Aristotle and the Potential Infinite: An Intuitionistic Approach 309

Aristotle and the Potential Infinite:

An Intuitionistic Approach1
Kyle Takaki

1 Introduction

According to Aristotle, the infinite first presents itself in what is contin-

uous (200b16), since what is continuous is infinitely divisible — — one
characterization of continuity. The other characterization of continuity
holds that Y is continuous to X when Y is successive to, and in contact
with, X, where the limits of both form a unity (227a10). Although there
are different continua — e.g., motion and time — the fundamental con-
tinuum for Aristotle is magnitude. Furthermore, magnitude’s primary
characterization is that it is (potentially) infinitely divisible; the other
(above) characterization of continuity builds upon infinite divisibility
in the context of motion and time.
In this paper I argue for a particular ‘intuitionistic’ interpretation of
Aristotle’s potential infinite. I contextualize this interpretation by dis-
cussing problems associated with cashing out the notion of ‘infinite
divisibility’. Specifically, I consider two interpretations provided by
Jonathan Lear and William Charlton, where, in brief, both argue that
Aristotle’s notion of potential infinite divisibility reduces to a finitist
position. While Lear and Charlton offer helpful accounts of Aristotle’s
notion of potential infinity, I argue, pace Lear and Charlton, that the
potential infinite 1) does not reduce to a finitist position, and 2) is most
plausibly construed as residing in an ‘evolutionary-constructivist’/

1 Thanks to Jim Tiles and an anonymous referee for helpful comments on earlier
versions of this paper.

APEIRON a journal for ancient philosophy and science

Brought
003-6390/2009/4204 309-324 16.00 © Academic to you
Printing byPublishing
and | ULB Bonn
Authenticated | 131.220.250.143
Download Date | 9/22/13 1:57 AM
310 Kyle Takaki

intuitionistic process. With this intuitionistic account in place, I draw

some brief implications for understanding motion, number, and time.

2 The Structural Properties of Magnitude and Their

Relation to the Potential Infinite

Michael White gives a useful overview of the structure of magnitude.

White claims that the principles of the ‘Non-Supervenience of Positive
Measure’ (NSPM) and the ‘Non-Supervenience of Continuity’ (NSC)
are ‘central to Aristotle’s conception of the basic structural properties
of spatial magnitude or extension’ (White 1992, 30). The former states
that ‘each partition of a continuous magnitude having positive mea-
sure or size into proper parts yields parts the sums of whose measures
are all non-nil’ (13). The latter states that ‘each partition of a continu-
ous magnitude into proper parts yields parts each of which is pairwise
continuous with at least one other part’ (29). (The NSPM essentially is
a more robust way of characterizing the infinite divisibility of continu-
ous magnitudes, and the NSC captures the other characterization of
continuity given at the beginning of this paper — namely that Y is con-
tinuous with X when Y is successive to, and in contact with, X, where
the limits of both form a unity.) Informally, draw a line without lifting
your pencil off the paper; if one divides any part of the line however
many times desired, the length between divisions will never be zero
(NSPM); and as each segment still lies on the unbroken line, it is un-
broken with its neighbor(s) (NSC). The line drawn is finite, serving as a
simple exemplar of magnitude, and the above two principles are what
any magnitude satisfies.
Observe, though, that the NSPM and the NSC are compatible with
a finite range of objects, an infinite range of objects, or otherwise. But
as these principles apply to Aristotle, it is important to note that the
extent of the dividing is not strictly finite, as strict finitism would lead
to indivisible lines, which Aristotle rejects. It is also important to note
that this ‘extent’ is not straightforwardly infinite either, but rather in-
volves the notion of something being infinite ‘in principle.’ Aristotle
writes: ‘For generally the infinite has this mode of existence: one thing
is always being taken after another, and each thing that is taken is al-
ways finite, but always different’ (206a28). Is this as intuitionistic as
it sounds? It is here, concerning the interrelation between the NSPM
and the NSC, that the notion of the potential infinite becomes crucial.
That is, we need to get straight on understanding the potential infinite

Brought to you by | ULB Bonn

Authenticated | 131.220.250.143
Download Date | 9/22/13 1:57 AM
 Aristotle and the Potential Infinite: An Intuitionistic Approach 311

since 1) the structure of magnitude — the fundamental continuum — is

‘infinitely’ divisible; 2) each divisible magnitude is continuous with its
neighboring magnitude(s); and yet 3) the extent of dividing (with their
corresponding divisibles) is neither strictly finite nor straightforwardly
infinite — it is potentially infinite for Aristotle. In sections three through
six I focus on infinite divisibility and the NSPM; then in section seven
I discuss the NSC.

3 The Potential Infinite, Division, Addition,

and Taking a Limit

White provides a plausible characterization of the potential infinite: Ar-

istotle’s infinite ‘does not signify a cardinal or ordinal number. Rather,
it signifies the absence of an upper bound’ (153). Let us unfold this char-
acterization. Aristotle claims that ‘in a way the infinite by addition is the
same thing as the infinite by division’ [emphases mine] (206b3). This
qualified parallel between addition and division is significant, since it is
earlier claimed that ‘everything that is infinite may be so in respect of
addition or division or both’ (204a7). Jonathan Lear, in his article ‘Ar-
istotelian Infinity,’ interprets the parallel in the following manner: ‘The
point is that given a successive division of a finite length AB, as pre-
scribed in Zeno’s Dichotomy 1/2AB, 1/4AB, 1/8AB … one can use this
division to form a process of addition 1/2AB + 1/4AB + 1/8AB + … .
Such a process could be witness to the infinite by addition, though the
addition of the lengths will never exceed the finite length AB’ (Lear
1979, 195). Aristotle qualifies the link between divisibility and additivi-
ty by noting that ‘just as we see division going on ad infinitum, so we see
addition being made in the same proportion [emphasis mine] to what is
already marked off’ (206b5). He proceeds to take each successive ratio
of a decreasing ‘sequence’, and by adding them together claims more
generally that ‘we shall not traverse the given magnitude’ (206b10).
Clearly from a modern standpoint this is not wholly correct, since the
notion of a limit of partial sums is something Aristotle did not have;
additionally, Lear sets up the summation in such a way that it happens
to be convergent. In principle, Aristotle could also generate a version
of Zeno’s paradox using a harmonic sequence, and probably wouldn’t
realize that the sum (1/n) is divergent. Regardless of the issue of con-
vergence, Aristotle — who also offers a primitive notion of divergence
(206b10-12) which is intuitively correct — has a notion of taking a limit,
but with important restrictions. I think the point to be drawn from the

Brought to you by | ULB Bonn

Authenticated | 131.220.250.143
Download Date | 9/22/13 1:57 AM
312 Kyle Takaki

parallel between addition and division is that both processes involve an

intuitive notion of a limit. As Aristotle puts it, ‘the infinite, then, exists
in no other way, but in this way it does exist, potentially and by reduc-
tion’ (206b14).
What kind of limit would this be? According to White, it would be ‘a
least finite magnitude (i) which the process of summation never (i.e., at
any finite stage) exceeds and (ii) to which the process of summation ap-
proaches closer at each successive stage but never (at any finite stage)
reaches’ (141). This means that each successive term in the summation
tends toward the limit but never gets identified with the limit. Each
term in the summation is a quantity where more can be taken — there is
no upper bound relative to the number of parts that can be taken, though
there is an upper bound in the sense that each magnitude is bounded,
and so the sums can approach this bound, this limit. Put another way,
division can be taken for each x, but not for all x (as a ‘totality’). Thus we
have, in brief, a working characterization of the ‘potential infinite’ and
its interrelation with ‘taking a limit’.

4 Interpreting the Potential Infinite

To cash out the potential infinite more precisely, I utilize William Charl-
ton’s article, ‘Aristotle’s Potential Infinities’. Charlton argues that Aris-
totle would accept

(F) For all x, if x is a member of series S, it is possible that there is

a y such that y is a member of S, and y is in the transitive and
irreflexive relation R to x

but would reject

(A) It is possible that for all x, if x is a member of S, there is a y such

that y is in S and y is R to x. (Charlton 1991, 141)

(F), according to Charlton, expresses a kind of finitism, while (A) ex-

presses the possibility of an actual infinite. Charlton argues that there
is no actual infinite for Aristotle (since the infinite is explanatory in the
bounded sense of material explanation), thus scratch any ‘it is possible’
concerning (A). But would Aristotle accept (F)? Charlton thinks so, as
apparently does Lear, where both finitist accounts rely on interpret-
ing the embedded ‘it is possible’. Charlton’s take is that Aristotle uses

Brought to you by | ULB Bonn

Authenticated | 131.220.250.143
Download Date | 9/22/13 1:57 AM
 Aristotle and the Potential Infinite: An Intuitionistic Approach 313

‘potentially’ in three different ways: ‘the cold is [potentially] hot, the

Hermes exists [potentially] in the wood, and the infinite exists [poten-
tially]’ (143). For all of these senses, ‘Aristotle’s finitism concerns sets
or series of things like men, sidereal revolutions, and parts which have
actually been cut off’ (143). By itself, (F) holds that for a domain, the
series on that domain is such that at any stage in the series, more could
be taken. Presumably this would mean that for something cold, it could
progress to an altered state of being hot; that for appropriate matter
such as wood, pieces could be chopped off, progressing to the state of a
statue; and that for things like planets, each revolution is such that an-
other revolution could be made.2 Exactly what kind of finitism would
this be? I suggest that Charlton has not adequately distinguished be-
tween strict finitism, and a constructive finitism with an appropriate
limit concept. Clearly strict finitism will not work, since, among other
reasons, Aristotle believes with regard to sidereal revolutions that the
motion of the planets occurs in a bounded universe, yet their motion
had no beginning and presumably has no end (cf. section eight). Be-
cause Charlton’s ‘it is possible’ is ambiguous, it is unclear that Aristotle
would accept (F). However, there is a more serious objection than this.
To situate the objection, let us turn attention to Lear’s interpretation.
Lear’s take is that ‘an actual process of division which terminates
after finitely many divisions, having failed to carry out all possible divi-
sions, is all that a witness to the existence of the potential infinite could
consist in’ (191). It may appear that this ‘witness’ is primarily process-
oriented; however when dealing with magnitudes, the ‘length is poten-
tially infinite not because of the existence of any process, but because
of the structure [emphasis mine] of the magnitude’ (193). If so, since
magnitude depends on physical/sensible body, part of the ontological
structure of the world concerns divisible things that are only appar-
ently (potentially) infinitely divisible — ’there will have to be possible
divisions that remain unactualized’ (194), an expression of a kind of
finitism. That is, on one interpretation, it could be taken to mean that
there will be unactualized divisions, and so always, there will have to
be a stopping point at which more divisions are possible, but are not
made. The problem here is that even if more divisions are possible, this
really has nothing to do with a potential infinity, but rather with what

2 More accurately, since there is no beginning of time for Aristotle (see section eight),
another revolution could be made because there seems to be an inexhaustible sup-
ply of previous planetary revolutions.

Brought to you by | ULB Bonn

Authenticated | 131.220.250.143
Download Date | 9/22/13 1:57 AM
314 Kyle Takaki

could be done with some finite magnitude. Another reading of Lear is

that while at any stage of the game only finitely many divisions are car-
ried out, the process could continue on forever, since there is a failure
to carry out all possible divisions. However, Lear appears to reject this
interpretation, as I explain below.

5 Lear on the Potential Infinite and ‘Intuitionism’

Lear claims that ‘we have evidence for equating the potential infinite
with the infinite by division and seeing both as existing in virtue of the
continuous structure of a magnitude and not in virtue of the existence
of any process’ [emphasis mine] (195). Evidence for equating the two
stems from Aristotle’s claim that ‘by addition then, also, there is poten-
tially an infinite, namely, what we have described as being in a sense
the same as the infinite in respect of division. For it will always be pos-
sible to take something ab extra’ (206b16-8). And given that Aristotle
utilizes two characterizations of continuity — one concerning the ex-
tremities of bodies forming a unity when in succession (NSC), and the
other concerning division ‘all the way down’ (NSPM) — Lear’s claim
that the continuous structure of magnitude is fundamental seems justi-
fied.3 But why does Lear argue that equating the two doesn’t hold by
virtue of any process? It is from this claim that a problematic conse-
quence arises, a consequence enabling Lear to separate Aristotle from
intuitionists. Lear writes:

Both Aristotle and the intuitionists agree that a magnitude is infinitely

divisible and both will interpret this as a claim that no matter how
many divisions of a magnitude have been made another could be
made. But in fact each is claiming a very different possibility. Aristotle
is claiming that the magnitude is such that if there were a divider who
could continue to divide the length (i.e. a Creative Mathematician, un-
hampered by human physical and mental limitations) then no matter
how many divisions he made, he could always make another. Only
the last ‘could’ is fundamental to Aristotle’s claim that the magnitude

3 I will discuss how these two characterizations are related in section seven. Al-
though I agree with Lear that the continuous structure of magnitude is fundamen-
tal, my nuanced dispute with Lear concerns articulating the manner in which the
‘structure’ of magnitude is intertwined with the potential infinite, and the associ-
ated implications regarding what it means to speak of magnitude as ‘continuous’.

Brought to you by | ULB Bonn

Authenticated | 131.220.250.143
Download Date | 9/22/13 1:57 AM
 Aristotle and the Potential Infinite: An Intuitionistic Approach 315

is infinitely divisible, for it is a claim about the structure of the mag-

nitude, not the existence of a process. … The intuitionists’ possibil-
ity-claim is, by contrast, inextricably tied to an ability to carry out a
certain procedure. (196-7)

So magnitude is this way, and process is incidental (epistemically) to

carrying out what magnitude affords. But the following problematic
consequence arises: if the structure of a magnitude is infinitely divis-
ible, and this is part of its ontology, how then, is its structure potentially
infinite? Grounding its divisibility in its structure is like claiming that
it is actually potentially infinite, whatever that may mean. It seems that
the potential has to reside in a process, as the very thing needing to be
avoided is any sort of reification. I think this is a problem both Charlton
and Lear have, though in different ways.
To further clarify, here is the problem on Lear’s account. He claims
that ‘for Aristotle it is because [emphasis mine] a length is infinite by
division that certain processes are possible and not vice versa’ (198).
If Aristotle held this, I think he was wrong. For this assumes that the
infinite by division ‘exists’, whether you call it ‘potential’, ‘actual’, or
even ‘actually potential’ (note that ‘potentially actual’, (A), was rejected
in section four), and where the process of dividing with always-more-
to-take is a consequence of this existence claim. Charlton’s potential in-
finite, (F), apparently doesn’t have this problem, due to the embedded
‘it is possible’ clause. But (F) too hides an assumption that illegitimately
reifies, leading to the same sorts of problems. Charlton claims that (F)
is finitist. We earlier rejected strict finitism, so let us suppose that (F) is
compatible with an intuitionistic viewpoint. The problem lies with the
structure of ‘for all x, if … .’ This is an ambiguous ‘all’ and an ambiguous
‘if’. What is the domain? And what are the conditions of satisfaction? If
Charlton takes the domain as being finite, he has said nothing about a
potential infinity, and thus his ‘it is possible’ is empty. Suppose he takes
the domain as infinite. But this by itself can’t get off the ground, since
Aristotle allows for each, but not for all. Indeed, in relation to the dis-
cussion of why his continuum cannot be composed of points, he states
that ‘it is only in one sense that the magnitude is divisible through and
through, viz. in so far as there is one point anywhere within it and all
its points are everywhere within it if you take them singly. But there are
not more points than one anywhere within it’ (317a6-8). Divisions can
only be taken one at a time. If the domain is taken as infinite, the ‘it is
possible’ is no longer over a domain of possibilities, as it should be, but
rather over a reified totality.

Brought to you by | ULB Bonn

Authenticated | 131.220.250.143
Download Date | 9/22/13 1:57 AM
316 Kyle Takaki

6 An ‘Evolutionary-Constructive’ (Intuitionistic)
Approach to the Potential Infinite

It seems to me there are two ways one might get out of this. First, one
could take the domain as infinite, but only hypothetically. This would
mean that the structure of Aristotle’s magnitude is hypothetical, where
divisions could be carried out for each x on the assumption that there
are always more ‘x’s to take. I find this unsatisfying because it isn’t
explicit enough. The second way out is intuitionistic, accounting for
the manner in which one can have a domain of possibilities (or a hypo-
thetical domain), since it puts process at the heart of the notion of a
potential infinite. Lear cannot accept this interpretation, as we will see
why shortly in his discussion of intuitionism. Charlton might accept it
based on his ambiguous position, although an intuitionistic reading of
(F) would be outside the standard realms of logic.
The claim is this: give an ‘evolutionary-constructive’ account of the
domain of quantification, with the condition placed on the antecedent
that satisfaction must occur relative to the changing and expanding
domain. So for some magnitude, the domain starts at ‘unity’ and the
antecedent is satisfied; then a cut is made, whereby the series is con-
structed as two pieces, and thus a second piece can be provided. Feed
this new domain back into (F), and from there generate set S. In such
a manner, the divisibility of a magnitude is intimately tied up with the
epistemic process of generating a series. Physical body comes first, and
then magnitude can be seen to be infinitely divisible by the process of
dividing the original thing, since by extrapolating from that process
there is the realization that the process will never end, that there is no
upper bound. This intuitionistic reading leaves the potential infinite as
potential in concept, and not just potential in name. It is the re-imposing
of a conceptual framework that proceeds potentially ad infinitum, and
not divisions applied to ‘the structure’ of magnitude. In sum, physi-
cal body is finite and ‘first-order’; magnitude, dependent on physical
body, nevertheless is bounded (and divisible even if there are possible
divisions which remain unactualized) and ‘second-order’; and division
is potentially infinite since the conceptual framework for understanding
magnitude is re-imposable — it is ‘third-order’.
What does Lear have to say about ‘intuitionism’? He claims that in-
tuitionism depends on the ability of a person to be able to decide certain
questions. This excludes infinite sorts of questions, and, surprisingly,
very large sorts of questions — e.g., ‘whether there are two prime num-
bers x and y such that 10100 divisions of a line are equal to x+y divisions’

Brought to you by | ULB Bonn

Authenticated | 131.220.250.143
Download Date | 9/22/13 1:57 AM
 Aristotle and the Potential Infinite: An Intuitionistic Approach 317

(197). Lear’s reading of intuitionism seems to be that it expresses a strict

finitism, as the intuitionist cannot ‘legitimately invoke a Creative Math-
ematician for, according to him, our conception of truth is derived from
our own ability to determine whether a sentence is true’ (197-8). How-
ever, not all intuitionists flock together. Some might be strict finitists,
but others are, well, others (e.g., Troelstra).4 The position I have tried
to argue for is that Aristotle should have subscribed to an ‘evolution-
ary-constructive’/intuitionistic view (non-strict-finitist) with regard to
magnitude to avoid a problematic consequence, and to preserve the po-
tential infinite as potential. In doing so, his intuitive concept of a limit
would additionally be preserved (recall section three).

7 Intuitionism and Motion

With the above machinery in place, for the remainder of this paper I
consider motion, number, and time. Starting with motion, the ‘infinite
is not the same in magnitude and movement and time ... movement is
called infinite in virtue of [emphasis mine] the magnitude covered by the
movement, and time because of the movement’ (207b22-5). It is impor-
tant to note that movement is intertwined with potentially measuring
the change undergone — in other words, motion relies primarily upon
magnitude. Similarly, as time depends on motion, time is grounded in
magnitude. The key characteristic of motion is its ‘from-to’ structure: a
body moves from some place to another place, and because magnitude
is continuous, motion too is continuous; thus ‘the movement goes with
the magnitude’ (219a11).
To account for motion, the NSC is invoked in conjunction with the
NSPM. In other words, it is in the context of motion that the NSC and
the NSPM are brought together. Following White, it seems plausible to
say that Aristotle needs ‘the principle of spatial non-supervenience of
local kinesis’ to characterize continuous motion. The principle states:
‘Each spatial partition of a continuous motion into kinetic proper seg-
ments of motion yields segments each of which is continuous with at
least one other kinetic segment of the partition in the following sense:
there is a common spatial point that is paired with the terminus a quo
of one of the kinetic segments and the terminus ad quem of the other

4 Note that my use of ‘intuitionism’ concerns only the previous ‘evolutionary-con-

structive’ account.

Brought to you by | ULB Bonn

Authenticated | 131.220.250.143
Download Date | 9/22/13 1:57 AM
318 Kyle Takaki

segment’ (44-5). The notion of partition employs the sense of continu-

ity as division (the NSPM), while continuity between segments employs
the other sense of continuity (the NSC). I have already argued that the
NSPM should be given an intuitionistic interpretation with respect to
infinite divisibility. The issue now raised is how the NSC may also be
given an intuitionistic account.
Concerning the NSC, Aristotle claims that the limits must form a uni-
ty. This raises the problem whether the place at which kinetic segments
meet is ‘one,’ for the notion of a spatial point seems to fit with contigu-
ity, but not necessarily continuity. That is, in On Indivisible Lines (which
may not have been authored by Aristotle) an unconvincing argument is
made to the effect that since points occupy no place and lack extension,
any two things which meet in what appears to be a point actually are
two points (the things are contiguous but not necessarily continuous).
This sense of (apparently) meeting at a point brought about by division
has a commonsense illustration, where if wood, say, is divided, there
are really two points, since there are two pieces (White 1992, 20). Any
actual divide leaves a gap in between. However, what should have been
done to avoid this problem and to preserve continuity when two things
meet at a point is to define meeting at a point as that which has noth-
ing in between. Defining unity by negation can be a handy tool. Why,
seemingly, wasn’t this done? According to White, there ‘is for Aristotle,
I suspect, no topological distinction between parts that are contiguous
and parts that are continuous. Rather, continuity pertains to what is
homeonumerous, while contiguity pertains to parts which are spatially
joined but essentially different’ (27). So, for example, water would be
continuous with water, while air would be contiguous with water. The
issue of dividing, say, air such that two air segments touch each other
at a point seems odd, and probably wasn’t the sort of thing which Aris-
totle considered. At this stage, our enriched characterizations of magni-
tude and continuity find application; specifically, the NSC is compatible
with the above negative definition of unity. Since such ‘bare’ negation
expresses minimal ontological or epistemic commitment, a plausible
intuitionistic development can be given of ‘negative unity’: rather than
talk of points, we can talk about ‘closed interval’ segments that have no
segments between them, relative to a domain of well-constructed segments.
Since magnitude is the fundamental continuum for Aristotle, starting
with well-constructed finite magnitudes allows for the further con-
struction of magnitudes (added or divided) that are continuous with
one another — that have no magnitudes between them.

Brought to you by | ULB Bonn

Authenticated | 131.220.250.143
Download Date | 9/22/13 1:57 AM
 Aristotle and the Potential Infinite: An Intuitionistic Approach 319

8 Time and Magnitude

In this section I give a brief exposition of how magnitude and motion

apply to time, as time is important to any sort of intuitionism.5 Build-
ing upon our above intuitionistic accounts of magnitude and motion,
observe that motion relies upon magnitude, and time depends on mo-
tion: motions ‘may be consecutive or successive in virtue of the time
being continuous, but there can be continuity only in virtue of [empha-
ses mine] the motions themselves being continuous, that is when the
end of each is one with the end of the other’ (228a30-5). What does it
mean to say that motions may be ‘successive in virtue of the time being
continuous’? Well, Y is in succession to X when Y is after X, and when
‘there is nothing of the same kind as itself between it and that to which
it is in succession’ (227a1). Succession is a discrete notion, like number.
However, motion itself is not discrete, but may be discrete relative to
time being continuous. These claims require articulation.
Time is a kind of number, since it is what is counted with respect
to before and after. Number, more broadly, can be ‘what is counted or
countable and also of that with which we count’ (219b1-9). For the for-
mer sense, number (as plurality — ’what is counted or countable’) has
a minimum, namely two things, and so is potentially infinite only by
addition. Time, though, is not just infinite by addition, but also by divi-
sion since, like with a line, time is divisible in that it has no minimum
(220a30). Importantly, time is likened to a magnitude, and thereby pos-
sesses divisibility ‘all the way down’ — time is continuous. And al-
though plurality has a minimum, number is associated with divisibility
in the sense that additivity is the inverse of a divisible process. Aristotle
states: ‘in the direction of largeness it is always possible to think of a
large number; for the number of times a magnitude can be bisected is
[potentially] infinite’ (207b10-2). Number, in the other sense of what is
used to count, is explicitly not continuous, since its basis in magnitude
is correlated with divisions made successively. Time is not that which is
used to count, but that which is counted with respect to before and after,

5 Time usually plays a ‘foundational’ role in intuitionistic accounts. But since mag-
nitude is fundamental for Aristotle, time, as a continuum, actually depends on
the structure of magnitude. This poses no problem for my ‘intuitionistic’ view, for
as previously mentioned, there are many kinds of intuitionists. What generally
characterizes diverse intuitionisms is some notion of ‘process’. My intuitionism
concerns only the bare features of the evolutionary-constructive account.

Brought to you by | ULB Bonn

Authenticated | 131.220.250.143
Download Date | 9/22/13 1:57 AM
320 Kyle Takaki

and as such is discrete. But what is counted concerns the application of

discrete counting to something which might not be discrete. Since what
comes before and after has movement to it (time is a process), someone
watching, say, a moving chariot stands as a witness during this event
not just to what is counted, but more comprehensively to the motion
of the chariot. So the time-event must be continuous. When it is said
above that motion may be discrete relative to time being continuous, I
think there are several interpretations to what Aristotle might have had
in mind. The first is something like a staccato run. The running part is
continuous, while the staccato ‘measure’ is not, but through the process
time flows on. There is a more explicit interpretation closer to the above
example of a moving chariot contained in a time-event. First let us give
another tidy principle.
White’s ‘principle of the temporal non-supervenience of kinesis’ cap-
tures nicely the relationship between time and motion:

Each temporal partition of a continuous motion into kinetic proper

segments of motion yields segments each of which is continuous with
at least one other kinetic segment of the partition in the following
sense: there is a common now/temporal instant that is paired with the
terminus a quo of one of the kinetic segments and the terminus ad quem
of the other segment. (37)

Given this principle, it becomes clear how time can have both discrete
and continuous aspects, with the continuous aspect being primary.
First it is assumed that some motion is continuous. This assumption
can be made since 1) a body (a ‘well-constructed’ continuous magnitude)
is moving relative to, say, the ground (another ‘well-constructed’ con-
tinuous magnitude), and 2) the well-constructed spatial-framework in
which the motion occurs is also continuous. Then a (well-constructed)
partition is made of the motion by employing the discrete aspect of
time, namely that time is what is counted. Motion is counted at each
now instant — keeping in mind that the partition is artificially imposed
on a continuous structure — where each now instant is continuous with
the before and after kinetic segments by the NSC. Thus the other inter-
pretation of the claim that motion may be discrete relative to time being
continuous is that motion itself is not discrete, but rather the numbering
of the motion into segments is a discrete partitioning, but the process
of time itself (before and after) is continuous through the motion. For
example, sidereal revolutions are continuous movements which can be
partitioned discretely into things like day and night, seasons, years, etc.

Brought to you by | ULB Bonn

Authenticated | 131.220.250.143
Download Date | 9/22/13 1:57 AM
 Aristotle and the Potential Infinite: An Intuitionistic Approach 321

But the process of time through the revolutions is continuous, since for
Aristotle there is no beginning to the universe (interpreting this claim
intuitionistically, I suggest that Aristotle should have added the qualifi-
cation that there is potentially no beginning to the universe).

9 An Anti-Realist Interpretation of Time?

What is the metaphysical status of time? Lear suggests that Aristotle

has an anti-realist conception, since ‘time is above all a measure and,
as such, could not exist were there no soul which could measure. This
does not mean that the measurement is subjective or that any measure-
ment a soul makes is correct: it only means that we cannot give an ad-
equate account of time without including in the account a soul which
is measuring the change’ (204-5). Lear gives the following evidence for
this claim:

It is also worth considering how time can be related to the soul; and
why time is thought to be in everything. … Whether if the soul did not
exist time would exist or not, is a question that may fairly be asked; for
if there cannot be some one to count there cannot be anything that can
be counted either, so that evidently there cannot be number; for num-
ber is either what has been, or what can be, counted. But if nothing but
soul, or in soul reason, is qualified to count, it is impossible for there to
be time unless there is soul, but only that of which time is an attribute,
i.e. if movement can exist without soul. The before and after are attri-
butes of movement, and time is these qua countable. (223a16-29)

From this passage it is not wholly clear to me that Aristotle has an anti-
realist conception of time; however, let us suppose he does, to see what
consequences follow.
Given an anti-realist conception of time, and given that time flows,
there will be processes like sidereal revolutions involving continuous
movements of continuous bodies through continuous space. But since
continuous spatial magnitude is required, this apparently means that it
too has an anti-realist conception, since ‘a soul’ needs to measure magni-
tude. On our intuitionistic reading of Aristotle, this is fine, since we not
only want to avoid reifying magnitude, but also put process at the core
of understanding potential infinity (and thus the NSPM and the NSC).
So an anti-realist conception of time is compatible with our intuitionistic
reading. However, a problem arises on Lear’s reading. His anti-realist
conception of time means that soul is required of any adequate account

Brought to you by | ULB Bonn

Authenticated | 131.220.250.143
Download Date | 9/22/13 1:57 AM
322 Kyle Takaki

of time as a measure. What is being measured? Partitions of motion?

Perhaps, but since these partitions or measurements are grounded in
magnitude, the process of measurement is integral to dividing magni-
tude; for if this weren’t the case then measurement would be part of the
structure of magnitude, and so, contra Lear, soul would not be required.
Lear’s ontological claim that divisibility is part of the structure of mag-
nitude ends up being inconsistent with his anti-realist conception of
time; furthermore, from this anti-realist conception it apparently fol-
lows that spatial magnitude also has an anti-realist conception.
Let us examine the above comments by Aristotle more carefully. He
considers that if there were no soul, and if counting can only occur with
a soul, then all that would be left is that of which time is an attribute,
namely movement. Is this ‘soulless’ notion of time possible? There is
an ambiguity in the claim that ‘before and after are attributes of move-
ment, and time is these qua countable’. If these antecedents are granted
to Aristotle, then this soulless notion of time is not possible, since move-
ment has before and after as ‘attributes,’ and these figure into what is
counted. But if the antecedents are not granted, and are interpreted as
expressing counterfactuals, then Aristotle is merely entertaining a soul-
less notion of time.
To clarify the former, let us grant Aristotle the antecedents. What
would be left is movement without soul. But since before and after are
attributed to movement, and time is what is counted with respect to
before and after, it would seem to follow that movement needs to be
counted. If this is the case, a contradiction is generated, and so there
is no soulless notion of time. Apparently Lear would be justified in
claiming that Aristotle has an anti-realist conception of time. However,
it doesn’t follow that movement needs to be counted. Movement can
retain its attributes of before and after, counting may be jettisoned, and
perhaps a strange kind of non-counted before-and-after time remains. Is
this soulless time non-anti-realist? Maybe, although the problem would
arise: how can time be non-counted; for what sense would it make to
throw counting out of the picture? Lear’s point that we cannot give
an adequate account of time without the function of counting (which
requires a soul) would be well taken — a point that our intuitionistic
approach naturally accommodates.
Now consider the alternative interpretation, namely that Aristotle
is entertaining a soulless notion of time. The non-counted movement
we would be left with might account for previous sidereal revolutions
being, apparently, actually infinite, since these revolutions could exist
independently of anyone counting them. But the problem that magni-

Brought to you by | ULB Bonn

Authenticated | 131.220.250.143
Download Date | 9/22/13 1:57 AM
 Aristotle and the Potential Infinite: An Intuitionistic Approach 323

tudes are potentially infinite would still have to be dealt with. So we are
back to square one. Given the whole of our discussion thus far, it seems
to me that Aristotle cannot find a way out by assuming that magnitude
has a particular ontological status. If geometry studies magnitude (see
268a6-8; 194a10), magnitude depends on physical body, and physical
body is bounded, then magnitude occupies the odd position of strad-
dling ‘the world’ and the mathematical science of geometry (cf. White
1992, 160). Indeed, Aristotle writes: ‘some continua are easily divided
and others less easily … [it] is the easily bounded, in proportion as it is
easily bounded, which is easily divided; and air is more so than water,
water than earth’ (313b5-10). How, then, can magnitude be given a pri-
or ontological characterization, antecedent to its study? I suggest that
it cannot. In order to preserve the potential infinite as potential, I have
argued that Aristotle should have adopted an intuitionistic account of
continuous magnitude as infinitely divisible.
To sum up, an intuitionistic account of the potential infinite provides
a less problematic interpretation of the claims that 1) magnitude is ‘in-
finitely’ divisible; 2) magnitude, motion, and time are continua; and
3) time should be given an anti-realist interpretation. Additionally, the
evolutionary-constructive account provides, I submit, a plausible story
of how the NSPM and the NSC are intertwined. For even though the
structure of magnitude is fundamental for Aristotle, the potential infi-
nite ‘runs through’ and connects the NSPM and the NSC.
University of Hawaii at Manoa
2500 Campus Road
Honolulu, HI 96822
U.S.A.
ktakaki@hawaii.edu

Bibliography

Barnes, Jonathan. The Complete Works of Aristotle (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University
Press 1984).
Charlton, William. ‘Aristotle’s Potential Infinities’, in L. Judson, ed., Aristotle’s Physics: A
Collection of Essays (Oxford: 1991) 129-49.
Lear, Jonathan. ‘Aristotelian Infinity’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 80 (1979) 187-
210.
Troelstra, Anne S. Principles of Intuitionism (New York: Springer 1969).
White, Michael. The Continuous and the Discrete: Ancient Physical Theories from a Contempo-
rary Perspective (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1992).

Brought to you by | ULB Bonn

Authenticated | 131.220.250.143
Download Date | 9/22/13 1:57 AM
324 Kyle Takaki

Brought to you by | ULB Bonn

Authenticated | 131.220.250.143
Download Date | 9/22/13 1:57 AM