Bunge - Funcion y Funcionalismo

Function and Functionalism: A Synthetic Perspective
Author(s): Martin Mahner and Mario Bunge

Source: Philosophy of Science, Vol. 68, No. 1 (Mar., 2001), pp. 75-94
Published by: The University of Chicago Press on behalf of the Philosophy of Science
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Function and Functionalism:
A Synthetic Perspective*
Martin Mahner and Mario Bungett

Center for Inquiry-Europe; Department of Philosophy, McGill University
In this paper we examine the following problems: How many concepts of function are
there in biology, social science, and technology? Are they logically related and if so,
how? Which of these function concepts effect a functional explanation as opposed to a
mere functional account? What are the consequences of a pluralist view of functions
for functionalism? We submit that there are five concepts of function in biology, which
are logically related in a particular way, and six function concepts in social science and
technology. Only two of them may help effect a genuine functional explanation. Finally,
our synthetic approach allows us to distinguish four different varieties of functionalism
in biology, psychology, social science, and technology: formalist, black boxist, adap-
tationist, and teleological. And only one of them is explanatory in the strong sense
defended here.
1. Introduction. Philosophical analyses of the concepts of function and

functional explanation are legion. It is obvious from these studies that the
word 'function' does not designate a single all-purpose concept of func-
tion, but in fact a plurality of function concepts. However, it is still not
clear how many function concepts there are, and whether they are logically
related, and if so, how. Nor is it clear which of these many function con-
cepts occur in which scientific disciplines: Is there one or more universal
function concept which can be found in any branch of science, and are
there specific notions occurring only in a particular science? Furthermore,
if the word 'function' designates a plurality of concepts, what precisely is
*Received March 1999; revised October 2000.

tSend requests for reprints to Martin Mahner, Center for Inquiry-Europe, Arheilger
Weg 11, D-64380 Rossdorf, Germany; email: mahner@gwup.org.
tWe thank Michael Kary and Dan A. Seni, as well as an anonymous referee for useful
suggestions that helped to improve the original manuscript.
Philosophy of Science, 68 (March 2001) pp. 75-94. 0031-8248/2001/6801-0005$2.00
Copyright 2001 by the Philosophy of Science Association. All rights reserved.
75
76 MARTIN MAHNER AND MARIO BUNGE
a functional explanation? And what about the term 'functionalism'

it, accordingly, designate different functionalisms too?
In this paper we shall try to answer these questions. We begin by
alyzing the notions of function occurring in biology and proceed
amine whether these can also be applied to social science and techn
In so doing, our aim is not to review all the previous studies on the no
of function, but to find unity behind this diversity, which emphasize
particular the logical relations of the various function concepts d
guished. We shall then explore the consequences of our analysis fo
notion of functional explanation. Finally, we shall apply our synthesis
functionalism in biology, social science, and technology, which will all
us to distinguish as many types of functionalism as there are notio
function.
2. Functions in Biology. The concept of function has been one of the m

topics in the philosophy of biology: see, e.g., Bock and von Wahlert 19
Cummins 1975; Wright 1976; Nagel 1977; Prior 1985; Bigelow and
getter 1987; Millikan 1989; Brandon 1990; Neander 1991; Godfrey-S
1993; Griffiths 1993; Kitcher 1993; Amundson and Lauder 1994; B
1998; Preston 1998; as well as the largely unknown work of Berie
Pirlot (1977). These studies have proposed, for example, the notion
Cummins function, causal role function, function as survival value, sy
function, design function, etiological or proper function, or historica
lutionary function. However, there are only a few studies which tried
systematize some of these notions (e.g., Walsh and Ariew 1996, and, pu
lished while we were already revising this paper, Wouters 1999). And t
seem not to have realized the logical relation among the various funct
concepts. For this reason, it will be worthwhile to try again and take an
look at biological functions. In so doing, we shall improve on our e
analysis of the notion of function in biology, Mahner and Bunge 1997
We submit that, in biology, the term 'function' is used in at least f
different, though related, senses. There are two basic concepts which
define the other three. The first basic concept is that of internal (bio
activity. More precisely, the internal activity of some organismic syst
or subsystem, such as a tissue or an organ, is simply the set of all pro
occurring in it. Think of the uncounted biochemical reactions occu
in the liver. Whether or not these processes are of any use to the organ
or to anything for that matter, is immaterial-at this stage of analysis
other words, this notion has no evolutionary, adaptive, or teleolo
connotations whatsoever.
This concept may appear so broad as to be useless. Indeed, in principle,
the internal activity of any concrete system may range from microphysical
processes at the quantum level to macrophysical ones such as develop-
FUNCTION AND FUNCTIONALISM 77
ment. For this reason, we will have to focus on those internal act
biotic systems that are of interest to biology, and hence add the
"biotic" or "biologically relevant" when speaking of the intern
of some biotic system or subsystem. Nevertheless, we cannot
priori any activity from being biologically relevant, so we do
broad notion. Furthermore, the internal activity of any given sy
prises both idiosyncratic and kind-specific ones. Thus, if necessar
form the notion of a specific internal activity, which refers to t
cesses that only a system of a given kind can undergo. For ex
need such a concept if we wish to speak of the normal internal a
a system (whereby "normal" is conceived of in a purely stati
normative, sense). But again, the internal activity of some bio
may, but need not be the same as its normal activity.
Speaking of organismic subsystems, it is evident that these do
in isolation but are the components of some more inclusive s
particular the organism or even the organism-environment syste
the internal activities of every organismic subsystem are someho
to the activities of other systems. We call the relations of some o
subsystem to (or rather its interactions with) other such subsyst
the organism as a whole, or to the organism-in-its-environme
ternal (biotic) activity or role of the given subsystem. In other w
role of an organismic subsystem is what it does in the supersystem
it is a part. Again, this notion comprises all the roles of a given s
and it is not concerned with the usefulness of any such activity.
before and as needed, we can restrict this very broad concept
the specific external activity.
According to the preceding distinctions, one of the (specific
activities of the heart is the performance of rhythmic contraction
ing the concomitant production of heart sounds), whereas its ext
tivity or role is blood pumping. (In German and French these tw
are distinguished by different words: the former is designated b
tionieren andfonctionnement respectively; the latter by Fungieren
and fonction [or role] respectively. See Bernier and Pirlot 197
and Bunge 2000.)
In biology, either the specific internal or the specific external a
an organismic subsystem or both have been called 'function' (in t
of 'functioning'). Let us distinguish these notions by means of su
the two basic concepts are those offunction, (internal biotic activ
function2 (external biotic activity or role). Since the internal and
activities of some organ are often interdependent, these concepts
combined into the notion offunction3 (internal cum external acti
example, when speaking of the function(ing) of the legs, we usua
in mind both the physiological activities of the muscles and the l
they bring about. Likewise, the rhythmic contractions of the heart are
interest to us only inasmuch as they allow for its role as a blood pu
Since these three notions of function entail nothing as to the valu
usefulness of the corresponding activities, they are often called 'eff
rather than 'functions.' Nevertheless, they constitute the working orfu
tioning of the system in question, hence they are indeed functions in t
sense.
Obviously, the function3 of some organismic subsystem m

able to the organism as a whole, i.e., it may favor its surviv
duction; or it may be indifferent, or even disvaluable. For exam
the function3 of the heart is highly valuable, that of the append
nil, and that of a tumor is disvaluable. If the function3 of the s
is valuable to the organism, we call it, or the subsystem in q
aptation. (Gould and Vrba 1982; Mahner and Bunge 1997) Co
ingly, a disvaluable function3 is a malaptation (or malfunction o
tion). And if a function3 should turn out to be neutral, we mig
nullaptation. We call any function,2,3 that is an aptation a func
cordingly, the production of heart sounds is not a function4 of
although it is clearly one of its activities (functions3). However, i
an aptation of our noses to support spectacles.
As evolutionary biologists would want to point out, the ap
most activities is often not merely accidental: in most cases it w
result of selection. We call an aptation that has been retained or
on by selection an adaptation. And we designate this concept by
Accordingly, it is not a function5 of our noses to support spect
that all adaptations are aptations, but not conversely. (Gou
wontin 1979; Gould and Vrba 1982) Note also that there are
things as maladaptations (or malfunctions5), but only malap
malfunctions4): By definition, there can be no features that are
selection for being disvaluable (see also Davies 2000).
The preceding definitions show that the concept of function5
presupposes (or implies) that of function4, which in turn presup
of either function,, function2, or function3. Thus, there is not
rality of function concepts, but these concepts are logically rela
by the relation of implication (see Figure l)-a fact that so far
to have been appreciated sufficiently. The corresponding proces
historically prior to each other: A new mutation may establish a
ternal or external activity of some organ, which may turn o
aptation in a given environment-or else a malaptation. If it t
be an aptation, natural selection may start to spread this apt
population, perhaps imposing in addition a direction on the
evolutionary process. In other words, our analysis is in tune
tionary biology.
Internal Activity
(Function ) \i
(Function 1) Total Activity Aptation Adaptation
(Function3) Function4) (Function 5)
External Activity/
(Function 2)
Figure 1. Relations among the five concepts of function (function,,) in biology. The figure
can be read from left to right ("is needed to define"), or else from right to left ("implies").
Note that, in principle, the ambiguous word 'function' can be elimi-

nated in favor of the expressions 'internal activity', 'external activity', 'ap-
tation', and 'adaptation.' Any one of these notions may be called 'func-
tion' in a given context, so that we need to watch out which of these
different concepts is being referred to in any biological work. (See also
Wouters 1999.) Thus, the search for the concept of function in biology is
futile.
3. Functions in Social Science. Given the different natures of biotic and

social systems, we may ask whether the preceding analysis is of any use
in the social sciences. We submit that it is. Indeed, all five concepts of
function distinguished above occur in the social-science literature, if only
tacitly (Fig. 1): internal social activity, role (external social activity), ac-
tivity cum role, aptation (valuable social activity or role), and adaptation
(an aptation that gets reproduced because of its value, perhaps being im-
proved along the selection process). Examples: Internal activities of social
systems are manufacturing, work coordination in a firm or in an orchestra,
election in a polity or a club, teaching at a school, and playing in a soccer
team. External activities (roles) of social systems are trade, marketing,
foreign relations, spying, broadcasting, and advertising. Again, internal
activities of social systems are of interest to us mostly insofar as they allow
for certain roles to be played in a higher-level social system, so that we
may combine the two as needed into the notion of function3.
The notion of aptation (function4) is exemplified by Radcliffe-Brown's
classic definition of a social function: "the function of any recurrent ac-
tivity, such as the punishment of a crime, or a funeral ceremony, is the
part it plays in the social life as a whole and therefore the contribution it
makes to the maintenance of the structural continuity." (1935, 396) A
social function4 (or social aptation) is thus an objective feature of society
that contributes to its cohesion and thereby to its continuity or "survival."
The opposite of a function, in this sense, is of course a social dysfunction
(or malaptation).
Finally, sociofunctions5 (or social adaptations) are aptations t

the result of some process of natural or artificial selection, suc
continual change of product line in view of market opportunities,
riculum updating.
If this were all there is to social functions, there would be no im
difference between social and biotic functions. However, in contrad
tion to biosystems and most animal societies, the functions_5 o
individuals and social systems often involve purposive actions. T
arrive at a sixth concept of function (or rather a set of concepts) t
genuinely teleological, involving the notions of intention, purpose,
We call this notion teleofunction. We do not call it function6, b
does not presuppose the notion of function5, which presuppose
function4, which in turn presupposes that of function3. Rather
teleofunction is a (relational) property of some systems perform
one function,5. That is, a purpose or goal may be attributed to
the five functions distinguished above, so that social activities, rol
tivities cum roles, aptations, and adaptations that are intentiona
leofunctions (see Figure 2). This is why we obtain five correspon
leofunctions, namely teleofunctionsl_5. For example, kno
committing a crime is a teleofunction3 of some individual in so
system (an intentional activity and role), but it is-at least mos
neither a function4 (an unintended socially valuable activity and ro
a teleofunction4 (an intended socially valuable activity and role).
The distinction between teleofunctions and functions simpl
matches Merton's (1957, 51) distinction between manifest and laten
Teleofunction 1
Internal Activity
(Function 1) \
\ Total Activity Aptation Adaptation

(Function 3) (Function 4) (Function 5)
External Activity
(Function 2)
Teleofunction 2 Teleofunction 3 Teleofunction 4 Teleofunction 5
Figure 2. In psychology, social science, and technology, any one function(,5), o

it, can be attributed a purpose or goal, and thus have an intentional aspect: it
teleofunction.
functions. The former are those that are recognized and intended, w
latent functions are unrecognized and unintended. Even purposiv
actions can have unanticipated consequences, some beneficial, oth
verse. For instance, a welfare program can keep the poor afloat
the same time inducing chronic welfare-dependency. Thus, the mani
latent distinction helps to explain the persistence of social practi
persist without having achieved their manifest purpose, or which ha
ceased to serve any useful manifest purpose. (Merton 1957, 64) F
ample, fertility rites and other ceremonies may persist in industria
ties because they have some latent collateral function4, such as reinf
group "identity" and thus social cohesion.
To conclude, the notions of function in social science differ from
in biology in that there is a further notion of function in the
intention, purpose, or goal. This teleological aspect may apply to
the five concepts of sociofunction, turning them into teleofunct
teleosociofunctions).
4. Functions in Technology. Technological design may be characte

the technique of inventing and implementing the function(s) br
about the best value. Not surprisingly, function analysis is central t
engineering and management science (see, e.g., Snodgrass and Ka
Umeda and Tomiyama 1997). And yet, the relevant literature is
by the absence of a clear definition of the very concept of a functio
turn, this conceptual fuzziness makes for widespread confusion. Thu
author of a highly praised monograph on the subject describes the s
of his discipline as follows: "In function analysis, concepts are consid
to be purposive actions involved in the creation of products and serv
(Akiyama 1991, 3) No distinction is made between concept-an a
entity-and action-a concrete process-nor between the differen
of function that the designer handles.
Our preceding analysis of the various concepts of function wi
in handy also in the case of artifacts. (For a philosophical analysi
notion of an artifact see, e.g., Bunge 1985, Ch. 5.) Obviously, artifac
carry out certain activities, perform certain roles, or both. (See also
drasekaran and Josephson 1997.) For example, a computer unde
certain processes that constitute its internal activity or function,. A
internal activities are of interest to us only inasmuch as they are re
to some role (function2) of the computer in some supersystem, in par
the user-computer system. However, not all artifacts have a relevan
tion,, though all have some role or other (function2). For examp
though a hammer or a screwdriver have no internal activities of int
to their users, they have a certain role-but only when they are bein
For this reason, the notion of function3 (internal activity cum role) m
not always be applicable or useful in technology.
Just as in the case of biosystems, an artifact's activity or role may b
valuable to some artifactual supersystem of which it is a part. For exam
a fuel injection device is necessary for the cylinders in an internal
bustion engine to work. Its specific function is then an aptation or fun
tion4. If, on the other hand, a certain activity is disvaluable to the syst
as whole, it is a malaptation or dysfunction. Think of all the "bugs" th
may plague a computer system. And if an artifact with any given functi
gets reproduced because of that function, perhaps being improved o
the course of this process, it is in addition a technofunction5.
However, technofunctions,_5 simpliciter are only such if they are late
or unintended. Although technology must take such side-effects into a
count, technological design involves the intentions, purposes, or goa
rational agents. Therefore, artifacts may be said to have a purpose, in t
sense that they have been designed according to some goal of some per
Thus, it is correct to speak of the proper function of an artifact, or ev
of its purpose, provided one adds that this is a function or purpos
proxy. For example, a car does not work for its own sake nor, in pa
ular, does it seek to survive. Involving both intention and value to som
body, technological functions,, are teleofunctions,,. And most of t
are also teleofunctions5, since they are the result of artificial (both tech
and economic) selection (Fig. 2).
To conclude, in technology, just as in social science, we find five
cepts of function as well as the teleological notion of a teleofunction. L
wise, each function_5 may be associated with a teleofunction (or t
technofunction).
5. Functional Account vs. Functional Explanation. When we ascribe a fu

tion to a system, what does this explain? In particular, do the vari
concepts of function distinguished above have the same or differen
planatory power? Let us see.
The first step in trying to understand some fact is to describe it. Th
second consists in subsuming the particular described under some unive
sal, or general pattern. Finally, in a third step we may unveil the mech
nism or modus operandi of the fact to be understood. More on this
moment. Let us first take a look at the second step, which is known as
classical account of scientific explanation, the so-called covering law mo
It consists in a deductive argument of the form:
Law & Circumstances .'. Proposition describing the fact to be explaine
For example, when wishing to explain why Jones died, we may p

out that he was given (a certain dose of) arsenic. Thus, the law stateme
"All people who take (a certain dose of) arsenic are bound to
the circumstance that Jones had indeed taken (a certain dose o
are said to jointly explain why Jones died.
In some sense this does explain why Jones died. But is this expl
satisfactory? We think that it is not, because it fails to tell us w
who take arsenic are doomed. We will have explained this fact
succeed in uncovering the biochemical mechanism that mediat
the intake of arsenic and death. Thus, we claim that genuine expl
point to the mechanism-causal, probabilistic, or mixed-by v
which the facts to be explained occur. Therefore, we distinguish
ismic explanations (or explanations proper) from mere subsum
Bunge 1967, 1983, 1997; Mahner and Bunge 1997; see also Wim
Salmon 1984). Thus, the covering-law model describes subsum
genuine explanation.
Let us apply these distinctions to our six concepts of function.
notion of internal activity is defined as the set of processes or m
occurring in a system, reference to functions, may provide a me
explanation. Not so with the second concept of function, i.e., tha
The problem is that one and the same role (function2) may re
alternative (internal) mechanisms (functionsl). For example, a cer
of a plant may grow either by the swelling of its cells or by the
plication; the output of a factory may grow either by recru
workers or by introducing a more advanced technology; and
can be sent in several different ways. It is in this sense that the
functional equivalence is often defined: Two systems are fu
equivalent if, and only if, their functions2 are the same, i.e., iff
(roughly) the same outputs regardless of their differences in inp
mechanisms. Not referring to any mechanism, a function ascript
sense can provide only a description or at most a subsumption
genuine explanation. For this reason, we speak of a functiona
instead of a functional explanation proper. Indeed, scientists a
isfied with subsumptions unless they hit on a plausible mech
sponsible for" the fact or the function2 in question. For exam
ner's hypothesis of continental drift was not accepted until plate
provided the underlying mechanism. And the conjecture that
emotion affect health did not gain currency until some of the co
ing neuro-endocrine-immune mechanisms were unveiled. Thus, k
of function2 or role is only preliminary knowledge.
The same holds for the concept of aptation or function4. To sh
a certain internal or external activity of some subsystem is valua
system of which it is a part, or even that its presence is required
overall design of the system in question, is a description or perh
a subsumption, but not a mechanismic explanation. (See also
1999, although he calls this an "explanation without a cause.") B

trast, what is mechanismic is an explanation of how and why a
function4 has come into being; in particular, showing that an aptat
also an adaptation (function5) is a mechanismic explanation, bec
so doing the biologist, for instance, will make use of the theory of s
which involves reference to a mechanism of evolution.
Finally, what about the explanatory power of the concept of teleofunc-
tion? To say that any one functionl5 occurs because it is intended may be
called a teleological account. But it is not an explanation proper, because
neither is it an argument nor does it point to a mechanism. Rather, it is
intentions that call for explanation, e.g., in terms of brain processes or
mechanisms.
In short, we submit that references to functions, and functions5 may
provide functional explanations, whereas references to functions2, func-
tions4, and teleofunctions provide at most functional accounts.
6. From Function to Functionalism. With the help of the preceding eluci-

dations, we can now take a look at functionalism. Having distinguished
six concepts of function, we may in principle form six corresponding no-
tions of functionalism. Whether there actually are six such notions will be
examined in the following sections.
Functionalism is usually understood as the (ontological) thesis that
function is all-important and stuff (or composition) nothing; more care-
fully stated, stuff is relevant at most as the material carrier of functions,
but, inasmuch as two things perform the same function1,2, their material
or compositional differences do not matter. Witness Putnam's classic dic-
tum: "We could be made out of Swiss cheese and it wouldn't matter."
(1975, 291) If functionalism claims that the internal activities (or func-
tions,) of two compositionally different things can be essentially the same,
we call it, for reasons to be given in the next section,formalistfunctionalism
(or functionalism,). If functionalism claims that two compositionally dif-
ferent things can perform the same external activities or roles (or func-
tions2), we call it black box functionalism (or functionalism2), because it
disregards the inner workings of the things in question. The same name
will be given to its epistemological counterpart, namely the claim that all
we need to know about things is what they do or what roles they perform
(functions2), regardless of substance and mechanism.
The term 'functionalism' also designates the thesis that every item of
certain kinds (biological, social, or technical) serves some function ("pur-
pose"). In this case 'function' may refer to an aptation, an adaptation, or
even an intention or teleofunction. We call the former two adaptationist
functionalism (functionalism4), and the latter teleologicalfunctionalism (or
teleofunctionalism). Teleological functionalism proper would hold that all
socio- and technofunctions, whether or not they are aptations o

tations, are in any case teleofunctions, in being useful to somebody
least in being intended to be useful to somebody.
In the following we shall examine which functionalisms discussed
philosophical literature do match the above distinctions. We sh
assess these functionalisms with respect to their explanatory power.
7. Functionalism in Biology and Psychology. The best-known functio

is the one discussed in the philosophy of mind and in Artificial Inte
(AI) (see, e.g., Putnam 1975; Dennett 1978; Block 1980; Fodor 198
latter's counterpart in biology is the Artificial Life (AL) project (see
ton 1989; Langton et al. 1991). In both cases, two versions of fu
alism are commonly distinguished: weak (or moderate) and str
radical). Weak functionalism claims only that some biological (or
logical) functions can be successfully imitated by artificial syst
machines. By contrast, strong functionalism claims that mind as a w
or life as a whole, as the case may be-can be replicated (not just
icked) by machines, and perhaps by other things as well.
Obviously, certain artifacts can imitate the net effect or outc
certain biological functions,. That is, they can perform certain roles
tions2) even though they differ from the corresponding living thing
composition and structure; in other words, they are functionally
lent as defined in Section 5. For example, when adequately progr
a computer can perform certain computations, such as calculat
value of an atomic energy level. But it does so through processes
tions,) widely different from the corresponding processes in th
brain; moreover, the computer does not know what an energy l
Therefore, any such imitation is partial. Thus, weak functionali
functionalism2: it claims only that certain functions2 are substrate-
in the sense that different mechanisms can perform the same role.
regarding the mechanisms underlying the roles in question, functio
is a black box functionalism: it may provide functional accounts
functional explanations.
The strong functionalism that rules in both AI and AL is quite an
matter. The former is the thesis that computers (or computer progr
are equivalent to thinking brains (or minds), in that they can replic
toto whatever the original things do. This equivalence is said to b
tional (or structural), in being substrate-neutral, i.e., independen
stuff that "embodies" the ideas concerned. What matters are co
tions or algorithms, not material mechanisms. Similarly, AL ho
life is a property of the organization of matter, not so much a prop
the matter itself that is so organized. Thus, AL is concerned w
"formal basis" of life, which would allow us to replicate or syn
genuine life processes in computers and perhaps other artificial th

(Langton 1989)
In both cases, the functions in question are not certain roles (funct
that might be performed with different underlying mechanisms
tions,): The mechanisms or processes themselves (functions,) are s
be replicable in different "substrates". Thus, in contradistinction to w
functionalism, strong functionalism is an instance of functionalism,.
ever, to a materialist, this position should be unacceptable. The po
materialism is that only matter matters and, in particular, that the f
tions, of any thing depend critically upon the kind of stuff the thin
sists of. Change it, and the organization and mechanism of the thing
change accordingly. Functionalisml, in contrast, assumes that pro
(mechanisms, functionsl) are not changes in concrete things but i
stuff-free algorithms, which are purely formal objects. For this reaso
call it formalist functionalism.
Although strong functionalism is a functionalism, for referrin
mechanisms, these mechanisms are, as we have just seen, formal, not
terial, mechanisms. Unless we share the idealist belief that formal obj
can steer material processes, or be embodied in material objects, we ca
admit that formalist functionalism has explanatory power. (Further c
cisms are made in Boden 1999.)
8. Adaptationist Functionalism. Traditional teleological functiona

viewing everything as being purposive or goal-seeking, is no longer te
ble. Its scientifically respectable, but not necessarily truer, descendan
adaptationist functionalism. In biology, this is the thesis that all trait
ultimately adaptive (or functional5), i.e., the product of natural select
In teleological parlance, it asserts that "selection acts for the benef
something, be it the individual (organism or gene) or-nowadays less f
ionably-the species. Thus, if observation shows that A does B, the
tationist will say that A has been designed to do B, or that B is the p
function or purpose of A, or that B has evolved for being beneficial t
bearer, or at least to the latter's genes (see, e.g., Williams 1966). Th
maintains that the concept of function is that of function5 (or proper
tion or adaptation), also known as the etiological concept of functi
Some adaptationists regard even disease as a means for survival
reproduction-though admittedly one that can occasionally turn
bearer. (Nesse and Williams 1994) These authors refrain from as
whether every disease has an evolutionary origin: instead, they assum
to explain all diseases in such terms. Indeed, they assert that "we
discover the evolutionary causes for each disease." (6) We submit that
way of approaching biological features is precisely the main methodol
ical flaw of adaptationism in general.
Nevertheless, if an aptation can be shown to be also an adaptati

may provide a genuine explanation, for it will refer to evolution
anisms such as natural selection.
9. Pan-Functionalism in Evolutionary Biology and Psychology. Daniel Den-

nett, who has long espoused functionalism in the matter of mind (1978),
has recently extended it to evolution (1995). In so doing, he combines
formalist with adaptationist functionalism. Dennett's formalist thesis is
that evolution is a substrate-neutral algorithmic process. However, if bio-
evolution were indeed substrate-neutral, it would be the only process of
this kind. The thesis that evolution is an algorithmic process is equally
dubious, for it assumes that evolution reduces to selection. But selection
is a sorting process, not a source of qualitative novelty. (Sober 1984; Mah-
ner and Bunge 1997; Buller 1998; Walsh 1998) And to account for the
emergence of qualitative novelty (not just its subsequent distribution in
organismal populations) is what we expect from a satisfactory theory of
evolution. In any event, Dennett's thesis is just hand-waving, for he ex-
hibits no evolutionary algorithm that we could feed into a computer to
check whether, indeed, "it" correctly predicts speciation and extinction.
The assumption that some kind of algorithmic-selectionist formalism
is the driving force of everything evolutionary leads Dennett straight to
adaptationist functionalism: Since everything biological is the result of
selection, all features are adaptive-if not prima facie, then at least ulti-
mately. Thus, panselectionism is paired off to panfunctionalism. (Ahouse
1998) No wonder, then, that Dennett devotes a considerable portion of
his book to attacking Gould's and Lewontin's (1979) classic critique of
adaptationism (see also Gould 1997a, 1997b; Mahner and Bunge 1997;
Ahouse 1998; Godfrey-Smith 1998).
Combining the adaptationist and formalist approaches to biological
evolution with the view that the mind is a sort of computer program, or
information processor, yields the latest version of evolutionary psychology
and its foray into social science. According to its parents (Cosmides and
Tooby 1987), the main theses of evolutionary psychology are the follow-
ing. First, psychology deals with function or purpose, not organ, and every
function can be "instantiated" in a variety of systems. "Just as different
kinds of hardware can run the same computer program, different physi-
ological mechanisms can accomplish the same adaptive function." (283)
Hence, psychology needs no neuroscience. Second, "natural selection the-
ory is a theory of function." (284) Third, there are innate psychological
mechanisms, all of which are information-processing programs that "ex-
tract information from the environment" and process it: they "map in-
formational input onto behavioral output." Fourth, the psychological
mechanisms in charge of learning special tasks are "Darwinian algo-
rithms" that "organize experience into adaptively meaningful sch

or frames." (286) Chomsky's mysterious "language acquisition de
would be one of them.
As will be obvious from the preceding sections, these views are open
to serious objections. To begin with, functions5, are not substrate-
independent. If in doubt, try to build a computer chip with air or iron
rather than silicon. For this reason, no two organs will be able to perform
the same functions,, although some may indeed perform the same func-
tions2 (or roles). Hence, again, the retreat to formal mechanisms, i.e., al-
gorithms. Moreover, function presupposes organ, but the converse is false.
Hence, natural selection does not only select "for" external activities of
organs-which is what the selection-sees-only-function thesis asserts-but
indirectly also "for" internal activities.
Furthermore, in our view, a mechanism is a process in a concrete thing;
hence there are brain mechanisms but not psychological ones. Besides,
contrary to what the defunct "ecological psychology" held, the environ-
ment contains no cognitive information. But even if it did, there is no
evidence for the algorithmic nature of all cognitive processes, from face
recognition to concept formation. Rather, our tentative and often unsuc-
cessful performance at such tasks is in sharp contrast with the certainty
inherent in any algorithm-steered process. Finally, the claim that "learning
is accomplished through psychological mechanisms (whose nature is not
yet understood)" (Cosmides and Tooby 1987, 292) reminds one of Mo-
liere's doctor, who solemnly declared that opium makes one sleepy be-
cause it possesses the "dormitive virtue."
To conclude, the currently fashionable version of evolutionary psy-
chology is purely speculative: it thrives on concocting adaptationist just-
so stories, which may be plausible but are as yet untested-and it is not
obvious how they could be tested unambiguously. We submit that it may
become a field of scientific research, but only once the adaptationist, for-
malist, and computationalist dogmas have been jettisoned in favor of the
psychobiological approach to mind. (For further and different criticisms
see Lloyd 1999.)
10. Functionalism in Social Science. In social studies, a first variety of

functionalism is the rational-choice approach. If one postulates that all
choices maximize the expected utility (gain), then one must assume that
those with unforeseen negative consequences correspond to wrong eval-
uations and mistaken probability estimates. This renders the "rationality
postulate" unfalsifiable. In other words, if the choice is successful, the
action is deemed to have been objectively rational; if not, the action is said
to have been only subjectively rational. In either case, the formalism is
saved at the expense of substance or, rather, mechanism, namely social
interaction. For this reason, we regard the rational-choice app

instance of formalist functionalism in social science.
Not referring to social mechanisms, the rational-choice approach fails
miserably to explain the very existence of social systems, from the family
to the transnational corporation. This failure is a necessary consequence
of its explicit adoption of ontological and methodological individualism.
(Bunge 1996, Ch. 14) Still, when used in moderation, this approach may
have some heuristic value. Indeed, it suggests looking for the reasons, good
or bad, that motivate decisions. (Boudon 1999) It also suggests explaining
some failed actions as results of miscalculations. (By contrast, success may
be explained either by correct calculation or by favorable circumstances.)
What is known as socialfunctionalism is a version of adaptationist func-
tionalism. It focuses on social systems and their specific functions3 or
activities. It also studies both the cohesive or system-preserving ("func-
tional4") and the divisive or system-interfering ("dysfunctional") conse-
quences of a system's activities3. In other words, it investigates whether
social functions3 are aptations (functions4) or even adaptations (func-
tions5). Social functionalism is an alternative to both Marxist economicism
and the traditional or culture-historical approach centered on statesmen
and battles. (Trigger 1989) Though fathered by E. Durkheim at the turn
of the century, functionalism flourished particularly in the UK and the
US between ca. 1920 and ca. 1960, particularly in the works of B. Mali-
nowski and E. R. Radcliffe-Brown in anthropology, G. Childe in archae-
ology, and T. Parsons in sociology.
The social functionalists postulated that all the social items (mecha-
nisms, roles, norms, patterns, institutions, etc.) come into being and persist
because they are useful to the social system concerned, or even to society
at large. Put negatively: the social items that have ceased to discharge any
useful function eventually disappear. Hence, the pattern of functional ex-
planation would be this:
For all x: If x is a useful social item, then x is a standard social item.
b is a useful social item.
.*. b is a standard social item.
Obviously, this is not an explanation proper, but only a subsumption,

or inclusion of a particular into a universal. Hence, it is at most a func-
tional account, not a functional explanation. Moreover, it is not even sat-
isfactory as a functional account, because it has a doubtful presupposition.
This is the assumption that the social system is homogeneous, so that what
is useful for its cohesion or preservation is good for every member of it.
This presupposition is not even true for primitive societies, all of which
retain negative items such as crippling kinship conventions and counter-
productive superstitions. Thus, it is an instance of the fallacy of division.
Having said this, we grant that, although adaptationist-functio

accounts may be shallow or even wrong, some functionalist questions
be rewarding. The reason is that many social functions are indeed
tions, or even adaptations. And the existence of such functions,,
the problem of their origin and persistence. Now, every such problem
be analyzed non-teleologically as the sequence of questions: What
internal activity in question? What is its role? Are the activities and r
valuable to the group (or the society) as a whole? If in fact they a
tations, are they also adaptations?
For instance, the persistence of religion in what is said to be the Ag
Science and Technology raises the problem of the latent or collateral f
tion(s) of some churches. Again, the corruption of political democracy
an economic elite invites looking at the way political campaigns are fu
and candidates are selected. Both are empirical problems, not ques
that can be solved a priori.
On the other hand, a moderate version of social functionalism requi
an account of the distinction and inter-relation between microsocial units
(individuals) and their subjective dispositions and activities on the one
hand, and macrosocial features (which are now constraints, now stimuli
to individual action) on the other. (Bunge 1998) Thus, in contrast to rad-
ical functionalism, its moderate counterpart does not proscribe the search
for mechanism. On the contrary:
Functionalist analysis in sociology, as in other disciplines like physi-

ology and psychology, calls for a 'concrete and detailed' account of
the mechanisms which operate to perform a designated function. This
refers, not to psychological, but to social, mechanisms (e.g., role-
segmentation, insulation of institutional demands, hierarchic ordering
of values, social division of labor, ritual and ceremonial enactments,
etc.) (Merton 1957, 52)
To conclude, social functionalism can be barren or fruitful. It will be
barren if it only restates Doctor Pangloss's thesis that we live in the best
of all possible worlds: that in which everyone maximizes his or her ex-
pected utilities. But it will be fruitful if it analyzes social systems and
attempts to discover what makes them tick-that is, their mechanisms.
11. Functionilism in Technology. Recall from Section 5 that there is an

asymmetry between function2 and mechanism (function): one and the
same function2 can often be implemented by different mechanisms (func-
tions,). In other words, the functions2 - mechanisms (functions,) relation
is one-many. For example, the manager of a factory poses functional ques-
tions to the engineer, such as "Can you design a better mousetrap?" The
technologist attempts to solve this problem by figuring out a novel mech-
anism, one that may involve stuff other than the traditional steel sp
such as electric shock, poison, infertility drug, or what have you. In
technological problems may be posed in functional2 terms, but th
only be solved in mechanismic terms. Thus, black box functionalism
not help the technologist.
However, the users of artifacts can be forgiven for adopting a
box functionalist stand. For example, the function2 of a car's cat
converter is to transform the toxic carbon monoxide and nitric
resulting from incomplete combustion, into inoffensive gases. Th
verter's mechanism, which the driver and the car mechanic need not
consists of two chemical reactions that are made possible by platinum
rhodium particles acting as catalyzers. By contrast, the designer
converter must know its mechanism. Indeed, every technological
tion3, be it symbol-processing, transportation, or social control, mus
"realized" in concrete artifacts. Hence, the designers must maste
mechanisms; in particular, they must know the behavior of the "stuf
question-physical, social, or what have you.
Another example is this: Accountants are uninterested in such feat
of a firm as the precise nature of its operations, organization, per
morale, or public image; they focus on the company's net inputs and
puts. The firm's managers and consultants, on the other hand, will ig
those aspects only at their own risk: They must identify the unde
mechanisms if they wish to control them and, a fortiori, to improve
performance. So much for black box functionalism in technology.
All technology is presumed to be adaptationist-functionalist becaus
practitioners are expected to design artifacts that perform pre-as
functions4 (which are at the same time teleofunctions4), such as grin
symbol-processing, or conflict-solving. However, technological design
be construed in either of two ways: as subordinating everything to a
function, or as combining the key function with collateral functions
example, whereas some cars are only efficient vehicles, others ar
elegant toys or status-symbols. Houses, TV sets, business firms, piece
legislation, public-health programs, and other technological items are
allel. Therefore, one may speak of two kinds of adaptationist func
ism in technology: radical and moderate. Whereas the former sac
everything to short-term efficiency, the latter makes room for other
and wider temporal and social horizons. It is the answer to such critic
performance-centered and context-free design as Vanderburg (200
In architecture and industrial design, radical adaptationist funct
ism was born in the 1920s. The Bauhaus is the best-known functionalist
school. Its mottos were "Form follows function" (actually first stated by
Louis Sullivan) and "Less is more." That is, it shunned the convolutions
typical of the Renaissance and Baroque plastic arts which served no (key)
functional purpose. In other words, technological functionalism

tarian and cuts the ties with tradition. Post-modem architecture is-or
rather was-a reaction against this cold functionalism. Like all reactions,
it failed.
Examples of radical adaptationist functionalism in sociotechnology are
the fashionable methods for containing inflation and cutting costs, namely
monetarism and downsizing, respectively. Monetarist policies are occa-
sionally effective in reducing inflation; but they are inefficient in that they
cause enormous social costs, such as unemployment and the accompa-
nying increase in social expenditures. Likewise, downsizing effectively cuts
the payroll; but it rips the firm's social fabric and is thus inefficient in the
long run. Like almost any other single goal, that of increasing profits can
be attained in alternative ways. What matters in a firm is not just how
much profit it makes, but also the technological and social means it em-
ploys to make it, as well as aiming at such additional goals as quality
enhancing and increased market share.
Successful technology is only moderately functionalist: it admits values
other than efficiency, and it balances the latter with social service. More-
over, it is mechanismic throughout, since it involves the design or control
of mechanisms. For example, medical therapy-a biotechnology-con-
sists increasingly in tampering with disease mechanisms; and management
science-a sociotechnology-relies increasingly on knowledge of the social
mechanisms that operate in the firm. In contradistinction to the traditional
arts and crafts, all modem technology is characterized by the utilization
or design of the mechanisms that mediate between input and output, and
that maximize the output/input ratio. Hence, both formalist and black-
box functionalism are out of the question in technology.
12. Concluding Remarks. If we acknowledge that, in science and technol-

ogy, there is no single all-purpose concept of function, we should try to
re-analyze and systematize the various notions of function proposed in
the literature. This is what we have attempted to do in this paper by dis-
tinguishing amongst five non-teleological concepts and their teleological
counterparts, as well as by analyzing the logical relations amongst them.
Moreover, this systematization has allowed us to propose a classification
of those views that come under the label functionalism, showing that the
term 'functionalism' inherits the ambiguities of the term 'function.'
Whether or not our systematic attempt is deemed to be completely satis-
factory, it should at least show that a synthetic perspective on functions,
functional explanation, and functionalism in science and technology is a
worthwhile goal.
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Function and Functionalism: A Synthetic Perspective

Author(s): Martin Mahner and Mario Bunge

Philosophy of Science Association, The University of Chicago Press are collaborating

Martin Mahner and Mario Bungett

1. Introduction. Philosophical analyses of the concepts of function and

*Received March 1999; revised October 2000.

a functional explanation? And what about the term 'functionalism'

2. Functions in Biology. The concept of function has been one of the m

Obviously, the function3 of some organismic subsystem m

Note that, in principle, the ambiguous word 'function' can be elimi-

3. Functions in Social Science. Given the different natures of biotic and

Finally, sociofunctions5 (or social adaptations) are aptations t

\ Total Activity Aptation Adaptation

Teleofunction 2 Teleofunction 3 Teleofunction 4 Teleofunction 5

Figure 2. In psychology, social science, and technology, any one function(,5), o

4. Functions in Technology. Technological design may be characte

5. Functional Account vs. Functional Explanation. When we ascribe a fu

Law & Circumstances .'. Proposition describing the fact to be explaine

For example, when wishing to explain why Jones died, we may p

1999, although he calls this an "explanation without a cause.") B

6. From Function to Functionalism. With the help of the preceding eluci-

socio- and technofunctions, whether or not they are aptations o

7. Functionalism in Biology and Psychology. The best-known functio

genuine life processes in computers and perhaps other artificial th

8. Adaptationist Functionalism. Traditional teleological functiona

Nevertheless, if an aptation can be shown to be also an adaptati

9. Pan-Functionalism in Evolutionary Biology and Psychology. Daniel Den-

rithms" that "organize experience into adaptively meaningful sch

10. Functionalism in Social Science. In social studies, a first variety of

interaction. For this reason, we regard the rational-choice app

Obviously, this is not an explanation proper, but only a subsumption,

Having said this, we grant that, although adaptationist-functio

Functionalist analysis in sociology, as in other disciplines like physi-

11. Functionilism in Technology. Recall from Section 5 that there is an

functional purpose. In other words, technological functionalism

12. Concluding Remarks. If we acknowledge that, in science and technol-

Ahouse, Jeremy C. (1998), "The Tragedy of a priori Selectionism: Dennett and G

Gould, Stephen J. and Richard C. Lewontin (1979), "The Spandrels of San

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