Cruz v National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP)

G.R. No. 135385, December 6, 2000

Per Curiam

Facts:

Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa assails the constitutionality of certain provisions of Republic Act
No. 8371 (R.A. No. 8371), otherwise known as the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997
(IPRA), and its implementing Rules and Regulations (Implementing Rules).

The respondents in their Comment to the Petition, defended the constitutionality of the IPRA
and pray that the petition be dismissed for lack of merit. A consolidated Comment was then filed
through the Solicitor General by respondents. The Solicitor General is of the view that the IPRA
is partly unconstitutional on the ground that it grants ownership over natural resources to
indigenous peoples and prays that the petition be granted in part.

Sen. Juan Flavier, one of the authors of IPRA, Mr. Ponciano Bennagen and the leaders and
members of the 112 groups of Indigenous peoples, filed their Motion for Leave to Intervene and
join the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP) in defending the constitutionality of
IPRA and praying for the dismissal of the petition.

The Commission on Human Rights (CHR) on the other hand, asserts that the IPRA is an
expression of the principle of parens patriae and that the State has the responsibility to protect
and guarantee the rights of those who are at a serious disadvantage like indigenous peoples.
This view is also supported by groups such as the Haribon Foundation for the Conservation of
Natural Resources, Inc. and the Ikalahan Indigenous People who were also granted their
motions for intervention.

Petitioners assail the constitutionality of some of the provisions of IPRA and its Implementing
Rules on the ground that they amount to an unlawful deprivation of the States ownership over
lands of the public domain as well as minerals ans other natural resources therein in violation of
the regalian doctrine embodied in Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution.

In addition, petitioners question the provisions of the IPRA defining the powers and jurisdiction
of the NCIP and making customary law applicable to the settlement of disputes involving
ancestral domains and ancestral lands on the ground that these provisions violate the due
process clause of the Constitution.

Issue:

Whether or not the IPRA is unconstitutional

Held:

No, the IPRA is not unconstitutional.

The decision of the United States Supreme Court in Cariño vs. Insular Government,holding that
a parcel of land held since time immemorial by individuals under a claim of private ownership is
presumed never to have been public land and cited to downgrade the application of the regalian
doctrine, cannot override the collective will of the people expressed in the Constitution. It is in
them that sovereignty resides and from them that all government authority emanates. It is not
then for a court ruling or any piece of legislation to be conformed to by the fundamental law, but
it is for the former to adapt to the latter, and it is the sovereign act that must, between them,
stand inviolate

Ancestral domains are all areas belonging to ICCs/IPs held under a claim of ownership,
occupied or possessed by ICCs/IPs by themselves or through their ancestors, communally or
individually since time immemorial, continuously until the present, except when interrupted by
war, force majeure or displacement by force, deceit, stealth or as a consequence of government
projects or any other voluntary dealings with government and/or private individuals or
corporations. Ancestral domains comprise lands, inland waters, coastal areas, and natural
resources therein and includes ancestral lands, forests, pasture, residential, agricultural, and
other lands individually owned whether alienable or not, hunting grounds, burial grounds,
worship areas, bodies of water, mineral and other natural resources. They also include lands
which may no longer be exclusively occupied by ICCs/IPs but from which they traditionally had
access to for their subsistence and traditional activities, particularly the home ranges of
ICCs/IPs who are still nomadic and/or shifting cultivators.

The identification and delineation of these ancestral domains and lands is a power conferred by
the IPRA on the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP). The guiding principle in
identification and delineation is self-delineation. This means that the ICCs/IPs have a decisive
role in determining the boundaries of their domains and in all the activities pertinent thereto.
 Aranda v Republic
G.R. No. 172331, August 24, 2011
Villarama, Jr., J:

Facts:

ICTSI Warehousing, Inc. (ICTSI-WI) represented by its Chairman, Enrique K. Razon, Jr.,
originally filed a petition for original registration before the RTC is a parcel of land situated in
San Andres, Malvar, Batangas with an area of 9,103 square meters and designated as Lot
3730, Psc 47, Malvar Cadastre.

The Republic through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed its opposition on grounds
that the land applied for is part of the public domain and the applicant has not acquired a
registrable title thereto under Commonwealth Act No. 141 as amended by Republic Act No.
6940.

ICTSI-WI sought leave of court to amend the application because (1) the petition was not
accompanied by a certification of non-forum shopping; (2) the statement of technical description
was based merely on the boundaries set forth in the tax declaration; and (3) due to a
technicality, the sale between the vendor and applicant corporation cannot push through and
consequently the tax declaration is still in the name of vendor Ramon Aranda and the land
cannot be transferred and declared in the name of ICTSI-WI.

The trial court admitted the Amended Application for Registration of Title, in the name of
Ramon Aranda. Petitioner prayed that should the Land Registration Act be not applicable to this
case having been in continuous possession of the subject land in the concept of owner, publicly,
openly and adversely for more than thirty (30) years prior to the filing of the application.

Petitioner’s sister, Merlita A. Enriquez, testified that their father, Anatalio Aranda, donated the
land to petitioner in 1965. The document signifying the donation was however eaten by rats.
Witness, Luis Olan, testified that they had open, peaceful, continuous and adverse possession
of the land in the concept of owner until his father, Lucio Olan, sold the land in 1946 to
Anatalio. Luis had no copy of the document of sale since it was given by his mother to
Anatalio.

The trial court granted the petition but it was already reversed by the Court of Appeals
(CA).

Issue:

Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the trial court and dismissing the
application for judicial confirmation of title?

Held:

No, the Court of Appeals did not err in reversing the trial court and dismissing the application for
judicial confirmation of title.
The Property Registration Decree (P.D. No. 1529) provides for the original registration of land in
an ordinary registration proceeding. Under Section 14 (1) thereof, a petition may be granted
upon compliance with the following requisites: (a) that the property in question is alienable aand
disposable land of the public domain; (b) that the applicants by themselves or through their
predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession
and occupation; and (c) that such possession is under a bona fide claim of ownership since
June 12, 1945 or earlier. In this case, the status of the and applied for as alienable and
disposable was not clearly established. Moreover, the court found that petitioner started paying
taxes on the land just three years before the filing of the application for original registration. As a
rule, tax declarations or realty tax payments of property are not conclusive evidence of
ownership, nevertheless they are good indicia of possession in the concept of an owner, for no
one in his right mind would be paying taxes for a property that is not in his actual or constructive
possession. Petitioner thus failed to meet the quantum of proof required by law and his petition
must be denied.
 Gavino Corpuz v. Sps. Grospe
G.R. No. 135297, June 8, 2000
Panganiban, J:
Facts:

Petitioner Gavino Corpuz was a farmer-beneficiary under the Operation Land Transfer
Program of the Department of Agrarian Reform. He was issued a Certificate of Land Transfer
over two parcels of agricultural land. In order to pay for the hospitalization of his wife, he
mortgaged the subject land in favor of Virginia de Leon. When the contract expired, he again
mortgaged it to respondent Hilaria Grospe for a period of four years. The parties executed a
contract, which allowed the respondents to cultivate the land during the duration of the
mortgage or until December 05, 1990. In 1991, petitioner instituted an action for the recovery of
possession of the land before the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB).
Respondents, however, claimed in their answer that instead of paying his loan the petitioner
executed a "Waiver of Rights" over the landholding in their favor on June 29, 1989. Petitioner
denied the allegation and claimed that his and his children's signature on the waiver were
forgeries. The Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) ruled that petitioner abandoned
and surrendered the landholding to the local Samahang Nayon, which passed resolutions
recommending the relocation of the lots to the respondent spouses. The DARAB affirmed
PARAD's decision. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration as well as the appeal to the Court of
Appeals was denied. The appellate court ruled that petitioner had abandoned the landholding
and forfeited his right as a beneficiary in accordance with Section 9 of RA 1199 and Section 28
of RA 6389, which allowed a tenant to voluntarily sever his tenancy status by voluntary
surrender. Furthermore, petitioner failed to prove the alleged forgery of his and his sons'
signatures. Hence, this recourse.

Issue:

(1) Was the appellate court correct in finding that the signatures of petitioner and his sons on
the Waiver were not forged?
(2) Assuming arguendo that the signatures in the Waiver were genuine, was it null and void
for being contrary to agrarian laws?
(3) Did the petitioner abandon his rights as a beneficiary under PD 27?
(4) Did he, by voluntary surrender, forfeit his right as a beneficiary?

Held:
The petition is devoid of merit.
(1) Yes. The filing of an information for estafa does not by itself prove that the respondents
forged his signature. It only means that the public prosecutor found probable cause
against the respondents, but such finding does not constitute binding evidence of forgery
or fraud. As a rule, if the factual findings of the Court of Appeals coincide with those of
the DARAB — an administrative body which has acquired expertise on the matter —
such findings are accorded respect and will not be disturbed on appeal. The presence or
 the absence of forgery was an issue of fact that was convincingly settled by the agrarian
and the appellate tribunals. Petitioner utterly failed to convince us that the appellate
court had misapprehended the facts. Quite the contrary, its findings were well-supported
by the evidence.

(2) Yes. The sale or transfer of rights over a property covered by a Certificate of Land
Transfer is void except when the alienation is made in favor of the government or
through hereditary succession. This ruling is intended to prevent a reversion to the old
feudal system in which the landowners reacquired vast tracts of land, thus negating the
government's program of freeing the tenant from the bondage of the soil.

(3) No. Based on the invalidity of the Waiver, petitioner concludes that the PARAD, the
DARAB and the CA erroneously ruled on the basis of the said document that he had
abandoned or voluntarily surrendered his landholding. Denying that he abandoned the
land, he contends that the transaction was a simple loan to enable him to pay the
expenses incurred for his wife's hospitalization. His surrender of possession did not
amount to an abandonment because there was an obligation on the part of private
respondents to return possession upon full payment of the loan.

(4) Yes. The nullity of the Waiver does not save the case for him because there is a clear
showing that he voluntarily surrendered his landholding to the Samahang Nayon which,
under the present circumstances, may qualify as a surrender or transfer, to the
government, of his rights under the agrarian laws. In this case, petitioner's intention to
surrender the landholding was clear and unequivocal. He signed his concurrence to
the Samahang Nayon Resolutions surrendering his possession of the landholding.
The Samahan then recommended to the team leader of the DAR District that the private
respondent be designated farmer beneficiary of said landholding. Petitioner's voluntary
surrender to the Samahang Nayon qualifies as a surrender or transfer to the government
because such action forms part of the mechanism for the disposition and the reallocation
of farmholdings of tenant-farmers who refuse to become beneficiaries of PD 27.