VILAVICENCIO v.

LUKBAN (Section 1)

Issue:

The writ of Habeas Corpus was filed by the petitioner, with the prayer that the respondent produce around 170
women whom Justo Lukban et, al deported to Davao. Liberty of abode was also raised versus the power of the
executive of the Municipality in deporting the women without their knowledge in his capacity as Mayor.

Facts:

Justo Lukban as Manila City's Mayor together with Anton Hohmann, the city's Chief of Police, took custody of
about 170 women at the night of October 25 beyond the latters consent and knowledge and thereafter were
shipped to Mindanao specifically in Davao where they were signed as laborers. Said women are inmates of the
houses of prostitution situated in Gardenia Street, in the district of Sampaloc.

That when the petitioner filed for habeas corpus, the respondent moved to dismiss the case saying that those
women were already out of their jurisdiction and that , it should be filed in the city of Davao instead.

The court ruled in favor of the petitioner with the instructions;

For the respondents to have fulfilled the court's order, three optional courses were open: (1) They could have
produced the bodies of the persons according to the command of the writ; or (2) they could have shown by
affidavit that on account of sickness or infirmity those persons could not safely be brought before the court; or (3)
they could have presented affidavits to show that the parties in question or their attorney waived the right to be
present.

Held:

The court concluded the case by granting the parties aggrieved the sum of 400 pesos each, plus 100 pesos for
nominal damage due to contempt of court. Reasoning further that if the chief executive of any municipality in the
Philippines could forcibly and illegally take a private citizen and place him beyond the boundaries of the
municipality, and then, when called upon to defend his official action, could calmly fold his hands and claim that
the person was under no restraint and that he, the official, had no jurisdiction over this other municipality.
We believe the true principle should be that, if the respondent is within the jurisdiction of the court and has it in
his power to obey the order of the court and thus to undo the wrong that he has inflicted, he should be compelled
to do so. Even if the party to whom the writ is addressed has illegally parted with the custody of a person before
the application for the writ is no reason why the writ should not issue. If the mayor and the chief of police, acting
under no authority of law, could deport these women from the city of Manila to Davao, the same officials must
necessarily have the same means to return them from Davao to Manila. The respondents, within the reach of
process, may not be permitted to restrain a fellow citizen of her liberty by forcing her to change her domicile and
to avow the act with impunity in the courts, while the person who has lost her birthright of liberty has no effective
recourse. The great writ of liberty may not thus be easily evaded.
Kuroda v. Jalandoni (Section 2)
Shigenori Kuroda was the highest ranking Japanese officer stationed in the Philippines during the Japanese
occupation. He was then charged before the Military Commission, headed by Major General Rafael Jalandoni, due
to the atrocities that were done against non combatant civilians and prisoners during the war. His trial was in
pursuant to Executive Order No. 68 which established the National War Crimes Office and prescribing rules and
regulations governing the trial of accused war criminals. Kuroda is questioning the legality of the said EO arguing
that the same is not provided for in the Constitution. He further underscores the fact that the Philippines is not a
signatory of the Hague Convention on the Rules and Regulations Covering Land Warfare hence we cannot impose
against him any criminal charges because it has no laws to base on, national or international.
ISSUE: Whether or not Kuroda can be charged in Philippine courts?
HELD: Yes. EO No. 68 is constitutional hence the Philippine courts can take cognizance of the case at bar. EO No 68
is in pursuant to the constitutional provision that states “the Philippines renounces war as an instrument of
national policy, andadopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the nation.”
The Hague Convention and other similar conventions whose principles are generally accepted are hence
considered as part of the law of the land.

AGUSTIN v. EDU (Section 2)

Facts:
Leovillo Agustin, the owner of a Beetle, challenged the constitutionality of Letter of Instruction 229 and its
implementing order No. 1 issued by LTO Commissioner Romeo Edu. His car already had warning lights and did not
want to use this. The letter was promulgation for the requirement of an early warning device installed on a vehicle
to reduce accidents between moving vehicles and parked cars. The LTO was the issuer of the device at the rate of
not more than 15% of the acquisition cost. The triangular reflector plates were set when the car parked on any
street or highway for 30 minutes. It was mandatory. Petitioner: 1. LOI violated the provisions and delegation of
police power, equal protection, and due process/ 2. It was oppressive because the make manufacturers and car
dealers millionaires at the expense f car owners at 56-72 pesos per set. Hence the petition. The OSG denied the
allegations in par X and XI of the petition with regard to the unconstitutionality and undue delegation of police
power to such acts. The Philippines was also a member of the 1968 Vienna convention of UN on road signs as a
regulation. To the petitioner, this was still an unlawful delegation of police power.

Issue:
Is the LOI constitutional? If it is, is it a valid delegation of police power?

Held: Yes on both. Petition dismissed.

Ratio:
Police power, according to the case of Edu v Ericta, which cited J. Taney, is nothing more or less than the power of
government inherent in every sovereignty. The case also says that police power is state authority to enact
legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property to promote the general welfare. Primicias v
Fulgoso- It is the power to describe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order, and
general welfare of the people. J. Carazo- government limitations to protect constitutional rights did not also intend
to enable a citizen to obstruct unreasonable the enactment of measures calculated to insure communal peace.
There was no factual foundation on petitioner to refute validity. Ermita Malate Hotel-The presumption
of constitutionality must prevail in the absence of factual record in over throwing the statute.
Brandeis- constitutionality must prevail in the absence of some factual foundation in overthrowing the statute.
Even if the car had blinking lights, he must still buy reflectors. His claims that the statute was oppressive was
fantastic because the reflectors were not expensive. SC- blinking lights may lead to confusion whether the nature
and purpose of the driver is concerned. Unlike the triangular reflectors, whose nature is evident because
it’s installed when parked for 30 minutes and placed from 400 meters from the car allowing drivers to see clearly.
There was no constitutional basis for petitioner because the law doesn’t violate any constitutional provision. LOI
229 doesn’t force motor vehicle owners to purchase the reflector from the LTO. It only prescribes rge requirement
from any source. The objective is public safety. The Vienna convention on road rights and PD 207 both
recommended enforcement for installation of ewd’s. Bother possess relevance in applying rules with the
decvlaration of principles in the Constitution. On the unlawful delegation of legislative power, the petitioners have
no settled legal doctrines.

ICHONG v. HERNANDEZ (Section 2)

Lao Ichong is a Chinese businessman who entered the country to take advantage of business
opportunities herein abound (then) – particularly in the retail business. For some time he and his fellow Chinese
businessmen enjoyed a “monopoly” in the local market in Pasay. Until in June 1954 when Congress passed the RA
1180 or the Retail Trade Nationalization Act the purpose of which is to reserve to Filipinos the right to engage in
the retail business. Ichong then petitioned for the nullification of the said Act on the ground that it contravened
several treaties concluded by the RP which, according to him, violates the equal protection clause (pacta sund
servanda). He said that as a Chinese businessman engaged in the business here in the country who helps in the
income generation of the country he should be given equal opportunity.

ISSUE: Whether or not a law may invalidate or supersede treaties or generally accepted principles.

HELD: Yes, a law may supersede a treaty or a generally accepted principle. In this case, there is no conflict at all
between the raised generally accepted principle and with RA 1180. The equal protection of the law clause “does
not demand absolute equality amongst residents; it merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under
like circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced”; and, that the equal
protection clause “is not infringed by legislation which applies only to those persons falling within a specified class,
if it applies alike to all persons within such class, and reasonable grounds exist for making a distinction between
those who fall within such class and those who do not.”
For the sake of argument, even if it would be assumed that a treaty would be in conflict with a statute then the
statute must be upheld because it represented an exercise of the police power which, being inherent could not be
bargained away or surrendered through the medium of a treaty. Hence, Ichong can no longer assert his right to
operate his market stalls in the Pasay city market.

GONZALEZ v. HECHANOVA (Section 2)

Then President Diosdado Macapagal entered into two executive agreements with Vietnam and Burma for the
importation of rice without complying with the requisite of securing a certification from the Nat’l Economic Council
showing that there is a shortage in cereals. Hence, Hechanova authorized the importation of 67000 tons of rice
from abroad to the detriment of our local planters. Gonzales, then president of the Iloilo Palay and Corn Planters
Association assailed the executive agreements. Gonzales averred that Hechanova is without jurisdiction or in
excess of jurisdiction”, because RA 3452 prohibits the importation of rice and corn by “the Rice and Corn
Administration or any other government agency.

ISSUE: Whether or not RA 3452 prevails over the 2 executive agreements entered into by Macapagal.

HELD: Under the Constitution, the main function of the Executive is to enforce laws enacted by Congress. The
former may not interfere in the performance of the legislative powers of the latter, except in the exercise of his
veto power. He may not defeat legislative enactments that have acquired the status of laws, by indirectly repealing
the same through an executive agreement providing for the performance of the very act prohibited by said laws. In
the event of conflict between a treaty and a statute, the one which is latest in point of time shall prevail, is not
applicable to the case at bar, Hechanova not only admits, but, also, insists that the contracts adverted to are not
treaties. No such justification can be given as regards executive agreements not authorized by previous legislation,
without completely upsetting the principle of separation of powers and the system of checks and balances which
are fundamental in our constitutional set up.
As regards the question whether an executive or an international agreement may be invalidated by our courts,
suffice it to say that the Constitution of the Philippines has clearly settled it in the affirmative, by providing that the
SC may not be deprived “of its jurisdiction to review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal, certiorari, or writ
of error, as the law or the rules of court may provide, final judgments and decrees of inferior courts in “All cases in
which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, law, ordinance, or executive order or regulation is in question”.
In other words, our Constitution authorizes the nullification of a treaty, not only when it conflicts with the
fundamental law, but, also, when it runs counter to an act of Congress.

In Re: Garcia 2 (Section 2)

Facts:Arturo E. Garcia,has applied for admission to the practice of law in the phils. without submitting to the
required bar examinations. In his verified petition, he avers among others that he is a filipino citizen born in
bacolod city of filipino parentage. He finished Bachillerato Superior in spain. He was allowed to practice law
profession in spain under the provision of the treaty on academic degrees and the exercise of profession between
the republic of the phils.

Issue: Whether treaty can modify regulations governing admission to the phil. bar.

Held: The court resolved to deny the petition. The provision of the treaty on academic degrees between the
republic of the phils. and spanish state cannot be invoked by the applicant. said treaty was intende to govern
filipino citizens desiring to practice their profession in spain. The treaty could not have been intended to modify
the laws and regulations governing admission to the practice of law in the phils., for the reason the executive may
not encroach upon the constitutional prerogative of the supreme court to promulgate rules for admission to the
practice of the law in the phils. The power to repeal, alter or supplement such rules being reserved only to the
congress of the phils.

PEOPLE v. LAGMAN (Section 4)

In 1936, Tranquilino Lagman reached the age of 20. He is being compelled by Section 60 of Commonwealth Act 1
(National Defense Law) to join the military service. Lagman refused to do so because he has a father to support,
has no military leanings and he does not wish to kill or be killed. Lagman further assailed the constitutionality of
the said law.

ISSUE: Whether or not the National Defense Law is constitutional.

HELD: Yes. The duty of the Government to defend the State cannot be performed except through an army. To
leave the organization of an army to the will of the citizens would be to make this duty of the Government
excusable should there be no sufficient men who volunteer to enlist therein. Hence, the National Defense Law, in
so far as it establishes compulsory military service, does not go against this constitutional provision but is, on the
contrary, in faithful compliance therewith. “The defense of the State is a prime duty of government, and in the
fulfillment of this duty all citizens may be required by law to render personal military or civil service.”

AGLIPAY v. RUIZ (Section 6)

The 33rd International Eucharistic Congress organized by the Roman Catholic Churchtook place sometime in 1936.
In commemoration thereof. then Director of Posts, Juan Ruiz, initiated the production of certain stamps the design
of which would have in their center a chalice, with grape and stalks of wheat as border design. Eventually, the
stamps were produced and some were sold pursuant to Act No. 4052, which provides for appropriation.
Gregorio Aglipay, the head of the Philippine Independent Church, assailed the production and sale of such stamps.
Aglipay contends that the funding of said stamps commemorative to a particular religious event is in violation of
Sec 13, Article 6 of the Philippine Constitution which prohibits the appropriation or usage of public money for the
use or benefit of any church or denomination.

ISSUE: Whether or not the production of the said stamps violate the Constitution.

HELD: No. The sale of stamps is not in violation of the Constitution. In fact, what was emphasized on the stamps
was not the religious event itself but rather the City of Manila as being the seat of such event. Act No. 4052 on the
other hand did not appropriate any public money to a religious event. Act No. 4052 appropriated the sum of
P60,000.00 for the cost of plates and printing of postage stamps with new designs and other expenses incident
thereto, and merely authorizes the Director of Posts, with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications, to dispose of the amount appropriated in the manner indicated and “as often as may be deemed
advantageous to the Government”. The fact that the fund is being used for such is only incidental to the function
of Director of Posts and under his discretion. On religious freedom The Supreme Court noted however that the
elevating influence of religion is recognized here as elsewhere. Evidence would be our preamble where we
implored the aid of divine providence to establish an ideal government. If should also be further noted that
religious freedom as a constitutional mandate is not an inhibition of profound reverence to religion.
CALALANG v. WILLIAMS (Section 10 & 11)

Facts: The National Traffic Commission, in its resolution of July 17, 1940, resolved to recommend to the Director of
the Public Works and to the Secretary of Public Works and Communications that animal-
drawn vehicles be prohibited from passing along the following for a period of one year from the date of the
opening of the Colgante Bridge to traffic:
1) Rosario Street extending from Plaza Calderon de la Barca to Dasmariñas
Street from 7:30Am to 12:30 pm and from 1:30 pm to 530 pm; and
2) along Rizal Avenue extending from the railroad crossing at Antipolo Street to
Echague Street from 7 am to 11pm
The Chairman of the National Traffic Commission on July 18, 1940 recommended to the Director of Public Works
with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works the adoption of
thethemeasure proposed in the resolution aforementioned in pursuance of the provisions of theCommonwealth A
ct No. 548 which authorizes said Director with the approval from the
Secretary of the Public Works and Communication to promulgate rules and regulations to regulate and control the
use of and traffic on national roads.
On August 2, 1940, the Director recommended to the Secretary the approval of the recommendations made by the
Chairman of the National Traffic Commission with modifications. The Secretary of Public Works approved the
recommendations on August 10,1940. The Mayor of Manila and the Acting Chief of Police of Manila have enforced
and caused to be enforced the rules and regulation. As a consequence, all animal-drawn vehicles are not allowed
to pass and pick up passengers in the places above mentioned to the detriment not only of their owners but of the
riding public as well.

Issues: 1) Whether the rules and regulations promulgated by the respondents pursuant to the provisions of
Commonwealth Act NO. 548 constitute an unlawful inference with legitimate business or trade and abridged the
right to personal liberty and freedom of locomotion?
2) Whether the rules and regulations complained of infringe upon the constitutional precept regarding
the promotion of social justice to insure the well-being and economic security of all the people?

Held: 1) No. The promulgation of the Act aims to promote safe transit upon and avoid obstructions on national
roads in the interest and convenience of the public. In enacting said law, the National Assembly was prompted by
considerations of public convenience and welfare. It was inspired by the desire to relieve congestion of traffic,
which is a menace to the public safety. Public welfare lies at the bottom of the promulgation of the said law and
the state in order to promote the general welfare may interfere with personal liberty, with property, and with
business and occupations. Persons and property may be subject to all kinds of restraints and burdens in order to
secure the general comfort, health, and prosperity of the State. To this fundamental aims of the government, the
rights of the individual are subordinated. Liberty is a blessing which should not be made to prevail over authority
because society will fall into anarchy. Neither should authority be made to prevail over liberty because then the
individual will fall into slavery. The paradox lies in the fact that the apparent curtailment of liberty is precisely the
very means of insuring its preserving.
2) No. Social justice is “neither communism, nor despotism, nor atomism, nor anarchy,” but the humanization of
laws and the equalization of social and economic forces by the State so that justice in its rational and objectively
secular conception may at least be approximated. Social justice means the promotion of the welfare of all the
people, the adoption by the Government of measures calculated to insure economic stability of all the competent
elements of society, through the maintenance of a proper economic and social equilibrium in the interrelations of
the members of the community, constitutionally, through the adoption of measures legally justifiable, or extra-
constitutionally, through the exercise of powers underlying the existence of all governments on the time-honored
principles of salus populi estsuprema lex.
Social justice must be founded on the recognition of the necessity of interdependence among divers and diverse
units of a society and of the protection that should be equally and evenly extended to all groups as a combined
force in our social and economic life, consistent with the fundamental and paramount objective of the state of
promoting health, comfort and quiet of all persons, and of bringing about “the greatest good to the greatest
number.”
ALMEDA v. COURT OF APPEALS (Section 10 & 11)

FACTS: Petitioner Jose Almeda filed a notice of appeal which was disapproved by the trial court due to it being filed
five (5) days late beyond the reglementary period and subsequently denied of motion for reconsideration.
Respondent court dismissed the petition contending that the requirement regarding perfection of an appeal was
not only mandatory but jurisdictional such that the petitioner’s failure to comply therewith had the effect of
rendering the judgment final. Subsequently, petitioner motions for reconsideration and is denied. Also, it was
found that there was lack of merit in the petitioner’s reason for the late filing of the notice of appeal.

ISSUE: Whether or not failure to comply with the requirement regarding perfection of an appeal within
reglementary period would render a judgment final and executory.

HELD: Yes, the period to appeal is prescribed not only by the Rules of Court but also by statute, particularly Sec 39
of BP 129, which provides:Sec.39 . Appeals. The period for appeal from final orders, resolutions, awards,
judgments, or decisions of any court in all cases shall be fifteen (15) days counted from the notice of the final
order, resolution, award, judgment, or decision appealed from…The right to appeal is a statutory right and one
who seeks to avail of it must strictly comply with the statutes or rules as they are considered indispensable
interdictions against needless delays and for an orderly discharge of judicial business. Due to petitioner’s
negligence of failing to perfect his appeal, there is no recourse but to deny the petition thus making the judgment
of the trial court final and executory.

ONDOY v. IGNACIO (Section 10 & 11)

Facts: Jose Ondoy, son of Estrella Ondoy, drowned while in the employ of Virgilio Ignacio. According tothechief
engineer and oiler, Jose Ondoy was aboard the ship as part of the workforce. He was invited byfriends to a
drinking spree, left the vessel, and thereafter was found dead. Therefore, Estrella wasaskingfor compensation
from the death of her son while in the respondents employ. However, thestatementgiven by the chief engineer
and oiler was ignored by the hearing officer and thereforedismissed the claimfor lack of merit. Even when a
motion for reconsideration was filed, this was alsodenied by the Secretaryof Labor for the same reason, that is,
lack of merit.

Issue: Whether or not the compensation for the death of Jose Ondoy is constitutional; is social justiceapplicablein
this case?

Ruling: Yes.Firstly, there was no due diligence in the fact finding of the Department of Labor. It
merelydisregardedthe statements made by the chief engineer and oiler. Secondly, the principle of social
justiceapplied inthis case is a matter of protection, not equality. The Court recognized the right of the petitioner to
theclaim of compensation because her son was shown to have died while in the actual performanceof hiswork. To
strengthen the constitutional scheme of social justice and protection to labor, TheCourtquoted another
case as between a laborer, usually poor and unlettered, and the employer, whohasresources to secure able legal
advice, the law has reason to demand from the latter the strictercompliance.

SALONGA v. FARRALES

Facts: Farrales was the titled owner of a parcel of residential land that was leased. Prior to the acquisition by
Farrales of the aforesaid land, Salonga was already a lessee of some portion of the land. She had built aa house and
paid rentals thereon. Sometime prior to November 1968, Farrales files ejectment case (one of the old forms of
action for recovery of the possession of real property) for non-payment of rentals against Salonga. The lower court
rendered a decision in favor of Farrales and order Salonga and the other lessees. (Pascual et al.) to vacate the
portion occupied by them and to pay rentals in arrears, attorney’s fees and costs. Even before the rendition of the
decision of the lower court. Farrales sold to Pascual et Al. (The other lessess of Farrales) the areas occupied by
them. Salonga offered to purchase from Farrales the portion of land that Salonga was leasing Farrales persistently
refused the offer and insisted to execute the judgment rendered in the ejectment case. Hence, if Salonga’s offer
to purchase was persistently refused by Farrales, it is obvious that no meeting of the minds took place and no
contract was perfected between them. It was revealed that Farrales wanted the payment of the land under
consideration to be in cash but Salonga did not have any money for that purpose that is why Farrales persisitenly
refused to sell the portion of the leased land to the lessee.

Issue: WON the lower court erred in dismissing the complaint of Salonga on the ground that no legal contract
exists between Farrales and Salonga.

Held: Contracts are only enforceable from the moment of the perfection. In the case at bar, Farrales rejected and
did not accept the offer of Salonga to buy the land in question. There being no consent there is, therefore, no
contract to sell to speak of. In the case of other lessess (Pascual et al) who were able to buy the portion of land
that they occupy, there was an existing contract between them and Farrales, unlike Salonga who does not have the
right to buy the land in question because the contract between her and Farrales in non-existent. Section 10 Article
II states that “The State shall promote social justice in all phases of national development” The aforementioned
provision is applicable to the case at bar. The social justice cannot be invoked to trample on the rights of property
owners who ar also entitles for protection under our Constitution. The social justice consecrated in our
Constitution was not intended to take away rights from a person and giv them to another who is not entitles
thereto. The plea for social justice cannot nullify the on obligations and contracts. Supreme Court’s Deision: The
appeals was dismissed for lack of merit and the judgment appealed is hereby affirmed.

MEYER v. NEBRASKA ( Section 12)

Brief Fact Summary: Plaintiff was convicted for teaching a child German under a Nebraska statute that outlawed
the teaching of foreign languages to students that had not yet completed the eighth grade.

Synopsis of Rule of Law. The Fourteenth Amendment prohibits states from creating legislation that restricts liberty
interests when the legislation is not reasonably related to an acceptable state objective
Facts. Plaintiff was convicted for teaching a child German under a Nebraska statute that outlawed the teaching of
foreign languages to students that had not yet completed the eighth grade. The Supreme Court of Nebraska
upheld the conviction.

Issue. Does the statute as construed and applied unreasonably infringe on the liberty guaranteed by the
Fourteenth Amendment?

Held. The statute as applied is unconstitutional because it infringes on the liberty interests of the plaintiff and fails
to reasonably relate to any end within the competency of the state.
The Fourteenth Amendment encompasses more than merely the freedom from bodily restraint. The state argues
that the purpose of the statute is to encourage the English language to be the native tongue of all children raised
in the state. Nonetheless, the protection of the Constitution extends to those who speak other languages.
Education is a fundamental liberty interest that must be protected, and mere knowledge of the German language
cannot be reasonably regarded as harmful.
Discussion. Liberty interests may not be interfered with by the states when the interference is arbitrary and not
reasonably related to a purpose which the state may permissively regulate.

PIERCE v. SOCIETY OF SISTERS (Section 12)

Brief Fact Summary. Appellees, two non-public schools, were protected by a preliminary restraining order
prohibiting appellants from enforcing an Oregon Act that required parents and guardians to send their children to
public school. Appellants appealed the order.

Synopsis of Rule of Law. The 14th Amendment provides a liberty interest in a parent’s or guardian’s right to decide
the mode in which their children are educated. State’s may not usurp this right when the questioned legislation
does not reasonably relate to a viable state interest.
Facts. Appellee the Society of Sisters, a corporation with the power to establish and maintain academies or schools
and Appellee Hill Military Academy, a private organization conducting an elementary, college preparatory, and
military training school, obtained preliminary restraining orders prohibiting appellants from enforcing Oregon’s
Compulsory Education Act. The Act required all parents and guardians to send children between 8 and 16 years to
a public school. The appellants appealed the granting of the preliminary restraining orders.

Issue. Does the Act unreasonably interfere with the liberty of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and
education of children under their control?
Held. The Act violates the 14th Amendment because it interferes with protected liberty interests and has no
reasonable relationship to any purpose within the competency of the state.
The Appellees have standing because the result of enforcing the Act would be destruction of the appellees’
schools. The state has the power to regulate all schools, but parents and guardians have the right and duty to
choose the appropriate preparation for their children.
Discussion. While the state has the right to insure that children receive a proper education, the 14th Amendment
provides parents and guardians with a liberty interest in their choice in the mode in which their children are
educated.

PEOPLE v. RITTER (Section 12)

FACTS: Heinrich Stefan Ritter was charged with the crime of rape with homicide involvinga young girl of about 12
years old who had been allegedly raped and who later died because aforeign object left inside her vaginal canal.
When arraigned, the accused pleaded "Not Guilty".Thereafter, the case was set for trial on the merits. The
trial court rendered a decision convictingthe appellant of such crime.

ISSUE: Whether SC should affirm the conviction of the accused rendered by the lower court?

RULING: Inasmuch as it is the bounden duty of this Court to affirm a judgment of convictiononly if the guilt of the
accused has been proved beyond reasonable doubt, it behooves us to exertthe most painstaking effort to
examine the records in the light of the arguments of both parties if only to satisfy judicial conscience that the
appellant indeed committed the criminal act. Before theconviction is affirmed, we must first follow the rule as
stated in the case of Urbanovs. Intermediate Appellate Court (157 SCRA 1 [1988]) to wit: “xxx The rule is that the
death of thevictim must be the direct, natural and logical consequence of the wounds inflicted upon him bythe
accused. And since we are dealing with a criminal conviction, the proof that the accusedcaused the victim's death
must convince a rational mind beyond reasonable doubt. xxx”We cannot convict on anything less than proof
beyond reasonable doubt. The protections of theBill of Rights and our criminal justice system are as much, if not
more so, for the perverts andoutcasts of society as they are for normal, decent, and law-abiding people.
The requirement of proof which produces in an unprejudiced mind moral certainty or conviction that the accused
didcommit the offense has not been satisfied. The established facts do not entirely rule out thepossibility that the
appellant could have inserted a foreign object inside Rosario's vagina. Thisobject may have caused her death. It is
possible that the appellant could be the guilty person.However, the Court cannot base an affirmance of conviction
upon mere possibilities. Suspicionsand possibilities are not evidence and therefore should not be taken against the
accused.(People v. Tolentino, supra) The appellant certainly committed acts contrary to morals, goodcustoms,
public order or public policy (see Article 21 Civil Code). The appellant has abusedFilipino children, enticing them
with money. The Court deplores the lack of criminal laws whichwilladequately protect street children from
exploitation by pedophiles, pimps, and, perhaps, their own parents or guardians who profit from the sale of young
bodies. The provisions on statutoryrape and other related offenses were never intended for the relatively recent
influx of pedophilestaking advantage of rampant poverty among the forgotten segments of our society. We
have toacquit the appellant because the Bill of Rights commands us to do so. We, however, express theCourt's
concern about the problem of street children and the evils committed against them.Something must be done
about it.

HELD:
The appealed judgment is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Appellant is ACQUITTED on grounds of reasonable doubt.
Department of Education vs. San Diego (Section 12)

Fundamental Principles and State Policies: Rearing of the Youth

The issue before us is mediocrity. The question is whether a person who has thrice failed the National
MedicalAdmission Test (NMAT) is entitled to take it again. The petitioner contends he may not, under its rule that-
Astudent shall be allowed only 3 chances to take the NMAT. After 3 successive failures, a student shall not
beallowed to take the NMAT for the fourth time. The private respondent insists he can, on constitutional grounds.
Facts: Private respondent is a graduate of the University of the East with a degree of BS Zoology. The
petitionerclaims that he took the NMAT 3 times and flunked it as many times. When he applied to take it again,
thepetitioner rejected his application on the basis of the aforesaid rule. He then went to the RTC of Valenzuela
tocompel his admission to the test.In his original petition for mandamus, he first invoked his constitutional rights
to academic freedom and qualityeducation. By agreement of the parties, the private respondent was allowed to
take the NMAT scheduled on April16, 1989, subject to the outcome of his petition. In an amended petition filed
with leave of court, he squarelychallenged the constitutionality of MECS Order No. 12, Series of 1972, containing
the above-cited rule. Theadditional grounds raised were due process and equal protection.

Issue: Whether or not there was a violation of the Constitution on academic freedom, due process and
equalprotection.

Held: No. The court upheld the constitutionality of the NMAT as a measure intended to limit the admission
tomedical schools only to those who have initially proved their competence and preparation for a medical
education.
Ratio:While every person is entitled to aspire to be a doctor, he does not have a constitutional right to be a doctor.
Thisis true of any other calling in which the public interest is involved; and the closer the link, the longer the bridge
toone's ambition. The State has the responsibility to harness its human resources and to see to it that they are
notdissipated or, no less worse, not used at all. These resources must be applied in a manner that will best
promotethe common good while also giving the individual a sense of satisfaction.The Court feels that it is not
enough to simply invoke the right to quality education as a guarantee of theConstitution: one must show that he is
entitled to it because of his preparation and promise. The privaterespondent has failed the NMAT five times. While
his persistence is noteworthy, to say the least, it is certainlymisplaced, like a hopeless love. No depreciation is
intended or made against the private respondent. It is stressedthat a person who does not qualify in the NMAT is
not an absolute incompetent unfit for any work or occupation.The only inference is that he is a probably better,
not for the medical profession, but for another calling that hasnot excited his interest. In the former, he may be a
bungler or at least lackluster; in the latter, he is more likely tosucceed and may even be outstanding. It is for the
appropriate calling that he is entitled to quality education forthe full harnessing of his potentials and the
sharpening of his latent talents toward what may even be a brilliantfuture. We cannot have a society of square
pegs in round holes, of dentists who should never have left the farmand engineers who should have studied
banking and teachers who could be better as merchants. It is time indeedthat the State took decisive steps to
regulate and enrich our system of education by directing the student to thecourse for which he is best suited as
determined by initial tests and evaluations. Otherwise, we may be "swampedwith mediocrity," in the words of
Justice Holmes, not because we are lacking in intelligence but because we are anation of misfits

Virtuoso v. Municipal Judge Case Digest (Section 12)

Facts: On February 23, 1978, petitioner Francisco Virtouso , Jr., who filed an application for the writ of habeas
corpus, premised his plea for liberty primarily on the ground that thepreliminary examination which led to the
issuance of a warrant of arrest against him was auseless formality as respondent Municipal Judge of Mariveles,
Bataan, (1) failed to meetthe strict standard required by the Constitution to ascertain whether there was a
probablecause. (2) He likewise alleged that aside from the constitutional infirmity that tainted theprocedure
followed in the preliminary examination, the bail imposed was clearly excessive. (3) It was in the amount of
P16,000.00, the alleged robbery of a TV set beingimputed to petitioner. As prayed for, the Court issued a writ of
habeas corpus, returnable to it on Wednesday,March 15, 1978. Respondent Judge, in his return filed on March
8, 1978, justified theissuance of the warrant of arrest, alleging that there was no impropriety in the way
thepreliminary examination was conducted. As to the excessive character of the bail, heasserted that while it was
fixed in accordance with the Revised Bail Bond Guide issued by the Executive Judge in Bataan in 1977, he
nevertheless reduced the amount to P8,000.00.

Issue: Whether or not the procedure by respondent Judge in ascertaining the existence of probable cause was
constitutionally deficient?

Ruling: The Supreme Court declared that the petition is granted in accordance with the terms of the Resolution of
this Court of March 15, 1978.The Court issued the following Resolution: “Acting on the verbal petition of counsel
for petitioner Francisco Virtouso, Jr., the Court Resolved pursuant to section 191of Presidential Decree No. 603,
petitioner being a 17-yearold minor, to order the release of the petitioner on the recognizance of his
parentsFrancisco Virtouso, Sr. and Manuela Virtouso and his Counsel, Atty. Guillermo B.Bandonil, who, in open
court, agreed to act in such capacity, without prejudice to further proceedings in a pending case against petitioner
being taken in accordance with law.” This Court should, whenever appropriate, give vitality and force to the
Youth and Welfare Code. Where, however, the right to bail exists, it should not be rendered nugatory by requiring
asum that is excessive

OPOSA v. FACTORAN (Section 16)

FACTS:
The plaintiffs in this case are all minors duly represented and joined by their parents. The first complaint was filed
as a taxpayer's class suit at the Branch 66 (Makati, Metro Manila), of the Regional Trial Court, National capital
Judicial Region against defendant (respondent) Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural
Reasources (DENR). Plaintiffs alleged that they are entitled to the full benefit, use and enjoyment of the natural
resource treasure that is the country's virgin tropical forests. They further asseverate that they represent their
generation as well as generations yet unborn and asserted that continued deforestation have caused a distortion
and disturbance of the ecological balance and have resulted in a host of environmental tragedies.

Plaintiffs prayed that judgement be rendered ordering the respondent, his agents, representatives and other
persons acting in his behalf to cancel all existing Timber License Agreement (TLA) in the country and to cease and
desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new TLAs.

Defendant, on the other hand, filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the complaint had no cause of action
against him and that it raises a political question.

The RTC Judge sustained the motion to dismiss, further ruling that granting of the relief prayed for would result in
the impairment of contracts which is prohibited by the Constitution.

Plaintiffs (petitioners) thus filed the instant special civil action for certiorari and asked the court to rescind and set
aside the dismissal order on the ground that the respondent RTC Judge gravely abused his discretion in dismissing
the action.

ISSUES:(1) Whether or not the plaintiffs have a cause of action.

(2) Whether or not the complaint raises a political issue.
(3) Whether or not the original prayer of the plaintiffs result in the impairment of contracts.

RULING:First Issue: Cause of Action.

Respondents aver that the petitioners failed to allege in their complaint a specific legal right violated by the
respondent Secretary for which any relief is provided by law. The Court did not agree with this. The complaint
focuses on one fundamental legal right -- the right to a balanced and healthful ecology which is incorporated in
Section 16 Article II of the Constitution. The said right carries with it the duty to refrain from impairing the
environment and implies, among many other things, the judicious management and conservation of the country's
forests. Section 4 of E.O. 192 expressly mandates the DENR to be the primary government agency responsible for
the governing and supervising the exploration, utilization, development and conservation of the country's natural
resources. The policy declaration of E.O. 192 is also substantially re-stated in Title XIV Book IV of the Administrative
Code of 1987. Both E.O. 192 and Administrative Code of 1987 have set the objectives which will serve as the bases
for policy formation, and have defined the powers and functions of the DENR. Thus, right of the petitioners (and all
those they represent) to a balanced and healthful ecology is as clear as DENR's duty to protect and advance the
said right.

A denial or violation of that right by the other who has the correlative duty or obligation to respect or protect or
respect the same gives rise to a cause of action. Petitioners maintain that the granting of the TLA, which they claim
was done with grave abuse of discretion, violated their right to a balance and healthful ecology. Hence, the full
protection thereof requires that no further TLAs should be renewed or granted.

After careful examination of the petitioners' complaint, the Court finds it to be adequate enough to show, prima
facie, the claimed violation of their rights.

Second Issue: Political Issue. Second paragraph, Section 1 of Article VIII of the constitution provides for the
expanded jurisdiction vested upon the Supreme Court. It allows the Court to rule upon even on the wisdom of the
decision of the Executive and Legislature and to declare their acts as invalid for lack or excess of jurisdiction
because it is tainted with grave abuse of discretion.

Third Issue: Violation of the non-impairment clause. The Court held that the Timber License Agreement is an
instrument by which the state regulates the utilization and disposition of forest resources to the end that public
welfare is promoted. It is not a contract within the purview of the due process clause thus, the non-impairment
clause cannot be invoked. It can be validly withdraw whenever dictated by public interest or public welfare as in
this case. The granting of license does not create irrevocable rights, neither is it property or property rights.

Moreover, the constitutional guaranty of non-impairment of obligations of contract is limit by the exercise by the
police power of the State, in the interest of public health, safety, moral and general welfare. In short, the non-
impairment clause must yield to the police power of the State.

The instant petition, being impressed with merit, is hereby GRANTED and the RTC decision is SET ASIDE.

LLDA v. CA (Section 16)

Facts: The Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA) was created through RA No. 4850 in order to execute the
policy towards environmental protection and sustainable development so as to accelerate the development and
balanced growth of the Laguna Lake area and the surrounding provinces and towns.
PD No. 813 amended certain sections of RA 4850 since water quality studies have shown that the lake will
deteriorate further if steps are not taken to check the same. EO 927 further defined and enlarged the functions
and powers of the LLDA and enumerated the towns, cities and provinces encompassed by the term “Laguna de Bay
Region”. Upon implementation of RA 7160 (Local Government Code of 1991), the municipalities assumed exclusive
jurisdiction & authority to issue fishing privileges within their municipal waters since Sec.149 thereof provides:
“Municipal corporations shall have the authority to grant fishery privileges in the municipal waters and impose
rental fees or charges therefore…” Big fishpen operators took advantage of the occasion to establish fishpens &
fish cages to the consternation of the LLDA. The implementation of separate independent policies in fish cages &
fish pen operation and the indiscriminate grant of fishpen permits by the lakeshore municipalities have saturated
the lake with fishpens, thereby aggravating the current environmental problems and ecological stress of Laguna
Lake. The LLDA then served notice to the general public that (1) fishpens, cages & other aqua-culture structures
unregistered with the LLDA as of March 31, 1993 are declared illegal; (2) those declared illegal shall be subject to
demolition by the Presidential Task Force for Illegal Fishpen and Illegal Fishing; and (3) owners of those declared
illegal shall be criminally charged with violation of Sec.39-A of RA 4850 as amended by PD 813. A month later, the
LLDA sent notices advising the owners of the illegally constructed fishpens, fishcages and other aqua-culture
structures advising them to dismantle their respective structures otherwise demolition shall be effected.

Issues: 1.Which agency of the government – the LLDA or the towns and municipalities comprising the region –
should exercise jurisdiction over the Laguna lake and its environs insofar as the issuance of permits for fishery
privileges is concerned?
2. Whether the LLDA is a quasi-judicial agency?

Held: 1. Sec.4(k) of the charter of the LLDA, RA 4850, the provisions of PD 813,and Sec.2 of EO No.927, specifically
provide that the LLDA shall have exclusive jurisdiction to issue permits for the use of all surface water for any
projects or activities in or affecting the said region. On the other hand, RA 7160 has granted to the municipalities
the exclusive authority to grant fishery privileges on municipal waters. The provisions of RA 7160 do not
necessarily repeal the laws creating the LLDA and granting the latter water rights authority over Laguna de Bay and
the lake region. Where there is a conflict between a general law and a special statute, latter should prevail since it
evinces the legislative intent more clearly than the general statute.The special law is to be taken as an exception to
the general law in the absence of special circumstances forcing a contrary conclusion. Implied repeals are not
favored and, as much as possible, effect must be given to all enactments of the legislature. A special law cannot be
repealed, amended or altered by a subsequent general law by mere implication. The power of LGUs to issue fishing
privileges was granted for revenue purposes. On the other hand, the power of the LLDA to grant permits for
fishpens, fish cages, and other aqua-culture structures is for the purpose of effectively regulating & monitoring
activities in the Laguna de Bay region and for lake control and management. It partakes of the nature of police
power which is the most pervasive, least limitable and most demanding of all state powers including the power of
taxation. Accordingly, the charter of the LLDA which embodies a valid exercise of police power should prevail over
the LGC of 1991 on matters affecting Laguna de Bay. 2. The LLDA has express powers as a regulatory and quasi-
judicial body in respect to pollution cases with authority to issue a “cease and desist order” and on matters
affecting the construction of illegal fishpens, fish cages and other aqua-culture structures in Laguna de Bay.
Sec.149 of RA 7160 has not repealed the provisions of the charter of the LLDA, RA 4850, as amended. Thus, the
LLDA has the exclusive jurisdiction to issue permits for enjoyment of fishery privileges in Laguna de Bay to the
exclusion of municipalities situated thereinand the authority to exercise such powers as are by its charter vested
on it.

GARCIA v. BOARD OF INVESTMENTS (Section 19)

FACTS:The Bataan Petrochemical Corporation (BPC), a Taiwanese private corporation, applied for registration with
the Board of Investments (BOI) in February 1988 as a new domestic producer of petrochemicals in the Philippines.
It originally specified the province of Bataan as the site for the proposed investment but later submitted an
amended application to change the site to Batangas. Unhappy with the change of the site, Congressman Enrique
Garcia of the Second District of Bataan requested a copy of BPC’s original and amended application documents.
The BoI denied the request on the basis that the investors in BPC had declined to give their consent to the release
of the documents requested, and that Article 81 of the Omnibus Investments Code protects the confidentiality of
these documents absent consent to disclose. The BoI subsequently approved the amended application without
holding a second hearing or publishing notice of the amended application. Garcia filed a petition before the
Supreme Court.

ISSUE: Whether or not the BoI committed grave abuse of discretion in yielding to the wishes of the investor,
national interest notwithstanding.

RULING:
The Court ruled that the BoI violated Garcia’s Constitutional right to have access to information on matters of
public concern under Article III, Section 7 of the Constitution. The Court found that the inhabitants of Bataan had
an “interest in the establishment of the petrochemical plant in their midst [that] is actual, real, and vital because it
will affect not only their economic life, but even the air they breathe” The Court also ruled that BPC’s amended
application was in fact a second application that required a new public notice to be filed and a new hearing to be
held.

Although Article 81 of the Omnibus Investments Code provides that “all applications and their supporting
documents filed under this code shall be confidential and shall not be disclosed to any person, except with the
consent of the applicant,” the Court emphasized that Article 81 provides for disclosure “on the orders of a court of
competent jurisdiction”. The Court ruled that it had jurisdiction to order disclosure of the application, amended
application, and supporting documents filed with the BOI under Article 81, with certain exceptions.

The Court went on to note that despite the right to access information, “the Constitution does not open every
door to any and all information” because “the law may exempt certain types of information from public scrutiny”.
Thus it excluded “the trade secrets and confidential, commercial, and financial information of the applicant BPC,
and matters affecting national security” from its order. The Court did not provide a test for what information is
excluded from the Constitutional privilege to access public information, nor did it specify the kinds of information
that BPC could withhold under its ruling.

ASSOC OF SMALL LAND OWNERS V. DAR (Sec tion 21)

These are four consolidated cases questioning the constitutionality of the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Act (R.A. No. 6657 and related laws i.e., Agrarian Land Reform Code or R.A. No. 3844).
Brief background: Article XIII of the Constitution on Social Justice and Human Rights includes a call for the adoption
by the State of an agrarian reform program. The State shall, by law, undertake an agrarian reform program
founded on the right of farmers and regular farmworkers, who are landless, to own directly or collectively the
lands they till or, in the case of other farmworkers, to receive a just share of the fruits thereof. RA 3844 was
enacted in 1963. P.D. No. 27 was promulgated in 1972 to provide for the compulsory acquisition of private lands
for distribution among tenant-farmers and to specify maximum retention limits for landowners. In 1987, President
Corazon Aquino issued E.O. No. 228, declaring full land ownership in favor of the beneficiaries of PD 27 and
providing for the valuation of still unvalued lands covered by the decree as well as the manner of their payment.
In 1987, P.P. No. 131, instituting a comprehensive agrarian reform program (CARP) was enacted; later, E.O. No.
229, providing the mechanics for its (PP131’s) implementation, was also enacted. Afterwhich is the enactment of
R.A. No. 6657, Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law in 1988. This law, while considerably changing the earlier
mentioned enactments, nevertheless gives them suppletory effect insofar as they are not inconsistent with its
provisions.
[Two of the consolidated cases are discussed below]
G.R. No. 78742: (Association of Small Landowners vs Secretary)
The Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. sought exception from the land distribution scheme
provided for in R.A. 6657. The Association is comprised of landowners of ricelands and cornlands whose
landholdings do not exceed 7 hectares. They invoke that since their landholdings are less than 7 hectares, they
should not be forced to distribute their land to their tenants under R.A. 6657 for they themselves have shown
willingness to till their own land. In short, they want to be exempted from agrarian reform program because they
claim to belong to a different class.
G.R. No. 79777: (Manaay vs Juico)
Nicolas Manaay questioned the validity of the agrarian reform laws (PD 27, EO 228, and 229) on the ground that
these laws already valuated their lands for the agrarian reform program and that the specific amount must be
determined by the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR). Manaay averred that this violated the principle in
eminent domain which provides that only courts can determine just compensation. This, for Manaay, also violated
due process for under the constitution, no property shall be taken for public use without just compensation.
Manaay also questioned the provision which states that landowners may be paid for their land in bonds and not
necessarily in cash. Manaay averred that just compensation has always been in the form of money and not in
bonds.

ISSUE:1. Whether or not there was a violation of the equal protection clause.
2. Whether or not there is a violation of due process.
3. Whether or not just compensation, under the agrarian reform program, must be in terms of cash.

HELD:1. No. The Association had not shown any proof that they belong to a different class exempt from
the agrarian reform program. Under the law, classification has been defined as the grouping of persons or things
similar to each other in certain particulars and different from each other in these same particulars. To be valid, it
must conform to the following requirements:
(1) it must be based on substantial distinctions;
(2) it must be germane to the purposes of the law;
(3) it must not be limited to existing conditions only; and
(4) it must apply equally to all the members of the class.
Equal protection simply means that all persons or things similarly situated must be treated alike both as to the
rights conferred and the liabilities imposed. The Association have not shown that they belong to a different class
and entitled to a different treatment. The argument that not only landowners but also owners of other properties
must be made to share the burden of implementing land reform must be rejected. There is a substantial
distinction between these two classes of owners that is clearly visible except to those who will not see. There is no
need to elaborate on this matter. In any event, the Congress is allowed a wide leeway in providing for a valid
classification. Its decision is accorded recognition and respect by the courts of justice except only where its
discretion is abused to the detriment of the Bill of Rights. In the contrary, it appears that Congress is right in
classifying small landowners as part of the agrarian reform program.
2. No. It is true that the determination of just compensation is a power lodged in the courts. However, there is no
law which prohibits administrative bodies like the DAR from determining just compensation. In fact, just
compensation can be that amount agreed upon by the landowner and the government – even without judicial
intervention so long as both parties agree. The DAR can determine just compensation through appraisers and if the
landowner agrees, then judicial intervention is not needed. What is contemplated by law however is that, the just
compensation determined by an administrative body is merely preliminary. If the landowner does not agree with
the finding of just compensation by an administrative body, then it can go to court and the determination of the
latter shall be the final determination. This is even so provided by RA 6657:
Section 16 (f): Any party who disagrees with the decision may bring the matter to the court of proper jurisdiction
for final determination of just compensation.
3. No. Money as [sole] payment for just compensation is merely a concept in traditional exercise of eminent
domain. The agrarian reform program is a revolutionary exercise of eminent domain. The program will require
billions of pesos in funds if all compensation have to be made in cash – if everything is in cash, then the
government will not have sufficient money hence, bonds, and other securities, i.e., shares of stocks, may be used
for just compensation.

The CITY GOV of BAGUIO CITY v. ATTY MASWENG (Section 22)

Facts:In pursuance of the final Decision in G.R. No. 180206, petitioner issued the subject demolition advicesfor the
enforcement of Demolition Order No. 33, Series of 2005 against Alexander Ampaguey, Sr.et.al; Demolition Order
No. 83, Series of 1999 against Julio Daluyen, Sr., et.al, all in Busol Watershed,Baguio City. As it is, the aforesaid
individuals filed a petition for injunction (Case No. 31-CAR-09)while Magdalena Gumangan, et al. filed a petition for
identification, delineation and recognition ofancestral land claims with prayer for temporary restraining order and
writ of preliminary injunction(Case No. 29-CAR-09).Respondent in his capacity as the Regional Hearing Officer
of the National Commission on IndigenousPeoples, Cordillera Administrative Region (NCIP-CAR) issued the
following separate temporaryrestraining orders and writs of preliminary injunction in both cases orders:(1) 72-
Hour Temporary Restraining Order dated July 27, 2009, Order dated July 31, 2009 and Writ ofPreliminary
Injunction4 in NCIP Case No. 31-CAR-09; and(2)72-Hour Temporary Restraining Order dated July 27, 2009, Order
dated July 31, 2009 and Writ ofPreliminary Injunction7 in NCIP Case No. 29-CAR-09.Hence, this petition asserting
that the restraining orders and writs of preliminary injunction wereissued in willful disregard, disobedience, def
iance and resistance of this Court’s Decision in G.R. No.180206 which dismissed the previous injunction case.
Petitioner contends that respondent’s act of
enjoining the execution of the demolition orders and demolition advices is tantamount to allowingforum shopping
since the implementation of the demolition orders over the structures in the BusolForest Reservation had already
been adjudicated and affirmed by this Court.Respondent claims that he issued the restraining orders and writs of
preliminary injunction in NCIPCase Nos. 31-CAR-09 and 29-CAR-09 because his jurisdiction was called upon to
protect andpreserve the rights of the petitioners (in the NCIP cases) who were undoubtedly members of
theindigenous cultural communities/indigenous peoples. In addition, he maintains that the orders andwrits he
issued did not disregard the earlier ruling of this Court in G.R. No. 180206 because the Courthas in fact affirmed
the power of the NCIP to issue temporary restraining orders and writs ofinjunction without any prohibition against
the issuance of said writs when the main action is forinjunction.

Issue:Whether the respondent should be cited in contempt of court for issuing the subject temporaryrestraining
orders and writs of preliminary injunction.

Held:The court ruled in affirmative.The said orders clearly contravene the court’s ruling in G.R. No. 180206 that
Elvin Gumangan, et.al.who are owners of houses and structures covered by the demolition orders issued by
petitioner arenot entitled to the injunctive relief previously granted by respondent.The court finds that petitioners
and private respondents present the very same arguments andcounter-arguments with respect to the writ of
injunction against the fencing of the Busol WatershedReservation. The same legal issues are thus being litigated in
G.R. No.180206 and in the case at bar,except that different writs of injunction are being assailed.
While res judicata does not apply on account of the different subject matters of the case at bar andG.R. No.
180206 (they assail different writs of injunction, albeit issued by the same hearing officer),the court is constrained
by the principle of stare decisis in granting the instant petition.Petitioner City Government of Baguio in issuing the
demolition advices are simply enforcing theprevious demolition orders against the same occupants or claimants or
their agents and successors-in- interest, only to be thwarted anew by the injunctive orders and writs issued by
respondent.
Despite the Court’s
pronouncement in G.R. No. 180206 that no such clear legal right exists in favor ofthose occupants or claimants to
restrain the enforcement of the demolition orders issued bypetitioner, and hence there remains no legal
impediment to bar their implementation, respondentstill issued the temporary restraining orders and writs of
preliminary injunction.
Respondent has willfully disregarded and defies the Court’s ruling on a matter submitted for the
second time before his office. Hence Atty. Masweng is guilty of indirect contempt under Section 7 ofRule 71 of the
Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, in relation to Section 3(b) of Rule 71 of the Rule.

BASCO v. PAGCOR (Section 25)

FACTS: Petitioners seek to annul the PAGCOR charter – PD 1869 – for being allegedly contrary to morals, public
policy and order, monopolistic & tends toward “crony economy”, waiving the Manila City government’s right to
impose taxes & license fees, and violating the equal protection clause, local autonomy and other state policies in
the Constitution.

ISSUES:Whether PD 1869 is valid.

HELD:Every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality. For a law to be nullified, it must be shown that
there is a clear & unequivocal breach of the Constitution. The grounds for nullity must be clear and beyond
reasonable doubt. The question of wether PD 1869 is a wise legislation is up for Congress to determine.
The power of LGUs to regulate gambling through the grant of franchises, licenses or permits was withdrawn by PD
771, and is now vested exclusively on the National Government. Necessarily, the power to demand/collect license
fees is no longer vested in the City of Manila. LGUs have no power to tax Government instrumentalities. PAGCOR,
being a GOCC, is therefore exempt from local taxes. The National Government is supreme over local governments.
As such, mere creatures of the State cannot defeat national policies using the power to tax as a “tool for
regulation”. The power to tax cannot be allowed to defeat an instrumentality of the very entity which has the
inherent power to wield it. The power of LGUs to impose taxes & fees is always subject to limitation provided by
Congress. The principle of local autonomy does not make LGUs sovereign within a state, it simply
means decentralization.
A law doesn’t have to operate in equal force on all persons/things. The equal protection clause doesn’t preclude
classification of individuals who may be accorded different treatment under the law as long as the classification is
not unreasonable/arbitrary. The mere fact that some gambling activities are legalized under certain conditions,
while others are prohibited, does not render the applicable laws unconstitutional.

LIMBONAS v. MANGELIN (Section 25)

Facts: Petitioner, Sultan Alimbusar Limbona, was elected Speaker of the Regional Legislative Assembly or Batasang
Pampook of Central Mindanao (Assembly). On October 21, 1987 Congressman Datu Guimid Matalam, Chairman of
the Committee on Muslim Affairs of the House of Representatives, invited petitioner in his capacity as Speaker of
the Assembly of Region XII in a consultation/dialogue with local government officials. Petitioner accepted the
invitation and informed the Assembly members through the Assembly Secretary that there shall be no session in
November as his presence was needed in the house committee hearing of Congress. However, on November 2,
1987, the Assembly held a session in defiance of the Limbona's advice, where he was unseated from his position.
Petitioner prays that the session's proceedings be declared null and void and be it declared that he was still the
Speaker of the Assembly. Pending further proceedings of the case, the SC received a resolution from the Assembly
expressly expelling petitioner's membership therefrom. Respondents argue that petitioner had "filed a case before
the Supreme Court against some members of the Assembly on a question which should have been resolved within
the confines of the Assembly," for which the respondents now submit that the petition had become "moot and
academic" because its resolution.

Issue: Whether or not the courts of law have jurisdiction over the autonomous governments or regions. What is
the extent of self-government given to the autonomous governments of Region XII?

Held: Autonomy is either decentralization of administration or decentralization of power. There is decentralization

of administration when the central government delegates administrative powers to political subdivisions in order
to broaden the base of government power and in the process to make local governments "more responsive and
accountable". At the same time, it relieves the central government of the burden of managing local affairs and
enables it to concentrate on national concerns. The President exercises "general supervision" over them, but only
to "ensure that local affairs are administered according to law." He has no control over their acts in the sense that
he can substitute their judgments with his own. Decentralization of power, on the other hand, involves an
abdication of political power in the favor of local governments units declared to be autonomous. In that case, the
autonomous government is free to chart its own destiny and shape its future with minimum intervention from
central authorities.

An autonomous government that enjoys autonomy of the latter category [CONST. (1987), Art. X, Sec. 15.] is subject
alone to the decree of the organic act creating it and accepted principles on the effects and limits of "autonomy."
On the other hand, an autonomous government of the former class is, as we noted, under the supervision of the
national government acting through the President (and the Department of Local Government). If the Sangguniang
Pampook (of Region XII), then, is autonomous in the latter sense, its acts are, debatably beyond the domain of this
Court in perhaps the same way that the internal acts, say, of the Congress of the Philippines are beyond our
jurisdiction. But if it is autonomous in the former category only, it comes unarguably under our jurisdiction. An
examination of the very Presidential Decree creating the autonomous governments of Mindanao persuades us that
they were never meant to exercise autonomy in the second sense (decentralization of power). PD No. 1618, in the
first place, mandates that "[t]he President shall have the power of general supervision and control over
Autonomous Regions." Hence, we assume jurisdiction. And if we can make an inquiry in the validity of the
expulsion in question, with more reason can we review the petitioner's removal as Speaker.

This case involves the application of a most

important constitutional policy and principle, that of local autonomy. We have to obey the clear mandate on local
autonomy.
Where a law is capable of two interpretations, one in favor of centralized power in Malacañang and the other
beneficial to local autonomy, the scales must be weighed in favor of autonomy.

Upon the facts presented, we hold that the November 2 and 5, 1987 sessions were invalid. It is true that under
Section 31 of the Region XII Sanggunian Rules, "[s]essions shall not be suspended or adjourned except by direction
of the Sangguniang Pampook". But while this opinion is in accord with the respondents' own, we still invalidate the
twin sessions in question, since at the time the petitioner called the "recess," it was not a settled matter whether
or not he could do so. In the second place, the invitation tendered by the Committee on Muslim Affairs of the
House of Representatives provided a plausible reason for the intermission sought. Also, assuming that a valid
recess could not be called, it does not appear that the respondents called his attention to this mistake. What
appears is that instead, they opened the sessions themselves behind his back in an apparent act of mutiny. Under
the circumstances, we find equity on his side. For this reason, we uphold the "recess" called on the ground of good
faith.

LEGASPI v. CSC (Section28)

FACTS : The fundamental right of the people to information on matters of public concern is invoked in this special
civil action for mandamus instituted by petitioner Valentin L. Legaspi against the Civil Service Commission. The
respondent had earlier denied Legaspi's request for information on the civil service eligibilities of certain persons
employed as sanitarians in the Health Department of Cebu City. These government employees, Julian Sibonghanoy
and Mariano Agas, had allegedly represented themselves as civil service eligibles who passed the civil service
examinations for sanitarians.

ISSUE : WON the petitioner has legal to access government records to validate the civil service eligibilities of the
Health Department employees

HELD : The constitutional guarantee to information on matters of public concern is not absolute. It does not open
every door to any and all information. Under the Constitution, access to official records, papers, etc., are "subject
to limitations as may be provided by law" The law may therefore exempt certain types of information from public
scrutiny, such as those affecting national security It follows that, in every case, the availability of access to a
particular public record must be circumscribed by the nature of the information sought, i.e., (a) being of public
concern or one that involves public interest, and, (b) not being exempted by law from the operation of the
constitutional guarantee. The threshold question is, therefore, whether or not the information sought is of public
interest or public concern. This question is first addressed to the government agency having custody of the desired
information. However, as already discussed, this does not give the agency concerned any discretion to grant or
deny access. In case of denial of access, the government agency has the burden of showing that the information
requested is not of public concern, or, if it is of public concern, that the same has been exempted by law from the
operation of the guarantee. To hold otherwise will serve to dilute the constitutional right. As aptly observed, ". . .
the government is in an advantageous position to marshall and interpret arguments against release . . ." (87
Harvard Law Review 1511 [1974]). To safeguard the constitutional right, every denial of access by the government
agency concerned is subject to review by the courts, and in the proper case, access may be compelled by a writ of
Mandamus Public office being a public trust it is the legitimate concern of citizens to ensure that government
positions requiring civil service eligibility are occupied only by persons who are eligibles. Public officers are at all
times accountable to the people even as to their eligibilities for their respective positions. In the instant, case while
refusing to confirm or deny the claims of eligibility, the respondent has failed to cite any provision in the Civil
Service Law which would limit the petitioner's right to know who are, and who are not, civil service eligibles. We
take judicial notice of the fact that the names of those who pass the civil service examinations, as in bar
examinations and licensure examinations for various professions, are released to the public. Hence, there is
nothing secret about one's civil service eligibility, if actually possessed. Petitioner's request is, therefore, neither
unusual nor unreasonable. And when, as in this case, the government employees concerned claim to be civil
service eligibles, the public, through any citizen, has a right to verify their professed eligibilities from the Civil
Service Commission. The civil service eligibility of a sanitarian being of public concern, and in the absence of
express limitations under the law upon access to the register of civil service eligibles for said position, the duty of
the respondent Commission to confirm or deny the civil service eligibility of any person occupying the position
becomes imperative. Mandamus, therefore lies

VALMONTE v. DE VILLA (Section 28)

Facts:1.Activated through LOI 02/87 of the Philippine General Headquarters, AFP, the NCRDistrict Command
sought to conduct security operations within its area ofresponsibility and peripheral areas for the purpose of
establishing an effectiveterritorial defense, maintaining peace and order, and providing an atmosphereconducive
to the social, economic and political development of the NCR. As part ofits duty to maintain peace and order,
the NCRDC installed checkpoints in variousparts of Valenzuela, Metro Manila.2. Petitioner (Ricardo Valmonte),
together with the Union of Lawyers and Advocates for People’s Rights, contended that said checkpoints caused
worries among the residents of Valenzuela, including the possibility of getting harassed. Aside fromthe possibility
of getting harassed, residents worry of their safety due to thearbitrary, capricious and whimsical disposition of the
military manning thecheckpoints, considering that their cars and vehicles are being subjected to regularsearches
and check-ups, especially at night or at dawn, without the benefit of asearch warrant and/or court order.3.
On July 9, 1988, a supply officer of the Municipality of Valenzuela, Bulacan(Benjamin Parpon) was gunned down
(not killed) allegedly by members of theNCRDC manning the checkpoint for ignoring and/or refusing to submit
himself tothe checkpoint and for continuing to speed off in spite of warning shots fired in theair.4. Petitioners
(Valmonte and ULAP) contended that the said checkpoints give therespondents (De Villa) a blanket authority to
make searches and/or seizureswithout search warrant or court order in violation of the Constitution. Valmontehas
claimed that he had gone thru said checkpoints where he was stopped and hiscar subjected to search/check-up
without a court order or search warrant.

Ruling:1.No proof has been presented before the Court to show that, in the course of theirroutine checks, the
military indeed committed specific violations of petitioners’ right against unlawfulsearches and seizures, or other
rights. Petitioner’s general allegation that he had been stopped and searched without a search warrant by
themilitary manning the checkpoints, without stating the details of the incidents whichamount to a violation of his
right against unlawful search and seizure, is notsufficient to enable the Court to determine whether there was a
violation of Valmonte’s right against unlawful search and seizure.
2.The constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures is a personalright, and could be invoked
only by those whose rights have been infringed orthreatened to be infringed. What constitutes a reasonable or
unreasonable searchand seizure in any particular case is purely a judicial question, determinable from
aconsideration of the circumstances involved.
3.Not all searches and seizures are prohibited. Those which are reasonable are notforbidden. A reasonable search
is not to be determined by any fixed formula but isto be resolved according to the facts of each case. When the
officer merely drawsaside the curtain of a vacant vehicle which is parked on the public fair grounds orsimply looks
into a vehicle or flashes a light therein, these do not constituteunreasonable search.
4.Between the inherent right of the State to protect its existence and promote publicwelfare and an individual’s
right against a warrantless search, which is reasonablyconducted, the former shall prevail.

AQUINO-SARMIENTO v. MORATO (Section 28)

FACTS : In February 1989, petitioner, herself a member of respondent Movie and Television Review and
Classification Board (MTRCB), wrote its records officer requesting that she be allowed to examine the board's
records pertaining to the voting slips accomplished by the individual board members after a review of the movies
and television productions. It is on the basis of said slips that films are either banned, cut or classified accordingly.
Petitioner's request was eventually denied by respondent Morato on the ground that whenever the members of
the board sit in judgment over a film, their decisions as reflected in the individual voting slips partake the nature of
conscience votes and as such, are purely and completely private and personal On February 27, 1989, respondent
Morato called an executive meeting of the MTRCB to discuss, among others, the issue raised by petitioner. In said
meeting, seventeen (17) members of the board voted to declare their individual voting records as classified
documents which rendered the same inaccessible to the public without clearance from the chairman. Thereafter,
respondent Morato denied petitioner's request to examine the voting slips. However, it was only much later, i.e.,
on July 27, 1989, that respondent Board issued Resolution No. 10-89 which declared as confidential, private and
personal, the decision of the reviewing committee and the voting slips of the members.

ISSUE : WON Resolution No. 10-89 is valid

HELD : The term private has been defined as "belonging to or concerning, an individual person, company, or
interest"; whereas, public means "pertaining to, or belonging to, or affecting a nation, state, or community at
large. As may be gleaned from the decree (PD 1986) creating the respondent classification board, there is no doubt
that its very existence is public is character. it is an office created to serve public interest. It being the case,
respondents can lay no valid claim to privacy. The right to privacy belongs to the individual acting in his private
capacity and not to a governmental agency or officers tasked with, and acting in, the discharge of public duties. the
decisions of the Board and the individual voting slips accomplished by the members concerned are acts made
pursuant to their official functions, and as such, are neither personal nor private in nature but rather public in
character. They are, therefore, public records access to which is guaranteed to the citizenry by no less than the
fundamental law of the land.

PROVINCE OF NORTH COTABATO v. GOVT OF THE R P PEACE PANEL

FACTS: The Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD) brought about by the Government of
the republic of the Philippines (GRP) and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) as an aspect of Tripoli
Agreement of Peace in 2001 is scheduled to be signed in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.
This agreement was petitioned by the Province of North Cotabato for Mandamus and Prohibition with Prayer for
the Issuance of Writ of Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order. The agreement mentions
“Bangsamoro Juridical Entity” (BJE) to which it grants the authority and jurisdiction over the Ancestral Domain and
Ancestral Lands of the Bangsamoro; authority and jurisdiction over all natural resources within internal waters. The
agreement is composed of two local statutes: the organic act for autonomous region in Muslim Mindanao and the
Indigenous People’s Rights Act (IPRA).

ISSUE: Whether or not the GRP violated the Constitutional and statutory provisions on public consultation and the
right to information when they negotiated and initiated the MOA-AD and Whether or not the MOA-AD brought by
the GRP and MILF is constitutional

HELD:GRP violated the Constitutional and statutory provisions on public consultation and the right to information
when they negotiated and initiated the MOA-AD and it are unconstitutional because it is contrary to law and the
provisions of the constitution thereof.
REASONING: The GRP is required by this law to carry out public consultations on both national and local levels to
build consensus for peace agenda and process and the mobilization and facilitation of people’s participation in the
peace process. Article III (Bill of Rights) Sec. 7. The right of people on matters of public concern shall be recognized,
access to official records and to documents and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well
as to government research data used as basis for policy development shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such
limitations as may be provided by law. Article II Sec. 28. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law , that
state adopts and implements a policy of full public disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest.
LGC (1991), “require all national agencies and officers to conduct periodic consultations. No project or program be
implemented unless such consultations are complied with and approval mus be obtained.”
Article VII (Executive Department) Sec. 21. No treaty or international agreement shall be valid and effective unless
concurred in by at least two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate. Article X. (Local Government) Sec. 1. The
territorial and political subdivisions of the Republic of the Philippines are the province, cities, municipalities and
barangays. There shall be autonomous regions on Muslim Mindanao and the Cordillera as hereinafter provided.
Sec. 15. There shall be created autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and in the Cordilleras consisting of
provinces, cities, municipalities and geographical areas sharing common and distinctive historical and cultural
heritage, economic and social structures and other relevant characteristics within the framework of this
constitution and the national sovereignty as well as territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines.
Section 16. The President shall exercise general supervision over autonomous regions to ensure that laws are
faithfully executed. Sec. 18. The creation of autonomous region shall be effective when approved by a majority of
the votes cast by the constituents units in a plebiscite called for the purpose, provided that only provinces, cities
and geographic areas voting favourably in such plebiscite shall be included in the autonomous region.
Sec. 20. Within its territorial jurisdiction and subject to the provisions of this Constitution and national laws, the
organic act of autonomous regions shall provide for legislative powers over:
1. Administrative organization;
2. Creation of sources of revenues;
3. Ancestral domain and natural resources;
4. Personal, family, and property relations;
5. Regional urban and rural planning development;
6. Economic, social, and tourism development;
7. Educational policies;
8. Preservation and development of the cultural heritage; and
9. Such other matters as may be authorized by law for the promotion of the general welfare of the people of the
region.
The President has sole authority in the treaty-making. ARTICLE XVII (AMENDMENTS OR REVISIONS) Section 1. Any
amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution may be proposed by: 1. The Congress, upon a vote of three-fourths
of all its Members; or 2. A constitutional convention. Section 4. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution
under Section 1 hereof shall be valid when ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite which shall be held
not earlier than sixty days nor later than ninety days after the approval of such amendment or revision.
MOA-AD states that all provisions thereof which cannot be reconciled with the present constitution and laws “shall
come into force upon signing of a comprehensive compact and upon effecting the necessary changes to the legal
framework.” The president’s authority is limited to proposing constitutional amendments. She cannot guarantee
to any third party that the required amendments will eventually be put in place nor even be submitted to a
plebiscite. MOA-AD itself presents the need to amend therein.