BAYOT V.

SANDIGANBAYAN March 23, 1984

Facts:

Petitioner Reynaldo R. Bayot was charged with the crime of Estafa thru Falsification of Public Documents before the
Sandiganbayan. In the meantime, he ran and was elected mayor of Amadeo, Cavite in January 1980. The
Sandiganbayan convicted petitioner; hence, he appealed.

While the case was pending on appeal, Batas Pambansa Blg. 195 was passed amending, among others, Section 13 of
Republic Act No. 3019. This authorized suspension of public officers against whom an information may be pending at
any stage.

On motion of the prosecution, the Sandiganbayan issued an order directing the suspension of petitioner. Petitioner
filed a motion for reconsideration alleging that "to apply the provision of Batas Pambansa Blg. 195 to the herein
accused would be violative of the constitutional guarantee of protection against an ex post facto law".

Issue:

Whether or not Batas Pambansa Blg. 195 is an ex post facto law

Held:

Paragraph 3 of Article 24 of the Revised Penal Code clearly states that suspension from the employment or public
office during the trial or in order to institute proceedings shall not be considered as penalty. It is not a penalty
because it is not imposed as a result of judicial proceedings. In fact, if acquitted, the official concerned shall be
entitled to reinstatement and to the salaries and benefits which he failed to receive during suspension. Those
mentioned in paragraph Nos. 1, 3 and 4 of said Article 24 are merely preventive measures before final judgment. Not
being a penal provision, therefore, the suspension from office, pending trial, of the public officer charged with crimes
mentioned in the amendatory provision committed before its effectivity does not violate the constitutional provision on
ex post facto law. Further, the claim of petitioner that he cannot be suspended because he is presently occupying a
position different from that under which he is charged is untenable. The amendatory provision clearly states that any
incumbent public officer against whom any criminal prosecution under a valid information under Republic Act 3019 or
for any offense involving fraud upon the government or public funds or property whether as a simple or as a complex
offense and in whatever stage of execution and mode of participation, is pending in court, shall be suspended from
office. Thus, by the use of the word "office" the same applies to any office which the officer charged may be holding,
and not only the particular office under which he was charged. Bayot vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 61776 to 61861.
March 23, 1984

PEOPLE V FERRER December 27, 1972

Facts: Hon. Judge Simeon Ferrer is the Tarlac trial court judge that declared RA1700 or the Anti-Subversive Act of
1957 as a bill of attainder. Thus, dismissing the information of subversion against the following: 1.) Feliciano Co for
being an officer/leader of the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) aggravated by circumstances of contempt and
insult to public officers, subversion by a band and aid of armed men to afford impunity. 2.) Nilo Tayag and 5 others,
for being members/leaders of the NPA, inciting, instigating people to unite and overthrow the Philippine Government.
Attended by Aggravating Circumstances of Aid or Armed Men, Craft, and Fraud. The trial court is of opinion that 1.)
The Congress usurped the powers of the judge 2.) Assumed judicial magistracy by pronouncing the guilt of the CPP
without any forms of safeguard of a judicial trial. 3.) It created a presumption of organizational guilt by being
members of the CPP regardless of voluntariness.

The Anti Subversive Act of 1957 was approved 20June1957. It is an act to outlaw the CPP and similar associations
penalizing membership therein, and for other purposes. It defined the Communist Party being although a political
party is in fact an organized conspiracy to overthrow the Government, not only by force and violence but also by
deceit, subversion and other illegal means. It declares that the CPP is a clear and present danger to the security of the
Philippines. Section 4 provided that affiliation with full knowledge of the illegal acts of the CPP is punishable. Section 5
states that due investigation by a designated prosecutor by the Secretary of Justice be made prior to filing of
information in court. Section 6 provides for penalty for furnishing false evidence. Section 7 provides for 2 witnesses in
open court for acts penalized by prision mayor to death. Section 8 allows the renunciation of membership to the CCP
through writing under oath. Section 9 declares the constitutionality of the statute and its valid exercise under freedom
if thought, assembly and association.

Issues:

(1) Whether or not RA1700 is a bill of attainder/ ex post facto law.

(2) Whether or Not RA1700 violates freedom of expression.

Held:

The court holds the VALIDITY Of the Anti-Subversion Act of 1957.

A bill of attainder is solely a legislative act. It punishes without the benefit of the trial. It is the substitution of judicial
determination to a legislative determination of guilt. In order for a statute be measured as a bill of attainder, the
following requisites must be present: 1.) The statute specifies persons, groups. 2.) the statute is applied retroactively
and reach past conduct. (A bill of attainder relatively is also an ex post facto law.)

In the case at bar, the statute simply declares the CPP as an organized conspiracy for the overthrow of the
Government for purposes of example of SECTION 4 of the Act. The Act applies not only to the CPP but also to other
organizations having the same purpose and their successors. The Act’s focus is on the conduct not person.

Membership to this organizations, to be UNLAWFUL, it must be shown that membership was acquired with the intent
to further the goals of the organization by overt acts. This is the element of MEMBERSHIP with KNOWLEDGE that is
punishable. This is the required proof of a member’s direct participation. Why is membership punished. Membership
renders aid and encouragement to the organization. Membership makes himself party to its unlawful acts.

Furthermore, the statute is PROSPECTIVE in nature. Section 4 prohibits acts committed after approval of the act. The
members of the subversive organizations before the passing of this Act is given an opportunity to escape liability by
renouncing membership in accordance with Section 8. The statute applies the principle of mutatis mutandis or that
the necessary changes having been made.

The declaration of that the CPP is an organized conspiracy to overthrow the Philippine Government should not be the
basis of guilt. This declaration is only a basis of Section 4 of the Act. The EXISTENCE OF SUBSTANTIVE EVIL justifies
the limitation to the exercise of “Freedom of Expression and Association” in this matter. Before the enactment of the
statute and statements in the preamble, careful investigations by the Congress were done. The court further stresses
that whatever interest in freedom of speech and association is excluded in the prohibition of membership in the CPP
are weak considering NATIONAL SECURITY and PRESERVATION of DEMOCRACY.

The court set basic guidelines to be observed in the prosecution under RA1700. In addition to proving circumstances/
evidences of subversion, the following elements must also be established:

1. Subversive Organizations besides the CPP, it must be proven that the organization purpose is to overthrow the
present Government of the Philippines and establish a domination of a FOREIGN POWER. Membership is willfully and
knowingly done by overt acts.
2. In case of CPP, the continued pursuance of its subversive purpose. Membership is willfully and knowingly done by
overt acts.
The court did not make any judgment on the crimes of the accused under the Act. The Supreme Court set aside the
resolution of the TRIAL COURT.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILS. V. KATIGBAK DECEMBER 22, 1989

They concern mainly the character of R.A. No. 1379 as an ex-post facto law, principally because it imposes the
penalty of forfeiture on a public officer or employee acquiring properties allegedly in violation of said R.A. No. 1379 at
a time when that law had not yet been enacted. 13
Whatever persuasiveness might have been carried by the ruling on the issue of the learned Trial Judge in 1961, the
fact is that the nature of R.A. No. 1379 as penal was in 1962 clearly and categorically pronounced by this Court in
Cabal v. Kapunan, Jr. 14 Citing voluminous authorities, the Court in that case declared that "forfeiture to the State of
property of a public officer or employee which is manifestly out of proportion to his salary as such ... and his other
lawful income and the income from legitimately acquired property ... has been held ... to partake of the nature of a
penalty"; and that "proceedings for forfeiture of property although technically civil in form are deemed criminal or
penal, and, hence, the exemption of defendants in criminal cases from the obligation to be witnesses against,
themselves is applicable thereto.

The doctrine was reaffirmed and reiterated in 1971 in republic v. Agoncillo. 16 And germane is the 1977 ruling of the
Court in de la Cruz v. Better Living, Inc. 17 involving among others the issue of the validity and enforceability of a
written agreement alleged to be in violation of Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices-Act to the effect that "the provisions of said law cannot be given retroactive effect."

The forfeiture of property provided for in Republic Act No. 1379 being in the nature of a penalty; and it being
axiomatic that a law is ex-post facto which inter alia "makes criminal an act done before the passage of the law and
which was innocent when done, and punishes such an act," or, "assuming to regulate civil rights and remedies only, in
effect imposes a penalty or deprivation of a right for something which when done was lawful," it follows that penalty
of forfeiture prescribed by R.A. No. 1379 cannot be applied to acquisitions made prior to its passage without running
afoul of the Constitutional provision condemning ex post facto laws or bills of attainder. 18 But this is precisely what
has been done in the case of the Katigbaks. The Trial Court declared certain of their acquisitions in 1953, 1954 and
1955 to be illegal under R.A. No. 1379 although made prior to the enactment of the law, and imposed a lien thereon
"in favor of the Government in the sum of P100,000.00." Such a disposition is, quite obviously, constitutionally
impermissible.

As to the issue of whether or not the Prosecuting Fiscal, Leonardo Lucena, should be made answerable for damages
because the filing of the forfeiture proceedings, Civil Case No. 31080, resulted from a preliminary investigation which
was allegedly conducted by Fiscal Lucena in an arbitrary and highhanded manner, suffice it to state that the trial court
found no proof of any intention to persecute or other ill motive underlying the institution of Civil Case No. 31080. The
trial court further found that during the preliminary investigation by Fiscal Lucena on September 13, 19, 24, 25 and
26, 1956, Alejandro Katigbak was assisted by reputable and competent counsel, Atty. Estanislao A. Fernandez and
Atty. Antonio Carag. The mere fact that the preliminary investigation was terminated against the objection of
Katigbak's counsel, does not necessarily signify that he was denied the right to such an investigation. What is more,
the Trial Court's factual conclusion that no malice or bad faith attended the acts of public respondents complained of,
and consequently no award of damages is proper, cannot under established rule be reviewed by this Court absent any
showing of the existence of some recognized exception thereto.

WRIGHT V. CA August 15, 1994

FACT

To suppress crimes, Australia and the Government of the Philippines entered into a Treaty of Extradition on the 7th of
March 1988. It was ratified in accordance with the provisions of Section 21, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution in a
Resolution adopted by the Senate on September 10, 1990 and became effective 30 days after both States notified
each other in writing that the respective requirements for the entry into force of the Treaty have been complied
with. The Treaty adopts a "non-list, double criminality approach" which provides for broader coverage of extraditable
offenses between the 2 countries and embraces crimes punishable by imprisonment for at least 1 year. It also allows
extradition for crimes committed prior to the treaty's date of effectivity, provided that these crimes were in the statute
books of the requesting State at the time of their commission.

Under the Treaty, each contracting State agrees to extradite “persons wanted for prosecution of the imposition or
enforcement of a sentence in the Requesting State for an extraditable offense." A request for extradition requires, if
the person is accused of an offense, the furnishing by the requesting State of either a warrant for the arrest or a copy
of the warrant of arrest of the person, or, where appropriate, a copy of the relevant charge against the person sought
to be extradited.

The Treaty defined extraditable offenses to include all offenses "punishable under the Laws of both Contracting States
by imprisonment for a period of at least 1 year, or by a more severe penalty." For the purpose of the definition, the
Treaty states that:

(a) an offense shall be an extraditable offense whether or not the laws of the Contracting States place the offense
within the same category or denominate the offense by the same terminology;

(b) the totality of the acts or omissions alleged against the person whose extradition is requested shall be taken into
account in determining the constituent elements of the offense.

On March 17, 1993, Assistant Secretary Sime D. Hidalgo of the Department of Foreign Affairs indorsed to the
Department of Justice Diplomatic Note No. 080/93 dated February 19, 1993 from the Government of Australia to the
Department of Justice through Attorney General Michael Duffy seeking to indict Paul Joseph Wright, an Australian
Citizen for:

a. count of Obtaining Property by Deception contrary to Section 81(1) of the Victorian Crimes Act of 1958 because
he and Herbert Lance Orr's, dishonestly obtaining $315,250 from Mulcahy, Mendelson and Round Solicitors, secured
by a mortgage on the property in Bangholme, Victoria owned by Ruven Nominees Pty. Ltd., a company controlled by a
Rodney and a Mitchell, by falsely representing that all the relevant legal documents relating to the mortgage had been
signed by Rodney and Janine Mitchell

b. counts of Obtaining Properties by Deception contrary to Section 81(1) of the Victorian Crimes Act of 1958
because he and Mr. John Carson Craker's received approximately 11.2 in commission (including $367,044 in bonus
commission) via Amazon Bond Pty. Ltd., by submitting 215 false life insurance proposals, and paying premiums
thereon o the Australian Mutual Provident Society through the Office of Melbourne Mutual Insurance, where he is an
insurance agent

c. count of Attempting to Obtain Property by Deception contrary to Section 321(m) of the Victorian Crimes Act of
1958 because he and Mr. Craker's attempted to cause the payment of $2,870.68 commission to a bank account in the
name of Amazon Bond Pty. Ltd. by submitting 1 false proposal for Life Insurance to the AMP Society based on an
inexistent policy-holder

d. 1 count of Perjury contrary to Section 314 of Victorian Crimes Act of 1958 because he and Mr. Craker's signed
and swore before a Solicitor holding a current practicing certificate pursuant to the Legal Profession Practice Act
(1958), a Statutory Declaration attesting to the validity of 29 of the most recent Life Insurance proposals of AMP
Society and containing 3 false statements

In accordance to Section 5 of PD No. 1069 (September 10, 1990), an extradition proceedings was initiated on April 6,
1993 before the Regional Trial Court of Makati. The Regional Trial Court on June 14, 1993 granted the petition for
extradition requested by the Government of Australian concluding that the extradition could be granted irrespective of
when the offense was committed. The extradition proceeding resulted in an order of his deportation. The decision
was sustained and Motion for Reconsideration was denied by the Court of Appeals. Wright filed a review on certiorari
to set aside the order of deportation contending that the provision of the Treaty giving retroactive effect to the
extradition treaty amounts to an ex post facto law which violates Section 21 of Article VI of the
Constitution. Moreover, he argues that the trial court's decision ordering his extradition is based on evidence that
failed to show that he is wanted for prosecution in his country.

ISSUE

Whether or not such retroactive application is in violation of the Constitution for being an ex post facto law.

RULING

Calder vs. Bull concluded that the concept of ex post facto laws in our Constitution was limited only to penal and
criminal statutes which affects the substantial rights of the accused. As concluded by the Court of Appeals, the Treaty
is neither a piece of criminal legislation nor a criminal procedural statute. "It merely provides for the extradition of
persons wanted for prosecution of an offense or a crime which offense or crime was already committed or
consummated at the time the treaty was ratified."

LACSON V EXEC. SECRETARY JANUARY 20, 1999

FACT

Eleven persons believed to be members of the Kuratong Baleleng gang, an organized crime syndicate involved in bank
robberies, were slain by elements of the Anti-Bank Robbery andIntelligence Task Group (ABRITG). Among those
included in the ABRITG were petitioners and petitioner-intervenors.

Acting on a media expose of SPO2 Eduardo delos Reyes, a member of the Criminal Investigation Command, that what
actually transpired was a summary execution and not a shoot-out between the Kuratong Baleleng gang members and
the ABRITG, Ombudsman Aniano Desiertoformed a panel of investigators to investigate the said incident. Said panel
found the incident as a legitimate police operation. However, a review board modified the panel’s finding and
recommended the indictment for multiple murder against twenty-six respondents including herein petitioner, charged
as principal, and herein petitioner-intervenors, charged as accessories. After a reinvestigation, the Ombudsman filed
amended informations before the Sandiganbayan, where petitioner was charged only as an accessory.

The accused filed separate motions questioning the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, asserting that under the
amended informations, the cases fall within the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court pursuant to Section 2 of R.A.
7975. They contend that the said law limited the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan to cases where one or ore of the
“principal accused” are government officals with Salary Grade 27 or higher, or PNP officials with rank of Chief
Superintendent or higher. Thus, they did not qualify under said requisites. However, pending resolution of their
motions, R.A. 8249 was approved amending the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan by deleting the word “principal”
from the phrase “principal accused” in Section 2 of R.A. 7975.

Petitioner questions the constitutionality of Section 4 of R.A. 8249, including Section 7 which provides that the said
law shall apply to all cases pending in any court over which trial has not begun as of the approval hereof.

ISSUE

Whether or not said statute may be considered as an ex-post facto statute.

RULING

There is nothing ex post facto in R.A. 8249. Ex post facto law, generally, provides retroactive effect of penal laws. R.A.
8249 is not a penal law. It is a substantive law on jurisdiction which is not penal in character. Penal laws are those
acts of the Legislature which prohibit certain acts and establish penalties for their violations or those that define
crimes and provide for their punishment. R.A. 7975, as regards the Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction, its mode of appeal
and other procedural matters, has been declared by the Court as not a penal law, but clearly a procedural statute, one
which prescribes rules of procedure by which courts applying laws of all kinds can properly administer justice. Not
being a penal law, the retroactive application of R.A. 8249 cannot be challenged as unconstitutional.