Page 1 of the CrimLaw Outline

EX POST FACTO LAWS Whether the case in which the two bouncing
check, issued on October 1974, is punishable
G.R. No. L-46228 January 17, 1978 (81 by prision mayor which took effect on Oct.
SCRA 95) 1975.

THE PEOPLE OF THE

PHILIPPINES, petitioner, HELD:
vs.
HON. ROLANDO R. VILLARAZA (as City
Judge of Cagayan de Oro City), and The estafa imputed to Caesar Puerto is
CAESAR PUERTO, respondents.
punishable by arresto mayor maximum to
prision correccional minimum or four months
Francisco P. Rabanes, Edgardo Y. Raagas,
and one day to two years and four months.
Casiano A. Gamotin, Jr., Office of the City
Fiscal of Cagayan de Oro City for petitioner.

Eric Menchavez for respondent Caesar The prision mayor applies only to swindling by
Puerto. means of issuing bouncing checks which was
committed on or after October 22, 1975. In this
case, the 2 bouncing checks was issued a in
1974, therefore the correct penalty for the said
FACTS: case should be prision correccional which is
under the jurisdiction of the city court.

Ceasar Puerto was charged with estafa in the

city court of Cagayan De Oro for issuing a two
bouncing checks on October 1974.
City Judge Rolando R. Villaraza in his order
March 31, 1976 noted that the accused had
waived the second stage of the preliminary
investigation. He directed that the case be
elevated, for trial, to the court of First Instance
or the Circuit Criminal Court.
If the increased penalty is applied to Ceasar
Puerto, it would make the decree an ex post
facto law and it retroactive application is
prohibited by Art. 21 and 22 of the revised
penal code and sec. 12 of Art. 4 of the
Constitution.
RULINfG:

WHEREFORE, the order of the Court of First

However, the Court of First Instance returned
Instance, returning the case to the city court, is
the case to the city court because the case falls
affirmed and the two orders of the respondent
on the jurisdiction of the city court.
city judge, elevating the case to the Court of
First Instance, are set aside. The city court is
directed to try the case. No costs.
The city judge redirected the evaluation of the
case because the said case fall withing the
jurisdiction of the CFI and estafa is punishable
by prision mayor, which took effect on Oct. 22,
1975.

ISSUE:

EX POST FACTO LAWS:
G.R. No. L-32485 October 22, 1970 (35
SCRA 529)
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR
THE DECLARATION OF THE
PETITIONER'S RIGHTS AND DUTIES
UNDER SEC. 8 OF R.A. No. 6132.
KAY VILLEGAS KAMI, INC., petitioner.
FACTS:
Kay Villegas Kami, Inc., claiming to be a duly
recognized and existing non-stock and
non-profit corporation created under the laws
of the land, argued that the Sec. 8 of R.A 6132
violates the due process clause, right of
association, and freedom of expression and that
it is an ex post facto law.
ISSUE:
Whether Sec. 8 of R.A 6132 is an ex post facto
Law
HELD:
It is said that an ex post fact law is one which:
(1) makes criminal an act done before the
passage of the law and which was innocent
when done, and punishes such an act;
(2) aggravates a crime, or makes it greater than
it was, when committed;
(3) changes the punishment and inflicts a
greater punishment than the law annexed to
the crime when committed;
(4) alters the legal rules of evidence, and
authorizes conviction upon less or different
testimony than the law required at the time of
the commission of the offense;
(5) assuming to regulate civil rights and
remedies only, in effect imposes penalty or
deprivation of a right for something which when
done was lawful; and
(6) deprives a person accused of a crime of
some lawful protection to which he has become
entitled, such as the protection of a former
conviction or acquittal, or a proclamation of
amnesty.
In the case at bar, the SEc. 8 does not consitute
ex post facto law because the penalty is
imposed only for acts committed after the
approval of the law and not those perpetrated
prior thereto.

RULING:

The prayer of the petition is hereby denied and

paragraph 1 of Sec. 8(a) of R.A. No. 6132 is not
unconstitutional. Without costs.

PAGE 2 OF THE CRIMLAW OUTLINE

G.R. Nos. L-32613-14 December 27,

1972

PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
HON. SIMEON. FERRER (in his capacity
as Judge of the Court of First Instance
of Tarlac, Branch I), FELICIANO CO
alias LEONCIO CO alias "Bob," and
NILO S. TAYAG alias Romy Reyes alias
"Taba," respondents.

FACTS:

The respondents were filed a criminal complaint

for the violation of the Sec. 4 of Anti-Subversion
Act. In which they were accused of aiming to
overthrow the government by means of force,
subversion, and other illegal means.

The respondents contends that the

Anti-Subversion act is a bill of attainder.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Anti- Subversion Act is a bill

of attainder.
HELD:
Anti- Subversion Act is not a bill of attainder.
For an act to be considered as a Bill of attainder,
it should inflict punishments without trial.
People vs. Galacgac CA 54 O.G. 1027
FACTS:
The respondent was charged of multiple
criminal cases such as attempted homicide with
physical injuries, illegal possession of
firearms,and frustrated homicide.
The respondent appealed claiming that the
firearm was a present for his wife and he as well
claimed that he is an American Citizen therefore
he is exempted from the charges and also
added that the possession of gun is a
constitutional right in the U.S
ISSUE:
Whether the respondent was liable for the
crimes committed.
HELD:
As a general rule, criminal law is binding on all
people who sojourn in the Philippines.
Therefore possessing a firearm which is
prohibited in the Philippines, constitutes a
crime and can be subject to a criminal case even
if the respondent is a U.S Citizen.
G.R. No. 448 September 20,
1901
THE UNITED
STATES, complainant-appellee,
vs.
PHILIP K. SWEET, defendant-appellant.
Theofilus B. Steele, for appellant.
Office of the Solicitor-General Araneta, for
appellee.
FACTS:
The appellant was employed by the United
States military and committed an offense . His
case was given to the Court of First Instance
having proper jurisdiction over the case at bar.
The Court of First Instance has a jurisdiction
when the offense is punishable by penalty with
more than 6 months imprisonment or a fine
exceeding one hundred dollars may be
imposed." The offense was therefore cognizable
by the court below unless the fact that the
appellant was at the time of its alleged
commission an employee of the United States
military authorities in the Philippine Islands, and
the further fact that the person upon whom it is
alleged to have been committed was a prisoner
of war in the custody of such authorities, are
sufficient to deprive it of jurisdiction.
The appellant is contending that the Court of
First Instance has no jurisdiction over the said
case because he is a military in character and is
exempted from the ordinary jurisdiction.
ISSUE:
Whether the CFI has the jurisdiction when the
said appellant happens to be in military in
character.
HELD:
The case is open to the application of the
general principle that the jurisdiction of the civil
tribunals is unaffected by the military or other
special character of the person brought before
them for trial
G.R. No. L-246 March 27,
1946
SILVERIO VALDEZ, petitioner,
vs.
ANTONIO G. LUCERO, Judge of First
Instance of Ilocos Sur, and CELESTINO
JIMENEZ, Provincial Warden of Ilocos
Sur, respondents.
Severino D. Dagdag for petitioner.
Respondent judge in his own behalf.
No appearance for respondent Warden.
FACTS:
Silverio Valdez was allegedly a member of a
recognized guerrilla and a member of the
United States armed forces in the Philippines
but was later absorbed in the Philippine army.
That, said Silverio Valdez, with an intent to kill,
did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously with cruelty, by deliberately and
inhumanly augmenting the suffering of one Juan
Ponce, kill the latter with bolo, dagger and other
weapons and died instantly.
The case was taken in to the Court of First
Instance where in the said petitioner argued
that the fiscal had no authority to file it and that
the court acquired no jurisdiction of the
defendant.
The petitioner also added that only the military
courts may only take the case wherein a person
subject to military law who commits murder in
time of war shall suffer death or imprisonment
for life.
ISSUE:
Whether the civil courts have jurisdiction to
take cognizance of and try the case for murder
filed against petitioner Silverio Valdez.
HELD:
The Court ruled that that the civil courts of the
Commonwealth of the Philippines are NOT
deprived of their jurisdiction over the petitioner
herein, but have CONCURRENT JURISDICTION
with the military courts or general courts
martial to try and take cognizance of the case of
murder against the petitioner herein.
They are not deprived of their jurisdiction over
murder cases committed by persons subject to
military law.

G.R. No. L-4663 May 30, 1951

FERDINAND E. MARCOS and MANUEL

CONCORDIA, petitioners,
vs.
CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF
THE PHILIPPINES, ET AL., respondents.

x------------------------------------------------------
---x

G.R. No. L-4671 May 30, 1951

MANUEL A. CONCORDIA and

FERDINAND E. MARCOS, petitioners,
vs.
CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF
THE PHILIPPINES, ET AL., respondents.

Petitioners in their own behalf.

Judge Advocate General Fred Ruiz Castro
and Leonardo R. Lucena for respondents.

FACTS:

The petitioners filed a two civil actions of

mandamus against the respondents alleging
that the respondents excluded unlawfully the
petitioners their right to appear ass a counsel
for the accused for the said tribunal. On the
ground that they are disqualified or inhibited by
section 17, Article 17 of the Constitution to
appear as counsel for said defendants
The said Section 17 states that no member of
the Senate and the House of Representative
shall take part as a counsel before any court in
any civil case wherein the Government or any
subdivision or instrumentality thereof is the
adverse party, or in any criminal case wherein
an offer or employee of the Government is
accused of an offense committed in relation to
his office.

ISSUE:

whether the prohibition contained in the above

quoted section 17 of our Constitution is
applicable to the petitioners.

HELD:

The word “any court” that prohibits the Senator

and members of the House of Representatives
to any criminal cases wherein government
employees is accused of an offense committed
in relation to his office, refer to not only to a
civil, but also to a military court or a
Court-Martial.

RULING:

The court rendered a decision that the

petitioners are indeed disqualified to appear as
a counsel for the accused before the tribunal
court.
 Constitution, the original jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court was not exclusive, but
concurrent with the Court of First Instance. And
that such grant of original jurisdiction did not
prevent the congress in conferring original
jurisdiction in cases affecting consuls.

RULING:

Schneckenburger vs. Moran The petition for writ of prohibition has been
denied.
63 Phil 249

FACTS:

The petitioner was a consul of Urugay at Manila

on June 1934. He was charged in the Court of
Instance of Manila with the crime of falsification
of Documents.

The petitioner argued that the Court of Instance

of Manila has no jurisdiction to the said case
because under the Constitution of the United
States only the United States supreme Court has
the original jurisdiction in all cases including the
consuls. And he further argued that under the
constitution of the Philippines, original
jurisdiction goes to the supreme court of the
Philippines over cases including consuls.

ISSUE: U.S vs. Fowler

1 Phil 64

Whether the jurisdiction stated under the

Constitution of the Philippines regarding a crime
FACTS:
committed by consuls are exclusive by the
Supreme Court.

The defendants has been accused for stealing

HELD:
It is true that the Supreme Court has the original
jurisdiction on such cases involving the consuls,
however, at the time of the adoption of the
the 16 bottles of champagne with an intent to
appropriate the same, without violence and
intimidation and consent of the owner. The
offense was committed in a cargo vessel
navigating the high seas.
The accused has been brought before the court
and alleging that the Court of First Instance has
no jurisdiction over the crime charged upon him
for the reason that the theft took place on the
high seas and not in the city of manila nor
within the territory of Manila/Philippines, or
upon the seas within the 3 mile limit to which
the jurisdiction of the court extends.

ENLGISH RULE
ISSUE:

US. Vs. BULL , 15 Phil 7

Whether or not the Court of Instance has the
jurisdiction on the offense committed in a
public vessel navigating the high seas.

FACTS:
HELD:

The said defendant allegedly committed a crime

Under the law, all crimes and offenses
committed on the high seas or beyond the
jurisdiction of any country, the place where the
vessel is registered or licensed will take
cognizance of the crime committed on board.
The transport Lawton, the said vessel at bar, not
being a vessel and registered in the Philippines,
the Phil courts have no jurisdiction over the
crime committed.
of transiting the animals without securing the
animals in a proper manner and the case was
brought in the court of the Philippines.
The defendant contends that there was an
insufficient information for the case to be
brought in front of the Philippines courts
because it the crime was not committed on the
vessel which was registered under the
Philippine Island or within the territorial waters
of the Philippines.

ISSUE:

Whether the Philippine courts have the

jurisdiction over the said case.

HELD:

The ship may be registered on other country but

then the ship/vessel came within the 3 mile s of
a line drawn from the headlines which was the
entrance of the manila bay.
When a vessel entered for the purpose of trade
in automatically presumed to be dangerous to
the society, therefore, it would be subject to the
laws of the territory where they are in.
RULING:
The defendant was found guilty.
US vs AH SING, GR NO. L-13005
FACTS:
The defendant was employed as a fireman on
the steamship Shun Chang. The defendant
bought opium from Saigon and that opium was
brought in the Philippines when the Steamship
anchored in Cebu.
The authorities at that time made a search and
found the opium hidden in the steamer’s engine.
The defendant admitted being the owner of the
said opium and purchased it in Saigon but did
not say that he has an intention to import the
prohibited drug into the Philippines.
ISSUE:
Whether there was an illegal importation of
opium into the Philippines.
HELD:
Under the Opium Law, any persons unlawfully
imports and brings any prohibited drug into the
Philippines shall be within under the
jurisdictional limits of the Philippines.