Species: A Modest Propasal 31

chance of formulating a one-size-fits-all criterion that would allow us

to recognize species across the different branches and thus enable us to
measure the overall species richness of a region. One way of responding
to the diversity of species concepts, then, is to conclude that the pros-
pects for a species-richness based account of biodiversity are grim both
practically and theoretically. They are grim practically because species
lists are compiled using different species definitions, and these are not
equivalent. They are grim theoretically because there is no single across-
the-board criterion that we could use to make taxonomic databases con-
sistent and well motivated. In 2.3, we argue that this is a much too pes-
simistic assessment of species-richness based accounts of biodiversity.

2.2 species, species concepts, and speciation

One response to the plethora of species definitions has been plural-

ism, the idea that there is no single, right species definition. However,
pluralism in this context is worrying, for it seems to undermine the
idea that species richness measures biodiversity. How could that be true
unless we had an invariant species concept to use in counting biodiver-
sity (see Mishler 1999, 313)? This is a legitimate concern, but we think
it can be met. In 1.2 we distinguished between two forms of plural-
ism. Investigation-specific pluralists think that different theorists with
their different explanatory agendas can legitimately describe one and
the same biological system in quite different ways. A given population
might be a valid species for a morphologist but not for a population
geneticist. Philip Kitcher is a pluralist about species in this sense (see
Kitcher 1984a; 1984b). Whatever its merits, this form of pluralism is
no threat to the idea that we can compare the diversity of different
biological systems by estimating their species richness. In contrast, sys-
tem-specific pluralists think that different biological systems need to
be characterized in quite different ways. Thus, for example, John Dupré
(1993) argues that different types of organisms will be best classified us-
ing different criteria for specieshood. We think there are indeed crucial
biological differences between the mechanisms that maintain the phe-
notypic and ecological integrity of lineages. As plenty of commentators
have noted, the biological species concept, with its focus on barriers to
gene flow between lineages, fits animals better than plants. So this form
of pluralism does potentially challenge the idea that species are a com-
mon currency of biodiversity measurement. In section 2.3, we recognize
the diversity of biological processes that cause lineages to split. Even so,
we argue that a version of an evolutionary species concept can underpin
a species-based account of biodiversity.