Electrical Power and Energy Systems 28 (2006) 374–386

www.elsevier.com/locate/ijepes

Substation event analysis using information

from intelligent electronic devices
C.L. Hor a,*, P.A. Crossley b
a
Angela Marmont Renewable Energy System Technology, Centre for Renewable Energy Systems Technology (CREST),
Loughborough University, Leicestershire LE 11 3TU, UK
b
Electric Power and Energy Systems, Queen’s University Belfast, Belfast, UK
Received 4 October 2004; accepted 13 December 2005

Abstract
The data acquisition capability of processor-based relays and intelligent electronic devices (IEDs) can improve reliability and reduce the global
cost of the power system. Nevertheless, the quantity and complexity of the captured data is beyond the requirements of most utilities, particularly
when ones consider their immediate operational needs. Though the data acquisition process has been highly automated, the process of assimilating
and analysing data still lags behind. Raw data must be transformed into knowledge in order to help users decide how to respond to the event and
implement the necessary actions. A promising technique for substation event analysis using rough set theory is described in this paper. It interprets
the data and outputs meaningful and concise information, which improves the performance of a data analysis system and help with the knowledge
acquisition process. A 132/11 kV substation model was developed to generate various fault scenarios for our case studies to evaluate the
performance of the rough set algorithm. The results show that it works well and efficiently with the overwhelming data.
q 2006 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Keywords: Intelligent electronic devices (IEDs); Data overwhelm; Knowledge extraction; Rough set theory; Discernibility functions; Fault events

1. Introduction
Processor based IEDs can improve the reliability of the
power network and reduce lifetime operating costs. Never-
theless, the quantities of data acquired, particularly during a
major incident, can overwhelm an operator and lead to an
incorrect response [1]. Operators have to analyse the available
data and apply the most appropriate remedial action. Emotional
and psychological stress may result in an inadequate response
that could damage equipment, risk human life or even initiate a
catastrophic emergency [2]. What we require is useful
information that summarises the problem and helps with the
solution. The data acquired in a substation come from a
multitude of sources but often carry the same information. This
creates superfluous and/or redundant information, which
makes the analytical task harder to achieve. To improve the
speed of data handling, the data must be grouped and unified.
The data overwhelm issue not only has an impact on each piece
* Corresponding author.
E-mail address: c.hor@lboro.ac.uk (C.L. Hor).
0142-0615/$ - see front matter q 2006 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
doi:10.1016/j.ijepes.2005.12.010
of plant and its substation, but also, at the system operational
level [3]. The paper focuses on ‘system’ instead of ‘device’
data analysis and formulates a technique that converts available
data to knowledge for decision-support.
Fig. 1 shows the impact of information overload that leads
to the decrease in our decision quality and accuracy. The
burden of heavy information load can confuse the individual,
affect his ability to set priorities, or makes prior information
harder to recall [4].
2. Information flow
The terms data and information are often used synonymously,
but they are not the same. Data describes what was collected
through observation and inference. Information describes what
was produced when data is analysed and organised.
Fig. 2 shows the steps required to convert raw data into
useful information before it can actually be used as knowledge.
Fig. 3 presents a future digital control system (DCS) integrated
with an information management unit (IMU) that is used to
deliver useful information to appropriate manpower groups in a
utility. Each group uses the monitored data for a different purpose
and consequently has varied information requirements.
 C.L. Hor, P.A. Crossley / Electrical Power and Energy Systems 28 (2006) 374–386 375

‘.represents a variety of basic classification skills (e.g.

according to colours, temperature, etc.) of an intelligent
agent or group of agents (e.g. organisms or robots) which
constitute the fundamental equipment of the agent needed to
define its relation to the environment or itself.’ [5]

3. Substation network model

Fig. 1. Decision accuracy versus information overload. It is impossible to test all scenarios because real data from
the control centre and IEDs are difficult to obtain. To partially
solve this problem, a typical 132/11 kV substation given in
Fig. 4 and its associated feeders has been simulated using
PSCAD/EMTDC [6].
The model includes the primary plant and the secondary
protection [7] and control systems. Bus-coupler BC is assumed
closed during normal operating conditions. To prevent both
transformers tripping when a fault occurs on the 11 kV
terminals of a transformer, the directional overcurrent and
earth fault relays (DOC/DEF), i.e. {IED5 and IED6} are set to
look into their respective transformers (IEEE nomenclature
67). These relays also include non-directional time graded
earth fault elements (50, 51N) for the protection of the 11 kV
busbar and backup of the overcurrent and earth fault relays
(OC/EF), i.e. {IED1, IED2, IED3 and IED4} on the outgoing
feeders [8]. Both 132 kV feeders are protected by overcurrent
Fig. 2. Information flow diagram.
(OC) and earth fault relays (EF) which may also include
Balanced Earth Fault (not shown in Fig. 4). The 132/11 kV
transformers are protected by restricted earth fault (REF) and
biased differential unit protection (BDF) [9]. A selection of
fault scenarios was applied to the simulator. For each scenario,

Fig. 3. Future DCS with information management unit.

To understand the theory of rough sets as related to the

knowledge discovery and data mining, it is useful to define
knowledge as an ability to classify objects. It provides an useful
starting point because it leads to a formal description of
knowledge defined by Prof. Zdzislaw Pawlak, the founder of
rough set theory:

‘Knowledge consists of a family of various classification

patterns of a domain of interest, which provide explicit facts
about reality—together with the reasoning capacity able to
deliver implicit facts derivable from the explicit knowl-
edge.’ [5]

Pawlak regards a body of knowledge as a knowledge base

that: Fig. 4. A typical 132/11 kV substation model.
376 C.L. Hor, P.A. Crossley / Electrical Power and Energy Systems 28 (2006) 374–386

Table 1
Data availability by device types

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P
SER ! ! ! ! ! # # # # ! # * ! ! ! !
DFR # # # # # # # # # ! # # # # # #
SCADA # # # # # ! * * # * * ! ! ! ! !
RELAYS # # # # # * * # ! # * # # # # #

#: data available, !: data not available,: partial data may not available in some form. SER, sequence events recorder; DFR, digital fault recorder; SCADA,
supervisory control and data acquisition system.

the operating response of the relays, circuit breakers and verified. Real-time data in power system always contains
voltage and current sensors are recorded and stored in an event mixed types of data, such as analogue values and digital data.
database. All these data contain useful information that could provide us
There are many types of IEDs, which could provide data for with a good picture about the supervised network in a safe and
solving different problems. The operational data required unsafe condition. For qualitative reasoning, the voltages and
analysing the performance of the relay systems and circuit currents parameters need to be discretised into three categories:
breakers during a fault on the electrical system are [3]: ‘normal (N)’, ‘high (H)’ and ‘low (L)’. The discretisation
determines how coarsely we want to view the raw data. It is
A. Bus phase voltages formulated as P : R/ C assigning a class c 2C to each value
B. Bus residual voltage r 2R in the domain of the attribute being discretised [12]. The
C. Line phase voltages normal operating range for voltage is typically 90–110% of the
D. Line phase currents nominal voltage. To categorise the disturbances, a threshold is
E. Line residual current set for the voltage and current signals [13]:
F. Pilot channel data
G. Breaker, station tripping and blocking status † The voltage thresholds:
H. Control contact performance (i) Low (L)!90% of the nominal voltage
I. Alarm contacts (ii) 90%!Normal (N)!110%
J. Relay target data (iii) High (H)O110%.
K. Time coded information † The current thresholds:
L. Fault duration (i) Low (L)!50% of nominal current
M. Clearing time (all phases) (ii) 50%!Normal (N)!150%
N. Magnitude of the fault current (iii) High (H)O150%.
O. Type of fault
P. Phases involved in the fault Sometimes the real-time data received may oscillate a lot.
If this happens close to the threshold, it will lead to a flood
Table 1 compares different devices types for the availability of events. The problem can be reduced by defining hysteresis
of the given set of data. values, i.e. 1% hysteresis for voltage threshold and 10% for the
Relays provide most of the information and the main current threshold.
exception is the alarm contacts. Since our interest lies on lower
level data analysis rather than higher-level alarm processing, 5. Information system
the absence of the alarm contacts is not important. Further-
more, relays have become the preferred recording system over Information system or knowledge representation system can
the years. The cost of adding other types of recording systems be perceived as a two-dimensional data table with sets of data
may not be justified if the use of relays as the source of data can represented by rows. Each row corresponds to a case or event
meet the goals [10]. Thus, protection IED is seen as the main and each column represents an attribute, which could be a
data source for us. There are two types of data in an IED relay, variable, an observation or a property. The table is filled with
i.e. operational and non-operational [11]. What we are attributes values. A set of attributes, i.e. voltage, current logged
interested is the operational data that could help us in fault in 1 ms time tag represents a set of operational situations in the
analysis. substation. Each of the attributes has a value set as normal (N),
high (H) or low (L).
4. Discretisation Table 2 describes a simplified dataset, which is composed of
a set of discrete voltages and currents over a time period of
The power system state changes over time as the event 0.139–2.012 s. It can be considered as a pair of finite and non-
evolves. It is important to determine the condition of the empty set (U, A) as an information table. U is the universe of
system based on the real-time data collected from IEDs. This objects and A is the set of attributes {IED1, IED2, IED5,
normally requires manipulating and processing a large volume IED7} assuming that the bus-coupler is open and only a partial
of data and information before the status of the system can be single busbar system of Fig. 4 is considered. Each attribute
 C.L. Hor, P.A. Crossley / Electrical Power and Energy Systems 28 (2006) 374–386 377

Table 2 Table 3
Information system Protection status of IED1

Time IED1 IED2 IED5 IED7 Time IED1

t (s) V1 I1 V2 I2 V5 I5 V7 I7 t (s) Pickup Trip AR 52A 52B
0.139 N N N N N N N N 0.139 0 0 0 0 1
1.003 N H N N N N N N 1.004 1 0 0 0 1
1.004 L H N N N N N H 1.937 1 1 0 0 1
1.005 L H N L N H L H 2.007 1 1 0 1 0
1.006 L H L L L H L H 2.010 0 1 0 1 0
2.007 L N L L L H L H
2.011 L N L N L H L N
2.012 L L N N N N N N picked up the fault at 1.004 s, tripped at 1.937 s and the breaker
BRK1 opened at 2.007 s.
a2A defines an information function such that, fa:U/na,
where na is the set of values of the attribute a, called the domain
7. Rough set theory
of a.
The information system format does not intuitively suggest
Rough set theory is a new mathematical tool that can
how time dependencies can be represented. When analysing
discover the dependencies within the data. It removes data
data from a substation, we are usually interested in how the
redundancies and generates the decision rules using an
attributes change over time. Without the time dimension, it is
approximation concept. Unlike crisp sets, each rough set has
not possible to recognize how and when the change of states
boundary line cases, i.e. objects that cannot be classified with
take place. There are two approaches for analysing time series
certainty either as members of the set or of its complement.
events, i.e. event and state representations. The latter is
Elementary sets are the basic concepts of our knowledge
preferable, since the natural data interpretation from a
about reality. Some of the attributes may be irrelevant or
substation control system is more suitable for state represen-
unimportant. Consequently, these entries are superfluous and
tations. When the operator monitors the operation of a
their removal would not worsen the classification. Rough sets
substation, he/she scrutinises how certain monitoring, control
detect superfluous attributes and boundary line cases using
and protection attributes would change over time. Some
the approximation set [14], a pair of precise concepts called
attributes, i.e. breaker(s), fault indicator and recloser status
the lower and upper approximation [15]. The lower
can have a number of discrete values. Others, i.e. voltage,
approximation (B*X) consists of all the objects, which
current and power operate over a continuous range. In both
certainly belong to the concept and the upper approximation
cases, the operator will have to monitor the values and also how
(B*X) contains all objects, which possibly belong to the
they change with respect to time. By just looking at variable
concept. These two approximations define three regions [15]
values, the operator is not able to recognize the complex
as illustrated in Fig. 5.
patterns exist in the data. Rather, he/she is watching out for
trends, i.e. ‘current is high over a period of time’, ‘breaker – Positive region, POSB(X)ZB*X. Members of this region
opens’, ‘voltage and frequency of the system is lower than are certainly members of the set to approximate.
nominal’ and etc. This suggests that the general trends rather – Negative region, NEGB(X)ZUKB*X, the complement of
than small variations or complex patterns are more essential the upper approximation. Members of this region are
when comes to analysing substation events. In order to fit the certainly non-members of the set to approximate.
time dimensions of event data into an information system, we – Boundary region, BNB(X)ZB*XKB*X. Members of the
convert the time dependencies into general trends by allowing boundary region have a membership status that cannot be
the attribute values be a set of trends instead of values ascertained with certainty, at least not on the basis of the
measured at discrete points in time. This can be done by attributes that the approximations are built from. If there
recording when a breaker opens or closes or when a change in are no boundary sets, i.e. BNB(X)ZØ (empty set), then set
the voltage or current state occurs. X is crisp, otherwise it is rough.

6. Protection status

For a circuit breaker, the value set is either open (1) or close
(0). To capture more information about the breaker status, we
utilise its auxiliary contacts (52A, 52B): ‘00 (breaker failed)’,
‘01 (closed)’, ‘10 (opened)’ and ‘11 (unknown)’. Table 3
presents the protection trip data, which merge with Table 2 to
describe the entire events, occurred. Relay IED1 has operated
whilst the other relays remain unchanged. The auto-recloser
(AR) has been disabled to simplify the example. Relay IED1 Fig. 5. Schematic diagram of the upper and lower approximation of set X.
378 C.L. Hor, P.A. Crossley / Electrical Power and Energy Systems 28 (2006) 374–386

Let X4U. The B*(X) of X are defined as

B * ðXÞ Z fX 2U : BðXÞ 4Xg (1)
The lower approximation of X, B*(X) is the subset of the set
X such that it is a member of the universe set, U. The upper
approximation of X, B*(X) is defined as
B * ðXÞ Z fX 2U : BðXÞh X s:g (2)
X is the member of U, where some of the upper
approximations of X are the element of X. Ø is an empty set.
B(X) denotes the set of all objects indiscernible with X, i.e. the
equivalence class determined by X.

7.1. Indiscernibility

Any subset B of A (B4A) determines a binary relation IND(B)

on U, called an indiscernibility or equivalent relation, defined as

INDðBÞ Z fðx; yÞ 2U 2 jc a 2A; aðxÞ Z aðyÞg (3)

0a(x) denotes the attribute value, a for an event x. If
(x,y)2IND(B), then the events x and y are indiscernible from
each other with respect to the attributes of B. The family of all the
equivalence classes of IND(B) is denoted by U/IND(B) and an
equivalence class of IND(B) containing the event x is denoted by
B(x) or B-elementary sets.
The objective of reducing data is to find a minimal subset of
relevant attributes that preserves the indiscernibility relation
computed on the basis of the full set of attributes. REDUCT is
defined as a reduced set of relations that ensures the same
quality approximation as the whole set of attributes. It discerns
all events discernible by the original information system, which
is crucial in the knowledge base reduction.

7.2. Procedure for rough sets analysis

Fig. 6 shows the procedure of the rough set algorithm that is

used to generate synthetic information from substation data.
The entire process can be broken down into five main stages:

(i) Eliminate identical attributes. The algorithm first

identifies and removes the identical attributes, which
carry the same information. This is to ensure that the
redundant attributes are not present.
(ii) Eliminate identical examples. All the identical rows
(events) are filtered out. Sometimes the same type of
messages may repeat at the different and non-
consecutive times. They carry the same information
except that one may represent the intermediate state
of fault initiation and the other may represent the
state of recovery. Though both states may not play
an essential part in fault diagnosis, it is still
necessary to discern them even they are considered
identical.
(iii) Eliminate dispensable attributes. This step is to reduce
the superfluous data by checking if the data is dispensable.
The process of reduction is to ensure that no attribute can
Fig. 6. Procedure for generating synthetic information.
be eliminated further without losing information. Dis-
pensable events can be distinguished from each other by
the discernibility matrix or other heuristic methods. The
minimal set of attributes are called reducts.
(iv) Compose a table with reduct. The table is composed with
the reduct, which contains a summary of events.
(v) Retain the change of state. To make the table more
condense, only the change of state information is
retained.
 C.L. Hor, P.A. Crossley / Electrical Power and Energy Systems 28 (2006) 374–386 379

7.3. Discernibility matrix Table 5

Reducts
A discernibility matrix is a symmetric n!n matrix where n Time IED1 IED2
denotes the number of elementary sets. For a set of attributes, t (s) V1 I1 V2 I1
B4A in AZ ðU; AÞ with UZ{u1,u2,u3,.un}. A discernibility
0.139 N N N N
matrix of B, denoted as M(B) can be formulated as 1.003 N H N N
1.004 L H N N
1.005 L H N L
MðBÞ Z fmB ðui ; uj Þgn!n 1.006 L H L L
(4) 2.007 L N L L
mB ðui ; uj Þ Z fa 2B : aðui Þ saðuj Þg 2.011 L N L N
2.012 L L N N

where i,jZ{1,.,n} and nZjU/IND(B)j Table 6

ui or uj belongs to the B-positive region of A. mB(ui,uj) is the Change of states
set of all condition attributes from B that classify objects ui and Time IED1 IED2
uj into different classes. Empty set, Ø denotes that this case
t (s) V1 I1 V2 I2
does not need to be considered. All disjuncts of minimal
disjunctive form of this function define the reducts of B. 0.139 N N N N
1.003 † H † †
1.004 L † † †
7.4. Discernibility function 1.005 † † † L
1.006 † † L †
2.007 † N † †
To compute reducts and core, the discernibility matrix is 2.011 † † † N
used with the discernibility function which is a Boolean 2.012 † L N †
function of m Boolean variables u1* ; .; um* (corresponding to
the attributes u1,.,um) where:
f ðBÞ Z f ð0:139Þo f ð1:003Þo f ð1:004Þo f ð1:005Þo f ð1:006Þ

m
B ðui ; uj Þ Z fu
ju 2mB ðui ; uj Þg (5) o f ð2:007Þo f ð2:011Þo f ð2:012Þ

Z ð1Þo ð1Þo ðð1n 7Þo ð2n 5n 7ÞÞo ð2n 5Þo ð1Þ

For a set of attributes B, the discernibility function can be
o ð2n 7Þo ð1n 2n 5n 7Þ
defined as:
Z 1o ð2n 5Þo ð2n 7Þ Z 1o ð2n ð5o 7ÞÞ
f ðBÞ Z o fnmB* ðui ; uj Þg (6)
i;j2f1;.;ng

From the solution presented, the relays {IED1, IED2} or

where mBsØ; nZjU/IND(B)j and nm
B ðui ; uj Þ is the dis- {IED1, IED5, IED7} are identified as the main source of
junction taken over the set of Boolean variables m
B ðui ; uj Þ information for the fault F2 on the feeder L1. We selected the
corresponding to the discernibility matrix element mB(ui,uj) solution with the least number of IEDs; {IED1, IED2}, which
[16]. To explain how the discernibility matrix computes appears in Table 5 as the minimal set of relations or reducts.
reducts, a simplified example based on Table 2 is formed. The reducts may be excessive for inclusion in the report. We
Table 4 shows how the reducts are obtained by forming the thus condense it further by retaining only the change of states.
discernibility matrix with its discernibility functions Combining Tables 3 and 6, a summary of the events can be
f(0.139).f(2.012) as listed: reported as:
Table 4
Discernibility matrix
Summary of the events
Time 0.139 1.003 1.004 1.005 1.006 2.007 2.011 2.012
0.139 Ø
1.003 1 Ø Feeder L1: current (H)Z1.003 s, voltage (L)Z1.004 s
1.004 1,7 1,7 Ø Feeder L2: current (H)Z1.005 s, voltage (L)Z1.006 s
1.005 1,2,5,7 1,2,5,7 2,5,7 Ø IED1: pickupZ1.004 s, trippedZ1.937 s
1.006 1,2,5,7 1,2,5,7 2,5,7 2,5 Ø
BRK1: openedZ2.007 s
2.007 1,2,5,7 1,2,5,7 1,2,5,7 1,2,5 1 Ø
2.011 1,2,5,7 1,2,5,7 1,2,5,7 1,2,5,7 1,2,7 2,7 Ø Faulted section: feeder L1 (isolated)
2.012 1 1 1,7 1,2,5,7 1,2,5,7 1,2,5,7 1,2,5,7 Ø System restored after 2.012 s
380 C.L. Hor, P.A. Crossley / Electrical Power and Energy Systems 28 (2006) 374–386

Table 7 Table 9
Reducts Change of states
Index IED1 IED2 IED5 IED7 Index IED1 IED2 IED5 IED7
No. I1 V2 I2 V5 I5 V7 I7 No. I1 V2 I2 V5 I5 V7 I7
1 N N N N N N N 1 N N N N N N N
2 N L N L N N N 2 † L † L † † †
3 H L N L N N N 3 H † † † † † †
4 H L N L H N H 4 † † † † H † H
5 H L L L H N H 5 † † L † † † †
6 L L N L N N N 6 L † N † N † N
7 L N N L N N N 7 † N † † † † †
8 L N N N N N N 8 † † † N † † †
9 H L N L H N N 9 † † N † † † N
Index Time, t (s)
1 0.139 8. Case studies
2 1.002
3 1.003, 1.004, 1.128, 1.985, 2.108, 3.367, 3.492, 5.172, 5.048 The following case studies discuss how rough set theory can be
1.005, 1.007, 1.008, 1.009, 1.125, 1.127, 1.987, 1.988, used to interpret substation data using unsupervised classification.
4 1.989, 1.990, 1.992, 2.105, 2.107, 3.368, 3.369, 3.372,
The approach requires no predefined classes or priori knowledge
3.373, 3.488, 5.049, 5.051, 5.053, 5.054, 5.168
to discover new relations between the data. It is able to perform
1.012, 1.014, 1.022, 1.117, 1.118, 1.122, 1.123, 1.124,
5 1.994, 1.995, 2.003, 2.097, 2.098, 2.102, 2.103, 2.104,
data clustering automatically. The events collected from the
3.377, 3.374, 3.385, 3.481, 3.482, 3.484, 3.487, 5.058, 132/11 kV substation are time-tagged in every 1 ms and thus,
5.066, 5.161, 5.162, 5.164, 5.167 only the results are presented. In these case studies, the currents
6 1.130, 1.132, 2.110, 2.112, 3.365, 3.494, 5.046, and voltages are regarded as separate entities.
5.047, 5.174
7 1.137, 1.984, 2.117, 3.366, 3.502, 5.181
8 1.156, 2.136, 3.520, 5.200
9. Permanent fault on the load feeder L1
9 3.491, 5.171
This section considers a three phase fault (F2) at 1.0 s on the
feeder L1. The reducts computed is given in Table 7. For
checking purpose, let us take a look at the time index. The

Table 8
Protection status

Time IED1 BRK1 Failure

t (s) Pickup Trip AR 52A 52B
0.139 0 0 0 0 1 0
1.003 1 0 0 0 1 0
1.022 1 1 0 0 1 0
1.102 1 1 0 1 0 0
1.130 0 0 0 1 0 0
1.902 0 0 1 1 0 0
1.982 0 0 0 0 1 0
1.985 1 0 0 0 1 0
2.003 1 1 0 0 1 0 Fig. 7. Currents of IED1 during fault period.
2.083 1 1 0 1 0 0
2.110 0 0 0 1 0 0
3.283 0 0 1 1 0 0
3.353 0 0 0 1 0 0
3.363 0 0 0 0 1 0
3.367 1 0 0 0 1 0
3.384 1 1 0 0 1 0
3.464 1 1 0 1 0 0
3.494 0 0 0 1 0 0
4.964 0 0 1 1 0 0
5.034 0 0 0 1 0 0
5.044 0 0 0 0 1 0
5.048 1 0 0 0 1 0
5.065 1 1 0 0 1 0
5.145 1 1 0 1 0 0
5.174 0 0 0 1 0 0
Fig. 8. Currents of IED2 during fault period.
 C.L. Hor, P.A. Crossley / Electrical Power and Energy Systems 28 (2006) 374–386 381

rest, i.e. IED2, IED5 and IED7 are normal. Referring to the
voltage V5 at time 1.156, 2.136, 3.520, and 5.200 s (see Index 8),
it indicates a recovery after the opening of BRK1. However, it
dropped to low after BRK1 was reclosed on the faulty feeder.
Based on the logic data in Table 8, we can conclude that the
fault was permanent. Table 7 was thus condensed to Table 9 as
a summary of the events represented as follows:

Summary of the events

Feeder L1: current (H)Z1.003 s

Fig. 9. Voltages of IED2, IED5 and IED7 during fault period.
indexes contain the number of events that repeated themselves
at multiple times. If all the events are sorted chronologically in
the index, the event at time 5.200 s in the index 8 is the last event
we received. For this event, the current of IED1 is low while the
Table 10
Station report
Feeder L2: current (H)Z1.012 s, voltage (L)Z1.002 s
Feeder L5: current (H)Z1.005 s, voltage (L)Z1.002 s
Feeder L7: current (H)Z1.005 s
IED1: pickupZ1.003 s, trippedZ1.022 s,
BRK1: openedZ1.102 s, Faulted section: feeder L1
System restored after 5.200 s

Station report
Date of event 13/08/04 Event number 11:20:12 am
Time of event 001 Sample rate 1 ms
Event description
Feeder L1: current (H) at 1.003 s.
Feeder L2: current (L) at 1.012 s, voltage (L) at 1.002 s.
Feeder L5: current (H) at 1.005 s, voltage (L) at 1.002 s.
Feeder L7: current (H) at 1.005 s.
IED1: tripped multiple times.
Breaker: BRK1 opened multiple times.
Loss of supply: feeder L1.
Protection system operation analysis
Relay IED1 Types 79, 50/51, 50/51N
First pickup (s) 1.003, 1.985, 3.367, 5.048
Primary (s) 1.022, 2.003, 3.384, 5.065
Backup N/A
Status Healthy Breaker state Healthy
Recloser Yes Number 3
Reclose time 1.902s, 3.283s, 4.964s, N/A
Status Healthy No. breakers 1 (BRK1)
Breaker (s) 1.102, 2.083, 3.464, 5.145
Breaker time 0.08 s Breaker status 52A(1), 52B(0)
Estimated fault data
Fault inception 1.0 s Fault types A–B–C, permanent
Faulted section L1 Avg. duration z0.098s
Maximum fault 32.21 kA
Breaker contact wear 406.68!106 As
Line currents, voltages (faulted section)
RMS value Pre-fault Max. fault Post-fault Unit
In 0.000 0.000 0.000 (kA)
Ia 0.513 31.89 0.000 (kA)
Ib 0.513 31.98 0.000 (kA)
Ic 0.513 32.21 0.000 (kA)
Va 6.170 0.000 0.000 (kV)
Vb 6.140 0.000 0.000 (kV)
Vc 6.300 0.000 0.000 (kV)
Vab 10.86 0.000 0.000 (kV)
Vbc 10.58 0.000 0.000 (kV)
Vca 10.80 0.000 0.000 (kV)
382 C.L. Hor, P.A. Crossley / Electrical Power and Energy Systems 28 (2006) 374–386

Table 11 Table 12
Protection status Reducts

Time IED1 BRK1 Failure Index IED1 IED2 IED5 IED7

t/s Pickup Trip AR 52A 52B No. V1 I1 V2 I2 V5 I5 I7
0.139 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 N N N N N N N
1.004 1 0 0 0 1 0 2 L H L N L N N
1.011 1 1 0 0 1 0 3 L H L N L H H
1.091 1 1 0 1 0 0 4 L H L L L H H
1.115 0 0 0 1 0 0 5 L H N N L H N
1.891 0 0 1 1 0 0 6 L H N N L N N
1.961 0 0 0 1 0 0 7 L L N N L N N
1.971 0 0 0 0 1 0 8 L L N N N N N
1.974 1 0 0 0 1 0 9 L H L N N N N
1.981 1 1 0 0 1 0 10 L H L N L H N
2.061 1 1 0 1 0 0 11 L N N N N N N
2.085 0 0 0 1 0 0
Index Time, t (s)
3.261 0 0 1 1 0 0
3.331 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0.139, 5.045
3.341 0 0 0 0 1 0 2 1.004, 1.975, 3.345
3.344 1 0 0 0 1 0 3 1.007, 1.109, 1.977, 2.079, 3.348, 3.449
3.351 1 1 0 0 1 0 4 1.012,1.984, 3.354
3.431 1 1 0 1 0 0 5 1.112, 2.082, 3.452
3.456 0 0 0 1 0 0 6 1.113, 2.083, 3.453
4.931 0 0 1 1 0 0 7 1.114, 1.115, 2.084, 3.454
5.001 0 0 0 1 0 0 9 1.121, 2.091, 3.461
5.011 0 0 0 0 1 0 10 1.974, 3.344
11 3.347
12 5.027
The time of fault inception can be estimated using the
abnormal condition status flag at about 1.002 s when voltage
9 and some additional data, which can be downloaded from
sags were first detected by the feeder L2 and L5. The duration
IED1 or other IEDs from the faulted section.
of the fault is determined by measuring the time period from
relay pick-up to the breaker opening. The nominal breaker
clearing time in the simulation is set 0.08 s. For any breaker 9.1. Transient fault on the load feeder L1
opening time longer than 0.15 s, it is considered not healthy or
faulty. The condition of the auto-recloser can be assessed The study considers almost the similar case as previous case
through each reclosing period. For instance, the reclosing except that the fault was transient and the circuit breaker
signal were initiated at 1.902, 3.283 and 4.964 s and the dead remained closed at the end of the fault period.
times calculated were 0.8, 1.2 and 1.5 s which matched our Table 11 presents the protection status of IED1 subject to
initial settings.1 Therefore, the auto-recloser operated cor- the transient fault on L1. This sequential event consists the
rectly. The relationship between the sequence components can change of states (or trends) of the protection systems. For
be used to classify the type of faults occurred. The breaker example, IED1 has picked up at 1.004, 1.974 and 3.344 s and it
BRK1’s last attempt to open was at 5.145 s before it was tripped at 1.011, 1.981 and 3.351 s, respectively. The breaker
actually lock-out. The system was then restored after 5.200 s. BRK1 opened at 1.091, 2.061 and 3.431 s and the opening time
All phases of currents on the feeder L1 were high at the time of is 0.08 s, which is within the normal operating range. The
fault (see Fig. 7) while L2 experienced current low (see Fig. 8).
Table 13
The fault was a three-phase type. Since L2 has a similar pattern to Change of state
L3 and L4, this explains that the currents in all load feeders were
Index IED1 IED2 IED5 IED7
low except L1. The fault must thus be located at the feeder L1.
Fig. 9 illustrated how the voltage varied against the time No. V1 I1 V2 I2 V5 I5 I7
sequence in the dataset. V7 merely dropped during the fault 1 N N N N N N N
period compared to the V2 and V5. The fault was therefore at the 2 L H L † L † †
3 † † † † † H H
downstream. Table 10 shows a detailed station report that can
4 † † † L † † †
be generated by processing the information from Tables 8 and 5 † † N N † † N
6 † † † † † N †
1
7 † L † † † N †
The dead times of the recloser were set artificially short to minimise the 8 † † † † N † †
runtime of the simulation. Shorter dead times mean that the relay is not able to 9 † H L † † † †
reset fully. The actual reset time of relay models can be as long as 30 s or more. 10 † † † † L H †
To compensate this, the reset time of the relays were modified to reset 10 times 11 † N N † N N †
faster than the original reset characteristics [7].
 C.L. Hor, P.A. Crossley / Electrical Power and Energy Systems 28 (2006) 374–386
Fig. 10. Currents of IED1 against time.
Fig. 11. Currents of IED2 against time.
reclosing signals were applied at 1.891, 3.261 and 4.931 s and
the dead times were 0.8, 1.2 and 1.5 s. The recloser operated
correctly as indicated (‘0—no fault’) by the failure indicator.
The reducts computed via discernibility matrix are given in
Table 12.
tZ0.139 s is the time at which the simulation attained a
steady state condition, e.g. voltageZnormal, currentZnormal.
The indexes given in Table 12 showed the number of events
that repeated themselves at multiple times. 5.045 s (index 1)
was the last event we received indicating that all the currents
and voltage had recovered to normal. Based on the logic data in
Table 11, the fault was transient and had been cleared. The final
solution in Table 13 was derived by condensing the reducts in
Table 12.
Combining Tables 11 and 13, a summary of events can be
reported as:
Summary of the events
Feeder L1: current (H)Z1.004 s, voltage (L)Z1.004 s
Feeder L2: current (L)Z1.012 s, voltage (L)Z1.004 s
Feeder L5: current (H)Z1.007 s, voltage (L)Z1.004 s
Feeder L7: current (H)Z1.007 s
IED1: pickupZ1.004 s, trippedZ1.011 s. Reclosed: 3
BRK1: openedZ1.091 s
Faulted section: feeder L1 (isolated)
System restored after 5.027 s
383
Fig. 12. Voltages of IED1, IED2, IED5 and IED7 against time.
Fig. 10 showed that only the A-phase current on L1 is high
during the fault period while L2 suffered a severe drop in
A-phase current (see Fig. 11). The fault is a single phase A to
earth type.
A voltage sag on the feeder L1 in Fig. 12 confirmed that the
fault has occurred on L1. By integrating the summary of events
and the additional source from IED1, we can generate a more
detailed station report given in Table 14.
9.2. Directional fault on the feeder L5
This case study considered the effect of a solid
directional A–B fault, F1. IED6 tripped and the breaker
BRK6 and BRK8 opened to clear the fault. IED5 did not
operate as it saw the fault in the reverse direction. Table 15
shows that IED6 tripped at 1.039 s and BRK6 and BRK8
opened at 1.119 s.
Table 16 shows the reduct table for the directional fault
scenario. Table 17 presents the final solution by condensing
the reducts in Table 16. In the reduct table, we can see that
the algorithm has identified five IEDs as the main data
sources. Among these IEDs, some are obviously redundant.
If we compare the reducts in a pre- and post-protection
system operation [17], we can see that {IED7, IED8} and
{IED5, IED6} are basically the same. The final reducts
should thus contain only three IEDs. We picked the
solution: {IED1, IED6, IED8} due to the responses of
IED6, BRK6 and BRK8.
Fig. 13 shows the voltage sags on L1, L5, L6 and L7
subject to the directional fault F1. All the voltages
recovered from the sags except V6, which gradually
decreased to zero. In Fig. 14, the current variations of the
directional IED5 and IED6 shows that the magnitude of
phase As and phase Bs currents have increased
significantly compare to the phase Cs. The fault is a
phase A–B type since no neutral currents were detected in
T1 and T2.
Combining with the information from Table 15, a summary
of the events can be interpreted as:
384 C.L. Hor, P.A. Crossley / Electrical Power and Energy Systems 28 (2006) 374–386

Table 14
Station report

Station report
Date of event 01/10/04 Event number 23:12:06 pm
Time of event 002 Sample rate 1 ms
Event description
Feeder L1: current (H)Z1.004 s, voltage (L)Z1.004 s.
Feeder L2: current (L)Z1.012 s, voltage (L)Z1.004 s.
Feeder L5: current (H)Z1.007 s, voltage (L)Z1.004 s.
Feeder L7: current (H)Z1.007 s.
IED1: tripped at 1.011 s; resets at 1.115 s.
Breaker: BRK1 opened at 1.091 s.
Loss of supply: none. System restored after 5.045 s.
Protection system operation analysis
Relay IED1 Types 79, 50/51, 50/51N
First pickup (s) 1.004, 1.974, 3.344
Primary (s) 1.011, 1.981, 3.351
Backup N/A
Status Healthy Breaker state Healthy
Recloser Yes Number 3
Reclose time 1.891s, 3.261s, 4.931s
Status Healthy No. breakers 1 (BRK1)
Breaker (s) 1.091, 2.061, 3.431
Breaker time 0.08s Breaker status 52A(0), 52B(1)
Estimated fault data
Fault inception 1.0 s Fault types A–G, Transient
Faulted section L1 Avg. duration z0.087s
Maximum fault 32.99 kA
Breaker contact wear 284.1!106 As
Line currents, voltages (faulted section)
RMS value Pre-fault Max. fault Post-fault Unit
In 0.000 32.51 0.000 (kA)
Ia 0.513 32.99 0.513 (kA)
Ib 0.513 0.511 0.513 (kA)
Ic 0.513 0.490 0.513 (kA)
Va 6.170 4.770 6.120 (kV)
Vb 6.140 6.170 6.200 (kV)
Vc 6.300 6.020 6.290 (kV)
Vab 10.86 9.110 10.59 (kV)
Vbc 10.58 10.610 10.89 (kV)
Vca 10.80 9.080 10.76 (kV)

Summary of the events

Feeder L1: voltage sagZ1.002 s, current lowZ1.015 s Table 15

Protection status
Feeder L6: voltage sag, current high z1.005 s
Feeder L8: current highZ1.005 s Time IED6 IED8
Relay IED6: trippedZ1.039 s t (s) 67 50/51 52A 52B 50/51 52A 52B
Breaker status: BRK6, BRK8 (1.119 s—opened)
0.139 0 0 0 1 0 0 1
1.039 1 0 0 1 0 0 1
Faulted section: 11 kV feeder 6
1.119 1 0 1 0 0 1 0
Fault type: directional A–B, permanent 1.133 0 0 1 0 0 1 0
System restored after 1.172 s 1.139 0 0 1 0 0 1 0
 C.L. Hor, P.A. Crossley / Electrical Power and Energy Systems 28 (2006) 374–386 385

Table 16 10. Conclusion

Reducts

Time IED1 IED5 IED6 IED7 IED8 The challenge for the modern power system operation
t (s) V1 I1 V5 I5 V6 I6 V7 I7 V8 I8 and control is the ability to interpret the data correctly
0.139 N N N N N N N N N N from IEDs and ensure the right decision is reached.
1.002 L N N N N N N N N N Without good information, action is either impossible or
1.003 L N L N L N N N N N foolhardy.
1.005 L N L H L N N H N H
1.007 L N L H L H N H N H
This paper presented a fairly simple technique that
1.015 L L L H L H N H N H automatically processes large volumes of raw data, identifies
1.134 L N L H L H N H N H the most significant and meaningful data patterns and
1.139 L N L H L L N H L N presents this information in an appropriate and condensed
1.140 L N L N L L N N L L
form. This helps the operators grasp a good picture of the
1.153 N N L N L L N N L L
1.172 N N N N L L N N L L events during the emergency. Several different fault scenarios
were analysed using the event datasets from the simulated
network. The case studies were conducted to evaluate the
Table 17 algorithm and improve our understanding about substation
Change of states
data. Like most data analysis algorithm, the defective/
Time IED1 IED5 IED6 IED7 IED8 incorrect data might affect the quality of extracted knowledge
t/s V1 I1 V5 I5 V6 I6 V7 I7 V8 I8 particularly for those datasets that contain a high degree of
0.139 N N N N N N N N N N noises. Advanced filtering or other pre-processing techniques
1.002 L † † † † † † † † † are thus required.
1.003 † † L † L † † † † † Substation event processing and analysis using rough set
1.005 † † † H † † † H † H approach is a new research area that would certainly benefit
1.007 † † † † † H † † † †
1.015 † L † † † † † † † † power utilities. It offers us the insightful analysis about the
1.134 † N † † † † † † † † power system data by examining how the pattern changes.
1.139 † † † † † L † † L N
1.140 † † † N † † † N † L
1.153 N † † † † † † † † †
1.172 † † N † † † † † † † References

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