PsychIncap Combined 1

10/18/2018 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 268
198 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Republic vs. Court of Appeals
*
G.R. No. 108763. February 13, 1997.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs.

COURT OF APPEALS and RORIDEL OLAVIANO
MOLINA, respondents.
Family Code; Marriage; Psychological incapacity must exist at

the time the marriage is celebrated.—In Leouel Santos vs. Court of
Appeals, this Court, speaking thru Mr. Justice Jose C. Vitug,
ruled that “psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a
mental (not physical) incapacity x x x and that (t)here is hardly
any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the
meaning of ‘psychological incapacity’ to the most serious cases of
personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter
insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the
marriage. This psychologic condition must exist at the time the
marriage is celebrated.” Citing Dr. Gerardo Veloso, a former
presiding judge of the Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal of the
Catholic Archdiocese of Manila, Justice Vitug wrote that “the
psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b)
juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability.”
Same; Same; Mere showing of “irreconcilable differences” and
“conflicting personalities” in no wise constitutes psychological
incapacity.—On the other hand, in the present case, there is no
clear showing to us that the psychological defect spoken of is an
incapacity. It appears to us to be more of a “difficulty,” if not
outright “refusal” or “neglect” in the performance of some marital
obligations. Mere showing of “irreconcilable differences” and
“conflicting personalities” in no wise constitutes psychological
incapacity. It is not enough to prove that the parties failed to meet
their responsibilities and duties as married persons; it is essential
that they must be shown to be incapable of doing so, due to some
psychological (not physical) illness.
Same; Same.—The evidence adduced by respondent merely
showed that she and her husband could not get along with each
other. There had been no showing of the gravity of the problem;
neither its juridical antecedence nor its incurability. The expert
http://central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/000001668498e8defc3e7766003600fb002c009e/t/?o=False 1/31
____________________________
* EN BANC.
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VOL. 268, FEBRUARY 13, 1997 199
testimony of Dr. Sison showed no incurable psychiatric disorder

but only incompatibility, not psychological incapacity.
Same; Same; Guidelines in the interpretation and application
of Art. 36 of the Family Code.—From their submissions and the
Court’s own deliberations, the following guidelines in the
interpretation and application of Art. 36 of the Family Code are
hereby handed down for the guidance of the bench and the bar: (1)
The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to
the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the
existence and continuation of the marriage and against its
dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our
Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and
unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire
Article on the Family, recognizing it “as the foundation of the
nation.” It decrees marriage as legally “inviolable,” thereby
protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the
family and marriage are to be “protected” by the state.
Same; Same; Root cause of psychological incapacity must be
identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature
fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified
psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.—The root cause of the
psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or clinically
identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by
experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the
Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological—
not physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may
be physical. The evidence must convince the court that the
parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such an
extent that the person could not have known the obligations he
was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid
assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need
be given here so as not to limit the application of the provision
under the principle of ejusdem generis, nevertheless such root
cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its
incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be

given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.
Same; Same; The incapacity must be proven to be existing at
“the time of the celebration” of the marriage.—The incapacity must
be proven to be existing at “the time of the celebration” of the
marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was existing
when the parties exchanged their “I do’s.” The manifestation of
the illness
200
need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must
have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
Same; Same; Such incapacity must be shown to be medically
or clinically permanent or incurable.—Such incapacity must also
be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable.
Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard
to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of
the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to
the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those
not related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or
employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in
diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to cure
them but may not be psychologically capacitated to procreate,
bear and raise his/her own children as an essential obligation of
marriage.
Same; Same; Such illness must be grave enough to bring
about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations
of marriage.—Such illness must be grave enough to bring about
the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of
marriage. Thus, “mild characteriological peculiarities, mood
changes, occasional emotional outbursts” cannot be accepted as
root causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or
inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In
other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in
the person, an adverse integral element in the personality
structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really
accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to
marriage.
Same; Same; Non-complied marital obligation(s) must be
stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text
of the decision.—The essential marital obligations must be those

embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards
the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the
same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-
complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition,
proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision.
Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial
Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not
controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our
courts. It is clear that Article 36 was taken by the Family Code
Revision Committee from Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon
Law, which became effective in 1983 and which provides: “The
following are incapable of contracting mar-
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VOL. 268, FEBRUARY 13, 1997 201
riage: Those who are unable to assume the essential obligations of

marriage due to causes of psychological nature.”
Same; Same; Trial court must order the prosecuting attorney
or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the
state.—The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or
fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state.
No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General
issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly
stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the
case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along with the
prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such certification
within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed
submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall
discharge the equivalent function of the defensor vinculi
contemplated under Canon 1095.
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the

Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

The Solicitor General for petitioner.
Juanito A. Orallo for respondent.
Oscar V. Cruz and Ricardo C. Puno amici curiae.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
The Family Code of the Philippines provides an entirely

new ground (in addition to those enumerated in the Civil
Code) to assail the validity of a marriage, namely,
“psychoogical incapacity.” Since the Code’s effectivity, our
courts have been swamped with various petitions to declare
marriages void based on this ground. Although this Court
had interpreted the meaning of psychological incapacity in
the recent case of Santos vs. Court of Appeals, still many
judges and lawyers find difficulty in applying said novel
provision in specific cases. In the present case and in the
context of the herein assailed Decision of the Court of
Appeals, the Solicitor General has labelled—exaggerated to
be sure but nonetheless expressive of his frustration—
Article 36 as the “most liberal divorce procedure in the
world.” Hence, this Court in
202

addition to resolving the present case, finds the need to lay

down specific guidelines in the interpretation and
application of Article 36 of the Family Code.
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari1 under
Rule 45 challenging
2
the January 25, 1993 Decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 34858 affirming in
toto the May 14,3 1991 decision of the Regional Trial Court
of La Trinidad, Benguet, which declared the marriage of
respondent Roridel Olaviano Molina to Reynaldo Molina
void ab initio, on the ground of “psychological incapacity”
under Article 36 of the Family Code.
The Facts
This case was commenced on August 16, 1990 with the

filing by respondent Roridel O. Molina of a verified petition
for declaration of nullity of her marriage to Reynaldo
Molina. Essentially, the petition alleged that Roridel and
Reynaldo were 4 married on April 14, 1985 at the San
Agustin Church in Manila; that a son, Andre O. Molina
was born; that after a year of marriage, Reynaldo showed
signs of “immaturity and irresponsibility” as a husband
and a father since he preferred to spend more time with his
peers and friends on whom he squandered his money; that
he depended on his parents for aid and assistance, and was
never honest with his wife in regard to their finances,
resulting in frequent quarrels between them; that

sometime in February 1986, Reynaldo was relieved of his
job in Manila, and since then Roridel had been the sole
breadwinner of the family; that in October 1986 the couple
had a very intense quarrel, as a result of which their
relationship was estranged; that in March 1987, Roridel
resigned from her job in Manila and went to live with her
par-
____________________________
1 Rollo pp. 25-3.

2 Sixteenth Division composed of J. Segundino G. Chua, ponente and
chairman; JJ. Serafin V.C. Guingona and Ricardo P. Galvez, concurring.
3 Presided by Judge Heilia S. Mallare-hillipps.
4 Solemnized by Fr. Jesus G. Encinas.
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VOL. 268, FEBRUARY 13, 1997 203

ents in Baguio City; that a few weeks later, Reynaldo left

Roridel and their child, and had since then abandoned
them; that Reynaldo had thus shown that he was
psychologically incapable of complying with essential
marital obligations and was a highly immature and
habitually quarrelsome individual who thought of himself
as a king to be served; and that it would be to the couple’s
best interest to have their marriage declared null and void
in order to free them from what appeared to be an
incompatible marriage from the start.
In his Answer filed on August 28, 1989, Reynaldo
admitted that he and Roridel could no longer live together
as husband and wife, but contended that their
misunderstandings and frequent quarrels were due to: (1)
Roridel’s strange behavior of insisting on maintaining her
group of friends even after their marriage; (2) Roridel’s
refusal to perform some of her marital duties such as
cooking meals; and (3) Roridel’s failure to run the
household and handle their finances.
During the pre-trial on October 17, 1990, the following
were stipulated:
“1. That the parties herein were legally married on

April 14, 1985 at the Church of St. Augustine,
Manila;
2. That out of their marriage, a child named Albert

Andre Olaviano Molina was born on July 29, 1986;
3. That the parties are separated-in-fact for more than
three years;
4. That petitioner is not asking support for her and
her child;
5. That the respondent is not asking for damages;
6. That the common child of the parties is in the
custody of the petitioner wife.”
Evidence for herein respondent wife consisted of her own

testimony and that of her friends Rosemarie Ventura and
Maria Leonora Padilla as well as of Ruth G. Lalas, a social
worker, and of Dr. Teresita Hidalgo-Sison, a psychiatrist of
the Baguio General Hospital and Medical Center. She also
submitted documents marked as Exhibits “A” to “E-1.”
Reynaldo did not present any evidence as he appeared only
during the pre-trial conference.
204

On May 14, 1991, the trial court rendered judgment

declaring the marriage void. The appeal of petitioner was
denied by the Court of Appeals which affirmed in toto the
RTC’s decision. Hence, the present recourse.
The Issue
In his petition, the Solicitor General insists that “the Court

of Appeals made an erroneous and incorrect interpretation
of the phrase ‘psychological incapacity’ (as provided under
Art. 36 of the Family Code) and made an incorrect
application thereof to the facts of the case,” adding that the
appealed Decision tended “to establish in effect the most
liberal divorce procedure in the world which is anathema to
our culture.”
In denying the Solicitor 5
General’s appeal, the
respondent Court relied heavily on the trial court’s
findings “that the
____________________________
5 The Court of Appeals reproduced in its Decision a substantial portion

of the RTC Decision as follows:
“To sustain her claim that respondent is psychologically incapacitated to comply

with his marital obligations, petitioner testified that he is immature, irresponsible,
dependent, disrespectful, arrogant, a chronic liar, and an infidel. These
characteristics of respondent are based on petitioner’s testimony that the former
failed to be gainfully employed after he was relieved from the Office of the
Government Corporate Counsel sometime in February, 1986, leaving petitioner as
the sole breadwinner of the family. Also when they were separated in fact,
respondent practically abandoned both petitioner-mother and son except during
the first few months of separation when respondent regularly visited his son and
gave him a monthly allowance of P1,000.00 for about two to four months.
Respondent is likewise dependent on his parents for financial aid and support as
he has no savings, preferring to spend his money with his friends and peers. A
year after their marriage, respondent informed petitioner that he bought a house
and lot at BF Homes, Parañaque for about a million pesos. They then transferred
there only for the petitioner to discover a few months later that they were actually
renting the house with the respondent’s parents responsible for the payment of the
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VOL. 268, FEBRUARY 13, 1997 205

marriage between the parties broke up because of their

opposing and conflicting personalities.” Then, it added its
own
____________________________
rentals. Aside from this, respondent would also lie about his salary and ability.
And that at present, respondent is living with his mistress and their child, which
fact he does not deny.
It is unfortunate that the marriage between petitioner and respondent turned
sour if we look at the background of their relationship. During their college days,
when they were still going steady, respondent observed petitioner to be
conservative, homely, and intelligent causing him to believe then that she would
make an ideal wife and mother. Likewise, petitioner fell in love with respondent
because of his thoughtfulness and gentleness. After a year, however, they decided
to break their relationship because of some differences in their personalities.
Almost five (5) years later, while they were working in Manila, petitioner and
respondent rekindled their love affair. They became very close and petitioner was
glad to observe a more mature respondent. Believing that they know each other
much better after two years of going steady, they decided to settle down and get
married. It would seem, therefore, that petitioner and respondent knew each other
well and were then prepared for married life.
During their marriage, however, the true personalities of the parties cropped-
up and dominated their life together. Unexpectedly on both their parts, petitioner
and respondent failed to respond properly to the situation. This failure resulted in
their frequent arguments and fightings. In fact, even with the intervention and
help of their parents who arranged for their possible reconciliation, the parties
could not come to terms.
It seems clear at this stage that the marriage between the parties broke-up
because of their opposing and conflicting personalties (sic). Neither of them can
accept and understand the weakness of the other. No one gives in and instead,
blame each other for whatever problem or misunderstanding/s they encounter. In
fine, respondent cannot be solely responsible for the failure of other (sic) marriage.
Rather, this resulted because both parties cannot relate to each other as husband
and wife which is unique and requisite in marriage.
Marriage is a special contract of permanent union between a man and a woman
with the basic objective of establishing a conjugal and family life. (Article 1,
Family Code). The
206

opinion that “the Civil Code Revision Committee

(hereinafter referred to as the Committee) intended to
liberalize the application of our civil laws on personal and
family rights x x x.” It concluded that:
“As a ground for annulment of marriage, We view psychological

incapacity as a broad range of mental and behavioral conduct on
the part of one spouse indicative of how he or she regards the
marital union, his or her personal relationship with the other
spouse, as well as his or her conduct in the long haul for the
attainment of the principal objectives of marriage. If said conduct,
observed and considered as a whole, tends to cause the union to
self-destruct because it defeats the very objectives of marriage,
then there is enough reason to leave the spouses to their
individual fates.
In the case at bar, We find that the trial judge committed no
indiscretion in analyzing and deciding the instant case, as it did,
hence, We find no cogent reason to disturb the findings and
conclusions thus made.”
Respondent, in her Memorandum, adopts these discussions

of the Court of Appeals.
The petitioner, on the other hand, argues that “opposing
and conflicting personalities” is not equivalent to
psychological incapacity, explaining that such ground “is
not simply the neglect by the parties to the marriage of
their responsibilities and duties, but a defect in their
psychological nature which
____________________________
unique element of permanency of union signifies a continuing, developing, and

lifelong relationship between the parties. Towards this end, the parties must fully
understand and accept the (implications and consequences of being permanently)
united in marriage. And the maintenance of this relationship demands from the
parties, among others, determination to succeed in their marriage as well as
heartfelt understanding, acceptance, cooperation, and support for each other.
Thus, the Family Code requires them to live together, to observe mutual (love,
respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and support. Failure to observe) and
perform these fundamental roles of a husband and a wife will most likely lead to
the break-up of the marriage. Such is the unfortunate situation in this case.”
(Decision, pp. 5-8; Original Records, pp. 70-73)
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VOL. 268, FEBRUARY 13, 1997 207

renders them incapable of performing such marital

responsibilities and duties.”
The Court’s Ruling
The petition is meritorious. 6

In Leouel Santos vs. Court of Appeals, this Court,
speaking thru Mr. Justice Jose C. Vitug, ruled that
“psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a
mental (not physical) incapacity x x x and that (t)here is
hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been
to confine the meaning of ‘psychological incapacity’ to the
most serious cases of personality disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give
meaning and significance to the marriage. This psychologic
condition must exist at the time the marriage is
celebrated.” Citing Dr. Gerardo Veloso, a former presiding
judge of the Metropolitan Marriage7
Tribunal of the
Catholic Archdiocese of Manila, Justice Vitug wrote that
“the psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a)
gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability.”
On the other hand, in the present case, there is no clear
showing to us that the psychological defect spoken of is an
incapacity. It appears to us to be more of a “difficulty,” if
not outright “refusal” or “neglect” in the performance of
some marital obligations. Mere showing of “irreconcilable
differences” and “conflicting personalities” in no wise
constitutes psychological incapacity. It is not enough to
prove that the parties failed to meet their responsibilities
and duties as married persons; it is essential that they
must be shown to be incapable of doing so, due to some

psychological (not physical) illness.
The evidence adduced by respondent merely showed
that she and her husband could not get along with each
other. There had been no showing of the gravity of the
problem;
____________________________
6 240 SCRA 20, 34, January 4, 1995.

7 Quoted from Justice Alicia Sempio-Diy, Handbook on the Family
Code, First Edition, 1988.
208

neither its juridicial antecedence nor its incurability. The

expert testimony of Dr. Sison showed no incurable
psychiatric disorder but only incompatibility, 8
not
psychological incapacity. Dr. Sison testified:
“COURT
Q It is therefore the recommendation of the psychiatrist
based on your findings that it is better for the Court to
annul (sic) the marriage?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q There is no hope for the marriage?
A There is no hope, the man is also living with another
woman.
Q Is it also the stand of the psychiatrist that the parties
are psychologically unfit for each other but they are
psycho logically fit with other parties?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q Neither are they psychologically unfit for their
professions?
A Yes, Your Honor.
The Court has no more questions.”
In the case of Reynaldo, there is no showing that his

alleged personality traits were constitutive of psychological
incapacity existing at the time of marriage celebration.
While some effort was made to prove that there was a
failure to fulfill pre-nuptial impressions of “thoughtfulness
and gentleness” on Reynaldo’s part and of being

“conservative, homely and intelligent” on the part of
Roridel, such failure of expectation is not indicative of
antecedent psychological incapacity. If at all, it merely
shows love’s temporary blindness to the faults and
blemishes of the beloved.
During its deliberations, the Court decided to go beyond
merely ruling on the facts of this case vis-a-vis existing law
and jurisprudence. In view of the novelty of Art. 36 of the
Family Code and the difficulty experienced by many trial
courts in interpreting and applying it, the Court decided to
invite two amici curiae, namely, the Most Reverend Oscar
V.
____________________________
8 TSN, April 6, 1991, p. 5.
209
VOL. 268, FEBRUARY 13, 1997 209

9
Cruz, Vicar Judicial (Presiding Judge) of the National
Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic 10
Church in
the Philippines, and Justice Ricardo C. Puno, a member of
the Family Code Revision Committee. The Court takes this
occasion to thank these friends of the Court for their
informative and interesting discussions during the oral
argument on December 3, 1996, which they followed up
with written memoranda.
From their submissions and the Court’s own
deliberations, the following guidelines in the interpretation
and application of Art. 36 of the Family Code are hereby
handed down for the guidance of the bench and the bar:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the

marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should
be resolved in favor of the existence and
continuation of the marriage and against its
dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact
that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the
validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus,
our Constitution
11
devotes an entire Article on the
Family, recognizing it “as
____________________________
9 The National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal reviews all decisions of

the marriage tribunals of each archdiocese or diocese in the country. Aside
from heading the Appellate Tribunal, Most Rev. Cruz is also incumbent
president of the Catholic Bishops’ Conference of the Philippines,
Archbishop of Dagupan-Lingayen, and holds the degrees of Doctor of
Canon Law and Doctor of Divinity. Archbishop Cruz was also Secretary-
General of the Second Plenary Council of the Philippines—PCP II—held
from January 20, 1991 to February 17, 1991, which is the rough
equivalent of a parliament or a constitutional convention in the Philippine
Church, and where the ponente, who was a Council member, had the
privilege of being overwhelmed by his keen mind and prayerful
discernments.
10 Justice Puno was a former member of the Court of Appeals, retired
Minister of Justice, author, noted civil law professor and law practitioner.
11
“Article XV
THE FAMILY
Section 1. The State recognizes the Filipino Family as the foundation of the
nation. Accordingly, it shall strengthen its solidarity and actively promote its total
development.
210

the foundation of the nation.” It decrees marriage

as legally “inviolable,” thereby protecting it from
dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the
family and marriage are to be “protected” by the
state.
12
The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on
marriage and the family and emphasizes their permanence,
inviolability and solidarity.
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must

be: (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged
in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts
and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36
of the Family Code requires that the incapacity
must be psychological—not physical, although its
manifestations and/or symptoms may be physiccal.
The evidence must convince the court that the
parties, or
____________________________
Section 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the

family and shall be protected by the state.
Section 3. The State shall defend:
(1) The right of spouses to found a family in accordance with their religious
convictions and the demands of responsible parenthood;
(2) The right of children to assistance, including proper care and nutrition,
and special protection from all forms of neglect, abuse, cruelty,
exploitation, and other conditions prejudicial to their development;
(3) The right of the family to a family living wage and income;
(4) The right of families or family associations to participate in the planning
and implementation of policies and programs that affect them.
Section 4. The family has the duty to care for its elderly members but the state
may also do so through just programs of social security.”
12 “Art. 1. Marriage is a special contract of permanent union between a

man and a woman entered into in accordance with law for the
establishment of conjugal and family life. It is the foundation of the family
and an inviolable social institution whose nature, consequences, and
incidents are governed by law and not subject to stipulation, except that
marriage settlements may fix the property relations during the marriage
within the limits provided by this Code.”
211
VOL. 268, FEBRUARY 13, 1997 211

one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such

an extent that the person could not have known the
obligations he was assuming, or knowing them,
could not have given valid assumption thereof.
Although no example of such incapacity need be
given here so as not to limit the application of the13
provision under the principle of ejusdem generis,
nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a
psychological illness and its incapacitating nature
fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by
qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at “the
time of the celebration” of the marriage. The
evidence must show that the illness was existing
when the parties exchanged their “I do’s.” The
manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable
at such time, but the illness itself must have
attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically

or clinically permanent or incurable. Such
incurability may be absolute or even relative only in
regard to the other spouse, not necessarily
absolutely against everyone of the same sex.
Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to
the assumption of marriage obligations, not
necessarily to those not related to marriage, like
the exercise of a profession or employment in a job.
Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing
illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to
cure them but may not be psychologically
capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own
children as an essential obligation of marriage.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about
the disability of the party to assume the essential
obligations of marriage. Thus, “mild
characteriological peculiarities, mood changes,
occasional emotional outbursts” cannot be accepted
as root causes. The illness must be shown as
downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal,
neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other
words, there is a natal or supervening disabling
factor in the person, an adverse integral element in
____________________________
13 Salita vs. Magtolis, 233 SCRA 100, June 13, 1994.
212

the personality structure that effectively

incapacitates the person from really accepting and
thereby complying with the obligations essential to
marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those
embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family
Code as regards the husband and wife as well as
Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in
regard to parents and their children. Such non-
complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated
in the petition, proven by evidence and included in
the text of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate

Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the
Philippines, while not controlling or decisive,
should be given great respect by our courts. It is
clear that Article 36 was taken by the Family Code
Revision Committee from Canon 1095 of the New
Code of Canon Law, which became effective in 1983
and which provides:
“The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who

are unable to assume the essential
14
obligations of marriage due to
causes of psychological nature.”
Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family

Code is to harmonize our civil laws with the religious faith
of our people, it stands to reason that to achieve such
harmonization, great persuasive weight should be given to
decisions of such appellate tribunal. Ideally—subject to our
law on evi-
____________________________
14 This text is taken from the Memorandum of Archbishop Cruz. On the

other hand, the text used in Santos vs. CA reads:
“Canon 1095. They are incapable of contracting marriage:

x x x x x x x x x
3. Who for causes of psychological nature are unable to assume the essential
obligations of marriage.”
The difference in wording between this and that in Arch. Cruz’s Memorandum
is due to the fact that the original Canon is written in Latin and both versions are
differently-worded English translations.
213
VOL. 268, FEBRUARY 13, 1997 213

dence—what is decreed as canonically invalid should also

be decreed civilly void.
This is one instance where, in view of the evident source
and purpose of the Family Code provision,
contemporaneous religious interpretation is to be given
persuasive effect. Here, the State and the Church—while
remaining independent, separate and apart from each
other—shall walk together in synodal cadence towards the
same goal of protecting and cherishing marriage and the
family as the inviolable base of the nation.
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney

or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as
counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed
down unless the Solicitor General issues a
certification, which will be quoted in the decision,
briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement
or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition.
The Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting
attorney, shall submit to the court such certification
within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is
deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The
Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent
function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under
Canon 1095.
In the instant case and applying Leouel Santos, we have

already ruled to grant the petition. Such ruling becomes
even more cogent with the use of the foregoing guidelines.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed
Decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The marriage of
Roridel Olaviano to Reynaldo Molina subsists and remains
valid.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa (C.J.), Davide, Jr., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno,

Francisco, Hermosisima, Jr. and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.
Padilla, J., See Separate Statement.
Regalado, Kapunan and Mendoza, JJ., In the
result.
Romero, J., Please see my separate opinion.
Vitug, J., Please see concurring opinion.
214

SEPARATE STATEMENT
PADILLA, J.:
I concur in the result of the decision penned by Mr. Justice

Panganiban but only because of the peculiar facts of the
case. As to whether or not psychological incapacity exists in
a given case calling for annulment of a marriage, depends
crucially, more than in any field of the law, on the facts of
the case. In Leouel Santos v. Court of Appeals and Julia

Rosario-Bedia Santos, G.R. No. 112019, 4 January 1995,
240 SCRA 20-36, I maintained, and I still maintain, that
there was psychological incapacity on the part of the wife to
discharge the duties of a wife in a valid marriage. The facts
of the present case, after an indepth study, do not support a
similar conclusion. Obviously, each case must be judged,
not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or
generalizations but according to its own facts. In the field
of psychological incapacity as a ground for annulment of
marriage, it is trite to say that no case is on “all fours” with
another case. The trial judge must take pains in examining
the factual millieu and the appellate court must, as much
as possible, avoid substituting its own judgment for that of
the trial court.
SEPARATE OPINION
ROMERO, J.:
The majority opinion, overturning that of the Court of

Appeals which affirmed the Regional Trial Court ruling,
upheld petitioner Solicitor General’s position that
“opposing and conflicting personalities” is not equivalent to
psychological incapacity, for the latter “is not simply the
neglect by the parties to the marriage of their
responsibilities and duties, but a defect in their
psychological nature which renders them incapable of
performing such marital responsibilities and duties.”
In the present case, the alleged personality traits of
Reynaldo, the husband, did not constitute so much
“psychological incapacity” as a “difficulty,” if not outright
“refusal” or “neg-
215
VOL. 268, FEBRUARY 13, 1997 215

lect” in the performance of some marital obligations. “it is

not enough to prove that the parties failed to meet their
responsibilities and duties as married persons; it is
essential that they must be shown to be incapable of doing
so, due to some psychological (not physical) illness.”
I would add that neither should the incapacity be the
result of mental illness. For if it were due to insanity or
defects in the mental faculties short of insanity, there is a
resultant defect or vice of consent, thus rendering the

marriage annullable under Art. 45 of the Family Code.
That the intent of the members of the U.P. Law Center’s
Civil Code Revision Committee was to exclude mental
inability to understand the essential nature of marriage
and focus strictly on psychological incapacity is
demonstrated in the way the provision in question
underwent revisions.
At the Committee meeting of July 26, 1986, the draft
provision read:
“(7) Those marriages contracted by any party who, at the time of

the celebration, was wanting in the sufficient use of reason or
judgment to understand the essential nature of marriage or was
psychologically or mentally incapacitated to discharge the
essential marital obligations, even if such lack of incapacity is
made manifest after the celebration.”
The twists and turns which the ensuing discussion took

finally produced the following revised provision even before
the session was over:
“(7) That contracted by any party who, at the time of the

celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to discharge the
essential marital obligations, even if such lack or incapacity
becomes manifest after the celebration.”
Noticeably, the immediately preceding formulation above

has dropped any reference to “wanting in the sufficient use
of reason or judgment to understand the essential nature
or marriage” and to “mentally incapacitated.” It was
explained that these phrases refer to “defects in the mental
faculties vitiating consent, which is not the idea . . . but
lack of appre-
216

ciation of one’s marital obligation.” There being a defect in

consent, “it is clear that it should be a ground for viodable
marriage because there is the appearance of consent and it
is capable of convalidation for the simple reason that there
are lucid intervals and there are cases when the insanity is
curable . . . . Psychological incapacity does not refer to
mental faculties and has nothing to do with 1
consent; it
refers to obligations attendant to marriage.”
My own position as a member of the Committee then

was that psychological incapacity is, in a sense, insanity of
a lesser degree.
As to the proposal of Justice Caguioa to use the term
“psychological or mental impotence,” Archbishop Oscar
Cruz opined in the earlier February 9, 1984 session that
this term “is an invention of some churchmen who are
moralists but not canonists, that is why it is considered a
weak phrase.” He said that the Code of Canon Law would
rather express it as “psychological or mental incapacity to
discharge . . . .” Justice Ricardo C. Puno opined that
sometimes a person may be psychologically impotent with
one but not with another.
One of the guidelines enumerated in the majority
opinion for the interpretation and application of Art. 36 is:
“Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or
clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be
absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse,
not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same
sex.”
The Committee, through Prof. Araceli T. Barrera,
considered the inclusion of the phrase “and is incurable”
but Prof. Esteban B. Bautista commented that this would
give rise to the question of how they will determine
curability and Justice Caguioa agreed that it would be
more problematic. Yet the possibility that one may be cured
after the psychological incapacity becomes manifest after
the marriage was not ruled out by Justice Puno and Justice
Alice Sempio-Diy. Justice
____________________________
1 Justice Caguioa’s explanation in the Minutes of July 26, 1986 of the

Civil Code Revision Committee of the U.P. Law Center.
217
VOL. 268, FEBRUARY 13, 1997 217

Caguioa suggested that the remedy was to allow the

afflicted spouse to remarry.
For clarity, the Committee classified the bases for
determining void marriages, viz:
1. lack of one or more of the essential requisites of

marriage as contract;
2. reasons of public policy;
3. special cases and special situations.
The ground of psychological incapacity was subsumed

under “special cases and special situations,” hence its
special treatment in Art. 36 in the Family Code as finally
enacted.
Nowhere in the Civil Code provisions on Marriage is
there a ground for avoiding or annulling marriages that
even comes close to being psychological in nature.
Where consent is vitiated due to circumstances existing
at the time of the marriage, such marriage which stands
valid until annulled is capable of ratification or
convalidation.
On the other hand, for reasons of public policy or lack of
essential requisites, some marriages are void from the
beginning.
With the revision of Book I of the Civil Code,
particularly the provisions on Marriage, the drafters, now
open to fresh winds of change in keeping with the more
permissive mores and practices of the time, took a leaf from
the relatively liberal provisions of Canon Law.
Canon 1095 which states, inter alia, that the following
persons are incapable of contracting marriage: “3. (those)
who, because of causes of a psychological nature, are
unable to assume the essential obligations of marriage”
provided the model for what is now Art. 36 of the Family
Code: “A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time
of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to
comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage,
shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes
manifest only after its solemnization.
218

It bears stressing that unlike in Civil Law, Canon Law

recognizes only two types of marriages with respect to their
validity: valid and void. Civil Law, however, recognizes an
intermediate state, the voidable or annullable marriages.
When the Ecclesiastical Tribunal “annuls” a marriage, it
actually declares the marriage null and void, i.e., it never
really existed in the first place, for a valid sacramental
marriage can never be dissolved. Hence, a properly
performed and consummated marriage between two living
Roman Catholics can only be nullified by the formal
annulment process which entails a full tribunal procedure

with a Court selection and a formal hearing.
Such so-called church “annulments” are not recognized
by Civil Law as severing the marriage ties as to capacitate
the parties to enter lawfully into another marriage. The
grounds for nullifying civil marriage, not being congruent
with those laid down by Canon Law, the former being more
strict, quite a number of married couples have found
themselves in limbo—freed from the marriage bonds in the
eyes of the Catholic Church but yet unable to contract a
valid civil marriage under state laws. Heedless of civil law
sanctions, some persons contract new marriages or enter
into live-in relationships.
It was precisely to provide a satisfactory solution to such
anomalous situations that the Civil Law Revision
Committee decided to engraft the Canon Law concept of
psychological incapacity into the Family Code—and
classified the same as a ground for declaring marriages
void ab initio or totally inexistent from the beginning.
A brief historical note on the Old Canon Law (1917).
This Old Code, while it did not provide directly for
psychological incapacity, in effect recognized the same
indirectly from a combination of three old canons: “Canon
#1081 required persons to be ‘capable according to law’ in
order to give valid consent: Canon #1082 required that
persons ‘be at least not ignorant of the major elements
required in marriage; and Canon #1087 (the force and fear
category) required that internal and external freedom be
present in order for consent to be valid. This line of
interpretation produced two distinct but
219
VOL. 268, FEBRUARY 13, 1997 219

related grounds for annulment, called ‘lack of due

discretion’ and lack of due competence.’ Lack of due
discretion means that the person did not have the ability to
give valid consent at the time of the wedding and therefore
the union is invalid. Lack of due competence means that
the person was incapable of carrying out the obligations of
the promise he or she made during the wedding ceremony.
“Favorable annulment decisions by the Roman Rota in
the 1950s and 1960s involving sexual disorders such as
homosexuality and nymphomania laid the foundation for a
broader approach to the kind of proof necessary for
psychological grounds for annulment. The Rota had
reasoned for the first time in several cases that the

capacity to give valid consent at the time of marriage was
probably not present in persons who had displayed such
problems shortly after the marriage. The nature of this
change was nothing short of revolutionary. Once the Rota
itself had demonstrated a cautious willingness to use this
kind of hindsight, the way was paved for what came after
1970. Diocesan Tribunals began to accept proof of serious
psychological problems that manifested themselves shortly
after the ceremony as proof of an inability to give valid
consent at the time of the ceremony.
Furthermore, and equally significant, the professional
opinion of a psychological expert became increasingly
important in such cases. Data about the person’s entire life,
both before and after the ceremony, were presented to these
experts and they were asked to give professional opinions
about a party’s mental capacity at the time of the wedding.
These opinions were rarely challenged and tended to be
accepted as decisive evidence of lack of valid consent.
The Church took pains to point out that its new
openness in this area did not amount to the addition of new
grounds for annulment, but rather was an accommodation
by the Church to the advances made in psychology during
the past decades. There was now the expertise to provide the
all–important connecting link between a marriage
breakdown and premarital causes.
220

During the 1970s, the Church broadened its whole idea of

marriage from that of a legal contract to that of a covenant.
The result of this was that it could no longer be assumed in
annulment cases that a person who could intellectually
understand the concept of marriage could necessarily give
valid consent to marry. The ability to both grasp and
assume the real obligations of a mature, lifelong
commitment are now considered2
a necessary prerequisite to
valid matrimonial consent.”
Rotal decisions continued applying the concept of
incipient psychological incapacity, “not only to sexual
anomalies but to all kinds of personality disorders that
incapacitate a spouse or both spouses from assuming or
carrying out the essential obligations of marriage. For
marriage . . . is not merely cohabitation or the right of the
spouses to each other’s body for heterosexual acts, but is, in
its totality, the right to the community of the whole of life,

i.e., the right to a developing, lifelong relationship. Rotal
decisions since 1973 have refined the meaning of
psychological or psychic capacity for marriage as
presupposing the development of an adult personality; as
meaning the capacity of the spouses to give themselves to
each other and to accept the other as a distinct person; that
the spouses must be `other oriented’ since the obligations of
marriage are rooted in a self–giving love; and that the
spouses must have the capacity for interpersonal
relationship because marriage is more than just a physical
reality but involves a true intertwining of personalities.
The fulfillment of the obligations of marriage depends,
according to Church decisions, on the strength of this
interpersonal relationship. A serious incapacity for
interpersonal sharing and support is held to impair the
relationship and consequently, the ability to fulfill the
essential marital obligations. The marital capacity of one
spouse is not considered in isolation but in reference
3
to the
fundamental relationship to the other spouse.
____________________________
2 Zwack, Joseph P., Annulment, A Step-by-Step Guide.

3 The Code of Canon Law, A Text and Commentary, The Canon Law
Society of America, Paulist Press, New York, 1985.
221
VOL. 268, FEBRUARY 13, 1997 221

Fr. Green, in an article in Catholic Mind, lists six elements

necessary to the mature marital relationship:
“The courts consider the following elements crucial to the marital

commitment: (1) a permanent and faithful commitment to the
marriage partner; (2) openness to children and partner; (3)
stability; (4) emotional maturity; (5) financial responsibility; (6)
an ability to cope with the ordinary stresses and strains of
marriage, etc.”
Fr. Green goes on to speak about some of the psychological
conditions that might lead to the failure of a marriage:
“At stake is a type of constitutional impairment precluding
conjugal communion even with the best intentions of the parties.
Among the psychic factors possibly giving rise to his or her
inability to fulfill marital obligations are the following: (1)
antisocial personality with its fundamental lack of loyalty to
persons or sense of moral values; (2) hyperesthesia, where the

individual has no real freedom of sexual choice; (3) the inadequate
personality where personal responses consistently fall short of
reasonable expectations.
x x x x x x x x x
The psychological grounds are the best approach for anyone
who doubts whether he or she has a case for an annulment on any
other terms. A situation that does not fit into any of the more
traditional categories often fits very easily into the psychological
category.
As new as the psychological grounds are, experts are already
detecting a shift in their use. Whereas originally the emphasis
was on the parties’ inability to exercise proper judgment at the
time of the marriage (lack of due discretion), recent cases seem to
be concentrating on the parties’ incapacity to assume or carry out
their responsibilities and obligations as promised (lack of due
competence). An advantage to using the ground of lack of due
competence is that at the time the marriage was entered into civil
divorce and breakup of the family almost always is proof of
someone’s failure to carry out marital responsibilities
4
as promised
at the time the marriage was entered into.”
In the instant case, “opposing and conflicting personalities”

of the spouses were not considered equivalent to
psychological
____________________________
4 Zwack, ibid., p. 47.
222

incapacity. As well in Santos v. Court of Appeals cited in

the ponencia, the Court held that the failure of the wife to
return home from the U.S. or to communicate with her
husband for more than five years is not proof of her
psychological
5
incapacity as to render the marriage a
nullity. Therefore, Art. 36 is inapplicable and the
marriages remain valid and subsisting.
However6
in the recent case of Chi Ming Tsoi v. Court of
Appeals, this Court upheld both the Regional Trial Court
and the Court of Appeals in declaring the presence of
psychological incapacity on the part of the husband. Said
petitioner husband, after ten (10) months’ sleeping with his
wife never had coitus with her, a fact he did not deny but
he alleged that it was due to the physical disorder of his

wife which, however, he failed to prove. Goaded by the
indifference and stubborn refusal of her husband to fulfill a
basic marital obligation described as “to procreate children
based on the universal principle that procreation of
children through sexual cooperation is the basic end of
marriage,” the wife brought the action in the lower court to
declare the marriage null.
The Court, quoting Dr. Gerardo Veloso, a former
Presiding Judge of the Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal of
the Catholic Archdiocese of Manila (Branch I) on
psychological incapacity, concluded:
“If a spouse, although physically capable but simply refuses to

perform his or her essential marriage obligations, and the refusal
is senseless and constant, Catholic marriage tribunals attribute
the causes to psychological incapacity than to stubborn refusal.
Senseless and protracted refusal is equivalent to psychological
incapacity. Thus, the prolonged refusal of a spouse to have sexual
intercourse with his or her spouse is considered a sign of
psychological incapacity.”
We declared:
____________________________
5 G.R. No. 112019, 240 SCRA 20 (1995).

6 G.R. No. 119190 (1997).
223
VOL. 268, FEBRUARY 13, 1997 223

“This Court, finding the gravity of the failed relationship in which

the parties found themselves trapped in its mire of unfulfilled
vows and unconsummated marital obligations, can do no less but
sustain the studied judgment of respondent appellate court.”
I concur with the majority opinion that the herein marriage

remains valid and subsisting absent psychological
incapacity (under Art. 36 of the Family Code) on the part of
either or both of the spouses.
CONCURRING OPINION
VITUG, J.:
I fully concur with my esteemed colleague Mr. Justice

Artemio V. Panganiban in his ponencia, and I find to be
most helpful the guidelines that he prepared for the bench
and the bar in the proper appreciation of Article 36 of
Executive Order No. 209 (“The Family Code of the
Philippines”). The term “psychological incapacity” was
neither defined nor exemplified by the Family Code. Thus
—
“Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of

the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with
the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be
void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its
solemnization.”
The Revision Committee, constituted under the auspices of

the U.P. Law Center, which drafted the Code explained:
“(T)he Committee would like the judge to interpret the provision

on a case-to-case basis, guided by experience, the findings of
experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by
decisions of church tribunals which, although not binding on the
civil courts, may be given persuasive
1
effect since the provision
was taken from Canon Law.”
____________________________
1 Mr. Justice Josue N. Bellosillo, quoting Mme. Justice Alicia V.

Sempio-Diy, in Salita vs. Hon. Magtolis, 233 SCRA 100.
224

Article 36 of the Family Code was concededly taken from

Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon Law—
“Canon 1095. (The following persons) are incapable of contracting

marriage; (those)—
“1. who lack sufficient use of reason;

“2. who suffer from a grave defect of discretion of judgment
concerning essential matrimonial rights and duties, to be
given and accepted mutually;
“3. who for causes of psychological nature are unable to
assume the essential obligations of marriage”—
that should give that much value to Canon Law

jurisprudence as an aid to the interpretation
2
and
construction of the statutory enactment.
The principles in the proper application of the law teach
us that the several provisions of a Code must be read like a
congruent whole. Thus, in determining the import of
“psychological incapacity” under Article 36, one must also
read it along with, albeit to be taken as distinct from, the
other grounds enumerated in the Code, like Articles 35, 37,
38 and 41 that would likewise, but for distinct reasons,
render the marriage void ab initio, or Article 45 that would
make the marriage merely voidable, or Article 55 that
could justify a petition for legal separation. Care must be
observed so that these various circumstances are not
applied so indiscriminately as if the law were indifferent on
the matter.
I would wish to reiterate 3
the Court’s statement in
Santos vs. Court of Appeals; viz:
“(T)he use of the phrase ‘psychological incapacity’ under Article 36

of the Code has not been meant to comprehend all such possible
cases of psychoses as, likewise mentioned by some ecclesiastical
authorities, extremely low intelligence, immaturity, and like
circumstances x x x. Article 36 of the Family Code cannot be
taken and construed independently of, but must stand in
conjunction with,
____________________________
2 In Santos vs. Court of Appeals, 240 SCRA 20.

3 Supra.
225
VOL. 268, FEBRUARY 13, 1997 225

existing precepts in our law on marriage. Thus correlated,

‘psychological incapacity’ should refer to no less than a mental
(not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly
incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly
must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage
which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include
their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and
fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly any doubt
that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of
‘psychological incapacity’ to the most serious cases of personality
disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or
inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. This
psychologic condition must exist at the time the marriage is

celebrated. The law does not evidently envision, upon the other
hand, an inability of the spouse to have sexual relations with the
other. This conclusion is implicit under Article 54 of the Family
Code which considers children conceived prior to the judicial
declaration of nullity of the void marriage to be ‘legitimate.’
“The other forms of psychoses, if existing at the inception of
marriage, like the state of a party being of unsound mind or
concealment of drug addiction, habitual alcoholism,
homosexuality or lesbianism, merely renders the marriage
contract voidable pursuant to Article 46, Family Code. If drug
addiction, habitual alcoholism, lesbianism or homosexuality
should occur only during the marriage, they become mere grounds
for legal separation under Article 55 of the Family Code. These
provisions of the Code, however, do not necessarily preclude the
possibility of these various circumstances being themselves,
depending on the degree 4 and severity of the disorder, indicia of
psychological incapacity.”
In fine, the term “psychological incapacity,” to be a ground

for the nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family
Code, must be able to pass the following tests: viz:
First, the incapacity must be psychological or mental,
not physical, in nature;
Second, the psychological incapacity must relate to the
inability, not mere refusal, to understand, assume and
discharge the basic marital obligations of living together,
____________________________
4 At pages 34-35.
226

observing love, respect and fidelity and rendering mutual

help and support;
Third, the psychologic condition must exist at the time
the marriage is contracted although its overt
manifestations may occur only thereafter; and
Fourth, the mental disorder must be grave or serious
and incurable.
It may well be that the Family Code Revision Committee
has envisioned Article 36, as not a few observers would
suspect, as another form of absolute divorce or, as still
others would also put it, to be an alternative to divorce;
however, the fact still remains that the language of the law
has failed to carry out, even if true, any such intendment.
It might have indeed turned out for the better; if it were
otherwise, there could be good reasons to doubt the
constitutionality of the measure. The fundamental law
itself, no less, has laid down in terse language its
unequivocal command on how the State should regard
marriage and the family, thus—
Section 2, Article XV:
“Sec. 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the

foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State.”
Section 12, Article II:
“Sec. 12. The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall
protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social
institution x x x.”
Section 1, Article XV:
“Section 1. The State recognizes the Filipino family as the

foundation of the nation. Accordingly, it shall strengthen its
solidarity and actively promote its total development.” (The 1987
Constitution)
The case of Marcelino vs. Cruz, 121 SCRA 51, might here
be significant not so much for the specific issue there
resolved but for the tone it has set. The Court there has
held that
227
VOL. 268, FEBRUARY 13, 1997 227

People vs. Letigio
constitutional provisions are to be considered mandatory

unless by necessary implication, a different intention is
manifest such that to have them enforced strictly would
cause more harm than by disregarding them. It is quite
clear to me that the constitutional mandate on marriage
and the family has not been meant to be simply directory in
character, nor for mere expediency or convenience, but one
that demands a meaningful, not half-hearted, respect.
Petition granted. Judgment reversed and set aside, the
marriage subsists and remains valid.
Notes.—Psychological incapacity must be characterized

by: (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c)
incurability. (Santos vs. Court of Appeals, 240 SCRA 20

[1995])
Article 36 of the Family Code cannot be taken and
construed independently of, but must stand in conjunction
with existing precepts in our law on marriage. (Ibid.)
The intendment of the law has been to confine the
meaning of “psychological incapacity” to the most serious
cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an
utter insensibility or inability to give meaning and
significance to the marriage. (Id.)
——o0o——
© Copyright 2018 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights reserved.

Hernandez vs. Court of Appeals
*
G.R. No. 126010. December 8, 1999.
LUCITA ESTRELLA HERNANDEZ, petitioner, vs.

COURT OF APPEALS and MARIO C. HERNANDEZ,
respondents.
Civil Law; Marriages; Annulment; Evidence; Petitioner failed

to establish the fact that at the time they were married, private
respondent was suffering from a psychological defect which in fact
deprived him of the ability to assume the essential duties of
marriage and its concomitant responsibilities; It was not
sufficiently proved that private respondent was really incapable of
fulfilling his duties due to some incapacity of a psychological
nature, and not merely physical.—In the instant case, other than
her self-serving declarations, petitioner failed to establish the fact
that at the time they were married, private respondent was
suffering from a psychological defect which in fact deprived him of
the ability to assume the essential duties of marriage and its
concomitant responsibilities. As the Court of Appeals pointed out,
no evidence was presented to show that private respondent was
not cognizant of the basic marital obligations. It was not
sufficiently proved that private respondent was really incapable of
fulfilling his duties due to some incapacity of a psychological
nature, and not merely physical. Petitioner says that at the outset
of their marriage, private respondent showed lack of drive to work
for his family. Private respondent’s parents and petitioner
supported him through college. After his schooling, although he
eventually found a job, he availed himself of the early retirement
plan offered by his employer and spent the entire amount he
received on himself.
________________
* SECOND DIVISION.
77
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VOL. 320, DECEMBER 8, 1999 77
For a greater part of their marital life, private respondent was out
of job and did not have the initiative to look for another. He
indulged in vices and engaged in philandering, and later
abandoned his family. Petitioner concludes that private
respondent’s condition is incurable, causing the disintegration of
their union and defeating the very objectives of marriage.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Private respondent’s alleged
habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity or perversion, and
abandonment do not by themselves constitute grounds for finding
that he is suffering from a psychological incapacity within the
contemplation of the Family Code.—Private respondent’s alleged
habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity or perversion, and
abandonment do not by themselves constitute grounds for finding
that he is suffering from a psychological incapacity within the
contemplation of the Family Code. It must be shown that these
acts are manifestations of a disordered personality which make
private respondent completely unable to discharge the essential
obligations of the marital state, and not merely due to private
respondent’s youth and self-conscious feeling of being handsome,
as the appellate court held.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Burden of proof to show the nullity
of the marriage rests upon petitioner; Any doubt should be resolved
in favor of the validity of the marriage.—Expert testimony should
have been presented to establish the precise cause of private
respondent’s psychological incapacity, if any, in order to show that
it existed at the inception of the marriage. The burden of proof to
show the nullity of the marriage rests upon petitioner. The Court
is mindful of the policy of the 1987 Constitution to protect and
strengthen the family as the basic autonomous social institution
and marriage as the foundation of the family. Thus, any doubt
should be resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage.
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the

Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Jimeno, Jalandoni & Cope for petitioner.
78

MENDOZA, J.:
1
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of
the Court of Appeals, dated January 30, 1996, affirming
the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 18,
Tagaytay City, dated April 10, 1993, which dismissed the
petition for annulment of marriage filed by petitioner.
Petitioner Lucita Estrella Hernandez and private
respondent Mario C. Hernandez were married at the Silang
Catholic Parish 2
Church in Silang, Cavite on January 1,
1981 (Exh. A). Three children were born to them, 3
namely,
Maie, who was born on May 4
3, 1982 (Exh. B), Lyra, born
on May 22, 1985 5
(Exh. C), and Marian, born on June 15,
1989 (Exh. D).
On July 10, 1992, petitioner filed before the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 18, Tagaytay City, a petition seeking
the annulment of her marriage to private respondent on
the ground of psychological incapacity of the latter. She
alleged that from the time of their marriage up to the time
of the filing of the suit, private respondent failed to perform
his obligation to support the family and contribute to the
management of the household, devoting most of his time
engaging in drinking sprees with his friends. She further
claimed that private respondent, after they were married,
cohabited with another woman with whom he had an
illegitimate child, while having affairs with different
women, and that, because of his promiscuity, private
respondent endangered her health by infecting her with a
sexually transmissible disease (STD). She averred that
private respondent was irresponsible, immature and
unprepared for the duties of a married life. Petitioner
prayed that for having abandoned the family, private
respondent be ordered to give support to their three
children in the total
_______________
1 Per Justice Lourdes K. Tayao-Jaguros and concurred in by Justices

Jorge S. Imperial (Chairman) and B.A. Adefuin-De la Cruz.
2 RTC Records, p. 7.
3 Id., p. 8.
4 Id., p. 9.
5 Id., p. 10.
79
VOL. 320, DECEMBER 8, 1999 79

amount of P9,000.00 every month; that she be awarded the

custody of their children; and that she be adjudged as the
sole owner of a parcel of land located at Don Gregorio
Subdivision I in Bo. Bucal, Dasmariñas, Cavite, purchased
during the marriage, as well as the jeep which private
respondent took with6
him when he left the conjugal home
on June 12, 1992.
On October 8, 1992, because of private respondent’s
failure to file his answer, the trial court issued an order
directing the assistant provincial prosecutor to conduct an
investigation 7
to determine if there was collusion between
the parties. Only petitioner appeared at the investigation
on November 5, 1992. Nevertheless, the prosecutor found
no evidence 8of collusion and recommended that the case be
set for trial.
Based on the evidence
9
presented by the petitioner, the
facts are as follows:
Petitioner and private respondent met in 1977 at the
Philippine Christian University in Dasmariñas, Cavite.
Petitioner, who is five years older than private respondent,
was then in her first year of teaching zoology and botany.
Private respondent, a college freshman, was her student for
two consecutive semesters. They became sweethearts in
February 1979 when she was no longer private
respondent’s teacher. On January 1, 1981, they were
married.
Private respondent continued his studies for two more
years. His parents paid for his tuition fees, while petitioner
provided his allowances and other financial needs. The
family income came from petitioner’s salary as a faculty
member of the Philippine Christian University. Petitioner
augmented her earnings by selling “Tupperware” products,
as well as engaging in the buy-and-sell of coffee, rice and
polvoron.
From 1983 up to 1986, as private respondent could not
find a stable job, it was agreed that he would help
petitioner in her
_________________
6 Petition, RTC Records, pp. 1-4.

8 Id., p. 25.
9 TSN, pp. 6-56, Nov. 13, 1992; pp. 3-31, Dec. 8, 1992.
80
businesses by delivering orders to customers. However,

because her husband was a spendthrift and had other
women, petitioner’s business suffered. Private respondent
often had smoking and drinking sprees with his friends
and betted on fighting cocks. In 1982, after the birth of
their first child, petitioner discovered two love letters
written by a certain Realita Villena to private respondent.
She knew Villena as a married student whose husband was
working in Saudi Arabia. When petitioner confronted
private respondent, he admitted having an extra-marital
affair with Villena. Petitioner then pleaded with Villena to
end her relationship with private respondent. For his part,
private respondent said he would end the affairs, but he
did not keep his promise. Instead, he left the conjugal home
and abandoned petitioner and their child. When private
respondent came back, however, petitioner accepted him,
despite private respondent’s infidelity in the hope of saving
their marriage.
Upon the recommendation of a family friend, private
respondent was able to get a job at Reynolds Philippines,
Inc. in San Agustin, Dasmariñas, Cavite in 1986. However,
private respondent was employed only until March 31,
1991, because he availed himself of the early retirement
plan offered by the company. He received P53,000.00 in
retirement pay, but instead of spending the amount for the
needs of the family, private respondent spent the money on
himself and consumed the entire amount within four
months of his retirement.
While private respondent worked at Reynolds
Philippines, Inc., his smoking, drinking, gambling and
womanizing became worse. Petitioner discovered that
private respondent carried on relationships with different
women. He had relations with a certain Edna who worked
at Yazaki; Angie, who was an operator of a billiard hall;
Tess, a “Japayuki”; Myrna Macatangay, a secretary at the
Road Master Driver’s School in Bayan, Dasmariñas,
Cavite, with whom he cohabited for quite a while; and,
Ruth Oliva, by whom he had a daughter named Margie P.
Oliva, born on September 15, 1989 (Exh.
81
VOL. 320, DECEMBER 8, 1999 81

10
10
E). When petitioner confronted private respondent about
his relationship with Tess, he beat her up, as a result of
which she was confined at the De la Salle University
Medical Center in Dasmariñas, Cavite11 on July 4-5, 1990
because of cerebral concussion (Exh. F).
According to petitioner, private respondent engaged in
extreme promiscuous conduct during the latter part of
1986. As a result, private respondent contracted gonorrhea
and infected petitioner. They both received treatment at
the Zapote Medical Specialists Center in Zapote, Bacoor,
Cavite from
12
October 22, 1986 until March 13, 1987 (Exhs.
G & H).
Petitioner averred that on one occasion of a heated
argument, private respondent hit their eldest child who
was then barely a year old. Private respondent is not close
to any of their children as he was never affectionate and
hardly spent time with them.
On July 17,
13
1979, petitioner entered into a contract to
sell (Exh. J) with F & C Realty Corporation whereby she
agreed to buy from the latter a parcel of land at the Don
Gregorio Heights Subdivision I in Bo. Bucal, Dasmariñas,
Cavite and placed a partial payment of P31,330.00. On
May 26, 1987, after full payment of the amount of
P51,067.10, inclusive of interests from monthly 14
installments, a deed of absolute sale (Exh. K) 15 was
executed in her favor and TCT No. T-221529 (Exh. M) was
duly issued.
According to petitioner,
16
on August 1, 1992, she sent a
handwritten letter to private respondent expressing her
frustration over the fact that her efforts to save their
marriage proved futile. In her letter, petitioner also stated
that she was
_______________

11 Id., p. 38.
12 Id., pp. 39-40a.
13 Id., pp. 41-43.
14 Id., pp. 44-45.
15 Id., p. 47.
16 Id., pp. 49-51.
82

17
17
allowing him to sell their owner-type jeepney and to
divide the proceeds of the sale between the two of them.
Petitioner also told private respondent of her intention to
file a petition for the annulment of their marriage.
It does not appear that private respondent ever replied
to petitioner’s letter. By this time, he had already
abandoned petitioner and their children. In October 1992,
petitioner learned that private respondent left for the
Middle East. Since then, private respondent’s whereabouts
had been unknown.
Ester Alfaro, petitioner’s childhood friend and co-teacher
at the Philippine Christian University, testified during the
hearing on the petition for annulment. She said that
sometime in June 1979, petitioner introduced private
respondent to her (Alfaro) as the former’s sweetheart.
Alfaro said she was not impressed with private respondent
who was her student in accounting. She observed private
respondent to be funloving, spending most of his time with
campus friends. In November 1980, when petitioner asked
Alfaro to be one of the secondary sponsors at her
forthcoming wedding, Alfaro wanted to dissuade petitioner
from going through with the wedding because she thought
private respondent was not ready for married life as he was
then unemployed. True enough, although the couple
appeared happy during the early part of their marriage, it
was not long thereafter that private respondent started
drinking with his friends and going home late at night.
Alfaro corroborated petitioner’s claim that private
respondent was a habitual drunkard who carried on
relationships with different women and continued hanging
out with his friends. She also confirmed that petitioner was
once hospitalized because she was beaten up by private
respondent. After the first year of petitioner’s marriage,
Alfaro tried to talk to private respondent, but the latter
accused her of meddling with their marital life. Alfaro said
that private
________________
17 Id., p. 48.
83
VOL. 320, DECEMBER 8, 1999 83

respondent was not close

18
to his children and that he had
abandoned petitioner.
19
19
On April 10, 1993, the trial court rendered a decision
dismissing the petition for annulment of marriage filed 20
by
petitioner. The pertinent portion of the decision reads:
The Court can underscore the fact that the circumstances

mentioned by the petitioner in support of her claim that
respondent was “psychologically incapacitated” to marry her are
among the grounds cited by the law as valid reasons for the grant
of legal separation (Article 55 of the Family Code)—not as
grounds for a declaration of nullity of marriages or annulment
thereof. Thus, Article 55 of the same code reads as follows:
Art. 55. A petition for legal separation may be filed on any of the
following grounds:
(1) Repeated physical violence or grossly abusive conduct directed
against the petitioner, a common child, or a child of the petitioner;
....
(5) Drug addiction or habitual alcoholism of the respondent;
....
(8) Sexual infidelity or perversion;
....
(10) Abandonment of petitioner by respondent without justifiable
cause for more than one year.
....
If indeed Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines,

which mentions psychological incapacity as a ground for the
declaration of the nullity of a marriage, has intended to include
the above-stated circumstances as constitutive of such
incapacity, then the same would not have been enumerated as
grounds for legal separation.
_________________
18 TSN, pp. 32-68, Dec. 8, 1992.

19 Per Acting Presiding Judge Eleuterio F. Guerrero.
20 RTC Records, pp. 58-59.
84

In the same manner, this Court is not disposed to grant relief in

favor of the petitioner under Article 46, paragraph (3) of the
Family Code of the Philippines, as there is no dispute that the
“gonorrhea” transmitted to the petitioner by respondent occurred
sometime in 1986, or five (5) years after petitioner’s marriage
with respondent was celebrated in 1981. The provisions of Article
46, paragraph (3) of the same law should be taken in conjunction

with Article 45, paragraph (3) of the same code, and a careful
reading of the two (2) provisions of the law would require the
existence of this ground (fraud) at the time of the celebration of
the marriage. Hence, the annulment of petitioner’s marriage with
the respondent on this ground, as alleged and proved in the
instant case, cannot be legally accepted by the Court.
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals which, on

January 30, 1996, rendered its decision affirming the
decision of the trial
21
court. Citing the ruling22 in Santos v.
Court of Appeals, the Court of Appeals held:
It is clear in the above law and jurisprudence that the

psychological incapacity of a spouse, as a ground for
declaration of nullity of marriage, must exist at the time of the
celebration of marriage. More so, chronic sexual infidelity,
abandonment, gambling and use of prohibited drugs are not
grounds per se, of psychological incapacity of a spouse.
We agree with the Solicitor General that petitioner-appellant
failed to prove that her respondent-husband was psychologically
incapacitated at the time of the celebration of the marriage.
Certainly, petitioner-appellant’s declaration that at the time of
their marriage her respondent-husband’s character was on the
“borderline between a responsible person and the happy-go-
lucky,” could not constitute the psychological incapacity in
contemplation of Article 36 of the Family Code. In fact, petitioner-
appellant herself ascribed said attitude to her respondent-
husband’s youth and very good looks, who was admittedly several
years younger than petitioner-appellant who, herself, happened to
be the college professor of her respondent-husband. Petitioner-
appellant even described her re-
________________
21 310 Phil. 22; 240 SCRA 20 (1995).

22 Rollo, pp. 44-46.
85
VOL. 320, DECEMBER 8, 1999 85

spondent-husband not as a problem student but a normal one (p.

24, tsn, Dec. 8, 1992).
The acts and attitudes complained of by petitioner-appellant
happened after the marriage and there is no proof that the same
have already existed at the time of the celebration of the marriage
to constitute the psychological incapacity under Article 36 of

the Family Code.
Hence, this petition. Petitioner contends that the

respondent Court of Appeals erred—
I. IN FINDING THAT THE PSYCHOLOGICAL

INCAPACITY OF THE PRIVATE RESPONDENT
TO COMPLY WITH HIS ESSENTIAL MARITAL
OBLIGATIONS DID NOT EXIST FROM THE
TIME OF THE CELEBRATION OF THE
MARRIAGE.
II. IN RULING THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENT WAS
NOT PSYCHOLOGICALLY INCAPACITATED TO
COMPLY WITH HIS ESSENTIAL MARITAL
OBLIGATIONS.
III. IN AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL
COURT DENYING THE AWARD OF
PERMANENT CUSTODY OF THE CHILDREN TO
PETITIONER.
IV. IN AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL
COURT DENYING THE PRAYER FOR
ISSUANCE OF AN ORDER REQUIRING
PRIVATE RESPONDENT TO GIVE SUPPORT TO
THE THREE CHILDREN IN THE AMOUNT OF
P3,000.00 PER CHILD.
V. IN NOT DECLARING THE REAL PROPERTY
ACQUIRED BY PETITIONER AS HER
EXCLUSIVE PROPERTY.
The issue in this case is whether or not the marriage of

petitioner and private respondent should be annulled on
the ground of private respondent’s psychological
incapacity.
Petitioner alleges that the Court of Appeals erred in
hold-ing that petitioner failed to show that private
respondent’s psychological incapacity existed at the
time of the celebration of the marriage. She argues that the
fact that the acts of incapacity of private respondent
became manifest only after the
86

celebration of their marriage should not be a bar to the

annulment of their marriage.
Art. 36 of the Family Code states:
A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the

celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void
even if such 23 incapacity becomes manifest only after its
solemnization.
24
In Santos v. Court of Appeals, we held:
“Psychological incapacity” should refer to no less than a

mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly
incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly
must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage
which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include
their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and
fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly any doubt
that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of
“psychological incapacity” to the most serious cases of
personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter
insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the
marriage. This psychological condition must exist at the time
the marriage is celebrated. The law does not evidently envision,
upon the other hand, an inability of the spouse to have sexual
relations with the other. This conclusion is implicit under Article
54 of the Family Code which considers children conceived prior to
the judicial declaration of nullity of the void marriage to be
“legitimate.”
The other forms of psychoses, if existing at the inception of
marriage, like the state of a party being of unsound mind or
concealment of drug addiction, habitual alcoholism,
homosexuality or lesbianism, merely renders the marriage
contract voidable pursuant to Article 46, Family Code. If drug
addiction, habitual alcoholism, lesbianism or homosexuality
should occur only during the marriage, they become mere grounds
for legal separation under Article 55 of the Family Code. These
provisions of the Code, however, do not necessarily preclude the
possibility of these various circumstances
_______________
23 As amended by E.O. No. 227 dated July 17, 1987.

24 Supra, at 40-41.
87
VOL. 320, DECEMBER 8, 1999 87
being themselves, depending on the degree and severity of the

disorder, indicia of psychological incapacity.
Until further statutory and jurisprudential parameters are
established, every circumstance that may have some bearing on
the degree, extent, and other conditions of that incapacity must,
in every case, be carefully examined and evaluated so that no
precipitate and indiscriminate nullity is peremptorily decreed.
The well-considered opinions of psychiatrists, psychologists, and
persons with expertise in psychological disciplines might be
helpful or even desirable.
In the instant case, other than her self-serving

declarations, petitioner failed to establish the fact that at
the time they were married, private respondent was
suffering from a psychological defect which in fact
deprived him of the ability to assume the essential duties of
marriage and its concomitant responsibilities. As the Court
of Appeals pointed out, no evidence was presented to show
that private respondent was not cognizant of the basic
marital obligations. It was not sufficiently proved that
private respondent was really incapable of fulfilling his
duties due to some incapacity of a psychological nature,
and not merely physical. Petitioner says that at the outset
of their marriage, private respondent showed lack of drive
to work for his family. Private respondent’s parents and
petitioner supported him through college. After his
schooling, although he eventually found a job, he availed
himself of the early retirement plan offered by his employer
and spent the entire amount he received on himself. For a
greater part of their marital life, private respondent was
out of job and did not have the initiative to look for
another. He indulged in vices and engaged in philandering,
and later abandoned his family. Petitioner concludes that
private respondent’s condition is incurable, causing the
disintegration of their union and defeating the very
objectives of marriage.
However, private respondent’s alleged habitual
alcoholism, sexual infidelity or perversion, and
abandonment do not by themselves constitute grounds for
finding that he is suffering from a psychological
incapacity within the contemplation of the Family Code.
It must be shown that these acts are manifestations of a
disordered personality which make private
88

respondent completely unable to discharge the essential

obligations of the marital state, and not merely due to
private respondent’s youth and self-conscious feeling of
being handsome, as the appellate court held. As pointed
25
out
in Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals:
The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a)

medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c)
sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the
decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the
incapacity must be psychological—not physical, although its
manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence
must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was
mentally or physically ill to such an extent that the person could
not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing
them, could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no
example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit
the application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem
generis (citing Salita v. Magtolis, supra) nevertheless such root
cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its
incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be
given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.
Moreover, expert testimony should have been presented to

establish the precise cause of private respondent’s
psychological incapacity, if any, in order to show that it
existed at the inception of the marriage. The burden of
proof to show the nullity of the marriage rests upon
petitioner. The Court is mindful of the policy of the 1987
Constitution to protect and strengthen the family as the
basic autonomous social institution
26
and marriage as the
foundation of the family. Thus, any doubt27 should be
resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage.
We, therefore, find no reason to reverse the ruling of
respondent Court of Appeals whose conclusions, affirming
the trial court’s finding with regard to the non-existence of
private respondent’s psychological incapacity at the
time of the
________________
25 335 Phil. 664, 676-680, 268 SCRA 198, 210-212 (1997).

26 See Art. II, §12; Art. XV, §§1-2.
27 Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, supra.
89
VOL. 320, DECEMBER 8, 1999 89

28
marriage, are entitled to great weight and even finality.
Only where it is shown that such findings are whimsical,
capricious, and arbitrary can these be overturned.
The conclusion we have reached makes it unnecessary
for us to pass upon petitioner’s contentions on the issue of
permanent custody of children, the amount for their
respective support, and the declaration of exclusive
ownership of petitioner over the real property. These
matters may more appropriately be litigated in a separate
proceeding for legal separation, dissolution of property
regime, and/or custody of children which petitioner may
bring.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo (Chairman), Quisumbing, Buena and De

Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
Judgment affirmed.
Note.—The incapacity must be proven to be existing at

“the time of the celebration” of the marriage. (Republic vs.
Court of Appeals, 268 SCRA 198 [1997])
——o0o——
_______________
28 Tuason v. Court of Appeals, 326 Phil. 169; 256 SCRA 158 (1996).
90
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10/18/2018 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 268

198 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs.

Family Code; Marriage; Psychological incapacity must exist at

VOL. 268, FEBRUARY 13, 1997 199

Republic vs. Court of Appeals

testimony of Dr. Sison showed no incurable psychiatric disorder

incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be

200 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Republic vs. Court of Appeals

of the decision.—The essential marital obligations must be those

VOL. 268, FEBRUARY 13, 1997 201

Republic vs. Court of Appeals

riage: Those who are unable to assume the essential obligations of

PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

The Family Code of the Philippines provides an entirely

202 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

addition to resolving the present case, finds the need to lay

This case was commenced on August 16, 1990 with the

resulting in frequent quarrels between them; that

1 Rollo pp. 25-3.

VOL. 268, FEBRUARY 13, 1997 203

ents in Baguio City; that a few weeks later, Reynaldo left

“1. That the parties herein were legally married on

2. That out of their marriage, a child named Albert

Evidence for herein respondent wife consisted of her own

204 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

On May 14, 1991, the trial court rendered judgment

In his petition, the Solicitor General insists that “the Court

5 The Court of Appeals reproduced in its Decision a substantial portion

“To sustain her claim that respondent is psychologically incapacitated to comply

VOL. 268, FEBRUARY 13, 1997 205

marriage between the parties broke up because of their

206 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

opinion that “the Civil Code Revision Committee

“As a ground for annulment of marriage, We view psychological

Respondent, in her Memorandum, adopts these discussions

unique element of permanency of union signifies a continuing, developing, and

VOL. 268, FEBRUARY 13, 1997 207

renders them incapable of performing such marital

The Court’s Ruling

The petition is meritorious. 6

must be shown to be incapable of doing so, due to some

6 240 SCRA 20, 34, January 4, 1995.

208 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

neither its juridicial antecedence nor its incurability. The

In the case of Reynaldo, there is no showing that his

and gentleness” on Reynaldo’s part and of being

8 TSN, April 6, 1991, p. 5.

VOL. 268, FEBRUARY 13, 1997 209

(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the

9 The National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal reviews all decisions of

210 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

the foundation of the nation.” It decrees marriage

(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must

Section 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the

12 “Art. 1. Marriage is a special contract of permanent union between a

VOL. 268, FEBRUARY 13, 1997 211

one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such

(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically

13 Salita vs. Magtolis, 233 SCRA 100, June 13, 1994.

212 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

the personality structure that effectively