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USDA FOREST SERVICE – SOUTHERN REGION

April 10, 2012

Facilitated Learning Analysis


Ozark-St. Francis National Forests – Blanchard Springs Recreation Area Flood Event

INTRODUCTION
Early in the morning of Wednesday, March 21 a flash flood impacted the Blanchard Springs campground on
the Ozark-St. Francis National Forests. The campground is managed by the Sylamore Ranger District.
Many of the campsites were occupied and the flood forced several campers to evacuate their campsites
before dawn. Forest Service staff responded to the incident to provide for the safety of the public. Although
there were no reported injuries, several campers’ lost
property in the incident, including two camp trailers and a “The SO called and asked me if I knew for
pickup truck. sure all the campers were accounted for; I
said, I can’t – but nobody is crying and
This Facilitated Learning Analysis (FLA) was conducted to that’s a pretty good sign.”
capture the lessons from the Blanchard Springs campground
event. It attempts to identify the conditions that led to the
event and how the individuals involved made sense of the event as it occurred. It is an attempt to allow those
involved to share their story so that others may learn from it.

BACKGROUND
In this area, high water and flooding, including flooding of campground facilities is not an uncommon event.
The local karst limestone geology, steep slopes, and occasional high precipitation can combine to create a
significant flooding hazard. In 2008, the Blanchard Springs campground experienced a flood higher than
this 2012 event. In 2010, a campground in another part of Arkansas was the site of a flash flood event that
resulted in significant loss of life and property.
In the days leading up to March 19-21, a weather system
“It’s in our DNA to base our decisions on developed that had the potential to bring heavy rainfall to
our experience. But rain events, tornadoes, Arkansas. A low pressure system approaching from the west
and floods are all worse than they used to was held in place by a high pressure ridge to the east,
be. They are all more violent and more resulting in prolonged periods of heavy precipitation in
extreme. How do we deal with that which is Oklahoma and Texas. This pattern was predicted to
beyond our experience?” continue over Arkansas in the coming week. The week of
March 18 was also spring break for local schools, resulting
in a high demand for campsites and recreation on the forest.
On the Ozark St. Francis National Forests, the Forest Supervisor was out on assignment and an acting Forest
Supervisor was designated. On the Sylamore District, the District Ranger had limited availability due to
illness. An acting District Ranger had been designated in his absence.

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NARRATIVE
Monday, March 19
During the Monday morning forest leadership team staff call, the “It’s kind of become an
acting Forest Supervisor asked District personnel to update him on expectation that our employees
what was happening on-the-ground because of the impending severe are going to stay up all night in
weather. The Sylamore Ranger District reported it was closing the rain watching water levels.”
Blanchard Springs Recreation Area Upper Loop. The other
potentially impacted areas on the Forest were reported as being closed; at this point no rain had fallen. The
Ouachita and Ozark-St. Francis National Forests began
“We have hazardous recreational preparing a joint press release on severe weather, recreation
facilities - we need to learn how to closings, and status of facilities.
manage these.”
Very early Monday morning a Forest Service employee went
to Blanchard Springs campground and talked to campers about the impending weather and let them know
about the threat of flooding. He asked them about their comfort level and whether or not they had planned to
leave. By 10:00 a.m. the employee received confirmation from the district recreation staff to close the Upper
Loop campground and to have it empty by 4:00 p.m. to prevent campers from being stranded by rising
waters blocking the low water crossing into that section. He began locating campers in the Upper Loop and
advising them that they would have to relocate. Once everyone was out, he closed and locked the gate to the
Upper Loop campground and unlocked the gate to the evacuation route. In the past, when 4-5 inches of
rainfall is forecasted, a discussion with the District Ranger would
result in a closure of the Upper and Lower Loops. Due to the fact that “Ya gotta stay on top of this all
it had not started raining yet and the weather forecast did not seem the time – it doesn’t let you
certain, the Lower Loop was left open. sleep like you should.”

The feeling of folks working that day was that things went flawlessly. However, there was a feeling of
anxiety about the possibility of heavy rain which might mean having to close the Lower Loop; with less
lead-time to make that closure happen. Due to the fact that it was more of a gut feeling than substantiated by
tangible observations, the Lower Loop campground area was left open.
Tuesday, March 20
In coordination with the Supervisor’s Office, preparations for severe weather continued at the campgrounds.
Managers were weighing the impact of previous events, using a combination of sophisticated measurement
tools (water gage measurements) and perhaps less sophisticated methods that might prove to be even more
accurate; the local knowledge and experience of employees who work at the campground. There were
multiple possible impacts that were creating a challenging environment for decision-making. Issues included
the unpredictable nature of the weather system approaching, rain predictions that were not occurring, and
changing forecasts.
The Acting Forest Supervisor continued his request for regular updates.
“The scary thing is, if I had the Based on expected heavy rainfall within the area, other Forest and Park
same information again, I’d make Service campgrounds in the state were being closed. Efforts to
all the same decisions again. encourage campers to depart the campgrounds or at least relocate to
There was nothing in the forecast sites at higher elevations were largely unsuccessful with only a few
or the weather we were getting voluntarily moving to other facilities. The weather at Blanchard
that would have indicated closing Springs campground remained rain free until later in the evening.
the upper loop.” Throughout the morning and afternoon, the sun broke through the
clouds indicating the forecast could be completely wrong.

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Later in the afternoon rain began to fall, characterized as a “hard rain” around 6 p.m. This was followed by a
succession of visits from several employees (acting on their own); feeling responsible for visitor safety. An
observer at 8 p.m. judged the creek as being “Clear Water,” an indicator that no flooding was present
upstream. At 9 p.m. another observer noted that the creek flow was at the “Base Flow Rate.” The final
observation occurred after midnight, early Wednesday morning and revealed “Clear Water.”
Wednesday, March 21
Around 3 a.m. campers in the Lower Loop were awoken by water entering tents and shaking campers. In
total darkness and a driving rain, campers picked up and began to move to higher ground. Two groups of
campers with small children and pets began a long arduous hike through the woods to the swim beach
parking area. The realization that flooding had occurred in the Blanchard Springs campground became
known when District employees began arriving at work. The response by District personnel was nothing
short of heroic. The first District employees to arrive at the campground found campers in the woods
seeking high ground to stay out of the flooded area. Access to the campground was blocked by water over
the bridge and the alternate access (evacuation route) was a 30- to 45-minute drive. Compounding the initial
confusion is the fact that there is spotty radio coverage and no cell communication in the recreation area. In
order to call out for more help employees had to drive up out of the
“To make campers understand the
recreation area to get a cell phone signal.
seriousness of the situation ya
have to jar em.”
The first priority was to account for all campers; however, detailed
information to follow through with this effort was not readily available. The most expedient way to find out
was to ask the campers if they knew anyone that was unaccounted for. The search for the two groups that
were hiking to the swim beach parking area resulted in a high risk rescue attempt by employees. High water
was blocking access to some areas within the campground. At least one District employee forged through
the flood waters twice to try to locate the unaccounted for campers.
Power to the sewage lift station was turned off at approximately 7:30 “Now it ain’t just campers at
a.m. As more employees arrived to help with the response efforts risk, I got employees taking
significant effort was made to protect private property by moving high risks to save em. That
vehicles to higher ground and searching for missing property. A tow scared the crap out of me.”
truck was brought in to extract private vehicles, because the evacuation
route was impassable for low clearance vehicles. Aid and comfort was offered to the campers that needed
assistance. Two groups of campers were taken to the Blanchard Springs Cavern visitor information center
and given dry clothes and food. Other displaced campers were put up in hotels in town. It was important to
District personnel to demonstrate compassion to the campers that were involved in the flood event.

“We dodged a bullet.”

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LESSONS LEARNED AS SHARED BY THE PARTICIPANTS OF THE EVENT

• Don’t underestimate the amount of time it is going to take to talk to every camper. It takes a long
time to evacuate a campground; especially at night.
• Employees at the recreation area may be giving the public a false sense of security by leaving part of
the campground open.
• We need to help our Rangers and employees to understand how to deal with events that happen after
regular duty hours. Incidents can happen anytime; not only from 8:00 to 5:00.
• We need SOPs going forward to relieve angst, undue stress, and provide for public and employee
safety. A set standard or maybe trigger points would make it clear-cut and less of an individual
judgment call as to when to close the campground.
• When we shut a campground we need to just shut the whole thing.
• Don’t leave the decision to evacuate up to the campers.
• The lessons I learned from Albert Pike (flash flood event) helped me with the response. I can’t say
that it helped us with predicting or preventing this event, but it did help me with the response. We
need to care for the campers we displace.
• Need clear, concise, instructional guidance; we need to describe ‘what right looks like.’
• An evacuation route is a false sense of security.
• All employees need to know they have the power/authority to close a campground.
• We need to find a way to efficiently account for and communicate with our visitors/campers. It may
help if the campground registration form requested a cell phone contact number.
• All employees on the Ranger District (including front liners and visitor information personnel) need
to know what is going on so they can give the public and other Forest Service employees a consistent
message and assistance.
• You should take refund forms with you when you go to close a campground. Campers will be
concerned about losing their money for nights paid in advance—which complicates a closure.
• Next time I’ll be more methodical in keeping a log to document events and exact times.
• In a situation like this where you have gaps in cell phone and radio coverage you should put a human
relay up to help with communications back to the district and dispatch.

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LESSONS LEARNED FROM FOREST LEADERSHIP OF THE EVENT

• The acting Forest Supervisor needs to communicate with the Forest Supervisor and Regional Office
staff early and often in anticipation of severe weather impacts to keep them informed. Keeping a log
to document events, calls, conversations, and emails through the day(s) is critical.
• The acting Forest Supervisor should occupy the Forest Supervisor’s office. Doing so allows the
Executive Assistant (EA) to fully assist the acting in an organizational and logistical capacity. The
EA should be included in all outgoing and incoming correspondence. If the EA is absent, an acting
EA should be assigned.
• There is a great need to work effectively when sharing a joint Public Affairs staff among two forests
while blending public news releases and notifications. The need to communicate early and often with
adjoining forest personnel can be a challenge given different forest management approaches and
policies. It remains important to encourage coordination with adjacent forest(s) reacting differently
to similar weather tracks while considering if combined news releases may not be timely or
necessary.
• The agency needs better communication regarding our interim direction for these high risk
campgrounds; specifically, there needs to be two-way communications between the field and the
Regional Office.
• Prior employee contact with visitors to share weather predictions was critical and invaluable and
seemed to influence their immediate actions when flash flood hit the campground in the early
morning.
• We need to empower employees onsite (technicians in particular) to make the decisions to close
facilities; especially when communications are poor and delaying could result in a life threatening
situation.
• There is a need for Standard Operating Procedures (SOP’s) to operate developed recreation sites,
especially in flash flood prone areas that address approaches to closure in anticipation of severe
weather. The SOP’s need to be tempered with experience, as well as science, so that acting’s and
new staff can make reasoned decisions.

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APPENDICES

Appendix A: Maps

Vicinity Maps

Campground Map

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Birdseye View of Campground

Topography Map

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Overhead View

Approximate Extent of Flooding

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Appendix B: Photos

Figure 4 – Topography Map

Photo Sites See Photos 1-11 Below

Photo 1 – Low Water Crossing to Upper Loop Photo 2 – “Evacuation Route” Road to the North

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Photo 3 – High Water Levels

Photo 4 – Vehicles Moved to Higher Ground

Photo 5 – Flood Debris – Campsite 7 Photo 6 – Confluence of Tributary and Creek, Bridge

Photo 7 – Tributary and Fee Tube Photo 8 – Road to the East of Campsites 3-8

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Photo 9 – Confluence and Bridge

Photo 10 – Flooded Pickup and Camp Trailer – Campsite 1

Photo 11 – Damaged Camp Trailer

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Appendix C: 48-Hour point weather forecast for period of March 20th to 22nd

Point Weather Forecast

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Stream Gage for Sylamore Creek

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Appendix D: National Weather Service Storm Report for March 19th to 22nd

Heavy Rain/Severe Weather on March 19-22, 2012

A significant heavy rain event unfolded on


March 19th, and continued through the
21st. A slow moving storm system in the
southern Plains was responsible for the
prolonged period of precipitation.

In the picture: A storm system ("L") approaching from the west encountered a ridge of high pressure over the
southeast United States in the seventy two hour period ending at 700 am CDT on 03/22/2012. The high grinded
the system to a halt. The main flow aloft was well to the north, and had difficulty carrying the system away

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Abundant moisture surrounding
the system made showers and
thunderstorms more efficient
rainmakers.

In the picture: The most significant moisture (along an axis) was slow to advance to the east in the seventy two
hour period ending at 700 am CDT on 03/22/2012. Precipitable water, or water vapor contained in a vertical
column of at atmosphere, ranged from 1.00" to 1.50". Values are normally between .50" and .75" heading into
late March

Before a large swath of rain drifted into


the region, there were widespread totals
from three to five inches and locally over
six inches in eastern Oklahoma and
northeast Texas. By the morning of the
21st, amounts were similar in central and
western Arkansas.

In the picture: The WSR-88D (Doppler Weather Radar) showed showers and thunderstorms and areas of heavy
rain in the western half of Arkansas at 328 pm CDT on 03/20/2012. Isolated severe storms were possible along
the eastern edge of the precipitation.

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Keys to Flooding
(1) A slow moving system from the west triggered precipitation.
(2) A ridge of high pressure to the east held the system in place for a few
days to prolong precipitation.
(3) Above normal moisture levels created more water to wring out of the
atmosphere. This elevated the likelihood of heavy to excessive rain.

In the picture: Forty eight hour rainfall through 700 am CDT on 03/21/2012.

Twenty four hour rainfall through 700 am CDT on the 21st included 6.20 inches at Norfork (Baxter County),
6.10 inches at Mountain Home (Baxter County), 5.88 inches near Damascus (Van Buren County), 5.47
inches just northeast of Maumelle (Pulaski County), 4.45 inches at Sheridan (Grant County) and 4.35 inches
at Calico Rock (Izard County).

At Gassville (Baxter County), creeks were out of their banks and water covered several county roads. There
was extensive flooding along Sylamore Creek around Allison (Stone County), with people evacuated safely
from a campground. Several families were driven from their homes by high water at Greenbrier (Faulkner
County). Toward Mablevale (Pulaski County), water flowed into homes and garages along Stagecoach
Drive. White Oak Bayou was out of its banks in the Marche (Pulaski County) community. Nearby roads
were closed due to high water.

TEAM MEMBERS

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Stephen Weaver, Team Leader
Assistant Director – Fire and Emergency Operations
FS R8 – Fire and Aviation Management

Steve Holdsambeck, FLA Coach


Fire Operations Safety Program Manager
FS R4 – Fire and Aviation Management

Brian Beisel
Staff Officer
FS R8 – Land Between the Lakes National Recreation Area

Colby Jackson, Team Members


Smokejumper
FS R1 – GETA Group

Dante Whittaker, Sr.


NFFE R8 – Forest Service Council, Vice President
FS R8 –National Forests in Alabama

Debra Burgos
Training Specialist
FS R8 – Fire and Aviation Management

Jim Truitt
Regional Aviation Safety Program Manager
FS R8 – Fire and Aviation Management

Julian Affuso
FAM Staff Officer
FS R8 – National Forests in Florida

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