D.
Equal Protection
1. Concept
The constitutional right to equal
protection requires that all persons or
things similarly situated should be treated
alike, both as to rights conferred and
responsibilities imposed. It requires public
bodies and institutions to treat similarly
situated individuals in a similar manner.
(Source: ABRC 2017 Special Lecture Notes)
2. Requisites for Valid Classification
The requirements for a valid and
reasonable classification are: (1) it must rest
on substantial distinctions; (2) it must be
germane to the purpose of the law; (3) it
must not be limited to existing conditions
only; and (4) it must apply equally to all
members of the same class. (Source:
Political Law Reviewer 2018, Atty. Alexis
Medina)
3. Standards of Judicial Review
(Mosqueda, et al. v. Pilipino Banana
Growers & Exporters Association, Inc., et al.,
G.R. No. 189185, August 16, 2016, En Banc
[Bersamin])
a. Rational Basis Test
The rational basis scrutiny
(also known as the rational relation
test or rational basis test) demands
that the classification reasonably
relate to the legislative purpose.
The rational basis test often applies
in cases involving economics or
social welfare, or to any other case
not involving a suspect class.
b. Strict Scrutiny Test
The strict scrutiny review
applies when a legislative
classification impermissibly
interferes with the exercise of a
fundamental right or operates to
the peculiar class disadvantage of a
suspect class. The Government
carries the burden to prove that
the classification is necessary to
achieve a compelling state interest,
and that it is the least restrictive
means to protect such interest.
c. Intermediate Scrutiny Test
When the classification
puts a quasi-suspect class at a
disadvantage, it will be treated
under intermediate or heightened
review. Classifications based on
gender or illegitimacy receives
intermediate scrutiny. To survive
intermediate scrutiny, the law must
not only further an important
governmental interest and be
substantially related to that
interest, but the justification for
the classification must be genuine
and must not depend on broad
generalizations. (Source: ABRC
2017 Special Lecture Notes)
E. Searches and Seizure
1. Concept
The right of a person against
unreasonable searches and seizure is
recognized and protected by no less than
the Constitution, particularly, Sections 2 and
3(2) of Article III which provide:
SEC. 2. The right of the people to
be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and
seizures of whatever nature and
for any purpose shall be inviolable,
and no search warrant or warrant
of arrest shall issue except upon
probable cause to be determined
personally by the judge after
examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and
the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to
be searched and the persons or
things to be seized.
SEC. 3. x x x
(2) Any evidence obtained in
violation of this or the preceding
 section shall be inadmissible
(Source: Political Law Reviewer
2018, Atty. Alexis Medina)
2. Warrant requirement; Requisites for a
valid warrant
Accordingly, Sections 4 and 5, Rule
126 of the Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure laid down the following
requisites for the issuance of a valid search
warrant:
SEC. 4. Requisites for issuing search
warrant. – A search warrant shall
not issue except upon probable
cause in connection with one
specific offense to be determined
personally by the judge after
examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and
the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to
be searched and the things to be
seized which may be anywhere in
the Philippines.
SEC. 5. Examination of
complainant; record. – The judge
must, before issuing the warrant,
personally examine in the form of
searching questions and answers,
in writing and under oath, the
complainant and the witnesses he
may produce on facts personally
known to them and attach to the
record their sworn statements,
together with the affidavits
submitted.
Therefore, the validity of the issuance of a
search warrant rests upon the following
factors: (1) it must be issued upon probable
cause; (2) the probable cause must be
determined by the judge himself and not by
the applicant or any other person; (3) in the
determination of probable cause, the judge
must examine, under oath or affirmation,
the complainant and such witnesses as the
latter may produce; and (4) the warrant
issued must particularly describe the place
to be searched and persons or things to be
seized. (People v. Tuan, G.R. No. 176066,
August 11, 2010) (Source: Political Law
Reviewer 2018, Atty. Alexis Medina)
3. Warrantless Search
In a search incident to a lawful
arrest, the law requires that there first be a
lawful arrest before a search can be made --
the process cannot be reversed. Search
incident to a lawful arrest: A search
incidental to a lawful arrest requires that
there must first be a lawful arrest before a
search is made. Otherwise stated, a lawful
arrest must precede the search; the process
cannot be reversed. (Source: Political Law
Reviewer 2018, Atty. Alexis Medina)
4. Warrantless Arrest
There are three (3) grounds that
will justify a warrantless arrest. Rule 113,
Section 5 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure provides:
Section 5. Arrest Without Warrant;
When Lawful. -A peace officer or a
private person may, without a
warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the
person to be arrested has
committed, is actually committing,
or is attempting to commit an
offense;
(b) When an offense has just been
committed and he has probable
cause to believe based on personal
knowledge of facts or
circumstances that the person to
be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested
is a prisoner who has escaped from
a penal establishment or place
where he is serving final judgment
or is temporarily confined while his
case is pending, or has escaped
while being transferred from one
confinement to another.
The first kind of warrantless arrest is known
as an in flagrante delicto arrest. The validity
of this warrantless arrest requires
compliance with the overt act test:
[F]or a warrantless arrest of in
flagrante delicto to be affected,
"two elements must concur: (1) the
person to be arrested must execute
an overt act indicating that he [or
she] has just committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to
commit a crime; and (2) such overt
act is done in the presence or
within the view of the arresting
officer." (Veridiano v. People, G.R.
No. 200370, 07 June 2017) (Source:
Political Law Reviewer 2018, Atty.
Alexis Medina)
F. Privacy of Communications and Correspondence
5. Administrative Arrest
1. Private and Public Communications
Vivo v. Montesa, G.R. No. L-24576 July
29, 1968
As long as the offense of the respondents
has not yet been established and their
expulsion finally decided upon, their
arrest upon administrative warrant
violates the provisions of our Bill of
Rights. The constitutional guarantees of
individual liberty must be liberally
construed and applied if we are to enjoy
the blessings of a regime of justice,
liberty and democracy that the Philippine
Constitution sought to secure and
consolidate.
6. Drug, Alcohol and Blood Tests
To make the provision applicable to all
persons arrested or apprehended for
any crime not listed under Article II is
tantamount to unduly expanding its
meaning. Note that accused appellant
here was arrested in the alleged act of
extortion. A charge for violation of
Section 15 of R.A. 9165 is seen as
expressive of the intent of the law to
rehabilitate persons apprehended or
arrested for the unlawful acts
enumerated above instead of charging
and convicting them of other crimes
with heavier penalties.
Section 3. (1) The privacy of
communication and
correspondence shall be inviolable
except upon lawful order of the
court, or when public safety or
order requires otherwise, as
prescribed by law.
(2) Any evidence obtained in
violation of this or the preceding
section shall be inadmissible for
any purpose in any proceeding.
Case Doctrines
Exclusionary Rule (Sec3, par2)

People v. Marti – package bound for

Dela Cruz v. People, G.R. No. 200748, Switzerland – The Bill of Rights is not
July 23, 2014 meant to be invoked against act of
private individuals. It is directed against
The drug test in Section 15 does not
the government and its agencies tasked
cover persons apprehended or arrested
with the enforcement of the law. The
for any unlawful act, but only for
constitutional against unreasonable
unlawful acts listed under Article II of
searches and seizures cannot be
R.A. 9165. A drug test can be made
extended to acts committed by a private
upon persons who are apprehended or
individual.
arrested for, among others, the
"importation," "sale, trading,
administration, dispensation, delivery,
distribution and transportation",
"manufacture" and "possession" of
dangerous drugs and/or controlled
precursors and essential chemicals;

Waiver of Rights
Veroy v. Layague – search of rebels in a
house – Permission was granted by Veroy
to enter the house but only to ascertain
the presence of rebel soldiers. Where
permission to enter a residence was
given,
it is illegal to search the rooms therein
and seize firearms without as search
warrant.
Okabe v. Gutierrez – estafa case – An
application for or admission to bail shall
not bar the accused from challenging the
validity of his arrest or the legality of the
warrant issued therefore.. An application
for bail SHALL NOT BE considered as a
waiver of rights. A valid waiver,
requisites. 1) rights must exist; 2) there
must be clear and convincing proof that
there was an actual intention to
relinquish the right
Anti-Wiretapping Act
Navarro v. CA – police complaint gone
bad – where the exchange between two
persons is not private, the tape recording
is not prohibited
Salcedo-Ordonez v. CA – annulment with
damages – husband is cheating on me
case – Unauthorized tape recordings of
telephone conversations not admissible
Privacy of Bank Accounts
Marquez v. Desierto – secrecy of bank
deposits – exceptions: 1) depositor
consents in writing; 2) subject of an
impeachment case; 3) by court order in
cases of bribery and dereliction by public
officials, 4) deposit is subject of litigation;
5) unexplained wealth
Privacy of Communication
Roxas v. Zuzuaregui – Contempt of the
Supreme Court – the letter ceased to be
private when Roxas furnished the letter
to all the justices and not just to the one
whom it is addressed.
2. Intrusion, when allowed
Gamboa v. Chan, G.R. No. 193636, July
24, 2012
The right to privacy is considered a
fundamental right that must be
protected from intrusion or constraint.
When the right to privacy finds tension
with a competing state objective, the
courts are required to weigh both
notions. In these cases, although
considered a fundamental right, the right
to privacy may nevertheless succumb to
an opposing or overriding state interest
deemed legitimate and compelling.
3. Writ of Habeas Data
Gamboa v. Chan, G.R. No. 193636, July
24, 2012
Habeas data – The writ of habeas data is
a remedy available to any person whose
right to privacy in life, liberty or security is
violated or threatened by an unlawful act
or omission of a public official or
employee, or of a private individual or
entity engaged in the gathering,
collecting or storing of data information
regarding the person, family, home and
correspondence of the aggrieved party.
Vivares v. St. Theresa’s College, G.R. No.
202666, September 29, 2014
In developing the writ of habeas data, the
Court aimed to protect an individual’s
right to informational privacy, among
others The writ, however, will not issue
on the basis merely of an alleged
unauthorized access to information about
a person. Availment of the writ requires
the existence of a nexus between the
right to privacy on the one hand, and the
right to life, liberty or security on the
other. Thus, the existence of a person’s
right to informational privacy and a
showing, at least by substantial evidence,
of an actual or threatened violation of the
right to privacy in life, liberty or security
of the victim are indispensable before the
privilege of the writ may be extended.
G. Freedom of Expression expression that may be a nexus to
criminal conduct is subject to
1. Concept and Scope punishment and restraint.

a. Prior Restraint (censorship) 2. Content-based and Content-neutral

regulations
Chavez vs. Gonzales G.R.No. 168338
February 15, 2008 a. Test

This refers to official governmental Chavez vs. Gonzales G.R.No. 168338

restrictions on the press or other forms February 15, 2008
of expression in advance of actual
publication or dissemination. Freedom A distinction has to be made whether the
from prior restraint is largely freedom restraint is (1) a content-
from government censorship of neutral regulation, i.e., merely concerned
publications, whatever the form of with the incidents of the speech, or one
censorship, and regardless of whether it that merely controls the time, place or
is wielded by the executive, legislative or manner, and under well defined
judicial branch of the government. Thus, standards;60 or (2) a content-
it precludes governmental acts that based restraint or censorship, i.e., the
required approval of a proposal to restriction is based on the subject matter
publish; licensing or permits as of the utterance or speech. 61 The cast of
prerequisites to publication including the the restriction determines the test by
payment of license taxes for the privilege which the challenged act is assayed with.
to publish; and even injunctions against
publication. Even the closure of the
business and printing offices of certain
newspapers, resulting in the b. Applications
discontinuation of their printing and
publication, are deemed as previous When the speech restraints take
restraint or censorship. 57 Any law or the form of a content-neutral
official that requires some form of regulation, only a substantial
permission to be had before publication governmental interest is required
can be made, commits an infringement of for its validity. Because regulations
the constitutional right, and remedy can of this type are not designed to
be had at the courts. suppress any particular message,
they are not subject to the strictest
b. Subsequent Punishment form of judicial scrutiny but
Clear and Present Danger.—Certain an intermediate approach—
expression, oral or written, may somewhere between the mere
rationality that is required of any
incite, urge, counsel, advocate, or
importune the commission of other law and the compelling
criminal conduct; other expression, interest standard applied to
content-based
such as picketing, demonstrating,
restrictions. The test is
and engaging in certain forms of
“symbolic” action, may either called intermediate because the
counsel the commission of criminal Court will not merely rubberstamp
the validity of a law but also
conduct or itself constitute criminal
conduct. Leaving aside for the require that the restrictions be
moment the problem of “speech- narrowly-tailored to promote an
plus” communication, it becomes important or significant
governmental interest that is
necessary to determine when
unrelated to the suppression of
expression. The intermediate
approach has been formulated in
this manner:
A governmental regulation is
sufficiently justified if it is within
the constitutional power of the
Government, if it furthers an
important or substantial
governmental interest; if the
governmental interest is unrelated
to the suppression of free
expression; and if the incident
restriction on alleged [freedom of
speech & expression] is no greater
than is essential to the furtherance
of that interest.
On the other hand, a governmental
action that restricts freedom of
speech or of the press based on
content is given the strictest
scrutiny in light of its inherent and
invasive impact. Only when the
challenged act has overcome
the clear and present danger
rule will it pass constitutional
muster, with the government
having the burden of overcoming
the presumed unconstitutionality.
Unless the government can
overthrow this presumption,
the content-based restraint will be
struck down.
With respect to content-
based restrictions, the government
must also show the type of harm
the speech sought to be restrained
would bring about— especially the
gravity and the imminence of the
threatened harm – otherwise the
prior restraint will be invalid. Prior
restraint on speech based on its
content cannot be justified by
hypothetical fears, "but only by
showing a substantive and
imminent evil that has taken the
life of a reality already on
ground." As formulated, "the
question in every case is whether
the words used are used in such
circumstances and are of such a
nature as to create a clear and
present danger that they will bring
about the substantive evils that
Congress has a right to prevent. It
is a question of proximity and
degree."
The regulation which restricts the
speech content must also serve an
important or substantial
government interest, which is
unrelated to the suppression of
free expression. (Chavez vs.
Gonzales G.R. No. 168338 February
15, 2008)
3. Facial challenges and Overbreadth
doctrine
Facial Challenge
James M. Imbong, et al. v. Hon. Paquito
N. Ochoa, Jr., et al., GR No. 204819, April
8, 2014, En Banc [Mendoza]
The application of doctrines originating
from the U.S. has been generally
maintained, albeit with some
modifications. While the Court has
withheld the application of facial
challenges to strictly penal statutes
(Romualdez v. Commission on Elections,
576 Phil. 357 [2008]; Romualdez v.
Sandiganbayan, 479 Phil. 265 [2004];
Estradfa v. Sandiganbayan, 421 Phil. 290
[2001]), it has expanded its scope to
cover statutes not only regulating free
speech, but also those involving religious
freedom, and other fundamental
rights(Resolution, Romualdez v.
Commission on Elections, 594 Phil. 305,
316 [2008]). The underlying reason for
this modification is simple. For unlike its
counterpart in the U.S., this Court, under
its expanded jurisdiction, is mandated by
the Fundamental Law not only to settle
actual controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable and
enforceable, but also to determine
whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of the
Government.
 Overbreadth doctrine
Jose Jesus M. Disini, Jr., et al. v. The
Secretary of Justice, et al., G.R. No.
203335, Feb. 11, 2014, En Banc [Abad]
Under the overbreadth doctrine, a proper
governmental purpose, constitutionally
subject to state regulation, may not be
achieved by means that unnecessarily
sweep its subject broadly, thereby
invading the area of protected freedoms.
But Section 4[a][3] does not encroach on
these freedoms at all. It simply punishes
what essentially is a form of vandalism,
the act of wilfully destroying without
right the things that belong to others, in
this case their computer data, electronic
document, or electronic data message.
Such act has no connection to guaranteed
freedoms. There is no freedom to destroy
other people’s computer systems and
private documents.
4. State Regulation of Different Types of
Mass Media
GMA Network v. Commission on
Elections, G.R. No. 205357, September 2,
2014
Where there is a need to reach a large
audience, the need to access the means
and media for such dissemination
becomes critical. This is where the press
and broadcast media come along. At the
same time, the right to speak and to
reach out would not be meaningful if it is
just a token ability to be heard by a few.
It must be coupled with substantially
reasonable means by which the
communicator and the audience could
effectively interactPolitical speech is one
of the most important expressions
protected by the Fundamental Law.
"[F]reedom of speech, of expression, and
of the press are at the core of civil
liberties and have to be protected at all
costs for the sake of democracy."
Accordingly, the same must remain
unfettered unless otherwise justified by a
compelling state interest.
5. Commercial Speech
Disini v. Secretary of Justice, G.R. No.
203335, February 18, 2014
To prohibit the transmission of
unsolicited ads would deny a person the
right to read his emails, even unsolicited
commercial ads addressed to him.
Commercial speech is a separate category
of speech which is not accorded the same
level of protection as that given to other
constitutionally guaranteed forms of
expression but is nonetheless entitled to
protection.The State cannot rob him of
this right without violating the
constitutionally guaranteed freedom of
expression. Unsolicited advertisements
are legitimate forms of expression.
6. Private vs Government Speech
Ang Ladlad LGBT Party v. Commission on
Elections, G.R. No. 190582, April 8, 2010
Freedom of expression constitutes one of
the essential foundations of a democratic
society, and this freedom applies not only
to those that are favorably received but
also to those that offend, shock, or
disturb.
Disini v. Secretary of Justice, G.R. No.
203335, February 18, 2014
Libel is unprotected speech and may be
penalized. The government has an
obligation to protect private individuals
from defamation. The cybercrime law
penalizing the author of a libelous online
statement or article is valid.
The Diocese of Bacolod v. Commission on
Elections, G.R. No. 205728, January 21,
2015
Speech with political consequences is at
the core of the freedom of expression
and must be protected by this court.
 7. Heckler’s Veto
In the free speech context, a heckler's
veto is either of two situations in which a
person who disagrees with a speaker's
message is able to unilaterally trigger events
that result in the speaker being silenced.
In the strict legal sense, a heckler's veto
occurs when the speaker's right is curtailed
or restricted by the government in order to
prevent a reacting party's behavior. The
common example is the termination of a
speech or demonstration in the interest of
maintaining the public peace based on the
anticipated negative reaction of someone
opposed to that speech or demonstration.
The term was coined by University of
Chicago professor of law Harry Kalven.
In common parlance, the term is used to
describe situations where hecklers or
demonstrators silence a speaker without
intervention of the law.
H. Freedom of Religion
1. Non-establishment Clause
a. Concept and Basis
In re: Holding of Religious Rituals at the
Hall of Justice Building in Quezon City,
A.M. No. 10-4-19-SC, March 7, 2017
The non-establishment clause reinforces
the wall of separation between Church and
State. It simply means that the State cannot
set up a Church; nor pass laws which aid
one religion, aid all religion, or prefer one
religion over another nor force nor
influence a person to go to or remain away
from church against his will or force him to
profess a belief or disbelief in any religion;
that the state cannot punish a person for
entertaining or professing religious beliefs
or disbeliefs, for church attendance or
nonattendance; that no tax in any amount,
large or small, can be levied to support any
religious activity or institution whatever
they may be called or whatever form they
may adopt or teach or practice religion; that
the state cannot openly or secretly
participate in the affairs of any religious
organization or group and vice versa. Its
minimal sense is that the state cannot
establish or sponsor an official religion.
b. Acts permitted and not
permitted by the clause
In re: Holding of Religious Rituals at the
Hall of Justice Building in Quezon City,
A.M. No. 10-4-19-SC, March 7, 2017
In the same breath that the
establishment clause restricts what the
government can do with religion, it also
limits what religious sects can or cannot
do. They can neither cause the
government to adopt their particular
doctrines as policy for everyone, nor can
they cause the government to restrict
other groups. To do so, in simple terms,
would cause the State to adhere to a
particular religion and, thus, establish a
state religion.
Father Bernas further elaborated on this
matter, as follows:
"In effect, what non-
establishment calls for is
government neutrality in
religious matters. Such
government neutrality may be
summarized in four general
propositions: (1) Government
must not prefer one religion
over another or religion over
irreligion because such
preference would violate
voluntarism and breed
dissension; (2) Government
funds must not be applied to
religious purposes because this
too would violate voluntarism
and breed interfaith dissension;
(3) Government action must not
aid religion because this too can
violate voluntarism and breed
interfaith dissension; [and] (4)
Government action must not
result in excessive entanglement
with religion because this too
can violate voluntarism and
breed interfaith dissension."
 c. Test

3. Tests
Imbong v. Ochoa, G.R. No. 204819, 8
April 2014 a. Clear and present danger test
In a situation where the free exercise of Victoriano vs. Elizalde Rope Workers
religion is allegedly burdened by Union G.R. No. L-25246 September 12,
government legislation or practice, the 1974
compelling state interest test in line with
the Court's espousal of the Doctrine of
The constitutional guaranty of free
Benevolent Neutrality in Escritor, finds
exercise and enjoyment of religious
application. In this case, the
profession and worship carries with it the
conscientious objector's claim to religious
right to disseminate religious
freedom would warrant an exemption
information. Any restraint of such right
from obligations under the RH Law,
can be justified like other restraints on
unless the government succeeds in
freedom of expression on the ground that
demonstrating a more compelling state
there is a clear and present danger of any
interest in the accomplishment of an
substantive evil which the State has the
important secular objective. Necessarily
right to prevent (American Bible Society
so, the plea of conscientious objectors for
v. City of Manila G.R. No. L-9637 April
exemption from the RH Law deserves no
30, 1957). It is only where it is
less than strict scrutiny.
unavoidably necessary to prevent
In applying the test, the first inquiry is an immediate and grave danger to the
whether a conscientious objector's right security and welfare of the community
to religious freedom has been burdened. that infringement of religious freedom
Accordingly, a conscientious objector may be justified, and only to the smallest
should be exempt from compliance with extent necessary to avoid the danger
the mandates of the RH Law. If he would
be compelled to act contrary to his
religious belief and conviction, it would
be violative of "the principle of non- b. Compelling State Interest
coercion" enshrined in the constitutional
right to free exercise of religion. Estrada vs Escritor : AM P-02-1651 :
August 4, 2003

The "compelling state interest" test is

2. Free Exercise Clause
proper where conduct is involved for the
whole gamut of human conduct has
In re: Holding of Religious Rituals at the different effects on the state's interests:
Hall of Justice Building in Quezon City, some effects may be immediate and
A.M. No. 10-4-19-SC, March 7, 2017 short-term while others delayed and far-
reaching. A test that would protect the
The Free Exercise Clause of the
interests of the state in preventing a
Constitution protects the freedom to
substantive evil, whether immediate or
believe and the freedom to act on one’s
delayed, is therefore necessary. The test
beliefs. The individual is free to believe
requires the state to carry a heavy
(or disbelieve) as he pleases concerning
burden, a compelling one, for to do
the hereafter. But where the individual
otherwise would allow the state to batter
externalizes his beliefs in acts or
religion, especially the less powerful ones
omissions that affect the public, his
until they are destroyed.
freedom to do so becomes subject to the
authority of the State.
 c. Conscientious Objector Test
In a situation where the free
exercise of religion is allegedly
burdened by government
legislation or practice, the
compelling state interest test in
line with the Court's espousal of
the Doctrine of Benevolent
Neutrality in Escritor, finds
application. In this case, the
conscientious objector's claim to
religious freedom would warrant
an exemption from obligations
under the RH Law, unless the
government succeeds in
demonstrating a more compelling
state interest in the
accomplishment of an important
secular objective. Necessarily so,
the plea of conscientious objectors
for exemption from the RH Law
deserves no less than strict
scrutiny.
In applying the test, the first
inquiry is whether a conscientious
objector's right to religious
freedom has been burdened. The
Court is of the view that the
obligation to refer imposed by the
RH Law violates the religious belief
and conviction of a conscientious
objector. Once the medical
practitioner, against his will, refers
a patient seeking information on
modem reproductive health
products, services, procedures and
methods, his conscience is
immediately burdened as he has
been compelled to perform an act
against his beliefs.
I.Liberty of Abode and Freedom of Movement
1. Limitations
The constitutional right to travel is not
absolute, it can only be restricted in the
interest of national security, public safety,
or public health, as may be provided by
law. As held in Silveriov. Court of Appeals:
Article III, Section 6 of the 1987
Constitution should be interpreted
to mean that while the liberty of
travel may be impaired even
without court order, the
appropriate executive officers or
administrative authorities are not
armed with arbitrary discretion to
impose limitations. They can
impose limits only on the basis of
national security, public safety, or
public health and as may be
provided by law, a limitive phrase
which did not appear in the 1973
text (The Constitution, Bernas,
Joaquin G., S.J., Vol. I, First Edition,
1987, p. 263). Apparently, the
phraseology in the 1987
Constitution was a reaction to the
ban on international travel
imposed under the previous
regime when there was a Travel
Processing Center, which issued
certificates of eligibility to travel
upon application of an interested
party.
2. Right to Travel
a. Watch-list and Hold departure
orders
A Watchlist Order (WLO) is a list of
persons who cannot leave the
country without first seeking
clearance from the Department of
Justice (DOJ). A Watchlist Order is
valid for sixty (60) days unless
terminated. The WLO may be
extended for a non-extendible
period of not more than sixty (60)
days. A Hold Departure Order
(HDO) stops an individual from
exiting Philippine territory. Hold
Departure Order is valid for five (5)
years unless terminated, reckoned
from the date of issuance.
The instances when an HDO may
be issued are as follows:
(a) Against the accused,
irrespective of nationality, in
criminal cases falling within the
jurisdiction of courts below the
Regional Trial Courts (RTCs).
(b) Against the alien whose
presence is required either as a
defendant, respondent, or witness
in a civil or labor case pending
litigation, or any case before an
administrative agency of the
government.
(c) Against any person, either
motu proprio, or upon the request
by the Head of a Department of
the Government; the head of a
constitutional body or commission;
the Chief Justice of the Supreme
Court for the Judiciary; the Senate
President or the House Speaker for
the Legislature, when the adverse
party is the Government or any of
its agencies or instrumentalities, or
in the interest of national security,
public safety or public
health. (Section 1, Department of
Justice Circular No. 41.)
The instances when a WLO may be
lifted or cancelled are as follows:
(a) Whent the validity of the WLO
has already expired;
(b) When the accused subject of
the WLO has been allowed by the
court to leave the country during
the pendency of the case or has
been acquitted of the charge
(c) When the preliminary
investigation or petition for review
or motion for reconsideration is
terminated. (Section5,
Department of Justice Circular No.
41.)
3. Return to one’s country
FERDINAND MARCOS, ET AL. VS. HON.
RAUL MANGLAPUS, ET AL., G.R. NO.
88211, September 15, 1989
The right to return to one’s country, a
totally distinct right under international
law, independent from, though related
to the right to travel. Thus, even the
Universal declaration of Human Rights
and the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights treat the right to
freedom of movement and abode within
the territory of the state, the right to
leave a country and the right to enter
one’s country as separate and distinct
rights.
The right to return to one’s country is not
among the rights specifically guaranteed
by the bill of rights, which treats only of
the liberty of abode and the right to
travel, but it is our well-considered view
that the right to return may be
considered as a generally accepted
principle of international law, under our
constitution, is part of the law of the
land.
J. Right to Information
1. Limitations
Chavez v. Public Estates Authority (G.R. No.
133250. July 9, 2002) thus laid down the
rule that the constitutional right to
information includes official information on
on-going negotiations before a final
contract. The information, however, must
constitute definite propositions by the
government and should not cover
recognized exceptions like privileged
information, military and diplomatic secrets
and similar matters affecting national
security and public order. In addition,
Congress has prescribed other limitations
on the right to information in several
legislations.

2. Publication Laws and Regulations
Tanada Vs Tuvera (136 SCRA 27 April 24,
1985) thus stated that Art. 2 of the Civil
Code does not preclude the requirement of
publication in the Official Gazette, even if
the law itself provides for the date of its
effectivity. The clear object of this provision
is to give the general public adequate notice
of the various laws which are to regulate
their actions and conduct as citizens.
Without such notice and publication, there
would be no basis for the application of the
maxim ignoratia legis nominem excusat. It
would be the height of injustive to punish or
otherwise burden a citizen for the
transgression of a law which he had no
notice whatsoever, not even a constructive
one.
3. Access to Court Records
Section 7, Article III of the Constitution
explains the peoples right to information on
matters of public concern in this manner:
Sec. 7. The right of the people to
information on matters of public
concern shall be
recognized. Access to official
records, and to documents, and
papers pertaining to official acts,
transactions, or decisions, as well
as to government research data
used as basis for policy
development, shall be afforded the
citizen, subject to such limitations
as may be provided by law.
(Emphasis supplied)
The State policy of full transparency in all
transactions involving public interest
reinforces the peoples right to information
on matters of public concern. This State
policy is expressed in Section 28, Article II of
the Constitution, thus:
Sec. 28. Subject to reasonable
conditions prescribed by law, the
State adopts and implements
a policy of full public disclosure of
all its transactions involving public
interest. (Emphasis supplied)
These twin provisions of the Constitution
seek to promote transparency in policy-
making and in the operations of the
government, as well as provide the people
sufficient information to exercise effectively
other constitutional rights. If the
government does not disclose its official
acts, transactions and decisions to citizens,
whatever citizens say, even if expressed
without any restraint, will be speculative
and amount to nothing. These twin
provisions are also essential to hold public
officials at all times x x x accountable to the
people, for unless citizens have the proper
information, they cannot hold public
officials accountable for anything. Armed
with the right information, citizens can
participate in public discussions leading to
the formulation of government policies and
their effective implementation. An informed
citizenry is essential to the existence and
proper functioning of any democracy.
4. Right to Information relative to:
a. Government contract
negotiations
Initiative vs Power Sector G.R. No.
192088, October 9, 2012.
The Court distinguished the duty to
disclose information from the duty to
permit access to information on matters
of public concern under Sec. 7, Art. III of
the Constitution. Unlike the disclosure of
information which is mandatory under
the Constitution, the other aspect of the
people’s right to know requires a demand
or request for one to gain access to
documents and paper of the particular
agency. The duty to disclose covers only
transactions involving public interest,
while the duty to allow access has a
broader scope of information which
embraces not only transactions involving
public interest, but any matter contained
in official communications and public
documents of the government agency.
Such relief must be granted to the party
requesting access to official records,
documents and papers relating to official
acts, transactions, and decisions that are
relevant to a government contract.
 b. Diplomatic Negotiations
Akbayan v Aquino G.R. No. 170516, July
16, 2008
Diplomatic negotiations, therefore, are
recognized as privileged in this
jurisdiction, the JPEPA negotiations
constituting no exception. It bears
emphasis, however, that such privilege is
only presumptive. For as Senate v. Ermita
holds, recognizing a type of information
as privileged does not mean that it will be
considered privileged in all instances.
Only after a consideration of the context
in which the claim is made may it be
determined if there is a public interest
that calls for the disclosure of the desired
information, strong enough to overcome
its traditionally privileged status.
K. Right of Association
In Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers Association, et
al. (G.R. No. L-25246, September 12, 1974), the
Supreme Court declared that the right to join a union
includes the right to abstain from joining any
union, for a right comprehends at least two broad
notions, namely: first, liberty or freedom, i.e., the
absence of legal restraint, whereby an employee
may act for himself without being prevented by law;
and second, power, whereby an employee may, as
he pleases, join or refrain from joining an
association. In as much as what both the
Constitution and the Labor Code have recognized
and guaranteed to the employee is the right to join
associations of his choice, it would be absurd to say
that the law also imposes, in the same breath, upon
the employee the duty to join associations.
L. Eminent Domain
1. Concept
In Republic, et al. v. Limbonhari& Sons, G.R.
No. 217956, November 16, 2016, Peralta, J,
the SC was confronted with the issue as to
whether title to a property which the State
took under the power of eminent domain
was transferred since there was no payment
of just compensation.
The right of eminent domain is usually
understood to be an ultimate right of the
sovereign power to appropriate any
property within its territorial sovereignty for
a public purpose. The nature and scope of
such power has been comprehensively
described as follows: (Jesus is Lord Christian
School Foundation, Inc. v. Municipality (now
City) of Pasig, Metro Manila, 503 Phil. 845
[2005])
2. Expansive concept of “public use”
Republic vs Borbon G.R. No. 165354,
January 12, 2015
Public use, in common acceptation,
means “use by the public.” However, the
concept has expanded to include utility,
advantage or productivity for the benefit
of the public.
To be valid, the taking must be for public
use. The meaning of the term “public
use” has evolved over time in response to
changing public needs and exigencies.
Public use which was traditionally
understood as strictly limited to actual
“use by the public” has already been
abandoned. “Public use” has now been
held to be synonymous with “public
interest,” “public benefit,” and “public
convenience.”
3. Just Compensation
a. Determination
Republic v. Mupas, G.R. No. 181892,
September 8, 2015
It is he full and fair equivalent of the
property taken from its owner by the
expropriator. Just compensation means
that the former owner must be returned
to the monetary equivalent of the
position that the owner had when the
taking occurred. We use the standard
value of b. Effect
"fair ofmarket
Delay value" of the
property at the time of the filing of the
complaint for expropriation or at the time
of the taking of property, whichever is
earlier.
 4. Abandonment of intended use and right
of repurchase
Mactan-Cebu International Airport
Authority v. Lozada, Sr. G.R. No. 176625
February 25, 2010
With respect to the element of public
use, the expropriator should commit to
use the property pursuant to the purpose
stated in the petition for expropriation
filed, failing which, it should file another
petition for the new purpose.If not, it is
then incumbent upon the expropriator to
return the said property to its private
owner, if the latter desires to reacquire
the same. Otherwise, the judgment of
expropriation suffers an intrinsic flaw, as
it would lack one indispensable element
for the proper exercise of the power of
eminent domain, namely, the particular
public purpose for which the property will
be devoted.
5. Miscellaneous Application
Hacienda Luisita Incorporated v.
Presidential Agrarian Reform Council,
G.R. No. 171101, July 5, 2011
In Agrarian Reform, The basic law allows
two (2) modes of land distribution: direct
and indirect ownership. Direct transfer to
individual farmers is the most commonly
used method by DAR and widely
accepted. Indirect transfer through
collective ownership of the agricultural
land is the alternative. By using the word
collectively, the Constitution allows for
indirect ownership of land and not just
outright agricultural land transfer. Thus,
allowing corporations or associations to
own agricultural land with the farmers
becoming stockholders or members does
not violate the agrarian reform policy
under the Constitution.
M. Contract Clause
1. Contemporary Application of the
Contract Clause
Social Weather Station v. Commission on
Elections, G.R. No. 208062, April 27, 2015
It is settled that "the constitutional
guaranty of non-impairment . . . is limited
by the exercise of the police power of the
State, in the interest of public health,
safety, morals and general welfare." "It is
a basic rule in contracts that the law is
deemed written into the contract
between the parties." The incorporation
of regulations into contracts is "a
postulate of the police power of the
State." [W]hile non-impairment of
contracts is constitutionally guaranteed,
the rule is not absolute, since it has to be
reconciled with the legitimate exercise of
police power, i.e., "the power to
prescribe regulations to promote the
health, morals, peace, education, good
order or safety and general welfare of the
people. x x x We do not see why public
welfare when clashing with the individual
right to property should not be made to
prevail through the state's exercise of its
police power.
This case does not involve a "capricious,
whimsical, unjust or unreasonable"
regulation. It effects the constitutional
policy of "guarantee[ing] equal access to
opportunities for public service" and is
impelled by the imperative of "fair"
elections.
N. Legal Assistance and free access to courts
People v. Rio G.R. No. 90294 September
24, 1991)
Sec11, ArtIII of the 1987 Constitution
imposes a duty on the judicial branch of
the government which can cannot be
taken lightly. "The Constitution", as aptly
stated in one case, "is a law for rulers and
for people equally in war and in peace
and covers with the shield of its
protection all classes of men at all times
and under all circumstances."
O. Rights of the Suspect
1. Availability
People v. Marra, et.al., G.R. No. 108494
September 20, 1994
Custodial investigation involves any
questioning initiated by law enforcement
officers after a person has been taken
into custody or otherwise deprived of his
freedom of action in any significant way.
It is only after the investigation ceases to
be a general inquiry into an unsolved
crime and begins to focus on a particular
suspect, the suspect is taken into
custody, and the police carries out a
process of interrogations that lends itself
to eliciting incriminating statements that
the rule begins to operate.
Manila Water Company v. Rosario, G.R.
No. 188747, January 29, 2014
The constitutional right to counsel is
available only during custodial
investigation. If the investigation is
merely administrative conducted by the
employer and not a criminal
investigation, the admission made during
such investigation may be used as
evidence to justify dismissal.
2. Requisites
Tanenggee v. People, G.R. No. 179448,
June 26, 2013
A person under custodial investigation is
guaranteed certain rights which attach
upon the commencement thereof, viz: (1)
to remain silent, (2) to have competent
and independent counsel preferably of
his own choice, and (3) to be informed of
the two other rights above.
3. Waiver
(d) Any extrajudicial confession made by a
person arrested, detained or under
custodial investigation shall be in writing
and signed by such person in the presence
of his counsel or in the latter's absence,
upon a valid waiver, and in the presence of
any of the parents, elder brothers and
sisters, his spouse, the municipal mayor, the
municipal judge, district school supervisor,
or priest or minister of the gospel as chosen
by him; otherwise, such extrajudicial
confession shall be inadmissible as evidence
in any proceeding.
(e) Any waiver by a person arrested or
detained under the provisions of Article 125
of the Revised Penal Code, or under
custodial investigation, shall be in writing
and signed by such person in the presence
of his counsel; otherwise the waiver shall be
null and void and of no effect. (Sec 2,
Republic Act No. 7438 April 27, 1992)
P. Rights of the Accused
Section 14(2), Article III of the 1987 Constitution
enumerates rights of the accused in all criminal
prosecutions, to wit:
(a) Right to be presumed innocent until the
contrary is proved;
(b) Right to be heard by himself and
counsel;
(c) Right to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation against him;
(d) Right to have a speedy, impartial, and
public trial;
(e) Right to meet the witnesses face to face;
and
(f) Right to have compulsory process to
secure the attendance of witnesses and the
production of evidence in his behalf.
The right to be presumed innocent refers to the
constitutional guarantee that the accused should be
treated as if innocent until he is proven guilty
beyond reasonable doubt.

The right to be heard is the heart of criminal due

process. Basically, it refers to all the mechanisms
afforded to the accused during the criminal
proceedings. It is a safeguard against prejudicial and
partial judgments by the courts, as well as a
guarantee that the accused be given an opportunity
to participate during trial in defense of himself.

Right to be informed is again an essential aspect of

procedural due process. The constitutional mandate
is complied with by the arraignment of the accused
in which he is informed by the court of the offense
charged to which the accused either pleads guilty of
not guilty.

Right to speedy trial is based on the maxim that

“justice delayed is justice denied.” Unreasonable
delays may result to a prolonged suffering of an
innocent accused or an evasion of justice by a truly
guilty person. It offends not just the accused but also
the State, inasmuch as what is at stake is the speedy,
inexpensive, and orderly administration of justice.
Undue postponements not only depletes the funds
of the defense but also of prosecution.

The right to confrontation enables the accused to

test the credibility of the witnesses. The right is
reinforced under the rules of criminal procedure by
the so-called cross-examination. Cross-examination
is conducted after the presentation and direct
examination of witnesses by the opposing side. Both
parties are allowed to test the veracity of the
testimonies presented by the other.

In the right to compulsory process, the form of

criminal proceeding is adversarial because two
opposing parties battle out against each other and
only one of them could emerge as victor. It is often
the case that the party with the weightier evidence
wins. In criminal proceedings, the accused needs
only to create reasonable doubt on the mind of the
court to be acquitted. Nevertheless, evidence is
difficult to find because of people’s anxiety in
testifying in court as well as their dislike for
burdensome court processes. In recognition
therefore of this fact, the law and the rules give the
accused the right to avail of compulsory means for
attendance of witnesses and production of needed
document or things.