Gualberto CASTRO v Hon Sec Ricardo GLORIA as SECS  From the facts it is clear that the penalty of dismissal
it is clear that the penalty of dismissal from the service
Aug 20, 2001 | Sandoval-Gutierrez, J.
Porfirio Gutang Jr. filed with the DECS a complaint for disgraceful and immoral
conduct against Gualberto Castro, a teacher in Guibuangan Central School,
Barili, Cebu.
 It was alleged that he has an illicit affair with Gutang’s wife, petitioner’s
co-teacher at the same school.
After hearing, the DECS Regional Office VII, through Assistant Superintendent
Francisco B. Concillo, rendered a decision declaring petitioner guilty of the
offense charged.
 He was meted the penalty of dismissal from the service.
 The DECS Central Office affirmed Concillo’s decision in an Indorsement
Petitioner filed a MR.
 School Division Superintendent recommended that the motion be
resolved favorably. However, the recommendation was opposed by the
DECS Region VII.
Petitioner then sent letters to the incumbent SECS to resolve his MR but his
letters remained unheeded thus, petitioner filed with the DECS Central Office a
Motion for Review Setting Aside/Modifying the Decision of RD of DECS Region
VII.
 SECS Ricardo Gloria referred the motion to the RD of Region VII for
comment
 RD Eladio Dioko issued a 2nd Indorsement sustaining the decision of
Asst Superintendent Concillo
 In his 3rd Indorsement, he denied petitioner’s motion for review
Petitioner then filed a petition for mandamus with the RTC, imploring that
judgment be rendered ordering respondent Secretary or anyone who may have
assumed the duties and functions of his office (1) to reduce his penalty from
dismissal to one (1) year suspension; 2) to consider the one (1) year suspension
as already served considering that he has been out of the service for more than
ten (10) years; 3) to reinstate him to his former position; and 4) to pay is back
salaries.
 RTC dismissed the petition on the ground of non-exhaustion of
administrative remedies, ruling that petitioner should have appealed to
the CSC before coming to court
was erroneously imposed upon petitioner. Certiorari is the remedy to
correct errors of judgment which are grave and arbitrary and not
mandamus
 Mandamus will not lie to order the reinstatement of the petitioner in
his former position as it was not yet established that he is entitled to or
has legal right to the office
His MR was denied hence, the present petition for review on certiorari
Petitioner insists that, when the question to be settled is purely a question of law,
he may go directly to the proper court so that he can have proper redress.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) contends that petitioner’s adequate
remedy was to appeal the decision of respondent Secretary to the Civil Service
Commission, pursuant to the provisions of Executive Order No. 292.
 Since petitioner failed to exhaust administrative remedies, his petition
must be dismissed for lack of cause of action.
 Also, the OSG argues that the remedy of mandamus to compel payment
of back salary does not lie unless petitioners right thereto is well
defined. This is based on the general proposition that a public official is
not entitled to any compensation if he has not rendered any service.
ISSUE
WON the penalty of dismissal from service is properly meted out – NO
Petitioner has all the reasons to seek the aid of this Court since it has been
clearly established by evidence that he is a first time offender.
Section 23, Rule XIV of the Rules Implementing Book V of Executive Order No.
292 (Otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987 and other Pertinent
Civil Service Laws) provides:
Sec. 23. Administrative offenses with its corresponding penalties are
classified into grave, less grave, and light depending on the gravity of its
nature and effects of said acts on the government service.
The following are grave offenses with its corresponding penalties:
xxxxxx
(o) Disgraceful and immoral conduct <1st Offense, Suspension for six (6)
months and one day (1) day to one (1) year; 2nd Offense, Dismissal.>
As correctly pointed out by petitioner, the proper penalty for the 1st offense of
disgraceful and immoral conduct is only suspension for six (6) months and one
(1) day to one (1) year.
In Aquino v. Navarro, a secondary guidance counselor in a public high school,
was merely suspended for disgraceful and immoral conduct. In Burgos v.
Aquino, the Court suspended a court stenographer for six months for
maintaining illicit relations with the complainants husband and for perjury in
not disclosing in her personal information sheet she has a daughter as a result
of that relationship. Similarly, in Nalupta Jr. v. Tapec, a deputy sheriff was
suspended for six months and one day for having a relationship with a woman
other than his wife by whom he has two children. Thus:
The act of respondent of having illicit relations with Consolacion Inocencio is
considered disgraceful and immoral conduct within the purview of Section
36 (b) (5) of Presidential Decree No. 807, otherwise known as the Civil
Service Decree of the Philippines, for which respondent may be subjected to
disciplinary action. Memorandum Circular No. 30, Series of 1989 of the
Civil Service Commission has categorized disgraceful and immoral
conduct as a grave offense for which a penalty of suspension for six (6)
months and one (1) day shall be imposed for the first offense, while the
penalty of dismissal is imposed for the second offense.
Inasmuch as the present charge of immorality against respondent
constitutes the first charge of this nature, the Court shall at this instance
suspend respondent for six (6) months and one (1) day.
charges such as when the penalty of dismissal is reduced to mere suspension, he
would not be entitled to the payment of his back salaries.
In Yacia v. City of Baguio, the decision of the Commissioner of Civil Service
ordering the dismissal of a government employee on the ground of dishonesty
was immediately executed pending appeal. But, on appeal, the Civil Service
Board of Appeals modified that penalty of dismissal to a fine equivalent to six
months’ pay. This Court ruled that the employees claim for back wages, for the
period during which he was not allowed to work because of the execution of the
decision of the Commissioner, should be denied.
The general proposition is that a public official is not entitled to any
compensation if he has not rendered any service. As he works, he shall earn.
Since petitioner did not work during the period for which he is now claiming
salaries, there can be no legal or equitable basis to order the payment of such
salaries.
Thus, we reduce the penalty of dismissal imposed upon petitioner to suspension
for a period of one year without pay. Considering that he has been out of the
service for quite a long time, we feel he has been sufficiently punished for his
offense. We, therefore, order his reinstatement.
PETITION GRANTED.

Again, in the 1997 case of Ecube-Badel v. Badel, the Court imposed the penalty of
suspension for one (1) year without pay against respondent David Badel for his
first offense of immorality.

It is worthy to note that even DECS Regional Director Eladio C. Dioko stated in
his 2nd Indorsement dated January 3, 1996, that while he sustains Director
Concillos decision, the proper penalty as provided by law (should) be meted out
for him. The Regional Trial Court also echoed the same sentiment.

RE: Payment of backwages

Prayer is without legal basis.
Payment of salaries corresponding to the period when an employee is not
allowed to work may be decreed if he is found innocent of the
charges. However, if the employee is not completely exenorated of the
Herman CANIETE and Wilfredo Rosario v SECS
June 19, 2000 | Kapunan, J.
Petitioners are public school teachers at the Juan Sumulong High School in
Quezon City.
 For being absent on 20 and 21 September 1990, they were charged by
Secretary Isidro Cario, then Secretary of the Department of Education,
Culture and Sports, with alleged participation in the mass
actions/strikes on said dates.
 Petitioners were placed under preventive suspension on 21 September
1990. Later, Secretary Cario found petitioners "guilty as charged" and
dismissed them from the service "effective immediately."
 The said decisions of Secretary Cario, however, were set aside by the
Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB) when the case was brought to
it on appeal. The MSPB found that petitioners were guilty only of Gross
Violation of Existing Civil Service Law and Rules and suspended them
for three (3) months without pay.
In its Resolution, the Civil Service Commission (CSC) modified the decision of
the MSPB.
 CSC found that petitioners were only guilty of being absent on 20 and
21 September 1990 without the necessary leave of absence, and not as
charged by Secretary Cario of participating in the mass actions/strikes
on said dates. Accordingly, petitioners were meted out the penalty of
reprimand.
Petitioners moved for a reconsideration of the CSC resolution insofar as it
disallowed the payment of their back salaries.
 The CSC denied their motion for reconsideration.
Petitioners then elevated the case to the CA but the latter affirmed the decision
of the CSC.
 In denying petitioners claim for back salaries, the CA cited City Mayor of
Zamboanga vs. CA, where this Court held:
x x x back salaries may be ordered paid to an officer or employee only if
he is exonerated of the charge against him and his suspension or
dismissal is found and declared to be illegal. In Sales vs. Mathay, Sr., 129
SCRA 321, this Court held that a postal clerk suspended for six months
for gross neglect of duty is not entitled to back salary if he cannot show
that his suspension was unjustified or that he is innocent of the charge.
 [T]o allow private respondent to receive full back salaries would
amount to rewarding him for his misdeeds and compensating him for
services that were never rendered.
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the above decision but the CA
denied the same in its Resolution. Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE
WON petitioners are entitled to their back salaries upon their reinstatement
after they were found guilty of an offense with a lower penalty (dismissed for
allegedly participating in mass action/strikes, found guilty of violating
reasonable office rules and regulations penalized with reprimand) – YES
In Gloria v CA, the public school teachers therein were either suspended or
dismissed for allegedly participating in the strikes sometime in September and
October 1990. They were eventually exonerated of said charge and found guilty
only of violation of reasonable office rules and regulations by failing to file
applications for leave of absence. Thus, the penalty of dismissal earlier imposed
on them was reduced to reprimand and their reinstatement was ordered.
Moreover, the Court affirmed the payment of back salaries of said teachers
explaining that although "employees who are preventively suspended pending
investigation are not entitled to the payment of their salaries even if they are
exonerated, we do not agree with the government that they are not entitled to
compensation for the period of their suspension pending appeal if eventually
they are found innocent. 1
1
The pertinent provisions of the Civil Service Law (Book V, Title I, Subtitle A of the
Administrative Code) on preventive suspension are as follows:
SEC. 47. Disciplinary Jurisdiction.
xxx
(2) The Secretaries and heads of agencies and instrumentalities, provinces, cities
and municipalities shall have jurisdiction to investigate and decide matters involving
disciplinary action against officers and employees under their jurisdiction. Their
decisions shall be final in case the penalty imposed is suspension for not more than
thirty days or fine in an amount not exceeding thirty days salary. In case the
decision rendered by a bureau or office head is appealable to the Commission, the
same may be initially appealed to the department and finally to the Commission
and pending appeal, the same shall be executory except when the penalty is
removal, in which case the same shall be executory only after confirmation by the
Secretary concerned.
There are two kinds of preventive suspension of civil service employees
charged with offenses punishable by removal or suspension:
(1) preventive suspension pending investigation (51) and
(2) preventive suspension pending appeal if the penalty imposed by the
disciplining authority is suspension or dismissal and, after review, the
respondent is exonerated (47[4])
In Gloria, it was held that the employee who is placed under preventive
suspension pending investigation is not entitled to compensation because such
suspension is not a penalty but only a means of enabling the disciplining
authority to conduct an unhampered investigation.
 “Under Section 23 of the Rules Implementing Book V of Executive Order
No. 292 and other pertinent civil service laws, in violations of
reasonable office rules and regulations, the first offense is punishable
by reprimand. To deny petitioner Mariano his back wages during his
suspension would be tantamount to punishing him after his
exoneration from the charges which caused his dismissal from the
service.”
 “In Jacinto v CA, a public school teacher who was found guilty of
violation of reasonable office rules and regulations for having been
absent without leave and reprimanded was given back salaries after
she was exonerated of the charge of having taken part in the strikes.”

On the other hand, there is right to compensation for preventive suspension
pending appeal if the employee is eventually exonerated. This is because
"preventive suspension pending appeal is actually punitive although it is in
effect subsequently considered illegal if respondent is exonerated and the
administrative decision finding him guilty is reversed. Hence, he should be
reinstated with full pay for the period of the suspension."
Given the substantial factual similarities of the present case to Gloria, there is no
reason for the Court to rule against the payment of back salaries to petitioners.
PETITION GIVEN DUE COURSE. CA RESOLUTION REVERSED AND SET
ASIDE.

xxx
(4) An appeal shall not stop the decision from being executory, and in case the
penalty is suspension or removal, the respondent shall be considered as having
been under preventive suspension during the pendency of the appeal in the event
he wins an appeal.

SEC 51. Preventive Suspension.- The proper disciplining authority may preventively
suspend any subordinate officer or employee under his authority pending an
investigation, if the charge against such officer or employee involves dishonesty,
oppression or grave misconduct, or neglect in the performance of duty, or if there
are reasons to believe that the respondent is guilty of charges which would warrant
his removal from the service.

SEC. 52. Lifting of Preventive Suspension Pending Administrative Investigation.-

When the administrative case against the officer or employee under preventive
suspension is not finally decided by the disciplining authority within the period of
ninety (90) days after the date of suspension of the respondent who is not a
presidential appointee, the respondent shall be automatically reinstated in the
service: Provided, That when the delay in the disposition of the case is due to the
fault, negligence or petition of the respondent, the period of delay shall not be
counted in computing the period of suspension herein provided.
Mariano NALUPTA Jr, v Honesto TAPEC, Deputy Sheriff, RTC Br 18, Batac,
Ilocos, Norte
March 30, 1993 | Nocon, J.
Complainant Mariano R. Nalupta, Jr. accuses respondent Honesto G. Tapec, of
immorality by cohabiting with his paramour Consolacion Inocencio, with whom
he had two children, and of discharging the duties of Barangay Captain of
Masintoc, Paoay, Ilocos Norte despite holding his present position.
In a sworn complaint dated September 20, 1988 filed with the Office of the
Court Administrator, complainant Nalupta averred that:
 he is the Congressman representing the Second District of Ilocos Norte,;
 his wife's relatives are from Batac, and that they are close to a certain
Consolacion Inocencio;
 Consolacion Inocencio is the paramour of respondent Tapec, with
whom she had two children, namely, Marc Henry Tapec, born
September 23, 1985, and Joseph Marlou I. Tapec, born November 27,
1987
 Respondent Tapec is married to Felicitas Langaman from Paoay and
that their marriage is still subsisting
 respondent Tapec is cohabiting with Inocencio in such an open and
scandalous manner that it offended the relatives of the wife of
complainant Nalupta, constraining them to call his attention to it.
 Complainant also stated that respondent Tapec is presently discharging
the duties of Barangay Captain of Masintoc, Paoay, despite his
appointment as Deputy Provincial Sheriff.
Then Court Administrator, Hon. Maximo A. Maceren, referred complainant
Nalupta's sworn complaint to the Supreme Court for its consideration.
Tapec vehemently denied the charges of immorality, claiming that these were
"malicious and fabricated."
 He claims that his son Honesto Tapec, Jr. is the father of the two
children Marc and Joseph, as shown by the affidavits of Consolacion
Inocencio and Atty. Benigno Galacgac.
 He likewise denied the charge that he is discharging the duties of
barangay captain, the truth being that he is merely a barangay
consultant.
Respondent attributed the filing of the complaint to his refusal to support
complainant's candidacy during the 1987 elections, as well as his refusal to
accommodate complainant's unreasonable requests in connection with several
cases the latter was handling before the Regional Trial Court of Batac.
Complainant points to several items in the certified true copies of the birth
certificates submitted to the Court which show that respondent Tapec is the
father of the two children. Regarding the charge that respondent is discharging
the duties of barangay captain, complainant submitted a certification dated
September 30, 1988 from Bonifacio A. Eclipse of the Department of the Local
Government at Paoay, Ilocos Norte, to the effect that respondent was appointed
OIC-Barangay Captain of Barangay No. 19, Masintoc, Paoay, Ilocos Norte on
December 11, 1986. Complainant denies having any improper motive for filing
the complaint.
SC referred the case to the Executive Judge of RTC of Batac for investigation,
report and recommendation.
 Judge Rubio set the case for hearing on September 23, 1991, and on
said date, received the evidence for the complainant consisting of
complainant's own testimony and that of Noel Rosario. Respondent
failed to attend said hearing despite due notice.
 Judge Rubio reset the case for the reception of respondent's evidence.
However, respondent through counsel Atty. Romeo Bringas filed a
Manifestation and Motion praying that the proceedings on September
23,1991 be set aside and that Judge Rubio inhibit himself on the ground
that he was a former client of Atty. Bringas.
Judge Rubio asked the SC for permission to inhibit himself. Case was reassigned
to Judge Agnir who directed the parties to appear before him for the purpose of
setting the dates for the continuous hearing of the case.
 None of the parties appeared on said date, prompting Judge Agnir to
reset the conference. The notice of the new date for the conference sent
to respondent was returned to the court with the annotation "AWOL."
After several more postponements, the hearing resumed with only the
complainant's counsel Atty. Daniel Rubio appearing.
 Said counsel informed the court that his client had suffered a stroke
and submitted a medical certificate attesting to such a fact.
 Counsel, who happened to be from Batac, also intimated to the court
that respondent had gone abroad and had not returned since.
  Judge Agnir scheduled several more hearing dates, but since neither
complainant nor respondent appeared, he issued an order considering
the case submitted for decision.
Judge Agnir directed his Branch Clerk of Court to verify with the Local Civil
Registrar of Batac, Ilocos Norte the authenticity of the birth certificates of the
children submitted by complainant and to verify with Branch 18 of the Regional
Trial Court of Batac, Ilocos Norte, the whereabouts of respondent.
On September 15, 1992, the Branch Clerk of Court submitted a report follows:
1. The Birth Certificates of Joseph Marlou I. Tapec and Marc Henry I. Tapec,
both children of Honesto Tapec are both authentic according to the
records of the Local Civil Registrar of Batac, Ilocos Norte which I
personally compared with the copies attached in [sic] the records of the
case.
2. As to the status of Honesto Tapec, a certification was issued by Mariano
Macandog, Clerk of Court V of RTC, Branch 18, a copy of which is hereto
attached as Annex "A" and made an integral part of this report.
An additional information was furnished by Hon. Ariston L. Rubio, Executive
Judge and Presiding Judge of RTC, Branch 17, Batac, Ilocos Norte, saying that he
has already recommended the dismissal of Honesto Tapec for absence without
official leave but as of this time, it has not been acted upon by the Supreme
Court.
Thereafter, Judge Agnir submitted his report finding respondent guilty of the
charge of immorality and recommending the imposition of an appropriate
penalty.
ISSUE
WON Tapec is guilty of immorality - YES
Complainant had sufficiently established the charge of immorality against
respondent. Noel Rosario, a neighbor of respondent's paramour Consolacion
Inocencio at Barangay Ablan, Batac, Ilocos Norte, testified that he had often seen
respondent leaving the house of Inocencio in the morning and returning to the
same in the afternoon, and that this had gone on for quite some time.
Moreover, it was well-known in the neighborhood that respondent was married
and that Inocencio was merely his paramour.
Similarly established is the fact that the illicit union of respondent and Inocencio
had produced two children as shown by the certified true copies of the
children's respective birth certificates. 5 The authenticity of these birth
certificates was later verified by Judge Agnir's Branch Clerk of Court.
The entries in the birth certificates point to respondent as the father of these
two children. As pointed out by Judge Agnir in his report:
Respondent's allegation that these two children were fathered by his son is
clearly negated by the entries in the Birth Certificates such as the middle
initial, the age, and the occupation of the father listed in the Birth
Certificates. As pointed out by the complainant in his Reply, respondent's
middle name is "Galano," hence, the middle initial "G" of Honesto Tapec as
appearing in the Birth Certificates. At the time the Complaint was filed
(1989) respondent was 52 years old so that he was 48 years old when Marc
Henry was born on September 23, 1985 and 50 years old when Joseph
Marlou Tapec was born on November 27, 1987, as correctly shown in the
Birth Certificates. On the other hand, respondent's son Honesto Tapec, Jr.
was more or less 23 years old on September 1985 when Marc Henry was
born and around 25 years old on November 1987 when Joseph Marlou was
born. Moreover, the middle name of Honesto, Jr. is "Langaman," the maiden
name of his mother Felicitas Langaman who is the legal wife of respondent.
Further, the father's occupation listed in the two birth certificates are
"farmer" and "government employee," respectively, which tally with
respondent's circumstances, while his son Honesto Jr. was never an
employee of the government. Complainant also pointed out in his Reply that
if Honesto Jr. was indeed the father of these two children then their status
should have been indicated as "Natural" instead of "Illegitimate" because in
point of fact Honesto Jr. got married only after the children were born.
Clearly, respondent's allegation that his son is the father of the two
illegitimate children is a patent falsity.
The affidavits of Consolacion Inocencio and Benigno Galacgac have no probative
value at all.
The act of respondent of having illicit relations with Consolacion Inocencio is
considered disgraceful and immoral conduct within the purview of Section 36
(b)(5) of Presidential Decree No. 807, otherwise known Civil Service Decree of
the Philippines, for which respondent may be subjected to disciplinary action.
Memorandum Circular No. 30, Series of 1989 of the Civil Service Commission
has categorized disgraceful and immoral conduct as a grave offense for which a
penalty of suspension for six (6) months and one (1) day shall be imposed for
the first offense, while the penalty of dismissal is imposed for the second
offense.
Inasmuch as the present charge of immorality against respondent constitutes
the first charge of this nature, the Court shall at this instance suspend
respondent for six (6) months and one (1) day. While it is true that during the
investigation of this case, respondent has absented himself without official
leave, the recommendation of his immediate superior, Judge Ariston L. Rubio,
for his dismissal on this ground has yet to be received by this Court. The Court
hereby reserves the right to impose the appropriate penalty upon respondent
for this new offense at the proper time.
TAPEC FOUND GUILTY OF THE CHARGE OF IMMORALITY AND IS
SUSPENDED FOR 6 MONTHS AND 1 DAY WITHOUT PAY.
OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR v Vicente LIBRADO, Deputy
Sheriff, MTCC Branch 1, Iligan City
Aug 22, 1996 | Per Curiam
Respondent Vicente P. Librado is deputy sheriff of the Municipal Trial Court in
Cities (MTCC), Branch 1, in Iligan City.
 he was charged with violation of R.A. No. 6425 for selling and having in
his possession certain quantities of prohibited drugs known as
metamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu and marijuana.
 He was subsequently found guilty and sentenced to six (6) years of
imprisonment.
Office of the Court Administrator filed this administrative complaint against him
and he was suspended from office.
 Respondent admits that he had been convicted of violation of R.A. No.
6425 and claims that he is now on probation. He narrated the incident
that led to his apprehension, as follows:
1) That on September 12, 1995 (sic) at 10:00 PM, a minica driver, a.k.a. JUN
NEGRO . . . together with an unidentified companion, came to my residence
in Pala-o and induced me to procure shabu.
2) On September 13, 1994 at 7:00 PM, Jun Negro, together with a nice
looking lady brought with them two [packs] of shabu worth P1,000 each[,]
[t]wo-third[s] of which was consumed by that lady, [Jun Negro], and myself,
leaving a small quantity which Jun Negro requested me to convert [into]
cash.
3) September 13, 1994-2:00 AM
I was awakened by two men who insisted [on entering into] my
residence. As I opened the door, I . . . learned that it was Jun Negro and a
person [who] introduced himself as Randolph. Then Jun Negro asked me if I
still ha[d] a pack of shabu. I gave to him the remaining pack which he price
(sic) P300.00 to Randolph. The latter gave his P300 pesos to [me] while
requesting for more. But I didnt have any. He later said that I would buy
more this fiesta (sic).
This Jun Negro immediately opened the door, seconds later, Rene Salazar
came in and said: We have a Search Warrant. This Randolph stood up and a
shot took place! I was so nervous and out of my senses. (Note: The Narcom
agents never reported the matter).
 They then conducted their search with their witness, Mr. Nerius M. Actub . . .
He was killed three (3) weeks later, while their alleged agent Jun Negro has
disappeared.
xxx xxx xxx
With all my shortcomings: A) Arrested on September 14, 1994; b) My wife
had just arrived from USA on September 27, 1994, [and] immediately filed
an Annulment of Marriage; and C) My house has been demolished on
October 2, 1994 . . . I pleaded guilty of said crime.
I am now on probation hoping that Id be given a second chance.
Based on the foregoing facts, Judge Valerio M. Salazar, Executive Judge of RTC-
Iligan City, to whom this case was referred for investigation, report and
recommendation, recommends that in view of respondents probation, a penalty
short of dismissal be meted out against respondent to provide him with the
incentive and the will to rehabilitate himself and apply his time to his work as a
judicial employee.
ISSUE
WON a judicial employee under probation for a crime involving moral turpitude
may be readmitted to public service – NO.
This case involves a conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude as a ground
for disciplinary action under the Civil Service Law.
Under the rules of the Civil Service Commission, conviction of a crime involving
moral turpitude is considered a grave offense punishable, upon first
commission, by dismissal. As the SC has held, it alone suffices as a ground for
the dismissal of a civil service employee.
Drug-pushing, as a crime, has been variously condemned as an especially
vicious crime, one of the most pernicious evils that has ever crept into our
society. For those who become addicted to it not only slide into the ranks of the
living dead, what is worse, they become a grave menace to the safety of law-
abiding members of society, while peddlers of drugs are actually agents of
destruction. They deserve no less than the maximum penalty [of death].
There is no doubt that drug-pushing is a crime which involves moral turpitude
and implies everything which is done contrary to justice, honesty, modesty or
good morals including acts of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private and
social duties which a man owes to his fellowmen or to society in general,
contrary to the accepted rule of right and duty between man and man. Indeed
nothing is more depraved than for anyone to be a merchant of death by selling
prohibited drugs, an act which, as this Court said in one case, often breeds other
crimes. It is not what we might call a contained crime whose consequences are
limited to that crime alone, like swindling and bigamy. Court and police records
show that a significant number of murders, rapes, and similar offenses have
been committed by persons under the influence of dangerous drugs, or while
they are high. While spreading such drugs, the drug-pusher is also abetting,
through his greed and irresponsibility, the commission of other crimes.
The image of the judiciary is tarnished by conduct, which involves moral
turpitude. While indeed the purpose of the Probation Law (P.D. No. 968, as
amended) is to save valuable human material, it must not be forgotten that
unlike pardon probation does not obliterate the crime of which the person
under probation has been convicted. The reform and rehabilitation of the
probationer cannot justify his retention in the government service. He may seek
to reenter government service, but only after he has shown that he is fit to serve
once again. It cannot be repeated too often that a public office is a public trust,
which demands of those in its service the highest degree of morality.
RESPONDENT IS DISMISSED FROM SERVICE WITH FORFEITURE OF ALL
LEAVE CREDITS AND RETIREMENT BENEFITS AND WITH DQ FOR
REEMPLOYMENT IN THE GOVENRMENT.
OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR v Judge Lorenzo VENERACION
and Branch Clerk of Court Rogelio Linatoc, both of the RTC, Br 47, Manila
June 21, 2000 | Pardo, J.
Nov 4, 1998. Merlinia Santos filed with the Court Administrator a sworn letter-
complaint against Rogelio Tria, Acting Sheriff IV, Br 47, RTC Manila, assailing the
acts of Sheriff Tria in the implementation of a writ of execution in a civil case for
support.
Court Admin Alfredo Benipayo then ordered an investigation of the status of
“sheriff” Tria.
 Investigation revealed that “sheriff” Tria was not an employee of the
judiciary at the time he acted as "sheriff" in the civil case where Santos
was a party.
 The record showed that on August 9, 1988, Mr. Rogelio A. Tria was
appointed process server of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 47,
Manila. However, on January 1, 1995, he transferred to the Economic
Intelligence and Investigation Bureau (EIIB), Department of Finance, as
an Intelligence Officer. He was not thereafter re-employed in the
judiciary.
The investigation disclosed the following facts:
"1. that the writ of execution dated July 3, 1998 was signed by Judge Lorenzo
B. Veneracion addressed to Mr. Rogelio A. Tria as Acting Sheriff IV;
"2. that the Sheriff's Return dated July 30, 1998 was signed by Mr. Rogelio A.
Tria as Acting Sheriff IV; and
"3. that the Notice of Levy and Sale dated July 3, 1998 was signed by Mr. Tria
as Acting Sheriff IV."
The investigation further disclosed that in 1985, Mr. Antonio Velasco was the
duly appointed Deputy Sheriff IV of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 47, Manila.
Subsequently, however, Judge Veneracion assigned Deputy Sheriff IV Antonio
Velasco to the Office of the Clerk of Court in order that Rogelio A. Tria, who was
not an employee of the judiciary, could be designated to perform the functions
of "Acting Deputy Sheriff IV" considering the position vacant and authorized to
carry out the writ of execution.
This irregularity was not limited to the period July to August 1998.
 The Court Administrator concluded that Judge Veneracion and Branch
Clerk of Court Rogelio M. Linatoc had knowledge of the irregularity.
Meanwhile, Justice Benipayo directed Judge Veneracion to desist from assigning
any task to "Sheriff" Rogelio A. Tria and to prevent him from holding office in his
sala. On January 18, 1999 Judge Veneracion ordered Rogelio A. Tria to return to
his post at the EIIB.
On January 29, 1999, Court Administrator Benipayo recommended that the
memorandum report be considered as an administrative complaint against
Judge Lorenzo B. Veneracion for grave misconduct and violation of Canon 3,
Rule 3.08 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics and against Atty. Rogelio M. Linatoc for
grave misconduct.
 the Court adopted a resolution considering the memorandum as an
administrative complaint against Judge Veneracion and Atty. Linatoc,
On August 16, 1999, Judge Veneracion filed an answer, contending that there
was nothing irregular about a judge signing a writ of execution
 it had been his practice as a matter of court policy.
 He professed good faith in detailing Mr. Rogelio A. Tria, an employee of
the EIIB with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 47, Manila and his
designation as "Acting Deputy Sheriff" assigned to serve writs of
execution in cases therein, properly supported by documents.
 The latest authority for the detail was issued on October 5, 1998, by
Executive Secretary Ronaldo B. Zamora, to Col. Wilfred A. Nicolas,
Commissioner, EIIB, recommending approval of Mr. Tria's detail with
Branch 47, as requested by retired Supreme Court Justice Emilio A.
Gancayco.
Atty. Linatoc filed an answer denying involvement in any anomaly.
 He averred that there was nothing anomalous with the issuance of a
writ of execution signed by a presiding judge.
 He denied participation in the temporary detail of Mr. Rogelio A. Tria
with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 47, Manila as "Acting Deputy
Sheriff IV."
 He expressed good faith in believing that "Sheriff" Tria's appointment
was legal since it was supported by various documents authorizing his
detail with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 47, Manila.
According to the investigation conducted by CA Justice Fernando, on January 1,
1995, Rogelio A. Tria was employed with EIIB, an agency under the Department
of Finance. However, from January 2, 1995 to June 30, 1995 and January 1, 1997
to June 30, 1997, Tria was detailed with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 47,
Manila as Acting Deputy Sheriff IV, upon the request of Judge Veneracion. From
January 1, 1998 to April 22, 1998, Rogelio A. Tria was detailed with Branch 47,
at the request of former Justice Emilio A. Gancayco.
It will be noticed, however, that when "sheriff" Tria implemented the writ of
execution in Civil Case No. 97-84356 on July 3, 1998, he had no appointment or
designation authorizing his assignment as "Acting Deputy Sheriff IV" of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 47, Manila. Nor was he a duly bonded official.
On August 13, 1998, Judge Veneracion requested EIIB Commissioner Colonel
Wilfred Nicolas for Mr. Rogelio A. Tria's assignment as Deputy Sheriff of
Branch 47.
 Colonel Lara denied the request. Nonetheless, respondent Judge
Veneracion assigned "sheriff" Tria to execute writs in cases therein.
ISSUE
WON an employee of EIIB, an agency under the Department of Finance, of the
executive branch of the government, may be assigned by that agency on detail
with the judiciary, specifically to the RTC as deputy sheriff, upon the request of
the presiding judge of the court without the authority of the SC - NO
Judge Veneracion’s repeated requests for Mr. Rogelio A. Tria's detail with the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 47, Manila, as Acting Deputy Sheriff IV, a position
that was not vacant, contravened Article VIII, Section 5 (6) of the Constitution,
Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 07 dated August 27, 1987, re:
appointments to vacant positions in the judiciary, and Supreme Court
Administrative Circular No. 12, dated October 1, 1985, addressed to all judges
and clerks of court of the Regional Trial Courts, prescribing guidelines and
procedure in the service and execution of court writs and processes.
Administrative Circular No. 12 provides that "in the absence of deputy sheriff
appointed and assigned in his sala" the judge may at any time designate any of
the deputy sheriffs in the office of the clerk of court. However, the judge shall
not be allowed to designate the deputy sheriff of another branch without first
securing the consent of the presiding judge thereof.
 Judge Veneracion failed to observe the Constitutional and regulatory
prescriptions. Judge Veneracion had no power to assign on temporary
detail his duly appointed sheriff to the office of the clerk of court.
 The authority to detail employees of his branch to the office of the clerk
of court is vested in the executive judge.
 There was no vacancy even temporarily in the office of branch sheriff of
Branch 47, and the judge cannot appoint or designate any person of his
choice to act as sheriff.
 His action showed persistent disregard of the rule in the designation of
acting sheriffs. This act constitutes usurpation of the appointing
authority of the Supreme Court amounting to grave misconduct in
office.
As a member of the bench, Judge Veneracion is conclusively presumed to know
the law and is "expected to keep abreast of all laws and prevailing
jurisprudence" which he clearly failed to do in this instance.
 Judge Veneracion did not observe the Constitutional and regulatory
prescriptions. He persistently disregarded well-known legal rules in the
designation of acting sheriffs. By such action, he repeatedly usurped the
appointing authority of the Supreme Court. Thus, it amounts to grave
misconduct in office.
 Since 1989, Judge Veneracion has made repeated requests for the detail
of Mr. Tria to his court. He even made further request for the detail of
"sheriff" Tria from the EIIB after the head of the EIIB had denied such
request.
 Judge Veneracion appealed the denial to the Executive Secretary, and
even asked the help of a retired Supreme Court justice to effectuate his
appeal. And what triggered the complaint at bar against respondent
Judge Veneracion was an act of corruption by "Acting Deputy Sheriff IV"
Rogelio A. Tria in the enforcement of a writ of execution that Judge
Veneracion assigned directly to him.
 He personally signed the writ of execution, a function normally
delegated to the branch clerk of court. Worse, Judge Veneracion did not
even require "sheriff" Tria to post a sheriff’s bond, as required by
law. "Sheriff" Tria demanded P250.00 from the prevailing party for
his taxi fare from his residence in Antipolo to Manila, RTC.
Atty. Linatoc, as Branch Clerk of Court is likewise liable for misconduct in office
for following the unlawful orders of Judge Veneracion regarding Mr. Rogelio A.
Trias assignment as "Deputy Sheriff" of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 47,
Manila without the authority of the Supreme Court.
Justice Fernando recommended the dismissal of Judge Veneracion and Branch
Clerk of Court Atty. Linatoc, with prejudice to reemployment with any other
branch of the government.
Although the Court agrees with the factual findings and conclusions of Justice
Fernando, the Court, after due consideration, tempers the severity of the
recommended dismissal of respondent judge considering his long service in the
government and the judiciary and his obedience to the order of the Court
Administrator directing him to terminate the questioned designation of sheriff
Tria, thus, evincing remorse and repentance for his unauthorized acts.
direct participation in the irregularity, we are inclined to be more lenient with
him.
JUDGE VENERACION FOUND GUILTY OF GRAVE MISCONDUCT IN OFFICE
AND IS ORDERED SUSPENDED FROM OFFICE FOR A PERIOD OF 3 MONTHS,
WITHOUT PAY AND ALLOWANCES.

As to respondent Atty. Linatoc, SC considers his dismissal from the service as The Court orders Judge Veneracion to cease and desist immediately from
too harsh a penalty. His fault was in following blindly the orders of the rendering judgment, or issuing resolution or order in any pending case or
respondent judge, even though these violated the Constitution and circulars of continuing with any judicial action or proceeding whatsoever, effective
the Supreme Court. upon notice of this resolution.

Judge Veneracion’s outright disregard of the well-established separation of BRANCH CLERK OF COURT LINATOC IS FOUND GUILTY OF SIMPLE
powers of the three great departments of government and his exercise of MISCONDUCT IN OFFICE AND IS FINED PHP5,000 WITH WARNING THAT
powers beyond his judicial competence and in defiance of directives of the REPETITION OF THE SAME OR SIMILAR ACTS WOULD BE DEALT WITH
Supreme Court undermined the independence of the judiciary Judge Veneracion MORE SEVERELY
cannot hide behind the authorizations issued by officials of the executive branch
of the government, giving an impression of legality of his actions. Administrative
Circular No. 12, dated October 1, 1985, and Administrative Circular No. 7, dated
April 27, 1987 clearly provide for the implementation of the Supreme Courts
Constitutional power of appointment of judiciary employees, including sheriffs
and the assignment of acting deputy sheriffs to the courts. Judge Veneracion
repeatedly violated, nay defied, these circulars.

Finally, it is pertinent to state that on March 11, 1997, the Court found Judge
Veneracion guilty of gross ignorance of the law and imposed on him a fine of
P10,000.00 for disregarding a complainants right to procedural due process
with warning that the commission of the same or similar infraction shall
be dealt with more severely.

As Branch Clerk of Court, Atty. Linatoc has administrative supervision over all
other employees of the court and ought to know that a non-judicial person has
no place in the judicial service. His admission that he did not find any reason to
report to the Supreme Court the presence of "Sheriff" Rogelio A. Tria in Branch
47 since the orders for his assignment came from Judge Veneracion showed
gross ignorance of his role as branch clerk of court. He has the obligation to
report to the Supreme Court anyone in his staff without proper appointment
from the Supreme Court. As Branch Clerk of Court, Atty. Linatoc has control of
the employment records of the courts staff. However, considering his lack of
RTC MAKATI MOVEMENT AGAINST GRAFT AND CORRUPTION v ATTY.
Inocencio DUMLAO, Acting Clerk of Court of the RTC Valenzuela, MM
Susan Quino v Atty. Dumlao
Aug 9, 1995 | Kapunan, J.
Respondent Dumlao, then Branch Clerk of Court of Br 134, RTC Makati was
charged by the RTC Makati Movement against Graft and Corruption for allegedly
engaging in usurious activities, immorality and violation of the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act.
 The complaint alleged that Respondent withheld the salary checks of all
RTC Makati employees to compel them to borrow money from him at
usurious rates, as evidenced by Trust Agreements.
 The amounts loaned are collected through his alleged paramour, Ms.
Piedad Rufo (now Piedad R. Cruz), a clerk employed at the Cash Section
of the Office of the Clerk of Court, RTC Makati
 He was also charged with allegedly demanding money from party
litigants and lawyers in exchange for favorable action on their cases.
The letter-complaint was supported by:
 Petition signed by about 90 employees of the Makati RTC requesting
that the remittances of the employees' checks, allowances and other
benefits be done either by registered mail addressed to the respective
Branch Clerks or OIC's or by personal representation;
 Memorandum of then Makati, RTC Clerk of Court Maximo C. Contreras
directing the release of treasury warrants to the payees only, otherwise
the release should bear his approval;
 Complaint for Sum of Money filed by respondent Inocencio E. Dumlao
against a certain Nelson Olandesca based on a promissory note
 Affidavit complaint of respondent Inocencio E. Dumlao for estafa (trust
agreement) against Adora Balinguit filed with the fiscal's office of
Makati
 Subpoena issued for estafa (violation of trust agreement) where the
complainant is respondent Dumlao against one Lorie Ann Martinez who
was then a court employee of Makati RTC Branch 149. Attached to the
subpoena are two (2) receipts signed by Martinez as trustee and
Dumlao as trustor.
Case was given due course
 Following the rule in Anonymous Complaint against District Judge
Gibson Araula, CFI of Southern Leyte, Branch X that anonymous
complaints are acted upon where the charge could be fully borne by
public records of indubitable integrity, thus needing no corroboration
by evidence to be offered by complainant
Respondent denied all the charges and branded the allegations as mere
conjectures, hearsay and rumors without legal or factual basis
 Since December 1992, he has been engaged in a confidential mission to
help the Court Administrator expose the widespread corruption in the
Makati RTC and he surmised that this is the reason for the "anonymous
poison letter" against him
Complainant movement denigrated respondent’s claim as prime crusader
against graft and corruption. His appointment as a confidential agent was
challenged in view of his removal from the LTO for being notoriously
undesirable.
The Office of the CJ received another letter-complaint against Respondent,
signed by one Susan Quinto for:
1) Corruption and dereliction of duty for exacting money from court
litigants in the pretext that the amounts exacted are his commissioner's
fees, yet, he does not prepare his reports:
2) For operating a lending agency with the use of the facilities of the court
and for exacting from court employees usurious interest:
3) For criminal negligence in the performance of his duties as Branch
Clerk of Court of RTC, Branch 234, Makati, Metro Manila
In the course of the investigation conducted by Executive Judge Abad Santos of
RTC Makati, no one appeared in behalf of the RTC Movement although
complainant Quinto testified and adduced evidence to substantiate her
complaint. He made the following findings:
 Private Complainant has shown through court records that respondent
had charged commissioner’s fees for the reception of evidence in at
least 2 ex-parte cases, both pending before Br 134. Both cases were
dismissed for failure to prosecute only to find out that plaintiffs had
already presented their evidence ex-parte before Respondent. Court
believes him to be liable since in the first place, he admitted having
demanded certain amounts from the parties. Nowhere in the Rules is
 the Clerk of Court allowed to charge and collect commissioner's fees for
the reception of evidence ex-parte.
 Allegation of a certain Atty. Eugenio Macababayao that respondent
asked Php1,000 from him when he requested that his case be set for
hearing was unrefuted. Because he refused to pay, the case was not set
for hearing.
 Re: usurious activities, the evidence of complainant are so
preponderant that it cannot but be concluded that respondent was into
usurious activities on government time and resources. The testimony of
his runner details his collection process. Several court employees
testified. Documentary evidence attached to the complaint convinced
the court.
 Re: dereliction of duty. Examining the Monthly Reports signed by
Dumlao and the inventory submitted by the present presiding judge
makes it apparent that while Dumlao reported that their court had only
2 cases pending decision for the month of April, 1993; 4 for May 1993;
and 2 for June 1993; yet the inventory submitted by Judge P. Arcangel
as of 13 December 1993 shows about 120 cases were submitted for
decision or with unresolved incidents some of which as early as 1983.
Exec Judge Abad Santos recommended the dismissal of Respondent from
service on grounds of grave misconduct and dishonesty prejudicial to the best
interest of the service and acts unbecoming a court officer.
ISSUE
WON dismissal is proper – YES
Public service requires utmost integrity and strictest discipline. A public servant
must exhibit at all times the highest sense of honesty and integrity. The
administration of justice is a sacred task. By the very nature of their duties and
responsibilities, all those involved in it must faithfully adhere to, hold inviolate,
and invigorate the principle solemnly enshrined in the 1987 Constitution that a
public office is a public trust; and all public officers and employees must at all
times be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility,
integrity, loyalty and efficiency. The conduct and behavior of everyone
connected with an office charged with the dispensation of justice, from the
presiding judge to the lowliest clerk, should be circumscribed with the heavy
burden of responsibility. Their conduct, at all times, must not only be
characterized by propriety and decorum but, above all else, must be above
suspicion. Indeed, every employee of the judiciary should be an example of
integrity, uprightness and honesty.
A Branch Clerk of a court of justice is described as an essential officer in any
judicial system, whose office is the hub of activities, both adjudicative and
administrative and who occupy a position of great importance and
responsibility in the framework of judicial administration. Clerks of Court are,
thus, required to be individuals of competence, honesty and probity specifically
mandated to safeguard the integrity of the court and its proceedings, to earn
respect therefor, to maintain loyalty thereto and to the judge as the superior
officer, to maintain the authenticity and correctness of court records and to
uphold the confidence of the public in the administration of justice.
Re: demanding and receiving “commissioner’s fees,” the charges are
meritorious.
The Manual for Clerks of Courts, which in essence is the "Bible for Clerks of
Courts" specifically provides that:
No Branch Clerk of Court shall demand and/or receive commissioner's fees
for reception of evidence ex-parte.
. . . The court shall allow the commissioner, other than an employee of the
court, such reasonable compensation as the circumstances of the case
warrant. . . .
 Despite the express prohibition, a bill for payment of Php2,000 as
commissioner’s fees and stenographer’s fees for the ex-parte
presentation of plaintiff’s evidence was issued and signed by
Respondent
 Respondent's explanation that he was not the commissioner appointed
in the aforementioned case and that he did not receive any
money insufficient in view of his categorical admission on two (2)
occasions that he signed the said bill.
 Respondent's admission that he is unfamiliar with the Manual of the
Clerks of Courts and is not even aware of its existence does not help
him any. In his Supplemental Affidavit dated 29 July 1994, he
categorically stated:
15.1 That respondent has no personal knowledge of the
existence of the Manual for Clerks of Court, published in 1991,
prohibiting the collection of commissioner's fees. In fact, herein
respondent must admit that he saw the Manual for the first time
 only on July 28, 1994, during the hearing of this case, when the
Executive Judge showed it to him.
 This was confirmed by him during his cross-exam, that he relies on his
13 years of experience as guidelines in performing his duties as Clerk of
Court. As a court officer, he should keep abreast of the various changes
and amendments of the law.
The affidavit of Atty. Eugenio Macababayao Jr recanting his previous testimony
that respondent demanded Php1k from his client for the case to be set for
hearing, was not well-taken.
 Atty. Macababayao admitted that Respondent neglected to fully explain
the purpose of the amount. His failure to explain the purpose of the
money reflects poorly on his conduct as Branch Clerk of Court and how
he carries out the functions of his office.
Re: the lending business
Court concurs with the findings of Exec Judge Abad Santos
 The documentary exhibits presented by Complainant leave no doubt as
to the existence of Respondent's lending operation, some of which even
led to the filing (by Respondent) of criminal charges against borrowers
who failed to pay their loans under the so-called trust
agreements. Such despicable acts cannot be tolerated by this Court
 Respondent's reliance on CB Circular No. 905 implementing Monetary
Board Resolution No. 225 which effectively suspended the provisions of
the Usury Law is misplaced. Although Respondent may not be
criminally or civilly liable, he is still administratively liable under the
Civil Service Law where lending money at usurious rates of interests is
specifically listed as grounds for disciplinary action.
 By engaging in lending activities, Respondent has caused dishonor to
courts of justice.
Re: dereliction of duty
Court also concurs with the findings of Exec Judge Abad Santos
 One of the duties of a Branch Clerk of Court is to attend all court
sessions. In the instant case, however, Respondent has seriously
neglected this duty to the prejudice of public interest.
 Witness Rolando Santos testified that his duty is purely to interpret
testimonies and to assist the Clerk of Court during the trial that is
mandated by the Supreme Court, but during the course of the hearings
it is seldom that I assist Atty. Dumlao, it is almost always me assisting
the Judge during the trial.
 Atty. Dumlao is generally absent during hearings.
Respondent’s failure to prepare proper or correct monthly reports of cases is a
serious breach of duty.
 One of the basic responsibilities of a Branch Clerk of Court is the
preparation of the monthly report of cases to be submitted to this Court
 Reliance on the so-called Clerks-in-charge who prepare the actual
reports, or particularly on their initials which allegedly indicate
accuracy and veracity is insufficient and is a lazy and sloppy manner of
executing one's duties and responsibilities.
 This practice cannot be considered as proper supervision since
Respondent in the above-mentioned procedure practically does next to
nothing, his only contribution or input is his signature. Branch clerks of
court must realize that their administrative functions are just as vital to
the prompt and proper administration of justice. They are charged with
the efficient recording, filing and management of court records, besides
having administrative supervision over court personnel. They play a
key role in the complement of the court and cannot be permitted to
slacken on their jobs under one pretext or another. They must be
assiduous in performing their official duties and in supervising and
managing court dockets and records.
ATTY DUMLAO IS DISMISSED FROM THE SERVICE WITH FORFEITURE OF
ALL BENEFITS AND WITH PREJUDICE TO REINSTATEMENT IN
GOVERNMENT SERVICE.
Maritoni NIEVA v Saturnina ALVAREZ-EDAD, Branch Clerk of Court MTC,
Br 32, QC
Jan 31, 2005 | Sandoval-Gutierrez, J.
An administrative complaint was filed by Maritoni Nieva, former legal
researcher of the QC MeTC Br 32, charging Saturnina Alvarez-Edad with:
1) Falsification of daily time records;
2) Dishonesty;
3) Demanding or receiving commissioners fee for reception of evidence ex-
parte;
4) Conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service;
5) Issuing certified true copies of warrant of arrest without payment of the
corresponding fees; and
6) Discourtesy in the conduct of official business.
It was alleged that respondent falsified her daily time records.
 The entries therein of the time of her arrival in the office and departure
therefrom vary from her entries in the logbook
 Complainant submitted xerox copies of respondent’s DTR and logbook
showing such variance.2
It was also alleged that she demanded from one Billy Ranas, a messenger from
Unifunds, Php1.5k as commissioner’s fee in connection with the ex-parte
hearing in Unifunds v Sps Ann and Jose Aquino et al.
2
 Ranas followed up the case, he tried to hand P500.00 to respondent, but
she rejected it because she was expecting to receive P1,500.00. In the
presence of other court employees, she shouted at Ranas, Yuong
hinihingi kong legal, iyang negosyo ninyo ang illegal dahil ang taas taas
ng singil ninyo sa interest. Tapos hindi ninyo babayaran ang
commissioners fee!
 Upon respondent’s instruction, Judith Cueto, Stenographer II, prepared
a receipt for P500.00 as payment for stenographic notes. Respondent
then signed the receipt for the P500.00 but kept P300.00 for herself and
gave Cueto only P200.00.
Respondent allegedly harassed complainant and Helen Santiago, stenographer.
 respondent indicated in the logbook that complainant attended office
for only one half day. When complainant insisted that she was present
the whole day and was sitting beside her (respondent) in the afternoon,
respondent replied sarcastically that she did not see her that same
afternoon.
 One morning, Respondent prematurely closed the logbook at 8:20 A.M.
by indicating therein that it was already 8:30 A.M. When Helen Santiago
politely apprised respondent that it was still 8:20 A.M., respondent
tauntingly remarked, Eh di ilagay mong 8:29. Helen then reported the
matter to the Presiding Judge who settled their dispute. However,
respondent still issued a memorandum to Helen directing her to
explain within 72 hours why no disciplinary action should be taken
against her for her disrespectful and discourteous conduct.

Date Daily Time Record Office Log Book She also allowed Lily Monteverde, accused in a criminal case, to post bail
April 6, 1998 7:20 sick leave 7:20-12:00 12:30-4:30 although the latter did not personally appear in court, in violation of the Rules
of Court.
May 14, 1998 7:35-12:00 12:30-4:30 7:35-12:00 12:00-2:30 Respondent issued CTCs of warrants of arrest in People v Raquel Rodriguez,
without requiring the requesting party to pay the corresponding fees.
May 28, 1998 7:50-12:00 12:30 7:50-12:00 12:30-4:30
Respondent displayed conduct unbecoming of a public servant by publicly
June 18, 1998 7:55-12:00 12:30-4:00 7:55-12:00 12:30-4:30
humiliating complainant, the lawyers, the accused, and the members of her staff.
 Respondent unjustly charged Danilo Dela Cruz, a utility worker, with
June 26, 1998 8:00-12:00 halfday (sic) 8:00-12:00 12:30-4:30
insubordination. As a result, Dela Cruz was dismissed from the service.
August 6,1998 8:00-4:00 8:00-12:00 12:30-4:30  Complainant was forced to resign as legal researcher of Branch 32 on
respondent’s pretext that she did not live up to her expectations.
August 12,1998 7:15-12:00 12:30-4:30 7:15-12:00 12:30-4:00
Respondent denied all the charges against her. She submitted her dtr and the  DCA believes that she did not commit dishonesty when she demanded
logbook commissioner’s fee. Respondent is guilty of Violation of the Manual for
Date Daily Time Record Office Log Book Clerks of Court.3
April 6, 1998 7:20 sick leave 7:20-12:00 12:30-4:30  For all intents and purposes, respondent is in reality collecting
commissioners fee when she demanded payment from Unifunds
May 14, 1998 7:35-12:00 12:30-2:00 7:35-12:00 12:30-2:30 through messenger Billy Ranas and Documentation Officer Melinda De
Guzman even though she issued a receipt in the guise of collecting
May 28, 1998 7:50-12:00 12:30 7:50-12:00 12:30-4:30 payment for transcript of stenographic notes (TSN) in behalf of Court
Stenographer Cueto. When respondent gave Court Stenographer Judith
June 18, 1998 7:55-12:00 12:30-4:00 7:55-12:00 12:30-4:30 Cueto the sum of P200.00 pesos, she is merely giving the latter her
share for transcribing the stenographic notes of the case of Unifunds.
June 26, 1998 8:00-12:00 halfday (sic) 8:00-12:00 12:30-4:30  The intent or motive to gain out of Cueto’s collectibles for the payment
of TSN is totally absent. In fact, it was established during the
August 6,1998 8:00-4:00 8:00-12:00 12:30-4:30
investigation that respondent collected the sum of P500.00 in the
presence of the other staff and especially Court Stenographer Judith
August 12,1998 7:15-12:00 12:30-4:30 7:15-12:00 12:30-4:30
Cueto. The latter, upon receipt of the P200.00 pesos, did not object or
complain.
Executive Judge Gregorio Dayrit exonerated respondent from all the charges
 Presumably, respondent and Court Stenographer had a previous
except dishonesty.
understanding or some sort of an agreement to this kind of
 Investigating Judge Dayrit found that respondent demanded from the
arrangement, which they call it a package deal when conducting ex-
representative of Unifunds P1,500.00 as commissioners fee and
parte hearing. As testified by Court Stenographer Cueto, the normal fee
received P500.00 in the guise of payment for stenographic notes.
for ex-parte hearing, as far as their court is concerned, is P1,500.00
 She kept P300.00 for herself without the consent of Judith Cueto, a
pesos, with the following sharing scheme: P1,000.00 goes to the Branch
stenographer.
Clerk, then P500.00 goes to the Court Stenographer. Were it not for this
 Judge Dayrit then recommended that respondent be found guilty of two
kind of arrangement, respondent could have pocketed everything
(2) counts of dishonesty and be suspended from the service for one (1)
instead of giving part of it to Cueto. Since respondent was able to
year without pay and be disqualified for promotion or from receiving
collect P500.00 pesos only, she gave Cueto the P200.00 and retained for
any increase in salary during the pendency of the suspension, pursuant
herself the P300.00 pesos. Thus, the absence of an intent or motive to
to Section 46 (b), Subtitle A, Title I, Book V of Executive Order
gain.
292; Section 22, Rule XIV, Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of E.O.
 Sec 30, Rule 30 of RoC, is very specific that: in default or ex-parte
No. 292; and Section 7 of Republic Act No.6713
hearings, and in any case where the parties agree in writing, the
This was referred to the Office of the Court Administrator for evaluation, report
and recommendation
 Deputy Court Admin Christopher Lock found the findings and 3
(a) Section B, Chapter II (p. 36), which states that: No Branch Clerk of Court shall
recommendation well-taken except for the charge of dishonest and demand and/or receive commissioners fees for reception of evidence ex-parte;'
misconduct for demanding & collecting commissioner’s fee and
(b) Section D.7, Chapter IV(p. 74), which states that: The Court shall allow the
commissioner, other than an employee of the Court, such reasonable
compensation as the circumstances of the case warrant to be taxed as costs
against the defeated party, or apportioned, as justice requires.
 court may delegate the reception of evidence to its clerk of court
who is a member of the bar.
 As a Branch Clerk of Court who is a non-lawyer, she ought to know that
under the said rule it is only a member of the bar who is authorized to
receive evidence ex-parte. Records reveal that there is no order of the
presiding judge showing that she was authorized to act as such.
 In the present case, the facts do not warrant her dismissal from service
considering that only one out of 7 charges was proved.
 Penalty recommended by Exec Judge is too stiff to the administrative
offense committed by respondent. This is the first time that respondent
was administratively charged after service the judiciary for 10 years.
 DCA recommended a fine of Php1k and that she is severely
reprimanded with warning that a repetition of a similar act shall be
dealt with more severely.
ISSUE
WON penalty recommended is proper – NO.
Respondent overstepped her powers and responsibilities. The records
convincingly show that she demanded and received a commissioner’s fee from a
litigant in an ex-parte proceedings, a violation of the Manual for Clerks of Court
which proves that No Branch Clerk of Court shall demand and/or receive
commissioner’s fees for the reception of evidence ex-parte.
To be entitled to reasonable compensation, a commissioner must not be
an employee of the court. Section D (7), Chapter IV of the same Manual for
Clerks of Court provides that The Court shall allow the commissioner, other
than an employee of the court, such reasonable compensation as the
circumstances of the case warrant to be taxed as costs against the defeated
party, or apportioned, as justice requires.
Respondent, as a court employee, has no authority to demand or receive any
commissioners fee. In RTC Makati Movement Against Graft and Corruption vs.
Atty. Inocencio E. Dumlao, Acting Clerk of Court, Regional Trial Court, Valenzuela,
Metro Manila, the Court held:
The Manual for Clerks of Courts, which in essence is the Bible for Clerks of
Courts, specifically provides that No Branch Clerk of Court shall demand and/or
receive commissioners fees for reception of evidence ex parte. The court shall
allow the commissioner, other than an employee of the court, such
reasonable compensation as the circumstances of the case warrant.
Respondent does not meet the strict judicial standard when she demanded and
collected commissioners fee.
For violating a Supreme Court rule, directive or circular, the OCA recommends
that respondent be fined P1,000.00 and be severely reprimanded. The OCA
stresses that after all, respondent is a first-time offender.
The penalty recommended is too light.
Under the facts of this case, respondents transgression constitutes simple
misconduct, classified as a less grave offense under Section 52 (B), Rule IV of the
Revised Uniform Rules On Administrative Cases In The Civil Service, thus:
RULE IV PENALTIES
Section 52. Classification of Offenses. Administrative offenses with
corresponding penalties are classified into grave, less grave or light, depending
on their gravity or depravity and effects on the government service.
xxx
B. The following are less grave offenses with the corresponding penalties:
xxx
2. Simple Misconduct
1st Offense Suspension
1 mo. 1 day to 6 mos.
2nd Offense Dismissal
RESPONDENT FOUND GUILTY OF DEMANDING/RECEIVING
COMMISSIONER’S FEE AND IS HEREBY SUSPENDED FOR 2 MONTHS
WITHOUT PAY AND WARNED THAT A REPETITION SHALL BE DEALT WITH
MORE SEVERELY.

Rosalinda De Perio SANTOS v Exec Sec Catalino Macaraig and Sec Raul
Manglapus
April 10, 1992 | Grino-Aquino, J.
Petitioner is a career service officer with the rank of Chief of Mission II and
Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary, was appointed on July 24,
1986, by her Excellency, President Corazon C. Aguino, to the position of
Permanent Representative of the Philippines to the Philippine Mission to the
United Nations and other International Organizations with station in Geneva,
Switzerland.
April 6, 1987. Petitioner sought a LOA from the DFA to spend the Easter
Holidays in NY, at no expense to the government.
 She bought two (2) non-transferable, non-refundable discounted
tickets costing SFr. 1,597 for herself and her adopted daughter

Before they could take the trip however, petitioner was instructed to proceed to
Havana, Cuba to attend a UNCTAD conference as Philippine delegate. Petitioner
is entitled for official trip outside her station (Geneva) for the cost of airplane
ticket costing to SFr. 2,996 for Geneva-New York-Geneva portion of her Geneva-
New York-Havana-New York-Geneva trip. Instead of buying an economy
roundtrip ticket, petitioner used for the Geneva-New York-Geneva portion of
her trip the two (2) discounted tickets costing only SFr. 1,597 for herself and
her daughter Pia. They left Geneva for New York en route to Havana on April 15,
1987. On the same day, the DFA approved her application for a leave of absence
with pay from April 27 to May 1, 1987. After the Havana Conference, she and
her daughter spent her vacation leave in New York before returning to Geneva
(Ibid.). Instead of claiming reimbursement for SFr. 2,996, she requested, and
received, reimbursement of only SFr. 1,597 which she spent for the Geneva to
New York, and New York to Geneva portion of her trip, thereby effecting savings
of SFr.1,399 for the Government.
On September 16, 1987, the DFA ask her to explain why the Mission paid for
plane ticket of infant Pia de Perio-Santos (petitioner's daughter) Geneva-New
York-Geneva when petitioner was not authorized to accompany her adopting
mother at government expense.
Petitioner replied that the air fare tickets were for her only and did not include
her daughter whose trip was paid from her personal funds
On September 21, 1987, the DFA required her to refund the amount
representing her daughter's round-trip ticket since DFA received a copy of the
"facture" from the travel agency showing that the amount of SFr.1,597 was in
payment her trip and that the sum of SFr. 673 represented the cost of her
daughter's portion of the ticket.
On October 5, 1987, her co-workers led by Deputy Armando Maglaque, and
some MISUNPHIL employees filed administrative charges against her for
"incompetence; inefficient; corrupt and dishonest activities; rude and uncouth
manners; abusive and high-handed behavior; irregular and highly illegal
transactions involving funds of the mission.
On March 17, 1988, the Board of Foreign Service Administration (BFSA)
constituted a new 5-man investigating committee to evaluate the evidence
presented by the parties. The committee found her liable for misconduct only,
and recommended dismissal of the other charges. They also recommended that
she be reprimanded and recalled to Manila.
In a letter-decision dated April 27, 1988, the Secretary of Foreign Affairs
affirmed the BFSA's recommendation declaring Petitioner guilty of the lesser
offense of misconduct, instead of dishonesty, meted to her the penalty of
reprimand, and recalled her to the home office.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration on the ground that she was denied
due process when she was declared guilty of misconduct although it was not
one of the charges against her.
On March 30, 1989, President Aquino issued Administrative Order No. 122
finding petitioner guilty of dishonesty (instead of misconduct) and imposed
upon her the penalty of reprimand, with recall to the home office.
Hence this petition for certiorari alleging that the President's "reprimand and
recall orders are not supported by substantial evidence and were issued with
gross abuse of discretion and serious error of law".
ISSUE:
Whether the petitioner was unjustly found guilty and whether her recall to
Manila was a valid exercise of power by the Secretary - YES
A review of the records fails to yield any evidence of dishonesty on the part of
the petitioner, or an intent to cheat and defraud the government. Her failure to
disclose the fact that her discounted tickets included the fare for her child, was
harmless and inconsequential as the two (2) discounted Geneva-New York-
Geneva tickets for herself and her daughter were in fact inseparable,
intransferable, non-cancellable and non-refundable, in effect one whole fare
only, for purposes of the discount. The mother and daughter tickets were, in the
words of the petitioner, "married to each other". One without the other would
not have been entitled to the discount. And if she left her daughter behind, it
would have made no difference in the fare because the ticket was not
refundable.
Using the discounted tickets was beneficial to the Government for they cost
50% less than an economy roundtrip ticket that the petitioner was entitled to
purchase for the same trip if she travelled alone. She obviously saved money
(SFr.1,399) for the government by using her discounted tickets even if her
daughter's fare was included therein.
Nevertheless, the Court is not disposed to disturb the order of the DFA and the
Office of the President recalling the petitioner to the home office. There is no
merit in the petitioner's contention that her tour of duty in Geneva was for four
(4) years. The Court held that under a secret Executive Order No. 168, provides
that a person who has completed a minimum of one year of service, the
Secretary of Foreign Affairs can transfer that person to Manila for reassignment
and did not have to be explained and justified. The Secretary, as an alter ego of
the President, act with the implied imprimatur of the President herself, unless
the act is reprobated by her
The petitioner's designation as the permanent representative of the Philippine
Government to the United Nations and other International Organizations in
Geneva (Annex B, p. 34, Rollo), was one based on the special trust and
confidence which the appointing power, the President, had in the appointee.
Once that trust and confidence ceased to exist, the incumbent's continuance in
the position became untenable.
The tenure of officials holding primarily confidential positions ends upon loss of
confidence, because their term of office lasts only as long as confidence in them
endures (Corpus vs. Cuaderno, 13 SCRA 591). When that confidence is lost and
the officer holding the position is separated from the service, such cessation is
not removal from office but merely an expiration of his/her term (Cadiente vs.
Santos, 142 SCRA 280).
An incumbent of a primarily confidential position holds office at the pleasure of
the appointing power. When the pleasure turns into displeasure, the incumbent
is not removed or dismissed from office — his term merely expires (Ingles vs.
Mutuc, 26 SCRA 171).
"Primarily confidential" denotes "not only confidence in the aptitude of the
appointee for the duties of the office but primarily close intimacy which insures
freedom of intercourse without embarrassment or freedom from misgivings of
betrayals of personal trust or confidential matters of state" (Pinero vs.
Hechanova, 18 SCRA 417; citing De los Santos vs. Mallare, 87 Phil. 289).
It is the fact of loss of confidence, not the reason for it, that is important and
controlling. As holder of a primarily confidential position, petitioner's foreign
assignment was at the pleasure of the President. The recall order terminating
her tour of duty in Geneva and returning her to the home office was merely a
change of post or transfer of location of work.
Petitioner may not justifiably assail the appointment of Narcisa Escaler as her
replacement in Geneva because the power to appoint is essentially
discretionary. The appointing power, the President, has the right of choice
which she may exercise freely, according to her best lights (Pamantasan ng
Lungsod ng Maynila vs. Court of Appeals, 140 SCRA 22). This Court may not
order the reinstatement of the petitioner to her former position in Geneva for
that would be tantamount to a usurpation by this Court of the power of
appointment, which is the exclusive prerogative of the Chief Executive (Article
VII, Section 16, 1987 Constitution). It would violate the system of separation of
powers which inheres in our democratic republican form of government.
The recall order issued by the Secretary of Foreign Affairs (Assignment Order
No. 58/88) was a valid exercise of his authority as an alter ego of the President
(Villena vs. Secretary of Interior, 67 Phil. 451). His acts, "performed and
promulgated in the regular course of business, are, unless disapproved or
reprobated by the Chief Executive presumptively the acts of the latter (Cruz,
Political Law, p. 188, 1987 Edition). His order recalling the petitioner to the
home office, having been affirmed by the President, any doubts as to its validity
and propriety have thereby been laid to rest.
AO FINDING PETITIONER GUILTY IS SET ASIDE.
Isabelo GARCIANO v Wilfredo OYAO
Jan 27, 1981 | Makasiar, J.
The complainant alleges that:
"(1) sometime in February of 1968, the respondent borrowed money from him
in the sum of P568.00 for which he signed a promissory note with special power
of attorney authorizing respondent to collect his first quincena salary until his
indebtedness is fully paid but, instead, the respondent collected in advance his
salary checks so complainant was unable to collect a single check by way of
payment of the indebtedness;
(2) that respondent employed all sorts of tactics and manipulations to evade
payment of his obligations but due to the persistent demands of the
complainant the sum of P268 was paid leaving a balance of P300.00;
(3) that on July 26, 1973, the respondent executed a promissory note promising
to pay his obligation within that month of July or August;
(4) that after his attention was called by Judge Andres Sabido of Branch X, CFI of
Cebu regarding his unpaid obligation to him, the respondent signed another
promissory note on August 31, 1973 promising to pay his obligation on or
before September 15, 1973, but until now the respondent has not complied with
his promises to settle his indebtedness to him; and
(5) that respondent's act in wilfully refusing to settle his obligation is a violation
of the Civil Service Rules and Regulations which would subject him to
punishment."
The respondent admits that "he is indebted to complainant in the original
amount of P300.00 plus interest so that all in all it reaches the amount of
P560.00
 that he already paid the complainant the amount of P260.00
representing the interest of the principal capital of the original amount
of P300.00;
 Last July 26, 1973, the complainant demanded from him the remaining
balance of P300.00 and so he proposed to him to pay said balance at
P50.00 per month but the complainant got angry so he signed a
promissory note; then on August 31, 1973, he again came to their office
and demanded again from him the remaining balance but again he
prayed of him to please give him an ample time to look for the amount
with the request again to pay him in installments to which proposal he
did not agree, so he again signed a promissory note; that he is only
receiving a monthly pay of P273.00 and being the sole bread-winner of
a big family, he cannot pay the complainant in lump sum of the
remaining balance of P300.00; and that he is very willing to pay the
complainant in installments of P50.00 a month."
ISSUE
WON Oyao’s act in wilfully refusing to settle his obligation is a violation of the
Civil Service Rules and Regulations which would subject him to punishment. –
YES
The explanation of respondent is not satisfactory considering that for over 12
years from February, 1968 until this date, respondent has not fully paid his
indebtedness in the original amount of P568.00 despite his various promises to
pay the same on installment basis at the rate of P50.00 a month, lie has still an
unpaid balance of P300.00 on the principal since July, 1973.
Respondent's willful failure to pay just debt for twelve (12) years since 1968, is
unbecoming of a public official, to put it mildly (Flores vs. Tatad, Adm. Case No.
P-1808, March 31, 1980) and is a ground for disciplinary action against him,
including suspension or dismissal from the service (Sec. 19, Rule XVI I I of the
Civil Service Rules in relation to Sec. 33, R.A. No. 2260; Sec. 36, Art. IX, P.D. No.
807 of October 6, 1975),
His alleged "obvious financial set-back"—about which no proof was
submitted—cannot justify the unnecessary inconvenience he caused to the
complainant. The indebtedness was incurred as early as February, 1968.
Respondent executed a promissory note in favor of the complainant and also a
special power of attorney authorizing herein complainant to collect
respondent's first quincena salary until the indebtedness was fully paid. But
complainant could not collect the first 15-day salary of respondent, for the latter
always collected it ahead of complainant. Respondent's execution of the
aforesaid documents in favor of the complainant induced the latter to grant the
said loan. Hence, it is clearly unfair to the complainant as well as unethical for
herein respondent to welch on his promise.
Moreover, in his explanation dated January 4, 1974, respondent falsely averred
that, being the sole bread winner of a "big family" he cannot pay with his
monthly salary of P273.00 herein complainant lsabelo Garciano in a lump sum
the remaining balance of P300.00 (Respondent's Explanation, par. 6). This claim
is belied by his Personnel File No. 201, which discloses that respondent has only
one daughter, Rhodora T. Oyao born on August 19, 1961 and since January 1,
1975—seven years after he incurred the indebtedness—he has been receiving a
monthly salary of P435.16 (Personnel File No. 201, p. 13).
Respondent's unstable financial position is due to his habitual absenteeism—
several leaves of absence without pay—as revealed his personnel File No. 201.
Moreover, while it is meet and just for an individual to incur an indebtedness
uncurtailed by the fact that he is a public officer or employee, caution should be
taken to prevent the development of suspicious circumstances that might
inevitably impair the image of the public office. We need not exaggerate the
importance of being absolutely free from any, suspicion which may
unnecessarily erode the faith and confidence of the people in their government.
As the Constitution categorically declared: "Public office is a public trust. public
officers and employees shall served with the highest degree of responsibility,
integrity, loyalty and efficiency, and shall remain accountable to the people"
(Art. XIII, Sec. 1, Constitution).
A ground for apprehension is the possibility that cases might arise involving
parties who are creditors of the respondent, then Docket Clerk, now Clerk of a
Court of First Instance of Cebu-a public employee. This is certainly not a remote
possibility. lt is well to stress here that at the time respondent incurred the
above-said indebtedness he was discharging the duties of a docket clerk, in
charge of the custody and maintenance of up-to-date entries in: docket books on
all cases, record book of judgment, record book on archived cases, record book
on appealed cases, and the record of the minutes on the raffling of cases. As
clerk of court, among his important duties are to receive all pleadings,
documents and communications pertaining to the court, to refer to the deputy
clerk of court all cases, pleadings, documents and communications received, to
take charge of all mail matters, and to release decisions, orders, processes,
subpoenas and notices as directed.
Respondent, it is thus clear, occupies a sensitive position and, if moved by
sinister or ulterior motives, he could unduly impair the administration of
justice. By simply failing to act or by tampering with the record books for a
consideration with which to pay his debts, he can unilaterally imperil the
orderly administration of justice.
In one case, Bautista vs. Joaquin, Jr. (Adm. Matter No. P- 236, July 29, 1977, 78
SCRA 83, 86, 87), this Court penalized the respondent deputy clerk of court for
irregularity in receiving pleading". In underscoring the importance of a correct
and accurate court record and its consequent effect on the faith and trust of the
litigants in our courts of justice, this Court held:
In the administration of justice. litigants repose their faith and trust in the
authenticity and correctness of court records, and it is the bounden duty of
officials and employees of the court to maintain and uphold that confidence
of the public. Any act which tends to undermine and corrode the public trust
is a wrongdoing which warrants administrative sanctions the severity of
which should be commensurate with the gravity of the act committed.
We cannot over-emphasize the importance of a faithful and accurate entry of
the time and date of receipt of pleadings filed in court. Where there is no
mechanical device available to make the tampering of dates impossible,
safeguards are taken to ensure the correct recording of the time and date when
pleadings are received. One such safeguard is the keeping of an entry book. Here
there was such an en try book, but the filing of the answer of the defendants at
4:00 PM on December 19, 1973, was not registered thereon on said date or any
date thereafter, thus giving rise to the fears of complainant, which We hold to be
justified, that said answer was surreptitiously received by respondent after the
period given by the trial court to the defendant to file their answer had expired,
especially since, the original of said answer did not bear any proof of receipt of a
copy thereof by complainant's counsel as of the date, December 19, 1973. ...
Respondent Wilfredo Oyao, should avoid so far as reasonably possible a
situation which would normally tend to arouse any reasonable suspicion that he
is utilizing his official position for personal gain or advantage to the prejudice of
party litigants or the public in general. In the language of then Justice, now Chief
Justice Enrique M. Fernando in the case of Pineda vs. Claudio (28 SCRA 34, 54):
"There may be occasion then where the needs of the collectivity that is the
government may collide with his private interest as an individual".
Respondent's improper conduct unavoidably stains the image of the judiciary.
Court personnel must comply with just contractual obligation, act fairly and
adhere to high ethical standards to preserve the court's integrity.
Furthermore, respondent, although an ordinary court employee, should not, like
judges, incur obligations which will in any way interfere, directly or indirectly,
with his function as such. He should be scrupulously careful to avoid such action
as may reasonably tend to generate the suspicion that his relations with others
constitute an element in the determination of the course of action that the court
to which he belongs, will. take in a pending case.
... The conduct and behavior of everyone connected with an office charged with
the dispensation of justice, like the courts below, from the presiding judge to the
lowliest clerk, should be circumscribed with the heavy burden of responsibility.
His conduct, at all times, must not only be characterized with propriety and
decorum but above all else must be above suspicion (Jereos, Jr. vs. Reblando, Sr.,
Adm. Matter No. P-141, May 31, 1976, 76 SCRA 126, 131, 132).

To emphasize the warning, Section I of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act
(R.A. No. 3019, as amended by R.A. 3047) states: "It is the policy of the
Philippines (Government in line with the principle that a public office is a public
trust, to repress certain acts of public officers, and private persons alike which
constitute graft and corrupt practices or which may lead thereto" (emphasis
supplied).

Although the actuation of the respondent in the present case may not clearly fall
under any of the graft and corrupt practices defined by law, the impropriety of
the same is evidently unquestionable for it may lead to any of those prohibited
acts.

RESPONDENT IS ADMONISHED TO PAY HIS DEBTS WHEN DUE.