since those terms apply only to the penalties imposed by the Penal Code,
and not to the penalty in special penal laws. This is because generally,
special laws provide their own specific penalties for the offenses they
punish, which penalties are not taken from nor refer to those in The Revised
Penal Code.

_______________

* SECOND DIVISION.

http://www.central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/00000164ad9251956aedab27003600fb002c009e/t/?o=False 1/8
7/18/2018 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 392

688

688 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Mercado vs. People

PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of

Appeals.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

     Public Attorney’s Office for petitioner.
     The Solicitor General for the People.

BELLOSILLO, J.:

MARVIN MERCADO, together with Rommel Flores, Michael

Cummins, Mark Vasques and Enrile Bertumen, was charged with
and convicted of violation of R.A. 6538 or The Anti-Carnapping Act
of 1972, as amended, for which he and his co-accused were
sentenced to a prison term of twelve (12) years and one (1) day as
minimum to seventeen1 (17) years and four (4) months of reclusion
temporal as maximum.
The case before us concerns only the petition for review of
accused Marvin Mercado where he assails his conviction, and
arguing that the Court of Appeals having increased the penalty
imposed by the court a quo to a prison term of seventeen (17) years
and four (4) months to thirty (30) years, should have certified the
case to this Court as the penalty of thirty (30) years was already
reclusion
2
perpetua, pursuant to the last paragraph of Sec. 13, Rule
124, of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure.
We cannot sustain the petition; we agree instead with the Court
of Appeals.

_______________

1 Decision penned by Judge Sixto Marella, Jr., RTC-Br. 138, Makati City; Original
Records, pp. 160-172; CA Rollo, pp. 32-45.
2 Sec. 13. Quorum of the court; certification of appeal of cases to Supreme Court.
—x x x Whenever the Court of Appeals finds that the penalty of death, reclusion
perpetua, or life imprisonment should be imposed in a case, the court, after discussion
of the evidence and the law involved, shall render judgment imposing the penalty of
death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment as the circumstances warrant.
However, it shall refrain from entering the judgment and forthwith certify the case
and elevate the entire record thereof to the Supreme Court for review.

689

VOL. 392, NOVEMBER 26, 2002 689

Mercado vs. People

In denying the prayer of petitioner, the Court of Appeals correctly

held that the provision of Sec. 13, Rule 124, relied upon by
http://www.central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/00000164ad9251956aedab27003600fb002c009e/t/?o=False 2/8
7/18/2018 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 392

petitioner, was applicable only when the penalty imposed was

reclusion perpetua or higher as a single indivisible penalty, i.e., the
penalty was at least reclusion perpetua. Hence, the penalty imposed
by the appellate court3 on the accused was clearly in accordance with
Sec. 14 of RA 6538, which is 4not considered reclusion perpetua for
purposes of Sec. 13, Rule 124.
The Court
5
of Appeals in its assailed resolution relied on People v.
Omotoy where the Regional Trial Court found the accused guilty of
arson and sentenced him to imprisonment ranging from twelve (12)
years of prision mayor maximum, as minimum, to reclusion
perpetua. The case reached this Court on automatic appeal. In
Footnote 16 of the decision, it was observed—

The appeal was taken directly to this Tribunal for the reason no doubt that
the penalty of reclusion perpetua is involved, albeit joined to prision mayor
in its maximum period in accordance with the Indeterminate Sentence Law.
Actually, the appeal should have gone to the Court of Appeals since strictly
speaking, this Court entertains appeals in criminal cases only where “the
penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or higher” (Sec. 5[2](d), Article VIII,
Constitution), i.e., the penalty is at least reclu-

_______________

3 Sec. 14. Penalty for Carnapping.—Any person who is found guilty of carnapping, as this
term is defined in Section Two of this Act, shall irrespective of the value of the motor vehicle
taken, be punished by imprisonment for not less than fourteen years and eight months and not
more than seventeen years and four months, when the carnapping is committed without
violence or intimidation of persons, or force upon things; and by imprisonment for not less than
seventeen years and four months and not more than thirty years, when the carnapping is
committed by means of violence against or intimidation of any person, or force upon things;
and the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death shall be imposed when the owner, driver or
occupant of the carnapped motor vehicle is killed or raped in the course of the commission of
the carnapping or on the occasion thereof (as amended by RA 7659).
4 Resolution of the Court of Appeals of 7 August 2001 penned by Justice Eriberto U.
Rosario, Jr., and concurred in by Justices Buenaventura J. Guerrero and Alicia L. Santos,
Former Fifth Division; CA Rollo, pp. 342-343; Rollo, pp. 111-112.
5 G.R. No. 112719, 29 January 1997, 267 SCRA 143, 152.

690

690 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Mercado vs. People

sion perpetua (or life imprisonment, in special offenses). The lapse will be
overlooked so as not to delay the disposition of the case. It is of slight
nature, the penalty of reclusion perpetua having in fact been imposed on the
accused, and causes no prejudice whatsoever to any party.

Petitioner now asks whether the last paragraph of Sec. 13, Rule 124,
of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure is applicable to the instant
case considering that the penalty imposed was seventeen (17) years
and four (4) months to thirty (30) years.

http://www.central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/00000164ad9251956aedab27003600fb002c009e/t/?o=False 3/8
7/18/2018 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 392

Article 27 of The Revised Penal Code states that the penalty of

reclusion perpetua shall be from twenty (20) years and one (1) day
to, forty (40) years. While the thirty (30)-year period falls within
that range, reclusion perpetua nevertheless is a single indivisible
penalty which cannot be divided into different periods. The thirty
(30)-year period for reclusion perpetua is only for purposes of
successive
6
service of sentence under Art. 70 of The Revised Penal
Code.
More importantly, the crime committed by petitioner is one
penalized under RA 6538 or The Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972
which is a special law and not under The Revised Penal Code.
Unless otherwise specified, if the special penal law imposes such
penalty, it is error to designate it with terms provided for in The
Revised Penal Code since those terms apply only to the penalties
imposed
7
by the Penal Code, and not to the penalty in special penal
laws. This is because generally, special laws provide their own
specific penalties for the offenses they punish, which penalties
8
are
not taken from nor refer to those in The Revised Penal Code.
The penalty of fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months under
RA 6538 is essentially within the range of the medium period of
reclusion temporal. However, such technical term under The Revised
Penal Code is not similarly used or applied to the penalty for
carnapping. Also, the penalty for carnapping attended by the
qualifying circumstance of violence against or intimidation of any
per-

_______________

6 People v. Quitorio, G.R. No. 116765, 28 January 1998, 285 SCRA 196, 219.
7 People v. Canoy and Gabucan, 92 Phil 1076 (1953).
8 People v. Simon, G.R. No. 93028, 29 July 1994, 234 SCRA 555, 573.

691

VOL. 392, NOVEMBER 26, 2002 691

Mercado vs. People

son or force upon things, i.e., seventeen (17) years and four (4)
months to thirty (30)9
years, does not correspond to that in The
Revised Penal Code. But it is different when the owner, driver or
occupant of the carnapped vehicle is killed or raped in the course of
the carnapping or on the occasion 10
thereof, since this is penalized
with reclusion perpetua to death.
Hence, it was error for the trial court to impose the penalty of “x
x x imprisonment of TWELVE (12) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY as
minimum to SEVENTEEN (17) YEARS 11
and FOUR (4) MONTHS of
reclusion temporal as maximum.” For these reasons the use of the
term reclusion temporal in the decretal portion of its decision is not
proper. Besides, we see no basis for the trial court to set the
minimum penalty at twelve (12) years and one (1) day since RA

http://www.central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/00000164ad9251956aedab27003600fb002c009e/t/?o=False 4/8
7/18/2018 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 392

6538 sets the minimum penalty for carnapping at fourteen (14) years
and eight (8) months.
We see
12
no error by the appellate court in relying on a Footnote in
Omotoy to affirm the conviction of the accused. The substance of
the Footnote may not be the ratio decidendi of the case, but it still
constitutes an important part of the decision since it enunciates a
fundamental procedural rule in the conduct of appeals. That this rule
is stated in a Footnote to a decision is of no consequence as it is
merely a matter of style.
It may be argued that Omotoy is not on all fours with the instant
case since the former involves an appeal from the Regional Trial
Court to the Supreme Court while the case at bar is an appeal from
the Court of Appeals to the Supreme Court. As enunciated in
Omotoy, the Supreme Court entertains appeals in criminal cases only
where the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or higher. The basis
for this doctrine is the Constitution itself which empowers this Court
to review, revise, reverse, modify or affirm on appeal, as the law or
the Rules of Court may provide, final judgments of lower

_______________

9 Id., p. 576.
10 See Note 3.
11 0riginal Records, p. 303; CA Rollo, p. 44.
12 See Note 5.

692

692 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Mercado vs. People

courts in all criminal

13
cases in which the penalty imposed is reclusion
perpetua or higher.
Where the Court of Appeals finds that the imposable penalty in a
criminal case brought to it on appeal is at least reclusion perpetua,
death or life imprisonment, then it should impose such penalty,
refrain from entering judgment thereon, certify14
the case and elevate
the entire records to this Court for review. This will obviate the
unnecessary, pointless and time-wasting shuttling of criminal cases
between this Court and the Court of Appeals, for by then this Court
will acquire jurisdiction over the case from the very inception and
can, without bothering the Court of Appeals which has 15fully
completed the exercise of its jurisdiction, do justice in the case.
On the other hand, where the Court of Appeals imposes a penalty
less than reclusion perpetua, a review of the case may 16
be had only
by petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 where only
errors or questions of law may be raised.
Petitioner, in his Reply, also brings to fore the issue of whether
there was indeed a violation of The Anti-Carnapping Act. This issue
is factual, as we shall find hereunder.

http://www.central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/00000164ad9251956aedab27003600fb002c009e/t/?o=False 5/8
7/18/2018 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 392

In the evening of 26 May 1996 Leonardo Bhagwani parked the

subject Isuzu Trooper in front of his house at No. 7015-B Biac-na-
Bato. St., Makati City, Metro Manila. The vehicle was owned by
Augustus Zamora but was used by Bhagwani as a service vehicle in
their joint venture. The following day the Isuzu Trooper was
nowhere to be found prompting Bhagwani to report its disappear-

_______________

13 Sec. 5, par. (d), 1987 Constitution.

14 Last paragraph, Sec. 13, Rule 124 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure; see
Note 2.
15 People v. Daniel, No. L-40330, 20 November 1978, 86 SCRA 511, 540,
reiterated in People v. Ramos, No. L-49818, 20 February 1979, 86 SCRA 511; People
v. Traya, No. L-48065, 30 March 1979, 89 SCRA 274; and People v. Centeno, et al.,
No. L-48744, 30 October 1981, 108 SCRA 710.
16 Id., Sec. 3 (e), Rule 122 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure: “Except as
provided in the last paragraph of section 13, Rule 124, all other appeals to the
Supreme Court shall be by petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45.”

693

VOL. 392, NOVEMBER 26, 2002 693

Mercado vs. People

ance to the Makati Police Station and the Anti-Carnapping 17

(ANCAR) Division which immediately issued an Alarm Sheet.
On 31 May 1996 Bhagwani’s neighbor, fireman Avelino Alvarez,
disclosed that he learned from his daughter, a common-law wife of
accused Michael Cummins, that the accused Rommel Flores, Mark
Vasques, Enrile Bertumen and Michael Cummins himself stole the
Isuzu Trooper. Alvarez’s daughter 18
however refused to issue any
statement regarding the incident.
In the evening of 31 May 1996 SPO3 “Miling” Flores brought to
his house Michael Cummins, Mark Vasques, Enrile Bertumen,
Rommel Flores, and complaining witness Bhagwani. In that
meeting, Cummins, Vasques, Bertumen and Flores admitted that
they took19
the vehicle and used it in going to Laguna, La Union and
Baguio. They claimed however that it was with the knowledge and
consent of Bhagwani. They alleged that on the night they took the
vehicle, they invited Bhagwani to join them in their outing to
Laguna. But when Bhagwani declined, they asked him instead if
they could borrow the Isuzu Trooper.20 Bhagwani allegedly agreed
and even turned over the keys to them.
Petitioner Marvin Mercado was absent during that confrontasi in
the house of SPO3 “Miling” 21
Flores but his co-accused narrated his
participation in the crime.
The Court of Appeals affirmed their conviction but increased the
penalty imposed on the four (4) accused from a prison term of
twelve (12) years and one (1) day as minimum to seventeen (17)

http://www.central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/00000164ad9251956aedab27003600fb002c009e/t/?o=False 6/8
7/18/2018 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 392

years and four (4) months of reclusion temporal as maximum 22

to
seventeen (17) years and four (4) months to thirty (30) years.
Petitioner insists that the accused were more motivated by fun
rather than theft in taking the Isuzu Trooper, and that they

_______________

17 TSN, 22 October 1996, pp. 10-24.

18 Id., pp. 35-43.
19 Id., pp. 47-65.
20 TSN, 10 June 1997, pp. 4-13; 14 July 1997, p. 2; 17 July 1997, pp. 6-8; 29 July
1997, pp. 6-9.
21 Id., pp. 62-63.
22 See Notes 1 and 4.

694

694 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Mercado vs. People

merely took the vehicle for a joyride with no intention of stealing it.
If they were really thieves, according to petitioner, they would have 23
sold the vehicle outright instead of simply abandoning it in Baguio.
Petitioner apparently overlooks the fact that this is a petition for
review on certiorari where only questions of law, and not questions
of fact, may be raised. The issue before us being factual, a
reevaluation of the facts and the evidence may not be entertained in
this appeal. Besides, findings of fact of the trial court, when affirmed
24
by the Court of Appeals, are binding upon the Supreme Court. This
rule may be disregarded only when the findings of fact of the Court
of Appeals are contrary to the findings and conclusions of the trial
court, or are not supported by the evidence on record. But there is no
ground to apply this exception to the instant case. This Court will
not assess all over again the evidence adduced by the parties
particularly where as in this case the findings 25of both the trial court
and the Court of Appeals completely coincide.
However, we disagree with the Court of Appeals on its
imposition of the penalty. Republic Act No. 6538 imposes the
penalty of imprisonment for seventeen (17) years and four (4)
months to thirty (30) years when the carnapping is committed by
means of violence against or intimidation of any person, or force
upon things. The evidence in this case shows that the accused broke
a quarter window of the Isuzu Trooper to gain access to it, thus
demonstrating that force was used upon the vehicle; nonetheless, we
believe that this does not merit the imposition of the full penalty.
With the application of The Indeterminate Sentence Law, the penalty
to be imposed may be reduced to an indeterminate prison term of
seventeen (17) years and four (4) months to twenty-two (22) years.
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals
denying the Motion and Manifestation of petitioner Marvin Mercado

http://www.central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/00000164ad9251956aedab27003600fb002c009e/t/?o=False 7/8
7/18/2018 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 392

dated 19 January 2001 is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION

that the penalty imposed is reduced to an indeterminate

_______________

23 Rollo, pp. 158-159.

24 Gloria Changco v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 128033, 20 March 2002, 379
SCRA 590.
25 Ibid.

695

VOL. 392, NOVEMBER 26, 2002 695

Valarao vs. Pascual

prison term of seventeen (17) years and four (4) months to twenty-
two (22) years. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

          Mendoza, Quisumbing, Austria-Martinez and Callejo, Sr.,

JJ., concur.

Judgment affirmed with modification.

Note.—Life imprisonment and reclusion perpetua are two

distinct penalties and are not interchangeable. (People vs. Jimenez,
302 SCRA 607 [1999])

——o0o——

© Copyright 2018 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights reserved.

http://www.central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/00000164ad9251956aedab27003600fb002c009e/t/?o=False 8/8