CASE # 8 OFELIA TY VS.

CA AND EDGARDO REYES

(New Civil Code governs.)
Article 40 – Exception to the Rule
In 1977, Reyes married Anna Maria Villanueva in a civil ceremony. They had a church wedding in the
same year as well. In 1980, the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of QC declared their marriage
as null and void; the civil one for lack of marriage license and the subsequent church wedding due to
the lack of consent of the parties. In 1979, prior to the JDRC decision, Reyes married Ofelia. Then in
1991, Reyes filed for an action for declaration of nullity of his marriage with Ofelia. He averred that
they lack a marriage license at the time of the celebration and that there was no judicial declaration
yet as to the nullity of his previous marriage with Anna. Ofelia presented evidence proving the
existence of a valid marriage license including the specific license number designated. The lower
court however ruled that Ofelia’s marriage with Reyes is null and void. The same was affirmed by the
CA applying the provisions of the Art 40 of the FC.
ISSUE: Whether or not the absolute nullity of the previous of marriage of Reyes can be invoked in
the case at bar.
HELD: Art. 40 of the FC provides that, “The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked
for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage
void.” This means that before one can enter into a second marriage he must first acquire a judicial
declaration of the nullity of the previous marriage and such declaration may be invoked on the basis
solely of a final judgment declaring the previous marriage as void. For purposes other than
remarriage, other evidences may be presented and the declaration can be passed upon by the
courts. In the case at bar, the lower court and the CA cannot apply the provision of the FC. Both
marriages entered by Reyes were solemnized prior to the FC. The old CC did not have any provision
that states that there must be such a declaration before remarriage can be done hence Ofelia’s
marriage with Reyes is valid. The provisions of the FC (took effect in ’87) cannot be applied
retroactively especially because they would impair the vested rights of Ofelia under the CC which
was operational during her marriage with Reyes.
CASE # 32 JOCSON VS. EMPIRE INSURANCE COMPANY
(New Civil Code Governs)
Facts: Agustin Jocson, who was appointed guardian of the persons and properties of his minor children
Carlos, Rodolfo, Perla, Enrique and Jesus, had a bond filed with Empire Insurance Co. for surety and
managed his children’s properties that included war damage payments, which formed part of their
inheritance from their mother. In the course of the guardianship, Agustin submitted periodic accounts
to the court for expenses for education and clothing of the children.After his death, Perla, who had
already reached age of majority and thereafter appointed guardian of her still minor brothers Enrique
and Jesus, filed a petition for the reopening of Agustin’s accounts, claiming that illegal disbursements
were made from the guardianship funds for education and clothing. Upon reaching age of majority,
Enrique and Jesus adopted the petition and moved for declaration of illegality of disbursements—which
Empire Insurance Co. and Agustin’s administratrix appealed from—on the ground that these should
have come instead from the support, which they were entitled to receive from their father.

Issue: W/N the petitioners-appellants’ contention their father’s disbursements from their guardianship
funds are illegal are valid

Ruling: No. The Court ruled that right to support (which includes education and clothing) must be
demanded and established before it becomes payable. It does not arise from the petitioners’ mere
relationship with their father. “The need for support, as already stated, cannot be presumed and
especially must this be true in the present case where it appears that the minors had means of their
own.” Therefore, the disbursements made by Agustin, which were even sanctioned by the lower court,
are not illegal. Claim for support should also be done in a separate action, not in guardianship
proceedings. Judgment affirmed; without costs since (case) is a pauper’s appeal.

Art. 298. The obligation to give support shall be demandable from the time the person who has a right
to receive the same needs it for maintenance, but it shall not be paid except from the date it is
extrajudicial demanded.
Payment shall be made monthly in advance, and when the recipient dies, his heirs shall not be
obliged to return what he has received in advance.

Discussion:

The law says that support should be paid, under the premises given, from the date of extrajudicial
demand. Where the Court held that the support must be paid, not necessarily from the time the child
was born, but from the date extrajudicial demand.

An action for support may still prosper despite an error in selecting a more favourable venue.
Judgment for support does not prescribe, but instalments do prescribe if uncollected; remedy is
motion for execution.

If the case involves past, present, and future, support, it should be noted that Future Support is
also asked for. This is something on which there can be No Compromise. It is still in the interest of
substantial justice, the plaintiffs should be allowed to amend. This is not lack of jurisdiction; this merely
seeks to complete the statement of a cause of action.

Art. 290. Support is everything that is indispensable for sustenance, dwelling, clothing and medical
attendance, according to the social position of the family.
Support also includes the education of the person entitled to be supported until he completes his
education or training for some profession, trade or vocation, even beyond the age of majority.

Discussion:

1. Support Maybe:

1. Natural (bare necessities of life), which is completely indispensable for recipient to survive;

2. Civilly (in accordance with financial standing), which is necessary according to the civil and social life
of the recipient;

3. Legal from (provisions of law), provided by the law;

4. Voluntary (from agreement or from provision of a will), created by will of man, also called contractual
support which is governed by law the law on obligations and contracts;

5. Inter-vivos, during one’s lifetime;

6. Mortis causa, created by will;

7. Permanent, characterized by regularity;

8. Temporary, like support pending litigation (support pendent lite)

9. General, to meet all the needs of the recipient; and

10. Special or Specific, as when it refers to one’s need for education

2. Support Includes:

a. Food or sustenance
b. Dwelling or Shelter
c. Clothing
 d. Medical Attendance
e. Education

3. Effect of Reaching Age of Majority

Support for education shall continue up to the completion of one’s course, even beyond the age
of majority. If a person is of age and no longer studies, she/he is still entitled to support unless there are
just reasons for the extinguishment of the right. If on the other hand, he has not yet finished his/her
studies even if already of age, he/she is still entitled generally to be supported. Of course, if the person
supporting dies, the obligation stops.
CASE # 56 ANTONIO VS. REYES
484 SCRA 353 – Civil Law – Family Code – Annulment of Marriage – Article 45 (3) distinguished from
Psychological Incapacity (Article 36)
In 1990, Leonilo Antonio married Marie Ivonne Reyes, who was ten years older than Leonilo. In 1993,
Leo filed a petition to annul their marriage due to the alleged psychological incapacity of Reyes.
Leonilo claimed that Marie persistently lied about herself, the people around her, her occupation,
income, educational attainment and other events or things. She would claim that she is a
psychologist but she is not. She’d claim she is a singer with the company Blackgold and that she is
the latter’s number 1 money maker but she’s not. She’d also spend lavishly as opposed to her
monthly income. She fabricates things and people only to serve her make-believe world.
Leonilo presented an expert who testified to Reyes’s psychological incapacity. Reyes denied all of
Leonilo’s allegations and she also presented an expert to prove her case. The RTC ruled against
Reyes and declared their marriage void. Meanwhile, The Matrimonial Tribunal of the church also
annulled the marriage and was even affirmed by the Vatican’s Roman Rata. However, the Court of
Appeals reversed the decision hence the appeal.
ISSUE: Whether or not Marie Ivonne Reyes is psychologically incapacitated.
HELD: Yes, Reyes was proven to be psychologically incapacitated.
In this cases also, the Supreme Court emphasized what fraud or misrepresentation means as
contemplated in Article 45 (3) of the Family Code vis-a-vis Article 46. But first, it must be stated: in
Psychological Incapacity, the misrepresentation done by Reyes points to her inadequacy to cope
with her marital obligations, kindred to psychological incapacity. In Article 45 (3), marriage may be
annulled if the consent of either party was obtained by fraud, and Article 46 which enumerates the
circumstances constituting fraud under the previous article, clarifies that “no other misrepresentation
or deceit as to character, health, rank, fortune or chastity shall constitute such fraud as will give grounds
for action for the annulment of marriage.” These provisions of Article 45 (3) and Article 46 cannot be
applied in the case at bar because the misrepresentations done by Reyes is not considered as fraud
but rather such misrepresentations constitute her aberrant behaviour which further constitutes
Psychological Incapacity. Her misrepresentations are not lies sought to vitiate Leonilo’s consent to
marry her. Her misrepresentations are evidence that Marie cannot simply distinguish fiction/fantasy
from reality which is so grave and it falls under the fourth guideline laid down in the Molina Case.

Set of Strict Standards in the Interpretation of Art 36 of the Famiy Code Established in the Molina
Case (RP vs CA and Molina)
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt
should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its
dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the
validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article on the
Family, recognizing it “as the foundation of the nation.” It decrees marriage as legally “inviolable,”
thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are
to be “protected” by the state.
The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and emphasizes their
permanence, inviolability and solidarity.
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically
identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the
decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological—not
physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must
convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such an extent
that the person could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not
have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so
as not to limit the application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis, nevertheless
such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully
explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at “the time of the celebration”of the
marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their “I
do’s.” The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must
have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable.
Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily
absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the
assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the
exercise of a profession or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing
illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to cure them but may not be psychologically
capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as an essential obligation of marriage.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the
essential obligations of marriage. Thus, “mild characterological peculiarities, mood changes,
occasional emotional outbursts” cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as
downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words,
there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the
personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby
complying with the obligations essential to marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the
Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same
Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be
stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic
Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our
courts. It is clear that Article 36 was taken by the Family Code Revision Committee from Canon 1095
of the New Code of Canon Law, which became effective in 1983 and which provides:
“The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who are unable to assume the essential
obligations of marriage due to causes of psychological nature.”
Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is to harmonize our civil laws with
the religious faith of our people, it stands to reason that to achieve such harmonization, great
persuasive weight should be given to decisions of such appellate tribunal. Ideally— subject to our law
on evidence—what is decreed as canonically invalid should also be decreed civilly void.
This is one instance where, in view of the evident source and purpose of the Family Code provision,
contemporaneous religious interpretation is to be given persuasive effect. Here, the State and the
Church—while remaining independent, separate and apart from each other—shall walk together in
synodal cadence towards the same goal of protecting and cherishing marriage and the family as the
inviolable base of the nation.
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to
appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General
issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his
agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along with the
prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such certification within fifteen (15) days from the
date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge
the equivalent function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095.