11
But I Could be Wrang
George Sher
I. Introduction
My alm in this essay is co explore ehe' irnplications of
the fact that even our most deeply held mor.u belietS
have been profoundly affected by our upbringing and
experience - that if Jny of us had had J sufficiencly
different upbrmging and sec of experiences, he almost
ceruinly would now have a \'ery different set of moral
belie& and very diffen~nt habits of mor:U judgment.
This fact. together with [he associated proliferation of
incomparible mm doctrines. is sometimes invoked in
support o( liberal poLeies of tolerarion l11d restnim. bUf
(he rclev.mce of these considenrions 10 individual mor.tl
deliberation bas receivt.."<1 less Jttention. In Sections H
rhrough v. I mall argue du( thi.s combinaoon of
conringellCY and controversy poses l seriow chaJlenge to
the authoriry of our moraJjud.gmen~.ln SecrionV1,1 slull
explo~ J promisi.ng \\1';1)' of responding to thi.'i chalIenge.
11. The Challenge to My Moral
Judgments
In Chapter 11 of 0" LibN't)'. John Sruan Mill observes
that (he person who uncrirically accepts the opinion
of"tbe world"
Grorge She-r. "Bur I Could Ek Wrong:' So<iA1 Plti/~Iry & PoIiry. 18/2
(2001),64-78. Reprinred with pernUssion ofUmbridgc=" JounuIs.
Ethical Throry:AII A",ltology. Second Edition. Edited by Russ Shafer-Lmd..u.
Cl 2013 John Wiley & Sens. Ine. Publishc:d 2013 by John Wiley & SOM. (ne.
dC"'olve-s upon his own worid rhe resporuibilüy of being
in c.h(' ri~r againsr the disst'ntiem worlds of other pcoplc;
and ir nevt.'r troubles him mac me~ .lccident h:lS decided
whieh of cht.'St.' nume-rous worlds is thl" objecr of his
relianct:' ..:md th~( tht.· s.;lme C1USt"'S whit.·h ntad(' him a
churchm..m in london would hJvt, l1Iade." him :1 Buddhist
Or ;1 Confucian in Pl"king. I
Along similar linc:-s. John Rawls observc:s in Polilical
Ubemlism rhat ehe "burdens of judgmcl1t" that make
moral diS3gre:-emenr incvitablt' include (he fact (hat
ro some extent (how grt.·lr We" c:lOnor cdl) rhl" \V:lY WC:
J$Se-sse"vidc:nct' ;1nd weight moraJ and politicli va.lue-~ is
shapt"d by aur (oral expc:ril."m:c:::. our whole course of lifl~
up to tlOW; .md aur total t."xperi{'nce."s rnmt a.lW;l~ ditf(,~r . ~
Despitc: rheir sketdunl."SS. boch passages app~ar to
conwn much trurh. Moreover. t.hc rwo pa~res a.re
complc-mentary in that MiU emphasiu.s the influcnce of
conongenr factors on thc contem of a person 'N most
basic religious (and, by extemion. mora) and philosophi-
cal) convicrions. while R...'lwl.'i (oeuses more on ehe influ-
ence mal contingent factor's hav~ on ehe 1l1.fcn::nces and
judgments dur a person nL1ke~ l.vithin hi.~ basic fran1(.'"Work.
Thus. ukrn rogerher. (he two pa 'ag :s su~('sr thar the:
influence of conringcnt factors on mor.J judgment is
certainly cxten.~ve :md nuy weH bc peTva..'\ivc.
The principl~ that Mill and IUwls are dcfenrlinR in
these pasug~ are not the S3m~: tht passage (rom MiU
appears in his famou.s defcnse of frccdorn of ~pcech.
86 GEORGE SHE,R
while Rawls's point is [hat in a pluralistlc society. a
conc~ption of jusoc<! must be defensible in terms
accessiblc to ill. However, each of these principles pur-
ports to provide a reason nO[ ro :Jet in JII the ways [hat
initially appcar to be callcd for by onc's moral beliefs.
This is why Mill and R:lwls are both comfort.lblc
invoking a consideratlon - the influence of COnfingent
t2cto~ on our moral belids - which, if uken seriously.
is bound to lInderm.ine our confidence in thc trurh or
r.uional defensibility of thest' moral belieEs.
But the same consideration th:lt is so congenial co
liberal principles that rcquire us to distance ourselves
from our moral beliefs in political contexts is decidedly
uncon~l\ia.l to our d10rts CO marshaI these moral
bdietS when \Ve delibel"';l[C as individuals. My awarencss
dut I wou.ld now have different moral convicuons if
I had hild a different upbringing or different experi-
ences may make ie easier for me [0 put my moral beliefs
out of pby in the ilnerest of allowing competing beliefs
a f.llr hearing. or for the sake of arriving at terms of
soda! cooperJrion acceptJble to all. This same :1w.lrc-
ness.. how-ever. makes ü correspondingly IUlrder for me
to aet on my moral convlctions whc:n these contljct
with the moru convictions of others. Therc is an
obvious tension berween my belief that my moral
ass.essmc::.ot of a siruation 15 right while yours is wrong
:md my further belief mac it 1S only an accident of f.ltC
th::u I a.ssess the situation in my way rather than yours.
This tension raiS<."S questions about what I have
n=:2Son ro do in various praccical interpersonal concCXt5,
~ps most obviously, it raises such questiolls when
I t:lke m}~.lf to be morally justified in rrearing you in a
w.:ty tb::ac you find morally objecrionable - when. for
e.'ample. I think I am not obligated to finance your
dnbious business venrure despite our long friend~hip.
or whe.o you de.mand attention that I feell do not owe.
Tbc ~on also muddies the walers whcn you ;md
I c:lisa.gree abouf something we must do rogether -
whcn., for ex:unple. 1 want to give our f..1iJing student a
retes( bot you worry abaut fairness to other studcnts.
cw ~·ben W~ disagree abouc how much of our joint
incomc we mOllid donare to charity, It even rnises
doubts wben I :un contemplating t~kin~ ~ome action
tb:at will nor affect you at all , but of which YOll mOr.llly
diszppro~-e - when. for exarnple. I ;lfl1 considcring
join:ing th~ Marines. contributing to ~ pro-choicc
cmdic::btt. or tlking spectJcular reven~'e on ;1 harcd
rinL but )"Ou ofter dissenting counsel. In al.l ol' the
~tioned conrern, my aW.lreneS-.C\ [hat I llI.ight
weil have raken a poslfIon like yours if my history
h;1d becn sufficicndy difTcrcllt will not sir welJ wilh my
belief [hat I have more rc a~on to :let on my morJI
bclicf.oc; rhan I havc to an on yours.
Why. cX:lcr.ly, do these.: bdie& nor sit welJ rogl'thcr?
Thc answer. I think. is (hat rny bl'lie( th:u ] hl~
more reason to :lct on my OWI1 moral bdiefs chan on
YOlifS JppL'ar~ to rest 011 :a flIrther hclit:f {hat my own
mor.l.l beliers ,Ire somchow berur - dut lhr'Y :lfC mur,
more dcfensiblc, more n,\l'\o nahlc. or ~olllethil1R simil.u.
Howcvcr, if I bclievc r.hat it is only an accidenr o(hislory
that I hold rny own rnor:1.1 belie r:lthl'r thJn YlJUr5. Ihm
] must also helicvc rh~[ whieh of us: ha .. eh<: bcttt'r monJ
belier.. i~ also an accidcl1t or hi~tory. This o( (OU~c
does nor mC":l1l that my bcl.icf that IlIY OWI1 mOr:l.l bclic&
are better is wrong or basele~'. bm ir d()t'~ melln lhll
I would have th:lt same belief ('.ven if jr wtn' wronf: or
baselc!'s. Howevcr, oncc I re ..dizl~ that I would h~VC' Ihis
bdief whether or not it wC'rc tTlIe, I 110 lon~r K'('O!
entitlcd to usc it in my pr.lt~tical dclihcratioru.
111. The Challenge Not a FOrln
of Skepticism
Asjusr prcscnted, the pruhlclllS rJiscd by t.he ,ontin~m
origins of our rnornl bl'licfS bC.lr ~ ~lrikill~ ~mibriN 10
ccrrain f.·1I11iHar ~kcptical worri c1\, T hcH.' i~. tri pU{WlIl.lT.
an obvious afTinity bctWl'ClI (he bim .Hlv~n(cd oll dl(,
end or [he preccJ.inH sertioll th.lt \\~ .II"C 1I\.)l an .I
position (Q rell whrrhcr wc...· hold our lIIM.l1 hdi('h
bt'Cluse rhcy arc ddcllSiblc or 1.T\le öf m~I,'ly hfi'.lllit
of our upbrin~iuH - .md lhC' sr.~l1l(.l :u\1 ~kf'fHI'~JI ('I.lim
that wc are not in a position lU tell wh eth"r Wt' hllld
our empiric;!1 hcli<."f; beOHIO\l' rhc-)' tl'pl ' ('IH l lil)'
:tccur:ttl'ly or 1I1l'f('ly h('CHlse thl~Y h.l\'(' lW<,,1I ill~lI11",,1
in lIS by all cvil octl1on or .l lIIad ~ it~ l\t i st xrilnul.tliut:,l.
braill ill ~ V;.ll.. ThllS. i:u 1'( rh(' l"l1l' l'C nt pl(\bl(,'1Il 1Ih"l'('ly
:I spl't:ial case of;1 (:Jr m o re ~'I\(, t .ll du: pI i ,'.,l dl.\IIt'II~
!1 challengl' whosC' t~) ro~ wt." alt .Il'knnwk I~ , hut wllh
which Wl' tOllt( :a~!O It':u'lIcd to (. tH' x i ~l ?
Thac is both s nJl)Nhill~ rij,lht :lnd ~(\I\\l'lhlll~ \\"i\)I~
about [his ~1It-tJ.t{'stil)l\. Wh;tt is r it.tht is il .. I'r~'ll\iR' Ilut
thl.' (:\lrn'lIt pn.)hklll 11 .. , th (' , ,IIHr .\b~l"h·r \lllll'l\\I\' ~(II
vcry COllllllUIl 1~)l'1II u f skqHil'ism; wh,\! \~ WlüHtt 1\ 11'
("ondll~ioll Ihat w(' l'~II' thct 'hilf\' I\V(' with d)C' ,,'UII ·1\1
prohk'm =.lS c:lsily .\s w(' f un 11\"(, wh h ~kqU h' i~I\\, 'n
f:ll:t, for rhl' 'l' r(' <' N() n~. th(' l' lIrtt'IIt IU'lhklll ,~ ·tdf 1I1'''~
v~xill~ :lIld \I ~C tlt.

BOT I COUlD BE WRONC
first, unlike the Sl.IIh..iJrd s~ricill hypoth~es. rhe
claim th..at each per:;oll \ 11l0ml bdiefs W~re sh4pcd by
his upbringing .1Ild Ilk L'~rienccs has Jn obvious
basjs in fact . We h:l\'l' !lO c-vidence J( aU that 4111)' of
our empincal bc\it'(c, w~'rL' c4Iused by ~m c..-vil demon
or :. nud ~Cic.'lltist; :lnd even thc hypotllt'si" flut f am
110W dre:lllljllg. though sOn1ewh.n more: rl"Jlistic. is
improbable in liglu of the l.ow (TC'quc:ncy wirh which
experiencd w"ith ~Il UlC" marks of wakcfulnc~ -
vividness. continuity, cohcn·nce. sclf-consciomncss.
4ind the röl - h:lVt' in {he p;tSt turncd out [0 be
dreams. Thu$. the most th:H ~my skeptlClI hypo[hesj~
an ~how i~ thoat aU of our belids aboUl (be world
might hav(" h~d CJlIses that opC'r,He independemly of
tht truth of wh:1f wr belicve. In stark contrast, how-
ever. the (act t.h:H people's moral beliefs vary syscem-
arica.Uy ,,,ith their backgrounds and life experience'S
shows conslderably more. for in becollung aware of
this.. I 3cquire ;\ posItive reason to smpecc {hat when
you and 1 disagree about wh3t moraliry demands. my
raking th~ position I do has les$ eo do wlth the
superiority of my moral insighr chan with the natur~
of the causes that have operaced on me.
The second reason th.at ehe current problem i.s harder
to live with chan 15 genera.! skepticism i.s that we have
significant second-order reason co be confident in our
shared empiriol beliefs. but no corresponding
second-order reason to be confidem in our controver-
iia.\ moral beliefs. In ehe ease of our shared empirical
beliefs. the second-order reason for confidence is
provided by ehe vanous background theories that imply
the re li abi IHY. \vitrun broad limits, of (he pro c esses
through which these beliefS were formed - physiologi-
c.al theones aboue the mechanisms through which our
sensory receptors pur us in comact wirh the world. bio-
logical theories th3t imply that reliable belief-form..ing
mechanisms have survival value. and so on. Even if
appealing to these cheories begs the qucsrion against
global skepticism. our acceptance of them snll makes
such skepticism easier tO ignore by reinforcing the con-
6dence clut we {eel in our empirical beliefs when we
are 00[ comemplating the skeptical challenge. By con-
trast. my acceptance of the same background theorics
does not similarly reinforce my con6dence thac my
own moral beließ are better than yours. for bec.ause the
theotics imply the reliability of belief-forming mech:l-
nisms that are common to aU members of our species.
they provide no basL~ for any distincrions mno/1g indi-
viduals.lndeed. i( anything. my awareness chat a different
............
~
87
upbringing and set of experi"..lCes would have caused
me to acquire a different set of moral beliefs provides
evidence clur the processes through whkh r acquired
my acrual moral heliefs are probably not reliable.
Even by themselves. these two reasons would suggest
that the current problem 15 much harder (0 live with
trun is genenl ~kepticism . However, a third rea50n
makes ehe case cven more srrongly. Simply pUl. the
most seriou5 abrude to our bracketing the current
problem in ehe same way Wf: routindy bracket skepti-
cism is that unlike the fabricatlons of che skeptic. the
current challenge to our moral belien is directly
relevant to action.
For. a.s is onen remark.ed, the hypotheses tiuc all of
my bcliefs are being orchestrarcd by an evil demon Of
a rruster neurorrunipularor. ormal I am now dre3m.ing.
have no obvlous impact eicher on what I oughJ co do
or on wh..1t [ am inllined co do. Even j( 1 WeTe able to
suspend my commoruense beliefSt my awareness tmt
vanous cypes of experic:ncc havc been reguUrly con-
nected in the p;tSt might well justUy my "acting" 0lS if
the world were exaccly as it seemed. and. in any ca:se.
suspending my commonsense beliefs in practial con-
texts is not a live option. A.5 Hume Umously observed.
even if I find skepticism convineing in the isolation
of my srudy. I will. as soon as I emerge. "find mys.elf
absolutely and necessarily detennined to live. :md ~
and aet like orher people in ehe common affairs of
life.") When it comes time [0 aet, our robust animal
realism will always dominate .
But not so our corresponding tendency to moral
realism. for although we standardly do proceed as
though our moral convictions are in some sense true.,
our con.6dence in their truch is neither anchored in OUT
animaJ nature (since nonhuman animah evidenuy do
not share it) nor invulnerable to reflecrive eh allen ge.
Becau.se this confidence is rebrively superficial. we can-
nor assume [hat it would survive d compelling demon-
stration th;lt it cannot be defendcd . There is. tO be
sure, a real question about what it would be rational (or
me to do if I dJd lose confidence in my own moraJ
belietS - I would. aftc!r all. have exaccly the same
grouncls for doub( abour your moral belielS as f wouJd
about mine - but at a minimum. chis loss of confidence
would reopen many quesriom tJlat my own moral
beliefS were previously thought co senk Because of
chis. ehe challenge co the authority of my moral judg-
ments seems capable of destabiliring my pracrical
deliberation in a way ehat generaJ skepricism cannot .
~
 8fi GEORGE SHER
IV The Interplay of Controversy
and Contingency
As just presented. thc challenge (0 ehe <luthoriry of
my moral judbl'J11cnts has a duaJ focus. for ir :lppe:trs ro
rl.~t both on a prcmise about moral dis:tgrcement and
Oll a prcmUic about the contingem origins of my moral
beliefs Jlld ways of assessing evidence and weighting
compeling vaJues. (For brevity, I shall henccforrh refcr
to thc combin..1tion of a person's moral beliefS and his
ways of assessing evidence Jnd weighring v-alues JS h.is
moralou/look.) Respecrively. these prenUses are as foUows:
1. lohen disagree with others about whJt I morally
ough[ tO do.
2. Thl.' mor:ll oudook rhJ( supports my currentjudg-
mcm Jbout wh ar I oughr (0 do has beeil shaped by
my upbringing ;:md cxperiences; for CJust about)
:my altcrn:Hive judgment, there is some different
upbringing and set of experiences that would have
causcd me (0 acquire amoral ourlook that would
in turn luve supported this altermüve judgment.
Because these prt.~es are 10glcaJly discinct - because
H could bc (rliC rh.:n you and I disagree about what one
o( us oughr to do but fJlse mac our backgrounds have
shapcd our moral ouuoob. or rrue that our back-
grounds have sluped our moraJ ouclooks bur false that
wc: disagrec - ie is not enrirely obvious how (1) and (2)
fit togethcr. Are they bom doing real work in the
arb'Ulllent challenging the authority of my moral
judgment.s? If so, why are they both necded? If not.
which is necessary and which superfluous?
Onc possible answer i.s that the argumcm does not
requirc both (I) :md (2). but duc e-ach provides an
mdependent route to ehe argument's conclusion. On
chis account.. ehe vc:rsion of the argument that re Li es
"
exclu~ively on (I) is simply Uut
(A 1) Bec.ause I am just another member of [he
hulTW1 species (md because I am far from the
the mose c1earheaded, or the bcst-
SlTlMtcst,
informed member of th.at species), I have
no special reason to regard my own moral
judgments a.s being any better grounded, or
:.my more likdy to be true, than the moral
judgrtlencs of any numbCT of omers who see
things differentl y.
By conrrasr, the version that relie.s exclusively on (2)
asserts that
(A2) Becallse a different upbringing and set 01'
expericnces would bave caused me co haw :l
very different mora.l ouclook. my having ehe
moral outlook that inform.s my specific mora}
judgmems is unJikdy to luve much to do
wich thac ouclook 's justifilbility or truth .
Because these two versions of the argument h:lVt'
such different srrucmres - because (A 1) turns Oll lhe
fact (hat there is nothing special about me whilc (Al)
turns on the very different fact that the proce!iS through
which I acquired my moral outlook is unlikdy to be
reliable - we may be tempted to conclude that each
version muse be evaluated separately. and hellct' mat the
original combined appeal ro (I) and (2) is a misbcgotten
hybrid .
But that temptarion should be resisted; for by thili
separati ng the appeals to (I) and (2), we would gravely
weaken the case for the conclusion that they both scek
tO establish. The n~ason that separating chem would
have chis effect is [hat (A 1) 's appeal (Q (1) is vulnerable
{O an obvious objection eheU is best blocked by intro-
ducing (2) , wh.iJe (A2)'s appeal to (2) is si.m.ilarly vul-
nerable ro an obvious objection that is best blocked
by introducing (1). To bring out the underlyillg syn-
ergy beeween (1) and (2), and {hus {O reconS(Tucr the
challenge [Q (he authority of our moral judgments in
ics strongest form, we must look more closdy at cach of
these si.mpler arguments.
To argument (A 1). which asserts that I have no spL"Ciai
reason [Q favor my own moraJ judgments over those of
others who are no less inteUigem aod well-inforllled.
the obvious rejoinder is that the grounds for favoring
one moral judgl1lem over anorher typically cOltSist nor
offacts abouc the persons who make the judgmc-nts. but
rather of evidence or argumentS for and aga.illSt the
judgments themselves. There are, to be sure, some obvi-
ous count.erexamples to th.is claim - we may indeed be
jusrified in discouncing someone's moral judgmems if
we have independent evidence that he is misinformed.
confused, biased, or very stupid - but such cases are the
exception rather than (he rule. In the [ar more standard
case, our reasoning runs just the other way: we infa that
our interlocutor's thought processes must somehow
h.ave gone awry because we beLieve (here are independ-
ent grounds for rejecting his conclusion. Thus, as long
 BUT I COUlD BE WRONG
as mt' challenge to my own moral judgments extends
11(' hIrther man (l)'s claim that many others do not
,Iurt" thcm. I can rcsist it through the simple expediem
l)( rt'mindin~ rnyself of whichever eonsideratlons I take
lO make my own judgments more plausible man those
ot IIlY intcrlocmors.
This rejoinder becomes problemacic. however. as
~oon as we faetor in (2)'s claim that my having me
moral outlook [hat inforrm my moral judgmem 1S irself
an lccident of my history; for the import of this claim
is to cast doubt noc onIy on my judgmem itsetf. but also
on whateVer evidence or arguments I take to suppon ie
If my upbringing and experiences had been sufficiently
diffcrem.1 would now share not onIy my interlocutor's
conviction that I ought to Jbandon my grand plan to
humiliarc [he rlval who has [ormenred me for ye,ars.
bur al~o my interlocutor's disdain for the moral argu-
mrnts that r eurrently take [Q underwTite that plan.
Howeva. once I agree that I have been caused to
Jccrpt these argument" by factors independent of their
force. I can no longer confidenrly base my decisl0n on
my convicrion that they have force.
Thus. argument (Al), which appeals co (1) alone,
5ecms ulllikely co succet'd unJess it is supplemented by
(2). Convrr\cly. ;Jrgl.lmenr (A2). which appells to (2)
<Ilone. rcqllin:~ sl.Ipplcll1cnratlOn by (1) . Argument (Al).
ir will be recallcd. attempts [Q movc from (2)'s cWm
that l different upbringing and set of experiences
would have causcd me to acquire a differem rnon.l our-
look to ehe conclusion that my having the moral
outlook I do (and. by extension. my reaching the moral
judgmcnts I do) probably has Iittle to do with its (md
[heir) jusrifiJbility or truth . Howev~. lS it stands. this
argument is J non sequirur. sincc e'Ven if the upbrlng-
ing ~md experiences that caused me [Q :lcquirt' my
current mOrlt ouclook would have had th.is effea on
me wherha or not my currenr moral outlook was
jumfi:lblc or true. it hardly foUows that me M)ciaJ con-
dicions that clused me to have that upbringing and
{ho~e experiences would also have existed regard1es.s o{
wheeher or noe my currenr moral oudook was justi6-
ablt' or rrue. For al1 [hat has yet been said. it may lm~
bcen precisdy the truth or Jusrifiability of the various
elements of my currem moral ouclook that a.used
them to work (heir way into the culture mat in rum
clused me to acquire (hat outlook. BeCluse this possi-
bility remairu open. it does not follow from the fact th:n
3 different upbringing and set of e~"periences wauld
have camed me to acquire a d.i.fferent moral oudook
89
that it is unreasonable for me to continue acting on thc
judgmems that my aerual moral ouclook supports.
Bur whatt'ver force this rejoinder hJS against (A2)'s
appea.l to (2) alone, [he rejoinder becomes problematlc
as soon as we faccor in (1)'5 c1ajm mat people's moral
judgments ofien ditfer: for if my socially tneulCJted
moral ouclook has led me Co reach one conclusion
abom wh:lt I ought to do while yours has led you ro
reach momer. then me social derenninams of at least
one of our moral ouclooks caww/ be indireccly r:raceable
ro me juscifiabilüy or rruth of alJ of its oper~tive
elements. Even if I can reasonably beheve mat I was
c~used [Q acquire all the opeflove elements o( my
own moral ouclook by socü.l betors that 0\\"t'<:I their
erutence to [he jllSti6Jbili~' or rruth of ü'lo$e elements
as long as you :l11d I agree th:\[ I m:lY not tOml~ or
murder my hlted riv--.u, I can no longer reas,onably
believe chis when you go on ro conde.mn evcn thc:' less
extreme pbn to humiliatc my rival thac I {'onsider
enti.rely .lppropriate. ,'ti soon a.... \\~ di~grt't.. I ;un tOrn~ti
to conclude that Jt least one of L1S must have been
caused ro acquire SQme operative element of rus mor.U
ouclook by ~ol1le lSpect of hls upbring-ing cr c:'",:pcri-
encc: [hat did tl(l1 owe its ex:1stenfe (() t.hJt dl~ment's
rruth or justi6ability: md thc proble.m. OIK't' ;\gain.
is UUt I ha\"e 00 speci:tl rea.son ro b<-lit'\~ th~tr t11~H
somcone is you r.uht:'r than me.
Thus. to give me ch:l.llenge to the authority of my
moral judgments the Stroll~t poss.ible run fur its
mon~. we cannot rt'pre:sl'm ir lS n'"Stin~ e.\."d\lsin.·~' on
either (t) or (2) .JLL~ lS the \'~·rsion of rhe' r h.l.Uen~ t:hat
begi~ by appe:lling to (1' is \mlikcly (0 ~ut.'C~
without supplcrne-m:\tion by ~ . the \~n1on uur ~ru
by appe-iling to (2) l"\ unhk't"Iy ro SlKC~ witholU
rupplcOlc-netion by (t) . Ht'Il<'e. no nutter whel"(' \Vl"
sun. we \vill ('nd by cond\ldin~ thar (t) .md (2) work
bnt \,,",hen t:h~ \mn:: t~her.
V The Role of Reflection
How \\~. tbough. ~ dK' cornbulai:lppC'l.l to ('1) ;.md
(2) uuri.:? Musr I ~. ~ m corro.sn~ impliclItton
tlur I oftm ~ 00 ~ 1"e.lSOO tQ rd}. on n.n- '--"\\"1\
mon! judwnenrs dun on the .~~.u öf ~ \\;th
wnom 1 saungty ~ .~ ~,\ md _ boc:b ti~
eoougb groundrd ro ~ this dNurbi-. (-ondu.Qon~
T~ is. I thinl. liale pOOl. in COOtMng I. fOr
its chim m.:ll I otim ~ ~;th Olbtn ~t wh.:.at
90 GEORGE SHBR
I morally ought to do is 311 too obviously true. However,
when we turn to (2)'~ cbim that I would now view
my moral obligations difTerenrly if my upbringing
and experienc~ had bt·en sufficienrly differem, the
issue becomes more compIicated. Briefly put, [he
complicarion is that although a person's upbringing
and experiences clearly do cause hi.rn to acquire vari-
ous moral helietS and lubics of judgment, these cannO[
be assumed to persist un:1lrercd over time. No less than
any other heuefs and Il:lbits, our moral belietS and
habits of moral judgmcrH CII1 be expected (0 evolve in
response to various intclleclual pressures.
We may not fuUy register chis if we focus too exclu-
sively on Milrs claim that "(he same causes [hat made
Jsomeone} J churchm:m in London would have made
hirn a Buddhist or a Confucian in Pek.ing," for rh.is
claim dra\~rs attention [0 a single aspect of what a per-
son beueves - the panicular religion he accepts - mat
often i.s a direct result of his background. Ir is obviously
impossible for someone who has only been exposed to
one religion co become devout in another. However,
the more pertinent question is whether a person who
has only been exposed to a single religion may never-
theless come tO reject some or all of its teachings; and
to chis further quesrion, the answer is clearly "Yes."
For because any set of claims about religion (or, by
extension, moraliry) can be subjecced to rational SCTU-
tiny. people can and ofcen do rejecc even the religjous
and moral doccrines tO which they have been most
relentlessly eA-posed. Even when someone has at first
been nonrationaIly caused to acquire a certain religious
or moral beuef, ic is open co rum rarionally tO evaluate
chat belief ac any later point. Of course, in so doing,
he will rely on various ways of assessing evidence and
weighting values, and it 1S likely thac the ways he uses
will memselves have been shaped by his experiences
(and, we may add. by his culcure). Still, no matter how
fa.r chese influences extend - and, as Rawls notes about
the in.fluence of experience, this is something we can-
not know - their introduction does not alter che basic
point because any resulting ways of assessing evidence
and weighting values can be rarionally scrutinized in
rum. Thus, properly underscood, the moral outlook
tluc we have been nonrationally caused to acquire is
best viewed not as a perrnanenr fixture of our thought,
but flther as a starting point that we may hope succes-
sively to irnprove through ongoing crincal retlection.
There is, of course, no guar.lntee that (his hope will
be realized. Despite my hest efforts, ir rcmains possible
that my moral outlook has &om me sun bcen b~­
lessly compromised by same nuss:ive error. and mar rny
lack of access to ehe source of e~rror tu.s systenuciolly
subverted all my ameliorarive endavon. Hov.-~"tt. th1s
hypothesis. ifbacked by no positive argument. is DO ~
specubtive man is me hypothesis that ~ my e..~o
are caused by a scientist stimuhting a br.rin in a ...-at..
Thus, as long as I have no concrete reason to belin-~
otherwise, it nuy weil be reasonah}e for me to 2SSUIIle
(hat my etforn to think througb ehe lrgUII1Cnts for
and against my fundamenul moral convicrions.. md co
corrcct for me disrorrions. biases~ wd fa!se beJicfs dl2:
my upbrin.ging and eulier experie.ßces iu\"l:' incviubly
introduced, have on ehe whole made thi.ngs better
rathcr than worse.
How, cxactJy, would the truth of thls mdiorisl
assumprion beat on (2) 's cbim rur if I tud tud 4
sufficiently differenc upbringing md set of ex:pericoc~_
r would now judge my moru obtig;ariom di:if~dy:
Tbe answer, I think, is complicated. Tbe muh of thc
meuorist assumption would noe: show tha.r (2) 's cbim
is false, but would indet!d l~n (2) 's sting. Hov.~"tt. it
would also le-ave intact ehe dullenge t:o ehe autharity
of my moral judgments mat (2) posc:s in conjuncrion
with (1). Let me arguc brieBy tOr each of tbese three
points in turn.
At first glance, the assumprion dw rd1«ting 00
one's moral outlook tends co impro\"'e it 1ll2'f in~
seem co tell againsc (2), for if this assnmption i:s co.Ttta..
men even [WO r;;ulical1y differe.n t moru oudook:s. O!l
be expected evenru.illy to com~ if robjected. to
enough retlecrion. HoweveT, for :1t lelst ~-o tt2S0DS...
this way of argu.i ng against (2) does not SC'aD promis-
ing. First, even if \\-'"e grane hoch tbat I vrocld ~
retlected seriously on the al.te~riv~ monl oudook
[hat a given alternative history ,,~uld ~ cru:::s.ed DX
to acquire and chat I did re.Bc!ct se.r iously on the n.i
outlook mac my acrual b.istory CUJ:s~d me ro ~
mere is no guarantee th2r ehe [WO st4I1ing points 1.~
dose enough to allow ;mything 2pp~chjng fu!l
convergence within my lifetime (or. .J Jürri4m, now ln
addition, at least same af m~ a.ltt.rn2.tlVe hlsrori-es mal
wou.ld have caused me to acquire öl d:itfe.ren[ mor::d
outlook would also have cau.stXi me t:o be ~
to cnga~ in the kind of rdIemon m.l[ \"\uuld ~ ~­
essary to secure any degree of COD\'ergence. Fot both
reasons, the assumption mat re.tlect:ing on ooe's roor:ll
outlook generilly improvt.'S ie docs not ~ ~ oi
supporting a rchltation of (2).
 BUT I (:01)I.D 815 WRONG
Ewn ,(md L' toC.l, however. thc aJiumprion dot !\ milke L
rTJ morr JnImbf e , (or ~~ I(mg a~ I can C'vcn p:lrtially
~'CMll(' rhc non-nt:ion~ O1igin~ of my morJI outlook
by (TtUC1lly rdlC'(:ung on ir., (he f::tn (hat my mOrd]
audook wouW no'W be different if my hi~tory had beeil
diB'rrm f wtll not cntircly undcrminc in redibility.
Giw'n r:hc vaJu:l::ltJnf( cffcCI:\ of critjc~1 rdlc(;tion. I will.
bf Y1f'tUC of cn.g;lWng in it, ;at Ic;t\L parlly transu:lld my
monI oodook', mC'fcly contint(cnt origin~ .
Yet n'm rf Ihu i~ !\tO. it will h:ndly fc)llow t.haf. I have
lIPf fD()K rn~ll to rely on my own mor;l! jud~1I1ellts
man on ehe- judgmCllL\ o( othen with Wh"lnl I serongly
dD.Jp«~ (01 bccau~ th~c di~Bre(;mC'nt~ l.,k· placc
W1dIin J KKKty rh.u pri.1.n rdlcctioll (Jnd b(' Glu ~e, a5
JA .aadnmc.1 !.end (0 intt'r.IICl with thc more rdlcctive
tt:pnmt 01 my ~iety), I c;;annO[ a~Ulmc tha[ thosc
.üb wbom I d,ugrt'c h.we bccn any Ic~~ rcfh:ctivc than
L GMD ch.at dlcy. !OO, nuy weil have ~ol1ght to
~ ehe mctdy hi.U()Tical origins of thcir moral
oudoob. 2n :lIppc'll to rhe v;tli(htin~ cfTcC"t-: of rny
~ will not rc,olvc my p·roblcm. bur will o\11y
trr.:Dt J! U :I htghcr k"VeL Whc:n you and J disilgree
Jbouc wtut I (yUght t() do - whcn, for cxamplc. my
CJWD (.{)I1Klcnrlt-,U\ n ..llcction leavc~ mc convinccd that
_ rtVCTtgt ( olm planning f.. lh weil within tolerable
maul hrmtt. whilc youn Ic;tVe-9 YOU no les convln<:cd
m. I ccilly ooght w re,iu my ugly. vcngcful urgcs -
I alD(J( re.ttan:lhty ~,umc that it is J rather [km you
wtJo h:~uucctHful~ thought hi~ way oue of hi.1\ G;tll~ally
iIlIduad erron,
Md f{ I a:m temp1.ed (0 "hink othcrwi~e. I need
r,.:rl remindmy~J( (l how oftC:1I <:urh ~itlLlliom ;HisC'.
ff I mI rnotkd rö H~umc th;1( y()U have 1'>(,,(,11 le~s
taU~J rn~n mc in purginK YOLir [hinkin~ of C:UIS-
• indoced amf, thcn J mU.\ t hc cnriLlcd to J'nakc
die WDe' 2MUmptitJf1 ~bout the ~rc:Jt m:ljority of
~ wid'i whüm I di~agr - anout V;L~t. numbcrs of
~ md .tOJ'hj~i ..ted vc~ct.arl(lns. pacifisrs.
, ...moderrrKll, (J.ecO'mtrlJcti()nilt..~ 1 «ender (('!TI i 11 ists.
" proponent' (lf pa rti:tl~-birth abonion. IIClJ-
,~~ ('(h.ttc-tpce h (}dc,:. funclalllcnta.lisrs,
't'~f fiW)f'~u. ~fJ(J cuo-iutJ , to r1;Jmc jllst :1 fcw. lJut
~ ft K(;C1uifJly p~.it.llc tlut J luve heell more
.~ m w(;'Idifl~ crr(Jr th:m ,omc ofrhcsl' olhns ~
" fikdy (1fi \Utiuic:.t I ~fl."orJd al()II(~ -~ il st.rJ.ins
f,b .uPf't'~ dj:4t t ),;.vr, l 'n lIlur' ll ll l.TC ~flll
' - . , (W n'tn frj(~f of the1l1. It would be SO fT!(: t hi tlH
rn mc
l1i j IWWacle ;{, (JUt alJ cl "fHJtant•. I' \W~ jtl~t me
~ WJC if: 2ft fJWn,
91
VI. Practical Solution to These
Doubts?
So wh:lt shouJd I do? More precisely. how should
Irespond to the challenge to my ability to decide on
rational grounds what I mould do? I can see three nuin
pos 'ibilitics: first. to renew my quest for 3 convincing
rcasOIl to bdieve that my own moral judgments are
more likcly (Q be true or jusrified than are those of the
innumt'rJblc others with whom I dis.agree; second, to
concc:dc borh tha[ no ~uch roson is li.kely to be forth-
coming and rn:H I therefore cannot nriorWly b~ my
~Jctio m on I11Y own mon! judgments; 3nd t:hird. to
acknowlcdgc th3t no suc.h ~n is forthcoming but
deny thJt [his makes ie irrariornl to base my actions OD
my own moral judgmencs. UnfortuJUtdy. of th.ese
three sr-r.aegics, the fint i.s pretty clC2rly doom.ed, while
the second wou.ld commit me to a wbolesa.le rcjecrion
ofrhc mor.tl point of view.Tbus.. ifl am to :J'o-oid t:he twin
pitfalls 01' futility and mor.tl slc.epcicism.. I Vv-iIl probWly
havc to imp!cmem seme ...'"Himt of thc third stntegy.
To do t.his. I will blYe to block che infarnce &om
"I have no good rea.son to believe t:hat my own monl
judgments are more likely to be justified OT D'U:e rh2n
tho~e of innumerablc others wbo disagree wich me'" to
"I cannot r.ttionilly base My actions OD MY 09w-n mor::a.l
judgrnems."This in tunl requires a demon:stn'rion tbat
what mak~ it rariorul far me 00 ~ my acriom on
my OW11 mon.! judgmems is noc mnply ehe suength of
my ~:lSorlS for believing dut these ju~ 4Il"e
justified or true. More speci6cilly.. v-..int I must s.b~ is
{hat t"Vt"n when 1 reali..zt' ~ my own monl jndgments
d.re no more likdy ro be rrue or justi:fied than a:re yours.
it ncvertheJess re.mains r.ujonal far mc to act OD my
own judgmt"nts simply be-c-.lllSe they ~ my own.
Cm, anything lil..-e this be shown? lf 50., it sa:rm ~
argument would likdy M-"e to turn OD cen:Un fe.atuTeS
Ofpr.lCt1CaJ re",.lSon itsdf.ln puticuLu:. its pM:nl ~
st"cms likdy to \Je mat bec.m5e no ODe C4:n act arion-
aUy \virhom b~ng h.is d«h;ons on bis Olm ~
of the re~$ons for and 19.Unst tb~ actiom l:V2i.bbk to
hi.m. pracoc-.l.l reason itsdf mptiltS tlut I gNe pride of
pbce to my OW1\ judglnen~ Although I C2Il of coune
r-Jrio.milly diSt\Junt my p:arricubr jndgment that I ~
to hc t~llse or UlÜustified. the re~son I an da this is dw
tu discount ;1 p<uticular judgment is not to abdiate tbe
t.1s.k of jud~ing: rJth(,f, it is only to aIlow- ont of my
own judgrnen~ to trump motber. Beausc acting
92 GEORGE SHER
r.1tionaUy neü"S."-lrily involves b.asing my decisions on
me: W'3Y 1 S('c things. I cannot ellen'ly transcend my
own outlook \\;thout moving decisivdy beyond the
bounds. of pncricu fe.lSon.
This much , 1 think. is dear enough. Ho\V~ver.
because not alI reasons for .lcting are moral reasons -
becau.s.c. tor example. I can also have reasons mac are
prudenriaJ. hedoniscic. or aestheric - the mere fact chat
practical reason requires thac 1 bJ.S~ my amons on my
own judgmems Jbout what I have reason ro do is not
sufficienc co vindicate the rationality of :1Cring on my
OW11 best moral judgments. To show tbat practical
reason requires this. I must tlke me funher srep of
argumg mac even an attempc to trcUlSCend my own
mora} outlook would take me beyond me bounds of
practical reason; and unlike tbe p~vious step. this ODe
may see rn probJem:lric indeed.
For because my moral outIook encompasses only a
srnall menon of wh at I believe. want, and aim at. simply
cfuregarding it \ ..'ould hardly leave me v.rith Ilothing. or
too htcle. upon which to base my practical dec:i.s:ioru.
Even if I were [Q set aside e'Vcry ODe of my moral
beliefst I could still choose one action over mother on
any numbl!r of furcher grounds - for example. beC:1Use
the chosen Jcrion \\'ould be fun. b~C.1use it \...-ould
ad~nct: the aims of ~me pc~n [ care about, or
bccaust' ie is requirc-d for me completion of some
proJect I hJve undc.:rtlken. Thus... given my J\'V'areness
that my o\\ln mOrll judgmems are no more likely ro be
trlle or justified th ;m are the moral judgments of any
number of others. isn't it indeed r.ltional for me to set
moral considcrJ[iollS lSide and mJke my decisions
exeluslvcly on orher ~rounds?
The J.n~wcr. I thillk. is that th.i.s is Ilot rational. for if
I wert' tO do ir. I would merdy be discounring one set
of praccical jud~m~llts in favor of mother whose
mClllbcrs .H ·C no Ics..~ compromiscd by the now-familiar
combill.ltioll of comro~rsy and conringency.AJthough
a full dt'fcnse of this tin~1 claim i.s beyond my scope,
I shall end this section with a brief s.k~tch of the
argument for it.
The first thing t.hat n~eds (0 be s:a..id is thaI just as
the grelt majority of my moral judgments would be
COlHcsted by various persons who a~ no les.s ref)cctive
than I. so too would the grear mJjorlry of my lJotlmoral
practical judgnlt·ntS. lndeed. tbe larter disagreemems
scem if anything to be cven more \vide-ranging. since
they encompass born disagreements about whieh sort.s
of norunoral conslderations are relevant [0 the decision
3t hand - for e..'Cample. disagreements abaut wheth
I should make the decision mainlyon hedonistier
prudential. aesrhetic. or affectional grounds - and d'IS-a_c.
greements abour what each type of consideration glves
me reason to de. Although some sucb di.sagreements
obviously turn on different undcrstdndings of th c
facts of a given situation . many others do nOt. Also
while man)' endorse the metaprinciple that wha;
1 ought to do depends on my owu weighting of the
competing nonmoral considerations, (here are also
many who reject [his meuprinciple. Thus. aU in all, my
nonmoral pracrical judgments are sure [0 be every bit
as conrroversial as my moral judgments.
Moreover. second. m)' having the belie& and habits of
thought that combine to ~uppon the rdevam pracncal
judgments seems equally conringent in both the moral
and nonmoral cases. Just as it i.s true mat if I had had ~
sufficiently different upbringing and ser of experience:s.,
I would now hold YOUT view rather than mine about
whar I morally ought to do, so roo is it true that if I lud
had a sufficiently difierent upbringing and set of experi-
ences, I would now hold YOUf view rather than mine
about what I have nonmora/ reason [0 de. Our attitud~
about the value of culcure. work. friendship, planning.
and much else are 110 less accidellts of our upbringing
and experiences. alld are no less influenrial in shaping
our judgments about how to live, [han are our beliefi
about virrue and vice and what wc owe to ~ch other.
Thus. in the end, my moral and nonmoral judg-
ments abeut what I ought to do - or. better. the
mora} and nonmoral components of my integrateti
judgments about what, all things considaed, I ought
to do - seem l.ikdy to stand or flLl togcther. Eimer i!
is rational for me to set boch components of my own
practical judgments aside or it is not rational for me
[0 set either of them a.side. If I were to set born com-
ponems aside. I would indeed lack any basis upon
which to make rcasoned dccisions abeut what to do.
Henec, given the inescapability of my commirnuot
to acting for reasons, my tentative eondusion i5 thJ[
practical rationaliry precludes my setting eitht!r ofthe
components aside.
VII. Conclusion
My rruin contennon in chis essay has been rnat gP.'('[I
the degree [0 which merely connngent factors ap~
to have shaped our moral outlooks. there i.s a serlO US
 8UT I COCLD BE WRONG
quc~nf)n about whrther I ever h~ve good grounds for
brlievillg th,;,t I ~m nght and you are wrong when you
JnJ I di.\Jwce .. bouc wtut I ought to 00. Howevcr.
I h:.vc l.hn wtl,gt"\tcd dur even if I neve1" do h:ave
~o(}d )(round\ für bclieving (hiA, it DU}' ~everthd~s
otlC11 remJl1I r3rioll.aJ for mc to bast: my acnOI15 on my
(JWII nlüral Judgme nl5 rather {han yours. When they are
(OOIbincd. (hc~ daims hAVC the paradoxicaJ impliation
th~( it I~ o(ten rational for me to act on the ba5i.~ of
monl judgmcn~ the objectivc ldtdihood of whosi:
Iruth or ju~tifLabiliry I have good reason to ~~rd a5
Notes
(Ncw York.: ColumbL1
93
quire low. This impliarion casts (~h) doube on our
ability to integrate our reasoru for believing and for
acting - dur is, on our ability to square medemands of
theoretical and pnctical re~on.l[ also suggests mat the
price wc pay for being c1ear-eyed moral agents nuy be
a <fuconcerting awareness of a certain inescapable form
of bad [aith. Whether these are the only conclusions
that the paradoxical implication warrants, or whether,
in addition., it provides a pbtform for some further
thrust by the moraJ skepric, is a quesrion I will not
anempt to answer here.
3. DMd Hum~. A fflaliJ.t of HUm411 Nature, ed. l. A. Se1by-
Bigge (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1960), bk. I, sec. 7,
p.269.