1. VILLASOR v.

REPUBLIC

Republic vs. Villasor (Consti1)

Republic of the Philippines, petitioner, vs. Hon. Guillermo P. Villasor, as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Cebu,
Branch I, the Provincial Sheriff of Rizal, the Sheriff of the City of Manila, the Clerk of Court of First Instance of Cebu,
P.J. Kiener Co., Ltd., Gavino Unchuan, and International Construction Corporation, respondents.

November 28, 1973

Fernando, J:

Facts: The decision that was rendered in favor of respondents P.J. Kiener Co., Ltd, Gavino Unchuan and
International Construction Corporation was declared final and executory by Respondent Hon. Guillermo P. Villasor.
Pursuant to the said declaration, the corresponding Alias Writ of Execution was issued. And for the strength of this
writ, the provincial sheriff served notices of garnishment with several banks, specially on the 'monies due the Armed
Forces of the Philippines in the form of deposits; the Philippines Veterans Bank received the same notice of
garnishment.
The funds of the AFP on deposit with the banks are public funds duly appropriated and allocated for the payment of
pensions of retireees, pay and allowances of military and civillian personnel and for maintenance and operations of
AFP.
Petitioner filed a petition against Villasor for acting in excess jurisdiction amounting to lack of jurisdiction in granting
the issuance of a Writ of Execution against the properties of AFP, hence the notices and garnishments are null and
void.
Issue: Whether or not the Writ of Execution issued by respondent Judge Villasor is valid.
Held: No. What was done by respondent Judge is not in conformity with the dictates of the Constitution. It is a
fundamental postulate of constitutionalism flowing from the juristic concept of sovereignty that the state and its
government is immune from suit unless it gives its consent. A sovereign is exempt from suit not because of any
formal conception or obsolete theory but on the logical and practical ground that there can be no legal right as
against the authority that makes the law on which the right depends.
2. LASCO v. UNRENRE

Lasco vs UNRFNRE
Eldepio Lasco et al v United Nations Revolving Fund For Natural Resources Exploration (UNRFNRE)
G.R. Nos. 109095-109107 February 23, 1995

Facts: Petitioners were dismissed from their employment with privaterespondent, the United Nations Revolving
Fund for NaturalResourcesExploration (UNRFNRE), which is a special fund and subsidiary organ of theUnited
Nations.The UNRFNRE is involved in a joint project of thePhilippineGovernment and the United Nations for
exploration work in Dinagat Island.Petitioners are thecomplainants for illegal dismissal and damages.Private
respondent alleged that respondent Labor Arbiter had no jurisdiction over its personality since itenjoyed diplomatic
immunity.

Issue: WON specialized agencies enjoy diplomatic immunity

Held: Petition is dismissed. This is not to say that petitioner have no recourse.Section 31 of the Convention on the
Privileges and Immunitiesof the SpecializedAgencies of the United Nations states that ³each specialized agency
shall makea provision for appropriate modes of settlement of (a) disputes arising out of contracts or other disputes
of private character to which thespecialized agencyisa party.´ Private respondent is not engaged in a commercial
venture in thePhilippines.Its presence is by virtue of a joint project entered into by thePhilippine Government and
theUnited Nations for mineral exploration in DinagatIsland
3. SEAFDEC v. NLRC

Seafdec vs. NLRC

G.R. Nos. 97468-70, September 2 1993, 241 SCRA 580

FACTS: Two labor cases were filed by the herein private respondents against the petitioner, Southeast Asian
Fisheries Development Center (SEAFDEC), before the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), Regional
Arbitration Branch, Iloilo City. In these cases, the private respondents claim having been wrongfully terminated from
their employment by the petitioner.

The petitioner, who claims to be an international inter-government organization composed of various Southeast
Asian countries, filed a Motion to Dismiss, challenged the jurisdiction of the public respondent in taking cognizance
of the above cases.

The private respondents, as well as respondent labor arbiter, allege that the petitioner is not immune from suit and
assuming that if, indeed, it is an international organization, it has, however, impliedly, if not expressly, waived its
immunity by belatedly raising the issue of jurisdiction.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner is immune from suit.

HELD: The Court ruled for the petitioner. It is beyond question that petitioner SEAFDEC is an international agency
enjoying diplomatic immunity. It has already been held in Southeast Asian Fisheries Development Center-
Aquaculture Department vs. National Labor Relations Commission (G.R. No. 86773, 206 SCRA 283/1992).
Petitioner Southeast Asian Fisheries Development Center-Aquaculture Department (SEAFDEC-AQD) is an
international agency beyond the jurisdiction of public respondent NLRC.

Being an intergovernmental organization, SEAFDEC including its Departments (AQD), enjoys functional
independence and freedom from control of the state in whose territory its office is located. One of the basic
immunities of an international organization is immunity from local jurisdiction, i.e., that it is immune from the legal
writs and processes issued by the tribunals of the country where it is found. The obvious reason for this is that the
subjection of such an organization to the authority of the local courts would afford a convenient medium thru which
the host government may interfere in their operations or even influence or control its policies and decisions of the
organization; besides, such objection to local jurisdiction would impair the capacity of such body to discharge its
responsibilities impartially on behalf of its member-states.
4. CALLADO v. IRRI

G.R. No. 106483 May 22, 1995/ ROMERO, J.:

Facts: Ernesto Callado, petitioner, was employed as a driver at the IRRI. One day while driving an IRRI vehicle on
an official trip to the NAIA and back to the IRRI, petitioner figured in an accident.

Petitioner was informed of the findings of a preliminary investigation conducted by the IRRI's Human Resource
Development Department Manager. In view of the findings, he was charged with:
(1) Driving an institute vehicle while on official duty under the influence of liquor;
(2) Serious misconduct consisting of failure to report to supervisors the failure of the vehicle to start because of a
problem with the car battery, and
(3) Gross and habitual neglect of duties.

Petitioner submitted his answer and defenses to the charges against him. However, IRRI issued a Notice of
Termination to petitioner.

Thereafter, petitioner filed a complaint before the Labor Arbiter for illegal dismissal, illegal suspension and indemnity
pay with moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees.

IRRI wrote the Labor Arbiter to inform him that the Institute enjoys immunity from legal process by virtue of Article 3
of Presidential Decree No. 1620, 5 and that it invokes such diplomatic immunity and privileges as an international
organization in the instant case filed by petitioner, not having waived the same.

While admitting IRRI's defense of immunity, the Labor Arbiter, nonetheless, cited an Order issued by the Institute to
the effect that "in all cases of termination, respondent IRRI waives its immunity," and, accordingly, considered the
defense of immunity no longer a legal obstacle in resolving the case.

The NLRC found merit in private respondent's appeal and, finding that IRRI did not waive its immunity, ordered the
aforesaid decision of the Labor Arbiter set aside and the complaint dismissed.

In this petition petitioner contends that the immunity of the IRRI as an international organization granted by Article 3
of Presidential Decree No. 1620 may not be invoked in the case at bench inasmuch as it waived the same by virtue
of its Memorandum on "Guidelines on the handling of dismissed employees in relation to P.D. 1620."

Issue: Did the (IRRI) waive its immunity from suit in this dispute which arose from an employer-employee
relationship?

Held: No. P.D. No. 1620, Article 3 provides:

Art. 3. Immunity from Legal Process. The Institute shall enjoy immunity from any penal, civil and administrative
proceedings, except insofar as that immunity has been expressly waived by the Director-General of the Institute or
his authorized representatives.

The SC upholds the constitutionality of the aforequoted law. There is in this case "a categorical recognition by the
Executive Branch of the Government that IRRI enjoys immunities accorded to international organizations, which
determination has been held to be a political question conclusive upon the Courts in order not to embarass a
political department of Government.
It is a recognized principle of international law and under our system of separation of powers that diplomatic
immunity is essentially a political question and courts should refuse to look beyond a determination by the executive
branch of the government, and where the plea of diplomatic immunity is recognized and affirmed by the executive
branch of the government as in the case at bar, it is then the duty of the courts to accept the claim of immunity upon
appropriate suggestion by the principal law officer of the government or other officer acting under his direction.
The raison d'etre for these immunities is the assurance of unimpeded performance of their functions by the agencies
concerned.

The grant of immunity to IRRI is clear and unequivocal and an express waiver by its Director-General is the only
way by which it may relinquish or abandon this immunity.

In cases involving dismissed employees, the Institute may waive its immunity, signifying that such waiver is
discretionary on its part.

5. Begosa vs. PVA

Gaudencio A. Begosa, plantiff-appellee,
vs. Chairman, Philippine Veterans Administration;and Members of the Board of Administrators, Philippine Veterans
Administration, defendants - appellants
.
Nature:
Appeal from a decision of the CFI of Manila
Date:
April 30, 1970
Ponente:
Fernando, J.

Facts:
•Plaintiff sought the aid of the judiciary to obtain the benefits to which he believed hewas entitled under the Veterans’
Bill of Rights.
•H e f i l e d h i s c l a i m f o r d i s a b i l i t y p e n s i o n o n M a r c h 4 , 1 9 5 5 b u t w a s e r r o n e o u s l y disapproved
on June 21, 1955 due to his dishonorable discharge from the army.
• The Board of Administrators of PVA finally approved his claim on September 2, 1964,entitling him with a pension of
P30 a month, to take effect on October 5 of that year.
•Believing that his pension should have taken effect back in 1955 when his claim wasdisapproved, and that he is
entitled to a higher pension of P50 (RA No. 1362 amendingSection 9 of RA No. 65) as a permanently incapacitated
person, which was increased toP100 a month when RP 1362 was amended by RA No. 1920 on June 22,
1957, Begosafiled a case against PVA in the Court of First Instance.
•CFI ruled in favor plaintiff.
•Defendants claim that the plaintiff has not exhausted all administrative remedies before resorting to
court action and that the plaintiff’s claim is in reality a suit
againstt h e G o v e r n m e n t w h i c h c a n n o t b e e n t e r t a i n e d b y t h i s C o u r t f o r l a c k o f j u r i s d i c t i o n be
cause the Government has not given its consent.

Issue:
WON the SC can entertain the suit against PVA.

Held:
Yes.

Ratio:
•Where a litigation may have adverse consequences on the public treasury, whetherin the disbursements of funds or
loss of property, the public official proceeded againstnot being liable in his personal capacity, then the
doctrine of non-suitability mayappropriately be invoked.
•However, it has no application where the suit against such a functionary hadt o b e i n s t i t u t e d b e c a u s e
o f h i s f a i l u r e t o c o m p l y w i t h t h e d u t y i m p o s e d b y statue appropriating public funds for the
benefit of plaintiff.
• Also, where there is a stipulation of facts, the question before the lower court beings o l e l y o n e o f l a w a n d o n
t h e f a c e o f t h e d e c i s i o n , t h e a c t u a t i o n o f a p p e l l a n t s b e i n g patently illegal, the doctrine of
exhaustion of administrative remedies certainly does notcome into play.
6. DEL MAR V. PHILIPPINE VETERANS ADM (PVA)

Facts:
Del Mar averred that he served during WW II as chief Judge advocate of the Cebu Area Command(a duly
recognized guerrilla org.) w/ the rank of major; that he subsequently obtained an honorable discharge from the
service on 10/20/46 on a cert. of permanent total physical disability;that upon proper claim presented and after
hearing and adjudication, the Phil. Veterans BD granted him a monthly life pension of P50 effective 1/28/47;that in
3/50,the aid Bd,discounted payment of monthly life pension on the ground that his receipt of similar pension from
the Us gov’t,thru the US Veterans Admin. by reason of military service rendered in the US in the Far East during the
war, precluded him from receiving any further monthly life pension from the Phil. Govt; that he wrote the said BB.
Twice, demanding the continued payment of his monthly pension but his demands went unheeded. And petition for
mandamus was filed w/ CFI Cebu w/c rendered judgement upholding Del mar’s claim.
The PVA argues that the court a quo was w/o jurisdiction to try civil cases bec.it involves a money claim against
PVA- a mere agency of the Gov’t performing governmental functions w/ no juridical personality of its own-and,in
reality, partakes of an action against the Phil. Gov’t which is immune from suit w/o its consent.

HELD: As a general proposition, the rule on the immunity of the Government from suit w/o its consent holds true in
all actions resulting in “adverse consequences on the public treasury,whether in the disbursements of funds or loss
pf prop. Needless to say,in such actions,w/c,in effect,constitute suit against the Gov’t, the court has no option but to
dismiss them. Nonetheless,the rule admits of an exception. It finds no application where a claimant. As clearly
discernible from the circumstances, the case at bar falls under the exception.

10. RAYO VS. CFI OF BULACAN

Facts: During the height of typhoon Kading , the National Power Corporation’s plant superintendent Chavez opened
simultaneously all the three floodgates of the Angat Dam.

As a direct and immediate result, several towns in Bulacan were flooded (particularly Norzagaray). About a hundred
of its residents died and properties worth million of pesos were destroyed.

The petitioners, who are among the unfortunate victims of the man-caused flood, filed several complaints for
damages against NPC and the plant superintendent.

NPC claimed, as its defense, that in the operation of the Angat Dam, it is performing a purely governmental function.
Thus, it cannot be sued without the express consent of the State.

The petitioners opposed the claim of NPC and claimed that it is performing not governmental but merely proprietary
functions and that based on the organic charter (charter -a legal document that provides for the creation of a
corporate entity ) of NPC, it can be sued and be sued in any court.

Issue: Whether or not the power of NPC to sue and be sued under its organic charter includes the power to be sued
for tort.

Held : The government has organized a private corporation, put money in it and has allowed it to sue and be sued
in any court under its charter. NPC, as a government owned and controlled corporation, has a personality of its own,
distinct and separate from that of the Government. In any court, NPC can sue and be sued for tort. The petition of
the petitioners was granted.

Notes:

Government-owned and controlled corporations have a personality of their own, separate and distinct from the
government. Therefore, although they are considered to be public in character, they are not exempt from
garnishment (legal proceedings).

11. MALONG VS. PNR, G.R. NO. L-49930

Facts: The Petitioners, Malong spouses alleged in their complaint that on October 30, 1977 their son, Jaime
Aquino, a paying passenger, was killed when he fell from a PNR train while it was between Tarlac City and Capas.
The said train was overloaded with passengers and baggage in view of the proximity of All Saints Day. The Malong
spouses prayed that the PNR be ordered to pay them damages totalling P136,370.

The trial court dismissed the complaint, ruling that it had no jurisdiction because the PNR, being a government
instrumentality, the action was a suit against the State.

The petitioners appealed to SC pursuant to RA No. 5440.

Issue: W/N the PNR is immune from suit? NO.

 Although the PNR is a government instrumentality under Republic Act No. 4156, as amended by Republic
Act No. 6366 and Presidential Decree No. 741, it was held that the State divested itself of its sovereign
capacity when it organized the PNR which is no different from its predecessor, the Manila Railroad
Company. The PNR did not become immune from suit. It did not remove itself from the operation of articles
1732 to 1766 of the Civil Code on common carriers.
 However, as held in precedents, the correct rule is that "not all government entities, whether corporate or
non-corporate, are immune from suits. Immunity from suit is determined by the character of the” objectives
“for which the entity was organized.”
 The Manila Hotel case also relied on the following rulings: “By engaging in a particular business through the
instrumentality of a corporation, the government divests itself pro hac vice of its sovereign character, so as
to render the corporation subject to the rules of law governing private corporations.”
Held: The order of dismissal is reversed and set aside. The case is remanded to the trial court for further
proceedings, costs against the Philippine National Railways.

It would be unjust if the heirs of the victim of an alleged negligence of the PNR employees could not sue the PNR for
damages. Like any private common carrier, the PNR is subject to the obligations of persons engaged in that private
enterprise. It is not performing any governmental function.

Notes

Abad Santos, J., concurring:

 The claim that Philippine National Railways is immune from suit because it is an instrumentality of the
government is so outlandish that it deserves slight consideration.
 He mentioned the Central Bank of the Philippines as an example of government instrumentality that is not
immune from suit for it also performs proprietary functions.
 He also contended the use of the immunity from suit on the part of the government corporations to deny
justice that is due to the people they are to serve.

12. JESUS DISNI v. SANDIGANBAYAN

Hermino T. Disini vs. the Honorable Sandiganbayan

Decision: The Sandiganbayan has exclusive original jurisdiction over the criminal action of Hermino T. Disini
notwithstanding that he is a private individual considering his criminal prosecution is intimately related to the
recovery of ill-gotten wealth of the Marcoses, their immediate family, subordinates and close associates.

Facts:

1. Disini, is the husband of Paciencia Escolin-Disini, the first cousin of First Lady Imelda Romualdez-Marcos,
and at the same time the family physician of the Marcoses, had close personal relations and intimacy with
and free access to President Marcos, a public official.

2. Mr. Disini was charged by the Sandiganbayan on June 30, 2004 with corruption of public officials and
violation of Section 4a of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act

a. Criminal Case No. 28001 – from the period of 1974 to February 1986 conspired with then President
Marcos to give gifts and presents to President Marcos in forms of 2.5 billion shares of stock in
Vulcan Industrial and Mining Corporation and 4 billion shares of stock in the Energy Corporation with
both shares having a book value of P 100.00/share.

b. Criminal Case No. 28002 - from the period of 1974 to February 1986, conspired with then President
Marcos to request and receive from Burns and Roe, a foreign consultant, the total amount of One
Million U.S. Dollars ($1,000,000.00),more or less, and also from Westinghouse Electric
Corporation(WESTINGHOUSE), the total amount of Seventeen Million U.S.
Dollars($17,000,000.00), more or less, all for and in consideration of Disini to secure and obtain,
which Disini did secure and obtain, the contract for the said Burns and Roe and Westinghouse to do
the engineering and architectural design, and construct, of the Philippine Nuclear Power Plant
Project at Morong, Bataan.

3. Mr. Disini via petition for critoriari alleging the Sandiganbayan committed grace abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

a. Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction

b. Grave abuse of discretion by denial of petitioner’s constitutional and statutory right of prescription
erring in the following:

i. Determining applicable prescriptive period;

ii. Commencement of prescriptive period; and

iii. Determination of point of prescriptive period.

c. Sandiganbayan showed prejudgement of the case by upholding the glaringly absent elements of the
offenses charged

d. Sandiganbayan refused to quash the information despite utter failure to comply to prescribed form
denying the petitioner’s constitutional and statutory right to be informed the nature and cause of
accusations against him.

Issue: The jurisdiction of Sandiganbayan over the criminal action of Hermino Disina and the grave abuse of the
Sandiganbayan to Mr. Disini’s statutory and constitutional rights of prescription and rights to be informed the cause
and nature of accusations against him.

Ruling:

1. The petition for critiorari has no merit

2. On the issue of jurisdiction, Section 2 of E.O. No.1 has tasked the PCGG to assist the recovery of ill-gotten
wealth of President Marcos. It is underscored that it was the PCGG that had initially filed the criminal
complaints in the Sandiganbayan, with the Office of the Ombudsman taking over the investigation of Disini
only after the Court issued in Cojuangco, Jr. the directive to the PCGG to refer the criminal cases to the
Office of the Ombudsman on the ground that the PCGG would not be an impartial office following its finding
of a prima facie case being established against Disini

3. Similarly, The Sandiganbayan also holds jurisdiction of Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in
connection with Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986 under Section c of RA 8249.
 4. On the issue of offenses charged has not yet prescribed:

a. Applicability of prescription period: Although period of prescription for corruption of public officials
charged against Disini is 15 years, it would not be held that the prescriptive period began to run from
1974 since during the Marcos regime, no person would have dared to assail the legality of the
transaction.

b. Prescriptive period for the crime commenced from the date of its discovery in 1992 after the
Committee made an exhaustive investigation. When the complaint was filed in 1997, only five years
have elapsed, and, hence, prescription has not yet set in.

c. Criminal complaints were filed and their records transmitted by the PCGG to the Office of the
Ombudsman on April 8, 1991for the conduct the preliminary investigation and as such there was no
interruption of proscriptive period.

5. Information was insufficient in form and substance:

a. Information on Criminal Case 28001 and 28002 is sufficiently complied to the requirements of
Section 6, Rule 110 of the Rules of the Court since it states the name of the accused; the
designation of the offense given by the statute; the acts or omissions complained of as constituting
the offense; the name of the offended party; the approximate date of the commission of the offense;
and the place where the offense was committed.

b. Allegations are also sufficiently upheld as the elements of the offenses under Section 4(a) of RA
3019 are present.

13. DA v. NLRC

Department of Agriculture vs. the National Labor Relations Commission

Decision: Petition to nullify the Resolution, 1 dated 27 November 1991, of the National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC), Fifth Division, Cagayan de Oro City, which will deny the petition for injunction, prohibition and mandamus
that prays to enjoin permanently the NLRC's Regional Arbitration Branch X and Cagayan de Oro City Sheriff from
enforcing the decision 2 of 31 May 1991 of the Executive Labor Arbiter and from attaching and executing on
petitioner's property.

Facts:

1. The NLRC rendered a decision on May 31, 1990 finding the DA jointly and severally liable with Sultan
Security Agency for the payment of money claims, aggregating P266,483.91, of the complainant security
guards. The petitioner and Sultan Security Agency did not appeal the decision of the Labor Arbiter. Thus, the
decision became final and executory.

2. On 18 July 1991, the Labor Arbiter issued a writ of execution. 5 commanding the City Sheriff to enforce and
execute the judgment against the property of the two respondents. Forthwith, or on 19 July 1991, the City
Sheriff levied on execution the motor vehicles of the petitioner, i.e. one (1) unit Toyota Hi-Ace, one (1) unit
Toyota Mini Cruiser, and one (1) unit Toyota Crown. 6 These units were put under the custody of Zacharias
Roa, the property custodian of the petitioner, pending their sale at public auction or the final settlement of the
case, whichever would come first.

3. Petitioner charged that the NLRC with grave abuse of discretion for refusing to quash the writ of execution
as the NLRC assumes jurisdiction over a money claim which should fall under the exclusive jurisdiction of
the Commission on Audit and the NLRC disregards the cardinal rule of the non-suability of the State.

Issue: The non-suability of the State and execution of the NLRC to acquire the government property.

Ruling:

1. Petition was granted.

2. The basic postulate in the Constitution states that "The State may not be sued without its consent. (Article
XVI, Section 3 of the Constitution). This rule though does not say that the State cannot be sued in any
circumstances.
 3. When the state gives its consent to be sued, it does thereby necessarily consent to unrestrained execution
against it. In other words, when the State waives its immunity, all it does, in effect, is to give the other party
an opportunity to prove, if it can, that the State has a liability.

4. The universal rule that where the State gives its consent to be sued by private parties either by general or
special law, it may limit the claimant's action "only up to the completion of proceedings anterior to the stage
of execution"

5. That the power of the Courts ends when the judgment is rendered, since government funds and properties
may not be seized under writs or execution or garnishment to satisfy such judgments, is based on obvious
considerations of public policy. Disbursements of public funds must be covered by the correspondent
appropriation as required by law. The functions and public services rendered by the State cannot be allowed
to be paralyzed or disrupted by the diversion of public funds from their legitimate and specific objects, as
appropriated by law.

14. VMPSI v. CA

Facts: Veterans Manpower and Protective Services, Inc. (VMPSI) alleges that the provisions under Section 4 and
17 of Republic Act No. 5487 or the Private Security Agency Law violate the 1987 Constitution against monopolies,
unfair competition and combinations in restraint of trade, and tend to favor and institutionalize the Philippine
Association of Detective and Protective Agency Operators, Inc. (PADPAO) which is monopolistic because it has an
interest in more than one security agency.

Respondent VMPSI likewise questions the validity of paragraph 3, subparagraph (g) of the Modifying Regulations
on the Issuance of License to Operate and Private Security Licenses and Specifying Regulations for the Operation
of PADPAO issued by then PC Chief Lt. Gen. Fidel V. Ramos, through Col. Sabas V. Edades, requiring that “all
private security agencies/company security forces must register as members of any PADPAO Chapter organized
within the Region where their main offices are located...”. As such membership requirement in PADPAO is
compulsory in nature, it allegedly violates legal and constitutional provisions against monopolies, unfair competition
and combinations in restraint of trade.

A Memorandum of Agreement was executed by PADPAO and the PC Chief, which fixed the minimum monthly
contract rate per guard for eight (8) hours of security service per day at P2,255.00 within Metro Manila and
P2,215.00 outside of Metro Manila.

Odin Security Agency (Odin) filed a complaint with PADPAO accusing VMPSI of cut-throat competition by
undercutting its contract rate for security services rendered to the Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System
(MWSS), charging said customer lower than the standard minimum rates provided in the Memorandum of
Agreement dated May 12, 1986.

PADPAO found VMPSI guilty of cut-throat competition, hence, the PADPAO Committee on Discipline recommended
the expulsion of VMPSI from PADPAO and the cancellation of its license to operate a security agency. The PC-
SUSIA affirmed the findings and likewise recommended the cancellation of VMPSI’s license. As a result, PADPAO
refused to issue a clearance/certificate of membership to VMPSI.

VMPSI made a request letter to the PC Chief to set aside or disregard the findings of PADPAO and consider
VMPSI’s application for renewal of its license, even without a certificate of membership from PADPAO.
Issue: Whether or not VMPSI’s complaint against the PC Chief and PC-SUSIA is a suit against the State without its
consent.
Held: Yes. A public official may sometimes be held liable in his personal or private capacity if he acts in bad faith, or
beyond the scope of his authority or jurisdiction, however, since the acts for which the PC Chief and PC-SUSIA are
being called to account in this case, were performed as part of their official duties, without malice, gross negligence,
or bad faith, no recovery may be had against them in their private capacities. Furthermore, the Supreme Court
agrees with the Court of Appeals that the Memorandum of Agreement dated May 12, 1986 does not constitute an
implied consent by the State to be sued. The consent of the State to be sued must emanate from statutory authority,
hence, a legislative act, not from a mere memorandum. Without such consent, the trial court did not acquired
jurisdiction over the public respondents. Petition for review is denied and the judgment appealed from is affirmed in
toto.

15. LARKINS v. NLRC

T/Sgt. Larkins vs NLRC (1995) G.R. 92432

Facts: On August 12, 1988, private respondents filed a complaint with the Regional Arbitration Branch No. III of the
NLRC, San Fernando, Pampanga, against petitioner Larkins, a member of the United States Air Force (USAF)
assigned to oversee the dormitories of the Third Aircraft Generation Squadron (3 AGS) at Clark Air Base,
Pampanga., Lt. Col. Frankhauser, and Cunanan (the new contractor ) for illegal dismissal and underpayment of
wages. Petitioner and Lt. Col. Frankhauser failed to answer the complaint and to appear at the hearings.
They, likewise, failed to submit their position paper, which the Labor Arbiter deemed a waiver on their part to do so.
On the basis of private respondents' position paper and supporting documents, the Labor Arbiter rendered a
decision granting all the claims of private respondents. He found both Lt. Col. Frankhauser and petitioner "guilty of
illegal dismissal" and ordered them to reinstate private respondents with full back wages, or if that is no longer
possible, to pay private respondents' separation pay. Petitioner appealed to the NLRC claiming that the Labor
Arbiter never acquired jurisdiction over her person because no summons or copies of the complaints, both original
and amended, were ever served on her. In her "Supplemental Memorandum to Memorandum of Appeal," petitioner
argued that the attempts to serve her with notices of hearing were not in accordance with the provisions of the RP-
US Military Bases Agreement of 1947.

Issue: Whether or not the questioned resolutions are null and void.

Held: No jurisdiction was ever acquired by the Labor Arbiter over the case and the person of petitioner and the
judgment rendered is null and void. Summonses and other processes issued by Philippine courts and administrative
agencies for United States Armed Forces personnel within any U.S. base in the Philippines could be served therein
only with the permission of the Base Commander. If he withholds giving his permission, he should instead designate
another person to serve the process, and obtain the server's affidavit for filing with the appropriate court.
Respondent Labor Arbiter did not follow said procedure. He instead, addressed the summons to Lt. Col.
Frankhauser and not the Base Commander. Respondents do not dispute petitioner's claim that no summons was
ever issued and served on her. They contend, however, that they sent notices of the hearings to her Notices of
hearing are not summonses. The provisions and prevailing jurisprudence in Civil Procedure may be applied by
analogy to NLRC proceedings (Revised Rules of the NLRC, Rule I, Sec. 3). It is basic that the Labor Arbiter cannot
acquire jurisdiction over the person of the respondent without the latter being served with summons. In the absence
of service of summons or a valid waiver thereof, the hearings and judgment rendered by the Labor Arbiter are null
and void. Petitioner, in the case at bench, appealed to the NLRC and participated in the oral argument before the
said body. This, however, does not constitute a waiver of the lack of summons and a voluntary submission of her
person to the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter. She may have raised in her pleadings grounds other than lack of
jurisdiction, but these grounds were discussed in relation to and as a result of the issue of the lack of jurisdiction. In
effect, petitioner set forth only one issue and that is the absence of jurisdiction over her
person. If an appearance before the NLRC is precisely to question the jurisdiction of the said agency over the
person of the defendant, then this appearance is not equivalent to service of summons. Be that as it may, on the
assumption that petitioner validly waived service of summons on her, still the case could not prosper. There is no
allegation from the pleadings filed that Lt. Col. Frankhauser and petitioner were being sued in their personal
capacities for tortious acts. However, private respondents named 3 AGS as one of the respondents in their
complaint. Private respondents were dismissed from their employment by Lt. Col. Frankhauser acting for and in
behalf of the U.S. Government. The employer of private respondents was neither Lt. Col. Frankhauser nor petitioner.
The employer of private respondents, as found by NLRC, was the U.S. Government which, by right of sovereign
power, operated and maintained the dormitories at Clark Air Base for members of the USAF. Indeed, assuming that
jurisdiction was acquired over the United States Government and the monetary claims of private respondents
proved, such awards will have to be satisfied not by Lt. Col. Frankhauser and petitioner in their personal capacities,
but by the United States government
19. ACT NO. 3083

ACT NO. 3083 - AN ACT DEFINING THE CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH THE GOVERNMENT OF THE
PHILIPPINE ISLANDS MAY BE SUED

Section 1

Complaint against Government. — Subject to the provisions of this Act, the Government of the Philippine Islands
hereby consents and submits to be sued upon any moneyed claim involving liability arising from contract, expressed
or implied, which could serve as a basis of civil action between private parties.

Section 2

A person desiring to avail himself of the privilege herein conferred must show that he has presented his claim to the
Insular Auditor 1 and that the latter did not decide the same within two months from the date of its presentation.

Section 3

Venue. — Original actions brought pursuant to the authority conferred in this Act shall be instituted in the Court of
First Instance of the City of Manila or of the province were the claimant resides, at the option of the latter, upon
which court exclusive original jurisdiction is hereby conferred to hear and determine such actions.

Sec. 4. Actions instituted as aforesaid shall be governed by the same rules of procedure, both original and
appellate, as if the litigants were private parties.

Sec. 5. When the Government of the Philippine Island is plaintiff in an action instituted in any court of original
jurisdiction, the defendant shall have the right to assert therein, by way of set-off or counterclaim in a similar action
between private parties.

Sec. 6. Process in actions brought against the Government of the Philippine Islands pursuant to the authority
granted in this Act shall be served upon the Attorney-General 2 whose duty it shall be to appear and make defense,
either himself or through delegates.

Sec. 7. Execution. — No execution shall issue upon any judgment rendered by any court against the Government of
the Philippine Islands under the provisions of this Act; but a copy thereof duly certified by the clerk of the Court in
which judgment is rendered shall be transmitted by such clerk to the Governor-General, 3 within five days after the
same becomes final.

Sec. 8. Transmittal of Decision. — The Governor-General, 4 at the commencement of each regular session of the
Legislature, 5 shall transmit to that body for appropriate action all decisions so received by him, and if said body
determine that payment should be made, it shall appropriate the sum which the Government has been sentenced to
pay, including the same in the appropriations for the ensuing year.

Sec. 9. This Act shall take effect on its approval.

Approved: March 16, 1923.

21. ARTICLE 2180 OF THE CIVIL CODE

 Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged
to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between
the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.

 Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions,
but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.

 * The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible for the damages caused by
the minor children who live in their company.

 * Guardians are liable for damages caused by the minors or incapacitated persons who are under their
authority and live in their company.

 * The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are likewise responsible for damages caused
by their employees in the service of the branches in which the latter are employed or on the occasion of their
functions.

 * Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within
the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry.

 * The State is responsible in like manner when it acts through a special agent; but not when the damage has
been caused by the official to whom the task done properly pertains, in which case what is provided in
Article 2176 shall be applicable.

 * Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for damages caused by their
pupils and students or apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody.

 The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove that they
observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage.
22. DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE (DOA), petitioner, vs. THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
COMMISSION, et al., respondents.

Facts:

 DOA and Sultan Security Agency (SSA) entered into a contract for security services. Several guards filed a
complaint against DOA and SSA for under payment of wages, non-payment of 13th month pay and etc.

 The Labor Arbiter of Cagayan de Oro found DOA and SSA liable for the payment of money claim of the
guards. The Labor Arbiter issued a “Writ of Execution” commanding the City Sheriff to execute the judgment
against the DOA and SSA. Hence, the City Sheriff seized three motorcycles of the DOA.

 In a petition of certiorari, DOA filed a “petition for injunction, prohibition and mandamus, with prayer for
preliminary injunction” to the NLRC Cagayan De Oro for reasons that the “writ” was null and void

 and the seizure of motorcycles jeopardizes governmental functions. NLRC --- dismissed the petition.

 DOA charges NLRC for grave abuse of discretion for refusing to nullify the “writ of execution”. DOA further
asserts that NLRC has disregarded the rule on the non-suability of the State.

Issue: Whether or not the doctrine of non-suability of the State applies in the case

Held: Under the Constitution, the rule which says “the State cannot be sued without its consent” is not really
absolute. The State’s consent may be given expressly through a general or special law, or impliedly when the State
commences litigation or enters a contract. In this jurisdiction, the general law waiving the immunity of the state from
suit is found in Act No. 3083, where the Philippine government "consents and submits to be sued upon any money
claim involving liability arising from contract, express or implied”. The claims of the guards for underpayment of
wages and similar other items, arising from the Contract for Security Services, clearly constitute money claims.
However, pursuant to Commonwealth Act No. 327, as amended by PD No. 1445, the money claim should first be
brought to the Commission on Audit.
29. SANTIAGO v. CA

Facts: On 20 Jan 1971, Santiago gratuitously donated a parcel of land to the Bureau of Plant Industry. The terms of
the donation are; that the Bureau should construct a building on the said lot and that the building should be finished
by December 7, 1974, that the Bureau should install lighting facilities on the said lot. However, come 1976 there
were still no improvements on the lot. This prompted Santiago to file a case pleading for the revocation of such
contract of donation. The trial court dismissed the petition claiming that it is a suit against the government and
should not prosper without the consent of the government.

Issue: Whether or not the state has not waived its immunity from suit.

Held: The government has waived its immunity and such waiver is implied by virtue of the terms provided in the
deed of donation. The government is a beneficiary of the terms of the donation. But the government through the
Bureau has breached the terms of the deed by not complying with such, therefore, the donor Santiago has the right
to have his day in court and be heard. Further, to not allow the donor to be heard would be unethical and contrary to
equity which the government so advances. Case should prosper.

30. FROILAN V. ORIENTAL PAN SHIPPING, SEPTEMBER 30, 1950

Facts: Fernando A. Froilan purchased the vessel FS-197 from the Shipping Commission for P200,000, paying
P50,000 down and agreeing to pay the balance in installments. However, the installments were not paid and the
Shipping Commission took possession of the vessel and considered the sale cancelled. The Shipping Commission
then chartered the vessel to Pan Oriental Shipping Co.

Froilan then filed a complaint against Pan Oriental Shipping Co. Pan Oriental Shipping Co. filed its answer denying
the right of Froilan to the vessel. Following this, the Republic of the Philippines, as intervenor, filed a complaint in
intervention alleging that Froilan had failed to pay to the Shipping Commission the balance. Froilan then tendered to
the Board of Liquidators (which was liquidating the affairs of the Shipping Administration) a check in payment of his
obligation for the vessel. The lower court held that the check constituted a payment and a discharge of Froilan's
obligation to the government.

However, Pan Oriental Shipping Co. had also filed an answer to the government's complaint in intervention saying
that the government was obligated to deliver the vessel to it by contract. In response, the government filed a motion
to dismiss the counterclaim of Pan Oriental Shipping Co. against it on the grounds that the action of delivering the
vessel to Pan Oriental Shipping Co. was no longer feasible and was barred by prior judgment, and also that the
court has no jurisdiction over the intervenor government of the Republic of the Philippines.

Issue: Whether or not the Government's motion to dismiss Pan Oriental's counterclaims are allowable.

Held: The counterclaim was not barred by prior judgment, as the counterclaim was filed before the decision had
been made with regards to Froilan's payment. The State was also not immune from suit, since by filing its complaint
in intervention, the Government waived its right of nonsuability. Appellee
31. RCBC v. DE CASTRO

Facts: The Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City issued an order regarding civil case Badoc Planters, Inc v.
Philippine Virginia Tobacco Administration, et al. for the recovery of unpaid tobacco deliveries to BADOC. The
Branch clerk of court then issued a Writ of Execution to Special Sheriff Faustion Rigor, who issued a Notice of
Garnishment to the General Manager/Cashier of RCBC requesting a reply within 5 days to any property that PVTA
that was currently in control of RCBC. On the same day, BADOC filed an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for a Writ of
Execution, which was also granted by the respondent judge. In compliance, RCBC delivered to Sheriff Rigor a
certified check with the amount.

PVTA then filed a Motion for Reconsideration to restore the account of PTVA in RCBC to the condition it was in
before the issuance of the Writ of Execution and the Orders. It was granted, and then RCBC filed a Motion for
Reconsideration as well. This, however, was denied, so RCBC filed a Notice of Appeal to the Court of Appeals from
the said orders.

Issues:

1) Whether or not PVTA funds are public funds not subject to garnishment;

2) Whether or not the respondent Judge correctly ordered the petitioner to reimburse the amount paid to the
special sheriff

Ruling: The court found that RCBC should not be held liable since it was following the court order which instructed
that a check be delivered to Sheriff Rigor. They could also not be held responsible that the check was later
encashed, which was also directed by a court order. In response to the issues at hand, the court found that PVTA
funds are not exempt from garnishment because PVTA was created by RA 2265 as an ordinary corporation subject
to the provisions of Corporation Law. Hence, it possesses the power to “sue and be sued” and "to acquire and hold
such assets and incur such liabilities resulting directly from operations authorized by the provisions of this Act or as
essential to the proper conduct of such operations." [Section 3, Republic Act No. 2265.].

RCBC cannot therefore be compelled to make restitution solidarily with the plaintiff BADOC. Plaintiff BADOC alone
was responsible for the issuance of the Writ of Execution and Order of Payment and so, the plaintiff alone should
bear the consequences of a subsequent annulment of such court orders; hence, only the plaintiff can be ordered to
restore the account of the PVTA.

33. MUNICIPALITY OF MAKATI VS CA 190 SCRA 206

Facts: An expropriation proceeding was filed by the Municipality of Makati, herein petitioner, against the private
property of Arceli Jo. In compliance to PD 42, the petitioner opened an account under its name at PNB depositing
an amount of P417,510.00. The court fixed the appraised value of the expropriated property at P5,291,666.00 and
an advanced payment was made in the amount of P338,160 leaving a balance of P4,953,506. After the decision
becomes final and executory, the private respondent moved for the issuance of a writ of execution. A notice of
garnishment was thereafter issued by the court to the PNB account. A manifestation was filed by the petitioner
informing the court that the private respondent was no longer the true owner of the expropriated property. The court
consolidated the ownership of the property to PSB as a mortgagee/purchaser. The private respondent and PSB
agreed to divide the compensation due from the expropriation proceeding. The judge ordered PNB to immediately
release to them the sum of P4,953.506 corresponding to the balance of the appraised value of the expropriated
property. The PNB bank manager refused as he is waiting for the approval of their head office. The Municipality of
Makati contends that its fund with DBP could neither be be garnished or levied upon execution for to do so would
result to the disbursement of public funds without the proper appropriation required under the law. The lower court
denied the motion for reconsideration of the petitioner ruling that the account with DBP of the petitioner was an
account specifically opened for the expropriation proceeding. Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari to the Court of
Appeals which affirmed the lower court’s decision. A petition for review with a prayer for preliminary injunction was
filed to the S.C. A temporary restraining order was issued by the S.C.

Issue: Whether or not the PNB funds may be levied in the expropriation proceeding?

Held: The petitioner belatedly informed the court that there are two existing accounts with PNB. Account A was the
one intended for the expropriation proceeding and account B is primarily intended for financing governmental
functions and activities. Because account A has a fund that is insufficient to meet the remaining amount of its
balance for the expropriation proceeding, it is unlawful to get the remaining balance from Account B without an
ordinance appropriating said funds for expropriation purpose. Thus the court ruled that account A maybe levied but
not account B. The respondents are without recourse however should the petitioner refuse to pay its remaining
obligation. Where a municipality refuses without justifiable reason to effect payment of a final money judgment
rendered against it, the claimant may avail the remedy of mandamus in order to compel the enactment and approval
of the necessary appropriation ordinance and the corresponding disbursement of municipal funds for such purpose.

34. National Irrigation Administration (NIA) v Court of Appeals

Facts:
Petitioner NIA awarded HYDRO a contract for construction of the main civil works of the Magat River Multi-purpose
Project. The contract provided Respondent HYDRO would be paid partly in Philippine pesos and partly in US
dollars. Respondent HYDRO substantially completed in 1982 and final acceptance by Petitioner NIA was made in
1984. Thereafter, HYDRO still had an account receivable from NIA representing dollar differential rate after the
prescribed provided in the contract. HYDRO filed Request for Adjudication in Construction Industry Arbitration
Commission (CIAC). Petitioner NIA filed its Answer wherein it questioned the jurisdiction of the CIAC alleging lack of
cause of action, laches and estoppel in view of Respondent HYDRO’s alleged failure to avail of its right to submit
the dispute to arbitration within the prescribed period as provided in the contract.
Later, Petitioner NIA filed a Motion to Dismiss alleging lack of jurisdiction over the disputes.
Petitioner NIA filed with the CA an Original Action of Certiorari and Prohibition with prayer for Restraining Order
and/or Injunction which dismissed the same.
Hence, the present Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with urgent prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and
Writ of Preliminary Injunction.

Issue: Whether or not the CIAC has jurisdiction over the case.

Held: Yes. The CIAC has jurisdiction over the controversy, contrary to the claim of NIA. The instant Petition is
dismissed for lack of merit.