G.R. No.

L-14722 May 25, 1960

IGNACIO MESINA, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
EULALIA PINEDA VDA. DE SONZA, ET AL., defendants.
EULALIA PINEDA VDA. DE SONZA, defendant-appellee.

Agustin C. Bagasao for appellant.

Luis Manalang and Associates for appellee.

Facts of the Case:

Sometime in September 12, 1953, the Director of Lands issued a homestead patent in favor
of the defendants and as a consequence of which a certificate of title was issued in their
name by the register of deeds. The decree of registration or issuance of patent over the
property was issued "sometime on September 12, 1953 ", while the transfer certificate of
title covering the same was issued on September 16, 1953. On March 25, 1958 plaintiff
brought this action before the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija praying that Original
Certificate of Title No. P-1137 of the Register of Deeds of Nueva Ecija be ordered cancelled
and that the registration case pending before the same court covering the property
described therein be given due course. The Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija sustained
defendants motion to dismiss on the ground that plaintiff's action is already barred by the
statute of limitations. The present action has been filed after the elapse of more than four
years, and the title has already become indefeasible and incontrovertible. The court
sustained this motion and dismissed the complaint. Hence the present appeal.

Plaintiff claims that he is the owner in fee simple of the said subject lot. He claims that he
has been in actual possession thereof since 1914, publicly, openly, peacefully and against
the whole world and up to the present time. The said lot is also the subject of registration
proceedings pending in the same court known as Registration Case No. N-372, L.R.C. Cad.
Record No. N-12238. The Director of Lands issued a homestead patent in favor of the
defendants but did not exercise due care, in spite of his knowledge that defendants had not
complied with the requirements set forth in Commonwealth Act No. 141. Plaintiff claims
that the title was procured by defendants was through frauds, deception and
misrepresentation since they knew that the lot belonged to the plaintiff.

Issue:

Did the trial court erred in dismissing the case outright? Was the requirements set forth in
Republic Act No. 1942, which took effect on June 22, 1957 amending Section 48-b of
Commonwealth Act 141 been complied with?

Held:

Yes. Republic Act No. 1942, which took effect on June 22, 1957 (amending Section
48-b of Commonwealth Act 141), provides:

(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public
domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, for at least thirty years immediately
preceeding the filing of the application for confirmation of title except when prevented by war or
force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to
a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter.

In the case of Susi vs. Razon, all the necessary requirements for a grant by the Government
are complied with through actual physical possession openly, continuously, and publicly. The
possessor is deemed to have already acquired by operation of law not only a right to a
grant, but a grant of the Government.

Plaintiff is deemed to have acquired the lot by a grant of the State, it follows that the same
had ceased to be part of the public domain and had become private property and, therefore,
is beyond the control of the Director of Lands. Consequently, the homestead patent and the
original certificate of title covering said lot issued by the Director of Lands in favor of the
defendants can be said to be null and void, for having been issued through fraud, deceit and
misrepresentation.

Considering that this case was dismissed by the trial court merely on a motion to dismiss on
the ground that plaintiff's action is already barred by the statute of limitations, which in
theory does not apply here because the property involved is allegedly private in nature and
has ceased to be part of the public domain, The court ruled that the lower trial court erred
in dismissing the case outright without giving plaintiff a chance to prove his claim. It would
have been more proper for the court to deny the motion on the ground that its object does
not appear to be indubitable, rather than to have dismissed it, as was done by the trial
court.

Wherefore, the order appealed from is set aside. The case is remanded to the trial court for
further proceedings. No costs.