Republic of the Philippines

REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF CAVITE

Fourth Judicial Region
Branch 18
Tagaytay City

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES (Plaintiffs)

versus

Pedro Lim y Caniza

Venerando Ozores
Bonifacio Roxas y Viacrusis
Luisito Mirasol y Balungan
Eugenio Hizon y Param
Mariano Hizon y Mendoza
Capt. Alfred Abad and
Eugene Yu y Chua (Accused)
___________________________________

D E C I S I O N
At bar is the above captioned cases charging Pedro Lim Y Caniza, Verando Ozores, Bonifacio Roxas Y
Viacrusis, Luisito Mirasol Y Balungan, Eugenio Hizon Y Param, Mariano Hizon Y Mendoza, Capt.
Alfred Abad and Eugene Yu Y Chua for the crime of kidnapping with two (2) counts of murder.

In an Information charging all accused on November 14, 1994 reads as follows:

“With intent to kill, qualified by treachery, evident premeditation, taking advantage of superior
strength, with the aid of armed men, or by a band, or by employing means or persons to ensure or
afford impunity and the use of a motor vehicle, consideration of price reward or promise, conspiring,
confederating and mutually helping one another, did then there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
abduct the (two victims herein), with violence upon the persons of Atty. Eugene Tan and Eduardo
Constantino by then shooting in the head with a firearm thereby causing their instantaneous
death.” CONTRARY TO LAW.
The arraignment of the accused took place on different dates. On June 23, 1997, the following
accused who were then arraigned are Pedro Lim Y Caniza, Eduardo Hizon Y Param, Mariano Hizon
Y Mendoza and Luisito Mirasol Y Balungan.

On July 7, 1997, accused Bonifacio Roxas was likewise arraigned with Venerando Ozores on July 9,
1997.

Accused Eugene Yu was likewise arraigned on May 13, 2003.

All of the accused after having been arraigned entered their respective plea of NOT GUILTY.

NOTE: This is a consolidated information; the accused being the same in the cases of Murder two (2)
counts and kidnapping.

Consequently pre-trial follows:

On August 5, 2003, pre-trial was conducted pursuant to the provisions of the 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure as amended by the 1988 Rules on Criminal Procedure. The prosecution was represented
by the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor, Jose Velasco, Jr., Private Prosecutors, Atty. Phydias
Emmanuel Ramos and Atty. Danilo Cunanan and the accused Bonifacio Roxas, assisted by his
counsel-de-parte, Atty. Victorino Fonier appeared.

The prosecution did not mark any documentary evidence and manifested that the marking will be
made during the course of the trial.

The following proposals for admission were introduced by the prosecution:

1. That Bonifacio Roxas who is here today is the same Bonifacio Roxas who is the accused in these
cases, which was admitted by the defense;

2. That the Honorable Court has the jurisdiction to try these cases over the person of the accused,
which was admitted by the defense;

3. That in so far as those cases are concerned, we have already presented witnesses and we have
already formally offered some documents in the petition for bail, which were admitted by the
defense;

4. That there were previous stipulations and markings insofar as the other accused are concerned
and the same be adopted as far as Bonifacio Roxas is concerned.

5. And likewise, the testimonies of the witnesses be considered as retaken subject to cross-
examination of the same, which were admitted by the defense.

The issues proposed by the prosecution are then following:

1. Whether or not Bonifacio Roxas is part of he conspiracy and the alleged gunman who shot Eugene
Tan and Eduardo Constantino.

2. Whether or not the accused Bonifacio Roxas is liable for damages.

On the part of the accused, the counsel did not mark any documentary evidence nor offer any
stipulation of facts. The counsel manifested then manifested that he will be presenting the accused
himself (Bonifacio Roxas)

Pre-trial was concluded and parties are given fifteen (15) days from receipt of the pre-trial order to
make the necessary correction otherwise they are not allowed thereafter.

The initial presentation of the prosecution’s evidence as against the accused Bonifacio Roxas is
hereby set to August 19, 2003, at 8:30 o’clock in the morning and thereafter on August 20,
September 1, 2, 3, 15, 16, 17 and 30, 2003 also at the same time.

That while all the accused when under custody of the Presidential Anti-Crime Commission (PACC)
the accused Ochoa and De Los Santos became state witnesses. They executed sworn statements
implicating Eugene Yu in the participation and commission of the crime during the preliminary
investigation before the Fiscal’s Office, Department of Justice, Padre Faura, Manila. The said
Reynaldo De Los Santos and Rodolfo Ochoa were consequently discharged as one of the accused and
became state witnesses. It was impugned before the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court by the
other accused. However, the Supreme Court upheld the decision of the Department of Justice
discharging De Los Santos and Ochoa as state witnesses.

1. ROLANDO OCHOA, 54 years old married, welder, and resident of Block 12, Lot 18, Golden Gate
Subdivision, Las Pinas City, after being duly sworn to in accordance with law, testified as follows:
Rodolfo Ochoa’s testimony was being offered for purposes of proving the material allegations in the
three (3) information which were consolidated and tried befoe this Court; and to affirm his
“Sinumpaang Salaysay” executed on December 16, 1994 which was admitted by the defense
counsel. Ochoa, affirmed the allegations in his “Sinumpaang Salaysay” and the same were marked as
Exhibit “C”, Exhibit “C-1” up to Exhibit “C-14” and he further affirmed that in page 14 is his signature
appearing therein. Notably, the witness affirmed in number 16 of the “Sinumpaang Salaysay,” that he
came to know Peter Lim during the wedding of Patricia. He likewise stated that on November 14,
1994, about 4:00 o’clock in the afternoon, he was accompanied by Eugene De Los Santos and
Bonifacio Roxas in going to a house in Taft Avenue near La Salle University. When Capt.Abad
instructed him to meet a certain Eugene Yu and in that afternoon, he saw Eugene Yu gave Bonifacio
Roxas an envelope which appear to be cash money, piece of paper etc. The house was owned by
Peter Lim and they conducted a surveillance with the use of the owner type jeep and a Datsun
car. The Datsun car was owned by Peter Lim and the owner type jeep belongs to Rodolfo Ochoa.

On cross-examination Rodolfo Ochoa reiterated that he freely and voluntarily executed a

“Sinumpaang Salaysay” and his purpose is to tell the everything about the incident on November 14,
1994; and that the “Sinumpaang Salaysay” was freely executed by him and nobody forced him to do
so and he likewise testified that Sgt. Abalon is his superior and that it is his duty to follow
instructions of the people who are organic personnel. Sgt. Abalon and his superior are organic
officer and in charge of releasing other equipments of the 520th Air Wing; and that said officer is in
charge of releasing firearms to civilian agents and he is one of the agent who was issued the
firearm. Said witness stated that he was armed with a Mission Order. The affidavit dated December
31, 1993 and the Mission Order dated June 20, 1994. The 9 m. m. pistol issued to the herein wtitness
was covered by a Mission Order. Subsequent order were issued to him (referring to Ochoa) covering
the date of questioned incident dated November 14, 1994 and that all the civilian agent were
involved in that November 14, 1994 incident were issued a Mission Order as well as the
Memorandum Receipt for their firearm and that they were dispatched on November 14, 1994 by
Capt. Alfred Abad to continue the surveillance of a certain Wilfredo De Los Santos. The said witness
furthermore said that before they went to the place of the subject matter of the surveillance, the
group which was manned by Roxas, Sgt. Abalon, Vennie Ozores, Eugene de los Santos and Toto
Mirasol went to Greenbelt and arrived so early in the target place.

They decided to watch “Karate” movie. So much so, that where they were already tailing the subject
Mercedes vehicle of Atty. Tan and his driver were on board, they were caught at the Alabang
exit. The Datsun car driven by Bonifacio Roxas suddenly cut the lane of the Mercedes Benz. The
owner type jeep driven by Sgt. Abalon stopped at the back of the Mercedes Benz. The driver of the
Mercedes Benz alighted and the group forcefully entered the Mercedes Benz at the back seat and at
the side of the subject Atty. Tan and his driver. The witness realized that the mission order given to
him was to arrest the “Financier na Pula” was a dangerous mission. And being a dangerous mission
all of them must be armed.

In the additional direct-examination, Rodolfo Ochoa was able to identify Eugene Yu, Venerando
Ozores, Luisito alyas “Toto” Mirasol were also in the group of as well as Bonifacio Roxas alyas
“Boning.” That Rodolfo Ochoa when he first came to know in the media and newspapers that they
were charged with this crime dated December 13, 1994, he surrendered to the police authorities
especially before the Task Force Habagat on December 16,1994. His “Sinumpaang Salasay” was
signed by him after he surrendered to the said Task Force Habagat before Gen. Pampilo Lacson.

2. REYNALDO DE LOS SANTOS, under direct-testimony testified that in the surveillance he

conducted in person “Financier na Pula” took them almost a month and in the second week of
October. That the surveillance mission with accused Bonifacio Roxas, Venerando Ozores and
Rodolfo Ochoa and the vehicle that they used were two (2) Datsun cars colored brown owner jeep
owned by Rudy Ochoa. The start of the surveillance took place after lunch and pulled out around
3:00 o’clock and 4:00 o’clock in the afternoon and after checking the subject was not around and if it
is positive they will just follow the subject up to 8:00 o’clock in the evening.
The duration of the surveillance was financed by Bonifacio Roxas, as he provided them food, gasoline
expenses.

Other than Bonifacio Roxas somebody is providing the latter money for the expenses. When the
surveillance was negative, they called up someone who gave instruction to proceed to a house in Taft
Avenue, Manila. Ochoa, Reynaldo De Los Santos were brought by Bonifacio Roxas to a house in Taft
Avenue near La Salle. In fact, when Bonifacio Roxas called up somebody on a phone and talked to a
certain Peter Lim, he was only one (1) foot away from the accused Roxas. After knocking at the green
gate of the house at Taft Avenue two (2) persons opened the gate and we were allowed to get in. That
their vehicle stopped in front of the door of the house; That he still remember that the house was
located between the school building of La Salle, Taft Avenue. Accused Eugene Yu appeared at the
door and Bonifacio Roxas approached him and he handed to Bonifacio Roxas an envelope with a
cash and a small piece of paper. Witness De Los Santos was certain that the person was Eugene
Yu. Witness further testified that he first came to know Eugene Yu at his wedding at Green Hills and
he was one of those who secured the area. Aside from the fact that he frequented the Office at 520th
Airbase, Airwing and he was certain that the one handling the money was Eugene Yu, the house to
where Rodolfo Ochoa and Reynaldo De Los Santos were brought by Bonifacio Roxas was owned by
Peter Lim and two (2) persons who were also civilian agents were also given money by Bonifacio
Roxas. On their way back to the office, Bonifacio Roxas showed him piece of paper handed to him by
Eugene Yu and the cash. The contents of this piece of paper was the name of Tan Manzano Law
Office, Pacific Building, Ayala Makati and consequently they were advised to proceed to said place as
the subject was holding office there. Upon arrival at Villamor air Base, he handed the envelope to
Captain Abad and Captain Abad opened it and took some cash and gave it to Bonifacio Roxas and
before leaving the office, Bonifacio Roxas again handed to them some cash and told them
“bonus”. And before they separated, accused Bonifacio Roxas instructed Sgt. Abalon and Venerando
Ozores to wear PLDT uniform, the following day. The following day, they proceeded to De La Rosa
street in front of the place where the subject was working and they parked their car in the car
park. Reynaldo De Los Santos was instructed by Bonifacio Roxas to proceed to the third level of the
car park, to check the vehicle of our subject. He saw the car, he went down again and reported to
Bonifacio Roxas that the vehicle of the subject was there. In connection with this case, Reynaldo De
Los Santos voluntarily surrendered was detained at Camp Crame. After surrendering, he
was interrogated and investigated regarding this case. The witness was shown is “Sinumpaang
Salaysay” and was asked to sign above the type written name Reynaldo De Los Santos and he
affirmed to be his signature.

3. SGT. EDGAR ALLAN C. ABALON – he is a member of the Philippine Air Force Intelligence
520th ABW. Sgt. Abalon was present when Patricia Lim then accompanied by Eugene Yu and Peter
Lim had an argument with Gilda Lim. Eugene Yu, was the fiance of Patricia Lim, thwarted the
attempt of Gilda Lim against Patricia with the help and timely arrival of some law enforcement
agents. Sgt. Abalon further testified that he met Pedro Lim six times at their office at Villamor Air
Base and during which Pedro Lim always met with Capt. Abad. Sgt. Abalon, thus he stated:
Sometime in October 1994, Capt. Abad ordered him (Sgt. Abalon) with the other accused and state
witnesses to conduct a surveillance operations on one “Wilfredo delos Santos”, a “financier” ng mga
pula (NPA) – Alex Buncayno Brigade who in reality is the victim Atty. Eugene Tan, demanding
revolutionary tax on Pedro Lim. He was also told that Bonifacio Roxas, one of the accused, can point
to him this “Wilfredo de los Santos” he was to coordinate with Bonifacio Roxas. Accused Bonifacio
Roxas then was one of their civilian assets and a protege of Capt. Abad. He, “Roxas” was likewise
assigned as a security to Pedro Lim by Capt. Abad.

Sometime in the first week of November 1994, Capt. Abad, Roxas and Pedro Lim were impatient that
they wanted “Wilfredo de los Santos” picked up as Pedro Lim was being pressured to pay the
revolutionary tax. Pedro Lim told Sgt. Abalon “Kailangan mukuha na Butch dahil tinatakot na ako.”
On November 7, 1994, Sgt. Abalon, Bonifacio Roxas, Rudy Ochoa, Venarando Ozores, Reynaldo
delos Santos and Toto Mirasol were about to get “Wilfredo delos Santos” whom they were tailing
while the latter was aboard his Nissan Patrol Car. Except for Toto Mirasol who was Roxas’ man,
Ochoa, Ozores and Delos Santos were all Capt. Abad’s civilian agents. Capt. Abad’s instruction was
to take “Wilfredo de los Santos” to his office for tactical interrogation.

On November 14, 1994, the operatives got “Wilfredo de los Santos”. After tailing “Wilfredo de los
Santos” for sometime starting from Makati with Roxas driving a Datsun Car along with Reynaldo de
los Santos and Toto Mirasol, blocked the path of “Wilfredo de los Santos” Mercedes Benz car, 150
meters from the Alabang Toll booth causing the victim of the car to stop while the owner type jeep
driven by Rudy Ochoa bumped the rear of the Mercedes Benz.

Sgt. Abalon was riding the owner type jeep driven by Rudy Ochoa and Venerando Ozores, Bonifacio
Roxas then jumped out of the Datsun car and strangled the victim’s driver, Eduardo Constantino, for
him to obey their instructions. Thereafter, he was put inside the Datsun car with Mirasol’s help.
Venerando Ozores then drove the Mercedes Benz while he and Reynaldo de los Santos sat with
the victim Atty. Eugene Tan at the back seat. Sgt. Abalon then called Roxas to now proceed to the
office of “challenger”, Capt. Abad’s call sign, but Bonifacio Roxas, with the agreement of others, said
they were taking the victims to the safe house.

Along the way, Sgt. Abalon had a conversation with “Wilfredo de los Santos” who asked why he was
arrested. It was then that “Wilfredo de los Santos” told Sgt. Abalon that they got the wrong guy and
that he was not “Wilfredo de los Santos” but Atty. Eugene Tan. Sgt.Abalon remonstrated over the
blunder but he later realized that everyone in the team except he, knew the real identity of “Wilfredo
de los Santos” to be Atty. Eugene Tan and that they were not taking the victims to Capt. Abad’s office
but somewhere else. Sgt. Abalon was helpless everyone else in the team was armed except him.

Upon reaching Dasmarinas, Cavite, accused Bonifacio Roxas alighted from the Datsun car and
forcibly dragged Atty. Eugene Tan out of the car and said to the victim “Putang ina mo, alam mo
malaki atraso mo kay Peter Lim? Halika nga ditto!” then forcibly loaded him aboard the Datsun car
and drove further. At this point Reynaldo “Engine” de los Santos transferred to the Datsun
car. Somewhere along the way he, again tried to convince Bonifacio Roxas to bring Atty. Eugene Tan
to Capt. Abad’s office for tactical interrogation. That he flagged down the Datsun car driven by
Bonifacio Roxas who stopped, then rolled the window. Sgt. Abalon then saw the dead bodies of Atty.
Eugene Tan and his driver Constantino lying limp and bathed in blood. Bonifacio Roxas then
proceeded to the place of Eugenio Hizon in Silang, Cavite to bury the bodies. Sgt. Abalon and Ozores
followed and when they reached the house the wife of Eugenio Hizon told them, “Dinala na nia,”
implying that she knew that Bonifacio Roxas and company were going to bury the bodies.

Sgt. Abalon and the other team members, except for Reynaldo delos Santos, went to see Capt. Abad
at the house of Col. Abelardo Abad. Sgt. Abalon immediately protested and told Capt. Abad “Sir,
bakit ganoon nangyari. Ginago n’yo ako eh!” But Capt. Abad told him to keep quiet, not to pose a
security risk and that he will be compensated for the job.

Then Capt. Abad called someone in front of him Ochoa and Ozores. Abad called Peter Lim by phone
and the witness overheard Capt. Abad say “Hello…Peter please…Peter Lim…Si Nonoy… O, tapos
na…” then hung up the receiver.

4. CYNTHIA TAN – the widow of the late Atty. Eugene Tan testified that she and the victim have
five (5) children. That the happiness of the family was cut short by the unjustified killing of her
husband. She likewise testified on the anguish and pain that she and her children suffered; the loss of
monetary support that her husband provides. The loss of life of the husband cannot be compensated
in terms of money only but the justice of putting behind bars the perpetrators and conspirators of the
crime. She therefore testified on the expense incurred for the burial of her husband and the earning
capacity of her husband who was a senior partner of the Tan, Manzano law offices.
5. EUNICE TAN – the third of the five children of the deceased Atty. Eugene Tan likewise narrated
how she felt with the loss of her father. Of how the love and support of their father was suddenly
snatched by the grisly murder of her father and his driver for which all of the accused must suffer the
consequences.
For Eduardo Constantino’s part, the driver of the late Atty, Eugene Tan, the defense made stipulation
on the death of the said victim. They likewise agreed to stipulate the heirs left by the said victim and
the expenses incurred in the burial.

6. DR. ROSALINE COSIDON, Medico Legal Officer, Camp Crame, testified on cause, facts and
circumstances of death of Atty. Eugene Tan and Eduardo Constantino, both of which are un-
rebutted. The identities were duly established. And pursuant to the autopsy conducted by the said
Medico Legal Officer, the first cadaver examined was Atty, Eugene Tan. He briefly testified that the
gunshot wound was on the head of the victim with size of 0.8 x 0.8; that the gun used was a 38
caliber revolver, With respect to the autopsy of the other victim Eduardo Constantino, the driver of
Eugene Tan, the same location of the gunshot wound on the head was testified to by the Doctor as
well as the size of the gunshot wound which is 0.8 x 0.8. The autopsy of both cadavers were
conducted on November 18, 1994 at the Crime Laboratory, Camp Crame, Quezon City.
7. CHIEF SUPERINTENDENT RODOLFO TOR – testified that he was one of the arresting
officer of Pedro Lim. That Lim was arrested because of the affidavit of Bonifacio Roxas pointing to
him as one of the mastermind in the killing of Atty. Eugene Tan and his driver.
After the prosecution has completely presented their evidence, the presentation of defense evidence
followed:

1. PETER LIM Y CANIZA was presented as first defense witness and stated that he was 43 year
old, married, sales manager and resident of 2353 Taft Avenue. Malate, Metro Manila and an
Australian citizen. He further testified that he was born in Manila of Filipino parents; that he became
an Australian citizen through naturalization process which was in 1984. He was required to reside in
Australia after naturalization in 1984 and then he said he was residing in Melbourne, Australia and
he worked as a sales manager for an import-export corporation dealing in artificial flowers and the
name of his employer was Danic Propriety Limited in 1990 receiving a salary of $26,000.00
Australian Dollar. Since, he was naturalized as an Australian Citizen in 1994, he had been in the
Philippines three times and that was in 1986, 1990 and 1994. And after he goes to the Philippines, he
usually stays here for several months. He further testified that his nick name is Peter and that he
denies being the mastermind in the killing of a certain Eugene Tan and that he never met any one
like Sgt. Abalon, Bonifacio Roxas inside the Villamor Airbase and that he further denies having met
Sgt, Abalon and uttered to him the statements, “Pinipilit ka na raw.” by the victim in this case. And
this meeting with Sgt. Abalon was followed by another meeting between you (Peter Lim), a certain
Capt, Abad and Bonifacio Roxas inside the Villamor Airbase; that he further denied that he made a
promise to the other accused in this case to pay them about 500,000.00 pesos in exchange for the
killing the victim Eugene Tan; that he arrived in the Philippines in July 2, 1994 and he presented his
passport and that he was arrested illegally pursuant to the Decision of the Court of Appeals in the
case of Peter Lim versus Judge Guerrero. He furthermore stated that he is married and the name of
his wife is Bernadette Lm and she is here today attending the court hearing. And that he never made
any inducement in the commission of the crime which led to the death of the victim Eugene Tan and
Eduardo Constantino neither was he a privy to that conspiracy leading to the arrest of Eugene Tan
and his driver.
The accused Peter Lim was again called to the witness stand. Said witness in testifying under the
same oath for additional direct-examination, for purposes of authenticating the passport.

Defense witness, Peter Lim Y Caniza presented his two (2) original passports in the name of Peter C.
Lim, the first which expired on July 6, 1998 and the second which expired on July 21, 2008. Said
witness testified on the authenticity of both passports; that the photocopies of the passports No L-
1307093 and passports No. 0271259 are faithful reproduction of the original.

Said witness further testified that his parents are Filipino and they are still alive and residing in
Malate, Manila and their lives have been spent here in the Philippines. But the mother of said
witness has already died on February 1995 and his father is the only one living in Manila as well as
his brother, sisters are all residing in Manila; that they are all Filipino Citizen; that the witness wife
and is child are also residing in Manila most of them stay here; that most of his closest relatives and
friends are all here in the Philippines; that when the witness said if he is willing to surrender his
passport he answered “By all means”; that he is willing to comply with all the conditions imposed by
this Honorable Court, in particular, reporting periodically in person to the members of the Court or
to any representative of the Court. As an Australian Citizen, the embassy has been supportive in his
case; they have been monitoring the same and they have written the Department of Foreign Affairs
about the case; they also visited him (Peter Lim) in jail; they also attended Court hearings; that one
of the consular officers is present in Court; that definitely he has no intention of fleeing the country
(Philippines) should his application for bail is granted; the witness said that the renewal of his
passport was properly made. The Australian embassy sent their personnel to jail, took photograph
and then he filled up a renewal application form for the passport.

The said witness, accused Peter Lim on cross-examination testified that he was in the Philippines on
November 14, 1994 and even a month prior thereto he was also here in the Philippines.

2. ANTHONY LUCERO, 39 years old, married, government employee and resident of Block 9, Lot
8, Mercedes Homes, Binan, Laguna, after which he testified in the following manners:
The instant witness is the chief of PAG-ASA station of Tagaytay and he is being presented for the
purpose of identifying the measurement of rainfall made by the Amdadeo Rain on November 14, 15
and 17, 1994. He further testified that a certain Panfila Gica, a weather specialist of PAG-ASA, Rosa
Boy and Lourdes are also connected with the climatology. All these persons are connected with PAG-
ASA. Witness Anthony Lucero testified that he is connected with PAG-ASA and is presently holding
the position of Weather Specialist II and his designated as the Chief of the Tagaytay PAG-ASA since
admission. This witness likewise stated his duties and responsibilities and one of which is to manage
the weather station administratively and technically insure that the weather parameter are properly
measured and recorded on the PAG-ASA form that we have been provided and to perform
supervisory duties to the personnel assigned hereat and pursuant to the bunch of documents which
were presented by the witness was the weather condition over Matitim, Amadeo, Cavite from
November 14, 15, 17, 1994; that was the measurement of the amount of rainfall for the day on 14 of
November, 1994 and the period of occurrence, the period of occurrence of rainfall starting from a
certain period and the period where it ended. The witness further stated the measurement of rainfall
through eight inches gauge and which is measured from 8:00 o’clock. The period of observation is
8:00 o’clock in the morning and 5:00 o’clock in the afternoon, they measure the rainfall and they
recorded it to the chart where it had occurred and that they clarify that the metrical day is very much
different with the local standard because the meteorological standard starts at 8:00 o’clock the
following day and whatever measurement they could record in 8:00 o’clock, that is charged the
previous day.

3. SPO3 AGATON OLQUINO testified that he is from Firearms and Explosive Office, Philippine
National Police (FEO-PNP), who produced and identified exhibits “8”, “9” and “10” and their sub-
markings, consisting of duly authenticated public documents pertaining to firearms licenses and/or
applications in the name of Edgar Allan Castillo Abalon. Through Oliquino, the defense was able to
establish that:
a. Abalon lied when he testified before this Court on 20 August 1997 that he did not own a 45 caliber
firearm, when FEO records show that just two months previously, on 11 June 197 Abalon applied for
a license for a .45 caliber frame (tsn, 6-22-01), pp. 24-25);
b. Abalon lied in the license application (Exh. “9”) he filed with FEO in 1996 for a .38 caliber pistol
when he stated therein that he has no previous application for a firearm license, when Exh. “8” and
its sub-markings show that Abalon applied for and was granted a firearm license in 1995 for a 9 mm.
pistol (tsn,6-22-01, pp. 9-10, 17-18); and

c. Abalon has been illegally possessing firearms since 1997, since he never renewed the firearms
licenses that he secured in 1996 (for a .38 caliber pistol) after they lapsed in 1997 and 1998
respectively, since Section 5 of P.D. 1866 provides that the term of “unlicensed firearms” includes a
firearms with an expired license (TSN, 6-22-01, pp 29 -34).

Pursuant to trial memorandum of the accused Pedro C. Lim page 6 and 7. The said witness testified
on the validity of the firearms for two years. Upon the expiration of the two year period lifetime of
the license, under Section 5 of Presidential Decree 1866, as amended the coverage of the term
unlicensed shall include the firearm with expired license.

Meaning this particular license has already expired and considered to be unlicensed firearm.

4. EUGENE YU, with respect to the accused Eugene Yu, as summarized herein, post the twin isssue
of:
1. Whether or not accused Eugene Yu’s constitutional rights to speedy trial and speedy disposition of
his case has been violated.

2. Whether or not the evidence of the prosecution show beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of the
accused Eugene Yu.

Accused Eugene Yu respectfully submits his constitutional right to speedy trial and disposition of
cases has been transgressed.

First, record shows that the period between the day when this Honorable Court’s Resolution
downgrading the Information against accused Eugene Yu should have been compile with by the
prosecution of, which was sometime in February 1996, and the arraignment of accused Eugene Yu,
which was on 13 May 2003, is more than seven (7) years.

Second, the delay is attributable to the prosecution. Accused Eugene Yu after failing to seek for a
reconsideration of the Order of this Honorable Court finding probable cause to indict him as an
accomplice for the abduction and killing of Atty. Tan and his driver, did not anymore assail the said
ruling before the High Court but instead steadfastly faced the accusations against him. On the other
hand, the prosecution persistently wanted to indict accused Eugene Yu as principal for the abduction
and killing of Atty. Tan and his driver notwithstanding the unconvincing statements of is witnesses
Ochoa and de los Santos.

Third, the accused Eugene Yu is asserting that his constitutional right to speedy trial and speedy
disposition of cases at this very stage. And even on the assumption that the accused failed to assert
this right, it is settled that the right of the accused to speedy trial and speedy disposition of his case
will be upheld notwithstanding his failure to take any step to assert his right. Thus, in Cervantes vs.
Sandiganbayan (307 SCRA 149 ), Supreme Court held:

“We cannot accept the Special Prosecutor’s ratiocination. It is the duty of the Prosecutor to to
speedily resolve the complaint, as mandated by the Constiution, regardless of whether the petitioner
did not object to the delay or that the delay was with his acquiescence provided that it was not due to
causes directly attributable to him.”

Finally, the question of how much lapse of time is consistent with the constitutional guarantee of
speedy trial and speedy disposition of cases varies with the particular circumstances. There is no
constitutional basis for holding the right to a speedy trial can be quantified into a specified number
of days and months (21A Am Jur 2d Sec.1036). The mere passage of time is not sufficient to
establish a denial of a right to speedy trial, but a length delay, which is presumptively prejudicial,
triggers the examination of other factors to determine whether rights have been violated (U.S. vs.
Villete 688 F. Supp. 777 (D. Mer. 1988).

To be considered as accomplice, one needs to have knowledge of and participation in the criminal
act. In other words, the principal and the accomplice must have acted in conjunction and directed
their efforts to the same end. Thus, it is essential that both were united in their criminal design and
purposes.

CAREFUL EVALUATION, of the foregoing facts and circumstances will show that the testimonies
of Abalon, de los Santos and Ochoa, on the out of Court utterances of Roxas and Capt. Abad have no
legal importance because they are heresay without probative value. Unless Roxas and Abad are
presented in Court and unless accused Pedro Lim is given the opportunity to cross-examine them, so
as to test their accuracy and credibility, the extra judicial declaration of (Abalon, de los Santos and
Ochoa) have no probative value at all and cannot be used as evidence against Pedro Lim and the
other accused.
State witnesses Reynaldo de los Santos and Rodolfo Ochoa personally saw the shooting to death of
the late Atty. Eugene Tan and his driver Eduardo Constantino by accused Bonifacio Roxas inside the
Datsun car.

There is no evidence that the accused Pedro Lim participated in the commission of the crime by the
other specific acts direct or indirect.

The spontaneous utterances of accused Bonifacio Roxas quoted therein “Halika ka nga dito, malaki
atraso mo ka Peter Lim” to the late Atty. Eugene Tan was nothing but a hollow utterances bereft of
any evidenciary value against Pedro Lim because the accused Bonifacio Roxas was never presented
in court although he was available. The failure of the prosecution to represent evidence that will
collaborate such utterances of accused Bonifacio Roxas renders the inculpation of Peter Lim in the
above captioned cases without legal and factual basis.

The telephone conversation claimed by Sgt. Edgar Allan C. Abalon obtaining between Capt. Abad
and Pedro Lim was without any corroborating evidence showing clearly that both Abad and Lim
were really talking to each other on he phone because there was specific evidence showing as to who
was talking in the other line. Aside from the fact that Sgt. Abalon does not know the exact number
which was dialed by Capt. Alfred Abad. Again, it is speculative in character and therefore not
cognizable in this Jurisdiction.

In sum, the above captioned cases are without substantial evidence beyond reasonable doubt
impleading Pedro Lim as accused herein.

With respect to the case of Eugene Yu, the envelope and piece of paper written the Office of Tan,
Manzano, Villes, Pacific Building, Greenbelt Makati City given to the accused Bonifacio Roxas as
claimed by Ochoa, de los Santos and Abalon the best evidence is to prove such incident is accused
Bonfacio Roxas by Eugene Yu and therefore the failure to present him in Court renders the said
claim nullified and without legal force and effect.

The evidence that the alleged envelope contains the pay off money given to accused Bonifacio Roxas
by Eugene Yu was hearsay being uncorroborated by other evidence.

Prosecution witnesses Rodolfo Ochoa, Reynaldo de los Santos and Sgt. Edgar Allan Abalon to the
effect that they have no knowledge about the real purpose of the operation is NOTED, because all the
while they were made to believe by accused Bonifacio Roxas that the objective behind the
surveillance operation was on how to arrest the Colletor ng Pula (NPA-Communist Tax Collector)
known as Wilfredo de los Santos, and therefore such surveillance operation was legitimate.

On the other hand it was only Bonifacio Roxas who knew the surveillance operation true and real
objectives. The Datsun car used in such operation driven by Bonifacio Roxas was without any
registration papers showing its ownership, hence the allegation that the Datsun car is owned by Peter
Lim is self-serving and therefore hearsay on the ground that the certificate of registration of the
Datsun car was never presented by the Prosecution.

Our Honorable Supreme Court said in People vs. Ragondiaz, 334 SCRA 193, 207, 208, (2000), When
an accused is charged as principal, the prosecution must prove the specific acts done by him.

“The principal in the commission of the crime are (1) those who takes a direct part in the execution of
the act, (2) those who directly force or induce others to commit it, and (3) those who cooperate in the
commission of the offense by another act without which it could not have been accomplished. As
such in order convict accused appellants as principal in the crime of murder, the prosecution must
prove specific acts done by him which fall under any of the above-mentioned acts.”

Viewed on the foregoing facts, this court believes that the prosecution miserably failed to prove the
culpability and the criminal liability of Pedro Lim accused as principal by induction for the crime of
kidnapping and double murder of late Atty. Eugene Tan and his driver Eduardo Constantino beyond
reasonable doubt.

Eugene Yu, accused as accomplice in the above caption cases is likewise without any criminal liability
as such, for failure of the prosecution to prove the criminal participation of Yu beyond reasonable
doubt.

With respect to the other accused namely:

Capt. Alfred Abad (at large)

Toto Mirasol (detained)

Venerando Ozores (detained)

Mariano Hizon (detained)

Eugenio Hizon (detained) deceased

Their respective criminal liability was not proven by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt
because accused Bonifacio Roxas was not presented in the hearing of the above caption
cases. Except for Capt. Abad who is at large, all other accused herein are without knowledge of the
true objective of the surveillance because they were not properly briefed by Bonifacio Roxas. All the
while they were in the firmed belief that the operation was legitimate.

Capt. Alfred Abad even during the conduct of the preliminary investigation proceedings before the
Department of Justice, panel of prosecutors was not presented, however due to the failure of the
prosecution to adduce evidence against him, the Constitutional presumption of innocence still holds
in his favor and therefore there is no legal and factual basis to indict and convict him for lack of
jurisdiction over this person.

Wherefore, in the light of the foregoing facts and circumstances accused Bonifacio Roxas is hereby
declared GUILTY of the CRIMES of KIDNAPPING and DOUBLE MURDER under the
Revised Penal Code of the Philippines for the killing of the late Atty. Eugene Tan and his
driver Eduardo Constantino beyond reasonable doubt. The Penalty of Reclusion Perpetua is hereby
imposed twice against the said Bonifacio Roxas, who is hereby further ordered to indemnify the the
civil and moral damages to the heirs of the late Atty. Eugene Tan and his driver Eduardo Constantino
in the total amount of 500,000.00 pesos for each victim.
For failure of the prosecution to prove the guilt of accused Peter Lim beyond reasonable doubt, he is
hereby ACQUITTED from the above captioned case.
Likewise Eugene Yu accused as accomplice is hereby ACQUITTED for failure of the prosecution to
prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt in the instant cases.
The ACQUITTAL of the following accused namely:
Capt. Abad ( at large )

Toto Mirasol ( detained )

Venerando Ozores ( detained )

Mariano Hizon ( detained )

Eugenio Hizon ( who died while in detention )

are hereby ORDERED on the grounds that their respective guilt were not proven by the prosecution
beyond reasonable doubt as it appears that they were in the firm belief tha the surveillance operation
was against the Collector na Pula an NPA-Communist Tax Collector and therefore a legitimate
surveillance operations.
Capt. Abad, who is at large up to now still enjoys the constitutional presumption of innocence and
lack of jurisdiction over his person being at large.

The Cash Bond put up for the provisional liberty of Pedro Lim and Eugene Yu shall be released upon
proper request and receipt of the same are duly acknowledged.

NO COST.

January 10, 2011, Tagaytay City

SO ORDERED

Signed: WILFREDO DE JOYA MAYOR (Assisting Judge Designate)

 FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 113886. February 24, 1998]

SPOUSES MARCIANO CHUA and CHUA CHO, petitioners, vs. COURT

OF APPEALS and SPOUSES MARIANO C. MORENO and SHEILA
MORENO, respondent.

DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:

To stay the execution pending appeal of a judgment in an ejectment suit, the Rules
require the defendant to file a supersedeas bond. What is the nature of this bond? How
is the amount to be computed? In what court should it be presented? At what point in the
litigation should it be filed?

The Case

The Court answers the foregoing questions as it resolves this petition for review
on certiorari assailing the December 15, 1993 Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals[2] in CA-
G.R. SP No. 32236, which disposed as follows:[3]
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED, the orders dated June 10,
1993 and June 17, 1993 are SET ASIDE, and respondent court is
ORDERED to issue a writ of execution for the enforcement of the
decision dated March 5, 1993 rendered by the Municipal Trial Court in
Civil Case No. 2592, insofar as the right to the possession of the lots is
concerned.
Petitioners also challenge the February 15, 1994 Resolution of Respondent Court
which denied their motion for reconsideration.[4]

The Facts

The facts of this case are undisputed. As found by Respondent Court, they are as
follows:[5]
Coming now to the merits of the case, it appears that on March 5,
1993, the Municipal Trial Court (branch II) of Batangas City rendered
 judgment for petitioners [private respondents herein] with respect to
four lots located in Galicano St., Batangas City, ordering the ejectment
of private respondents [petitioners herein] and ordering them to pay
monthly rentals of P50,000.00 starting April 7, 1992 until they shall
have vacated the lots and surrendered their possession to petitioners
and the sum of P20,000.00 as attorneys fees.
It appears further that a copy of the decision was received by private
respondents counsel on March 10, 1993; that on March 11, 1993 he
filed a notice of appeal; and that on March 16, 1993, the MTC ordered
the records of the case transmitted to the RTC.
On March 29, 1993, petitioners moved for the execution of the decision
in their favor, alleging that although private respondents had filed a
notice of appeal, the latter had not filed a supersedeas bond nor make
[sic] a deposit every month of the reasonable value of the use and
occupation of the properties as required by Rule 70, sec. 8.
Private respondents opposed the motion, claiming that they are co-
owners of the lots from which they were ordered to be ejected and that
to grant immediate execution of the decision would render their appeal
moot and academic. They later filed a supplement to their opposition,
claiming that while they were after all willing to file a supersedeas
bond, but that they had been kept busy attending to their businesses
and thus unable to secure a bond.
On June 10, 1993, the trial court issued the first of its disputed orders
in which it denied petitioners motion for execution on the ground that
the transmission by the MTC of the records of the ejectment case to
the RTC, without waiting for the expiration of the period of appeal,
prevented private respondents from filing a supersedeas bond on
time. The order reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the urgent Motion for
Execution filed by plaintiff-appellees is hereby DENIED for lack
of merit. Accordingly, the defendant appellants are hereby
directed to:

a) To file with this Court a supersedeas bond in the amount of FIVE

HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND (P550,000.00) PESOS within five days from
receipt of this Order;
b) To deposit, within the period afore-mentioned, an amount of ONE
HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND (P150,000.00) PESOS by way of accrued
rentals for the months of April, May and June, 1993; and

c) To periodically deposit on or before the tenth day of each succeeding

months [sic], starting from July 1993, and an [sic] amount of FIFTY
THOUSAND (P50,000.00) PESOS representing the reasonable monthly
rental fixed by the lower court.

On June 17, 1993, the RTC issued another order giving petitioners an extension of
five days within which to file a supersedeas bond. After initially admitting a cash bond
of P550,000, the RTC granted on September 20, 1993 petitioners motion for the
substitution of the cash bond with a surety bond. Private respondents filed a petition for
certiorari before the Court of Appeals, questioning the said three orders.

Respondent Courts Ruling

Invoking Section 8, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, Respondent Court ruled that the
RTC erred in extending the period for filing a supersedeas bond. This error was
compounded when the same court issued its second order on June 17, 1993 which gave
herein petitioners an additional extension of five days within which to do so. The Court of
Appeals held that the said provision was mandatory and gave the said trial court no
discretion with regard to its application. In dismissing petitioners claim that they did not
know where to file the supersedeas bond, the Court of Appeals noted that said argument
was made for the first time on appeal before it, petitioners opposition to the motion for
execution before the RTC being based only on their alleged co-ownership of the said
property. Respondent Court also distinguished the present case from Laurel vs.
Abalos,[6] holding that there was no basis for the application of an exception to the
mandatory provision of Section 8 of Rule 70.
While sustaining the order of September 20, 1993, Respondent Court set aside the
two other orders issued on June 10 and 17, 1993. Subsequently, said Court denied the
motion for reconsideration.
Hence, this petition for review.[7] In a Resolution dated March 11, 1996, this Court
noted that petitioners had no objection to the substitution of the deceased Mariano
Moreno by his surviving heirs.[8]

The Issues

Petitioners allege that the Court of Appeals committed the following errors: [9]
I
 The Court of Appeals committed a grave error of law when it found that petitioners
herein, the private respondents in C.A. G.R. SP NO. 32236, could have filed the
supersedeas bond on time and before June 10, 1993 when RTC, Branch I of
Batangas City fixed for the first time the amount of supersedeas bond which
ruling, if implemented, would have condoned and would have resulted to the
violation of the equal protection clause of the Constitution.
II

The Court of Appeals committed grave error of law when it made grossly
erroneous conclusions arising from admitted and undisputed facts which led the
said Court of Appeals to apply the general rule as stated in Section 8 of Rule
70 of the Rules of Court and not the law on exceptions to said rule.
III

The Court of Appeals committed grave error of law in making findings of fact
contrary to the admitted and proven facts by the petitioners and private
respondents in C.A. G.R. SP. No. 32236 and not supported by evidence on
record.
IV

The Court of Appeals committed an error of law when it ordered the RTC, Branch
I of Batangas City to issue a writ of execution which, if implemented, would
necessarily result to the deprivation of petitioners herein of their property without
due process of law in violation of Section 1, Article III of the Constitution.
In the main, the case hinges on whether, after the expiration of the period for
perfecting said appeal, the RTC had the authority to set the amount of and accept a
supersedeas bond to stay the immediate execution of a decision in an ejectment suit
pending appeal. This encompasses several questions regarding the nature of a
supersedeas bond: What is the amount of the bond? Who, if any, determines the
amount? Where and at what point in the litigation should the bond be filed? We shall deal
with each of these questions.

The Courts Ruling

The petition is not meritorious.

Main Issue: Late Filing of the Supersedeas Bond

The applicable rule in this case is Section 8, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, which
provides:[10]
SEC. 8. Immediate execution of judgment. How to stay same. If
judgment is rendered against the defendant, execution shall issue
 immediately, unless an appeal has been perfected and the defendant
to stay execution files a sufficient bond, approved by the municipal or
city court and executed to the plaintiff to enter the action in the Court of
First Instance and to pay the rents, damages, and costs accruing down
to the time of the judgment appealed from, and unless, during the
pendency of the appeal, he deposits with the appellate court the
amount of rent due from time to time under the contract, if any, as
found by the judgment of the municipal or city court to exist. In the
absence of a contract, he shall deposit with the court the reasonable
value of the use and occupation of the premises for the preceding
month or period at the rate determined by the judgment, on or before
the tenth day of each succeeding month or period. The supersedeas
bond shall be transmitted by the municipal or city court, with the other
papers, to the clerk of the Court of First Instance to which the action is
appealed.
xxxxxxxxx
As a general rule, a judgment in favor of the plaintiff in an ejectment suit is
immediately executory, in order to prevent further damage to him arising from the loss of
possession of the property in question.[11] To stay the immediate execution of the said
judgment while the appeal is pending, the foregoing provision requires that the following
requisites must concur: (1) the defendant perfects his appeal; (2) he files a supersedeas
bond; and (3) he periodically deposits the rentals which become due during the pendency
of the appeal.[12] The failure of the defendant to comply with any of these conditions is a
ground for the outright execution of the judgment, the duty of the court in this respect
being ministerial and imperative.[13] Hence, if the defendant-appellant perfected the appeal
but failed to file a supersedeas bond, the immediate execution of the judgment would
automatically follow. Conversely, the filing of a supersedeas bond will not stay the
execution of the judgment if the appeal is not perfected. Necessarily then, the
supersedeas bond should be filed within the period for the perfection of the appeal.
In the present case, petitioners filed their notice of appeal on March 11, 1993, a day
after their receipt of the MTCs decision. On March 16, 1993, or five days later, the MTC
transmitted the records of the case to the RTC. On March 29, 1993, the private
respondents filed a motion for the immediate execution of the decision. As noted earlier,
petitioners opposed the motion on the ground that they were co-owners of the
property. On June 10, 1993, the RTC denied the motion for execution and directed
petitioners to file a supersedeas bond. On the authority of the RTC order, petitioners filed
a cash bond, which was later substituted with a surety bond.
We agree with the Court of Appeals that the bond was filed out of time. The motion
for execution was filed eighteen days from the date the petitioners received a copy of the
MTCs decision, after the appeal had already been perfected. Because no supersedeas
bond had been filed within the period for appeal, a writ of execution should have been
issued as a matter of right. Petitioners manifestly failed to adduce a compelling reason to
justify a departure from the aforecited rule.
Petitioners contend that the delay should be excused because the MTC, without fixing
the amount of the bond, transmitted the records of the case to the RTC even before the
perfection of the appeal,[14] i.e., the expiration of the period for filing an appeal.[15] Hence,
they did not know whether to file a bond with the RTC or with the MTC. Neither were they
certain of the amount of the bond.
How the Amount of Supersedeas
Bond Is Determined
Petitioners need not require the MTC to fix the amount of the supersedeas
bond. They could have computed this themselves. As early as 1947, we have held
in Aylon vs. Jugo and De Pablo that the supersedeas bond is equivalent to the amount of
rentals, damages and costs stated in the judgment:[16]
x x x. Under the provisions of Section 8 of the Rule, a justice of the
peace or a municipal court may require the defendant to file a bond
for an amount which would cover the stipulated rentals, as found by
the judgment of the Court, or the reasonable value for the use and
occupation of the premises, at the rate determined by the judgment,
damages and costs down to the time of the final judgment in the
action. The reasonable value for the use and occupation of the
premises, the possession of which is sought to be recovered, is that
fixed by the Court in the judgment, because the rental stipulated in
the contract of lease that has expired or terminated may no longer be
the reasonable value for the use and occupation of the premises as a
result or by reason of the change or rise in values. But the bond
together with the appeal is only to prevent the immediate execution of
a judgment rendered against the defendant in forcible entry and
detainer cases. Such execution must be prevented further by paying
to the plaintiff or depositing with the Court of First Instance, during the
pendency of the appeal, the stipulated rental due from time to time
under the contract, as found by the judgment of the Court, or, in the
absence of a contract, the reasonable value for the use and
occupation of the premises for the preceding month, on or before the
tenth day of each calendar month, at the rate determined by the
judgment. (Underscoring supplied).
Under Section 8 of Rule 70, the supersedeas bond shall be equivalent to the unpaid
rentals, damages and costs which accrued before the decision was rendered, as
determined by the MTC in the said decision.[17] The bond does not answer for amounts
accruing during the pendency of the appeal, which are, in turn, the subject of the periodic
deposits to be made by the defendant.[18]
 In the present case, the MTC clearly stated in its March 5, 1993 decision that
petitioners should pay rentals of P50,000 a month from April 7, 1992 until they shall have
vacated the lots.The amount comprising the supersedeas bond and the periodic deposits,
therefore, is evident and computable from the MTCs decision.
Where Is the
Supersedeas Bond Filed?
In the light of the peculiar circumstances of this case, petitioners allege that they could
not determine whether to file the supersedeas bond with the MTC or the RTC. Thus, they
argue:[19]
28. In the facts of the dispute involved in his petition, the court of
origin cannot fix the amount of supersedeas bond since the records
are no longer with it. The RTC on the other hand cannot fix the
amount of supersedeas bond since the appeal has not yet been
perfected and, after the same has been perfected, the unlawful
detainer case records or expediente (case folder) must first pass
through several administrative processes such as docketing,
checking for completeness of expediente, raffle and finally taking
cognizance or initial action of the said appeal by the branch of the
RTC to which it was raffled.
Petitioners submissions are meritless. As earlier observed, there is no need for either
the MTC or the RTC to fix the amount of the supersedeas bond, the same being manifest
in the face of the MTCs decision. Moreover, petitioner failed to file the bond on time not
because they did not know where to file it, but because they believed that they should not
do so. Hence, their opposition to the motion for execution was based on their alleged co-
ownership of the property. It was only before the Court of Appeals that they claimed
confusion on where the bond should be filed. The Court of Appeals discarded petitioners
argument in this wise:
Their claim that they did not know where to file the supersedeas bond
is being made only now. Indeed, in opposing petitioners motion for
execution they based their opposition not on this ground but on the
claim that since they were claiming to be co-owners of the lots in
question, their claim would be rendered moot and academic if
execution were ordered pending appeal. It is, therefore, not true that
they were prevented from filing a supersedeas bond because the
MTC transmitted the records of the case to the RTC before the
expiration of private respondents period of appeal.
Petitioners also argue that Laurel vs. Abalos[20] should be applied here. In that case,
this Court held that [w]here supervening events occurring subsequent to the judgment
bring about a material change in the situation of the parties, which makes the execution
inequitable, or where there is no compelling urgency for the execution because it is not
justified by the prevailing circumstances, the court may stay immediate execution of the
judgment.[21] They also allege that the immediate execution of judgment of the inferior court
will cause irreparable injury[22] to the petitioners herein who stand to lose their home,
business and source of livelihood x x x.[23]
We are not persuaded. We do not find in this case any supervening circumstance or
any material change in the situation of the parties, which would render inequitable the
immediate execution of the judgment pending appeal. We agree with the disquisition of
Respondent Court on this point:
It is also argued that this case falls under the exception to the rule
making Rule 70, sec. 8 mandatory because of supervening events
which bring about a material change in the situation of the parties and
make the execution pending appeal inequitable or because there is
no urgency for the execution under the circumstances.
The case in which this exception was applied was that of Laurel v.
Abalos, 30 SCRA 281 (1969). The present case is, however, a far cry
from that case. In Laurel v. Abalos there was probability that the
plaintiff in the ejectment case would lose the property and therefore,
his right to eject the defendant became doubtful because, while the
appeal of the defendant was pending, another court declared the
plaintiffs title to be null and void at the instance of plaintiffs
predecessor-in-interest. In the present case, no such probability
exists. What is there is only an allegation by private respondents
ejectment suit, that they are co-owners of the lots in question. What is
noteworthy in this case is that the titles to the lots are in the names of
petitioners and, except for the claim of ownership put up as a defense
by the defendants, there is otherwise no action questioning the
validity of petitioners titles. Indeed no heirs of Chua Hai has ever
claimed ownership of the lots in question.
There is, therefore, no basis for private respondents contention that
because of a supervening event -- of which there is none -- there is
no compelling necessity for ordering execution of the decision in the
ejectment case based on private respondents failure to file a
supersedeas bond and deposit the monthly rentals within the time
provided by law.
The allegation of Petitioner Marciano Chua that he, as a co-owner of the subject
property, has filed an action for partition does not constitute a compelling reason to further
delay the execution of the judgment. An ejectment suit is conclusive only on the issue of
material possession or possession de facto of the property under litigation, [24] not on the
issue of ownership.Section 7[25] of Rule 70 of the Rules of Court is clear on this:
SEC. 7. Judgment conclusive only on possession; not conclusive in
actions involving title or ownership. -- The judgment rendered in an
 action for forcible entry or detainer shall be effective with respect to
the possession only and in no wise bind the title or affect the
ownership of the land or building. Such judgment shall not bar an
action between the same parties respecting title to the land or
building, nor shall it be held conclusive of the facts therein found in a
case between the same parties upon a different cause of action not
involving possession.
The pendency of the action for partition, where ownership is one of the principal
issues, does not preclude the execution of the judgment in the ejectment suit. Such action
for partition is entirely independent of the ejectment suit.[26] On the other hand, the issue
of ownership is considered in an ejectment suit only for the limited purpose of determining
who between the contending parties has the better right to possession. [27] Moreover, it
should be stressed that we are not being called upon here to decide which of the parties
has a better right of possession, let alone, a better title to the property. The only issue in
this case is whether or not a writ of execution should be issued pending appeal of the
ejectment suit.
In any event, it is erroneous to characterize the partition suit as a compelling reason
to stay the execution of the judgment pending appeal. On the contrary, the fact that the
titles to the disputed lots are in the name of Private Respondent Mariano C. Moreno, and
not in the name of petitioners or their father Chua Hai, justifies the transfer of possession
of the said property to the private respondents, at least during the appeal. The question
of irreparable injury to petitioners, on the other hand, cannot be discussed at this
forum, for this Court is not a trier of facts.[28] In any case, this question of irreparable injury
is, at best, speculative and conjectural, and deserves no further disquisition.
Coming back to the original question, the bond should be filed before the MTC or,
where the records have been forwarded to the RTC, before the latter court. In either case,
it should be done during the period of appeal.
Secondary Issue:
Deprivation of Property Without Due Process
Petitioners submit that they are the exclusive and absolute owners of successful and
profit[-]generating businesses located in [the] parcel of land in question. Thus, if the
judgment of ejectment is to be executed, private respondents will get possession not only
of the parcel of land, but also of the improvements thereon which are integral to the
business of petitioners.[29]They further argue that the rights of the petitioners over the
improvements located in the land are still to be resolved in the ejectment suit on appeal
and in the partition case.[30]
Petitioners submissions are irrelevant. In the first place, the present case involves
only the propriety of issuing a writ of execution pending the appeal. It is not conclusive on
the right of possession of the land[31] -- let alone the improvements therein[32] -- which is the
main issue in the appealed ejectment suit. In the second place, any of the perceived
injuries to their business could have been avoided by the simple expedient of filing a
supersedeas bond pursuant to Section 8 of Rule 70. Petitioners had an opportunity to file
the bond, but they did not do so on time. They cannot now complain of alleged deprivation
of property without due process.
In an action for ejectment or for recovery of possession of real property, it is well-
settled that the defendants claims for the value of the improvements on the property or
necessary expenses for its preservation should be interposed as compulsory
counterclaims.[33]
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED and the assailed Decision and
Resolution of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., (Chairman), Bellosillo, Vitug, and Quisumbing, JJ., concur.