FIRST DIVISION G.R. Nos.

162335 & 162605 December 12, 2005

Present: Davide, Jr., C.J. (Chairman),Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Carpio, and Azcuna, JJ.
SEVERINO M. MANOTOK IV, FROILAN M. MANOTOK, FERNANDO M. MANOTOK, FAUSTO MANOTOK III, MA. MAMERTA M. MANOTOK, PATRICIA L. TIONGSON, PACITA L. GO, ROBERTO LAPERAL
III, MICHAEL MARSHALL V. MANOTOK, MARY ANN MANOTOK, FELISA MYLENE V. MANOTOK, IGNACIO MANOTOK, JR., MILAGROS V. MANOTOK, SEVERINO MANOTOK III, ROSA R. MANOTOK, MIGUEL A.B. SISON,
GEORGE M. BOCANEGRA, MA. CRISTINA E. SISON, PHILIPP L. MANOTOK, JOSE CLEMENTE L. MANOTOK, RAMON SEVERINO L. MANOTOK, THELMA R. MANOTOK, JOSE MARIA MANOTOK, JESUS JUDE MANOTOK,

JR. and MA. THERESA L. MANOTOK, represented by their Attorney-in-fact, Rosa R. Manotok, Petitioners,
v.
HEIRS OF HOMER L. BARQUE, represented by TERESITA BARQUE HERNANDEZ, Respondents.
x ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

These consolidated petitions for review assail, in G.R. No. 162335, the February 24, 2004 Amended Decision[1]
of the Third Division of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 66642, ordering the Register of Deeds of Quezon City to
cancel petitioners’ TCT No. RT-22481 and directing the Land Registration Authority (LRA) to reconstitute respondents’
TCT No. 210177; and in G.R. No. 162605, the November 7, 2003 Amended Decision[2] of the Special Division of Five of
the Former Second Division in CA-G.R. SP No. 66700 directing the Register of Deeds of Quezon City to cancel
petitioners’ TCT No. RT-22481, and the LRA to reconstitute respondents’ TCT No. T-210177 and the March 12, 2004
Resolution[3] denying the motion for reconsideration.

The facts as found by the Court of Appeals[4] are as follows:

Petitioners, (respondents herein) as the surviving heirs of the late Homer Barque, filed a petition
with the LRA for administrative reconstitution of the original copy of TCT No. 210177 issued in the name
of Homer L. Barque, which was destroyed in the fire that gutted the Quezon City Hall, including the Office
of the Register of Deeds of Quezon City, sometime in 1988. In support of the petition, petitioners
submitted the owner’s duplicate copy of TCT No. 210177, real estate tax receipts, tax declarations and
the Plan FLS 3168 D covering the property.

Upon being notified of the petition for administrative reconstitution, private respondents
(petitioners herein) filed their opposition thereto claiming that the lot covered by the title under
reconstitution forms part of the land covered by their reconstituted title TCT No. RT-22481, and alleging
that TCT No. 210177 in the name of petitioners’ predecessors-in-interest is spurious.

On June 30, 1997, Atty. Benjamin M. Bustos, as reconstituting officer, denied the reconstitution of TCT No.
210177[5] on grounds that:

1. Lots 823-A and 823-B, Fls-3168-D, containing areas of 171,473 Sq. Mtrs. and 171,472
Sq. Mtrs., respectively, covered by TCT No. 210177, appear to duplicate Lot 823 Piedad Estate,
containing an area of 342,945 Sq. Mtrs., covered by TCT No. 372302 registered in the name of Severino
M. Manotok, et. al., reconstituted under Adm. Reconstitution No. Q-213 dated February 01, 1991;

2. The submitted plan Fls-3168-D is a spurious document as categorically stated by Engr.

Privadi J.G. Dalire, Chief, Geodetic Surveys Division, Land Management Bureau, in his letter dated
February 19, 1997.[6]

Respondents’ motion for reconsideration was denied in an order[7] dated February 10, 1998 hence they appealed
to the LRA.

The LRA ruled that the reconstituting officer should not have required the submission of documents other than the
owner’s duplicate certificate of title as bases in denying the petition and should have confined himself with the owner’s
duplicate certificate of title.[8] The LRA further declared:

Based on the documents presented, petitioners have established by clear and convincing
evidence that TCT NO. 210177 was, at the time of the destruction thereof, valid, genuine, authentic and
effective. Petitioners duly presented the original of the owner’s duplicate copy of TCT No. 210177 .... The
logbook of the Register of Deeds of Quezon City lists TCT No. 210177 as among the titles lost .... The
Register of Deeds of Quezon City himself acknowledged the existence and authenticity of TCT No.
210177 when he issued a certification to the effect that TCT No. 210177 was one of the titles destroyed
and not salvaged from the fire that gutted the Quezon City Hall on 11 June 1988 ....
Manotok v. barque 1
 It is likewise noteworthy that the technical description and boundaries of the lot reflected in TCT
No. 210177 absolutely conform to the technical description and boundaries of Lot 823 Piedad Estate ... as
indicated in the B. L. Form No. 28-37-R dated 11-8-94 and B. L. Form No. 31-10 duly issued by the
Bureau of Lands ....

It therefore becomes evident that the existence, validity, authenticity and effectivity of TCT No.
210177 was established indubitably and irrefutably by the petitioners. Under such circumstances, the
reconstitution thereof should be given due course and the same is mandatory.[9]

….

It would be necessary to underscore that the certified copy of Plan FLS 3168 D was duly issued
by the office of Engr. Ernesto Erive, Chief, Surveys Division LMS-DENR-NCR whose office is the lawful
repository of survey plans for lots situated within the National Capital Region including the property in
question. Said plan was duly signed by the custodian thereof, Carmelito Soriano, Chief Technical
Records and Statistics Section, DENR-NCR. Said plan is likewise duly supported by Republic of the
Philippines Official Receipt No. 2513818 Q dated 9-23-96 .... Engr. Erive in his letter dated 28 November
1996 addressed to Atty. Bustos … confirmed that a microfilm copy of Plan FLS 3168D is on file in the
Technical Records and Statistics Section of his office. Engr. Dalire, in his letter dated 2 January 1997
addressed to Atty. Bustos even confirmed the existence and authenticity of said plan. …

.…

The claim of Engr. Dalire in his letter dated 19 February 1997 that his office has no records or
information about Plan FLS 3168-D is belied by the certified copy of the computer print-out duly issued by
the Bureau of Lands indicating therein that FLS 3168D is duly entered into the microfilm records of the
Bureau of Lands and has been assigned Accession Number 410436 appearing on Page 79, Preliminary
Report No. 1, List of Locator Cards and Box Number 0400 and said computer print-out is duly supported
by an Offical Receipt ….

The said Plan FLS 3168D is indeed authentic and valid coming as it does from the legal
repository and duly signed by the custodian thereof. The documentary evidence presented is much too
overwhelming to be simply brushed aside and be defeated by the fabricated statements and concoctions
made by Engr. Dalire in his 19 February 1997 letter. …[10]

Nevertheless, notwithstanding its conclusion that petitioners’ title was fraudulently reconstituted, the LRA noted
that it is only the Regional Trial Court (RTC) which can declare that the same was indeed fraudulently reconstituted. It
thus opined that respondents’ title may only be reconstituted after a judicial declaration that petitioners’ title was void and
should therefore be cancelled.[11]

The dispositive portion of the LRA’s decision reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, it is hereby ordered that reconstitution of TCT No.
210177 in the name of Homer L. Barque, Sr. shall be given due course after cancellation of TCT No. RT-
22481 (372302) in the name of Manotoks upon order of a court of competent jurisdiction.

SO ORDERED.[12]

Petitioners’ filed a motion for reconsideration which was opposed by respondents with a prayer that reconstitution
be ordered immediately.

On June 14, 2001, petitioners’ motion for reconsideration and respondents’ prayer for immediate reconstitution
were denied.[13]

From the foregoing, respondents filed a petition for review[14] with the Court of Appeals docketed as CA-G.R. SP
No. 66700 and praying that the LRA be directed to immediately reconstitute TCT No. 210177 without being subjected to
the condition that petitioners’ TCT No. RT-22481 [372302] should first be cancelled by a court of competent jurisdiction.
[15] Petitioners likewise filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 66642.
Manotok v. barque 2
 In CA-G.R. SP No. 66700, the Second Division of the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision[16] on September 13,
2002, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered the assailed Resolution of the LRA dated
June 24, 1998 is AFFIRMED in toto and the petition for review is ordered DISMISSED. No
pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.[17]

Respondents moved for reconsideration.[18] On November 7, 2003, the Special Division of Five of the Former
Second Division rendered an Amended Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 66700, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, our decision dated 13 September 2002 is hereby reconsidered. Accordingly, the
Register of Deeds of Quezon City is hereby directed to cancel TCT No. RT-22481 of private respondents
and the LRA is hereby directed to reconstitute forthwith petitioners’ valid, genuine and existing Certificate
of Title No. T-210177.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.[19]

Petitioners’ motion for reconsideration of the amended decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 66700 was denied,[20] hence,
this petition docketed as G.R. No. 162605.

Meanwhile, in CA-G.R. SP No. 66642, the Third Division of the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision[21] on
October 29, 2003, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The Resolution of the LRA dated 24 June 1998 is
hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.[22]

In so ruling, the Third Division of the Court of Appeals declared that the LRA correctly deferred in giving due course
to the petition for reconstitution since there is yet no final judgment upholding or annulling respondents’ title.[23]

Respondents’ motion for reconsideration was granted by the Third Division of the Court of Appeals on February 24,
2004, thus:

WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration is hereby GRANTED. The Decision of this Court
dated 29 October 2003 is RECONSIDERED and a new one is entered ordering the Register of Deeds of
Quezon City to cancel petitioners’ TCT No. RT-22481 and directing the LRA to reconstitute forthwith
respondents’ TCT No. T-210177.

SO ORDERED.[24]

From the foregoing decisions of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 66700 and CA-G.R. SP No. 66642,
petitioners filed separate petitions for review before this Court docketed as G.R. No. 162605 and G.R. No. 162335,
respectively.

In G.R. No. 162605, petitioners argue that:

THE MAJORITY JUSTICES ACTED WITHOUT JURISDICTION IN ORDERING THE CANCELLATION

OF PETITIONERS’ EXISTING TITLE, CONSIDERING THAT:

a. THEY ORDERED THE CANCELLATION OF TITLE DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE SAME IS
NOT PART OF THE RELIEF SOUGHT IN A RECONSTITUTION PROCEEDINGS.
Manotok v. barque 3
 b. THEY ALLOWED A COLLATERAL ATTACK ON A TORRENS CERTIFICATE OF TITLE; and

c. THE COURT OF APPEALS, IN RESOLVING AN APPEAL OF THE DECISION OF THE LAND

REGISTRATION AUTHORITY, DOES NOT HAVE JURISDICTION TO ORDER THE
CANCELLATION OF TITLE, SINCE ONLY A PROPER REGIONAL TRIAL COURT CAN ORDER
THE ANNULMENT/CANCELLATION OF A TORRENS TITLE. BY ALLOWING A “SHORT CUT”,
THE MAJORITY JUSTICES DEPRIVED THE PETITIONERS OF THEIR PROPERTY AND
THEIR CONSTITUTIONALLY PROTECTED RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS OF LAW.

II

THE MAJORITY JUSTICES GRAVELY MISAPPLIED THE RULING OF THIS HONORABLE COURT IN
ORTIGAS V. VELASCO, CONSIDERING THAT:

a. IN THE ORTIGAS CASE, THERE WERE TWO TITLES EXISTING OVER THE SAME PARCEL
OF LAND, AS A RESULT OF THE RECONSTITUTED TITLE ISSUED IN THE NAME OF
MOLINA. IN THE INSTANT CASE, ONLY PETITIONERS HOLD TITLE TO THE PROPERTY IN
QUESTION, AS RESPONDENTS ARE MERELY TRYING TO HAVE TITLE RECONSTITUTED
IN THEIR NAMES.

b. IN ORTIGAS, THERE WERE SEVERAL DECISIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT WHICH

PREVIOUSLY RESOLVED THE ISSUE OF OWNERSHIP OF ORTIGAS’ PROPERTY. HENCE,
THERE WAS SUFFICIENT GROUND TO ANNUL MOLINA’S TITLE OUTRIGHT. IN THE
INSTANT CASE, THERE ARE NO SUCH DECISIONS IN FAVOR OF RESPONDENTS WHICH
WOULD JUSTIFY THE CANCELLATION OF THE TITLE OF PETITIONERS WITHOUT ANY
HEARING.[25]

In G.R. No. 162335, petitioners raise the following issues:

I. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS (THIRD DIVISION) COMMITTED GRAVE

ABUSE OF DISCRETION AND GROSS IGNORANCE OF THE LAW IN ORDERING THE LAND
REGISTRATION AUTHORITY TO CANCEL TCT NO. RT-22481 OF PETITIONERS MANOTOK
NOTWITHSTANDING THE FACT THAT SAID COURT WAS FULLY COGNIZANT THAT IT HAS NO
JURISDICTION TO EXERCISE SUCH AUTHORITY AND POWER AND THE LAND REGISTRATION
AUTHORITY IS EQUALLY DEVOID OF JURISDICTION ON THE MATTER BECAUSE UNDER THE
JUDICIARY REORGANIZATION ACT OF 1980 SPECIFICALLY SECTION 19 (2) THEREOF, ONLY THE
REGIONAL TRIAL COURTS HAVE EXCLUSIVE ORIGINAL JURISDICTION OVER CIVIL ACTIONS
WHICH INVOLVES TITLE TO, OR POSSESSION OF, REAL PROPERTY, OR ANY INTEREST
THEREIN.

II. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS (THIRD DIVISION) COMMITTED GRAVE

ABUSE OF DISCRETION AND GROSS IGNORANCE OF THE LAW IN INVOKING EQUITABLE
CONSIDERATION TO JUSTIFY ITS CHALLENGED AMENDED DECISION DATED FEBRUARY 24,
2004 DIRECTING LRA TO CANCEL PETITIONERS MANOTOK’S TITLE NOTWITHSTANDING THE
FACT, AS STATED, THE LAW EXPLICITLY VESTS EXCLUSIVE ORIGINAL JURISDICTION TO THE
REGIONAL TRIAL COURTS OVER CIVIL ACTIONS WHICH INVOLVES TITLE TO, OR POSSESSION
OF, REAL PROPERTY, OR ANY INTEREST THEREIN.

III. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF

DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN FAILING TO ORDER THE
SETTING ASIDE OF THE CHALLENGED RESOLUTION DATED JUNE 24, 1998 OF RESPONDENT
LAND REGISTRATION AUTHORITY IN LRC ADMIN. CASE NO. Q-547 [97] VIEWED FROM THE FACT
THAT SAID RESOLUTION OF LRA IS PATENTLY AT WAR WITH LAW AND CONTROLLING
JURISPRUDENCE THAT PROHIBITS RECONSTITUTION OF TITLE BY THIRD PARTY ALLEGED TO
HAVE BEEN LOST OR DESTROYED IF ANOTHER VALID TITLE IS EXISTING COVERING THE LAND
SUBJECT THEREOF.

IV. THE LRA COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR

IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN ORDERING THE RECONSTITUTION OF THE TITLE OF HOMER
Manotok v. barque 4
 BARQUE, SR. SUBJECT ONLY TO THE CONDITION THAT THE TITLE OF PETITIONERS MANOTOK
SHOULD FIRST BE ORDERED CANCELLED BY COURT OF COMPETENT JURISDICTION IN THE
FACE OF THE GLARING FACTS THAT SAID TITLE IS HIGHLY SUSPECT AND BEARS BADGES OF
FABRICATION AND FALSIFICATION AND THEREFORE NO OTHER LOGICAL AND CREDIBLE
CONCLUSION CAN BE DRAWN EXCEPT THAT IT IS A FAKE AND SPURIOUS TITLE.

V. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF

DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN ALLOWING
RESPONDENTS’ MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION WHICH WAS CLEARLY FILED OUT OF TIME.
[26]

On August 2, 2004, the petition in G.R. No. 162605 was consolidated with the petition in G.R. No. 162335.[27]

In sum, petitioners contend that (a) the LRA has no authority to annul their title; (b) the reconstitution of
respondents’ Torrens title would be a collateral attack on petitioners’ existing title; (c) they were not given the opportunity
to be heard, specifically the chance to defend the validity of their Torrens title; (d) the Court of Appeals, in resolving the
appeal from the LRA, has no jurisdiction to order the cancellation of petitioners’ title; and (e) the ruling in Ortigas was
misapplied.

The petitions must be denied.

The LRA properly ruled that the reconstituting officer should have confined himself to the owner’s duplicate
certificate of title prior to the reconstitution. Section 3 of Republic Act (RA) No. 26[28] clearly provides:

Section 3. Transfer certificates of title shall be reconstituted from such of the sources hereunder
enumerated as may be available, in the following order:

(a) The owner’s duplicate of the certificate of title;

....

When respondents filed the petition for reconstitution, they submitted in support thereof the owner’s duplicate
certificate of title, real estate tax receipts and tax declaration. Plainly, the same should have more than sufficed as
sources for the reconstitution pursuant to Section 3 of RA No. 26 which explicitly mandates that the reconstitution shall be
made following the hierarchy of sources as enumerated by law. In addition, Section 12 of the same law requires that
the petition shall be accompanied with a plan and technical description of the property only if the source of the
reconstitution is Section 3(f) of RA No. 26. Thus:

Section 12. … Provided, That in case the reconstitution is to be made exclusively from sources
enumerated in section 2(f) or 3(f) of this Act, the petition shall further be accompanied with a plan and
technical description of the property duly approved by the Chief of the General Land Registration Office,
or with a certified copy of the description taken from a prior certificate of title covering the same property.
[29]

Since respondents’ source of reconstitution is the owner’s duplicate certificate of title, there is no need for the
reconstituting officer to require the submission of the plan, much less deny the petition on the ground that the submitted
plan appears to be spurious. By enumerating the hierarchy of sources to be used for the reconstitution, it is the intent of
the law to give more weight and preference to the owner’s duplicate certificate of title over the other enumerated sources.

The factual finding of the LRA that respondents’ title is authentic, genuine, valid, and existing, while petitioners’
title is sham and spurious, as affirmed by the two divisions of the Court of Appeals, is conclusive before this Court. It
should remain undisturbed since only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court.

Findings of fact of administrative bodies are accorded respect, even finality by this Court and, when affirmed by
the Court of Appeals, are no longer reviewable except only for very compelling reasons. Basic is the rule that factual
findings of agencies exercising quasi-judicial functions … are accorded not only respect but even finality, aside from the
consideration that this Court is essentially not a trier of facts.[30]
Manotok v. barque 5
 Such questions as whether certain items of evidence should be accorded probative value or weight, or rejected as
feeble or spurious, or whether or not the proofs on one side or the other are clear and convincing and adequate to
establish a proposition in issue, are without doubt questions of fact. Whether or not the body of proofs presented by a
party, weighed and analyzed in relation to contrary evidence submitted by adverse party, may be said to be strong, clear
and convincing; whether or not certain documents presented by one side should be accorded full faith and credit in the
face of protests as to their spurious character by the other side; whether or not inconsistencies in the body of proofs of a
party are of such gravity as to justify refusing to give said proofs weight – all these are issues of fact. Questions like these
are not reviewable by this court which, as a rule, confines its review of cases decided by the Court of Appeals only to
questions of law raised in the petition and therein distinctly set forth.[31] A petition for review should only cover questions
of law. Questions of fact are not reviewable.[32]

In Dolfo v. Register of Deeds for the Province of Cavite,[33] this Court categorically declared:

Second. Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals made a factual finding that petitioner’s title
to the land is of doubtful authenticity.

Having jurisdiction only to resolve questions of law, this Court is bound by the factual findings of
the trial court and the Court of Appeals....

In view of the foregoing, it is no longer necessary to remand the case to the RTC for the determination of which
title, petitioners' or respondents', is valid or spurious. This has been ruled upon by the LRA and duly affirmed by the two
divisions of the Court of Appeals.

The LRA has the jurisdiction to act on petitions for administrative reconstitution. It has the authority to review,
revise, reverse, modify or affirm on appeal the decision of the reconstituting officer. The function is adjudicatory in nature
– it can properly deliberate on the validity of the titles submitted for reconstitution. Logically, it can declare a title as sham
or spurious, or valid on its face. Otherwise, if it cannot make such declaration, then there would be no basis for its
decision to grant or deny the reconstitution. The findings of fact of the LRA, when supported by substantial evidence, as
in this case, shall be binding on the Court of Appeals.[34]

In the reconstitution proceedings, the LRA is bound to determine from the evidence submitted which between or
among the titles is genuine and existing to enable it to decide whether to deny or approve the petition. Without such
authority, the LRA would be a mere robotic agency clothed only with mechanical powers.

The Court of Appeals also properly exercised its appellate jurisdiction over the judgment of the LRA. Under
Sections 1 and 3, Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, the appellate court has jurisdiction on appeals from judgments or final
orders of the LRA, whether the appeal involves questions of fact, of law, or mixed questions of fact and law.

Indeed, it would be needlessly circuitous to remand the case to the RTC to determine anew which of the two titles
is sham or spurious and thereafter appeal the trial court’s ruling to the Court of Appeals. After all, the LRA and the two
divisions of the appellate court have already declared that petitioners’ title is forged. In Mendoza v. Court of Appeals,[35]
we ruled that:

Now, technically, the revocation and cancellation of the deed of sale and the title issued in virtue
thereof in de los Santos’ favor should be had in appropriate proceedings to be initiated at the instance of
the Government. However, since all the facts are now before this Court, and it is not within de los
Santos’ power in any case to alter those facts at any other proceeding, or the verdict made
inevitable by said facts, for this Court to direct at this time that cancellation proceedings be yet
filed to nullify the sale to de los Santos and his title, would be needlessly circuitous and would
unnecessarily delay the termination of the controversy at bar, .... This Court will therefore make
the adjudication entailed by the facts here and now, without further proceedings, as it has done in
other cases in similar premises.

No useful purpose will be served if a case or the determination of an issue in a case is remanded to the trial court
only to have its decision raised again to the Court of Appeals and then to the Supreme Court. The remand of the case or
of an issue to the lower court for further reception of evidence is not necessary where the Court is in position to resolve

Manotok v. barque 6
the dispute based on the records before it and particularly where the ends of justice would not be subserved by the
remand thereof.[36]

The Register of Deeds, the LRA and the Court of Appeals have jurisdiction to act on the petition for administrative
reconstitution. The doctrine laid down in Alabang Dev. Corp., et al. v. Hon. Valenzuela, etc., et al.[37] does not apply in
the instant case. In Alabang, the Court stressed that:

… [L]ands already covered by duly issued existing Torrens Titles … cannot be the subject of petitions
for reconstitution of allegedly lost or destroyed titles filed by third parties without first securing by final
judgment the cancellation of such existing titles. … The courts simply have no jurisdiction over petitions
by such third parties for reconstitution of allegedly lost or destroyed titles over lands that are already
covered by duly issued subsisting titles in the names of their duly registered owners. The very concept of
stability and indefeasibility of titles covered under the Torrens System of registration rules out as
anathema the issuance of two certificates of title over the same land to two different holders thereof. …
[38]

The Alabang ruling was premised on the fact that the existing Torrens title was duly issued and that there is only
one title subsisting at the time the petition for reconstitution was filed. In the instant case, it cannot be said that
petitioners’ title was duly issued much less could it be presumed valid considering the findings of the LRA and the Court
of Appeals that the same is sham and spurious.

The Court of Appeals properly applied the doctrine laid down in Ortigas in refusing to remand the case to the trial
court. As expressly declared in Ortigas & Company Limited Partnership v. Velasco:[39]

Ordinarily, the relief indicated by the material facts would be the remand of the reconstitution case
(LRC No. Q-5405) to the Court of origin with instructions that Ortigas’ and the Solicitor General’s appeals
from the judgment rendered therein, which were wrongly disallowed, be given due course and the records
forthwith transmitted to the appellate tribunal. This, in fact, is a relief alternatively prayed for by petitioner
Ortigas. Considering however the fatal infirmities afflicting Molina’s theory or cause of action, evident
from the records before this Court, such a remand and subsequent appeal proceedings would be
pointless and unduly circuitous. Upon the facts, it is not possible for Molina’s cause to prosper. To defer
adjudication thereon would be unwarranted and unjust.

The same rationale should apply in the instant case. As already discussed, the validity of respondents’ and
petitioners’ title have been squarely passed upon by the LRA and reviewed and affirmed by the Court of Appeals, which
factual findings are no longer reviewable by this Court.

A careful examination of the case of Spouses Cayetano, et al. v. CA, et al.,[40] where this Court, as claimed by
petitioners, have affirmed their title over the disputed property, would reveal that the sole issue resolved therein is whether
or not a tenancy relationship exists between the parties.[41] There was no adjudication on ownership. In fact, it cannot
even be discerned if the property subject of the Spouses Cayetano case refers to the property subject of the instant
controversy.

There is no basis in the allegation that petitioners were deprived of “their property” without due process of law
when the Court of Appeals ordered the cancellation of their Torrens title, even without a direct proceeding in the RTC. As
already discussed, there is no need to remand the case to the RTC for a re-determination on the validity of the titles of
respondents and petitioners as the same has been squarely passed upon by the LRA and affirmed by the appellate court.
By opposing the petition for reconstitution and submitting their administratively reconstituted title, petitioners acquiesced to
the authority and jurisdiction of the reconstituting officer, the LRA and the Court of Appeals, and recognized their authority
to pass judgment on their title. All the evidence presented was duly considered by these tribunals. There is thus no basis
to petitioners’ claim that they were deprived of their right to be heard and present evidence, which is the essence of due
process.

As held in Yusingco v. Ong Hing Lian:[42]

Therefore, it appearing from the records that in the previous petition for reconstitution of
certificates of title, the parties acquiesced in submitting the issue of ownership for determination in the
Manotok v. barque 7
 said petition, and they were given the full opportunity to present their respective sides of the issues and
evidence in support thereof, and that the evidence presented was sufficient and adequate for rendering a
proper decision upon the issue, the adjudication of the issue of ownership was valid and binding.

The reconstitution would not constitute a collateral attack on petitioners’ title which was irregularly and illegally
issued in the first place.[43] As pertinently held in Dolfo v. Register of Deeds for the Province of Cavite:[44]

The rule that a title issued under the Torrens System is presumed valid and, hence, is the best
proof of ownership of a piece of land does not apply where the certificate itself is faulty as to its purported
origin.

In this case, petitioner anchors her arguments on the premise that her title to the subject property
is indefeasible because of the presumption that her certificate of title is authentic. However, this
presumption is overcome by the evidence presented, consisting of the LRA report … that TCT No. T-
320601 was issued without legal basis …

….

Thus, petitioner cannot invoke the indefeasibility of her certificate of title. It bears emphasis that
the Torrens system does not create or vest title but only confirms and records one already existing and
vested. Thus, while it may be true, as petitioner argues, that a land registration court has no jurisdiction
over parcels of land already covered by a certificate of title, it is equally true that this rule applies only
where there exists no serious controversy as to the authenticity of the certificate.

Under similar circumstances, this Court has ruled that wrongly reconstituted certificates of title secured through
fraud and misrepresentation cannot be the source of legitimate rights and benefits.[45]

WHEREFORE, the petitions are DENIED. In G.R. No. 162335, the February 24, 2004 Amended Decision of the
Third Division of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 66642, ordering the Register of Deeds of Quezon City to cancel
petitioners’ TCT No. RT-22481 and directing the Land Registration Authority to reconstitute respondents’ TCT No.
210177; and in G.R. No. 162605, the November 7, 2003 Amended Decision of the Special Division of Five of the Former
Second Division in CA-G.R. SP No. 66700 directing the Register of Deeds of Quezon City to cancel petitioners’ TCT No.
RT-22481, and the Land Registration Authority to reconstitute respondents’ TCT No. T-210177 and the March 12, 2004
Resolution denying the motion for reconsideration, are AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR: HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR. Chief Justice, LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING Associate Justice, ANTONIO T. CARPIO Associate Justice, ADOLFO S. AZCUNA Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion
of the Court’s Division.

[1] Rollo of G.R. No. 162335, pp. 113-118. Penned by Associate Justice Eubulo G. Verzola and concurred in by Associate Justices Remedios Salazar-Fernando and Edgardo F. Sundiam.
[2] Rollo of G.R. No. 162605, pp. 56-66. Penned by Associate Justice Buenaventura J. Guerrero and concurred in by Associate Justices Eloy R. Bello, Jr., Edgardo P. Cruz and Danilo B. Pine. Associate Justice
Juan Q. Enriquez, Jr., dissented.
[3] Rollo of G.R. No. 162605, pp. 71-73.
[4] In CA-G.R. SP No. 66700, Rollo of G.R. No. 162605, pp. 56-57.
[5] Rollo of G.R. No. 162605, p. 86.
[6] Id.
[7] Id. at 87.
[8] Id. at 90.
[9] Id. at 91.
[10] Id. at 92.
[11] Id. at 94.
[12] Id. at 95.
[13] Id. at 97.
[14] Id. at 99-121.

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[15] Id. at 119.
[16] Id. at 236-240. Penned by Associate Justice Juan Q. Enriquez, Jr. and concurred in by Associate Justices Buenaventura J. Guerrero and Eloy R. Bello, Jr.
[17] CA-G.R. SP No. 66700, Rollo of G.R. No. 162605, p. 240.
[18] Id. at 273-293.
[19] Id. at 65.
[20] Id. at 73.
[21] CA-G.R SP No. 66642, Rollo of G.R. No. 162335, pp. 106-111. Penned by Associate Justice Eubulo G. Verzola and concurred in by Associate Justices Remedios Salazar-Fernando and Edgardo F.
Sundiam.
[22] Id. at 110.
[23] Id.
[24] Id. at 117.
[25] Rollo of G.R. No. 162605, pp. 22-23.
[26] Rollo of G.R. No. 162335, pp. 35-37.
[27] Rollo of G.R. No. 162605, p. 386.
[28] AN ACT PROVIDING A SPECIAL PROCEDURE FOR THE RECONSTITUTION OF TORRENS CERTIFICATES OF TITLE LOST OR DESTROYED.
[29] Section 3 of RA No. 26 provides:
Section 3. Transfer certificates of title shall be reconstituted from such of the sources hereunder enumerated as may be available, in the following order:
(a) The owner’s duplicate of the certificate of title;
(b) The co-owner’s, mortgagee’s, or lessee’s duplicate of the certificate of title;
(c) A certified copy of the certificate of title, previously issued by the register of deeds or by a legal custodian thereof;
(d) The deed of transfer or other document, on file in the registry of deeds, containing the description of the property, or an authenticated copy thereof, showing that its
original had been registered, and pursuant to which the lost or destroyed transfer certificate of title was issued;
(e) A document, on file in the registry of deeds, by which the property, the description of which is given in said document, is mortgaged, leased or encumbered, or an
authenticated copy of said document showing that its original had been registered; and
(f) Any other document which, in the judgment of the court, is sufficient and proper basis for reconstituting the lost or destroyed certificate of title.
[30] Bataan Shipyard and Engineering Corp. v. NLRC, 336 Phil. 193, 204 [1997].
[31] Paterno v. Paterno, G.R. No. 63680, March 23, 1990, 183 SCRA 630, 636-637.
[32] Villanueva v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 143286, April 14, 2004, 427 SCRA 439, 449.
[33] G.R. No. 133465, September 25, 2000, 341 SCRA 58, 62-63.
[34] Section 10, Rule 43 of the Rules of Court.
[35] G.R. No. L-62089, March 9, 1988, 158 SCRA 508, 514.
[36] Heirs of Crisanta Y. Gabriel-Almoradie v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 91385, January 4, 1994, 229 SCRA 15, 29.
[37] 201 Phil. 727 [1982].
[38] Id. at 744.
[39] G.R. Nos. 109645 & 112564, July 25, 1994, 234 SCRA 455, 500-501.
[40] 215 Phil. 430 [1984].
[41] Id. at 436.
[42] 149 Phil. 688, 709 [1971].
[43] Heirs of Pael v. Court of Appeals, 423 Phil. 67, 69 [2001].
[44] Supra at 63 & 66.
[45] Jose v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 85157, December 26, 1990, 192 SCRA 735, 741.

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