1
Political Law; Constitutional Law; Judicial Department; Supreme Court; En
Banc And Division Cases
The Supreme Court shall be composed of a Chief Justice and fourteen Associate Justices. It
may sit en banc or in its discretion, in division of three, five, or seven Members. Any vacancy
shall be filled within ninety days from the occurrence thereof.
All cases involving the constitutionality of a treaty, international or executive agreement, or
law, which shall be heard by the Supreme Court en banc, and all other cases which under the
Rules of Court are required to be heard en banc, including those involving the
constitutionality, application, or operation of presidential decrees, proclamations, orders,
instructions, ordinances, and other regulations, shall be decided with the concurrence of a
majority of the Members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case
and voted thereon.
Cases or matters heard by a division shall be decided or resolved with the concurrence of a
majority of the Members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case
and voted thereon, and in no case without the concurrence of at least three of such
Members. When the required number is not obtained, the case shall be decided en banc:
Provided, that no doctrine or principle of law laid down by the court in a decision rendered
en banc or in division may be modified or reversed except by the court sitting en banc. [Sec.
4, Art. VIII, 1987 Constitution]
En Banc decisions covers all cases involving the constitutionality of a treaty, international or
executive agreement, or law; and all other cases which, under the rules of court, are to be
heard en banc, including those involving the constitutionality, application or operation of
presidential decrees, proclamations, orders, instructions, ordinances and other regulations.
These cases are decided with the concurrence of a majority of the members who actually
took part in the deliberations on the issues and voted thereon. [Nachura, Outline Reviewer
in Political law (2009)]
Political Law; Administrative Law; Powers Of Administrative Agencies; Quasi-
Judicial (Adjudicatory) Power
In administrative law, a quasi-judicial proceeding involves (a) taking and evaluating evidence;
(b) determining facts based upon the evidence presented; and (c) rendering an order or
decision supported by the facts proved. [Secretary of Justice v. Lantion, G.R. No. 139465, 18
January 2000]
The exercise of quasi-judicial functions involves a determination, with respect to the matter
in controversy, of what the law is; what the legal rights and obligations of the contending
parties are; and based thereon and the facts obtaining, the adjudication of the respective
rights and obligations of the parties. [Doran v. Executive Judge Luczon, Jr., G.R. No. 151344,
26 September 2006]
Quasi-judicial or administrative adjudicatory power on the other hand is the power of the
administrative agency to adjudicate the rights of persons before it. It is the power to hear
and determine questions of fact to which the legislative policy is to apply and to decide in
accordance with the standards laid down by the law itself in enforcing and administering the
same law. The administrative body exercises its quasi-judicial power when it performs in a
judicial manner an act which is essentially of an executive or administrative nature, where
the power to act in such manner is incidental to or reasonably necessary for the performance
of the executive or administrative duty entrusted to it. In carrying out their quasi-judicial
functions the administrative officers or bodies are required to investigate facts or ascertain
the existence of facts, hold hearings, weigh evidence, and draw conclusions from them as
basis for their official action and exercise of discretion in a judicial nature. [Bedol v.
COMELEC, G.R. No. 179830, 03 December 2009]
Administrative due process
Cardinal rights of parties in administrative proceedings, as follows:
1. The right to a hearing, which includes the right to present one’s case and submit
evidence in support thereof.
2. The tribunal must consider the evidence presented.
3. The decision must have something to support itself.
4. The evidence must be substantial.
5. The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least
contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected.
6. The tribunal or body or any of its judges must act on its or his own independent
consideration of the law and facts of the controversy and not simply accept the views of
a subordinate in arriving at a decision.
7. The board or body should, in all controversial question, render its decision in such a
manner that the parties to the proceeding can know the various issues involved, and
the reason for the decision rendered. [Ang Tibay v. CIR, G.R. No. L-46496, 27 February
1940]
As can be seen above, among these rights are “the decision must be rendered on the
evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the
parties affected;” and that the decision be rendered “in such a manner that the parties to the
proceedings can know the various issues involved, and the reasons for the decisions
rendered.” Note that there is no requirement in Ang Tibay that the decision must express
clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based. For as long as the
administrative decision is grounded on evidence, and expressed in a manner that sufficiently
informs the parties of the factual and legal bases of the decision, the due process
requirement is satisfied. [Flores v. Montemayor, G.R. No. 170146, 8 June 2011]
Where opportunity to be heard either through oral arguments or through pleadings is
granted, there is no denial of due process. It must not be overlooked that prior to the
issuance of the assailed Decision, petitioners were given several opportunities to attend the
hearings and to present all their pleadings and evidence. Petitioners voluntarily failed to
appear in most of those hearings. [NASECORE v. ERC, G. R. No. 190795, 6 July 2011]
 2

Administrative appeal and review

Where provided by law, appeal from an administrative determination may be made to a

higher or superior administrative officer or body. [Nachura, Outline Reviewer in Political law
(2009)]

Types of Administrative Appeal And Review

1. That which inheres in the relation of administrative superior to administrative

subordinate
2. That embraced in statutes which provide for a determination to be made by a particular
officer or body subject to appeal, review or redetermination by another officer or body
in the same agency or in the same administrative system.
3. That in which the statute makes or attempts to make a court a part of the
administrative scheme by providing in terms or effect that the court, on review of the
action of an administrative agency.
4. That in which the statute provides that an order made by a division of a Commission or
Board has the same force and effect as if made by the Commission subject to a
rehearing by the Commission.
5. That in which the statute provides for an appeal to an officer on an intermediate level
with subsequent appeal to the head of the department or agency.
6. That embraced in statutes which provide for appeal at the highest level, namely the
president. [De Leon, Administrative Law: Text and Cases (2013)]

Administrative res judicata

It is an established doctrine in this jurisdiction that the decisions and orders of administrative
agencies have upon their finality, the force and binding effect of a final judgment within the
purview of the doctrine of res judicata. These decisions and orders are as conclusive upon
the rights of the affected parties as though the same had been rendered by a court of
general jurisdiction. The rule of res judicata thus forbids the reopening of a matter once
determined by competent authority acting within their exclusive jurisdiction. [Ysmael v.
Deputy Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 79538, 18 October 1990]

Indeed, the principle of conclusiveness of prior adjudications is not confined in its operation
to the judgments of what are ordinarily known as courts, but it extends to all bodies upon
whom judicial powers had been conferred. Hence, whenever any board, tribunal or person is
by law vested with authority to judicially determine a question, like the Merit Systems Board
of the Civil Service Commission and the Office of the President, for instance, such
determination, when it has become final, is as conclusive between the same parties litigating
for the same cause as though the adjudication had been made by a court of general
jurisdiction. [San Luis v. CA, G.R. No. L-80160, June 26, 1989]

The doctrine applies only to judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings and not to the exercise of
the Court’s administrative powers. [Lucente v. Evangelista, A.C. No. 5957, February 4, 2003]
 3

Retroactive Application Of Laws Or Statutes The principle in criminal law, favorabilia sunt amplianda adiosa restrigenda or penal laws
As a general rule, laws are to be given prospective effect. Article 4 of the New Civil Code which are favorable to accused are given retroactive effect, is embodied under Article 22 of
provides: the Revised Penal Code, which provides as follows:

"Laws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is provided."
However, there are several recognized instances when retroactive application is allowed:
(1) When the law expressly provides for retroactivity.
Well-settled is the principle that while the Legislature has the power to pass retroactive laws
which do not impair the obligation of contracts, or affect injuriously vested rights, it is equally
true that statutes are not to be construed as intended to have a retroactive effect so as to
affect pending proceedings, unless such intent is expressly declared or clearly and necessarily
implied from the language of the enactment.
[Espiritu vs Cipriano, G.R. No. L-32743, February 15, 1974]
(2) When the law is curative or remedial.
Retroactive effect of penal laws. - Penal laws shall have a retroactive effect insofar as they
favor the persons guilty of a felony, who is not a habitual criminal, as this term is defined in
Rule 5 of Article 62 of this Code, although at the time of the publication of such laws, a final
sentence has been pronounced and the convict is serving the same.
[see People vs. Talaro, G.R. No. 175781, March 20, 2012]
(5) Administrative rules interpretive of a statute
Administrative rules interpretive of a statute, that are not declarative of certain rights and
corresponding obligations, are given retroactive effect as of the date of the effectivity of the
statute. [see Adamson Ozanom Educational Institution, Inc. v. Adamson University Faculty
and Employees Association, G.R. No. 86819, November 9, 1989, 179 SCRA 279; CIR vs
Azucena Reyes, G.R. No. 159694 and G.R. No. 163581, January 27, 2006]

Prospectivity Of Tax Laws

[T]he legislature has power to pass healing Acts which do not impair the obligation of
This principle provides that a tax bill must only be applicable and operative after becoming a
contracts nor interfere with vested rights. They are remedial by curing defects and adding to
law. As a general rule, taxing authorities must be applied prospectively, except by express
the means of enforcing existing obligations. The rule in regard to curative statutes is that if
provision of the law. Ex post facto is not applicable for tax purposes. However when it comes
the thing omitted or failed to be done, and which constitutes the defect sought to be
to civil penalties like fines and forfeiture (except interest), tax laws may be applied
removed or made harmless, is something which the legislature might have dispensed with by
retroactively unless it produces harsh and oppressive consequences w/c violate the
a previous statute, it may do so by a subsequent one. If the irregularity consists in doing
taxpayer's constitutional rights regarding equity and due process
some act, or doing it in the mode which the legislature might have made immaterial by a
prior law, it may do so by a subsequent one.
[Government of The Philippines vs. Municipality of Binalonan,G.R. No. 8243,December 24,
1915; see also Zulueta vs. Asia Brewery, G.R. No. 138137, March 8, 2001; see also CIR vs
Azucena Reyes, G.R. No. 159694 and G.R. No. 163581, January 27, 2006]

(3) When the law is procedural.

Statutes and rules regulating the procedure of courts are considered applicable to actions
pending and unresolved at the time of their passage. Procedural laws and rules are
retroactive in that sense and to that extent. The effect of procedural statutes and rules on
the rights of a litigant may not preclude their retroactive application to pending actions. This
retroactive application does not violate any right of a person adversely affected. Neither is it
constitutionally objectionable. The reason is that, as a general rule, no vested right may
attach to or arise from procedural laws and rules. It has been held that “a person has no
vested right in any particular remedy, and a litigant cannot insist on the application to the
trial of his case, whether civil or criminal, of any other than the existing rules of
procedure. [Panay Railways Inc. vs. Heva Management and Development Corporation, G.R.
No. 154061, January 25, 2012]

(4) When the law is penal in character and favourable to the accused.
 4

Political Law; Local Governments; Principles Of Autonomy We recognize that, although our Constitution guarantees autonomy to local government units,
the exercise of local autonomy remains subject to the power of control by Congress and the
Each local government unit shall have the power to create its own source of revenue and to power of supervision by the President. [Dadole v. COA, G.R. No. 125350, December 3, 2002]
levy taxes, fees, and other charges subject to such guidelines and limitation as the congress
may provide, consistent with the basic policy on local autonomy. Such taxes, fees and
charges shall accrue exclusively to the local government. [Sec. 5, Article X, 1987 Constitution]

Declaration of Policy
(a) Policy of the State that the territorial and political subdivisions of the State shall enjoy
genuine and meaningful local autonomy to enable them to attain their fullest development as
self-reliant communities and make them more effective partners in the attainment of national
goals.

(b) The State shall provide for a more responsive and accountable local government structure
instituted through a system of decentralization whereby local government units shall be given
more powers, authority, responsibilities, and resources. [Sec. 2, R.A. No. 7160]

Ours is still a unitary form of government, not a federal state. Being so, any form of autonomy
granted to local governments will necessarily be limited and confined within the extent
allowed by the central authority. Besides, the principle of local autonomy under the 1987
Constitution simply means decentralization. It does not make local governments sovereign
within the state or animperium in imperio. [Lina v. Pano, G.R. No. 129093, August 30, 2001]

The principle of local autonomy under the 1987 Constitution simply means decentralization.
[Basco v. PAGCOR, G.R. No. 91649, May 14, 1991]

Decentralization

1. Decentralization of administration – occurs when the central government delegates

administrative powers to political subdivisions in order to broaden the base of
government power. [Gozon v. CA,G.R. No. 101428, August 5, 1992]. The purpose of such
is to relieve the central government of the burden of managing local affairs and enable
to concentrate on national concerns.
2. Decentralization of power – Abdication of political power in favor of LGUs declared to be
autonomous regions, making the latter no longer accountable to the national
government, but to its constituents instead. This is not allowed under the 1987
Constitution.

Only Congress can create provinces and cities, because creation of such will lead to creation of
legislative districts too. The ARMM Regional Assembly cannot create provinces and cities.
[Sema v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 177597 & 178628, July 16, 2008]

Devolution

The act by which the national government confers power and authority upon the various local
government units to perform specific functions and responsibilities. [Sec. 17, R.A. No. 7160]

Extraterritoriality
This concerns the operation of laws outside the boundary of a state or country (Black's Law
Dictionary).
Action For Support Against A Non-Resident Individual, Mode Of Service Of Summons
Action for support is an action in personam
An action for support is characterized as an action is one in personam since the action is
made against a person based on his personal liability. The action instituted affect the parties
alone, not the whole world.
How the court acquires jurisdiction in an action in personam where the defendant is a non-
resident
In case the defendant does not reside and is not found in the Philippines (and hence personal
and substituted service cannot be effected), the remedy of the plaintiff in order for the court
to acquire jurisdiction to try the case is to convert the action into a proceeding in
rem or quasi in rem by attaching the property of the defendant.
Thus, in order to acquire jurisdiction in actions in personam where defendant resides out of
and is not found in the Philippines, it becomes a matter of course for the court to convert the
action into a proceeding in rem orquasi in rem by attaching the defendant's
property. The service of summons in this case may be by publication coupled with the
sending by registered mail of the copy of the summons and the court order to the last known
address of the defendant. [seePCI Bank vs. Alejandro, G.R. No. 175587, September 21, 2007]
Where the defendant in an action in personam is a non-resident, and refuses to appear and
submit to the jurisdiction of the court, the jurisdiction of the latter is limited to the property
within the country which the court may have ordered attached. In such a case, the property
itself is "the sole thing which is impleaded and is the responsible object which is the subject
of the judicial power.” [seeVillareal vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 107314, September 17,
1998]
Extraterritorial service does not apply in an action in personam
Under Section 15, Rule 14 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, there are only four
instances wherein a defendant who is a non-resident and is not found in the country may be
served with summons by extraterritorial service, to wit: (1) when the action affects the
personal status of the plaintiff; (2) when the action relates to, or the subject of which is
property, within the Philippines, in which the defendant claims a lien or an interest, actual or
contingent; (3) when the relief demanded in such action consists, wholly or in part, in
excluding the defendant from any interest in property located in the Philippines; and (4)
when the defendant non-resident's property has been attached within the Philippines. In
these instances, service of summons may be effected by (a) personal service out of the
country, with leave of court; (b) publication, also with leave of court; or (c) any other manner
the court may deem sufficient.
5
Undoubtedly, extraterritorial service of summons applies only where the action is in rem or
quasi in rem, but not if an action is in personam. [see Perkin Elmer Singapore Pte Ltd. vs.
Dakila Trading Corporation, G.R. No. 172242, August 14, 2007]
Service Of Summons, Summary Of Rules
Nature of Summons
Summons is the writ by which the defendant is notified of the action brought against
him. [Cano-Gutierrez vs. Gutierrez, G.R. No. 138584, October 2, 2000; Guanzon vs.
Arradaza, G.R. No. 155392, December 6, 2006]
Jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is generally acquired, in the absence of his
voluntary appearance, by proper service in person or substituted service of summons. The
issuance of summons is not discretionary on the part of the court or the clerk of court but is a
mandatory requirement. [Section 1, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court]
Purpose of Summons
Action in Personam -- not only to notify the defendant of the action against him but also to
acquire jurisdiction over his person. [Umandap vs. Sabio Jr., G.R. No. 140244, August 29,
2000]
Action in Rem or Quasi in rem – jurisdiction over the defendant is not mandatory and the
court acquires jurisdiction over an action as long as it acquires jurisdiction over the res. The
purpose of summons in these actions is not the acquisition of jurisdiction over the defendant
but mainly to satisfy the constitutional requirements of due process. [Gomez vs. CA, G.R. No.
127692, March 10, 2004; Biaco vs. Philippine Countryside Rural Bank, G.R. No. 161417,
February 8, 2007; PCI Bank vs. Alejandro, G.R. No. 175587, September 21, 2007]
Modes of Service (in order of priority)
1. Personal Service (Section 6, Rule 14)
When availed: Whenever practicable
Procedure: The summons shall be served by handing a copy thereof to the defendant in
person, or, if he refuses to receive and sign it, by tendering it to him
2. Substituted Service (Section 7, Rule 14)
When availed:
When, for justifiable reasons, the defendant cannot be personally served summons within a
reasonable time.
“Personal service of summons is preferred to substituted service. Only if the former cannot
be made promptly can the process server resort to the latter. Moreover, the proof of service
of summons must (a) indicate the impossibility of service of summons within a reasonable
 6

time; (b) specify the efforts exerted to locate the defendant; and (c) state that the summons (Sec. 8, Rule 14)
was served upon a person of sufficient age and discretion who is residing in the address, or
who is in charge of the office or regular place of business, of the defendant. It is likewise 2. Prisoner
required that the pertinent facts proving these circumstances be stated in the proof of
service or in the officer’s return. The failure to comply faithfully, strictly and fully with all the Service upon the prisoner shall be effected upon him BY the officer managing the jail or
foregoing requirements of substituted service renders the service of summons institution where said prisoner is confined. (Sec. 9, Rule 14)
ineffective.” [Spouses Jose vs. Spouses Boyon, G.R. No. 147369, 23 October 2003]
3. Minor or Incompetent or Insane
Procedure:
Leaving copies of the summons at the defendant’s residence with some person of suitable 1) Upon him personally; and
age and discretion then residing therein; or 2) Upon his legal guardian if he has one or if none, his guardian ad litem.
(Sec. 10, Rule 14)
Leaving the copies at defendant’s office or regular place of business with some competent
person in charge thereof 4. Private Domestic Juridical entity

3. Extraterritorial Service (Section 16, Rule 14) 1) President; or

2) Managing partner; or
When availed: 3) General manager; or
4) Corporate Secretary; or
Under Section 15 of Rule 14, a defendant who is a non-resident and is not found in the 5) Treasurer; or
country may be served with summons by extraterritorial service in four instances: 6) In-house counsel
(Sec. 11, Rule 14)
(1) when the action affects the personal status of the plaintiff;
(2) when the action relates to, or the subject of which is property within the Philippines, in * The selection is exclusive and summons cannot be served upon any other person. [see
which the defendant has or claims a lien or interest, actual or contingent; Paramount Insurance Corp. vs. A.C. Ordonez Corp, G.R. No. 175109, August 6, 2008]
(3) when the relief demanded consists, wholly or in part, in excluding the defendant from any
interest in property located in the Philippines; or 5. Public Corporation
(4) when the property of the defendant has been attached within the Philippines.
a) Republic of the Philippines – service upon the Solicitor General (Sec.13, Rule 14)
Procedure: b) Province, city or municipality – service upon the executive head, or on such other officer/s
of the law or the court may direct. (Sec. 14, Rule 14)
In these instances, extraterritorial service of summons may be effected under any of three
modes: (1) by personal service out of the country, with leave of court; (2) by publication and 6. Resident defendant whose identity or whereabouts are unknown (despite diligent
sending a copy of the summons and order of the court by registered mail to the defendant’s inquiry)
last known address, also with leave of court; or (3) by any other means the judge may
consider sufficient. [see Margarita Romualdez-Licaros vs Abelardo Licaros, G.R. No. 150656, Service made with prior leave of court: Through publication in a newspaper of general
April 29, 2003] circulation (Sec. 14, Rule 14)

To Whom Summons are Served 7. Resident temporarily out of the Philippines

1. Entity without juridical personality - Service made by leave of court out of the Philippines under the rules on extraterritorial
service in Sec. 15, Rule 14:
1) Any one or all of the defendants; or
2) Upon the person in charge of the office or of the place of business maintained in such By any of the following modes
name i) Personal service;
ii) Publication in a newspaper of general circulation together with a registered mailing of a
*This service shall not bind the individual whose connection with the entity, upon due notice, copy of the summons and the order of the court to the last known address of the defendant;
has been severed before the action was brought. or
 7

iii) By any manner the court may deem sufficient (Sec. 16, Rule 14) Substituted service of summons should be distinguished from substituted service of
pleadings. Under Rule 13 of the Rules of Court, service of pleadings can be done using the
8. Foreign private juridical entity (which has transacted business in the country) following modes:

a) Its resident agent designated in accordance with law;
or if there is no agent
b) On the government official designated by law; or
c) Any of its officers or agents within the Philippines
Mode of Service of Summons vis-à-vis Nature of the Action
a. Personal service- delivering personally a copy of the pleading to the party or his counsel, or
by leaving a copy in his office with his clerk or with a person having charge thereof.
b. Service by mail- either by registered mail or ordinary mail
c. Substituted service- made by delivering a copy of the pleading to the clerk of court, with
proof of failure of both personal service and service by mail. (see Sections 6-8, Rule 13, Rules
of Court)

Action In Personam

Resident:
1st: Personal service
2nd: Substituted service
3rd: Publication (if unknown identity/residence or out of the country)

Non-Resident
Jurisdiction is never acquired unless summons is served within the Philippines personally to
the defendant by handing a copy of the summons to him, or if her refuses by tendering it.

*extraterritorial service of summons is not allowed

Action in Rem/Quasi-In Rem

Resident
1st: Personal service
2nd: Substituted service
3rd: Publication (if unknown identity/residence or out of the country)

Non-Resident
1st: Personal service
2nd: Substituted service
3rd: Publication (if unknown identity/residence or out of the country)

The personal service using the procedure in Sec. 6 of Rule 14, will not have the effect of
acquiring jurisdiction over the nonresident defendant even if the summons and copy of the
complaint are personally received by him in the country where he may be found. This is
because of the rule that a nonresident defendant who refuses to come to the country
voluntarily remains beyond the personal processes of the court which therefore, cannot
acquire jurisdiction over him. [Banco Espanol-Filipino vs. Palanca, G.R. No. L-11390, March
26, 1918; Perkins vs. Dizon, G.R. No. 46631 ,November 16, 1939]

Substituted service of summons vs. Substituted service of pleadings


Administrative Issuances (Quasi-Legislative Power Of Administrative Bodies)
Statutory basis:
Executive Order No. 292 or the Administrative Code of 1987, provides that:
CHAPTER 11
Administrative Issuances
SECTION 50. General Classification of Issuances.—The administrative issuances of Secretaries
and heads of bureaus, offices or agencies shall be in the form of circulars or orders.
(1) Circulars shall refer to issuances prescribing policies, rules and regulations, and
procedurespromulgated pursuant to law, applicable to individuals and organizations outside
the Government and designed to supplement provisions of the law or to provide means for
carrying them out, including information relating thereto; and
(2) Orders shall refer to issuances directed to particular offices, officials, or employees,
concerning specific matters including assignments, detail and transfer of personnel, for
observance or compliance by all concerned.
Validity of administrative issuances
Under Article 7 of the New Civil Code: “...Administrative or executive acts, orders and
regulations shall be valid only when they are not contrary to the laws or the Constitution.”
To be valid, an administrative issuance, such as an executive order, must comply with the
following requisites:
(1) Its promulgation must be authorized by the legislature;
(2) It must be promulgated in accordance with the prescribed procedure;
(3) It must be within the scope of the authority given by the legislature; and
(4) It must be reasonable.
[see Executive Secretary vs. Southwing Heavy Industries, Inc., G.R. No. 164171, February 20,
2006]
Administrative regulations, classifications
The role of the executive branch or the concerned administrative agency tasked to formulate
rules and regulations implementing the law is either (i) to fill up details (supplementary rule-
making) or (ii) ascertain facts necessary to bring the law into actual operation (contingent
rule-making). [seeABAKADA Guro Party List vs. Purisima, G.R. No. 166715, August 14, 2008]
An administrative regulation may be classified as a (i) legislative rule, an (ii) interpretative
rule, or a (iii) contingent rule.
Legislative rules are in the nature of subordinate legislation and designed to implement a
8
primary legislation by providing the details thereof.They usually implement existing law,
imposing general, extra-statutory obligations pursuant to authority properly delegated by
Congress and effect a change in existing law or policy which affects individual rights and
obligations.
Meanwhile, interpretative rules are intended to interpret, clarify or explain existing statutory
regulations under which the administrative body operates. Their purpose or objective is
merely to construe the statute being administered and purport to do no more than interpret
the statute. Simply, they try to say what the statute means and refer to no single person or
party in particular but concern all those belonging to the same class which may be covered
by the said rules.
Finally, contingent rules are those issued by an administrative authority based on the
existence of certain facts or things upon which the enforcement of the law depends.
[see Republic (BFAD) vs. Drugmaker's Laboratories, Inc., G.R. No. 190837, March 5, 2014]
Interpretative rules are those which give no real consequence more than what the law itself
has already prescribed; and are designed merely to provide guidelines to the law which the
administrative agency is in charge of enforcing. A legislative rule, on the other hand, is in the
nature of subordinate legislation, crafted to implement a primary legislation. [see Executive
Secretary vs. Southwing Heavy Industries, Inc., G.R. No. 164171, February 20, 2006]
Requirement of notice, hearing and publication
According to Executive Order No. 292, s. 1987, otherwise known as the "Administrative Code
of 1987, (three) 3 copies of every rule should be filed in the Office of the National
Administrative Register (ONAR) of the UP Law Center. Failure to comply with this makes the
administrative issuance ineffective & may not be enforced. [see GMA v. MTRCB, G.R. No.
148579, February 5, 2007]
In general, an administrative regulation needs to comply with the requirements laid down by
the [Administrative Code of 1987] on prior notice, hearing, and publication in order to be
valid and binding, except when the same is merely an interpretative rule.
[However, not all administrative issuances require publication and hearing.] When an
administrative rule is merely interpretative in nature, its applicability needs nothing further
than its bare issuance, for it gives no real consequence more than what the law itself has
already prescribed. When, on the other hand, the administrative rule goes beyond merely
providing for the means that can facilitate or render least cumbersome the implementation
of the law but substantially increases the burden of those governed, it behooves the agency
to accord at least to those directly affected a chance to be heard, and thereafter to be duly
informed, before that new issuance is given the force and effect of law. [seeRepublic (BFAD)
vs. Drugmaker's Laboratories, Inc., G.R. No. 190837, March 5, 2014; see also Executive
Secretary vs. Southwing Heavy Industries, Inc., G.R. No. 164171, February 20, 2006]
Not all rules and regulations adopted by every government agency are to be filed with the UP
Law Center. Only those of general or of permanent character are to be filed. Interpretative
 9

regulations and those merely internal in nature are not required to be filed with the U.P. Law
Center. [see Board of Trustees v. Velasco, G.R. No. 170463, February 2, 2011 and Cawad vs.
Abad, G.R. No. 207145, July 28, 2015]

Weight of an interpretation given by an administrative agency to its own rules or

regulations

The necessity for vesting Administrative Authorities with power to make rules and
regulations because of the impracticability of the lawmakers to provide general regulations
for various and varying details of management, has been recognized by the courts and
upheld against various particular objections. Recognizing the existence of such rule making
authority, what is the weight of an interpretation given by an administrative agency to its
own rules or regulations? Authorities sustain the doctrine that the interpretation given to a
rule or regulation by those charged with its execution is entitled to the greatest weight by
the Court construing such rule or regulation, and such interpretation will be followed unless
it appears to be clearly unreasonable or arbitrary. It also been said that:

An Administrative body has power to interpret its own rules which have the force and effect
of law, and such an interpretation becomes part of the rule.

Rules, regulations, and general orders enacted by administrative authorities pursuant to the
powers delegated to them have the force and effect of law

The contemporaneous construction of statute (and similarly of rules and regulations) by the
executive officers of the government whose duty it is to execute it is entitled to great
respect, and should ordinarily control the construction of the statute by the courts

Courts are reluctant to disregard a settled practice of an executive department where they
are not satisfied that it is contrary to law, and are satisfied that it is in accordance with justice
and good faith.

[ see Geukeko vs. Araneta, G.R. No. L-10182, December 24, 1957 (citations omitted)]

Administrative practice

A mere administrative practice, not formalized into a rule or ruling, will not suffice because
such a mere administrative practice may not be uniformly and consistently applied. An
administrative practice, if not formalized as a rule or ruling, will not be known to the general
public and can be availed of only by those within formal contacts with the government
agency.

[see CIR vs. San Roque Power, G.R. No. 187485/G.R. No. 196113/G.R. No. 197156, October 8,
2013]
 10

Ignorance Or Mistake Of Fact As A Valid Defense The theory of non-liability by reason of honest mistake of fact or the maxim ignorantia facti
excusatapplies only when the mistake is committed without fault or carelessness. [see
Ignorance or Mistake of fact as a justifying circumstance People vs. Oanis, G.R. No. L-47722, Juky 27, 1942]

A “mistake of fact” is a misapprehension of a fact which, if true, would have justified the act In the case of US vs. Ah Chong, it was held that if, by reason of a mistake as to the facts, a
or omission which is the subject of the prosecution. Generally, a reasonable mistake of fact is person does an act for which he would be exempt from criminal liability if the facts were as
a defense to a charge of crime where it negates the intent component of the crime. [see he supposed them to be, but which would constitute the crime of homicide or assassination
Yapyuco y Enriquez vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 120744-46 and G.R. No. 122677 and G.R. if the actor had known the true state of the facts at the time when he committed the act,
No.122776, June 25, 2012] under such circumstances, there is no criminal liability, provided always that the alleged
ignorance or mistake of fact was not due to negligence or bad faith.
Ignorance or mistake of fact, if such ignorance or mistake of fact is sufficient to negative a
particular intent which under the law is a necessary ingredient of the offense charged (e. g.,
in larceny, animus furendi; in murder, malice; in crimes and misdemeanors generally some
degree of criminal intent) "cancels the presumption of intent," and works an acquittal;
except in those cases where the circumstances demand a conviction under the penal
provisions touching criminal negligence; and in cases where, under the provisions of [the
Revised] Penal Code one voluntarily committing a crime or misdemeanor incurs criminal
liability for any wrongful act committed by him, even though it be different from that which
he intended to commit. [see US vs. Ah Chong, G.R. No. 5272, March 19, 1910]

Whenever a man undertakes self-defense, he is justified in acting on the facts as they appear
to him. If without fault or carelessness, he is misled concerning them, and defends himself
correctly according to what he thus supposes the facts to be, the law will not punish him
though they are in truth otherwise, and he has really no occasion for the extreme
measure. [see US vs. Ah Chong, G.R. No. 5272, March 19, 1910]

Requirements to invoke the defense of mistake of fact

A proper invocation of this defense requires:

(a) that the mistake be honest and reasonable,

(b) that it be a matter of fact, and
(c) that it negate the culpability required to commit the crime or the existence of the
mental state which the statute prescribes with respect to an element of the offense.

[see Yapyuco y Enriquez vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 120744-46 and G.R. No. 122677 and
G.R. No.122776, June 25, 2012]

Mistake of fact cannot be invoked as a defense when there is negligence or bad faith
present

The justification of an act, which is otherwise criminal on the basis of a mistake of fact, must
preclude negligence or bad faith on the part of the accused. [see Yapyuco y Enriquez vs.
Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 120744-46 and G.R. No. 122677 and G.R. No.122776, June 25,
2012]

Renvoi Doctrine (Doctrine Of Renvoi)
The theory of the doctrine of renvoi is that the court of the forum, in determining the
question before it, must take into account the whole law of the other jurisdiction, but also its
rules as to conflict of laws, and then apply the law to the actual question which the rules of
the other jurisdiction prescribe. This may be the law of the forum.
One type of renvoi is when a jural matter is presented which the conflict-of-laws rule of the
forum refers to a foreign law, the conflict-of-laws rule of which, in turn, refers the matter
back again to the law of the forum. This is renvoi in the narrower sense. In succession cases,
the renvoi doctrine is applicable if the decedent is a national of one state and a resident of
another.
[See In Re: Edward E. Christensen Vs. Helen Christensen Garcia, G.R. No. L-16749, January 31,
1963]
Related Reference(s)
 In Re: Edward E. Christensen vs. Helen Christensen Garcia 117 Phil. 96
G.R. No. L-16749 | 1963-01-31
IN THE MATTER OF THE TESTATE ESTATE OF EDWARD E. CHRISTENSEN, DECEASED. ADOLFO
C. AZNAR, Executor and LUCY CHRISTENSEN, Heir of the deceased, Executor and Heir-
appellees, vs. HELEN CHRISTENSEN GARCIA, oppositor-appellant.
G.R. No. L-16749 | 1963-01-31
DECISION
LABRADOR, J.:
This is an appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Davao, Hon. Vicente N. Cusi,
Jr., presiding, in Special Proceeding No. 622 of said court, dated September 14, 1949,
approving among other things the final accounts of the executor, directing the executor to
reimburse Maria Lucy Christensen the amount of P3,600 paid by her to Helen Christensen
Garcia as her legacy, and declaring Maria Lucy Christensen entitled to the residue of the
property to be enjoyed during her lifetime, and in case of death without issue, one-half of
said residue to be payable to Mrs. Carrie Louise C. Borton, etc., in accordance with the
provisions of the will of the testator Edward E. Christensen. The will was executed in Manila
on March 5, 1951 and contains the following provisions:
"3. I declare . . . that I have but one (1) child, named Maria Lucy Christensen (now Mrs.
Bernard Daney), who was born in the Philippines about twenty-eight years ago, and who is
now residing at No. 665 Rodger Young Village, Los Angeles, California, U.S.A.
"4. I further declare that I now have no living ascendants, and no descendents except my
above named daughter, Maria Lucy Christensen Daney.
11
xxx xxx xxx
"7. I give, devise and bequeath unto Maria Helen Christensen, now married to Eduardo
Garcia, about eighteen years of age and who, notwithstanding the fact that she was baptized
Christensen, is not in any way related to me, nor has she been at any time adopted by me,
and who, from all information I have now resides in Egpit, Digos, Davao, Philippines, the sum
of Three Thousand Six Hundred Pesos (P3,600.00), Philippine Currency, the same to be
deposited in trust for the said Maria Helen Christensen with the Davao Branch of the
Philippine National Bank, and paid to her at the rate of One Hundred Pesos (P100.00),
Philippine Currency per month until the principal thereof as well as any interest which may
have accrued thereon, is exhausted.
xxx xxx xxx
"12. I hereby give devise and bequeath unto my well-beloved daughter, the said Maris Lucy
Christensen Daney (Mrs. Bernard Daney), now residing as aforesaid at No. 665 Rodger Young
Village, Los Angeles, California, U.S.A., all the income from the rest, remainder, and residue
of my property and estate, real, personal and/or mixed, of whatsoever kind or character, and
wheresoever situated, of which I may be possessed at my death and which may have come
to me from any source whatsoever, during her lifetime: . . ."
It is in accordance with the above-quoted provisions that the executor in his final account
and project partition ratified the payment of only P3,600 to Helen Christensen Garcia and
proposed that the residue of the estate be transferred to his daughter, Maria Lucy
Christensen.
Opposition to the approval of the project of partition was filed by Helen Christensen Garcia,
insofar as it deprives her (Helen) of her legitime as an acknowledged natural child, she having
been declared by Us in G.R. Nos. L-11483-84 an acknowledged natural child of the deceased
Edward E. Christensen. The legal grounds of opposition are (a) that the distribution should be
governed by the laws of the Philippines, and (b) that said order of distribution is contrary
thereto insofar as it denies to Helen Christensen, one of two acknowledged natural children,
one-half of the estate in full ownership. In amplification of the above grounds it was alleged
that the law that should govern the estate of the deceased Christensen should not be the
internal law of California alone, but the entire law thereof because several foreign elements
are involved, that the forum is the Philippines and even if the case were decided in California,
Section 946 of the California Civil Code, which requires that the domicile of the decedent
apply, should be applicable. It was also alleged that Maria Helen Christensen having been
declared an acknowledged natural child of the decedent, she is deemed for all purposes
legitimate from the time of her birth.
The court below ruled that as Edward E. Christensen was a citizen of the United States and of
the State of California at the time of his death, the successional rights and intrinsic validity of
the provisions in his will are to be governed by the law of California, in accordance with
which a testator has the right to dispose of his property in the way he desires, because the
right of absolute dominion over his property is sacred and inviolable (In re McDaniel's Estate,
77 Cal. Appl. 2d 877, 176 P. 2d 952, and In re Kaufman, 117 Cal. 286, 49 Pac. 192, cited in
page 179, Record on Appeal). Oppositor Maria Helen Christensen, through counsel, filed

various motions for reconsideration, but these were denied. Hence this appeal.
The most important assignments of error are as follows:
I States but returned to the Philippines in December, 1945. Appellees' Collective Exhibits '6',
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN IGNORING THE DECISION OF THE HONORABLE SUPREME
COURT THAT HELEN IS THE ACKNOWLEDGED NATURAL CHILD OF EDWARD E. CHRISTENSEN
AND, CONSEQUENTLY, IN DEPRIVING HER OF HER JUST SHARE IN THE INHERITANCE.
II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ENTIRELY IGNORING AND/OR FAILING TO RECOGNIZE THE
EXISTENCE OF SEVERAL FACTORS, ELEMENTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES CALLING FOR THE
APPLICATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW.
III
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO RECOGNIZE THAT UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW,
PARTICULARLY UNDER THE RENVOI DOCTRINE, THE INTRINSIC VALIDITY OF THE
TESTAMENTARY DISPOSITION OR THE DISTRIBUTION OF THE ESTATE OF THE DECEASED
EDWARD E. CHRISTENSEN SHOULD BE GOVERNED BY THE LAWS OF THE PHILIPPINES.
IV
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT THE SCHEDULE OF DISTRIBUTION
SUBMITTED BY THE EXECUTOR IS CONTRARY TO THE PHILIPPINE LAWS.
V the Philippines, for the latter was a territory of the United States (not a state) until 1946 and
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT UNDER THE PHILIPPINE LAWS HELEN
CHRISTENSEN GARCIA IS ENTITLED TO ONE-HALF (1/2) OF THE ESTATE IN FULL OWNERSHIP.
There is no question that Edward E. Christensen was a citizen of the United States and of the
State of California at the time of his death. But there is also no question that at the time of
his death he was domiciled in the Philippines, as witness the following facts admitted by the
executor himself in appellee's brief:
"In the proceedings for admission of the will to probate, the facts of record show that the
deceased Edward E. Christensen was born on November 29, 1875, in New York City, N. Y.,
U.S.A.; his first arrival in the Philippines, as an appointed school teacher, was on July 1, 1901,
on board the U.S. Army Transport 'Sheridan' with Port of Embarkation as the City of San
Francisco, in the State of California, U.S.A. He stayed in the Philippines until 1904.
"In December, 1904, Mr. Christensen returned to the United States and stayed there for the
following nine years until 1913, during which time he resided in, and was teaching school in
Sacramento, California.
"Mr. Christensen's next arrival in the Philippines was in July of the year 1913. However, in
1928, he again departed the Philippines for the United States and came back here the
following year, 1929. Some nine years later, in 1938, he again returned to his own country,
12
and came back to the Philippines the following year, 1939.
"Being an American citizen, Mr. Christensen was interned by the Japanese Military Forces in
the Philippines during World War II. Upon liberation, in April 1945, he left for the United
CFI Davao, Sp. Proc. 622. as Exhibits 'AA', 'BB' and 'CC-Daney'; Exhs. 'MM', 'MM-1', 'MM-2-
Daney', and p. 473, t.s.n., July 21, 1953.
"In April, 1951, Edward E. Christensen returned once more to California shortly after the
making of his last will and testament (now in question herein) which he executed at his
lawyers' offices in Manila on March 5, 1951. He died at the St. Luke's Hospital in the City of
Manila on April 30, 1953." (Pp. 2-3)
In arriving at the conclusion that the domicile of the deceased is the Philippines, we are
persuaded by the fact that he was born in New York, migrated to California and resided there
for nine years, and since he came to the Philippines in 1913 he returned to California very
rarely and only for short visits (perhaps to relatives), and considering that he appears never
to have owned or acquired a home or properties in that state, which would indicate that he
would ultimately abandon the Philippines and make home in the State of California.
"Sec. 16. Residence is a term used with many shades of meaning from mere temporary
presence to the most permanent abode. Generally, however, it is used to denote something
more than mere physical presence." (Goodrich on Conflict of Laws, p. 29)
As to his citizenship, however, we find that the citizenship that he acquired in California
when he resided in Sacramento, California from 1904 to 1913, was never lost by his stay in
the deceased appears to have considered himself as a citizen of California by the fact that
when he executed his will in 1951 he declared that he was a citizen of that Estate; so that he
appears never to have intended to abandon his California citizenship by acquiring another.
This conclusion is in accordance with the following principle expounded by Goodrich in his
Conflict of Laws.
"The terms 'residence' and 'domicile' might well be taken to mean the same thing, a place of
permanent abode. But domicile, as has been shown, has acquired a technical meaning. Thus
one may be domiciled in a place where he has never been. And he may reside in a place
where he has no domicile. The man with two homes, between which he divides his time,
certainly resides in each one, while living in it. But if he went on business which would
require his presence for several weeks or months, he might properly be said to have
sufficient connection with the place to be called a resident. It is clear, however, that, if he
treated his settlement as continuing only for the particular business in hand, not giving up his
former "home," he could not be a domiciled New Yorker. Acquisition of a domicile of choice
requires the exercise of intention as well as physical presence. Residence simply requires
bodily presence as an inhabitant in a given place, while domicile requires bodily presence in
that place and also an intention to make it one's domicile.' Residence, however, is a term
used with many shades of meaning, from the merest temporary presence to the most
permanent abode, and it is not safe to insist that any one use is the only proper one."
(Goodrich, p. 29)

The law that governs the validity of his testamentary dispositions is defined in Article 16 of
the Civil Code of the Philippines, which is as follows:
"ART. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country
where it is situated.
"However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of
succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of
testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose
succession is under consideration, whatever may be the nature of the property and
regardless of the country wherein said property may be found."
The application of this article in the case at bar requires the determination of the meaning of
the term "national law" as used therein.
There is no single American law governing the validity of testamentary provisions in the
United States, each State of the Union having its own private law applicable to its citizens
only and in force only within the state. The "national law" indicated in Article 16 of the Civil
Code above quoted can not, therefore, possibly mean or apply to any general American law.
So it can refer to no other than the private law of the state of which the decedent is a citizen,
in the case at bar, the private law of the State of California.
The next question is: What is the law in California governing the disposition of personal
property? The decision of the court below, sustains the contention of the executor-appellee
that under the California Probate Code, a testator may dispose of his property by will in the
form and manner he desires, citing the case of Estate of McDaniel, 77 Cal. Appl. 2d 877, 176
P. 2d 952. But appellant invokes the provisions of Article 946 of the Civil Code of California,
which is as follows:
"If there is no law to the contrary, in the place where personal property is situated, it is
deemed to follow the person of its owner, and is governed by the law of his domicile."
The existence of this provision is alleged in appellant's opposition and is not denied. We have
checked it in the California Civil Code and it is there. Appellee, on the other hand, relies on
the case cited in the decision and testified to by a witness. (Only the case Kaufman is
correctly cited.) It is argued on executor's behalf that as the deceased Christensen was a
citizen of the State of California, the internal law thereof, which is that given in the above-
cited case, should govern the determination of the validity of the testamentary provisions of
Christensen's will, such law being in force in the State of California of which Christensen was
a citizen. Appellant, on the other hand, insists that Article 946 should be applicable, and in
accordance therewith and following the doctrine of renvoi, the question of the validity of the
testamentary provision in question should be referred back to the law of the decedent's
domicile, which is the Philippines.
The theory or doctrine of renvoi has been defined by various authors, thus:
"The problem has been stated in this way: 'When the Conflict of Laws rule of the forum
refers a jural matter to a foreign law for decision, is the reference to the corresponding rule
13
of the Conflict of Law of that foreign law, or is the reference to the purely internal rules of
law of the foreign system; i.e., to the totality of the foreign law, minus its Conflict of Laws
rules?
"On logic, the solution is not an easy one. The Michigan court chose to accept the renvoi,
that is, applied the Conflict of Laws rule of Illinois which referred the matter back to Michigan
law. But once having determined that the Conflict of Laws principle is the rule looked to, it is
difficult to see why the reference back should not have been to Michigan Conflict of Laws.
This would have resulted in the 'endless chain of references' which has so often been
criticized by legal writers. The opponents of the renvoi would have looked merely to the
internal law of Illinois, thus rejecting the renvoi or the reference back. Yet there seems no
compelling logical reason why the original reference should be to the internal law rather than
to the Conflict of Laws rule. It is true that such a solution avoids going on a merry-go-round,
but those who have accepted the renvoi theory avoid this inextricabilis circulas by getting off
at the second reference and at that point applying internal law. Perhaps the opponents of
the renvoi are a bit more consistent for they look always to internal law as the rule of
reference.
"Strangely enough, both the advocates for and the objectors to the renvoi plead that greater
uniformity will result from adoption of their respective views. And still more strange is the
fact that the only way to achieve uniformity in this choice-of-law problem is if in the dispute
the two states whose laws form the legal basis of the litigation disagree as to whether the
renvoi should be accepted. If both reject, or both accept the doctrine, the result of the
litigation will vary with the choice of the forum. In the case stated above, had the Michigan
court rejected the renvoi, judgment would have been against the woman; if the suit had
been brought in the Illinois courts, and they too rejected the renvoi, judgment would be for
the woman. The same result would happen, though the courts would switch with respect to
which would hold liability, if both courts accepted the renvoi.
"The Restatement accepts the renvoi theory in two instances: where the title to land is in
question, and where the validity of a decree of divorce is challenged. In these cases, the
Conflict of Laws rule of the situs of the land, or the domicile of the parties in the divorce case,
is applied by the forum, but any further reference goes only to the internal law. Thus, a
person's title to land, recognized by the situs, will be recognized by every court; and every
divorce, valid by the domicile of the parties, will be valid everywhere." (Goodrich, Conflict of
Laws, Sec. 7, pp. 13-14.)
"X, a citizen of Massachusetts, dies intestate, domiciled in France, leaving movable property
in Massachusetts, England, and France. The question arises as to how this property is to be
distributed among X's next of kin.
"Assume (1) that this question arises in a Massachusetts court. There the rule of the conflict
of laws as to intestate succession to movables calls for an application of the law of the
deceased's last domicile. Since by hypothesis X's last domicile was France, the natural thing
for the Massachusetts court to do would be to turn to French statute of distributions, or
whatever corresponds thereto in French law, and decree a distribution accordingly. An
examination of French law, however, would show that if a French court were called upon to
determine how this property should be distributed, it would refer the distribution to the
national law of the deceased, thus applying the Massachusetts state of distributions. So on

the surface of things the Massachusetts court has open to it alternative course of action: (a)
either to apply the French laws as to intestate succession, or (b) to resolve itself into a French
court and apply the Massachusetts statute of distributions, on the assumption that this is
what a French court would do. If it accepts the so-called renvoi doctrine, it will follow the
latter course, thus applying its own law.
"This is one type of renvoi. A jural matter is presented which the conflict-of-laws rule of the
forum refers to a foreign law, the conflict-of-laws rule of which, in turn refers the matter
back again to the law of the forum. This is renvoi in the narrower sense. The German term for
this judicial process is 'Ruckverweisung.'" (Harvard Law Review, Vol. 31, pp. 523-571.)
"After a decision has been arrived at that a foreign law is to be resorted to as governing a
particular case, the further question may arise: Are the rules as to the conflict of laws
contained in such foreign law also to be resorted to? This is a question which, while it has
been considered by the courts in but a few instances, has been the subject of frequent
discussion by textwriters and essayists; and the doctrine involved has been descriptively
designated by them as the 'Renvoyer' to send back, or the Ruchversweisung', or the
'Weiterverweisung', since an affirmative answer to the question postulated and the
operation of the adoption of the foreign law in toto would in many cases result in returning
the main controversy to be decided according to the law of the forum . . . (15 C.J.S. 872.)
"Another theory, known as the 'doctrine of renvoi', has been advanced. The theory of the
doctrine of renvoi is that the court of the forum, in determining the question before it, must
take into account the whole law of the other jurisdiction, but also its rules as to conflict of
laws, and then apply the law to the actual question which the rules of the other jurisdiction
prescribe. This may be the law of the forum. The doctrine of the renvoi has generally been
repudiated by the American authorities." (2 Am. Jur. 296.)
The scope of the theory of renvoi has also been defined and the reasons for its application in
a country explained by Prof. Lorenzen in an article in the Yale Law Journal, Vol. 27, 1917-
1918, pp. 509-531. The pertinent parts of the article are quoted herein below:
"The recognition of the renvoi theory implies that the rules of the conflict of laws are to be
understood as incorporating not only the ordinary or internal law of the foreign state or
country, but its rules of the conflict of laws as well. According to this theory 'the law of a
country' means the whole of its law.
xxx xxx xxx
"Von Bar presented his views at the meeting of the institute of International Law, at
Neuchatel, in 1900, in the form of the following theses:
"(1) Every court shall observe the law of its country as regards the application of foreign laws.
"(2) Provided that no express provision to the contrary exists, the court shall respect:
"(a) The provisions of a foreign law which disclaims the right to bind its nationals abroad as
regards their personal statute, and desires that said personal statute shall be determined by
14
law of the domicile, or even by the law of the place where the act in question occurred.
"(b) The decision of two or more foreign systems of law, provided it be certain that one of
them is necessarily competent, which agree in attributing the determination of a question to
the same system of law.
xxx xxx xxx
"If, for example, the English Law directs its judge to distribute the personal estate of an
Englishman who has died domiciled in Belgium in accordance with the law of his domicile, he
must first inquire whether the law of Belgium would distribute personal property upon death
in accordance with the law of domicile, and if he finds that the Belgian law would make the
distribution in accordance with the law of nationality - that is the English law, - he must
accept this reference back to his own law."
We note that Article 946 of the California Civil Code as its conflict of laws rule, while the rule
applied in In re Kaufman, supra, its internal law. If the law on succession and the conflict of
law rules of California are to be enforced jointly, each in its own intended and appropriate
sphere, the principle cited In re Kaufman should apply to citizens living in the State, but
Article 946 should apply to such of its citizens as are not domiciled in California but in other
jurisdictions. The rule laid down of resorting to the law of the domicile in the determination
of matters with foreign element involved is in accord with the general principle of American
law that the domiciliary law should govern in most matters or rights which follow the person
of the owner.
When a man dies leaving personal property in one or more estates, and leaves a will
directing the manner of distribution of the property, the law of the state where he was
domiciled at the time of his death will be looked to in deciding legal questions about the will,
almost as completely as the law of the situs is consulted in questions about the devise of
land. It is logical that, since the domiciliary rules control devolution of the personal estate in
case of intestate succession, the same rules should determine the validity of an attempted
testamentary disposition of the property. Here, also, it is not that the domiciliary has effect
beyond the borders of the domiciliary state. The rules of the domicile are recognized as
controlling by the Conflict of Laws rules at the situs of the property, and the reason for the
recognition as in the case of intestate succession, is the general convenience of the doctrine.
The New York court has said on the point; 'The general principle that a disposition of
personal property valid at the domicile of the owner, is valid everywhere, is one of universal
application. It had its origin in that international comity which was one of the first fruits of
civilization, and in this age, when business intercourse and the process of accumulating
property take but little notice of boundary lines, the practical wisdom and justice of the rule
is more apparent than ever.'" (Goodrich, Conflict of Laws, Sec. 164, pp. 442-443.)
Appellees argue that what Article 16 of the Civil Code of the Philippines pointed out as the
national law is the internal law of California. But as above explained the laws of California
have prescribed two sets of laws for its citizens, one for residents therein and another for
those domiciled in other jurisdictions. Reason demands that We should enforce the California
internal law prescribed for its citizens residing therein, and enforce the conflict of law rules
law for the citizens domiciled abroad. If we must enforce the law of California as in comity
 15

we are bound to do, as so declared in Article 16 of our Civil Code, then we must enforce the
law of California in accordance with the express mandate thereof and as above explained,
i.e., apply the internal law for residents therein, and its conflict of laws rule for those
domiciled abroad.

It is argued on appellees behalf that the clause "if there is no law to the contrary in the place
where the property is situated" in Sec. 946 of the California Civil Code refers to Article 16 of
the Civil Code of the Philippines and that the law to the contrary in the Philippines is the
provision in said Article 16 that the national of the deceased should govern. This contention
can not be sustained. As explained in the various authorities cited above the national law
mentioned in Article 16 of our Civil Code is the law on conflict of laws in the California Civil
Code, i.e., Article 946, which authorizes the reference or return of the question to the law of
the testator's domicile. The conflict of law rule in California, Article 946, Civil Code, precisely
refers back the case, when a decedent is not domiciled in California, to the law of his
domicile, the Philippines in the case at bar. The court of the domicile can not and should not
refer the case back to California; such action would leave the issue incapable of
determination because the case will then be like a football, tossed back and forth between
the two states, between the country of which the decedent was a citizen and the country of
his domicile. The Philippine court must apply its own law as directed in the conflict of law
rule of the state of the decedent, if the question has to be decided, especially as the
application of the internal law of California provides no legitime for children while the
Philippine law, Arts. 887 (4) and 894, Civil Code of the Philippines, makes natural children
legally acknowledged forced heirs of the parent recognizing them.

The Philippine cases (In Re Estate of Johnson, 39 Phil., 156; Riera vs. Palmaroli, 40 Phil., 105;
Miciano vs. Brimo, 50 Phil., 867; Babcock Templeton vs. Rider Babcock, 52 Phil., 130; and
Gibbs vs. Government, 59 Phil., 293.) cited by appellees to support the decision can not
possibly apply in the case at bar, for two important reasons, i.e., the subject in each case
does not appear to be a citizen of a state in the United States but with domicile in the
Philippines, and it does not appear in each case that there exists in the state of which the
subject is a citizen, a law similar to or identical with Art. 946 of the California Civil Code.

We therefore find that as the domicile of the deceased Christensen, a citizen of California, is
the Philippines, the validity of the provisions of his will depriving his acknowledged natural
child, the appellant, should be governed by the Philippine law, the domicile, pursuant to Art.
946 of the Civil Code of California, not by the internal law of California.

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed and the case returned to the
lower court with instructions that the partition be made as the Philippine law on succession
provides. Judgment reversed, with costs against appellees.

Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes J.B.L., Barrera, Paredes, Dizon, Regala and
Makalintal, JJ., concur.

Bengzon, C.J., took no part.


Judicial Immunity
is a principle which provides that judges, and even Justices of superior courts, are insulated
from being held to account criminally, civilly or administratively for and erroneous decision
made in good faith.
Judicial Courtesy
Section 7 of Rule 65 provides the general rule that the mere pendency of a special civil action
for Certiorari commenced in relation to a case pending before a lower court or court of origin
does not stay the proceedings therein in the absence of a writ of preliminary injunction or
temporary restraining order.
[However], there are instances where even if there is no writ of preliminary injunction or
temporary restraining order issued by a higher court, it would be proper for a lower court or
court of origin to suspend its proceedings on the precept of judicial courtesy. As this Court
explained in Eternal Gardens Memorial Park v. Court of Appeals [G.R. No. L-50054. August
17, 1988]:
Although this Court did not issue any restraining order against the Intermediate Appellate
Court to prevent it from taking any action with regard to its resolutions .... upon learning of
the petition, the appellate court should have refrained from ruling thereon because its
jurisdiction was necessarily limited upon the filing of a petition for certiorari with this Court
questioning the propriety of the issuance of the above-mentioned resolutions. Due respect
for the Supreme Court and practical and ethical considerations should have prompted the
appellate court to wait for the final determination of the petition before taking cognizance of
the case and trying to render moot exactly what was before this court [underscoring
supplied]
[Republic vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 166859, June 26, 2006; see also Joy Mart Consolidated
Corp. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 88705, June 11, 1992, 209 SCRA 738]
When Judicial Courtesy is applied:
The precept of "judicial courtesy" should not be applied indiscriminately and haphazardly if
we are to maintain the relevance of Sec. 7, Rule 65, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure which
states that "the petition shall not interrupt the course of the principal case unless a temporary
restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction has been issued against the public
respondent from further proceeding in the case." So construed, in Eternal Gardens Memorial
Corp. v. Court of Appeals, the rule of "judicial courtesy" would apply only if there is a strong
probability that the issues before the higher court would be rendered moot and moribund as
a result of the continuation of the proceedings in the lower court. [underscoring supplied]
[Go v. Abrogar, A.M. No. RTJ-03-1759, February 27, 2003, 398 SCRA 166 ; see also Milagros
Panuncillo vs. CAP Philippines, Inc.; G.R. No. 161305, February 9, 2007]
Labor cases:
16
In Milagros Panuncillo vs. CAP Philippines, Inc. [G.R. No. 161305; February 9, 2007], the
court stated that:
While under the sixth paragraph of Article 223 of the Labor Code, the decision of the NLRC
becomes final and executory after the lapse of ten calendar days from receipt thereof by the
parties, the adverse party is not precluded from assailing it via Petition for Certiorari under
Rule 65 before the Court of Appeals and then to this Court via a Petition for Review under
Rule 45. If during the pendency of the review no order is issued by the courts enjoining the
execution of a decision of the Labor Arbiter or NLRC which is favorable to an employee, the
Labor Arbiter or the NLRC must exercise extreme prudence and observe judicial courtesy
when the circumstances so warrant.
In the same Milagros case, the court stated that observing judicial courtesy is advisable "if
there is a strong probability that the issues before the higher court would be rendered moot
and moribund as a result of the continuation of the proceedings in the lower court."
The result of exercising judicial courtesy would be as if a temporary restraining order was
issued, the effect of which is:
The issuance of the temporary restraining order ... did not nullify the rights of private
respondents to their reinstatement and to collect their wages during the period of the
effectivity of the order but merely suspended the implementation thereof pending the
determination of the validity of the NLRC resolutions subject of the petition. Naturally, a
finding of this Court that private respondents were not entitled to reinstatement would
mean that they had no right to collect any back wages. On the other hand, where the Court
affirmed the decision of the NLRC and recognized the right of private respondents to
reinstatement,... private respondents are entitled to the wages accruing during the effectivity
of the temporary restraining order. [Zamboanga City Water District v. Buhat , G.R. No.
104389, May 27, 1994]
[see also Saudi Arabian Airlines v. Ma. Jopette M. Rebesencio, G.R. No. 194321, December 01,
2010]
Executive is not bound by the principle of judicial courtesy
The principle of judicial courtesy is based on the hierarchy of courts and applies only to lower
courts in instances where, even if there is no writ of preliminary injunction or TRO issued by a
higher court, it would be proper for a lower court to suspend its proceedings for practical and
ethical considerations. In other words, the principle of "judicial courtesy" applies where there
is a strong probability that the issues before the higher court would be rendered moot and
moribund as a result of the continuation of the proceedings in the lower court or court of
origin. Consequently, this principle cannot be applied to the President, who represents a co-
equal branch of government. To suggest otherwise would be to disregard the principle of
separation of powers, on which our whole system of government is founded upon.
[Datu Michael Abas Kida vs. Senate of the Philippines, G.R. No. 196271, February 28, 2012]

Judicial Review
Constitutional Basis
The power of judicial review is conferred on the judicial branch of the government in Section
1, Article VIII of our present 1987 Constitution:
SECTION 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts
as may be established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or
not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on
the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government. (Emphasis supplied)
[Francisco vs House of Representatives, G.R. No. 160261, November 10, 2003]
Theory, Rationale, and Restrictions of Judicial Review
The Constitution is a definition of the powers of government. Who is to determine the
nature, scope and extent of such powers? The Constitution itself has provided for the
instrumentality of the judiciary as the rational way. And when the judiciary mediates to
allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not assert any superiority over the other
departments; it does not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the legislature, but only
asserts the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it by the Constitution to determine
conflicting claims of authority under the Constitution and to establish for the parties in an
actual controversy the rights which that instrument secures and guarantees to them. This is
in truth all that is involved in what is termed "judicial supremacy" which properly is the
power of judicial review under the Constitution. Even then, this power of judicial review is
limited to actual cases and controversies to be exercised after full opportunity of
argument by the parties, and limited further to the constitutional question raised or the very
lis mota presented. Any attempt at abstraction could only lead to dialectics and barren legal
questions and to sterile conclusions unrelated to actualities. Narrowed as its function is in
this manner, the judiciary does not pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of
legislation. More than that, courts accord the presumption of constitutionality to legislative
enactments, not only because the legislature is presumed to abide by the Constitution but
also because the judiciary in the determination of actual cases and controversies must reflect
the wisdom and justice of the people as expressed through their representatives in the
executive and legislative departments of the government. [Angara v. Electoral Commission,
G.R. No. 45081, July 15, 1936 cited in Francisco vs House of Representatives, G.R. No.
160261, November 10, 2003]
By virtue of this prerogative, the Supreme Court either checks or legitimates the acts of a
coordinate department, challenged in an appropriate legal proceeding. The decision
rendered then, whether one of approval or of rejection, of validity or of unconstitutionality,
is controlling. [Mitra vs Comelec, G.R. No. L-56503, April 4, 1981]
Requisites of Judicial Review
17
The Court's power of judicial review may be exercised in constitutional cases only if all the
following requisites are complied with, namely:
(1) the existence of an actual and appropriate case or controversy;
(2) a personal and substantial interest of the party raising the constitutional question;
(3) the exercise of judicial review is pleaded at the earliest opportunity; and
(4) the constitutional question is the lis mota of the case.
[See Montesclaros vs. Comelec, G.R. No. 152295, July 9, 2002]
A. Actual Case or Controversy
An actual case or controversy is one that involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of
opposite legal claims susceptible of judicial resolution; the case must not be moot or
academic or based on extra-legal or other similar considerations not cognizable by a court of
justice. Stated otherwise, it is not the mere existence of a conflict or controversy that will
authorize the exercise by the courts of its power of review; more importantly, the issue
involved must be susceptible of judicial determination. Excluded from these are questions of
policy or wisdom, otherwise referred to as political questions.[Garcia v. Executive Secretary,
G.R. No. 157584, April 2, 2009]
A justiciable controversy has been defined as, a definite and concrete dispute touching on
the legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests which may be resolved by a court
of law through the application of a law. Courts have no judicial power to review cases
involving political questions and as a rule, will desist from taking cognizance of speculative or
hypothetical cases, advisory opinions and in cases that has become moot. Subject to certain
well-defined exceptions courts will not touch an issue involving the validity of a law unless
there has been a governmental act accomplished or performed that has a direct adverse
effect on the legal right of the person contesting its validity. [Cutaran vs DENR, G.R. No.
134958, January 31, 2001]
Prematurity
In PACU vs. Secretary of Education [G.R. No. L-5279, October 31, 1955] the petition
contesting the validity of a regulation issued by the Secretary of Education requiring private
schools to secure a permit to operate was dismissed on the ground that all the petitioners
have permits and are actually operating under the same. The petitioners questioned the
regulation because of the possibility that the permit might be denied them in the future. The
Court held that there was no justiciable controversy because the petitioners suffered no
wrong by the implementation of the questioned regulation and therefore, they are not
entitled to relief. A mere apprehension that the Secretary of Education will withdraw the
permit does not amount to a justiciable controversy.
In Montesclaros vs. Comelec [G.R. No. 152295, July 9, 2002], the prayer to prevent Congress
from enacting into law a proposed bill lowering the membership age in the SK does not
present an actual justiciable controversy. A proposed bill is not subject to judicial review
because it is not a law. A proposed bill creates no right and imposes no duty legally
enforceable by the Court. There can be no justiciable controversy involving the

constitutionality of a proposed bill. The Court can exercise its power of judicial review only
after a law is enacted, not before.
Under the separation of powers, the Court cannot restrain Congress from passing any law, or
from setting into motion the legislative mill according to its internal rules. Thus, the following
acts of Congress in the exercise of its legislative powers are not subject to judicial restraint:
the filing of bills by members of Congress, the approval of bills by each chamber of Congress,
the reconciliation by the Bicameral Committee of approved bills, and the eventual approval
into law of the reconciled bills by each chamber of Congress. Absent a clear violation of
specific constitutional limitations or of constitutional rights of private parties, the Court
cannot exercise its power of judicial review over the internal processes or procedures of
Congress.
Exceptions to mootness
As an exception to the rule on mootness, courts will decide a question otherwise moot if it is
capable of repetition yet evading review. [Pimentel vs Ermita, G.R. No. 164978, October 13,
2005; Tolentino v. Comelec, G.R. No. 148334, January 21, 2004 citing Acop vs. Guingona, Jr.,
G.R. No. 134855, July 2, 2002]
As a general rule, courts decline jurisdiction over cases rendered moot. However, courts will
decide cases, otherwise moot and academic, in the following situations:
(i) there is a grave violation of the Constitution;
(ii) the exceptional character of the situation and the paramount public interest is involved;
(iii) when constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles to guide
the bench, the bar, and the public;
(iv) the case is capable of repetition yet evading review.
[see David vs Arroyo, G.R. No. 171396, May 3, 2006]
B. Proper Party
"Legal standing" or locus standi refers to a personal and substantial interest in a case such
that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury because of the challenged
governmental act. xxx Thus, generally, a party will be allowed to litigate only when (1) he can
show that he has personally suffered some actual or threatened injury because of the
allegedly illegal conduct of the government; (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged
action; and (3) the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable action. [Tolentino v.
Comelec, G.R. No. 148334, January 21, 2004]
The term "interest" means a material interest, an interest in issue affected by the decree, as
distinguished from mere interest in the question involved, or a mere incidental interest.
Unless a person's constitutional rights are adversely affected by the statute or ordinance, he
has no legal standing. [Jumamil vs.Cafe, G.R. No. 144570, September 21, 2005]
[see also Joya vs PCGG, G.R. No. 96541, August 24, 1993; Agan vs PIATCO, G.R. No. 155001,
May 5, 2003, CHR Employee's Association vs CHR, G.R. No. 155336, November 25, 2004]
18
Citizen Standing
The mere fact that he is a citizen satisfies the requirement of personal interest, when the
proceeding involves the assertion of a public right. [Chavez vs PEA AMARI, G.R. No. 133250,
July 9, 2002]
When the question is one of public right and the object of the mandamus is to procure the
enforcement of a public duty, the people are regarded as the real party in interest and the
relator at whose instigation the proceedings are instituted need not show that he has any
legal or special interest in the result, it being sufficient to show that he is a citizen and as such
interested in the execution of the laws. [Tanada vs Tuvera, G.R. No. L-63915, April 24, 1985]
Voter's Standing
The Court has relaxed the requirement on standing and exercised its discretion to give due
course to voters' suits involving the right of suffrage. [Tolentino v. Comelec, G.R. No. 148334,
January 21, 2004]
Taxpayer's Standing
Parties suing as taxpayers must specifically prove sufficient interest in preventing the illegal
expenditure of money raised by taxation. The expenditure of public funds by an officer of the
State for the purpose of executing an unconstitutional act constitutes a misapplication of
such funds...A taxpayer need not be a party to the contract to challenge its validity. [Jumamil
vs. Cafe, G.R. No. 144570, September 21, 2005]
Association's standing
The modern view is that an association has standing to complain of injuries to its members.
This view fuses the legal identity of an association with that of its members. An association
has standing to file suit for its workers despite its lack of direct interest if its members are
affected by the action. An organization has standing to assert the concerns of its
constituents. x x x The [association] is the appropriate party to assert the rights of its
members, because it and its members are in every practical sense identical. The [association]
is but the medium through which its individual members seek to make more effective the
expression of their voices and the redress of their grievances. [Pharmaceutical and Health
Care Association of the Philippines vs. (DOH) Health Secretary Francisco T. Duque III, G.R.
No. 173034, October 9, 2007]
An association has legal standing to to represent its members because the results of the case
will affect their vital interests. [Purok Bagong Silang Association, Inc. v. Yuipco, G.R. No.
135092, May 4, 2006]
Exception to locus standi requirement: Transcendental importance
In not a few cases, the Court has liberalized the locus standi requirement when a petition
raises an issue of transcendental significance or paramount importance to the people.
Objections to a taxpayer's suit for lack of sufficient personality, standing or interest are
procedural matters. Considering the importance to the public of a suit assailing the
constitutionality of a tax law, and in keeping with the Court's duty, specially explicated in the

1987 Constitution, to determine whether or not the other branches of the Government have
kept themselves within the limits of the Constitution and the laws and that they have not
abused the discretion given to them, the Supreme Court may brush aside technicalities of
procedure and take cognizance of the suit.
There being no doctrinal definition of transcendental importance, the following determinants
formulated by former Supreme Court Justice Florentino P. Feliciano are instructive: (1) the
character of the funds or other assets involved in the case; (2) the presence of a clear case of
disregard of a constitutional or statutory prohibition by the public respondent agency or
instrumentality of the government; and (3) the lack of any other party with a more direct and
specific interest in raising the questions being raised. [Jumamil vs. Cafe, G.R. No. 144570,
September 21, 2005][ see also David vs Arroyo, G.R. No. 171396, May 3, 2006]
C. Lis Mota of the case
The constitutionality of an act of the legislature will not be determined by the courts unless
that question is properly raised and presented in appropriate cases and is necessary to a
determination of the case, i.e., the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota
presented. [National Economic Protectionism Association et al. vs. Ongpin, G.R. No. 67752,
April 10, 1989]
Lis mota - the fourth requirement to satisfy before [the] Court will undertake judicial review -
means that the Court will not pass upon a question of unconstitutionality, although properly
presented, if the case can be disposed of on some other ground, such as the application of
the statute or the general law. The petitioner must be able to show that the case cannot be
legally resolved unless the constitutional question raised is determined. This requirement is
based on the rule that every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality; to
justify its nullification, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, and
not one that is doubtful, speculative, or argumentative.[Garcia v. Executive Secretary, G.R.
No. 157584, April 2, 2009]
Political Law; Constitutional Law; Judicial Department; Judicial Privilege
In the Judiciary, privileges against disclosure of official records “create a hierarchy of rights
that protect certain confidential relationships over and above the public’s evidentiary need”
or “right to every man’s evidence.” Accordingly, certain information contained in the records
of cases before the Supreme Court are considered confidential and are exempt from
disclosure. To reiterate, the need arises from the dictates of the integrity of the Court’s
decision-making function which may be affected by the disclosure of information. [In Re:
Production of Court Records and Documents and the Attendance of Court officials and
employees as witnesses under the subpoenas of February 10, 2012 and the various letters
for the Impeachment Prosecution Panel dated January 19 and 25, 2012]
Specifically, the Internal Rules of the Supreme Court (IRSC) prohibits the disclosure of (1) the
result of the raffle of cases, (2) the actions taken by the Court on each case included in the
agenda of the Court’s session, and (3) the deliberations of the Members in court sessions on
cases and matters pending before it. [Sec. 3, Rule 7, IRSC]
The rationale of the the rules on confidentiality will enable the Members of the Court to
“freely discuss the issues without fear of criticism for holding unpopular positions” or fear of
19
humiliation for one’s comments. The privilege against disclosure of these kinds of
information/communication is known as deliberative process privilege, involving as it does
the deliberative process of reaching a decision. “Written advice from a variety of individuals
is an important element of the government’s decision-making process and that the
interchange of advice could be stifled if courts forced the government to disclose those
recommendations;” the privilege is intended “to prevent the ‘chilling’ of deliberative
communications.” [Arroyo v. De Lima, G.R. Nos. 199034 & 199046, December 13, 2011]
Political Law; Constitutional Law; Judicial Department; Judicial Restraint
Judicial restraint is a theory of judicial interpretation that encourages judges to limit the
exercise of their own power in certain cases. It allows political processes to operate without
undue interference. [Sinaca v. Mula, G.R. No. 135691, September 27, 1999] The guideline in
determining whether it is a political question or not is based on the landmark case of U.S. v.
Carr and reiterated by our Court in one case wherein it stated that, “[P]rominent on the
surface on any case held to involve a political question is found a textually demonstrable
constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department or a lack of
judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it, or the impossibility of
deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretions; or
the impossibility of a court’s undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of
the respect due coordinate branches of government; or an unusual need for unquestioning
adherence to a political decision already made; or the potentiality of embarrassment from
multifarious pronouncements by various departments on question. Unless one of these
formulations is inextricable from the case at bar, there should be no dismissal for non
justiciability on the ground of a political question’s presence. The doctrine of which we treat
is one of ‘political questions’, not of ‘political cases’”. [Estrada v. Desierto, G.R. Nos. 146710-
15, March 2, 2001]
Note, however, that an author submits that because of the duty of the court to determine
the existence of grave abuse of discretion, the question is not political even when there is an
unsual need for unquestioning adgerence to a political decision already made; or the
potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncement by various departments on
one question. [Bernas, The 1987 Philippine Constitution: A Comprehensive Reviewer (2011)]
For instance, the on the act of the President Aquino on banning the return of the Marcos
family was to determine whether or not there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
government. [Marcos v. Manglapuz, G.R. No. 88211, September 15, 1988]
Political Law; Constitutional Law; Judicial Department; Concepts; Judicial
Power
he judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be
established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or
not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on
the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. [Sec. 1, Article VIII, 1987
Constitution]

The inherent powers of a Court to amend and control its processes and orders to as to make
them conformable with law and justice includes the right to reverse itself, especially when, in
its honest opinion, it has committed an error or mistake in judgment, and that to adhere to
its decision will cause injustice to a party litigant. [Tocao v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
127405, September 20, 2001]
Courts are given judicial power, nothing more. Hence, by the principle of separation of
powers, courts may neither attempt to assume nor be compelled to perform non-judicial
functions. Thus, a court may not be required to act as a board of arbitrators. [Manila Electric
Co. v. Pasay Transportation Co., G.R. No. L-37878, November 25, 1932] The courts may not
be charged with administrative functions as well, except when reasonably incidental to the
fulfillment of judicial duties. [Noblejas v. Teehankee, G.R. No. L-28790, April 29, 1968]
Political Law; Constitutional Law; Judicial Department; Concepts; Judicial
Review
Judicial review is the power of the Courts to test the validity of executive and legislative acts
in light of their conformity with the Constitution. The power is inherent in the Judicial
Department, by virtue of the doctrine of separation of powers. [Nachura, Outline Reviewer
in Political law (2009)] This is not an assertion of superiority by the Courts over the other
departments, but merely an expression of the supremacy of the Constitution. [Angara v.
Electoral Commission, G.R. No. L-45081, July 15, 1936].
All cases involving the constitutionality of a treaty, international or agreement, or law, which
shall be heard by the Supreme Court en banc, and all other cases which under the Rules of
Court are required to be heard en banc, including those involving the constitutionality,
application, or operation of presidential decrees, proclamations, orders, instructions,
ordinances, and other regulations, shall be decided with the concurrence of a majority of the
Members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted
thereon. [Sec. 4 (2), Article VIII, 1987 Constitution]
Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or the Rules of
Court may provide, final judgments and orders of lower courts. [Sec. 5 (2), Article VIII, 1987
Constitution] Such implies that lower courts can also exercise such power. In one case, the
Supreme Court said that the lower courts should not shy away from the task of deciding
constitutional questions when properly raised before them. [Ynot v. Intermediate Appellate
Court, G.R. No. 74457, March 20, 1987] This was later on affirmed in another case, where
the Court held that, the Constitution vests the power of judicial review not only in the
Supreme Court but also in Regional Trial Courts. Furthermore, B.P. 129 grants RTCs the
authority to rule on the conformity of laws and treaties with the Constitution. [Mirasol v.
Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 128448, February 1, 2001]
Requisites of Judicial Review
1. Actual case or controversy
2. Locus Standi
3. Question is raised at the earliest opportunity
4. Lis Mota of the case
20
Actual case or controversy means a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal
claims which can be resolved on the basis of existing law and jurisprudence. [Guingona v.
Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 125532, July 10, 1998]. The controversy must be definite and
concrete, bearing upon the legal relations of the parties who are pitted against each other
due to their adverse legal interest. [John Hay People’s Alternative Coalition v. Lim, G.R. No.
119775, October 24, 2003] The issues raised in the case must not be moot and academic, or
because of subsequent developments, have become moot and academic. A moot and
academic case is one that ceases to present a justiciable controversy by virtue of supervening
events. [Province of Batangas v. Romulo, G.R. No. 152774, May 27, 2004]
Locus standi is defined as the right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question.
[Black’s Law Dictionary, 6th ed., 1991] In private suits, real party in interest rule governs.
[Sec. 2, Rule 3, 1997 Rules of Court] A real party in interest is the party who stands to be
benefitted or injured by the judgment in the suit or the party entitled to the avails of the suit.
[Salonga v. Warner Barnes, G.R. No. L-2246, January 31, 1951]. The difficulty of determining
locus standi arises in public suits where the plaintiff asserts a public right in assailing the
validity of an official act, and he does so as a representative of the general public. To
establish legal standing, he has to make out a sufficient interest in the vindication of the
public order and securing relief as a citizen or taxpayer. [David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, G.R.
No. 171396, May 3, 2006]
A person has standing to challenge the validity of governmental act only if he has a personal
and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as
a result of its enforcement. [People v. Vera, G.R. No. L-45685, November 16, 1937] To put it
differently, a citizen can raise a constitutional question only if he can show the following: (1)
that he has personally suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of the allegedly
illegal conduct of the government; (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action;
(3) the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable action. [Telecommunications and
Broadcast Attorneys of the Philippines, Inc. v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 132922,
April 21, 1998] Note, however, that when the subject in issue is of transcendental interest to
the public, the Court entertains the suit even if those suing do not have personal and direct
interest such that they stand to suffer harm. [Kilosbayan v. Guingona, G.R. No. 113375, May
5, 1994] The following maybe parties (a) Taxpayers, when public funds are involved
[Tolentino v. Comelec, G.R. No. 148334, January 21, 2004]; (b) Government of the
Philippines, when questioning the validity of its own laws [People v. Vera, supra]; (c)
Legislators, when the powers of Congress are being impaired [PHILCONSA v. Enriquez, G.R.
No. 113105, August 19, 1994]; (d) Citizens, when the enforcement of a public right is
involved [Tañada v. Tuvera, G.R. No. L-63915, April 24, 1985]. Thus, when a citizen questions
the circulars issued by the Commission on Audit lifting the pre-audit of government
transactions of the national government agencies, government-owned and controlled
corporations, and local governments, he has standing to file the case since he would be
adversely affected by the illegal use of public money. [De la Llana v. Commission on Audit, G.
R. No. 180989, 7 February 2012]
The earliest opportunity to raise a constitutional issue is to raise it in the pleadings before a
competent court that can resolve the same, such that, if not raised in the pleadings, it cannot
be considered at the trial and, if not considered in the trial, it cannot be considered on
appeal. [Matibag v. Benipayo, G.R. No. 149036, April 2, 2002] However, in criminal cases, the

question can be raised at any time at the discretion of the court; in civil cases, the question
can be raised at any stage of the proceedings if necessary for the determination of the case
itself; and in every case, except when there is estoppel, it can be raised at any stage if it
involves the jurisdiction of the court. [Zandueta v. De la Costa, G.R. No. L-46267, November
28, 1938]
The doctrine of separation of powers demand that proper respect be accorded to the other
departments, courts are loathe to decide constitutional questions as long as there is some
other basis that can be used for a decision. The constitutional issue must be the lis mota of
the case. [De la Llana v. Alba, G.R. No. L-57883, March 12, 1982] As an example, in a case
where Fertiphil Corporation sought the refund of the capital recovery component it had paid
to the Fertilizer and Pesticide Authority levied under LOI No. 1465 by challenging the validity
of the LOI, the Supreme Court held that the issue of constitutionality of the LOI was
adequately pleaded in the complaint; it is the lis mota of the case because the trial court
cannot determine the claim without resolving the issue of constitutionality.[Planters
Products v. Fertiphil Corporation, G.R. No. 166006, March 14, 2008] Note, however, that the
Court will not pass upon the question of constitutionality, although properly presented, if the
case can be disposed of on some other ground, such as the application of the statute or
general law. [Ty v. Trampe, G.R. No. 117577, December 1, 1995] Every law has in its favor
the presumption of constitutionality, and to justify its nullification, there must be a clear and
unequivocal breach of the Constitution, and not that is doubtful, speculative or
argumentative. [Arceta v. Mangrobang, G.R. No. 152895, June 15, 2004]
Political Law; Constitutional Law; Constitutional Commissions; Review Of Final
Orders, Decisions Or Resolutions
No law shall be passed exempting any entity of the Government or its subsidiaries in any
guise whatever, or any investment of public funds, from the jurisdiction of the Commission
on Audit. [Sec. 3, Art. IX-D, 1987 Constitution]
Each Commission shall decide by a majority vote of all its Members, any case or matter
brought before it within sixty days from the date of its submission for decision or resolution.
A case or matter is deemed submitted for decision or resolution upon the filing of the last
pleading, brief, or memorandum required by the rules of the Commission or by the
Commission itself. Unless otherwise provided by this Constitution or by law, any decision,
order, or ruling of each Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by
the aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof. [Sec. 7, Art. IX-A, 1987
Constitution]
The provision of the Constitution is clear that what is required is the majority vote of all the
members, not only of those who participated in the deliberations and voted thereon in order
that a valid decision may be made by the Constitutional Commission. [Estrella v. COMELEC,
G.R. No. 160465, May 27, 2004] Since the Commissions are collegial bodies, the decisions are
made by the body and not by individual members of the body. [Orocio v. Commission on
Audit, G.R. No. 75959, August 31, 1992]
21
With regard to the votes needed by a commission sitting en banc,the Court Ruled that the
three members who voted to affirm the First Division constituted a majority of the five
members who deliberated and voted thereon en banc and their decision is also valid. [Cua v.
COMELEC, G.R. No. 80519-21, December 17,1987] Accordingly, one who is no longer a
member of the Commission at the time the final decision or resolution is promulgated cannot
validly take part in that resolution or decision. [Ambil, Jr. v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 143398,
October 25, 2000] The votes of Commissioners who retired after casting their votes should
be automatically withdrawn. There is no decision until it is promulgated. [Duamayas, Jr. v.
COMELEC, G.R. No. 141952-3, April 20, 2000]
Rendered in the exercise of quasi-judicial functions
The judgment or final order or resolution of the Commission on Elections and the
Commission on Audit may be brought by the aggrieved party to the Supreme Court on
certiorari under Rule 65. [Sec. 2, Rule 64, Rules of Court]
Prior to June 1, 1995, decisions could be reviewed only by the Supreme Court by certiorari
under Rule 65. Now, however, it is provided in the Revised Administrative Circular No. 1-95,
pursuant to R.A. 7902, that judgments or final orders of quasi-agencies may be appealed to
the Court of Appeals within fifteen days from notice thereof. The change is pursuant to Sec. 7
which says “Unless otherwise provided by this Constitution or by law.” [Mateo v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 113219, August 14, 1995]
Rule 65 says that certiorari may be resorted to when there is no other plain, speedy and
adequate remedy. As a consequence, in the case of decisions of the COMELEC, only decisions
en banc may be brought to the Court by certiorari since Art IX-C, Section 3 says that motions
for reconsideration of decisions shall be decided by the Commission en banc. [Reyes v.
Regional Trial Court, G.R. No. 108886, May 5, 1995] An exception was however admitted by
the Court when elections where already near and there was no more time for another
speedy remedy. [ABS-CBN v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 133486, January 28, 2000]
The case or matter referred to by the Constitution that may be brought to the Supreme
Court on certiorari under Sec. 7, are those that relate to the exercise of adjudicatory or quasi-
judicial powers. In the case of the COMELEC, these must be cases involving ‘elective regional,
provincial and city officials.’ [Garces v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 114795, July 17, 1996]
In the case of the Civil Service Commission, however, Supreme Court Revised Circular 1-91, as
amended by Revised Administrative Circular 1-95, which took effect on June 1, 1995,
provides that final resolutions of the Civil Service Commission shall be appealable by
certiorari to the Court of Appeals within fifteen days from receipt of a copy thereof. From the
decision of the Court of Appeals, the party adversely affected thereby shall file a petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. [Nachura, Outline Reviewer in
Political law (2009)] The proper mode of appeal from the decision of the Civil Serice
Commission is a petition for review under Rule 43 filed with the Court of Appeals. [Mahinay
v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 152457, April 30, 2008]
Administrative
 22

Each Commission shall appoint its own officials in accordance with law. [Sec. 4, Art. IX-A,
1987 Constitution]

Each Commission En Banc may promulgate its own rules concerning pleadings and practices
before it. [Sec.6, Art. IX-A, 1987 Constitution]

But these rules shall not diminish, increase or modify substantive rights Each Commission
shall perform such other functions asmay be provided by law [Sec. 8, Art. IX-A, 1987
Constitution]

Doctrine Of Non-Interference Or Doctrine Of Judicial Stability

The doctrine of non-interference has been regarded as an elementary principle of higher

importance in the administration of justice. [Republic v. Reyes, G.R. Nos. L-30263-5, October
30, 1987] This principle holds that courts of equal and coordinate jurisdiction cannot
interfere with each other’s orders. [Lapu-lapu Development and Housing Corporation v.
Group Management Corporation, G.R. No. 141407, September 9, 2002] The principle also
bars a court from reviewing or interfering with the judgment of a co-equal court over which
it has no appellate jurisdiction or power of review. [Villamor v. Salas, G.R. No. L-101041,
November 13, 1991] As a matter of fact, the assumption by the one court over an issue
operates as an "insurmountable barrier" to the subsequent assumption by the another court.
[PAFIN v. Yanagisawa, G.R. No. 175303, April 11, 2012]

Hence, a judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction may not be opened, modified or

vacated by any court of concurrent jurisdiction. [Go v. Clerk of Court of Negros Occidental,
G.R. No. 154623, March 13, 2009] Also, a Regional Trial Court has no power or authority to
nullify or enjoin the enforcement of a writ of possession issued by another Regional Trial
Court. [Suico Industrial Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 123050, January 20, 1999]

This doctrine applies with equal force to administrative bodies; when the law provides for an
appeal from the decision of an administrative body to the Supreme Court or Court of
Appeals, it means that such body is co-equal with the Regional Trial Court in terms of rank
and stature, and logically beyond the control of the latter. [Philippine Sinter Corporation v.
Cagayan Electric Power and Light Co., Inc., G.R. No. 127371, April 25, 2002] Hence,
in Freeman v. SEC, the Supreme Court held that, “the SEC is at the very least co-equal with
the Regional Trial Court. As such, one would have no power to control the other.” [Freeman
v. SEC, G.R. No. 110265, July 7, 1994] (Note: At the time this case was decided, the
jurisdiction of the SEC has not yet been transferred to the regular courts)
 23

Political Law; Constitutional Law; Executive Department; Powers; Power of

Control and Supervision

The power of control has been defined as “the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify
or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to
substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter. [Mandano v. Silvosa,G.R. No. L-
7708, May 30, 1955] It is such power which has been given to the President over all executive
officers, from Cabinet members to the lowliest clerk. This is an element of the presidential
system where the President is the “Executive of the Government of the Philippines, and no
other. The heads of the executive departments occupy political positions and hold office in an
advisory capacity. [Villena v. Secretary of Interior, G.R. No. L-46570, April 21, 1939] Thus,
when the President issues Administrative Orders to prevent discontent, dissatisfaction and
demoralization among personnel by committing limited resources of government for the equal
payment of incentives and awards, the President is just exercising his power of control by
modifying the acts of respondents who granted incentive benefits to their employees without
appropriate clearance from the office of the President. [Blanquera v. Alcala, G.R. No. 109406,
September 11, 1998] In 2012, the Court ruled that Administrative Order 161, which
standardized the incentive rewards is valid because of the power of control of the President.
[Velasco v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 189774, September 18, 2012]

It has been held, moreover, that the express grant of the power of control to the President
justifies an executive action to carry out the reorganization of an executive office under a broad
authority of law. [ Anak Mindanao v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 166052, August 29, 2007]
Note, however, that such power is not absolute, it can be limited by the Constitution, by law
or judicial decisions. Such as appeals, which are remedial and nature; hence, Constitutionally
subject to the Court’s rule-making power. [Philips Seafood v. Board of Investments, G.R. No.
175787, February 4, 2009]

General supervision, on the other hand means that, the President can only interfere in the
affairs and activities of a local government unit if he or she finds that the latter had acted
contrary to law. The President or any of his alter egos, cannot interfere in local affairs as long
as the concerned local government unit acts within the parameters of the law and the
Constitution. Any directive, therefore, by the President or any of his alter egos seeking to alter
the wisdom of a law-conforming judgment on local affairs of a local government unit is a patent
nullity, because it violates the principle of local autonomy, as well as the doctrine of separation
of powers of the executive and the legislative departments in governing municipal
corporations [Dadole v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 125350, December 3, 2002].

Recognition of Foreign Divorce decree by Philippine Courts
Overview: Absolute Divorce vs Limited Divorce
In its strict legal sense, divorce means the legal dissolution of a lawful union for a cause arising
after marriage. There are two basic types of divorce:
(1) Absolute divorce or a vinculo matrimonii -- this kind of divorce terminates the marriage
(2) Limited divorce or a mensa et thoro - this kind of divorce merely suspends [the marriage]
and leaves the [marital] bond in full force.
Philippine law does not allow for Absolute Divorce
Philippine law does not provide for absolute divorce; hence, our courts cannot grant it. A
marriage between two Filipinos cannot be dissolved even by a divorce obtained abroad,
because of Articles 15 [Nationality Principle] and 17 of the Civil Code. [Garcia vs Recio, G.R. No.
138322, October 2, 2000]
On the other hand, the concept of "limited divorce" is akin to legal separation under the Family
Code, which allows the spouses to live separately and separate their properties but does not
sever the marriage bond. In a legal separation, the spouses remain married under the eyes of
the law.
Exception under Article 26, 2nd paragraph applies only to mixed marriages
It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only
Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces, the same being
considered contrary to our concept of public policy and morality. However, aliens may obtain
divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according
to their national law. [Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr, G.R. No. L-68470, October 8, 1985, Llorente v.
Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 124371, November 23, 2000]
The relevant provision is Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code of the Philippines which
states:
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce
is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry,
the Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.
As it is worded, Article 26, paragraph 2, refers to a special situation wherein one of the couple
getting married is a Filipino citizen and the other a foreigner at the time the marriage was
celebrated. [Republic vs Iyoy, G.R. No. 152577, September 21, 2005] (underscoring supplied)
24
Exception under Article 26, 2nd paragraph may only be invoked by the Filipino spouse
In Corpuz vs Sto. Tomas [G.R. No. 186571, Augst 11, 2010], the husband, a naturalized
Canadian, obtained a divorce judgment in Canada against his Filipino wife in the Philippines.
The husband filed a petition in the Philippine courts for recognition of the foreign divorce
judgement and invoked Art 26 par 2 of the Family Code as basis for him to be able to remarry.
The Court ruled that the foreigner husband cannot invoke the said provision. The Court
reasoned that the substantive right granted under the second paragraph of Art 26 is in favor
of Filipinos, consequently, "only the Filipino spouse can invoke the second paragraph of Article
26 of the Family Code; the alien spouse can claim no right under this provision."
Exception based on Equity and Principle of Comity
The rationale behind the [provision] is to avoid the absurd and unjust situation of a Filipino
citizen still being married to his or her alien spouse, although the latter is no longer married to
the Filipino spouse because he or she has obtained a divorce abroad. [Republic vs Iyoy, G.R.
No. 152577, September 21, 2005]
Under the principles of comity, our jurisdiction recognizes a valid divorce obtained by a spouse
of foreign nationality. [Catalan vs Catalan-Lee, G.R. No. 183622, February 8, 2012]
Divorce as a Question of Fact
Aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they
are valid according to their national law." Therefore, before a foreign divorce decree can be
recognized by our courts, the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and
demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it. Presentation solely of the divorce
decree is insufficient. [See Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr, G.R. No. L-68470, October 8, 1985, Garcia
vs Recio, G.R. No. 138322, October 2, 2000]
Before a foreign judgment is given presumptive evidentiary value, the document must first be
presented and admitted in evidence. A divorce obtained abroad is proven by the divorce
decree itself. Indeed the best evidence of a judgment is the judgment itself. The decree
purports to be a written act or record of an act of an official body or tribunal of a foreign
country.
It is well-settled in our jurisdiction that our courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws.
Like any other facts, they must be alleged and proved. [M]arital laws [of other jurisdictions]
are not among those matters that judges are supposed to know by reason of their judicial
function. The power of judicial notice must be exercised with caution, and every reasonable
doubt upon the subject should be resolved in the negative.
[See Garcia vs Recio, G.R. No. 138322, October 2, 2000, Catalan vs Catalan-Lee, G.R. No.
183622, February 8, 2012]
 25

Manner of Proof (evidence required to have foreign divorce recognized in Philippine
jurisdiction)
The starting point in any recognition of a foreign divorce judgment is the acknowledgment that
our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign judgments and laws. This means that the
foreign judgment and its authenticity must be proven as facts under our rules on evidence,
together with the alien’s applicable national law to show the effect of the judgment on the
alien himself or herself. The recognition may be made in an action instituted specifically for
the purpose or in another action where a party invokes the foreign decree as an integral aspect
of his claim or defense. [see Noveras vs Noveras, G.R. No. 188289, August 20, 2014 and
Corpuz vs Sto. Tomas, G.R. No. 186571, Augst 11, 2010]
"Respondent replies that the Australian divorce decree, which was validly admitted in
evidence, adequately established his legal capacity to marry under Australian law. xxx
Respondent's contention is untenable. xxx divorces are of different types xxx There is no
showing in the case at bar which type of divorce was procured by respondent.
Respondent presented a decree nisi or an interlocutory decree -- a conditional or provisional
judgment of divorce. It is in effect the same as a separation from bed and board, although an
absolute divorce may follow after the lapse of the prescribed period during which no
reconciliation is effected." [Garcia vs Recio, G.R. No. 138322, October 2, 2000](underscoring
supplied)

The presentation solely of the divorce decree is insufficient; both the divorce decree and the
governing personal law of the alien spouse who obtained the divorce must be proven. Because
Philippine courts do not take judicial notice of foreign laws and judgment, the law on evidence
requires that both the divorce decree and the national law of the alien must be alleged and
proven and like any other fact. [see Ando vs DFA, G.R. No. 195432, August 27, 2014]

Evidence to prove and authenticate the foreign divorce decree

Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, a writing or document may be
proven as a public or official record of a foreign country by either (1) an official publication or
(2) a copy thereof attested by the officer having legal custody of the document.

If the record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be (a) accompanied by a certificate
issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed
in the foreign country in which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his
office. The attestation must state, in substance, that the copy is a correct copy of the original,
or a specific part thereof, as the case may be, and must be under the official seal of the
attesting officer. [see Corpuz vs Sto. Tomas, G.R. No. 186571, Augst 11, 2010; Noveras vs
Noveras, G.R. No. 188289, August 20, 2014]

Burden of proof

The burden of proof lies with the "party who alleges the existence of a fact or thing necessary
in the prosecution or defense of an action." In civil cases, plaintiffs have the burden of
proving the material allegations of the complaint when those are denied by the answer; and
defendants have the burden of proving the material allegations in their answer when they
introduce new matters. [See Garcia vs Recio, G.R. No. 138322, October 2, 2000]

Capacity to Remarry of Filipino spouse

Proof that a valid divorce has been obtained by the foreign spouse does not ipso facto
restore the Filipino spouse's legal capacity to remarry. It must also be proven that the divorce
decree obtained by the foreigner spouse granted the latter the freedom to remarry , i.e. that
the divorce was an absolute or unconditional divorce.

In Garcia vs Recio, the court ruled that:

 26

Effect of Divorce Obtained Abroad by Foreign Spouse

When a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated, and a divorce
is validly obtained abroad by the foreigner spouse, the Filipino spouse shall likewise have the
capacity to remarry under Philippine law [Art. 26, Family Code].

Elements

There are two elements for the application of Paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code:

1. A valid marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner; and1.

2. A valid divorce obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to marry.
The reckoning2. point is the citizenship of the parties at the time a valid divorce is
obtained abroad by the alien spouse [Republic v. Orbecido III, G.R. No. 154380, October
5, 2005].

Fact that private respondent obtained a valid divorce in his country is admitted and its legal
effects may be recognized in the Philippines. Also, the rule under American jurisprudence that
after a divorce has been decreed, the innocent spouse no longer has the right to institute
proceedings against the offender is in pari materia with ours [Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera, G.R. No.
80116, June 30, 1989].

The absolute divorce obtained by an alien abroad may be recognized in the Philippines if valid
under the national law of such an alien. A divorce decree granted by a foreign court between
a Filipino citizen and an alien is binding on the alien husband or wife. An alien granted absolute
divorce in his or her country with his or her Filipino spouse is estopped from asserting rights
over property allegedly held in the Philippines as conjugal property. The alien spouse is also
cut off from marital and successional rights with his or her spouse [Van Dorn v. Romillo Jr.,
G.R. No. L-68470, October 8, 1985].

Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code, by its plain and literal interpretation, cannot be
applied to the case of a Filipino couple where one spouse obtained a divorce while still a
Filipino citizen [Republic v. Iyoy, G.R. No. 152577, September 21, 2005].

In cases of an invalid foreign divorce between Filipino citizens, the marriage of the divorced
spouse and cohabitation with a person other than the lawful spouse entitles the latter to a
decree of legal separation conformably to Philippine law. The desertion and securing of an
invalid divorce decree by one consort entitles the other to recover damages [Tenchavez v.
Escano, G.R. No. L-19671, November 29, 1965].

| Page 2 of 2

Aliens may obtain divorces abroad, provided they are valid according to their national law;
Only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces [Llorente v. Court
of Appeals, G.R. No. 124371, November 23, 2000].