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(Derek Hook) Critical Psychology (B-Ok - Xyz)
(Derek Hook) Critical Psychology (B-Ok - Xyz)
Critical Psychology
Editor:
Critical Psychology is an approach rather than a Editor:
theory, an orientation towards psychological
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knowledge and practice, an to relations of power.
It cuts across the various sub-disciplines and includes
diverse theoretical perspectives and forms of practice.
Derek Hook
Derek Hook
This exciting text offer a broad and flexible Section Editors:
introduction to critical psychology and explores the
socio-political contexts of post-apartheid South Africa.
It expands on the theoretical resources usually Nhlanhla Mkhize
referred to in the field of critical psychology e.g.
Marxism, Psychoanalysis, Post-structuralism and
Feminism by providing substantive discussions on
Peace Kiguwa
Black Consciousness, Post-colonialism and Africanist
forms of critique. Anthony Collins
Critical Psychology
Critical Psychology contains a wealth of material,
and critical perspectives spread across theoretical, Consulting Editors:
practical and distinctly South African levels of
application, featuring chapters on racism, community
development, HIV/Aids as well as participatory action Erica Burman
forms of research.\
The Editors:
Ian Parker
Derek Hook, formerly of the Psychology Department
at the University of the Witwatersrand, is a lecturer in
Social Psychology at the London School of Economics.
He has acted as co-editor of Psychopathology and Social
Prejudice (2002) and Developmental Psychology (2002)
- both University of Cape Town Press titles.
Nhlanhla Mkhize teaches in the Psychology
Department at the University of KwaZulu-Natal,
Pietermaritzburg.
Peace Kiguwa teaches in the Psychology Department,
School of Human and Community Development,
University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg.
Anthony Collins teaches in the Psychology Department
at the University of KwaZulu-Natal, Durban.
Erica Burman is Professor of Psychology and Women’s
Studies at Manchester Metropolitan University, UK.
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CP_Prelims 11/2/04 4:37 pm Page i
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Critical Psychology
Editor:
Derek Hook
Section Editors:
Nhlanhla Mkhize
Peace Kiguwa
Anthony Collins
Consulting Editors:
Erica Burman
Ian Parker
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The authors and the publisher believe on the strength of due diligence exercised that this work does not contain
any material that is the subject of copyright held by another person. In the alternative, they believe that any
protected pre-existing material that may be comprised in it has been used with appropriate authority or has been
used in circumstances that make such use permissible under the law.
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Contents
Contributors.......................................................................................................... xi
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Nhlanhla Mkhize
16 Activity Theory as a framework for psychological
research and practice in developing societies ............................. 425
Hilde van Vlaenderen & David Neves
Learning outcomes ...................................................................................... 425
Introduction ................................................................................................ 426
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viii
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ix
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Index................................................................................................................... 645
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Contributors
Brett Bowman is a researcher at the Institute for Social and Health Sciences of
the University of South Africa, Pretoria. His current research interests include
the investigation of race, racism and other social asymmetries in post-
apartheid South Africa. His PhD research is a genealogical examination of
South African paedophiles. He is the co-editor of a multimedia CD-Rom (1999)
entitled From method to madness: Five years of qualitative enquiry, published
by Histories of the Present Press.
presented more than sixty papers at local and international conferences. His
books include Detention and torture in South Africa (David Phillip, Cape
Town, 1987), Mental health policy issues for South Africa (MASA, Pinelands,
1997). Professor Foster has bachelors and honours degrees from Stellenbosch
University, a master’s degree from the University of London, and obtained his
PhD at Cambridge University.
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Derek Hook was, until recently, a lecturer in Psychology at the University of the
Witwatersrand. He is currently a lecturer at the London School of Economics.
A co-editor of Psychopathology and Social Prejudice and Developmental
Psychology (both of UCT Press, 2002), he maintains a variety of research inter-
ests, stretching from political applications of psychoanalysis, to the history of
postcolonial theory and Foucaultian notions of power. His PhD focussed on
technologies of power in psychotherapy. He has acted as editor on special
editions of Psychology in Society and South African Journal of Psychology.
Catriona Macleod obtained her undergraduate and PhD degrees from the
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University of KwaZulu-Natal, and her HDE, honours and masters from the
University of Cape Town. She is currently working as a senior lecturer in the
Psychology Department of the University of Fort Hare, East London. Her
major areas of research interest are adolescent sexual and reproductive health
and inclusive education.
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David Neves is a registered research psychologist who has lived and worked in
Eastern Cape and KwaZulu-Natal. His research interests and external research
consultancy work have centred on cognition and social development.
Tamara Shefer is currently Director of Women and Gender Studies and Asso-
ciate Professor of Psychology at the University of the Western Cape, Cape
Town. Her research and published works have been primarily in the area of
gender, power and sexualities and she has also been co-editor of two South
African texts directed at authorship development: Contemporary issues in
human development and Discourses on difference, discourses on oppression.
She also has a strong interest and teaching experience in the areas of feminist
and qualitative research methodologies and philosophical and political issues
in research.
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Hilde van Vlaenderen obtained her PhD degree from Rhodes University,
Grahamstown, where she lectured in research methodology for 12 years. She
has worked in several African countries and her research and teaching interests
focus on participatory community development, local knowledge and organi-
sational development. She uses Activity Theory as a framework for much of
her work. She currently lives in France, where she works as an independent
international researcher and consultant.
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Section
1
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Theoretical resources
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Summary
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Anthony Collins
It makes sense that this book should begin with a section entitled ‘Theoretical
resources’ for, unlike mainstream psychology, critical psychology does not
begin with the scientific project of gathering new data but rather with exam-
ining the ways in which existing knowledge is organised. The primary problem
is not finding out new facts but rather reinterpreting how things are under-
stood and showing the implications of those forms of understanding. Unlike
traditional psychological science, which sees facts as the starting point and
theoretical interpretation of those facts as a late and relatively minor part of
the production of knowledge, critical psychology is interested in the theories
themselves, exploring the effects of different assumptions, ideas, concepts and
interpretations.
Critical psychology begins by rejecting the assumption that there can be
such a thing as a neutral presentation of objective facts. All explanations are
interpretations – those that deny this by making claims to universal scientific
truth are simply made more dangerous by their attempt to hide their own
perspective. The following chapters, in different ways, all show up the tradi-
tional assumptions about the truthfulness of certain psychological ideas. To
claim to speak the truth is to claim authority, to have the final say in explaining
or defining things and, most importantly, to silence all those who would say
things differently. In questioning traditional claims to authority, critical
psychology seeks clear spaces for those who have been silenced, ignored,
explained away, pathologised, marginalised or otherwise oppressed, and in
such spaces to open up discussions, permit new ways of speaking, and allow
different people to speak. In this, the challenge to traditional knowledge is a
challenge to those in power, and the questioning of ideas is the first step in
asserting new values, new freedoms, new ways of imagining oneself, and new
ways of conducting one’s life.
One of the problems is that challenging received forms of knowledge is no
easy task. How do we think beyond the categories we were taught to think
with? How do we escape the limits of our own ideas, especially those that are
most taken for granted, those that are so ingrained that we have come to accept
them as common sense? One way is to highlight contradictions, both within a
particular conceptual system and using one part against the other. Another is
to use two systems against each other, showing how elements from one prob-
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lematise elements of the other. Yet a third is simply to show the consequences
of taking an approach to its logical extreme, especially where the consequences
are quite different from those that the supporters of that approach might have
wished. But all of these necessarily involve working at a higher level of intellec-
tual abstraction than everyday thought or even scientific research requires.
They involve complex explorations of the interrelations between ideas and the
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Critical Psychology
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ideas and the social systems responsible for that psychological brutalisation.
Hook traces the links between Fanon’s ideas and the work of South African
Black Consciousness leader Steve Biko, showing how Biko’s political activism
stressed the importance of not simply overthrowing the political system of
apartheid but also of overcoming the negative sense of self internalised by
victims of racism.
Hook takes the analysis of Fanon even further, showing that his work not
only provides a model for anti-colonial transformation but in fact offers a
general model for critical psychology. Fanon does this by providing an alterna-
tive way of understanding psychological breakdown. Whereas psychology
tends to trace symptoms back to some failure in the individual, Fanon makes
it clear that most psychological problems have their roots in problems in
broader society. Where psychology blames the victim for his or her own
problems, Fanon reveals the brutality inherent in the social order. Fanon thus
politicises psychology, linking the needs for personal healing and radical social
change. While some commentators interpret Fanon as having abandoned
psychology for political activism, Hook goes on to give a detailed reading of
Fanon’s reworking of specific psychoanalytic concepts, showing how his work
is innovative and important precisely in articulating the links between the
psychological and political domains.
In his chapter Parker takes this exploration of the critical uses of psycho-
analytic concepts further in a more general discussion of psychoanalysis and
critical psychology. Whereas scientific psychology simply asks whether a
particular claim is true or false, Parker highlights the importance of examining
the social effects of adopting particular theoretical frameworks. He shows that
different articulations of psychoanalysis have consequences ranging from the
conservative to the potentially liberating. From the outset we are cautioned
against the dangers of essentialism – the tendency to explain our socially
constructed ways of being as natural and inevitable. Psychology does this by
ignoring the social dimension and attributing the ways we are to an underlying
human nature: a fixed, very often biological condition from which we cannot
escape. This denies the possibility of social change and leads us passively to
accept the current social existence as a reflection of a universal human condi-
tion. A frequent danger of uncritical psychology is that it takes culturally
specific assumptions about people and presents them as universal of human
nature in exactly this way.
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Critical Psychology
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highlighting the underlying tension between the majority who have to work
and the privileged minority who enjoy the profits made by exploiting that
labour. Marxist theory thus not only reveals gross differences in power within
that system but also provides a damning indictment by showing the human
cost of capitalist society. It thus provides a critical social theory that is some-
times missing from critical psychology – a necessary tool to prevent critical
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showing how masculinity and femininity were socially constructed roles that
people learned rather than being the natural result of biological makeup.
Psychology has tended to assume not only that there are two separate and
opposed genders but also that each of them is stable and internally coherent.
Even somewhat more critical models that put gender on a continuum, with a
range of possible positions between extremes of masculinity and femininity,
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Critical Psychology
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accepted that each individual could be safely pinned down at some fixed point
along that line.
Shefer shows how post-structuralist feminism has developed a profound
and far-reaching critique of these ideas, shifting the question away from ‘What
is gender?’ to ‘How is gender constructed?’. It reveals how language and
discourse produce gender, and how gender is complicated, changing and
contradictory even within the same individual. Post-structuralist feminists
further shift the understanding of gender away from what one is, to what one
does: gender as coming into being through continual specific practices. This
presents a radically different way of conceptualising gender from that offered
by traditional psychology, and one that opens completely different possibili-
ties for critical intervention into the problems produced by current gender
arrangements. Not only can we fundamentally change the social organisation
of gender inequality, but Shefer conveys the importance of rethinking what
gender is, so that we can re-imagine who we are and transform ourselves
through our shifting understandings and enactments of our own identities.
In the final two chapters of the section, Hook explores the significance of
Michel Foucault’s work for critical psychology, going deeper into some of the
issues of post-structuralism raised by Shefer. Here again the question is shifted
from ‘Who am I?’ to ‘How have I been constructed?’. But the radical innovation
in Foucault’s critique lies in shifting the latter question away from the tradi-
tional psychological query ‘What psychological forces have shaped me?’ and
instead asking a question about psychology itself: ‘How has the discipline of
psychology made people come to think about themselves in particular ways,
fundamentally changing what they are and what they do?’. Foucault enables us
to ask what psychology is, not in terms of its findings, claims and theories but
rather in terms of what its real social function is: why it came into existence,
and what effects it has.
Here psychology is shown to be part of a fundamental shift in forms of
social control, away from terrorising people into obedience with threats of
brutal punishment and instead towards understanding the causes of deviance.
Psychology is part of a process of observing, documenting and explaining
human life. It produces norms and categories: what people should be like, how
to classify and explain them if they are different. In so doing it produces a
profound shift in how people come to experience themselves, a shift in what
they in fact are. It produces self-regulating individuals who are constantly
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In the final chapter of this section Hook looks more deeply at the links
between psychology and power. He shows how Foucault moves us away from
the idea of state (or capital, in the Marxist model) as a centralised point from
which power is controlled and exercised over citizens, and instead reveals
modern government as an array of techniques and resources that work
together to produce overall effects. Its aim is not to enforce obedience but to
enhance the life of citizens, to optimise their health, wealth and happiness; and
precisely in so doing to enhance the power of the state. Psychology can thus be
seen as one of these technologies of power. It offers us ways of knowing
ourselves, of helping ourselves, of being ourselves that make us participate
more intimately in exactly these new forms of power. Not only in its academic
knowledge and professional practice, but also in self-help books, talk shows,
advice columns, personal growth courses and a range of popular ideas and
practices does psychology help people eagerly to produce themselves as good,
healthy, productive and responsible citizens.
This analysis throws traditional critique off balance, because we are no
longer seen as outside of and against power, opposing the way it tries to stop
us from being ourselves. Nor is the problem with psychology those points
where it collaborates with repression – racism, sexism and the denial of rights
or freedoms. We ourselves, and psychology in its very helpfulness and effec-
tiveness, are the mechanisms and technologies of power. Hence Foucault’s
suggestion that ‘our goal nowadays is not to discover what we are, but to refuse
who we are’, that we need to develop a more radical and far-reaching analysis
that even questions our own deepest desires, the aspects of ourselves we
believe to be most personal and true, in our ongoing attempt to move beyond
the limits of what is given.
These chapters, though dense and varied, are by no means a comprehen-
sive overview of the range of theoretical resources available to critical
psychology. Critical psychology is a diverse and growing area with a long,
though largely unrecognised history. Major areas within the field, such as the
anti-psychiatry movement, the Frankfurt School, important critiques of posi-
tivism and the cultural studies of science, to name but a few, have been
omitted. There are still more possible resources that exist in other fields but
which have not yet been tapped by critical psychology. None the less, the
reader who engages with this material will find a starting point for thought,
debate and action, and will, one hopes, be stimulated to investigate these
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fertile areas further, taking up some of the urgent challenges raised by these
authors. These chapters simply provide suggestions of some of the possibili-
ties, marking a few key concepts and providing some useful tools that will, one
hopes, provide an incentive for future critical intellectual work – a task that, as
Hayes suggests, will not be complete until the day when there is no critical
psychology, because all psychology is critical.
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Chapter
1
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Critical psychology:
The basic co-ordinates
Derek Hook
LEARNING OUTCOMES
By the end of this chapter, you should be able to:
Discuss the idea of critical psychology as a critical orientation towards psycho-
logical knowledge and practice that affects how we think about the theory, context
and practice of psychology
Provide examples of how psychology and power might be linked, of how psychology
may itself be political
Discuss what psychological imperialism might mean in a South African context
Elaborate on how psychology might operate as a powerful form of knowledge
Discuss how psychology works as a powerful way of depoliticing experience, of
knowing one's self, as a powerful form of subjectivity.
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Critical Psychology
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introduction that draws out the ways in which the chapters locate and respond
to the various imperatives that make up critical psychology; I shall comment
on each only briefly.
The theoretical resources section forms the conceptual backdrop to how we
understand much of what is politically problematic about the knowledges and
practices of psychology. This section demonstrates some of the ways in which
psychology is ideological, oppressive, Eurocentric, and how we might respond
to these crises of knowledge, practice and politics in a critical manner. Certain
traditional critical tools are applied here – Marxism, feminism, psycho-
analysis, post-structuralism – as are some newer ones, such as post-colonial
and Africanist forms of critique. The second section focuses on concerns
particularly germane to the southern African (or ‘Third World’) situation more
generally. Ongoing concerns of poverty, racism and HIV/Aids are addressed
and perspectives on community intervention, development, African
feminism(s), on what a black South African psychology might actually mean,
are all presented. The last section is about forms of practice – new ways of
making psychology more politically responsive, more active in contesting
traditional authority structures in psychology, more active in responding to
grassroots needs in South Africa. It includes explanations of Activity Theory, of
Participatory Action Research, discourse analysis, of the emotional compo-
nents of the typically unstated emotional-political subtexts of community
psychology. It also includes discussions of critical research objectives in critical
psychology, and of liberation psychology – that is, the ways in which
psychology may be usefully used to conceptualise how power works, how
various forms of oppression and inequality come to take hold and function,
and the ways in which they may be contested.
Although it is unnecessary to go into any more detail about these contents
here, it is useful to provide a loose thematic discussion of the key features of
what we take critical psychology to be. I shall do this by ‘playing out’ a number
of key themes or concerns in critical psychology. These themes may be taken as
ways of holding together the diverse activities, theoretical perspectives and
practical imperatives of critical psychology – themes that knit the seemingly
fragmentary component parts of critical psychology together. Such themes
may also be thought of as problematics, at least in view of the fact that they
point to a series of vital and vexing concerns that have motivated the emer-
gence of critical psychology in the first place.
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always gives rise to relationships of power. This is not just a question of how
clinical psychologists or research psychologists relate to their ‘subjects’, that is,
their clients (or ‘patients’), those on whom they are conducting research (or
studying) – although this in itself is a vital concern of critical psychology. We
are also concerned here with the kinds of knowledge that psychologists
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Critical Psychology
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produce, that kinds of knowledge that are ideological inasmuch as they priori-
tise certain views of the world over others, in that they marginalise certain
voices, gloss over certain kinds of social contradiction and ultimately collude
with larger structures of power.
It is this realisation more than any other that would seem to lie at the heart
of critical psychology, the realisation that psychology is not a neutral ‘science’,
not an unbiased, simply objective way of knowing the world. On the contrary,
power ‘runs in the veins’ of psychology; there is no form of psychological
Psychological knowledge or practice that does not set up or support a certain relationship of
knowledge, psycho- power. It is this fact more than any other that motivates the efforts, practices
logical expertise and critiques of critical psychology.
and practice always
constitute a power-
relationship of some
PSYCHOLOGY AS IDEOLOGICAL
sort or another.
Just as critical psychology endeavours to play up the very political nature of
psychology, so the traditional or mainstream practices and applications of
psychology have, historically, attempted to do just the opposite, to play down
this political nature. This avoidance of the political questions – that is, the
questions of power – of which psychology is part, is one way of pointing to the
ideological functioning of power. What do we mean by ideological? A number
of complementary notions of ideology are offered in this book, one of which
states basically that ideology might be understood as the ways in which
meaning serves to create and to sustain relations of power and domination.
Our second theme, then, in understanding critical psychology (which
extends the first) is the awareness that psychology functions in ideological
ways which have, for the most part outside of the domain of critical
psychology, gone largely unexamined. Hence Hayes’ (1989) understatement:
‘The study of ideology has not been a central issue in the history of psychology’
(84). Hayes is making two points here, drawing our attention to the facts both
of psychology’s omission of ideology as an important focus of study, and of
psychology’s own immanently (yet unadmitted) political nature. The link
between these two points is not at first clear, although Hayes’ further
comments make this articulation more evident. There could, Hayes (1989)
claims, be at least two possible ways of addressing the issue of ideology in
psychology, one which at basis is critical, another which at basis is substantive:
The critical dimension refers to the knowledge claims and the ontological status
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Critical Psychology
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ingly scientific, based on an objective, neutral ‘knowing’ of the world that thus
sells itself as ‘the truth’. Critical psychology is concerned with this supposed
truthfulness, with what has ‘fallen out of the picture’ in mainstream psycho-
logical depictions of the world, with how psychology produces what counts as
knowledge, and with how this knowledge is put to use in ways which detract
our attention from real, concrete relations of power within the world.
At the very broadest level, then, one of critical psychology’s basic preoccu-
pations lies with those ‘taken-for-granted’ assumptions concerning reality,
human nature and knowledge that are reflected and perpetuated by
psychology. Why is this such a vital concern of critical psychology? Well, to re-
emphasise the point, because the knowledge produced by psychology is not
simply a neutral and objective reflection of how the world is, but is rather a
kind of knowledge that is produced by a certain group, in certain ways, and for
certain interests. For this reason it becomes imperative to ask: who is
producing psychological knowledge, and for whom is this knowledge being
produced? The knowledge of psychology, to put things somewhat differently,
is not disinterested or impartial, nor is it universal. This is our fourth theme:
an awareness of the fact that psychological knowledge operates to extend rela-
tions of power.
PSYCHOLOGICAL IMPERIALISM
In saying that psychology produces powerful kinds of knowledge, we need be
aware that the knowledges of psychology are exclusionary, that is, they exclude
a great number of people in their attentions and priorities. Here we see a vital
concern for an African critical psychology: a critical attention to how partic-
ular forms of knowledge, generated within and particular to the ‘First World’
come to be generalised, assumed to be universal, and hence applied to non-
Western settings in prescriptive ways. We might understand this as the
imperialism of Western psychology. (The notion of the ‘First World’ is obvi-
ously questionable and problematic, since it implies a moral evaluation of the
‘First World’ as superior to the ‘Third World’; I use the term here as a way of
indicating the pervasiveness of this particular tendency to prioritise US-
American or European values and understandings.)
The question of the ideological nature of much knowledge produced by
psychology is not only a question of who is producing knowledge and for
or applicable copyright law.
whom; it is also a question of how such knowledge is approached and what are
the mechanisms, the particular methodologies and procedures used to
produce such kinds of knowledge. It is a questioning of what psychology’s
underlying assumptions are, the philosophical lenses that come to condition
its ‘truths’. All of these are liable to produce ideologically skewed or unrepre-
sentative kinds of knowledge. Given their Western ‘First World’ origin, these
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types of knowledge may be less than helpful – if not in fact actively harmful –
or applicable copyright law.
in African contexts and especially so if they have not first understood the
cultural contexts, the concepts, the beliefs, the worldviews of Africans. We
need be critically aware, in other words, of how psychology is a particular way
of approaching and making knowledge – hence what is called for is a critical
attention to its modes of knowing, its ways of doing research, the procedures it
uses in examining the world, and the concepts it assumes. In addition to this,
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Critical Psychology
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We need be
we need also a vigilance regarding how psychology imposes categories of expe-
critically aware of rience, ways of knowing over, in opposition to, older ways of knowing and
how psychology is a understanding the world, which it is typically disrespectful of. As Nhlanhla
particular way of Mkhize makes us aware in his two chapters, first, all psychologies are tied to
approaching and
making knowledge –
historical contexts and, secondly, when we are speaking about exclusionary
what is called for is kinds of knowledge, we are referring to nothing less than the marginalisation
a critical attention of the lived experiences of others.
to its modes of
knowing, its ways of
doing research, the DEPOLITICISING EXPERIENCE
procedures it uses in
examining the Another vital consideration of critical psychology is to be found in the claim
world, and the that much psychology has actively depoliticised our understanding of
concepts it assumes. ourselves and our world. Mainstream psychology has traditionally chosen
types of analysis that ignore pressing political contexts of culture, of
economics, of social power – of factors such as poverty and cultural and
economic marginalisation – in favour of abstracted, decontextualised and, of
course, psychologised descriptions of the world and the individual’s place
within it. As a number of chapters in the book argue, psychological research
has historically been dominated by issues of interest to the ‘First World’.
Knowledge production of this sort has traditionally been unconcerned with
political issues and, even less so, with political change. Furthermore, very little
psychological research has been directed towards improving the everyday lives
Critical psychology of underprivileged communities or towards explaining the processes of rapid
is concerned with
how psychology social change in developing countries. As such, one potential role for a critical
impacts on our psychology that is politically interested – that is, concerned with implementing
identities, how it social betterment and/or change – and that does aim to contribute to the
plays a part in specific concerns and interests of the developing world is exactly that of
making us who we
are by providing the
providing knowledge and services of social development in a rural African
technical vocabulary development context.
and concepts that
enable us to
examine ourselves, WAYS OF KNOWING OURSELVES
to practise and
Critical psychology is concerned with how psychology creates ways of under-
develop ourselves in
the terms it standing ourselves, frameworks of popular knowledge, for example, through
provides. which we begin to ‘know’ and speak of ourselves, through which we come to
regulate and control our behaviours. Critical psychology is concerned with
or applicable copyright law.
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Critical Psychology
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‘PSYCHOPOLITICS’
Here it is useful to draw on the notion of a ‘psychopolitics’, which may be taken
to refer to the explicit politicisation of the psychological. We can read the
notion of a psychopolitics in at least two ways, both of which helpfully illus-
trate what critical psychology is about. Such a politicisation may refer to the
critical process by which we place a series of ostensibly psychological concerns
and concepts within the register of the political and thereby show up the extent
to which human psychology is intimately linked to, and in some ways condi-
tioned or limited by, the sociopolitical and historical forces of its situation.
Likewise, such a politicisation may refer to the critical process by which we
employ psychological concepts, explanations and even modes of experience to
Critical psychology describe and illustrate the workings of power. The hope in this respect is that
involves questions by being able to analyse the political in such a psychological way, we might be
of the psychological able to think strategically about how we should intervene in ‘the life of power’,
processes,
dynamics, capacities
without reducing power to nothing but the psychological. Put differently, we
and practices might say that liberation psychology is a key component part to what we have
through which been calling critical psychology. What is liberation psychology? Well, as Foster
people may achieve describes it in his chapter, liberation psychology involves questions of the
emancipation,
freedom, liberation
psychological processes, dynamics, capacities and practices through which
and escape from people may achieve emancipation, freedom, liberation and escape from partic-
particular power ular power structures of oppression and exploitation. The engagement and
structures of critique of the power of psychology, and the psychological engagement and
oppression and
exploitation.
critique of power, are two very broad conceptualisations of critical psychology
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ative for much critical psychology today. Looking over some of the key texts in
critical psychology, we find what seems to be a disproportionate attention paid
to the conceptual and ideological problems in much of mainstream
psychology, a focusing of intellectual activity on theoretical and ideological
levels. While this is no doubt absolutely crucial, if we are properly to ‘follow
through’ on critical psychology’s promise as both an intellectual and a practical
form of criticism, we need to balance this intellectual attention with concrete
activity. It is not enough for critical psychology to remain a theoretically
oriented critique of ideology. Critical psychology needs to do more than ‘take
apart’ from afar. It needs to do more than critically deconstruct and evaluate
psychology as a system of knowledge and values, without formulating alterna-
tive ways and means of seeing and acting in the world. It does not carry its
critique far enough if it does only this: it remains too far removed from the
object of its criticism.
After all, if mainstream psychology is as much about knowledge as about
practice, then critical psychology – as exactly the critical engagement with the
relationships between power and psychology – need equally involve both intel-
lectual and practical components. As two of the book’s contributors, Hilde van
Vlaenderen and David Neves put it, a South African critical psychology needs
to move beyond the applied level of ideological critique to consider ways of
refashioning itself so as to serve an emancipatory and socially transformative
agenda that is properly responsive to the demands of a developing society.
In post-apartheid South Africa a psychology of political commitment and
action involves very practical concerns of redress, of community involvement
and assistance in areas which may traditionally be seen as lying outside of what
a Eurocentric psychology should concern itself with. Grassroots needs outside
of a delineated focus on the singular individual become pressing here, as do
questions of social and/or community resources not often prioritised by US-
American or European types of psychological intervention. Likewise, different
social and political crises come more immediately to the fore here, suggesting
a reformulation not only of the practices of psychology – and its contours as a
discipline – but of how one thinks about its core areas of concern. Quite
evidently, a South African critical psychology needs to address and engage as
central and even primary the sociopolitical concerns of its location. The
pressing concerns of ongoing social inequality, of the effects and circumstance
of poverty, of a rampant HIV/Aids problem, of globalised underdevelopment
or applicable copyright law.
– these are items which are at the top of the agenda as we think of what a refor-
mulated and uniquely South African psychology, and a South African critical
psychology, will be. And in this reformulation, the hope is that a discourse
from the South will not only challenge the discourses and institutions of the
North but suggest altogether new modes of practice also.
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Critical Psychology
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Before we ask ‘What is critical psychology?’, inner workings to the exclusion of the
perhaps we should ask ‘Why?’. Why is critical surrounding relationships, the interconnections
psychology? Why does it exist? Before it is a between individuals and their broader environ-
theory, a method, or a body of knowledge, ment. Thus, our second principle: critical
critical psychology is an attitude – and, let it psychology is a contextual psychology that
be said, a bad attitude: a disrespect for attempts to understand people in their social
authority, an uneasy suspicion that something and material worlds.
is wrong. And no matter how often we are told But why is this a critical psychology rather
that things are not so bad, that it is all on the than, say, a social or cultural or community
very verge of finally being fixed, that all we psychology? Because it is not just an attempt
need to do is complete the proper research or to fill a gap within psychology, to map out
perfect the necessary technique, the unshake- some neglected area. It is attempting funda-
able feeling remains that something is seriously mentally to challenge the foundations on which
amiss. the discipline is built. Psychology does not
We refuse to let this rest, because what is know what it is doing, because it does not
wrong is not simply a mistake, a conceptual know what it is. It is so busy doing its business
error, a lack of data, or the failure to implement that it has not been able to take the necessary
the necessary programme, but something far step back to consider exactly what business it
deeper and more serious. The world is full of is doing. Just as it takes individuals out of
suffering, alienation, brutality and neglect, and context, psychology takes itself out of context
psychology has responded with an erratic – it lacks a sense of the specific social and
combination of ineffectual concern, wilful igno- historical conditions in which it emerged, and
rance and willing collaboration. This intolerable how those conditions shaped its concepts,
situation leads us to the first principle: critical methods, institutions and practices. It believes
psychology is ethical practice, a response to a its own stories about itself because it does not
principled outrage. know where they came from.
Why does this concern drive us to critical For the most part psychology has been
psychology? Because psychology offers, or uncritically built on ideas that happened to
claims to offer, or we were once young and carry weight in the particular cultures in which
naive enough to believe it offered, a sustained it developed. Perhaps the two most influential,
attempt to intervene in the problems of human and disastrous, have been science (as the path
unhappiness, to make people’s lives better. Now to true knowledge) and the individual (as the
we are not so sure. We still believe that experi- way of conceptualising people), but these ideas
ence is important, and that human existence are so much part our everyday common sense
cannot simply be reduced to the abstract that is hard to imagine thinking differently. To
concepts of economics, politics, sociology, or do this we need to examine the origins and
any of the biological sciences. Thus we remain effects of these ideas, and to try to produce
committed to the discipline which (sometimes) alternatives.
takes seriously the understanding of human Critical psychology is precisely this moment
experience. But from this point we begin to of interrupting business as usual and examining
or applicable copyright law.
diverge from most traditional psychology on psychology from the outside. The critical
one fundamental issue: experience cannot be method entails a suspicion of accepted ideas.
understood in isolation, cannot be understood To do this critical psychology draws on many
in terms of internal processes or mechanisms other disciplines – including history, philos-
inside the individual. The fundamental problem ophy, sociology, anthropology, politics,
of psychology is that it tends to focus on these economics and everything that can be called
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‘cultural studies’, including feminism, post- psychology but to transform it to the point
colonial studies, critical race theory, science where it can become what it claims to be:
studies, and all manner of post-structuralisms. simultaneously a rigorous way of understanding
Thus critical psychology is transdisciplinary: it people and a caring profession. It is not the
is both inside and outside of psychology, it enemy of psychology, nor its sibling, but rather
borrows and steals useful concepts from its conscience: the insistent voice of self-
wherever they may be found, and it deliberately reflection that will not rest until psychology
attempts to make conceptual connections with lives up to its own best principles. Thus we can
critical approaches outside the field. state the final principle: critical psychology is
Critical psychology has a double meaning: a critique as method and goal: neither nihilism
critique of psychology, and a critical way of nor idealism, but a sustained and systematic
doing psychology. The aim is not to destroy attempt to transform through critical analysis.
or applicable copyright law.
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Chapter
2
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Psychology: An African
perspective
Nhlanhla Mkhize
LEARNING OUTCOMES
By the end of this chapter, you should be able to:
Critically discuss the context of psychology in developing societies
Distinguish between indigenous psychology and indigenisation
Define worldviews and the four dimensions of worldviews, illustrating each dimen-
sion with examples from traditional Western and indigenous societies
Illustrate the counselling and healthcare implications of the notion of worldviews,
preferably with your own examples
Critically discuss the core components of an African metaphysical system, including
a critical appraisal of the notion of a person-in-community.
or applicable copyright law.
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INTRODUCTION
Traditional Western approaches to psychology are based on certain pre-
suppositions about the person and the world. They also claim to be free of
roots in particular philosophical and value systems. Western-derived theories,
which are assumed to be universal, have been imposed on non-Western popu-
lations. Indigenous theoretical frameworks, on the other hand, have been
marginalised.
This chapter critically reviews the context of psychology in developing soci-
eties. A critical, emancipatory psychology, it is argued, should take into account
indigenous people’s languages, philosophies and worldviews (see Table 2.1 on Worldview: set of
page 36). It is through these worldviews and philosophies that people make basic assumptions
sense of themselves and the world. A traditional African metaphysical frame- that a group of
work is presented. This framework provides a basis for an African-based people develops in
order to explain
psychology. Its inclusion in teaching and research will give voice to marginalised reality and their
African perspectives. This will empower marginalised communities as active place and purpose
participants in the knowledge-generation process, rather than spectators. in the world.
Worldviews shape
our attitudes,
THE CONTEXT OF PSYCHOLOGY IN DEVELOPING SOCIETIES values and
opinions, as well as
Modern psychology as we know it is essentially a Western product. It was the way we think
brought to developing countries as part of the general transfer of knowledge and behave.
and technology (Sinha, 1986). In the quest to emulate the natural sciences,
psychologists construed their discipline as an objective, value-free and
universal science. Eager to demonstrate the universality of psychological
processes such as motivation, perception and emotion, psychologists saw
culture as an impediment (Gergen, Gulerce, Lock, & Misra, 1996). Traditional
psychology seeks to uncover underlying, universal structures of human func-
tioning. It assumes that psychological processes are fixed and ‘deeply hidden’
within individuals. Its purpose is to go beyond ‘superficial differences’,
resulting from varying cultural contexts, so as to isolate basic underlying
psychological mechanisms and describe the invariant laws of their operation
(Shweder, 1991). In line with this universalistic orientation, psychologists have
attempted to understand people in developing societies with reference to
conceptual categories and theories developed in the West. The same situation
applies to research conducted in developing nations. The research tends to be
initiated by psychologists in developed societies. Attempts are made to repli-
or applicable copyright law.
Cultural colonisation
The vertical – that is top-down, one-way – transfer of knowledge, ideas, values
and practices from developed to developing societies is a form of cultural
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Critical Psychology
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Self:
colonisation (Gergen et al, 1996; Sinha, 1990). It ensures that the developed
in traditional world continues to produce and market psychological knowledge and tech-
psychology, regarded nology (eg psychological tests) to developing societies. The latter, on the other
as a bounded, hand, remain consumers of Western ideas and technology. The end product is
autonomous entity:
it is defined in
that contemporary research and theorising in developing nations are largely
terms of its internal irrelevant to the needs of the local populations. These are needs such as elimi-
attributes such as nating poverty and illiteracy (Nsamenang, 1992; Sinha, 1990).
thoughts and Dissatisfaction with the assumptions and values embedded in Western
emotions, indepen-
psychology has increased in the past two decades or so. It has been argued that
dently of social and
contextual factors. psychological science is based on Western cultural presuppositions about the
knowing subject and the nature of knowledge (Gergen et al, 1996; Greenfield,
1997; Laubscher & McNeil, 1995). Traditional Western psychology is premised
on an independent view of the self. It also assumes that knowledge is value-free.
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as thoughts and emotions, independently of social and contextual factors. Collectivist self:
Where relationships with others and the social order exist, they are thought to be view of the self
established through discretionary choice (Shweder, 1982). This view of selfhood shared by many
is also known as self-contained individualism (Hermans et al, 1992; Sampson, indigenous societies
and non-Western
1988) or the independent view of self (Markus & Kitayama, 1991, 1994). culture in which the
The abovementioned view of the self contrasts sharply with conceptions of self is fundamen-
the self in indigenous societies and non-Western cultures in general. The self in tally context-based,
these societies tends to be context-based (Shweder, 1991). It is defined in terms defined in terms of
one’s relationships
of one’s relationships with others, such as family, community and status or
with others, such as
position within the group. The goal of socialisation is not to be autonomous family, community,
but to harmonise one’s interests with those of the collective. This view of and status or
selfhood is also called the collectivist or interdependent self (Markus & position within the
group. Also
Kitayama, 1991, 1994).
understood as the
interdependent
THE NATURE OF KNOWLEDGE: WESTERN PSYCHOLOGY AND THE notion of self.
PLACE OF VALUES
Traditional Western approaches to science seek objective knowledge. Knowledge
is not supposed to be affected by the knower’s values and meanings. The knower Materialism: theory
stands apart from that which is to be known, uninterested. Objective knowledge that physical matter
is the only reality
can be arrived at by anyone who has engaged in the necessary thought processes and that
or experimental procedures. This way of knowing, also known as ‘separate’ everything,
(Clinchy, 1996), is neither timeless nor universal. It is a product of the scientific including thought,
revolution in the 16th and 17th centuries (Cushman, 1990; Richardson, Rogers feeling, mind and
will, can be
& McCarroll, 1998). During this period the Western world witnessed a gradual
explained in terms
shift from a community/religious orientation to an unprecedented scientific and of matter and
materialistic position. This was accompanied by a rebellion against traditions physical
and customs, which were seen as a threat to individuality and freedom (Richard- phenomena.
son et al, 1998). Thus emerged the view that individuals could be sharply
distinguished from the world and each other, and from their customs, traditions,
and the social realm in general (Richardson & Fowers, 1998). Cultural
psychology: study
Cultural psychology of the way cultural
traditions and social
Cultural psychologists, among others, have criticised the notion of value-free practices regulate,
knowledge. Shweder (1991) defines cultural psychology as ‘the study of the express, and
way cultural traditions and social practices regulate, express, and transform transform the
or applicable copyright law.
the human psyche, resulting less in psychic unity for humankind than in ethnic human psyche,
resulting less in
divergences in mind, self, and emotion’ (73; emphasis added). Cultural psychic unity for
psychology also postulates that ‘subject and object, self and other, psyche and humankind than in
culture, person and context, figure and ground, practitioner and practice, live ethnic divergences
together, require each other, and dynamically, dialectically, and jointly make in mind, self and
emotion.
each other up’ (Shweder, 1991, 73). Thus, while traditional psychology seeks
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Critical Psychology
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Objective
objective knowledge, cultural psychology assumes that the subject (scientist)
knowledge: and his or her object of knowledge are interdependent.
notion that Like Shweder (1991), Bruner (1990) emphasises that an important part of
knowledge is not a human psychology is ‘meaning and the processes and transactions involved
supposed to be
affected by the
in the construction of meanings’ (33; original emphasis). These meanings are
knower’s values and not realised by individuals acting in isolation. They result from participation in
meanings. the symbolic systems afforded by the culture (Bruner, 1990; Shweder, 1991).
From a cultural psychology perspective, psychology cannot be value-free. It
needs to engage with the values and meaning systems of scientists or
researchers and well as those of local actors.
Lived experience:
term closely
associated with
phenomenology, a LINKS WITH CRITICAL PSYCHOLOGY
school of philosophy The abovementioned objections to traditional Western psychology are consis-
that seeks to study
tent with the goals of critical psychology. Parker (1999) contends that critical
human phenomena,
focusing entirely on psychology aims to reflect upon the diverse ways in which men and women of
them by suspending various cultures and classes create meaning in their lives, including the
all presuppositions. manner in which they reflect upon their lived experience. Because the expla-
In its most basic nations and concepts of psychology feature so strongly in such accounts, an
form, ‘lived experi-
ence’ refers to real important part of such an exercise is an examination of how dominant forms
life, as opposed to of psychology operate here, and operate ideologically in the service of certain
laboratory or interest and power groups. What becomes important here is that we consider
hypothetical, expe- the reflections on life of the marginalised groups in society – those reflections
riences. Thus, one
can study the lived
typically ignored by psychology – because these reflections may help us to
experience of being upset some of the ideological uses of certain psychological notions and the
sexually abused or interests of power that they serve. Furthermore, critical psychology also main-
the lived experience tains that all forms of psychological knowledge are grounded in social, cultural
of being racially
discriminated
and historical contexts (Maiers, 1991; Parker, 1999; Tolman, 1994).
against. Critical psychology is also opposed to the abstract-isolated notion of the
self, so characteristic of traditional psychology. Rather, it aims to restore
concreteness to our understanding of psychological functioning by locating
human values, motivations and behaviours in their cultural context (Martin-
From a cultural
psychology
Baro, 1994; Maiers, 1991; Tolman, 1994). In line with the goals of critical
perspective, psychology, then, this chapter argues that the hegemony of Western psycho-
psychology cannot logical science can be overcome if we turn our attention to indigenous
be value-free. It conceptions of psychology (Nsamenang, 1992).
or applicable copyright law.
needs to engage
with the values and
meaning systems of
scientists or
INDIGENOUS PSYCHOLOGIES
researchers as well The call for indigenous approaches to psychology stems from the realisation
as those of local that indigenous peoples of the world were never passive recipients of experi-
actors.
ence. Long before colonisation, indigenous peoples were actively creating
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Indigenisation
The definitions of indigenous psychology offered above focus narrowly on the
role of local frameworks in the interpretation of human experience. Other
frameworks cannot be ignored, however, given that people do not live in
impenetrable cultural enclaves. To take this into account, a distinction should
be made between indigenous psychologies and indigenisation. Indigenisation
is an attempt to blend imported theoretical and methodological frameworks Indigenisation:
attempt to blend
with the unique elements of the culture in question (Sinha, 1993). It aims to imported theoretical
transform foreign models to make them suitable to local cultural contexts. and methodological
According to Kumar (cited in Sinha, 1993), indigenisation may take place frameworks with the
at the structural, substantive, and theoretical levels. Structurally, indigenisa- unique elements of
the culture in
tion refers to the nation’s organisational and institutional capabilities to question. Indigeni-
produce and disseminate relevant knowledge. For example, Nsamenang sation aims to
(1992) laments that the growth of indigenous knowledge in Africa is hampered transform foreign
by limited publication and technological resources. Substantive or content models to make
or applicable copyright law.
them suitable to
indigenisation could be achieved by applying psychology to address national
local cultural
policy issues (eg health and educational policies) (Sinha, 1993; Nsamenang, contexts. Indigeni-
1992). Finally, theoretical indigenisation seeks to develop conceptual frame- sation can occur at
works and metatheories that are consistent with the sociocultural experiences, structural, substan-
worldviews and goals of the people in question. This includes the use of locally tive and theoretical
levels.
derived reference systems as well as borrowed theoretical frameworks that
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Self-contained
have been transformed to suit the needs of local populations (Sinha, 1993).
individualism: While recognising the importance of other forms of indigenisation, this
traditional chapter focuses on theoretical indigenisation.
psychological view
in which the self is The worldviews of a society
regarded as a
bounded, The chapter provides a conceptual framework to facilitate the indigenisation of
autonomous entity psychology in Africa. This is based on the realisation that it is not possible to
– defined in terms arrive at a balanced understanding of psychological processes in developing
of its internal
attributes such as
societies without a critical awareness of these societies’ assumptions about life.
thoughts and A proper understanding of a people should begin with an examination of the
emotions, philosophies, languages and worldviews through which they experience the
independently of world (Huebner & Garrod, 1991; Simpson, 1974; Vasudev & Hummel, 1987).
social and
contextual factors.
Psychology in general is based on the worldviews of the white middle class, to
Like the idea of the the exclusion of the worldviews and values of people in developing societies
knowing subject, (Nsamenang, 1992).
the self-contained
individual is
stripped of all DO WE NEED AN AFRICAN-BASED PSYCHOLOGY?
particularities such Contesting ideas of a ‘dated’ worldview
as gender, culture,
position, and of his Before going any further, I should like to address the possible objection that
or her existence in the worldview propounded here is dated, given the widespread influences of
space and time. acculturation and globalisation. To address this objection, I begin by posing
the typical Bakhtinian (1981) questions: Who says that the worldview is dated?
Based on what information? And whose voice/perspective and interests does
he or she represent? Far from being dated, the worldview continues to guide
the lives of many people in traditional sectors of African society. Unfortu-
nately, psychology in developing societies tends to be confined to the modern
sectors. It has hardly permeated the majority of people in rural settings
(Nsamenang, 1992). Rural inhabitants, who hardly, if ever, participate in
studies conducted by psychologists, continue to rely on indigenous theories of
illness and interventions, among others. What right do we, as psychologists,
have to proclaim that these ways of life are ‘dated’? If rural inhabitants
abandon their ‘dated’ ways of life, can we guarantee that they will be able to
participate in and benefit from modern psychology, among others? Or are we
creating doubly marginalised people, deprived of their own cultural heritage
and yet unable to partake meaningfully in modern ways of life? Let me leave
or applicable copyright law.
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Rural inhabitants,
who hardly, if ever,
participate in
studies conducted
by psychologists,
continue to rely on
indigenous theories
of illness and
interventions,
among other things.
What right do we,
as psychologists,
have to proclaim
that these ways of
life are ‘dated’?
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upper class Westerners, who are their mentors, and different from those of their
own (traditional) societies, is created (Moghaddam, 1993). The same could be
said of the training of psychologists in South Africa. Even at the level of research,
there is a tendency to encourage students to pursue research questions that are
more relevant to the needs of the modern sector (eg human-computer interac-
tions). On the other hand, problems of illiteracy, the disintegration of extended
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A reflection on the oppression of traditional uals to realise their innermost potential through
African knowledge systems cannot be complete the process of individuation (separation) and
without a brief overview of the complicity of the self-actualisation.
educational system and the African elite. The The training was alienating because it was
training of psychologists, for example, initiates the opposite of the socialisation I had received
(indigenous) students into a new way of thinking in the process of growing up. This socialisation
about the self and the world. It creates specific had emphasised the relational nature of person-
subjects who do things in a particular way, as hood. This is captured in the saying ‘Umuntu
mapped out by their discipline. Let me illustrate ngumuntu ngabantu’, which roughly translates
this by reflecting briefly on my first encounter as ‘A person becomes a human being through
with psychology as an undergraduate student. I, other human beings’. African conceptions of
like many others in my cohort, was initiated into experience and the world were conspicuous by
an individualistic way of thinking about the self their absence. Even to date, the teaching of
and the world. At first this was strange and African knowledge systems in South African
alienating, given my largely communal up- institutions of higher education has been largely
bringing. We had to master theories such as left to traditions such as philosophy and
behaviourism, psychoanalysis, and humanistic theology (eg Louw, 1999; 2001; Shutte, 1993,
approaches. Apart from being Western in origin, 2001; Teffo & Roux, 1998) rather than
these theories take the individual as the primary psychology. Consciously or unconsciously,
unit of analysis. The context in which the person psychological training creates new subjectivi-
is embedded is ignored. For example, behav- ties, characterised by an individualistic and
iourism focuses on the relationship between disembedded orientation towards the self and
stimuli and responses, while psychoanalytical the world. Again, the critical question is: To
and humanistic approaches seek to help individ- whose advantage?
family systems, and learning under conditions of abject poverty, take a back seat.
A critical
Those who do tackle such issues run the risk of having their research ignored psychology should
because it does not address ‘hard-core’ psychological issues. not only be
concerned with the
Agendas of an African critical psychology way in which
cultural and
The Aids pandemic has aptly brought home the importance of conducting institutional
relevant research in developing societies. Earlier intervention efforts, based on practices shape
research conducted in developed societies, focused on changing people’s individual
development: it
cognitions. The assumption was that cognitive change would result in behav-
should produce
ioural change. These efforts failed miserably because they did not take into research that
account the sociocultural context of people in developing societies. A critical furthers the needs
psychology should thus not only be concerned with the way in which cultural of developing
or applicable copyright law.
and institutional practices shape individual development: it should produce societies. This
includes research
research that furthers the needs of developing societies. This includes research into poverty,
into poverty, illiteracy and alienation caused by globalisation, among other illiteracy and
things. It is only then that critical psychology will achieve its emancipatory alienation caused
project. by globalisation.
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Panacea:
Possibility of dialogue between theoretical frameworks
kind of remedy, I have written at length about the relevance or otherwise of Western-derived
cure for diseases, theoretical frameworks. These frameworks are not irrelevant in an absolute
ailments, difficul-
ties, problems; a
sense (Tolman, 1991). As Tolman (1991) argues, even Watson’s stimulus-
sort of ‘cure all’. response behaviourism was relevant to the interests of capital and its
managers. Western theoretical frameworks do have a relevance of some sort in
developing societies. My objection to them is based on the view that they
cannot be exclusively used to explain human needs across cultures and across
time. In the past, this has been done, to the exclusion of local people’s attempts
to account for their own life experiences. Neither is it implied that African
frameworks are a panacea to resolve all sociopsychological problems among
Africans. Rather, the purpose is to show that a critical psychology should be
willing to engage in a dialogue with theoretical frameworks emanating from
the life perspectives of the people in question.
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What is a worldview?
A worldview is a set of basic assumptions that a group of
people develops in order to explain reality and their place and
purpose in the world. These assumptions provide a frame of
reference to address problems in life. Worldviews provide
responses to a set of core questions that people in all cultures
have had to respond to in the course of their development (Sue
& Sue, 1999). These are questions about the nature of the
world (what is the world like?) and the meaning of person-
hood, among other issues (Jensen, 1997). Worldviews shape
our attitudes, values and opinions as well as the way we think
and behave (Sue, 1978).
Worldviews contain the following components: time The spread of Western concepts and
categories of understanding – particularly
orientation; people-nature orientation; activity orientation; in psychology – has excluded or
and the relational orientation (Jensen, 1997; Lock, 1981; Sue marginalised the lived experience of
& Sue, 1999). The table overleaf shows general cultural others, especially Africans.
differences in worldviews.
To say that there is an African worldview does not mean every member of
a culture should subscribe to it, in the same manner that not every European
Metaphysics:
subscribes to individualism as a way of life. The worldview described is an branch of philo-
attempt to explain human reality from an indigenous African perspective sophy concerned
(Myers, 1988). Ignoring alternative worldviews limits practitioners’ ability to with our concep-
deal with people from different cultural backgrounds, especially in counselling tions of reality,
position in the
and healthcare (see Boxes 1 and 2).
or applicable copyright law.
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Description Examples
Time orientation Western societies tend to emphasise the future. Time is organised
A culture may emphasise history and into linear segments, marked by what people are doing at a time
tradition, the here and now, or the distant (Hall, 1983; Hall & Hall, 1990). Traditional communities, on the
future. Time and space orientation are other hand, concentrate on the past and the present. It is not the
intertwined. Self-awareness involves an passage of time per se that is important, but the relationship one
appreciation of where one is coming from, has with ancestors (the past) and one’s fellow human beings (the
the present, as well as where one is likely present). The ideal is to live harmoniously with ancestors, the family
to be in the future and the community. Paying attention to context and relationships is
thus more important than the mathematical division of time.
Orientation to nature For cultures that emphasise the past, external forces beyond one’s
This dimension answers the question: How control determine life (eg God, ancestors, and fate). For cultures
is the relationship of people to nature to that emphasise the present, people and nature co-exist, living
be understood? harmoniously with each other. Most indigenous African societies
emphasise both the past and the present. (Myers, 1988). Future-
oriented cultures, on the other hand, emphasise mastery and control
over the environment, a situation that holds in many Anglo
societies. (Ivey, Ivey & Simerk-Morgan, 1997)
Human activity Traditional Western cultures place value on doing over the being or
The human activity dimension answers the being-in-becoming (the process) mode of activity. This emanates
question: What is the preferred mode of from the belief that one’s value as a person is determined by
human activity? personal accomplishments (Sue & Sue, 1999). Other cultures, on the
other hand, emphasise being or being-in-becoming. This mode
values harmony with others and the social milieu, as well spiritual
fulfillment. (Sue & Sue, 1999)
The relational orientation Traditional Western cultures regard the self as a bounded entity.
This is concerned with how the self is People are defined in terms of internal attributes such as thoughts
defined in relation to the Other and the and emotions. This view of selfhood is also known as self-contained
environment individualism (Sampson, 1988, 1993; Hermans et al, 1992) or the
independent view of self (Markus & Kitayama, 1991). On the other
hand, indigenous cultures define the self in terms of one’s
relationships with others, such as family, community and status or
position within the group. Children are socialised to harmonise their
interests with those of their family and the community.
it. For example, people make sense of the world and their behaviour in it.
traditional African Metaphysical ontologies not only prescribe what is but also incorporate
worldviews described
in this chapter posit
ideals of what can be, the ideal cosmic and natural order, and its possible
a world in which defects. For example, traditional African societies believe that there should be
everything is inter- harmony and interdependence between elements in the cosmos. Disconnec-
connected.
tion between parts comprising the whole is undesirable and immoral or
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The following case study illustrates the impor- he could make peace with them. Bheki believes
tance of worldviews in counselling. The client that someone interfered with the transition of
presented at a Student Counselling Centre at one his father’s soul from the world of the living to
of the local universities. He was finding it difficult the spiritual world. He maintained that his
to concentrate on his studies. Thus, he was not father’s soul was being held captive by
making satisfactory academic progress. His name umthakathi (a sorcerer), who had turned his
and identifying particulars have been altered. father into a zombie. He was worried that his
Bheki is a 29-year-old, single black student. father’s soul was wandering aimlessly, without
He resides in one of the townships surrounding finding peace. He was also worried that, as the
a major urban city. He was referred to the eldest son, the same fate would befall him if he
Student Counselling Centre by one of his happened to die before rectifying the situation.
lecturers, who had noted that he was sometimes Bheki came to the Student Counselling
‘day-dreaming’ in class. Bheki is the 6th eldest Centre reluctantly because he knew that coun-
in a family of nine children. They all live with sellors ‘did not understand traditional problems’.
their mother, who is a pensioner. Except for the I’ve cited this case study to show that the
eldest sister, who now lives independently, all client relied on a different worldview to account
his siblings are unemployed. Prior to returning for his experience. This worldview espouses a
to university, Bheki had been a teacher for 5 different theory of illness. It is based on a con-
years. He decided to pursue further studies to nected, rather than an abstract, view of the self.
improve his education. This would in turn The case study is about relationships, responsi-
improve his income, enabling him to support his bilities, and consequences to the self and others.
siblings better. He maintained that whenever he To make sense of it, one needs to understand the
tried to study he became drowsy and fell asleep. nature of human relationships in traditional
He attributed this to family problems. He had African societies. This worldview is not part of
felt like this since 1994, but the situation had formal psychological training in many institu-
become more pronounced over the years. tions. No wonder the client felt the counsellors
Bheki’s father, Mr Nkosi, passed away in ‘did not understand traditional problems’. When
1994. He was born in a polygamous family. presented with this case, many students are
or applicable copyright law.
There was always tension within the family. Mr quick to argue incompetence, preferring to ‘refer
Nkosi decided to get married and stay away from the person to a traditional healer’. From an
his original family. He moved away from ethical perspective, that might be an appropriate
Nkandla, in Northern KwaZulu-Natal, to the city thing to do. However, one way to address this
to escape ‘bewitchment’ by members of his shortcoming is to incorporate indigenous world-
extended family. Unfortunately he died before views into the training of psychologists.
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The fact that a worldview is marginalised does do not give guidelines on how to act ethically
not mean that it ceases to function. People in particular circumstances.
continue to rely on it, sometimes secretly. The The nurses interviewed were black Africans
following excerpt is from Gambu (2000). who saw mainly black patients.
Gambu studied ethical decision-making in the The following extract involves an ophthal-
nursing profession. She was interested in how mic nurse who saw a 50-year-old partially blind
traditional African worldviews influence nurses’ patient. The nurse’s initial examination revealed
understanding and application of ethics. no organic basis for the patient's blindness. Her
Nurses are guided by a professional Code of own beliefs about Zulu traditions then came to
Ethics. Professional codes emphasise the fore. Rather than referring the patient for
autonomy, which is the freedom of individuals further assessment, as expected, she secretly
to hold and act upon their own opinions advised her to consult a traditional healer:
provided they do not violate others’ rights;
or applicable copyright law.
beneficence, which requires professionals to Gambu: What was the ethical dilemma for you
protect patients from harm and to promote in that situation?
their welfare; and justice, which requires that Nurse: The conflict was that I really did not
people be treated according to what is fair or know what to do. Should I refer this
due. Professional codes of ethics are based on woman for further assessment or
Western assumptions about the person. They should I advise her to consult a
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traditional healer? The conflict was areas before, people there believe
also the fact that we as black people strongly in traditional customs. We
have our own beliefs and customs also saw many instances where tradi-
while at the same time, in our tional healing was beneficial. (Gambu,
training we are taught what to do, 2000, 68; original emphasis)
which is different to our beliefs. But,
we at the same time know that there This extract has been cited not because the
are customs which we should follow, nurse acted ethically (or otherwise). The aim is
so the [ethical dilemma] for me was to highlight the shortcomings of a universalistic
in not knowing what to do. approach to ethics. Had traditional African
Gambu: What did you eventually do? worldviews, including theories of illness, been
Nurse: I secretly told her to consult a tradi- part of medical discourse, the nurse would have
tional healer whom I knew, and she freely discussed the issue with her colleagues
eventually confessed that she had (rather than acting secretly). This shows that
been to see a traditional healer marginalised worldviews do not die out. They
before. continue to operate underground. It is thus
Gambu: How did your decision make you feel important to engage openly with them. Useful
emotionally? aspects of African worldviews should be incor-
Nurse: It was a very difficult decision for me porated into patient treatment. This way, the
but I consoled myself that I had done many indigenous people who rely on them to
the right thing because I knew that make sense of their experiences will be empow-
there are things that cannot be cured ered. Open dialogue with this perspective will
at the hospital. I have worked in rural also enhance ethical conduct.
have very little life force of their own. As a result, they have no direct influence world:
level in the
on superior beings such as human beings. Animals occupy the level immedi-
hierarchy of being
ately above that of objects and plants. The next level, which Ngubane (1977) in African
calls the intermediate world, consists of human beings. Human beings can metaphysics that
communicate directly or indirectly with the living-dead (ancestors) (Mbiti, consists of human
beings.
1991), who occupy the next level on the hierarchy. According to Ngubane
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Generalised versus
(1977), the world of the ancestors is divided into two. First, there is the world
concrete self: of the recently deceased. They do not proceed directly to ancestorhood;
view of the self as initially they remain in an in-between state, until their relatives have
the ‘generalised performed rituals of integration on their behalf. While in this state, they are
other’ requires us to
see all individuals as
incapable of interceding with God on human beings’ behalf. However, they can
rational beings with make their concerns known to their relatives through dreams. Then there is
the same rights and the world of integrated ancestors, those who have had rituals performed for
duties we would them. Integrated ancestors are capable of communicating with God on behalf
ascribe to ourselves.
of their relatives. Ancestors, whose world is both analogous and contiguous to
It is what we have
in common that that of human beings, continue to interact with, and remain interested in the
matters, rather than affairs of, their relatives (Teffo & Roux, 1998). Human beings maintain a link
the individuality or with their ancestors through acts of libation and sacrifices. It is through the
concrete identity of
ancestors that human beings communicate with God, who is rarely invoked
the other. If we
adopt the stand- directly.
point of the self as
the ‘concrete other’, GOD
on the other hand,
people’s individu-
ality, history, and
concrete identity
take centre stage, COMMUNITY OF
while what we have INTEGRATED
in common recedes ANCESTORS
to the background.
WORLD
OF THE RECENTLY
DECEASED
Integrated
INTERMEDIATE WORLD:
ancestors:
Human beings
ancestors who are
capable of
communicating with
God on behalf of ANIMALS
their relatives, and
for whom rituals are
performed.
PLANTS & INANIMATE
Ancestors, whose
OBJECTS
world is both
analogous and
Legend:
contiguous to that
or applicable copyright law.
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Inyanya
Only those who lived a life characterised by high moral standards can be
elevated to the status of an inyanya. These standards include promoting inter-
dependence and harmony within one’s family and community. Once rituals of
integration – ukubuyisa, literally, to return the spirit of the ancestor home –
have been performed, the deceased who were good moral exemplars join the
community of iinyanya. This is a spiritual community of other family members
who lived exemplary lives. Sometimes a person does not have to die to be
considered inyanya (Dzobo, 1992). Older members of the family, whose lives
are worthy of emulation, may be referred to as iinyanya. Nevertheless, it
usually remains essential that integration rituals be performed after death, to
bring their ubu-nyanya (ancestorhood) to completion.
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God. The family is effectively cut off from God, the source of all life. Rituals and
acts of libation are not ancestor worship. They ensure that through izinyanya
one remains connected to God, the highest source of life.
A holistic worldview
God is at the apex of the hierarchy. Although at the apex, God is not apart from
the rest of the world. Together with the world, God ‘constitutes the spatio-
temporal totality of existence’ (Teffo & Roux, 1998, 140). That is, God does not
rule the world from a distance, but permeates everything in it. For example,
the fact that human beings participate in the Divine is captured by the Sotho
saying, ‘motho ke Modimo’, which means ‘The person is (the) Divine’. God’s
Holistic/holism:
omnipresence is consistent with the holistic worldview; an account of the
account of the world in which everything is interconnected in such a way that elements of the
world in which whole are contained in each part (see discussion of cosmic unity below).
everything is
interconnected in
such a way that THE NOTION OF VITALITY OR LIFE FORCE
elements of the
whole are contained Beings and objects in the hierarchy are endowed with a life force. The notion of
in each part. life force has been a source of great controversy in African scholarship since
Tempels (1959) propounded it. According to Myers (1988), life force refers to
the energy or power that is the essence of all phenomena, material and imma-
Life force:
energy or power
terial. Everything is endowed with ‘energy’, spirit, or creative force. The idea of
that is the essence life force as ‘spirit’ does not imply ghost-like, inner powers of an occult nature.
of all phenomena, It refers to dynamic creativity, thought to be the most precious gift from God.
material and This creativity descends hierarchically from God to izinyanya, elders, human
immaterial.
beings, and all that is created (Kasenene, 1992). The creativity of God’s power
is manifest in the changing seasons, birth, the cycles of nature and in human
achievements. It is extended to izinyanya, human beings, and other creatures
and creations lower in the hierarchy, in descending order. The Basotho/
Tswana refer to a person’s life force as seriti, while the Nguni call it isithunzi.
Literally, both terms mean ‘the shadow’. Human beings are capable of influ-
encing events in the world to a certain degree, because they partake in this
creative life force. Ideally, it is expected that one will always use life force to
maintain vital connections and interdependence between the family, the
community and the rest of nature.
or applicable copyright law.
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union. When the Nguni and the Sotho of southern Africa say a person When the Nguni and
uyaphila/o ea phela (he or she has life), they are not referring to biological life. the Sotho of
They refer to the relationship between individuals and their milieu. It is their southern Africa say
lived experience, as evidenced in the day-to-day relationships with others, that a person uyaphila/o
ea phela (he or she
is at stake. It is expected that one will live harmoniously and interdependently has life), they are
with others. From an African point of view, life is a never-ending spiral of not referring to
human and communal relationships. It is defined in terms of reciprocal obli- biological life. They
gations (Dzobo, 1992; Mbiti, 1991). All individuals are expected to promote refer to the rela-
tionship between
vitality in the community by fulfilling their duties and responsibilities,
individuals and
according to their positions or roles (Kasenene, 1992). their milieu. It is
their lived
An organic view of the universe experience, as
evidenced in the
Traditionally, it is assumed that human beings will live harmoniously with day-to-day
animals and nature. This organic view of the universe, the principal feature of relationships with
which is to think ecologically, making little or no distinctions between nature others, that is at
stake.
and culture, is common among indigenous societies (Howard, 1994; Maffi,
1998). Living harmoniously with the natural environment requires that it be
harvested to the extent that it is necessary to support human needs. This had
to be done respectfully and religiously. For example, religious rituals accompa-
nied the planting and harvesting of crops. Respect for the principle of life is
also illustrated by the practice by traditional healers to pray before harvesting Separate and
connected ways
plants for medical purposes. It is believed that not only does this make the
of knowing:
plant more effective; failure to do so could cause it to fail to regenerate. terms popularised
Harvesting the plant in a disrespectful manner will cause it to die. This means by Belenky et al
that it will not be available to support human life in the future. Recently, (1986). Separate
indigenous communities working with Western-trained scientists to find a knowing is charac-
terised by a
cure for HIV/Aids have voiced the view that plants should be collected respect- skeptical, distanced,
fully and religiously (Burford, Bodeker, Kabatesi, Gemmill, & Rukangira, and impartial stance
2000). Behind this concern is respect for the principle of life. It also affirms the toward the object of
interdependence between the natural and the human environment. one’s knowledge. It
takes an adversarial,
argumentative
The causes of things stance to new ideas,
even if they appear
Life forces are constantly in interaction with each other. It is possible for
to make intuitive
unknown forces to intervene in the order of events, without our awareness. sense. Connected
The nature of this intervention is beyond our conscious understanding. For knowing, on the
other hand, tries to
or applicable copyright law.
this reason Africans deny the possibility of events happening by accident. For
example, in the event of a personal tragedy, cause is sought as to how indi- accommodate new
ideas, searching for
vidual, the family or a sinister force might have brought about the undesired what is ‘right’ even
consequence. This stems from the belief that the creative life force may be in what might
manipulated for sinister purposes. Witchcraft is an example (Ngubane, 1977). initially appear to
It is believed that a witch can manipulate life force to bring about an be wrong.
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Teleology: unfortunate event to someone. The tendency among Africans to prefer teleo-
derived from the logically inclined explanations stems from the view that life force can be
Greek words telos manipulated. Teleological orientations assume that ‘reality hangs together
(end) and logos
because of aims, and is driven by aims’ (Teffo & Roux, 1998, 134). Conse-
(discourse), seeks
to explain the quently, questions are directed not only towards why events happen. Of most
universe in terms of interest is why they happen to someone at a particular locality and at a certain
final (rather than point in time.
immediate) causes. In review, then, life force is the creative energy, extending directly from
It is based on the
view that the God to all that is created. Through life force all share in God’s creative energy
universe has a or spirit, although not to the same degree. The creative power descends verti-
purpose or design. cally to izinyanya, human beings, and all that is created. The principle of life
To understand the force requires coexistence with and strengthening of vital relationships, in the
cause of things, one
needs to understand
community and universe (Kasenene, 1992; Ruch & Anyanwu, 1981). Severance
the final cause, of vital relationships constitutes the opposite of the Good, and is undesirable.
which is the Whether life force exists or not is irrelevant for our purposes. What is impor-
purpose why the tant is that a number of people share this belief. The belief continues to
phenomenon exists
or was created.
influence their perception of the world.
context cannot account for the flux of becoming (Myers, 1988). Rather,
becoming can be accounted for only by a holistic approach that relates indi-
vidual elements to the total system. Again, this differs sharply from traditional
Western ways of knowing. From a Western perspective, the knower stands
apart from the object of his or her knowledge.
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befitting of these terms (Verhoef & Michel, 1997). For example, parental
responsibilities may be assumed by anyone through the practice of collective
rearing of children (Mkhise, 1999). This is informed by an understanding that
the child will grow and develop leadership and/or other qualities that will
enhance the life of the community as a whole. The entire community is thus
expected to play a vital role in raising children.
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ceivable (Paris, 1995). It should be noted that ‘family’ is not restricted to the
Western notion of a nuclear family. It constitutes a closely knit community of
relatives, including both the living and the deceased (izinyanya) (Moyo, 1992).
Deceased family members continue to partake in the day-to-day affairs of their
families. Through the totemic system, family could be extended to plants,
other non-living objects, and anything connected with human relationships
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(Mbiti, 1969). In the totemic system, an animal (eg a particular snake) is Totem: animal,
adopted by the family or clan as its emblem. The animal is treated as a member plant, or natural
of the family. The family, as defined above, is the most important aspect of self- object that serves
definition. To be disowned by family is to cease to exist. among traditional
peoples as the
The family is hierarchically organised, from the oldest member to the emblem of a clan or
youngest child. Members are bound together by a reciprocal understanding of family.
their roles and responsibilities. These depend on position and status in the
hierarchy. The elder, usually the oldest member of the family, has the all-
important responsibility to ensure that the family remains a thriving, cohesive
unit. He or she is thus highly respected. Older members have the most
complete memory of the family’s lineage, and are considered to be much closer
to izinyanya (Mbiti, 1991). The injunction to respect elders, common in tradi-
tional societies, emanates from an understanding that a person of an elder’s
status and position will act in a dignified and responsible manner. Elders earn
their status in the community by virtue of the richness of their knowledge and
experiences. They are expected to bring their wisdom to bear in decision-
making (Ikuenobe, 1998; Paris, 1995). For example, elders play a critical role in
resolving marital and other forms of conflict. Failure to act responsibly dimin-
ishes the elder’s status. Irresponsible elders may in turn be censured by
izinyanya, who do not look kindly upon family members who neglect their
responsibilities (Moyo, 1992).
PERSONHOOD AS A PROCESS
It has been mentioned that the concept of a person in African societies is that
of a person-in-relation, a ‘being-with-and-for-others,’ and not an isolated,
atomistic individual. To attain personhood, it is not sufficient to be a biological
organism with physical and psychological attributes. Personhood does not
follow automatically simply because one is born of human seed. Rather, it
must be earned (Menkiti, 1984; Ruch & Anyanwu, 1981). Menkiti (1984) refers
to this as the ‘processual’ nature of being. Children are first born into a family
community. They then undergo rituals of incorporation, culminating in some
societies in the rites marking the passage from childhood to adulthood.
Personhood as earned
It could be argued that the ‘processual’ nature of personhood means that one
or applicable copyright law.
becomes a person as one ‘goes along’ in society. Indeed, Menkiti (1984) takes
this position. He maintains that children are not fully human. Following
Gyekye (1992), however, I would argue that the fact that personhood must be
earned is not a denial of personhood to children. It is an affirmation of the view
that personhood is an ongoing process attained through interactions with
others and one’s community. It requires one to affirm ideals and standards
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Ubuntu
Ubuntu: concrete or
It should be emphasised that standards of personhood are not of an abstract,
practical realisation theoretical type. Possession of the qualities of personhood is reflected in
of the knowledge people’s relationships with others and their milieu. It is referred to as ubuntu
that the possession in Nguni, and botho in Sotho/Tswana. Ubuntu is inferred from a person’s
of the qualities of
knowledge of his or her duties and responsibilities within a community of
personhood is
reflected in people’s other, interdependent human beings. Further, to know one’s duties is not
relationship with enough. Ubuntu is the concrete or practical realisation of this knowledge and
others. Ubuntu is not a cognitive appraisal of it. However, because a person is always a being-
characterised by
with-and-for-others, failure to attain personhood points blame at the
caring, just and
respectful individual, his or her family and his or her community. Just as it is a collective
relationships. responsibility to raise children, an individual’s shortcomings reflect poorly on
his or her family and the community. This is consistent with the notion of
person-in-community, discussed above.
CONCLUSION
An African critical psychology
Critical psychology situates psychological functioning in its societal and histor-
ical context. It attends to different voices, especially those that have been
marginalised for ideological and political reasons. This chapter has attempted
to achieve some of the aims of an African critical psychology by highlighting
the value of indigenous worldviews in psychological discourse. Attention to
marginalised voices is particularly important, given the long history of the
or applicable copyright law.
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Critical Psychology
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Recommended readings
Holdstock, T.L. (2000). Re-examining psychology: Critical perspectives and African
insights. London: Routledge.
Myers, L.J. (1988). Understanding an Afrocentric worldview: Introduction to an
optimal psychology. Dubuque, IA: Kendall/Hunt Publishing.
or applicable copyright law.
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Chapter
3
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Sociocultural approaches to
psychology: Dialogism and
African conceptions of the self
Nhlanhla Mkhize
LEARNING OUTCOMES
By the end of this chapter, you should be able to:
Describe the relationship between higher mental functions and social life
Critically discuss and apply Vygotsky’s account of human development to the South
African context
Compare and contrast Vygotskian and Bakhtinian approaches to psychological
mediation
Critically discuss the notion of a dialogical self
or applicable copyright law.
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Vygotsky (1978) located the origins of higher mental functions in social life.
This was against the then dominant social science view that psychological
Ontogenesis: functions can be studied in isolation from their context (Wertsch, 1991;
study of individual Wertsch & Stone, 1985). Instead, Vygotsky argued that ontogenesis (indi-
development. vidual development) originates from social, cultural and historical forms of
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life. This view is captured in what is known as the ‘general genetic law of
cultural development’ (Vygotsky, 1981). This law posits that:
Any function in the child’s development appears twice, or on two planes. First, it
appears on the social plane, and then on the psychological plane. First it appears
between people as an interpsychological category, and then within the child as
an intrapsychological category. This is equally true with regard to voluntary
attention, logical memory, the formation of concepts, and the development of
volition. We may consider this position as a law in the full sense of the word, but
it goes without saying that internalisation transforms the process itself and
changes its structure and functions. Social relations or relations among people
genetically underlie all higher functions and their interrelationships. (163)
For both Vygotsky
and critical psycho-
logy more generally,
psychological
functioning cannot
be properly
understood outside
of the social,
cultural, historical
and economic
contexts in which it
occurs.
plane, within the person (Wertsch, 1991). For example, when an adult gives a people as an
child instructions to solve an arithmetic puzzle (an activity between the child and interpsychological
an adult), the child can later use the same instructions to instruct herself, inde- category, and then
pendently of the adult. Self-instruction could take the form of a rehearsal, which within the child as
an intrapsycholo-
could be done verbally or silently (see egocentric speech). When this happens,
gical category.
the same activity is now being carried out at the intrapsychological plane.
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Cultural tools
The ‘general genetic law of cultural development’ implies that for psychology
to be truly social, historical and cultural, it needs to take into consideration
social relations and practices: the things people do and say. It needs to address
Forms of life: itself to forms of life valued in various cultural contexts. These forms of life are
in its most simplistic reflected in activities such as plays, songs, cultural narratives and proverbs,
form, the term refers
which collectively constitute the cultural tools through which psychological
to social relations or
practices, the things processes are mediated.
people do, or ways
of relating to each Mediation
other and respond-
ing to life experien- It has been mentioned that higher mental functions were once relations between
ces that are tied to people. Higher mental functions are mediated by cultural tools, which are even-
particular contexts. tually internalised to direct our own behaviour (Shotter, 1989; Wertsch & Stone,
For example,
1985). Mediation is a process by which individuals or groups employ cultural
ukubona, the tradi-
tion by which rela- tools such as language, stories and proverbs to carry out their actions (Wertsch,
tives and community 1995). For example, children in traditional African societies are socialised to the
members visit a moral values thought to be important to the community through storytelling.
family after the The stories are imbued with moral and other lessons that children must inter-
death of one of its
members, consti- nalise to become competent members of their societies. Vygotsky was of the view
tutes a form of life that human agency cannot be understood by analysing individuals or media-
to handle grief. tional means in isolation. Rather, it involves ‘humans ... acting with mediational
means’ (Wertsch, 1990, 69; original emphasis). This view differs from tradi-
tional Western approaches to psychology, which assume that the individual is
the primary unit of analysis. Hence, traditional Western approaches seek to
isolate social and cultural factors so as to uncover what are thought to be the
underlying bases of human behaviour (Shweder, 1991).
‘Self-talk’
We shall further illustrate mediation by contrasting Piaget and Vygotsky’s
understanding of the role of ‘self-talk’ in child development. Piaget
(1924/1969) viewed children’s ‘self-talk’ as an indication of immaturity or lack
of social interest. He expected this tendency, which he termed ‘egocentric
speech’, to disappear as children matured cognitively and socially. Vygotsky
(1966), on the other hand, argued that children use ‘egocentric speech’ as a tool
to solve problems. He noted that ‘egocentric speech’ repeats earlier social rela-
or applicable copyright law.
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psychological world (ie internalised). It becomes a tool that directs their behav-
iour (Shotter, 1989; Wertsch & Stone, 1985). From a Vygotskian perspective,
the ‘disappearance’ of ‘egocentric’ speech means that the social relations it
represented have become part of the inner world of the child. Thus, social rela-
tions between children and their social environment provide insight into
psychological functions such as thinking.
Rather, it represents the very process by which higher mental functions are
dialogues with the
formed. Shotter (1993a, 1993b) further contends that internalisation enables various, internalised
children to learn to do on their own what they initially did under the supervi- parts of the self,
sion of adults. Through internalisation, ‘the child learns to practice with representing
important Others in
respect to himself [sic] the same forms of behavior that others formerly
our lives.
practiced with respect to him’ (Vygotsky, 1966, 39–40). Internalisation may be
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Through
construed as a transformation in our responsibility for things (Shotter, 1993a,
internalisation, ‘the 1993b). It is a process by which individuals assume responsibility for activities
child learns to that were initially under others’ control.
practice with
respect to himself Internalisation as ethical-moral process
[sic] the same forms
of behavior that Internalisation is an indispensable part of becoming a person (the develop-
others formerly ment of self-understanding). Self-understanding emerges against the
practiced with background social practices provided by the culture at large. Shotter (1993b)
respect to him’
(Vygotsky, 1966, argues that internalisation involves an ethical-moral transformation of the self:
39–40). In learning how to be a responsible member of a certain social group, one must
learn to do certain things in the right kind of way: how to perceive, think, talk,
act, and to experience one’s surroundings in ways that make sense to the others
around one in ways considered legitimate. (73; original emphasis).
Shotter’s (1993b) reinterpretation of internalisation paves a way for the emer-
gence of personhood from the collective forms of life. Internalisation is an
ethical-moral process because it involves acquiring ways of understanding
oneself as a human being in relation to others. The ethical-moral nature of this
process lies in the fact that these ways of being are not ours. They have always
been there, serving other people’s purposes (eg the internalisation of dominant
gender relationships). This view finds support in MacIntyre (1984), who argues
that ‘the self has to find its moral identity in and through its membership in
communities’ (143). This does not mean, however, that we need to accept
uncritically the limitations of forms of self that are prevalent in our communi-
ties (McIntyre, 1984). These ways of talking and sense-making need to be
critically debated in order to determine their liberating and constraining effects
(Prilleltensky, 1997). Bakhtin’s dialogical account of human functioning,
discussed below, provides the necessary theoretical tools for such a critique.
Beyond Vygotsky
Vygotskian psychology provides fertile ground for studying the sociocultural
origins of psychological processes. Rather than focusing on processes occur-
ring within the individual, Vygotsky was more concerned with what happens
at the boundary or zone between the individual and his or her social and
cultural context.
or applicable copyright law.
Positioning
However, perhaps due to his rather short career, Vygotsky’s experimental work
was limited to small group interactions, such as parent–child dyads. He did not
spell out the relationship between cultural, historical and institutional settings
and various forms of mediated action (Wertsch, 1991). Neither did he take into
account influences of positioning in the process of individual development.
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BAKHTIN’S DIALOGISM
The starting point in understanding Bakhtin’s ideas is the notion of dialogue,
which is an interchange of ideas between two equally responsive subjects. For
Bakhtin, meaning is not pre-given, nor does it arise internally, from within the
person. It is constructed actively and dialogically, in our encounter with the
other (Bandlamudi, 1994). It also emanates from the person’s encounter with
or applicable copyright law.
Logical relationships
Relationships characterised by dialogism are better understood in comparison
with logical relationships (Hermans & Kempen, 1993). Logical relationships
constitute a closed system. They do not allow for further commentary beyond
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what is permissible in terms of the rules by which the statements are related.
Bakhtin (1984/1993) showed this by drawing a comparison between two iden-
tical statements, namely ‘life is good’ and ‘life is good’ (see also Hermans, 1996;
Hermans & Kempen, 1993; Vasil’eva, 1985). From the point of view of Aris-
totelian logic, the two statements are identical. Similarly, the statements ‘life is
good’ and ‘life is not good’ only express a relationship of negation. Logically,
the statements can be understood independently of who utters them.
Dialogical relationships
Dialogical relationships, on the other hand, presuppose (and recognise) the
other, with whom one can agree or disagree. A dialogical relationship between
the above pairs of statements exists if they are uttered by two embodied beings,
either in agreement or disagreement with each other. The meaning of the state-
ments can be fully grasped only in the context of the relationship between
speakers. Dialogism extends beyond interindividual processes to include how
the person engages with her or his social and cultural world.
Life as authoring
The idea of life as authorship is premised on the understanding that ‘the world
is not given but conceived’ (Clarke & Holquist, 1984, 59). This means that we
cannot have direct access to the world because it is not ‘out there’, to be discov-
ered independently of our experiences/actions. We make sense of the world
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Life as event presumes selves that are performers. To be successful, the relation
between me and the other must be shaped into a coherent performance, and
thus the architectonic activity of authorship, which is the building of a text, paral-
lels the activity of human existence, which is the building of a self (64).
every time we do something. Thus, our actions must take into account the anything. As
horizons of understanding (Gadamer, 1975), what has already been estab- psychologists, our
theories and social
lished within a given sphere of communication (Kozulin, 1991; Shotter, backgrounds
1993a). These horizons constitute the background against which we act. For constitute our
example, Mandela and Biko’s actions above could be understood with refer- horizons of
ence to colonialism and its defeat in other parts of Africa. understanding.
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the one to whom they are addressed. Bakhtin (1986) referred to this as the
responsiveness and ‘addressivity’ of utterances.
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alone in making up my mind, in an anticipated communication with others with activity of the
whom I must finally come to some agreement (cited in Bernstein, 1983, 218). solitary thinker.
Instead, the
internal world of
Oriented towards others the person is
The fact that ‘addressivity’ includes imagined others highlights that we cannot ‘populated’ with
others.
claim to be alone in what we are doing, even in our thoughts. Our actions must
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The superaddressee
Bakhtin (1986) also maintained that the ‘addressivity’ of utterances might be
or applicable copyright law.
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Psychology, like other forms of scientific knowl- In South Africa, Holdstock (2000) commented
edge, can function as a superaddressee. That is, as follows on the position of psychology during
we can appeal to psychological knowledge to the apartheid era:
justify our actions. For example, ‘racial differ-
The flourishing of psychology in South Africa
ences’ in IQ have been used to justify educational
during the apartheid era is an equally telling
and employment inequities. In the United States,
example of how a scientific discipline can
Ferguson (1916, cited in Richards, 1997) come to serve the political ends of those in
commented as follows on the performances of power. It also calls for a close examination of
black and white children on intelligence tests: the values underlying the practice of main-
The negroes ... were slow to warm up, quick stream psychology. ... The parallels between
to lose interest, difficult to stimulate except contemporary psychology and the political
through flattery, irregular, moody, vacil- system of apartheid are striking. Although
lating in attention, inaccurate, envious of there will certainly be those in psychology
each other’s progress, given to mumbling, who object to such a comparison, an uncanny
grumbling, humming, saying funny things commonality nevertheless exists between the
while at work. ... the very fact that the political system and the professional disci-
negroes were not interested as were the pline. The scale of the political experiment
whites possibly points to a deficiency in the was just grander than could ever be envisaged
colored group (cited in Richards, 1997, 85). by even the most inclusive of research
projects in psychology. In fact, the political
Ferguson went on to conclude as follows:
experiment approached the ideal of elimi-
[I]t is very clear that by far the greater nating sampling statistics by involving the
number of writers who have dealt with the total population. The entire country became a
problem of the relative mental ability of the laboratory. It is not surprising therefore, to
white and the negro take the view that the find critical descriptions of psychology that
negro is inferior. This is particularly true of fit the homelands policy of the nationalist
those investigators who have used quantita- government like a glove (57–58).
tive methods. The negro has not shown the
same capacity as the white when put to the Both Holdstock (2000) and Richards point us to
test of psychological or educational experi- the fact that psychology is not neutral. Rather,
ment, and the racial differences revealed psychological claims can be used to justify
have been considerable (cited in Richards, oppression.
1997, 85).
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primarily as a response to preceding utterances of the given sphere ... Each utter-
ance refutes, affirms, supplements, and relies upon others, presupposes them to
be known, and somehow takes them into account ... Therefore each kind of
utterance is filled with various kinds of responsive reactions to other utterances
of the given sphere of communication (91).
Gilligan, 1991). These issues have not been adequately addressed in South
African psychological discourse.
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Emerson, 1981; Vasil’eva, 1985; Wertsch, 1990). Holquist & Emerson (1981)
define ‘voice’ as ‘the speaking personality, the speaking consciousness’ (434).
Every utterance exists in so far as it can be produced by someone (Wertsch,
1990). An utterance is endowed with a voice when speakers adopt an expres-
sive, evaluative attitude towards the subject of their speech (Bakhtin, 1986).
The evaluative nature of the words we use in language is realised only in partic-
ular concrete situations, when we employ them for our purposes. Bakhtin
argued that ‘words belong to nobody, and in themselves ... evaluate nothing ...
[T]hey can serve any speaker and be used for the most varied and directly
contradictory evaluations on the part of the speakers’ (Bakhtin, 1986, 85).
Meanings, ideas, and thoughts are voiced when they are expressed by someone
to communicate a personal (ie authorial) position with respect to a particular ‘Words belong to
subject (Vasil’eva, 1985). The term ‘voice’ generally applies to the speaking nobody, and in
themselves ...
subject’s perspective, worldview and belief system with regard to written and evaluate nothing ...
other forms of communication (Wertsch, 1990). It is the very condition for the [T]hey can serve
existence of dialogue, an alternation of subjective points of view between any speaker and be
partners (Vasil’eva, 1985). used for the most
varied and directly
contradictory
Studying voicelessness evaluations on the
part of the speakers’
In I write what I like, Biko (1978) comments critically on circumstances that
(Bakhtin, 1986,
led to voicelessness among black people in South Africa. Suppose that a 85).
‘garden boy’ or ‘maid’ is angry with his or her superior but smiles, pretending
to be happy in his presence. He or she lacks voice to express his or her point of
view. Critical psychology, it could be argued, should also study voicelessness
among the oppressed. This includes studying processes through which the
mind becomes colonised (see Hook’s chapter on Fanon, this work). It should
also investigate means to decolonise the mind, thereby reclaiming voice for the
people. One way of doing this is to explicate the various ways through which
the oppressed have contributed to world civilisation and the history of ideas.
This chapter is an attempt to contribute to that process.
Collective voices
Bakhtin was concerned not only with utterances of individual, speaking
subjects; he paid attention to types of speech produced by certain groups in
society. He referred to these types of speech as collective voices (Bakhtin, 1986;
or applicable copyright law.
Wertsch, 1990). The term ‘collective voices’ refers to opinions, points of view
and perspectives that reflect the views of our social and cultural communities.
These voices can also be reflected in the way individuals speak about them-
selves. Bakhtin’s dialogism extends beyond face-to-face interaction. It includes
the process by which a person’s utterance incorporates voices of social groups
and institutions. Bakhtin (1981) referred to this process as ventriloquation.
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It is important to note that collective voices are not neutral: they are
imbued with expressive meanings. This is because utterances do not belong
entirely to individual speakers. They have always existed ‘out there’, belonging
to other people and social groups. Words cannot be ‘neutral’ because they have
always been used for particular purposes. They thus carry with them traces of
meanings associated with their use in particular spheres of communication
(Bakhtin, 1981; Shotter, 1993). Bakhtin (1981) expressed this as follows:
The word in language is half someone else’s. It becomes ‘one’s own’ only when the
speaker populates it with his [sic] own intention, his own accent, when he appro-
priates the word, adapting it to his own semantic and expressive intention. Prior
Appropriation: to this moment of appropriation, the word does not exist in a neutral and imper-
utterances, argued sonal language ... but rather it exists in other people’s mouths, in other people’s
Bakhtin (1981), are concrete contexts, serving other people’s intentions: it is from there that one
already imbued with must take the word, and make it one’s own (Bakhtin, 1981, 293–294).
others’ meanings.
Bakhtin used the
term ‘appropriation’ Collective voices and psychological mediation
to indicate a
process by which we
The notion of collective voices enriches our understanding of psychological
give voice mediation. Higher mental functions are also mediated by collective forms of
(intonation, accent, life. This observation ties psychological functions (eg self-understanding,
personal identity formation) to the social and cultural context. For example, a man who
meaning/intentions)
to the utterance or
believes that he is superior to women is not only expressing his point of view.
a particular Most probably, he is ventriloquating patriarchal views in his society, which he
subject/topic. has assimilated into the self. Identity development involves a struggle with
others’ voices. This may result in the person uncritically accepting others’
views, or giving new meanings to them (in Bakhtinian terms, ‘appropriating’
them), thereby authoring his or her own point of view. Thus, when a person is
speaking, we can ask the question: ‘Who is speaking?’ In other words, whose
ideas are being ventriloquated in the person’s speech? In what ways has the
person made sense of these views for himself or herself (ie appropriated them)?
As discussed below, such an analysis takes us beyond the individual–society
dichotomy (Wertsch, 1995). It focuses on the dialogical interchange between
the individual and others’ voices.
Three types of collective voice are critical for our purposes: national
languages, social languages and speech genres.
National languages
or applicable copyright law.
For Bakhtin, these are the traditional language units such as IsiZulu, Tshivenda
and Afrikaans. National languages are characterised by coherent grammatical
and semantic forms (Wertsch, 1991). Bakhtin noted that there is a dialogical
interaction between national languages in the sense that one language may be
used at home, another one in the school, and perhaps even another for
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Social languages
Bakhtin noted that within a single national language there might exist many
social languages. Social languages represent the social position of the speaker.
Examples are the languages of various professional groups, urban and rural
dialects, as well as the languages of various age groups or generations. Speakers
never produce utterances in isolation. Even if alone, they enter into dialogue
with the social and other languages, representing various interest groups in
society.
The fact that we speak in social languages has several implications for us as
social scientists. We need to engage critically with the voices embedded in our
practices. We need to be aware that our theories, methodologies, and inter-
vention methods are tied to particular social languages. The language of
psychology is consistent with the values of the dominant (white) middle
classes. For example, it has been argued that traditional psychotherapy is class
bound. It values verbal and emotional expressiveness on the part of the client.
It also distinguishes between the mental and physical needs of the client, and
chooses to focus on the former. Sessions are usually limited to 50 minutes,
tend to be unstructured, and the focus is on long-term rather than short-term
or applicable copyright law.
goals (Sue & Sue, 1999). The higher dropout rate in psychotherapy among
minorities has been attributed to this fact, among other factors.
The fact that our practices are imbued with class-bound social values calls
for dialogical reflexivity in practice. Reflexivity is ‘a process of explicitly turning
one’s critical gaze on oneself as well as the professional, historical, and cultural
discourses that empower and constrain one’s capacities to think and act in the
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1993). Although multiplicity of selves has been proposed by others (eg Higgins,
1987; Markus & Nurius, 1986; Markus & Wurf, 1987), Bakhtin’s approach
comprehensively explains the emergence of self from collective forms of life.
To understand fully the dialogical basis of selfhood, it is important to
revisit four main characteristics of the dialogical self, namely polyphony,
spatialisation, self-renewal or innovation, and power relationships. Parallels
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are drawn between a dialogically conceived self and the traditional African
view of selfhood.
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view of the self assumes that there is only one centralised thinker responsible
for the thinking process (Hermans, 2001). Polyphony, on the other hand,
makes it possible to envisage different voices in dialogue within a single person.
These voices are capable of engaging in a relationship of questioning and
answering, agreement and disagreement, with each other. In other words, the
dialogical self is characterised by a plurality of independent voices or perspec-
tives. A person is capable of telling different stories from different vantage
positions, reflecting the multiple worlds in which he or she has grown up.
The voices comprising the dialogical self need not be in agreement with
each other. Rivalry or tensions between different selves may occur. Bakhtin
(1993) showed that once an inner thought of a character has been transformed
into an utterance, dialogical relationships between this utterance and the
utterances of real or imagined Others occur spontaneously (Hermans &
Kempen, 1993). Bakhtin (1993) illustrated this by referring to Dostoevsky’s
novel, The double. In this novel, Dostoevsky creates a second hero (the double)
to act as an externalised, interior voice (thought) of Golyadkin, who is the first
hero. Once the thought of the second hero is externalised, dialogical relation-
ships between this voice and the first hero become possible. This makes it
possible to study the internal world of one individual with reference to the rela-
tionship between the multiple voices comprising the self (Hermans, 1996;
Hermans, 1997; Hermans & Kempen, 1993). For example, tensions may occur
between the social self, defined in terms of one’s membership in a particular
group, and the person’s own intentions (see Box 2).
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The following interview extract was taken from the author’s ongoing work on
moral and ethical decision-making. It illustrates many aspects of the dialogical
self. The narrator had been pressurised by members of his family to take part
in an effort to avenge a family murder.
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for them again, but [my conscience] was against what we were
doing. ‘Why Me! Why should I be the one driving the car?’ ... So,
that is the most difficult situation I faced in my life, having to
decide whether to withdraw or not, and the meaning the family
would attribute to my withdrawal. What would they say? They
would say I am forsaking him (the deceased) because he is dead?
At the same time I thought: ‘What about me? If I do not think of
myself as a member of the family, do I like what is happening?’ And
you find that inside; that is against your feelings, that I am doing
this because they say I must do it. Although I do not want to do
it, I do not want to show the Me [his real views]. Because, my
inside, it is weak compared to my outside, which is what I show.
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terms. Communication between the self and the world is the order of the day:
[The human being] enters into the surrounding environment, which in turn
penetrates him [sic]. Between the two realities there exists a constant communi-
cation, a sort of osmotic exchange, owing to which man finds himself
permanently listening, so to speak, to the pulse of the world (Zahan, 1979, 9).
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From a traditional African point of view, ‘the human being lives in close contact
with the universe; he [sic] lives in symbiosis with it and does not artificially
separate himself from it at any moment of his existence’ (Zahan, 1979, 20). As
the passage cited above indicates, there is always interpenetration between the
self and the external environment. Such a conceptualisation renders questions
about what is inside or outside of the person (the individual-versus-society
debate) inadequate. Rather, we should focus on how, through mediation, social
and cultural processes become part of the person’s internal world.
centralised thinker. The saying ‘umuntu ngumuntu ngabantu’ is a call for us to enrich our own
self-understanding through contact with, and recognition of, the Other who is
different from us. This requires that we come to terms with the Other’s points
of views, or lenses through which he or she makes sense of the world. As
Bakhtin argued, people become fully fledged personalities by virtue of their
ideas or points of view (Morson & Emerson). To deny others the right to mean
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The passage above indicates that personhood in African scholarship can only
be defined in terms of becoming. Conception and birth are not enough to
ensure humanhood (Menkiti, 1984; Zahan, 1979). Instead, it is through
participation in the community of others, which in some societies includes
rituals of transformation, that one becomes fully human (Sow, 1980; Zahan,
1979). These are ritual practices such as imbeleko, a sacrificial offering
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thought (Myers, 1988; Zahan, 1979). Self-knowledge does not result from the
maturation of internally held principles, however. It ensues from a person’s
relationships with others, including the social environment. Thus, it moves
from the direction of the social environment (social relationships and prac-
tices) to the internal world of the individual. One can never completely master
the external environment, and hence, self-knowledge is always oriented
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toward the future. As Zahan (1979) argues, initiation (to self-knowledge) Self-knowledge is
‘becomes a long process, a confrontation between man [sic] and himself which the basis of all
ends in death. It becomes an experience which is enriched with every passing forms of knowledge
day, being in principle more complete in an elderly person than in an adult, in African thought.
Self-knowledge does
and more in an adult than in a child’ (55). Because one can never attain full not result from the
(complete) self-knowledge, it could be argued that the self in African thought maturation of
is always distributed at the boundary between the self and the non-self. internally held
principles. It ensues
from a person’s
Ubuntu as a process
relationships with
Finally, I should like to reflect on the open-ended, dialogically oriented view of others, including
the self in African thought by analysing the meaning of the terms ubuntu the social
environment. It
(botho) and umuntu (motho). It should be noted that the term ubuntu has moves from the
complex philosophical and ethical implications. For the purposes of my direction of the
argument, only the linguistic analysis is presented here. Although similar social environment
terms are found in a number of South African languages, I limit the analysis to (social relationships
and practices) to
the Nguni equivalents.
the internal world
Ubuntu, often interpreted as ‘humanness’ in English, is about becoming. of the individual.
The word can be broken down to the prefix ubu- and the stem -ntu. Ubu-
belongs in the group of nouns indicating a process or becoming. The stem -ntu,
on the other hand, indicates a human being (umuntu). This means that, linguis-
tically, ubuntu indicates a being that is always oriented toward becoming.
According to Ramose (1999), umuntu, from which ubuntu is derived,
is the specific entity which continues to conduct an inquiry into experience,
knowledge, and truth. This is an activity rather than an act. It is an ongoing
process impossible to stop. On this reasoning, ubu- may be regarded as be-ing
becoming and this evidently implies the idea of motion (51; emphasis added).
The idea of personhood as becoming, (movement) as reflected in the writings
of Bakhtin (1984/1993) and those of Hermans and colleagues (Hermans,
2001a, 2001b; Hermans & Kempen, 1993), is consistent with traditional
African conceptions of the self. The fact that this idea is reflected in African
languages and proverbs indicates that it predates the psychological literature
about dialogism. Further, this view is not something the African reads about in
the literature (and hence, comes to know only cognitively). It is an indispen-
sable part of lived experience or ubu-ntu. Becoming, or inkambo (‘life journey’
or lived experience) is manifest in the relationship between the person and
or applicable copyright law.
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present nature, and the self in the process of being born (Ogbonnaya, 1994, 79).
The plurality of selves envisaged in African thought is expressed differently,
depending on one’s cultural group. For example, the Balong of Cameroon
believe that a person is born with different souls, some representing the
parents, the ancestors, God and other spiritual beings (Ogbonnaya, 1994).
Similarly, most traditional societies in South Africa believe that over and above
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unique ‘individual selves’ people are born with a spiritual self, representing
their izinyanya (ancestors). The spiritual self is thought to be more
pronounced in those called to become traditional diviners and healers
(izangoma). This indicates that multiplicity of the self is integral to traditional
African ways of thinking.
Most probably, plurality of selves applies to most cultures. However, the
people or internal ‘audiences’ (Day, 1991) inhabiting our worlds will differ
from culture to culture and from person to person. For some, these may be
angels (Christians), and for others, ancestors, and even movie heroes for others
(especially children). Further, our internal audiences may change as we move
from one cultural setting to another. The critical question is not only about
who constitutes our internal world, but how internal audiences are formed and
transformed over time (Day, 1991).
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the zone or contact between the person and his or her environment. Dialogism
provides a meaningful framework for exploring the role of social, historical
and cultural factors in development, making it an important theoretical
perspective for critical psychology.
Through the principle of dialogism, influences of the contact between
various worldviews on development can be explored. It acknowledges that
local (indigenous) and Western worldviews can coexist within a single person.
These worldviews can engage dialogically with each other, and people are
capable of moving between both worlds. The lived experiences of many
African (and other) people are already characterised by a need to continually
shift self perspectives. An old man who works as a sweeper in the mines may
be a highly respected induna (headman) in his rural community. Likewise,
Dialogism
Holdstock (2000) reports on many highly educated Africans who successfully
emphasises shift between modern and traditional ways of life. Because we live in a world
processes taking characterised by connections (eg between the local and the foreign, the
place at the zone or national and the transactional), focusing on the interplay between these world-
contact between
views is more fruitful. This, argue Hermans & Kempen (1998), requires the
the person and his
or her environment. notion of a dialogical self.
Dialogism provides
a meaningful Methodological individualism versus methodological collectivism
framework for
exploring the role Another advantage of dialogism is that it makes it possible to move beyond the
of social, historical, individual-society dichotomy, or what Wertsch (1995) calls methodological indi-
and cultural factors vidualism and methodological collectivism. Methodological individualism
in development.
reduces social and individual phenomena to facts about the individual. Every-
thing depends on the individual. Methodological collectivism, on the other
hand, explains human behaviour in terms of societal factors. Everything depends
on society. Dialogism breaches this dichotomy through the concept of mediated
activity. Mediation explains how what is outside the individual (the social and
cultural realm) becomes part of his or her functioning through internalisation.
The dichotomy between the individual and society is also reduced by the
notion of ventriloquation, by which people speak in collective voices. Indeed,
Bakhtin (1981) argues that the word is neither fully ours nor fully someone
else’s. We make it our own when we appropriate it (from others and the social
and cultural sphere) by populating it with our own intentions and accent.
or applicable copyright law.
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Recommended readings
Hermans, H.J.M., & Kempen, H.J.G. (1993). The dialogical self: Meaning as
movement. San Diego, CA: Academic Press.
Hermans, H.J.M., & Kempen, H.J.G. (1998). ‘Moving cultures: The perilous
problems of cultural dichotomies in a globalizing society.’ American
or applicable copyright law.
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Chapter
4
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LEARNING OUTCOMES
By the end of this chapter, you should be able to:
Define and understand what is meant by the colonial and the post-colonial
Discuss what is meant by a ‘psychopolitics’, and hence elaborate on how Fanon’s
work may be understood as a kind of critical psychology
Explain the concepts of political consciousness, psychological reductionism and
Négritude, as important theoretical contexts to Fanon’s thought
Explain how Fanon adapts the theoretical notion of alienation, along with the
concepts of estrangement, depersonalisation, internalisation and the sociogenetic
or applicable copyright law.
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That Fanon moves between the sociopolitical and the psychological, each as Psychopolitics:
a means of critiquing the other, means that his work has a lot to offer critical awareness of
contemporary critical psychology, especially from within a South African the role that
context. This chapter focuses on what we might call the ‘ppsychopolitics’ of political factors (ie
relations of power)
Frantz Fanon as a way of exploring opportunities for critical psychology. The play within the
notion of ‘psychopolitics’ (as it has been applied by Lebeau (1998), amongst domain of the
others) may be taken as referring to the explicit politicisation of the psycho- psychological. An
logical. Such a politicisation can take at least three related forms. It may refer understanding of
both how politics
to the critical process by which we place a series of ostensibly psychological
impacts upon the
concerns and concepts within the register of the political and thereby show psychological and
up the extent to which human psychology is intimately linked to, and in how personal
some ways conditioned or limited by, the sociopolitical and historical forces psychology may be
of its situation. Similarly, such a politicisation may refer to the critical the level at which
politics is
process by which we employ psychological concepts, explanations and even internalised and
modes of experience to describe and illustrate the workings of power. The individually
hope in this respect is that by being able to analyse the political in such a entrenched.
psychological way, we may be able to think strategically about how we should
intervene in ‘the life of power’. Extending this idea (thirdly), it might be
argued that we can put certain forms of psychology to actual political work,
that we can use both the concepts and the understandings of psychology, and
the actual terms of psychological experience, as a means of consolidating
Register:
resistances to power.
particular
Fanon’s ‘critical psychology’, I shall argue, manages all of these objectives. vocabulary, or
or applicable copyright law.
By examining some of the debilitating personality and identity effects of trying conceptual frame-
to understand oneself, as a black man or woman within the system of values of work, stemming
white or European culture, Fanon shows how what might otherwise be under- from a particular
school of thought
stood within a purely psychological framework is far better explained in and/or criticism.
political terms, that is, with reference to understandings of violence, power
and subordination. In doing this, Fanon is also, albeit strategically, using
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psychological concepts to political ends, that is, to draw attention to the true
extent and damage of colonial/political oppression.
Not only does Fanon bring politics into psychology; he also brings
psychology into politics by analysing power through a series of psychoanalytic
conceptualisations which help to dramatise the working and the logic of such
forms of power, in particular that of colonial racism. The objective of such
psychological descriptions is to subject such forms of power to critique, to
understand them better so as to challenge them more effectively. Here I am
referring to Fanon’s analysis of the ‘psychic life of the colonial encounter’.
Fanon’s work also urges us further to consider how we might explore psycho-
logical concepts, like the terms of everyday experience, to be used as
instruments of a progressive politics. Here, I shall argue, the objective is to
understand how a kind of psychology might inform a politics of resistance. In
this respect, as a way of both extending Fanon and integrating these debates
into the sociopolitical history of racism in South Africa, I shall make reference
to the writing of Steve Biko. This chapter will hence focus both on the politics of
psychology in the colonial context (by focusing on the work of Fanon) and on
the psychology and the politics of resistance (by focusing on Biko’s approach to
Black Consciousness). In the chapter that follows I consider Fanon’s approach
to the ‘psychic life’ of colonial power. Before I move on to these discussions,
however, it is useful to contextualise this chapter properly, first by providing
some information on the work and history of Frantz Fanon and then by consid-
ering the theoretical approach to criticism known as post-colonialism.
Why Fanon?
Frantz Fanon was a psychiatrist and revolutionary, born in the French colony
of Martinique, who dedicated much of his life to the liberation of Algeria from
France (see Julien, 1995; Macey, 2000a). Among other achievements, he was
responsible for the influential books Black skin, white masks (1986, originally
published 1952) and The wretched of the earth (1990, originally published
1961). These texts exerted a foundational influence on what would later
become the field of post-colonial theory and criticism. (Although Fanon is typi-
cally considered an anti-colonial theorist, his writings have come to bear such
a formidable influence on the later generation of post-colonial thinkers that it
is legitimate to group his ideas within this rubric, that is, that of the post-
colonial.) Fanon is useful to us here not only because of the fact that he has
or applicable copyright law.
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1985), a prominent scholar of Fanon, who has provided one of the most
valuable commentaries on Fanon from within psychology.
All post-colonial societies are still subject in one way or another to overt or subtle
forms of neo-colonial domination.
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More than just a historical period, the term ‘post-colonial’ denotes a partic-
ular critical orientation to understanding the relationship between colonisers
and colonised, and the psychological, material and cultural effects of these
relationships. Van Zyl (1998) provides one of the most useful shorthand defi-
nitions of the post-colonial from within a South African perspective. She
(1998) views post-colonialism as a critical perspective that aims to understand
the relationships of domination and/or resistance that manifest when one
culture (typically Western) ‘owns’ or controls another (typically Eastern or
African) culture, even after the era of formalised Colonialism has ended. Here
it is useful to add a further caveat, that is, a distinction between colonialism
and imperialism. Said (1978) distinguishes between the two by suggesting that
colonialism is the physical, material and typically violent practice of dispos-
sessing people of their native territory. Imperialism, by contrast, is the broader
theoretical and ideological basis that attempts to justify such actions (Said,
1978; 1993). A useful formulation, again drawing on Said (1979), is that impe-
rialism is the theory, colonialism the practice of forcibly appropriating and
controlling non-Western territories (of both physical and psychological kinds)
into subordinate versions of European or American society. This, incidentally,
is a helpful way of understanding how the legacy of colonialism continues into
the post-colonial era, because quite clearly, imperialism as an ideological form
of cultural and economic dominance continues far beyond the cessation of
formal colonial rule. Because this chapter focuses on Fanon’s discussion of
colonisation, we shall follow his terminology as that of colonial dominance,
although the pertinence of his terms of analysis to more properly imperialist
contexts is obvious.
It is also important that we realise here the importance of this approach to
South Africa. For, as Bertoldi (1998) points out, apartheid may be considered
a particular extension or variation of the basic politics and conditions of colo-
nialism. Similarly, Wolpe (1975) considered South Africa a ‘colonial society of
a special type’, and saw apartheid as a form of ‘internal colonialism’. In a
similar way, we might consider the current post-apartheid period as a particu-
larly South African variant of the broader post-colonial era; South Africa as
such is a very particular ‘post-colony’.
Historical specificity
Fanon opens his analysis of racial identity in Black skin, white masks with two
vital qualifications. This first concerns the sociopolitical specificity of the
domain of his analysis. The second – extending the first – concerns the dangers
of making broad or universalising psychological generalisations. In definitive
terms he states ‘[m]y observations and my conclusions are valid only for the
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Antilles’ (1968, 14). Clearly, Fanon is acutely aware of the time and place of the
objects of his analysis – here the colonial era of French-controlled Martinique
circa the Second World War. What is important here is Fanon’s insistence on
strong, historically grounded terms of analysis in psychological theorising – a
critical dimension often absent in universalising kinds of psychological theory.
Also of note here is Fanon’s awareness of the variability of human subjectivity.
Indeed, for Fanon one cannot take up psychological questions, such as ques-
tions of identity, outside the consideration of their specific social, historical,
political and economic contexts. These contexts are so much part of an indi-
vidual’s ‘psychology’ that, as Marxist approaches warn (see Grahame Hayes’
chapter: Marxism and critical psychology), the individual does not exist apart
from such contexts. Traditional psychology frequently isolates individuals from
these contexts – examining them as if their own internal psychology was all that
mattered. It is precisely this kind of approach that Fanon’s work sets out to
avoid. And it is in view of Fanon’s attempt to involve political factors fully – that
is, the role of relations of power – within the field of the psychological that his
psychology might be thought of as a ‘psychopolitics’ (Lebeau, 1998).
Given the two warnings to psychology above, of One should note here, however, that both
the importance of specific sociopolitical and Fanon (1986, 1990) and Bulhan (1979, 1980a,
historical forms of analysis, and of culturally 1985) make repeated reference to apartheid
appropriate, non-universalising forms of explana- South Africa in their writings. Furthermore, as
tion and theory, we should be cautious of is discussed below, critical Fanonian concepts
applying too quickly the terms of Fanon’s feature strongly in the work of Steve Biko and
analysis to the South African situation. Fanon’s the Black Consciousness Movement. Not only did
concepts do provide us with a valuable starting- Fanonian concepts make their influence felt in
point, a basic conceptual vocabulary that we South Africa, it was, as Gibson (2000) notes,
might choose to draw on where appropriate. the post-Soweto (1976) arrival of South African
Nevertheless, we should undertake our own exiles in London (in particular here, members of
forms of analysis and critique of racial identi- the Black Consciousness Movement) that began
ties in the particularity of the post-apartheid to revitalise and popularise elsewhere Fanon’s
South African context. ideas as forms of practical politics.
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the social conditions which define a particular time and place. One way of
understanding how Fanon means ‘lived experience’ here is through the idea of
Political a political consciousness, that is, an acute awareness both of how one is
consciousness: crucially a part of the world and its conditions and of how one can and should
acute awareness
attempt to change that world on the basis of a carefully considered political
both of how one is
crucially a part of project. Put differently, one might understand a political consciousness as an
the world and its awareness of the political dimension (that is, the power-relations) under-
conditions and of scoring virtually all facets of day-to-day life. This term – political conscious-
how one can and
ness – helps us to understand how for Fanon the field of psychological
should attempt to
change that world phenomena always deserves a political level of analysis – quite simply because
on the basis of a all aspects of day-to-day life are conditioned, by power-relationships such as
carefully considered that of racism.
political project.
Put differently, an
awareness of the Racist objectification
political dimension One of the reasons that Fanon so prioritises race in his analysis is that it comes
(ie the relations of
to act as the overriding, the essential and determining quality of identity
power) underscoring
virtually all facets within colonial contexts. European existentialist Jean-Paul Sartre, a prodigious
of day-to-day life. influence on Fanon’s writings, famously announced that ‘existence precedes
essence’, meaning to suggest, amongst other things, that one should not tie
one’s identity, or that of others, to predetermined qualities, prejudices or
stereotypes. The experience of living as a minority – racial or otherwise –
within a dominant or racist culture, is to live the reverse of this adage – to live
the experience of one’s ‘essence preceding one’s existence’. In this connection
Fanon (1986) relates an incident where a white child sees him on a train:
‘Look, a Negro!’ It was an external stimulus that flicked over me as I passed by …
‘Look, a Negro!’ It was true. It amused me.
‘Look, a Negro!’ The circle was drawing a bit tighter …
‘Mama, see the Negro! I’m frightened!’ Frightened! Frightened! Now they were
beginning to be afraid of me (111–112).
Fanon describes this situation in very evocative language, as a kind of ‘ampu-
tation, an excision, a haemorrhage that splatter[s] my body with black blood’
(1986, 112). It is an experience in which, as Wyrick (1998) depicts it, an entire
history of racial stereotypes and colonial oppression reasserts itself, one in
which the black subject feels himself ‘sealed into a crushing objecthood’
beneath the white gaze (Fanon, 1986, 110). Here Fanon feels himself radically
or applicable copyright law.
objectified, imprisoned by his race. His subjectivity, along with his ability to
represent or define himself, is dissipated, evaporated, destroyed. Who he is
becomes nothing more than a function of his race. He is held responsible for
his body, his skin colour, his racial history. Hence ‘it is not I who make a
meaning for myself, but it is the meaning that was already there, pre-existing,
waiting for me’ (1986, 134). The black subject, as such, becomes ‘the eternal
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Racial alienation
Keeping the above example in mind, it is important now that we turn to the
notion of racial alienation. The psychological violence experienced by Fanon in
the above encounter is such that he is barely able to describe it, explain it,
break it down or make it plain. It is partly for this reason that, again demon-
strating his indebtedness to Marxism, Fanon takes to the notion of alienation
as his principal means of understanding racial identity. This notion of alien-
ation helps him to describe what we might understand to be the ‘multiple
psychological violences’ of the racist encounter.
Alienation, however, is a broad and dynamic concept, one with a formi-
dable conceptual history (Zahar, 1969). The particular importance for us of
this concept (and particularly Fanon’s use of it) is that it provides a means of
relating experience to social conditions, of linking personal-subjective and
sociohistorical domains, and of doing so in a way that produces critique
(Bulhan, 1985; Zahar, 1969). Fanon uses the concept in just this way, as
thinking the connections – or articulations – between an individual’s internal
world, and the external world of the constraining social, economic or political
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Social rupture
The concept of alienation emphasises a sense of rupture – estrangement – in
the relationship between the individual and those things, objects and people
around him or her. This estrangement is not only that of the individual from
the world, but also, in a very powerful way, that of the individual person’s
ability properly to understand him- or herself and their social predicament.
Here it is important to pay attention to how Fanon adapts the concept of alien-
ation to his purposes. For Marx, the root causes of alienation reside in the
substructure of society, and particularly in the alienation of productive labour
engendered by a capitalist mode of production. Therefore, when the worker’s
labour is alienated, so too is his or her ‘humanness’. In different terms, because
of alienated labour, the ‘being’ of the worker remains alien to him and all
others.
For Fanon, race, and the various social practices and meanings attached to
it, proves to be the pivot of alienation rather than productive labour. As Bulhan
(1985) rightly notes, Fanon’s application favours psychological and cultural
dimensions rather than economic and class dimensions. Clearly, as a psychia-
trist, Fanon was interested in an exposition of alienation from a psychological
perspective (Bulhan, 1985). One can then be estranged, from one’s ‘human-
ness’, from one’s own body and sense of self, from a sense even of belonging to
one’s people, all on the basis of race. In many ways, this is perhaps the most
consistent theme throughout Black skin, white masks, that of dehumanisation,
that of the inability, because of various forms of racism and cultural disposses-
sion, to settle on any kind of authentic identity.
Fanon is here making recourse to psychological terms of analysis to
describe, and to critique, the dehumanising features not only of racism but of
sociocultural and political marginalisation more generally. Indeed, it is
through the basic concept of alienation – understood as the processes by which
individuals are distanced from the values, products, meanings and self-under-
standings they produce, the means through which they effectively become
strangers to themselves – that Fanon begins to rethink the notion of
psychopathology.
Fanon’s (1968) account, is to be continually fed with cultural values and under-
standings which are not one’s own, which are primarily hostile, and which
consistently de-evaluate both me and my culture. It means to exist in a state of
little or no cultural resources of my own, because they have been eradicated by
the cultural imperialism of the coloniser. As Wyrick (1998) emphasises, racism
(as one example) erases the black past, devalues black thinking, denies black
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It is important that we retain an awareness of The second aspect Mark referred to as ‘self-
the tremendous conceptual and historical reso- estrangement’, which emphasises the
nance of the notion of alienation, that we do worker’s relation to the act of production
not apply it too glibly. Whilst it is perhaps the itself. The process by which he produces
theoretical term most useful to the analysis of permits him no satisfaction. His ‘life
oppression, it has become, in Bulhan’s (1985) activity’, which should be spontaneous, free,
terms, an omnibus diagnosis for economic, and creative, is coerced, controlled, and
social, psychological and existential malaise. For regulated. He engages in work not for its
own sake, as an expression of his essential
these reasons it is vital to provide a brief sketch
being or of his natural activity, but for a
of this conceptual terrain in relation to Fanon’s
wage to permit him only animal existence –
own application of the term which Bulhan
eating, drinking, sleeping, etc. In conse-
(1985) manages admirably:
quence, the worker is alienated from his own
Fanon … used alienation as a descriptive, activity, which is also alienation from his
diagnostic, and prescriptive guide. His body, cognition and affect. He is alienated
application had a Marxian influence, even from himself (186–187).
though he chose to emphasise some aspects We see here how Marx’s concept is building in
(ie psychological and cultural) more than complexity, from the world of objects, to the
others (ie economic and class). … There are
world of actions, the worker comes to experience
four major aspects to alienation in the
himself as almost ‘outside of life’.
Marxian formulation: a) man’s [sic] alien-
ation from nature, b) man’s alienation from The third aspect refers to the negation of
himself, c) man’s alienation from his species- human essence inasmuch as the worker is
being, and d) man’s alienation from man denied actualisation of his inherent human
(186). potentials through activity. That is, man
expresses, objectifies, and duplicates his
Bulhan (1985) moves on to describe each of ‘species-being’, his human essence, through
these four dimensions of the notion of alienation: his labour, affirming not only his personality,
The first aspect Marx referred to as ‘estrange- but also the humanity he shares with others.
ment from the thing’, which means the Without his life-activity, everything about
alienation of the worker from the product of him remains implicit, unrealized, and unrec-
his labour – that is, the alienation of that ognized. When his labour is alienated, so too
which mediates his relation to the ‘sensual is his ‘humanness’. Through activity, he
external world’ and hence to the objects of leaves his mark in the world, transforming
nature. What the worker produces is not his objects around him, which in turn transform
own, but rather someone else’s; it meets not him. Because of alienated labour, his being
his but alien needs; it is a commodity he remains alien to him and to all others (187).
sells to eke out a bare existence. The more he Whereas the third aspect emphasises alienation
produces, the more his product and hence from mankind in general, the fourth aspect
the objects of nature stand opposed to him concerns alienation from specific others, by
(186). virtue of class contradictions:
or applicable copyright law.
If this first dimension of alienation refers to the [T]he fourth aspect refers to estrangement
processes of exploitation where the external of man from other men … It should be
world and its objects come to stand in opposi- stressed that at the conceptual kernel of the
tion to the worker, the second dimension of the Marxian formulation is a … reciprocity
concept refers to the worker’s relation to his between man, productive activity, and
own work: nature. A threefold interaction permeates
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these constituent parts. Man is part of intends when he puts it to use. To reiterate, all
nature, but he also humanises nature. With four dimensions of alienation reduce to charac-
his activity, he creates and is created. Capi- teristics of ‘alienated labour’. This, for Marx, is
talism divides society into private property because the root causes of alienation reside
and owner, on the one hand, and wage in the substructure of society, and most
labour and worker, on the other. It is to this centrally the alienation of productive labour as
antagonistic opposition of man against engendered by a capitalist mode of production.
man, with the violence and degradation it One should bear in mind, though, that the
entails, that the fourth aspect of alienation
effects of this alienation are profound and
refers (187).
multiple (as described above) and reverberate
Importantly, then, we can now see the density throughout all domains of social and psycho-
of this conceptual term, and all that Marx logical life.
Cultural dissonance
What Fanon is here attempting to impart to the critical consciousness of his
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for Fanon in the sense that it causes a deeply rooted sense of inferiority, a
constantly problematised sense of identity which is split and at war with itself,
causing ‘pathologies of liberty’, as Fanon (1990) calls them.
It is thus by tracing the micro-level psychological impacts of various kinds of
structural oppression in this way that Fanon understands colonialism not only
as a means of appropriating land and territory but of appropriating culture and
history themselves and, more pertinently perhaps, as a way of appropriating the
means and resources of identity, and hence effecting powerful forms psycholog-
ical damage. The colonisation of a land, its people, its culture, is also, in short, a
‘colonizing of the mind’, in Ngugi wa Thiong’o’s (1986) famous phrase. In similar
terms, Bulhan (1980, 1985) argues that racial alienation is the counterpart of
Lactification: economic enslavement. Whereas the slave trade had uprooted bodies and trans-
idea of the
ported them to alien lands, such forms of ‘deracination’ dislocate psyches, and
possibility of
moderating one’s impose an alien worldview on them. In his own words: ‘the uprooting of psyches
race, of lessening from their culture to their insertion into another, in which the basic values [are]
the degree of one’s prowhite and antiblack, elicit[s] a victimisation difficult to quantify, but very
blackness, and
massive’ (Bulhan, 1985, 189). It is this broad psychological level of affect that
‘becoming more
white’. This is a Aimé Césaire (1972) has in mind when he describes the impact of colonialism in
desire which Fanon the following terms: ‘I am talking of millions of men who have been skillfully
sees as damaging infected with fear, inferiority complexes, trepidation, servility, despair, debase-
and pathological. ment’ (cited in Fanon, 1986, 14).
What Fanon’s idea of lactification suggests, apparent lessening of one’s blackness. As true
perhaps contrary to our expectations, is that as these observations might seem, one should
race need not work simply as an ‘all or nothing’ point out that where racial categories have
category. In certain instances, it would seem been essentialised (as to be discussed below)
that we are working with a hierarchy of racial then race becomes an inescapable category. So
identities, with degrees of whiteness and even if one is able to lessen one’s blackness
blackness. The black subject hence, for Fanon considerably, one will never be totally white,
(1986) becomes proportionately white, and totally accepted by the colonising culture. Of
closer to being a real human being, in direct course, it is also important to mention here
ratio to his mastery of a white language, his that a dynamics of race is overlaid not only by
acquisition of white culture and the attaining a dynamics of class, but also by a dynamics of
of a certain level of wealth. Put differently, ethnicity, that Fanon notes that in the Antilles
one might say that the dynamics of race inter- it was understood that Senegalese were
sect with dynamics of class, so that it is considered to be more black, so to speak, that
or applicable copyright law.
understood that ‘one is white above a certain is, less civilised than the native inhabitants of
class’ (Fanon, 1986, 44). European accents, Martinique. In this sense one is able to see
figures of speech, fashions, modes of dress – how a racist culture begins to set up levels of
all of these come to act as ‘signals of class’ separation, differential degrees of blackness in
which contribute, in the colonised subject, to this case, hierarchies of prejudice within a
a feeling of equality with the European, to an given population.
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Systematic depersonalisation
Perhaps the closest that Fanon comes actually to naming or qualifying the
intrapsychic violence suffered by the black subject in the colonial situation is
the idea of a socially induced inferiority complex. If one is overwhelmed by the
wish to be white, Fanon (1986) argues, it is because one lives in a society that
makes a racial inferiority complex possible, ‘in a society that derives its
stability from the perpetuation of this complex, in a society that proclaims the
superiority of one race; to the identical degree to which that society creates
difficulties for him … [it is to that degree that] he will find himself thrust into a
neurotic situation’ (1986, 100).
Fanon (1986) illustrates this situation with reference to the role of cultural
representation in the formation of the black child’s subjectivity. Throughout
his or her upbringing the black child has been exposed to, and so identified
with, a white culture that has been put together ‘by white men for little white
men’, as Lebeau (1998) paraphrases Fanon. This culture has diverse forms and
is evident in systems of education, as well as in literature, and in the films, the
Reify/reification:
comics and cartoons of children’s entertainment. Inasmuch as the black child when concepts or
or adult does not think of or experience themselves as black – in so far as they ideas are spoken
have identified with white culture, and have come to think and act subjectively about as if they are
as white – they then come to experience themselves as a ‘phobic object’ (a term really existing
concrete objects.
I shall go on to explain shortly). As Lebeau (1998) emphasises about Fanon’s Psychological
text: the result of this is the effect of hatred coming both from inside and constructs such as
outside – a racism stemming both from within and without. ‘mind’ and
This is what we might understand as the double damage of the colonial ‘personality’ are
good examples of
environment on black identity. Not only is it the case that the black child takes this.
on the prejudices of the white/European world, coming to understand ‘the
figure of the Negro as the symbolic repository for all the malevolence of the
world’ (McCulloch, 1983, 70). It is also the case that the black child, and then
the adult, uses these racist values to understand and make sense of themselves,
that these deeply ingrained notions, attitudes and stereotypes become part of
the black man or woman’s own subjectivity to the extent that, as McCulloch
puts it, they actively participate in ‘forging the instruments of their own
oppression’ (1983, 70). Steve Biko draws attention to the fact that the inter-
nalisation of racist, self-deprecating identities is a key political tactic of
oppression in his famous comment that ‘[t]he most powerful weapon in the
hands of the oppressor is the mind of the oppressed’ (Biko, cited in Arnold,
or applicable copyright law.
1979, xx).
Pathologies of liberty
For Fanon, we can never gain an adequate sense of the damage of colonialisa-
tion without a consideration of its psychological effects. In the same way, we
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Although Fanon does not go into great detail in insidious and explicit racism. ‘For him,’ says
describing the psychological ‘mechanics’ of Fanon, ‘there is only one way out [of the hostile
socially induced inferiority complexes, he does and damaging culture of a racist environment]
make reference to Anna Freud’s ideas of ego- … and it leads into the white world’ (1986, 51).
defences. Following Anna Freud, he suggests the This is something of a dead-end, however, for
young ego is flexible and resilient in defending enthusiastic identification with the white world
itself from a hostile environment. This ego may only leads to further alienation.
draw on multiple different defence mechanisms, Again referring to Anna Freud, Fanon (1986)
and withdraw from the threat of pain in a variety notes that ‘the ego is driven to desperation by
of ways for which it is later able to compensate. the amputation of all its defense mechanisms’
When the ego has become more rigid, it often (59), identity becomes increasingly infirm,
comes to fix somewhat obsessively on certain weakened, and the pathological process is
modes of protection, of withdrawal from the hence advanced. The result of this situation is
threats of the world. This situation can lead to referred to by Fanon somewhat figuratively as
impaired development. Fanon uses this under- affective erethism, a massive form of hyper-
standing to emphasise how few identity sensitivity which McCulloch (1983) describes as
resources the black subject has in colonial ‘a pathological condition arising from the
contexts with which to affirm themselves in colonial experience’ which includes ‘a crippling
positive ways, and with which to defend them- sense of inferiority, a perpetual nearness to
selves against the constant onslaught of rage’ (67).
Affective erethism: can never properly understand psychopathology, at least within the colonial
pathological context, outside the consideration of the imbalances of political power that
condition of condition and give rise to it. A wide range of psychopathological symptoms in
hypersensitivity oppressed or colonised groups needs, claims Fanon (1986), to be seen as the
which arises in
oppressive or
outcome of a double process, primarily sociopolitical, and only subsequently,
colonial environ- as an internalised form of damage.
ments and which Although Fanon will not completely rule out the consideration of organic
involves both a or intrapsychic bases in the possible etiology of psychopathology, he insists –
sense of inferiority,
and a constant
and this is part of the radicalism of his approach – on the importance of
nearness to anger cultural dispossession and racial alienation in virtually all explanations of
and/or rage. psychopathology. Fanon will assert, for example, that in colonial contexts
[t]he neurotic structure of the individual is simply the elaboration, the forma-
tion, the eruption within the ego, of conflictual clusters arising in part out of the
environment and in part out of the purely personal way in which the individual
reacts to these influences (1986, 81).
or applicable copyright law.
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makes difficulties for him because of his colour, if in his dreams I establish the
expression of an unconscious desire to change colour, my objective will not be
that of dissuading from it by advising him to ‘keep his place’; on the contrary, my
objective, once his motivations have been brought into consciousness, will be to
put him in a position to choose action (or passivity) with respect to the real
source of the conflict that is, toward the social structures (100).
One of the most profound aspects of Fanon’s Bulhan (1985) warns how many of our
theories of racism and identity is the way they everyday conceptions of violence are overly
stress the ubiquitous violence of the colonial narrow and selective. Many internalised prohibi-
social order. His account forces us to rethink tions and prevailing social controls condition
violence, especially in light of its psychological our views in this respect, he (1985) cautions,
nature, its ‘identity effects’. In apartheid South and as such ‘we tend to recognise violence
Africa, for example, policies of separate devel- mostly in those instances when it is blatantly
opment forced black workers to live in destructive and contrary to the established
homeland areas far removed from their actual norms of society’ (131). Violence for Bulhan
places of work. This would result in the situa- (1985) is more pervasive in our day-to-day lives
tion where black workers would travel great than we commonly believe, underlying more of
distances daily, just to get to and from work. our cherished ideals and institutions than we
David Goldblatt’s famous photographs of those might like to admit.
daily travels force us to rethink our definitions Reviewing a series of definitions of violence
of violence. In some ways we might under- that he sees as inadequate, Bulhan (1985)
standably seek to qualify the damage of this shows how many such understandings rely on
arrangement, travelling up to 8 or 10 hours the ideas that violence must
daily, as a form of structural violence. The
(1) involve the use of physical force against
destructive pressure this arrangement exerted
another person
on families, its disruption of sleep patterns, on
(2) be accompanied by intense negative moti-
the psychological and physical well-being of
vating feelings such as rage and hatred
workers, would certainly seem to count as forms
(3) be intentional
of violence, even if not of the order of imme-
(4) lack social or legal sanction
diate physical effect.
(5) be immediately demonstrable at the level
A similar situation of a kind of indirect
of physical damage (133).
violence came to the fore at the hearings of the
Truth and Reconciliation Commission, where There are problems with each of these criteria,
torturers of the state admitted to layering the as the above examples amply demonstrate. It is
cells of prisoners with water. Such actions with these problems in mind that Bulhan (1985)
would cause no immediate harming of the offers a refined and more inclusive definition:
bodies of prisoners, but given that they had no
Violence is any relation, process, or condition
beds, and that it is impossible to sleep when
by which an individual or a group violates the
or applicable copyright law.
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The value of this definition for our current how post-colonial contexts may exude forms of
purposes is that it makes us understand how a racial violence that are not explicitly apparent,
wide range of activities and deprivations may be but none the less damaging to the subjectivity
understood as violence, even if not of the direct of oppressed individuals.
physical sort. Such a definition sensitises us to
servitude’
(1998b, 360).
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Biko’s view of Black Consciousness called for the psychological and cultural
liberation of the black mind as a prerequisite for political freedom – in his own
words: ‘mental emancipation as a precondition to political emancipation’
(Biko, cited in Arnold, 1972, xx). A principal part of the liberation struggle for
Biko was therefore exactly ‘the psychological battle for the minds of the black
people’ (Arnold, 1979; emphasis added). As Biko described it in May 1976:
Black Consciousness refers itself to the Black man and to his situation … [to the
Steve Biko
fact that] the Black man is subjected to two forces in [South Africa]. He is first of
all oppressed by an external world through institutionalized machinery, through
laws that restrict him from doing certain things, through heavy work conditions,
through poor education – these are all external to him – and secondly … the most
important, the Black man in himself has developed a certain state of alienation.
He rejects himself, precisely because he attaches the meaning White to all that is
good … (Biko, in Arnold, 1979, 22).
In opposition to such self-negating ways of thinking, Biko called for solidarity
among blacks, emphasising the need for oppressed groups to identify with
themselves and to advance the liberation struggle on this basis. The challenge
confronting Black Consciousness was to reverse years of negative self-image
and to replace it with an affirming and positive – if not angry – form of identity.
‘Blackness’ here was not simply an issue of skin colour, but was a form of soli-
darity, a collective form of hope and security, a way for black people to ‘build
up their humanity’ (Biko, cited in Arnold, 1979, 34). In fact, Biko defined
blacks as ‘those who are by law or tradition politically, economically, and
socially discriminated against as a group in South African society, and [who]
identify themselves as a unit in the struggle towards the realisation of their
aspirations’ (1998b, 360). ‘Blackness’ as a kind of politics was, therefore, as
Arnold (1979) argues, a deliberate attempt ‘to lay the intellectual and emotive
base for ultimate political unity between the Africans, Coloureds and Asians of
South Africa’ (1979, xxv). In Biko’s own words:
Black Consciousness is in essence the realisation by the black man [sic] of the
need to rally together with his brothers around the cause of their operation – the
blackness of their skin – and to operate as a group in order to rid themselves of
the shackles that bind them to perpetual servitude. It seeks to demonstrate the
lie that black is an aberration from the ‘normal’ which is white (1998b, 360). Conscientisation:
political strategy of
resistance in which
Black Consciousness and conscientisation
or applicable copyright law.
an attempt is made
The key strategy of Black Consciousness was conscientisation. Conscientisa- to develop a
heightened
tion involves what Biko referred to as ‘protest talk’, talk about circumstances of awareness of
oppression. It involves the repeated attempt to oppressive political
conditions of
make reference to the conditions of the Black man and the conditions in which
existence.
the Black man lives. We try to get Blacks in conscientization to grapple realisti-
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cally with their problems … to develop what one might call an awareness, a
physical awareness of their situation … to be able to analyze it, and to provide
answers for themselves (Biko, in Arnold, 1979, 33).
Black Consciousness was an extremely positive form of politics, one that main-
tained that the very conditions of oppression were what would often bring a
group of people together, embolden and invigorate them in their resistance to
power. As Biko himself puts it:
The call for Black Consciousness is the most positive call to come from any group
in the Black world for a long time … The quintessence of it is the realization by
blacks [that] … they have to use the concept of group power … Being an histori-
cally, politically, socially and economically disinherited and dispossessed group,
they have the strongest foundation from which to operate. The philosophy of
Black Consciousness … expresses group pride and the determination by the
Blacks to rise and attain the envisaged self (Biko, in Arnold, 1979, xx).
One of the most powerful lessons of Black Consciousness for Biko is contained
in ‘the realization by Blacks that the most potent weapon in the hands of the
oppressor is the mind of the oppressed’ (in Arnold, 1979, xx). This, of course,
is a weapon that can be reclaimed.
The consciousness-raising of Black Consciousness also involves a compo-
nent of historical redress: ‘Black Consciousness [has] … to do with correcting
false images of ourselves in terms of culture, education, religion, and
economics’, claims Biko (1998b). ‘[t]here is always an interplay between the
history of a people … the past, and their faith in themselves and hopes for their
future. We are aware of the terrible role played by our education and religion
in creating amongst us a false understanding of ourselves’ (363).
Although Biko was not totally uncritical of two major cultures that met and ‘fused’ were
Fanon’s ideas, many of his basic positions and the African cultural and the Anglo-Boer
political objectives shared a striking similarity culture … the Anglo-Boer culture had all
with those of Fanon. A case in point here is the the trappings of a colonialist culture and …
extensive reference Biko made to the kind of was heavily equipped for conquest. Where
cultural dispossession that Fanon described in they could, they conquered by persuasion,
Black skin, white masks. Here it is worth refer- using a highly exclusive religion that
ring, at length, to the words of Biko himself: denounced all other Gods and demanded a
strict code of behaviour with respect to …
or applicable copyright law.
Since that unfortunate date – 1652 – we education, ritual and custom. Where it was
have been experiencing a process of accul- impossible to convert, firearms were readily
turation. It is perhaps presumptuous to call available and used to advantage. Hence the
it ‘acculturation’ because this term implies a Anglo-Boer culture was the more powerful
fusion of different cultures. In our case this culture in almost all facets. This is where
fusion has been extremely one-sided. The the African began to lose a grip on himself
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BOX 6 Steve Biko and cultural dispossession in apartheid South Africa (continued)
and his surroundings. Thus, in taking a look indigenous culture. To justify its exploita-
at cultural aspects of the African people one tive basis the Angle-Boer culture has at all
inevitably finds oneself having to compare. times been directed at bestowing an inferior
This is primarily because of the contempt status on all cultural aspects of the indige-
that the ‘superior’ culture shows towards the nous people (Biko, 1998a, 26).
This process of ‘correcting false images’ must be undertaken by black men and
women themselves: ‘Whites … from the outside … can never extract and analyze
the ethos in the black community’ (363). This should not be taken as repre-
senting a segregationist viewpoint; rather, Biko’s (1998b) concern is that blacks
should not always be interpreted by whites. In a similar vein he warns that
[o]ne must immediately dispel the thought that Black Consciousness is merely a
methodology or a means to an end. What Black Consciousness seeks to do is to
produce at the output end of the process real black people who do not regard
themselves as appendages to white society … it will always be a lie to accept white
or applicable copyright law.
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As a black person born in 1980s apartheid South because I had attached all meaning with what
Africa, I was raised by an education system that was Western and hence valuable. All this led to
gave me a new language, that is, English, as the having little way to defend myself against
only medium of instruction, which I then had to racism and prejudice – to being even more
use as a means of defining myself. A good vulnerable to racism because I had internalised
example of this is when attending an interview, white values. This is where Black Consciousness
or applying for a job or a bursary: all the ques- is important, because it emphasises the role of
tionnaires are in English, and structured by Euro- a healthy subjectivity, and of a positive image of
centric or US-American concepts, ideas, norms. the black self. It argues that to understand
The education system and media made me myself in the oppressor’s racist terms is to be
understand that the only way to survive was to self-damaging. As means of de-colonising my
aspire to be more Western or more integrated mind, Black Consciousness calls for me to revise
into a Western lifestyle, with the hope of my culture, my language and history, to take
achieving the imaginary symbols and values that respectable, admirable and worthwhile aspects
encourage individual achievement and social of culture which are important to my identity,
mobility. But the political system refused me and to regain the pride, security and confidence
access to any significant material resources lost to the oppressive culture.
necessary for the formation of a strong identity. A challenge to Black Consciousness lies in
As Verwoerd had said: ‘allow a black man to see an awareness that aspects of traditional African
the greener pasture of the European, but don’t culture are not simply ‘pure’ or innocent, that it
allow him to tread there.’ has been patriarchal, oppressive to both females
I was fed with cultural values and under- and children.
standings which were hostile to me, and made We also need to be aware that we need not
to believe that black is an aberration from the a modification of the oppressive system of
normal, which was white or European. I had to apartheid but a total transformation of struc-
study Western history, not my own history; even tures of power – failure to do this produces black
dominant forms of entertainment are of a elites, the ‘cream’ of black communities that
Western kind, with Western norms or standards come to be incorporated into white power, while
that would have a Western lesson for me as a people less privileged, people in the dusty
non-white child. streets of KwaZulu-Natal or Soweto are still
I felt that I lost my culture, the ‘traditional downtrodden by the system.
education’ received from my township life,
question of sexual desire across the lines of race. For Fanon (1986) it is the case
that the black female’s desire to marry a white man is unauthentic, a detestable
example of negative, self-deprecating identity. The black male subject’s desire
for the white female subject is portrayed in very different terms, as containing
an almost redemptive political value: ‘When my restless hands caress those
or applicable copyright law.
white breasts, they grasp white civilisation and dignity and make them mine’
(Fanon, 1986, 63). Fanon has rightly been criticised for this sexist double-
standard in his work (Fuss, 1994; McCulloch, 1983; Wyrick, 1998). Kros
(1999) likewise takes issue with Biko’s predominant focus on black men, with
the fact that he seems to have very little to say about the specific conditions
applying to the sexist oppression of black women.
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A different critique focuses on the fact that Fanon is said often to represent
the colonial relationship as one of complete dominance and control (Moore-
Gilbert, 1997; Young 1990). The claim here is that Fanon undervalues the
various forms of resistance and opposition that colonised individuals and
groups can offer colonisers, and that he stereotypes the nature of these rela-
tionships. The first part of this suggestion is not always true, although a book
such as Black skin, white masks does spend far more time emphasising the
degree and dynamics of colonial/racist control than it does the possibility of
resistance. The wretched of the earth is a useful counterpoint here, in that it is
exactly a revolutionary text focusing on the possibility and, in Fanon’s terms,
the inevitability of an eventual overthrow of, colonial dominance. Perhaps the
point is that, whereas Black skin, white masks rather pessimistically prioritises
relations of domination and control in its analysis – because it does not want
these processes to be underestimated – The wretched of the earth far more
optimistically prioritises the prospects of revolutionary resistance. In Biko’s
case this criticism seems not to hold. Not only was it the case that apartheid
did approximate a form of (almost) complete domination and control – it
seems hard to overestimate the extent of apartheid’s racial oppression – but it
was also the case that Biko’s focus was exactly on strategised political routes of
contesting and overcoming this oppression.
A further criticism of Fanon is to argue that he himself involves essentialist
and static categories – ‘the black’, ‘the white’, ‘the colonised’, ‘the coloniser’,
and so on, as Caute (1970) suggests. To a certain extent this is true, Fanon does
appear to make sweeping statements at this level and does seem to tie certain
categories of personhood to certain necessary forms of experience, or identity.
The strongest version of this critique is to suggest that Fanon enforces a kind
of victim-blaming, by emphasising how black subjects, in their grasping at
white culture are making only ‘inauthentic’ and self-objectifying bids for
identity. The idea that the black subject perpetuates a form of internal racism
against themselves seems to do much the same – and might even be said to
enforce a different kind of racism altogether, one where the black person is
made problematic once again, understood as pathological, broken, damaged,
less than functional. Of course, one might argue that the reason that both Biko
and Fanon use the kinds of argument that they do is exactly to emphasise the
insidious and pervasive nature of the effects of racism on identity, effects that
had not previously been examined, and particularly not from a perspective of
or applicable copyright law.
internalised psychological damage. Does this mean, in the case of Fanon, that
his analysis may be somewhat stark, somewhat caricatured, that his under-
standing of the ‘black subject’ allows for little diversity within itself? In a
similar vein, do Biko’s somewhat romantic representations of an earlier pre-
colonial African culture give us a static, idealised version of ‘Africanness’ that
is no longer retrievable? Do both men rely on a kind of essentialisation, either
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CONCLUSION
This chapter has presented a view of what one might term the ‘critical
psychology’ of Frantz Fanon. This particular brand of critical psychology may
be typed as a ‘psychopolitics’ that politicises psychology by bringing psycholog-
ical terms and concepts into the register of the political. Fanon’s analysis ties his
psychological analyses at each point to very real sociopolitical and historical
circumstances of colonial domination. By adapting the theoretical notion of
alienation into that of racial alienation, Fanon has succeeded in providing a
powerful account of the damaging impact of a ‘white mask psychology’. That is,
he has dramatised, in a critical and analytical manner, the severity of the impact
of racist politics upon the identity and psyche of the black subject.
This chapter has also attempted to show how Fanon’s concern with the
politics of race and racial identity has had an important influence in the South
or applicable copyright law.
African context – particularly via the writings of Steve Biko. In this respect it is
important to note that Fanon’s use of psychology is both powerfully critical
and political. Fanon is aware both of what is wrong with psychology – how it is
used as part of the colonising agenda – and of how certain psychological
concepts, and psychological forms of analysis, may be politically applied as
part of the anti-colonial struggle. We may put this slightly differently by
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Recommended readings
Fanon’s key texts are Black skin, white masks (1986) (London: Pluto Press)
and The wretched of the earth (1990) (London: Penguin). While they can
be difficult and opaque at first, there is no substitute for attempting to
master the concepts as Fanon himself presents them.
While many of the ‘For beginners’ guides are confusing in their attempt to
or applicable copyright law.
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Chapter
5
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LEARNING OUTCOMES
By the end of this chapter, you should be able to:
Explain how Fanon adapts, in conditional ways, theoretical notions of psycho-
analysis (such as those of neurosis, phobia, paranoia, the ‘European collective
unconscious’, and so on) to illustrate the workings of colonial racism
Elaborate and apply Fanon’s psychoanalytic account of racism, with particular refer-
ence to the terms of projection, anxiety, sexuality, guilt, scapegoating, the racial
stereotype, the idealising component of racism etc.
or applicable copyright law.
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juxtaposition of white and black races in the context of colonisation. The white
coloniser and the black colonised exist within the grip of a ‘massive psychoex-
istenial complex’ (1986, 12), he suggests, that has multiple detrimental
psychological effects. Such effects are realized not only in the dreams of the
colonised but also in the psychic life of the colonised, who, in many ways,
thinks of himself (or herself ) as white.
In accordance with psychoanalytic theory, Fanon looks to the underlying
desire motivating the dreams, the actions and the personality of the colonised,
and claims to find there a simple wish. ‘What does the black man want?’ he
asks (8) mimicking Freud’s famous ‘What does a woman want?’. He answers
that ‘The black man wants to be white’ (9). Now it is of vital importance here
that we contextualise this wish within the colonial context, that is, within a
context in which the white subject has – in relative terms – everything and
where the black man or woman has nothing. Hence this desire to be white is
not in any way trans-historical or universal; rather, it is an outcome of a specific Trans-historical:
configuration of power, of real material, economic, cultural and sociopolitical across all historical
settings.
conditions that continually celebrate and empower the white subject and
continually denigrate and dispossess the black man or woman.
Fanon tracks the implications of this answer – of wanting to be white –
across the domains of language, sexuality, dreams and behaviour, finding in
each instance the persistence of this wish – the taking on of the white’s
language and culture, the desire for a white spouse or sexual partner, the
dream of turning white, actions of skin whitening, hair-straightening and so
on. It is this fundamental wish and its affects, the kinds of identity, conflict and
pathology it leads to, that form the focal points of Fanon’s analysis, and indeed,
that he is alluding to with the title of Black skin, white masks. Importantly,
even in his use of a psychoanalytic interpretative approach, Fanon points out
that such ‘pathologies of affect’, even once ‘wired through’ the sexual realms,
through unconscious processes, are ultimately derived from inequalities
present in wider social structures and cannot as such be reduced to the internal
psychical workings of individual subjects.
Neurosis:
Neuroses of blackness emotional disorder,
manifest at the
For Fanon this dream of turning white is a neurotic condition or, as it is put level of personality,
somewhat more figuratively in the introduction to The wretched of the earth, which stems from
or applicable copyright law.
the status of the native is a ‘nervous condition’ (1990, 17). What Fanon goes the conflict
between a
on to do is to analyse this pathological desire through Freud’s explanation of fundamental (often
the neuroses, making various changes to Freud’s conceptualisation along the instinctual) impulse
way. Here it is important that we briefly explain the psychoanalytic notion of or wish and the
neurosis. Neuroses hence can lead to a whole series of irrational behaviours need to repress this
instinct.
and beliefs that are the result of the conflict between powerful unconscious
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Neurosis of
urges and the social/cultural need to keep these urges outside of the conscious
blackness: mind. The ‘nneurosis of blackness’ Fanon has in mind is exactly the ‘dream of
‘dream of turning turning white’ (that is, the wish to attain the level of humanity accorded to
white’ (ie the wish whites in racist/colonial contexts) as it comes into conflict with one’s being in
to attain the level
of humanity
a black body, and within a racist society, which make this wish impossible.
accorded to whites Importantly, rather than framed within the limits of individual psychology, as
in racist/colonial was Freud’s intention with the concept of neurosis, Fanon’s use of the idea of
contexts) as it neurosis makes of it an explicitly social psychological phenomenon, rooted in
comes into conflict
with one’s being in
the specific historical and political contexts of colonisation.
a black body, and in
a racist society, Infantile trauma
which make this
wish impossible.
If we are looking for the cause of neurotic disturbances, says Freud (and
hence, a means to cure them), one must always look to the childhood history
of the individual. The symptoms of neurosis are always linked to a kind of
psychical trauma, which lends them their individual character. More than
this, we are not always looking for a single event, for the cause of the symptom
most often arises out of ‘multiple traumas, frequently analogous and
repeated’ (Freud, cited in Fanon, 1986, 144). Such traumas are expelled from
Traumatic examples of
brutal racist violence are
characteristic not only of
the colonial setting but
also, regrettably, of
recent South African
history, as this Zapiro
cartoon indicates.
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the conscious mind as means of saving the neurotic from great suffering. Register:
More importantly, this trauma need not have happened ‘in the real’. It need particular voca-
not have been an actual event, but may just as well have been fantasised. bulary, or concep-
Importantly, this is the conceptual leap which means psychoanalysis can tual framework,
stemming from a
focus its curative efforts almost completely on elements of fantasy rather than particular school of
on elements of reality. Hence, the neurosis of the black man or woman need thought and/or
not then have stemmed from actual experiences (the witnessing of the criticism.
lynching of one’s father is the example Fanon gives (1986)), but rather from
fantasised experiences or, more to the point, from indirect or cultural forms
of oppression or trauma. Then again, one might argue, it would seem that real
examples of traumatic racist violence or abuse would seem quite common-
place in the colonial environment.
Many first time readers find Black skin, white ronments. Like Feminism and Marxism, post-
masks a difficult text because it combines the colonial critique ultimately aims to do just this,
registers (that is, the theoretical vocabularies) to formulate a unique register through which
of numerous schools of European thought forms of discrimination and disempowerment
without ever relying on one particular form. that would have otherwise remained effectively
Concepts from Marxism exist alongside invisible, indiscernible, ‘naturalised’ within a
concepts drawn from psychoanalysis and exis- society, come to be brought into sharp relief.
tentialism, each somewhat individualised by One should note here that Fanon had an
Fanon’s own voice. Furthermore, Fanon’s refer- extremely ambivalent relationship with
ences are mixed and diverse. In addition to a psychology and psychoanalysis, that he was
set of rich philosophical resources, his extremely aware that both disciplines transmit,
argument is built up on personal, autobio- reinscribe or reify certain ideologically loaded
graphical anecdotes, and extended references Eurocentric notions that work to serve one
to literary as well as scholarly works. As Scheff dominant (oppressive, racist, colonial) social-
(1968) comments, Fanon’s first book is an political grouping over another. (I am speaking
unshapely mixture of personal reminiscence, here of the power exercised by racial, ethnic,
philosophical analysis, literary criticism and gender and sexual majorities over minorities).
psychiatric case history. Fanon’s writing, there- In other words, Fanon is aware of the strategic
fore, often reads like a patchwork of critical value of deploying certain psychological and
concepts and ideas that is still in the process of psychoanalytic terms in his analysis – and does
being brought together. As a result, one often so to great political effect – without becoming
gets the sense of Fanon formulating a new too reliant on them. Indeed, he compounds his
critical language where one had not previously psychological and psychoanalytic terms of
existed, of Fanon generating a new – even if analysis with so many other forms of criticism
hybrid – set of concepts with which to critique that his critique never becomes dependent on
or applicable copyright law.
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Meaning to
emphasise the
extreme conditions
of colonial racism,
Fanon suggests that
‘a normal black
child … will be
made normal by the
slightest contact
with the white
world’ (1986, 117).
Reify/reification: may not even have had direct contact with whites may still develop ‘neuroses
speaking about of race’? Here Fanon differs somewhat from Freud, as touched on above. While
concepts or ideas as he agrees with Freud that the basis of neurosis must be that of some or other
if they are really kind of infantile trauma, he will suggest that this original trauma can be shared
existing concrete
objects. Psycho-
and cultural rather than simply intrapsychic and individualistic in nature. The
logical constructs colonial environment, argues Fanon, is unlike any other. It is so characterised
like ‘mind’ and by racism, by violence and oppression, that these material and cultural forms
‘personality’ are of trauma may, as opposed to the internal fantasised bases posited by Freud,
good examples.
act as the causes of neurosis. In short, then, the basis of the racial neurosis of
the black subject lies, for Fanon, in the infantile trauma caused by the black
child’s exposure to the racist values of the oppressive colonial environment. It
is worth emphasising here again that Fanon takes solid social and political
inequalities to be at the bottom of what might be seen to be the exclusively
Catharsis:
psychological
intrapsychic problem of psychological neuroses.
process where In Fanon’s conceptualisation, then, the early traumatic event to be found at
distressing or the origin of neurosis appears to be cultural in form, its source hence being a
damaging emotional type of cultural trauma. As he puts it, ‘there is a constellation of postulates, a
material is ‘purged’,
‘gotten rid of’ via
series of propositions that slowly ... with the help of books, newspapers,
the means of some schools and their texts, advertisements, films, radio – work their way into one’s
or other activity mind’ (152). Fanon demands more of an explanation than this, though, and
which externalises
or applicable copyright law.
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ters (or plots) of television, comics, films, popular jokes, stories ‘the Wolf, the Scapegoating:
Devil, the Evil Spirit, the Bad Man, the Savage are always symbolized by projection of blame
Negroes’ (Fanon, 1986, 146). onto another person
or object, who then
Racial scapegoating becomes
blameworthy or
Importantly, there is an element of scapegoating at work here in that the punishable for
victims of punishment and aggression in such narratives are typically not, in something I am in
view of the full historical reality, really deserving of the violence meted out on fact guilty for.
Scapegoating is a
them. Here Fanon refers briefly to the writing of Legman, who ponders why way of avoiding
American popular media representations of the time (ie 1950s and 1960s), feelings of guilt and
need to rely on the myth of the ‘bad Indian’. Legman’s answer to this quandary responsibility.
is that ‘the punishment that we deserve can be averted only by denying respon-
sibility for wrong and throwing the blame on the victim’ (cited in Fanon, 1986,
146–147). What Legman has identified is the mechanism of projection as a
means of avoiding guilt. (Projection, in psychoanalysis, is the process by which
specific aspects of self, or certain wishes or impulses, are imagined to be
Projection:
located in something or someone else. The implication here is that the indi-
process by which
vidual is able to avoid confronting discomforting truths about him- or herself.) specific aspects of
This is a mechanism that Fanon makes use of in his analysis of racism also, and self, or certain
he is fully aware of the bizarre (if unconscious) logic that is at work here: a wishes or impulses,
hating of one’s victims proportionate to the guilt one feels for the injustices and are imagined to be
located in some-
violence one has subjected them to! This, then, is one psychoanalytic interpre- thing or someone
tation of racism: racial hatred arises from the need to deal with feelings of guilt else. It means that
that have emerged from the acts of violence, injustice or oppression that one the individual is
has perpetuated on a particular racial grouping. able to avoid
confronting certain
There seems to be a problem here, though – this ‘explanation’ sounds truths about him-
tautological – in a way, it uses racism to explain racism. It might explain how or herself, and
racism escalates, how racism itself breeds more racial violence, but where does hence functions
this all begin? This explanation does not offer an answer to what comes before as a means of
avoiding guilt.
racism, to the question of what brings the first racist action or sentiment into
being? Fanon again looks to Freud here, who, of course, finds sexual content of
sorts in the origin of virtually all neurotic symptoms. (In psychoanalytic
discourse, a symptom is an irrational action which is a compromise between
the need to express a repressed wish and need to keep this wish repressed.)
Fanon in turn directs his attentions to the dynamics of sexuality present in Symptom:
racism. At first this may seem a less than fruitful line of enquiry, because, irrational action
or applicable copyright law.
which is a
thinking intuitively, we might suggest that racism need have nothing at all to
compromise
do with sexuality, or with sexual attraction. Sexual attraction would, in fact, between the need
seem to be the very opposite of the prejudicial hatred that characterises racism! to express a
In opposition to this position, Fanon asserts that ‘no proper understanding of repressed wish and
racism is possible without reference to the sexual sphere’ (1986, 160; emphasis the need to keep
this wish repressed.
added).
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most counter-intuitive – its assertion that contrary reactions of fear and attrac-
tion exist as component parts of one another. A similarly counter-intuitive
suggestion is that unconscious elements of desire and or attraction are compo-
Phobogenic: nent parts of racial hatred. We shall move on to explain these concepts in more
fear-causing person
detail shortly; at the moment it is important to explain why, for Fanon, the
or object.
black person comes to act as what he calls a ‘pphobogenic’ object for whites.
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Just as Fanon rejected the aggressive Fanon (1986) similarly rejects the heavy-
imposition of Western culture, values and handed application of Hegel’s famous slave-
norms on other cultures, so he was antagonistic master dialectic, in which both parties are
towards an uncritical application of European involved in a struggle for recognition from the
theory in colonised contexts. This was other (the master receives his identity as
particularly the case if such theory functioned master from the slave; the slave his identity
to ‘psychologise away’ social inequality; the from the master’s withholding of his freedom).
facts of racism and violence could not simply be In the colonial context, the master sought not
reduced to minor terms of a theoretical analysis recognition from the slave, but work, claims
for Fanon. So, for example, he sets out to Fanon (1986), whilst the slave wanted simply
reinterpret a set of dreams – those of black to be the master. Although Fanon does not
subjects in the context of the violent Malagasy reject Marxism out of hand, he also has
colonial struggle – already analysed by concerns about how it might be applied in
European psychoanalyst Octave Mannoni. Fanon colonial contexts. Fanon’s terms were post-
sees there not the ever-present phallic symbol, Marxian, as Scheff (1968) notes, ‘economic
nor a threatening pair of father-figures, as realities were determining, but they in turn
reported by Mannoni (1990), but takes the derived from the racial structure of colonial
original objects of the dream, as reported by society’ (92). So although Fanon considered
the dreamers, at relative face value. The rifle in himself a socialist, he refused to equate the
one dream is not a penis but a genuine rifle – native struggle against colonialism with the
‘model Lebel 1916’, as Fanon puts it – a real fight between socialism and capitalism; the
object of the Malagasy uprising. The supposed politics and struggle he wished to wage was not
father figures in such dreams represent not a that of socialism against capitalism but that of
symbolised Oedipal fear but rather real colonial poor against rich and, at some level, the
authorities that the dreamer feared, because derided racial category of ‘blackness’ against
they had in fact tortured him or his peers! Here that of ‘whiteness’, African culture versus
psychoanalysis is working by projecting European.
European cultural values or understandings This is not to say that Fanon rejects
onto the colonial context in such a way that wholesale the critical potential of such theories
real conditions of oppression are masked. In the – clearly he made critical use of both aspects of
same way Fanon denied Mannoni’s contention psychoanalysis and Marxism, particularly, in
that African natives had a peculiar psychology view of the latter, a reformulated conception of
that gave them a need for subjection to others, alienation (as seen above). Likewise the notion
that only races that had a deep unconscious of the master-slave dialectic does inform his
or applicable copyright law.
need to be governed, controlled or parented analysis, but in a highly adapted, one might
could in fact be successfully colonised. In even say customised, manner. Fanon’s point is
such forms of psychoanalysis Fanon saw that these Eurocentric theories need to be
nothing but a form of victim-blaming and adequately re-evaluated and reformulated if
colonisation’s attempts at self-justifying forms they are to be sufficiently critical in colonial
of explanation. contexts. Indeed, one of Fanon’s most vital
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critical contributions was to emphasise how theoretical structures, critical as they may be
race, and an awareness of the day-to-day reality within ‘First World’ contexts – both Marxism and
of colonial violence, racism and exploitation, feminism are cases in point here – would not be
came to supersede traditional Eurocentric adequate to properly address the forms of
theoretical terms of analysis. This is also one of power particular to the colonial and post-
the reasons why he becomes so central a figure colonial situations. The danger of these critical
to the field of post-colonial theory: he offers up systems is that they risk homogenising the
the rudiments of a new grid of analysis, a new terms of particular importance to the colonial
set of analytical priorities, around exactly such environment under broader rubrics: race or
questions as cultural dispossession, colonial ethnicity, for example, come to fall under the
violence, racism and racial identity. Pre-existing rubrics of gender or class.
work of Hesnard in specifying that both qualities of revulsion and fear feature
within this sense of subjective insecurity. There is hate within the fear, in other
words; not only does this object scare me, it also revolts me, I find it detestable.
In addition, the phobic object also induces a powerful irrational reaction in me.
After all, in technical terms, a phobic reaction is one that is, by definition, irra-
tional, excessive in nature. As Fanon puts it (1986), ‘In the phobic, affect has a
priority that defies all rational thinking’(155). More than just this, in a proper
phobic reaction, one endows the object ‘evil intentions and ... the attributes of a
malefic power’ (Fanon, 1986, 155). In a phobic reaction, then, one exaggerates
the potential danger of this object, one turns it into something with a thoroughly
evil intent, with a range of threatening powers that promise to cause damage to
me. The phobic object then is something that we respond to with reactions not
Paranoid anxiety: only of fear and hatred but also of paranoid anxiety.
irrational, yet
consistent belief
Phobia and unconscious attraction
that one is being
systematically There is still a further necessary feature of the phobic object. Following the
undermined, logic of ambivalence, psychoanalysis understands the phobic object – that is,
persecuted or
that type of thing or person that causes particular amounts of anxiety, dread or
attacked by a ‘bad’
object, that is, a fear within me – as also a source of unconscious attraction. We have hence
person, group or uncovered, potentially at least, an aspect of sexuality even in phobia – namely
thing which intends that of sexual attraction – even in the revulsion, hatred and paranoid anxiety
to do me damage.
of the phobic response. We can therefore start to anticipate aspects of
or applicable copyright law.
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Negrophobia Collective
Part of Fanon’s analysis of the colonial encounter concerned an attempt to unconscious:
understand the scale of white or European racism, in particular, the depth and idea that all human
beings share a
pervasiveness of the irrational fear and hatred that the white subject is thought supply of innate
to feel toward the black man or woman. Why is it the case, asks Fanon 1986), ideas or archetypes
that ‘in Europe, the black is the symbol of evil’? (188); Why is it the case that that are genetically
‘concretely or symbolically, the black man stands for the bad side character’? supplied, that are
universal, and that
(198). So widespread, so pronounced and so irrational is this racist response can be seen
that Fanon is tempted to use Jung’s notion of the collective unconscious to spontaneously
explain it. (The collective unconscious is the idea that all human beings share produced in the
a supply of innate ideas or archetypes that are genetically supplied, that are symbolism of
different cultures
universal and that can be seen spontaneously produced in the symbolism of
and times.
different cultures and times. Archetypes are thought to be the universal motifs
or patterns that form the collective unconsciousness. Archetypes are therefore
considered to make up the shared basic contents of religions, mythologies, Archetypes:
legends and so on.) universal motifs or
The concept of the collective unconsciousness would seem to be able to patterns that form
the collective
explain how racism may work unconsciously, in a genetically inherited unconsciousness.
manner, shared by all Europeans or whites. However, just as was the case in his Archetypes make up
application of the Freudian concepts, Fanon again finds it necessary to modify the shared basic
certain of Jung’s basic ideas. The need to do so in the case of Jung is even more contents of
religions, mytholo-
pressing, because of the ways that the Jungian account may lend itself to a gies, legends etc.
naturalisation of racism. It is for this reason, along with Jung’s pronounced They also feature in
Eurocentricity, that Fanon finds much of Jungian theory distasteful. A partic- individual dreams
ular concern of Fanon’s here is Jung’s suggestion that the baser desires of all and fantasies.
racial groupings are associated – in a genetically predisposed way – with
blackness. Negro myth:
racist system of
The Negro myth representations and
values in which the
Importantly, while Fanon violently rejects the notion that there may be any figure of the black
innate, biologically predisposed devaluation of blackness – that blackness man or woman
may be in any inherent way problematic, amoral, pathological or inferior – comes to stand as a
repository, a figure
he does acknowledge the massive scale of white racism. So, for Fanon, there
in whom whites
does seem to be something to the derogatory ‘N Negro myth’, as he calls it, at come to symbolise
least in so far as it exists as a racist system of representations and values. all their lower
or applicable copyright law.
Fanon even goes so far as to guardedly use the term of the ‘European collec- emotions and baser
tive unconscious’ to describe how pervasive and systematic this derogatory inclinations. A
dominant theme
image of blackness is. In his own words, ‘... the archetype of the lowest values within what Fanon
is represented by the Negro’ (Fanon, 1986, 198). (Here, though, Fanon uses refers to as the
the term ‘archetype’ as a unit of social value and/or understanding rather ‘European collective
than as an genetically inherited image.) However, the point is that this unconscious’.
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One of Fanon’s strengths as a critical theorist of tion that he requests, but at the same time I
race is his ability to play up the often sublim- can hardly forget that he has a language of his
inal double standards in how black and white own, a country, and that perhaps he is a lawyer
subjects are understood or evaluated. One of or an engineer there. In any case, he is foreign
the best cases of such a racist double standards to my group, and his standards must be
occurs in connection with the devaluation of different. When it comes to the case of the
black language. When I meet a Russian or a [black man] ... nothing of the kind. He has no
German who speaks my language badly, says culture, no civilisation, no ‘long historical past’
Fanon, speaking from the position of the white (1986, 34).
French-speaker, I try to give him the informa-
culture, is purely
tive unconscious’ ‘is purely and simply the sum of prejudices, myths,
and simply the sum collective attitudes of a given group’ (1986, 188). Fanon’s attempt, as McCul-
of the prejudices, loch (1983) puts it, is to transform this concept of the collective unconscious
myths and ‘from an ahistorical mechanism located in inherited cerebral matter to a
collective attitudes
historically specific psychic structure that is open to continuous social rein-
of a given group.
forcement’ (71).
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‘White souls’
I have, in the previous chapter, discussed the internalisation of racism with
reference to how racist cultural values and prejudices become a potential mode
of self-understanding, according to Fanon, for black men and women in
colonial contexts. In complementing this foregoing understanding of racial
alienation with that of racial neurosis, Fanon extends his analysis of the
psychological effects of racism. Now we know from what has gone above that
the ‘racial neurosis of blackness’ is a neurosis ‘on the surface’ so to speak, that
is not driven deep into the unconscious mind. However, Fanon’s suggestion is
that there is, at times, a level of unawareness here, or willful delusion. So, it
or applicable copyright law.
may be the case that the black subject is often forced into the recognition of
their own blackness – this particularly so in contexts where racism is
omnipresent. However, it is also the case that there are frequent occasions
when the black subject thinks of him- or herself as white, that, after adopting
the cultural trappings and language of white culture, they come to conduct
themselves, subjectively and intellectually, as white. As odd as this may sound,
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one should bear in mind the fundamental irrationality of the neurotic condi-
tion that Fanon is describing. Furthermore, one should be well aware of the
force of the racist social values, understandings and discourse in colonial
settings which come to equate blackness with ‘ugliness, sin, darkness,
immorality’ (Fanon, 1986, 192).
If it is the case that all that is repugnant and undesirable is black, and that I,
as a black man or woman, order my life like that of a moral person, then ‘I am
simply not a Negro ... I know only one thing, which is the purity of my conscience
and the whiteness of my soul’ (Fanon, 1986, 193). What Fanon is speaking of
here is whiteness as a moral category, as a metaphysics of all that is positive. This
provides one way of explaining how I can be black and still divorce myself from
blackness; once the above logic is in place (of whiteness as a kind of moral
category), I may be someone who is black yet who has detached him- or herself
from all the derogatory values that have been associated with being black. I can
perhaps even provisionally recognise my physical blackness without admitting
my psychological blackness, so to speak, and avoid my blackness because of the
whiteness of my soul. Fanon describes this logic as follows: ‘I am a Negro – but of
course I do not know it simply because I am one’(191). Further yet:
As I begin to recognize that the Negro is the symbol of sin, I catch myself hating
the Negro. But then I recognize that I am a Negro ... this [is a] neurotic situation
in which I am compelled to choose an unhealthy, conflictual situation fed on
fantasies [that are] hostile and inhuman (Fanon, 1986, 197).
Hence the black subject may assume the structure of racism – via embracing
whiteness as a moral category of sorts – and unconsciously transposing it onto
himself. This is where the explanation of racial neurosis may be seen slightly to
exceed that of racial alienation: it is not just that I have been distanced from my
own blackness, that my own blackness has been objectified for me or that I
understand blackness only through white values – it is also the case that at
some very deep level I, the black subject, experience myself to be white. I have
taken on the subjectivity of whiteness. This process will always be a jarring one,
because race, unlike religion, and in some ways ethnicity, or even gender,
cannot be hidden or disguised – it is very patently visible. This means that even
if I do have the soul or mind of whiteness, my blackness will be continually
reaffirmed; I will be repeatedly confronted with this painful, and pathological
juxtaposition. It is for this reason that Fanon (1986) says that ‘the Negro lives
or applicable copyright law.
Manichean thinking
In his discussions of ‘white souls’ and the ‘Negro myth’, Fanon directs our
attention to the ways in which racist systems of value systematically separate
and divide all that is white from all that is black. This happens physically and
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and his rule of oppression ... The zone town is a strongly-built town, all made of
where the natives live is not complementary stone and steel ... is brightly lit ... the
to the zone inhabited by the settlers. The garbage cans swallow all the leavings ...
two zones are opposed, but not in the The settler’s town is a town of white people
service of a higher unity. Obedient to the and foreigners. The town belonging to the
rules of pure Aristotelian logic, they both colonized people, or at least the native
follow the principle of reciprocal exclu- town, the Negro village ... is a place of ill
sivity. No conciliation is possible, for of the fame, populated by men of evil repute ...
two terms, one is superfluous. The settler’s (Fanon, 1990, 29–30).
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carrying the burden of original sin’ (Fanon, 1986, 192). Racism in this way is
essentially a kind of defence reaction, ‘projecting his own desires onto the
Negro, the white man behaves “as if ” the Negro really had them’ (1986, 165).
This, in a way, explains why racism so powerfully enforces and reaffirms rela-
tions of separation and distance – the racist wants as much distance from the
object of racism as possible given that he has projected all that is worst about
him or herself onto this racial other.
This explanation would seem to cover one set of racist reactions – but there
is another type of reaction – no doubt intermingled with the first – which
seems to require a somewhat different account. What Fanon has in mind here,
again as anticipated above, is the phobic reaction of the white racist to the
black. Here again we find in the racist a whole series of hateful or derisory
values. Somewhat unexpectedly however, there seems also to be a set of
positive, even idealising associations that are also to be found in the racist
response. There is, in short, just as in the phobic response, something quite
alluring, something quite compelling or attractive about the hated object
of racism.
often than not it is a kind of essential quality or virtue that the racist would
dearly like to make his or her own. In fact, we may go so far as to say that it is
a quality that the racist would like to see represented within their most valued
personal attributes. Not a quality that can be manufactured; this quality is
taken to be an inherent trait, something that cannot simply be duplicated; this
is part of why it is so powerfully desired.
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‘Racial jealousy’
Fanon (1990) provides another example of this idealising component of racism
in The wretched of the earth. In the case of European anti-Muslim sentiment in
Algeria at the time of the war of independence, Fanon claimed that the
European’s belief in the Muslim’s apparent liking for violence revealed a deep,
hidden admiration. In the case of white racism, the perceived attribute of
blacks that represents so much anxiety for whites is that of a massive sexual
potency. We need bear in mind here that the idealised component in racism –
the key stereotype around which its logic turns – is itself irrational, unjustified,
exaggerated. And Fanon (1986) is at pains to emphasise that this assumption
of white colonialists is unrealistic, that there is no evidence to suggest that the
sexual powers of blacks are in any way superior to that of whites.
Fanon (1986) provides empirical evidence in support of his suggestion that a
chief stereotype of blackness is that of unrestrained sexual appetites and/or abil-
ities. He conducted 500 association tests with white Europeans; when his
subjects came to associate to ideas of ‘the Negro’ he was confronted with a series
of images of sexuality, natural vitality, strength and athleticism. A particular
anxiety came to the forefront in the fear of ‘the raping Negro’: ‘The white man is
convinced that the Negro is a beast ... if it is not the length of his penis, then it is
the sexual potency that impresses him’ (Fanon, 1986, 170). There is a certain
concealed respect and/or jealousy at work here for Fanon, a ‘rapturous admira-
tion of black ... prowess’ (1986, 174). We should be aware here how, in the logic
of racism, even the apparent ‘racial virtue’ can be twisted into a vice – an ‘ideal
gone wrong’ as it were. Hence not only is the black man (in particular) reduced
to his virulent sexuality, but his sexuality calls all his other qualities into
question, problematises him, makes him morally questionable, savage, animal-
istic etc. Sexuality, of course, represents a particularly powerful set of instinctual
impulses, and is the chief cause of neuroses, particularly in classical Freudian
psychoanalysis. Fanon has hence identified a particularly strong underlying
current in the perpetuation of colonial racism, although, as discussed above, this
psychical process is not to be reduced to psychological mechanisms alone.
colonial racism blackness becomes the ‘catch-all’ category for all negative
values and/or instincts. So, in a very broad way, the black subject comes to
represent all unadmitted and troubling sexual perversities. Hence, the black
subject comes to assume the burden of the European’s sense of sexual anxiety
(McCulloch, 1983). It is through the projection of sexual anxiety and/or guilt
onto the figure of the black – who is, after all, uncivilised, barbaric, uncultured
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– that the European avoids a neurotic sense of their own sexuality, or so Fanon
claims (1986). Secondly, however, and perhaps more importantly, the
perceived sexual potency of the black man is enough to create a sense of inad-
equacy and insecurity in the white man, regarding his own sexual abilities.
There is a form of envy underlying this racism, reiterates Fanon, the white man
wishes he possessed what he considers to be the black man’s primitivism, his
joy for life, his unrivalled sexual capacities.
The colonial condition is characterised by extremely high levels of sexual
anxiety for Fanon, and particularly so in white men, who are unusually preoc-
cupied with the threat posed by black men to white women. In this regard
Fanon makes historical reference to the US-American phenomenon of
lynching, that is, group acts of racially motivated mutilation and murder
carried out by white men chiefly on black men, Ku Klux Klan hangings being
the most obvious example. These acts were almost unfailing justified on the
basis of some or other apparent sexual misconduct of the black man, on the
contention that he had made inappropriate sexual advances to a white woman.
This, for Fanon, is an example of how white men have projected their own
sexual anxiety, in the form of exaggerated claims of the sexual powers, abilities
and intentions, onto black men. The fear of the Negrophobe stems from the
fact, as McCulloch (1983) puts it, that they feel a sense of diminution relative
to the fantasy of the black man’s incredible sexual powers. As Fanon puts it:
The white man is convinced that the Negro is a beast ... Face to face with this man
who is ‘different from himself ’, he needs to defend himself. In other words, to
personify the Other. The Other will become the mainstay of his preoccupations
and desires (1986, 120).
rationalising away both this jealousy and the hatred of the racial Other who
possesses this desired attribute is through a kind of stereotyping or carica-
turing. The tactic here is to exaggerate this quality hopelessly – a process we are
familiar with from the working of the phobia – ridiculously amplifying it,
‘blowing it out of all proportion’, so as to make it seem hopelessly extreme,
unbalanced, unhealthy.
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It would seem often to be the case in racism that the racial Other possessing
the desired attribute, be it the Jew or the Muslim, is reduced to this particular
quality, as if it exhausted all there was to know about them. Hence even this
valued quality is, in a sense, corrupted because it is framed as excessive, as the
only feature that this particular racial group possesses. So unbalanced, so
extreme, so, in a sense, pathological becomes this attribute that it is made out
to be undesirable. This form of prejudicial thinking works in two ways, not
only does it now pretend that the desirable attribute is no longer desirable; it
also objectifies the racial grouping thought to possess it, by virtue of the idea
that there is nothing else worth knowing about them. The Jew, to pursue the
above example, is nothing more than the acquisitive drive, the love of money.
What we detect here, in the unrealistic and racist reduction of a person or
Stereotype/ category to one or more basic qualities, is the racial stereotype.
stereotyping:
reduction of a The paranoia of racism
person or a
category of person The desired object is not only exaggerated, it is also now broadened and
to one (or more) twisted into a threat to my well-being, made both omnipresent, and power-
basic quality that is fully dangerous. Here, then, we confront the paranoid element in racism, the
taken to be sense of personal threat, the danger of my ‘coming undone’ that the racial
particular to them.
The stereotype is other is always thought to possess. This is what would seem to be at the
itself irrational, an bottom of the true hatred of racism: the sense that the racial other is taking
exaggerated or something away from me, that they are somehow stealing my livelihood, my
unrealistic vitality, something of immense value to my identity and/or my existence.
attribution which is
hence an example
That is why I hate you: because you imperil my life and all the things I hold
of prejudice. dear and stand for.
This logic seems paranoid because it hugely amplifies a perceived threat,
makes the racial other out to be a potentially controlling force who has mali-
cious intents, or evil designs, that target me. Hence the racial other inevitably
poses the threat of moral corruption, the degeneration of values, the violation
of law and order, of ‘the ways things are meant to be’. As Fanon puts it, ‘The
Negro destroys, brings to nothing, ruins, damages ... [is] the detriment of
what we have of our civilisation’ (1986, 180). Put differently, we might say that
this threat starts to approximate something like a delusion of persecution. It
fashions a plot that makes the Other (and the Other’s desired attributes)
responsible for my downfall. This logic is likewise paranoid in nature by
virtue of the fact of its sheer repetitiveness. Indeed, there is something
or applicable copyright law.
paranoid about the repetitiveness of racism. Why, one is tempted to ask the
racist, is it necessary continually to reaffirm, to reiterate and act out one’s own
racial superiority – to continually point out the Other’s supposed inferiority –
if this is simply a known fact? Why does one continually need to reassert this
‘fact’ of one’s own superiority and the Other’s inferiority if you are so confi-
dent of it?
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Paranoia as defence
The only way to make sense of this emotional reaction is via the logic of
paranoia. That is, the threat of the other needs to be hopelessly exaggerated,
the racist response needs to be continually repeated. Why? Well, because each
of these operations provides a means of defending against my own lack, my
own insecurity. Put differently, there is a bisarre kind of emotional logic at
work here, which twists itself into irrational forms precisely so I can prevent
myself from confronting two basic facts: (1) the perception that I am lacking
something that you have, that I badly want; (2) a deep and lingering sense of
inadequacy which stems from this perception. I don’t want to admit to either
of these facts. The best way to ‘short-circuit’ these realisations, to maintain my
own emotional equilibrium, is to represent them instead as threats coming
from the other. So, my anxieties are not at basis my own personal inadequa-
cies; rather they are a realistic reaction to the dangerous threat that you pose.
It is not that I lack a particular quality, it is rather than you have this quality in
an excessive and hence dangerous quantity. In this twisted emotional logic of
racism I, the racist, hence become the victim of you, the ‘racial Other’ who
undermines and threatens my existence. You, on the other hand, become my
persecutor, that which represents all that is threatening to me. Hence, I deserve
protection against you, and you, on the other hand, deserve punishment.
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Freud, it would seem that Fanon’s use of Jungian ideas departs so strongly from
their original conceptualisation that they become totally different concepts.
While this is in part true, Fanon’s analyses of the colonial situation are original,
and do not simply duplicate any foregoing analytical frameworks, it is impor-
tant to remember that, despite his powerful focus on social and political
contextual issues, Fanon does not want to lose sight of psychological concepts,
nor, indeed, a psychological level of analysis. This we see quite plainly in his
psychoanalysis of racism – although, even here, the specific context of the
colonial situation remains paramount.
This is the particular complexity of Fanon’s ‘psychopolitics’ and hence his
‘critical psychology – an awareness that psychology does feature in politics, and
that if we are to be able to confront racism properly, for example, we will need
to have a sophisticated understanding of how it works. Fanon is aware that
derogatory images of blackness can and do infiltrate the unconscious mind,
that such images and myths do feature in and motivate dreams, phobias,
symptoms and neuroses, even though this is not their primary level of exis-
tence, nor their point of origin. This is the challenge of Fanon’s approach: not
just an ability to conceptualise how politics impacts on psychology but an
awareness also of how the psychological repeats, reiterates and reinforces the
political. So, racism, like denigrating images of blackness, are in no way natural,
ahistorical, predisposed ‘qualities of cerebral matter’, although they do, in
racist or colonial environments, feature powerfully in the unconscious minds of
individuals and of the society, just as they do circulate within its psychical
phenomena. The conclusion we may draw from this state of affairs is that we
need strong psychological accounts of racism if such forms of prejudice are to
be adequately confronted and redressed. Such an account of racism finds its
place as one component part of an awareness and contestation of forms of
racism and prejudice, even if it alone is not sufficient. Racism no doubt exists at
levels of social structure, of social meaning and discourse, as well as at the level
of individual psychology. All such dimensions of racism need to be confronted.
We should take an important lesson from Fanon’s late work, where he focuses
his attentions on the revolutionary attempt to destroy the material conditions
of a racist, colonial social structure. That is to say, as important as a psycholog-
ical level of awareness and critique is here, it itself will never be enough.
A point of criticism
or applicable copyright law.
This chapter has attempted to illustrate how Fanon has drawn on aspects of
Western psychoanalysis to dramatise both the workings of racism and the
deep psychological impact of the colonial encounter. Particularly important
here, as in the previous chapter, is Fanon’s description of that in-between
position, the condition of a ‘white mask psychology’, of the black man or
woman who wants to be white, who often experiences him- or herself as white,
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but none the less runs up against the force of white racism which imprisons
him or her in a derogatory form of blackness.
There is an important point of specification that needs to be made here. We
can understand how Fanon himself experienced such an in-between position.
He was a well-educated doctor with a middle-class background in Martinique,
from a family of reasonable economic means, whole-heartedly initiated into
the traditions of Western philosophy and psychiatry. The ‘white mask
psychology’ of which he writes should perhaps be tied to this particular
context rather than be understood as the universal conflict or circumstances of
the response of all black people to racism or colonialism. Why do I say this?
Because, as McCulloch (1983) emphasises, Fanon has perhaps neglected
somewhat the dimension of class in his analysis. Not all black subjects find
themselves caught in this in-between state, simply because they may well not
have the economic or cultural, or even the historical, means to move beyond
the basest level of racist objectification. Taking an example from Fanon (1986)
himself, the Senegalese, he claims, were considered by many Martiniquians, to
be ‘more black’, so to speak, less civilised, a social and cultural level below such
Martiniquians themselves. Less socially mobile than the majority of
Martiniquians (at least relative to the norms and values of French culture), it
would seem that the Senegalese were perhaps less subject to being caught in
such a midway state between cultures. It is in this respect that McCulloch
(1983) argues that a greater awareness of class and class differences would have
sharpened Fanon’s analysis of colonial racism.
CONCLUSION
This chapter has presented one aspect of what we might loosely term Fanon’s
‘critical psychology’, namely a direction of ‘psychopolitics’ that politicises
psychology by approaching issues of social power and politics via the critical
use of a psychological (or psychoanalytic) vocabulary. Importantly, though,
even when Fanon revisits the domain of psychoanalysis so as to provide us with
an interpretation of the psychodynamics of racism, he is wary not to reduce
racism to the intrapsychic, to in any way naturalise, or ‘psychologise it away’.
Fanon’s analysis ties his psychological analyses at each point to very real
sociopolitical and historical circumstances of colonial domination.
By adapting the theoretical notion of neurosis into that of racial neurosis,
or applicable copyright law.
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Recommended readings
Fanon’s key texts are Black skin, white masks (1986) (London: Pluto Press)
and The wretched of the earth (1990) (London: Penguin). While they can
be difficult and opaque at first, there is no substitute for attempting to
master the concepts as Fanon himself presents them.
Macey’s recent (2000) biography Frantz Fanon: A life (London: Granta) is
perhaps the most extensive account yet of Fanon’s life and politics. Not
particularly psychological in nature, and perhaps overdetailed in its preoc-
cupation with the politics of the Algerian war of independence, it none the
less makes for a superb introduction to the life, writings and revolutionary
activities of Frantz Fanon.
McCulloch’s (1983) Black soul white artifact: Fanon’s clinical psychology
and social theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press) seems under-
represented in the literature on Fanon, which is a pity because it is an
excellent book. It provides a very incisive, yet critical overview of Fanon’s
thought, usefully linking the theoretical components of Black skin, white
masks both to the later The wretched of the earth and to a series of Fanon’s
clinical papers. McCulloch is not afraid to critique Fanon, and points out
apparent inconsistencies and contradictions when he finds them. The way
he rephrases and explains some of Fanon’s denser theoretical postulates is
of great value to anyone attempting to gain a basic grasp of the material.
or applicable copyright law.
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Chapter
6
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Psychoanalysis and
critical psychology
Ian Parker
LEARNING OUTCOMES
By the end of this chapter, you should be able to:
Explain the basic psychoanalytic conceptualisations of the unconscious and sexual
desire
Show how certain kinds of psychoanalysis (such as Kleinian psychoanalysis) serve
to treat certain psychological characteristics as essential and unchanging
Expand on how some kinds of psychoanalysis (such as US-American ego-
psychology) can be used strategically and pragmatically to deal with pressing tasks
of critical psychology
Demonstrate how certain kinds of psychoanalysis (taking the French Lacanian
tradition as an example) can link psychoanalytic work with an analysis of culture.
or applicable copyright law.
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INTRODUCTION
Against an essentialising psychology
Critical psychology is, amongst other things, an attempt to problematise the
place of psychological explanations in patterns of power and ideology. In this
respect it is important that we remain aware of the force of psychological
knowledge, of the fact that it wields authority and power, particularly within
Western societies, and particular with reference to questions of what is
normality and abnormal, and in terms of the ‘truth’ of deep internal states of
being. For this reason, a key objective of critical psychology is to contest essen-
tialising forms of psychology. These are those types of psychology that generate
internal categories of personhood that are unchanging and timeless, that come
to be inescapable, and hence that bear a determining influence of sorts on the
person in question. Determining, that is, at least inasmuch as that person
comes to understand themselves and how they are understood by others.
Essentialising forms
of psychology:
those types of
psychology which
generate internal
categories of
personhood that are
unchanging and
timeless, that come
to be inescapable,
and that therefore
bear a determining
influence of sorts on
the person in
question.
Shefer’s chapter in this work: Psychology and the regulation of gender for an
extended discussion of this point). They are often the means through which
certain dominant constructions of the world – or of particular groups of
people – come to be reiterated, solidified, given a kind of psychological
grounding, and hence a formidable kind of ‘reality’. Such essentialising trends
are a prime way that constructed and political notions come to be normalised,
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day, culturally
specific and
historically bound
The radical potential of psychoanalytic thought assumptions about
In fact, as a number of theorists have attempted to shown over the last 50 or so human nature,
years, there remains a radical critical and political potential within psychoana- experience and
behaviour.
lytic theory. The critical theory of the Frankfurt School – Adorno and Marcuse
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Rational unitary
(1969) in particular – looked to psychoanalysis in this way (Elliot, 1992), as did
subject: early psychoanalyst Reich (1970), the Marxist Althusser (1971), a series of
term used to feminist theorists such as Mitchell (1974), but also Kristeva, Irigaray and
describe the image Cixous (see Minsky, 1996), and a series of post-colonial thinkers such as
of the self used in
current academic
Bhabha, Spivak and, of course, Fanon (see Moore-Gilbert (1997)) (for Fanon’s
and popular critical use of psychoanalysis, see Derek Hook’s chapter in this work: Fanon
discourse in Europe and the psychoanalysis of racism).
and US-America. In fact, one might argue that it would be a serious omission for critical
Psychologists have
psychology if we were to neglect the subversive potential of psychoanalysis.
been the most
enthusiastic Why so? Because psychoanalysis is founded on the notion of the unconscious,
supporters of this which, for Freud at least, is the home of those transgressive desires that cannot
image as it allows be represented in the domain of the symbolic that cannot be allowed, except in
them to value distorted and disguised forms, into the realm of culture. Given this, it would
‘rational’ cognitive
processes over seem that psychoanalysis holds a powerful potential for the subversion of
feeling and treat certain ideological notions, such as essentialised categories of gender, or the
the mind as made notion of the singular, rational and self-conscious subject (Grosz, 1990). As
of components Minsky (1996) puts it, ‘in stressing the central role of the unconscious in all
unified to make a
self into a subject
identity ... (in everything with which we make an identification, including
they can study. language and knowledge), psychoanalysis inevitably suggests that all
meanings can be potentially subverted’ (xii). This, she (1996) claims, is the
ever-present potential of the unconscious to disrupt meaning.
Symbolic: New forms of theory and explanation
for psychoanalysis,
a domain of There is an important lesson here for critical psychology. Critical psychology
language, law should not become a static form of criticism satisfied simply to point out, to
and/or social destabilise, and pick apart the ideological contents or functioning of
authority.
psychology. In the same vein, critical psychology should not focus simply on
what has been ‘screened in’, allowed within the frame of broader psychological
discourse. If this was all that critical psychology was, if this was the sum total
Psychologisation: of its approach and content, then it would soon be relegated to little more than
turning human a watchdog position within the broader discourse of psychology. It would, in
experience into other words, amount to little more than a minor critical term, easily dismissed,
categories reduced
to the level of the
unable really to challenge the massive orthodoxy of mainstream psychology.
individual and The contribution of critical psychology needs to be more proactive, and more
objectified so that substantial than that. Critical psychology should look to the radical potential
psychologists can of either that lying outside of psychology or to that lying at its peripheries (as
or applicable copyright law.
treat them as
in the case of neglected aspects of psychoanalytic theory) with a view to intro-
processes and vari-
ables that can be ducing rival forms of theory and explanation into psychology itself. Critical
discovered inside psychology needs to do more than point out the ideological complicity of
people and manipu- standard psychology; it needs to facilitate and encourage rival theories and
lated in empirical forms of explanation which counter these ideological biases, and which do so
research studies.
in an ongoing way.
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In the course of this chapter I will explore how psychoanalysis might be Cathartic:
profitably connected to critical psychology. In doing this I will warn that we effect in which
need to refuse reactionary ideas in psychoanalysis that may lead us from there is insight and
psychology into something at least as bad. More than this, I will argue that we a feeling that one
has discharged
have to refuse the psychologisation of psychoanalysis that may lead us from something painful
being critical back into old reactionary psychology again. inside oneself.
Two key ideas define psychoanalysis in Freud’s work, and they define the
battleground over psychoanalysis through the last century, namely the notions Psyche/psychical:
of the unconscious, and sexual desire. of, related to, or
affecting the mind.
A term for psycho-
The unconscious logical processes
The first defining idea of psychoanalysis is the notion of the unconscious. The and qualities.
‘unconscious’ is a realm of psychical activity that operates beyond our
conscious control, manifesting itself in unexpected ways in our everyday life in Critical psychology
dreams, slips of the tongue and jokes. The unconscious, at least in classical needs to do more
psychoanalysis, is at the same time a vast repository of inaccessible memories than point out the
ideological compli-
and experiences, and a storehouse of our most disturbing ideas and impulses, city of standard
ideas and impulses that we would find abhorrent and disturbing, to say the psychology; it
least, should we be directly confronted with them. These are ideas that have needs to facilitate
been ‘repressed’ because they are too painful, because they will cause us and encourage
or applicable copyright law.
rivalling theories
massive anxiety should they be admitted, are still at work in the unconscious,
and forms of
and they emerge in disguised form as slips of the tongue, jokes and dreams. It explanation which
is important to note here that for Freud the unconscious is constructed of our counter these
earliest desires and losses, and that these powerful childhood emotions and ideological biases,
and which do so in
wants make up its system of ‘frozen meanings’. These meanings are thought to
an ongoing way.
influence everything we do, without us being aware of it. It is exactly because
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they are so old, ‘primal’, stemming from most basic childhood emotions, that
we would find them difficult to accept or to identify with. It is in this respect
that Freud understands the unconscious as ‘knowing no time’ as unchanging in
its basic constituents. Freud took these apparently nonsensical and super-
fluous aspects of our everyday life, that is, dreams, slips of the tongue, jokes etc,
seriously. Psychoanalysis is a way of reading significance into our everyday
actions, activities and wishes so as to discover the way the unconscious is at
work both in the choices we make and in our reactions to others.
Psychoanalysis is a
way of reading
significance into
What the unconscious means to psychology
our everyday Psychology is happy to look at ‘non-conscious’ processes and hence show that
actions, activities people do not really know what they are doing. Psychoanalysis unravels
and wishes, so as to
discover the way
consciousness much further, so as to question the assumption that any kind of
the unconscious is psychologist could know better – than we are ourselves – what we are doing.
at work both in the There is a point of critical reflection to be made here. Once you open the question
choices we make of the unconscious you should be led to examine what psychologists think they
and in our reactions
to others.
are doing when they examine other people. This would seem especially so if it is
the case that psychologists are qualifying themselves with an ability to read the
actions and thoughts of people better than they themselves can.
For psychoanalysis,
who we are always
seems to be a kind
of negotiation
between individual
and social. In this
approach, we can
never isolate the
individual, access
them apart from the
social world, which
continually
influences who they
are and want to be.
or applicable copyright law.
Sexual desire
The second defining idea of psychoanalysis is that of sexual desire. Psycho-
analysis sees unconscious sexual desire as the mainspring of human
relationships. More than this, psychoanalysis also treats this unconscious
sexuality as a strange mixture of a drive for connection and erotic gratification
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that is very different from our everyday adult conscious ideas about what sex
is. The ‘repression’ of our sexual desires is considered by psychoanalysis to be
a necessary part of growing up. Furthermore, we are thought to use different
kinds of defence against our desires throughout our lives. These desires affect
who we attach ourselves to on an individual and an intra-psychic level. Broader
forms of such desires are also evident in the social world and come to be
manipulated in the representations of mass media forms, as in advertising
images, for example, to imply that we will get some kind of sexual enjoyment
from buying certain products.
Most of the time mainstream psychology reduces sexuality to the banal and
predictable question ‘are there any sex differences?’. Psychoanalysis opens up
that question into a more radical one, which is ‘how is it that ‘sex differences’
comes to define who you think you are?’. It is important that we properly grasp
the psychoanalytic notion of desire here. One way of doing this is by suggesting
that human beings are the only creatures who can truly experience sexual
desire in a powerful subjective and psychological form, that is, who experience
desire in excess of the mere satisfaction of reproductive instincts. Put differ-
ently, human beings come to appreciate a variety of bodily sensations that were
initially tied to instinctual needs but that have subsequently come to be
enjoyed as pleasurable sensations outside of the fulfilment of any necessary
biological or physiological function. This is why the term ‘instinct’ is so
misleading a term. Freud explicitly used the German term ‘Trieb’, which
should be translated as ‘drive’, a force on the border of the physiological and
the psychical. What we experience driving us is always invested with meaning,
it is not a simply biologically wired in motor for psychoanalysis (Bettelheim,
1986).
This is the kind of sexuality that Freud has in mind in speaking of sexual
desire, a striving for pleasure which may be separated out from the needs for
survival, which is habit and tendency forming, and which comes to bear a very
powerful influence on the patterns of behaviour, the preferences and aversions
we will exhibit in later life. It is true to say, then, that in classical Freudian
terms, the difficult and painful process by which we become conscious human
subjects is marked by ‘infantile sexuality’ and what we, and others, do with it.
analysis very difficult to incorporate into its models of the rational individual,
and to speak of such things disturbs any clear boundary between what is indi-
vidual and what is social. Why is this so? Well, first, because the individual
does not simply ‘know’ himself or herself in any stable way when it comes to
questions of sexuality and desire. For psychoanalysis we do not always fully
know why we do what we do – in fact, for a very large part of the time, we
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Anti-essentialism:
definitely do not know all of the reasons why we do things, or make certain
approach to choices. This makes for something of a challenge to the rational, ‘knowable’
subjectivity, individual that forms the focus of much psychology.
sexuality or identity Furthermore, sexuality, in the Freudian interpretation given above, is
which suggests that
persons are not
extremely flexible, pliable, adaptable, not needing to take any one predisposed
fixed, predeter- form or content. Importantly here, we are not innately heterosexual for Freud,
mined, immutable just as we are not innately drawn, sexually, to any one kind of person or one
or unchanging basic type of sexual interaction or act. There is a powerfully anti-essentialist
essences.
strain to Freud’s notions of sexuality which defy commonplace notions of what
is and is not sexually ‘normative’. Plainly put, there is no normative model for
early sexuality for Freud: we all begin life in a polymorphously perverse state,
a phrase Freud coins to suggest that we have as yet no preferred form of sexual
pleasure, or sexual partner, or part of the body. This approach to sexuality is
also difficult to assimilate fully into much mainstream psychology in that it
Polymorphously
allows for no strict defining line between what is individual and social. Indeed,
perverse: if the form of our sexuality is not predetermined, but instead comes from inter-
here Freud suggests actions with the outside world, then who we are, at least as sexual beings,
that we have at the always seems to be a kind of negotiation between individual and social. Simi-
earliest stages of
larly, if the sexual desire which is treated as so vital to our individual
life no preferred
form of sexual personhood is always a kind of relation to things outside of us, then we can
pleasure, sexual never isolate the individual, access such things apart from the social world
partner (sexual which continually exercises an influence on who they are and on who they
type), part of the want to be. This makes psychoanalysis disturbing not only to the psychologists
body or kind of
sexual interaction.
but also to those types of bureaucratic control, and those forms of common-
place discourse and understanding that would like to know exactly who we are
and pin us into their own categories of sex, race and personality.
sexually ‘normative’.
which is very powerfully ideological – it discourages any attempt to change
There is no norma-
tive model for early society, and makes our current circumstances appear as if they are the only
sexuality for Freud: way they ever could have been, as if there are no real social, political or histor-
we all begin life in ical alternatives. Some of these most reactionary motifs appear when
a ‘polymorphously psychoanalysis makes racial difference into an essential asymmetric differ-
perverse’ state.
ence that is impossible to change.
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BOX 1 Why Jung is a problem for critical work in psychoanalysis in South Africa
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Phenomenology:
English-speaking psychoanalysis that becomes evident in the attempts to bring
philosophical the good word once again to Africa in training institutions modelled on those in
approach that Western Europe. We see this essentialism also in the attempts to explain the
attempted to study as history and effects of oppression in psychologically reductionist terms, and in
fully as possible all
the appearances of
the attempts to discover in research material the underlying processes psycho-
human experience. analysis knows must be there. Here psychoanalysis works like a meta-
Phenomenology narrative, that is, a privileged form of explanation, an account, a story or a theo-
demands that one retical system, that is treated as superior to all others in its explanatory abilities.
bracket one’s own
Psychoanalysis thus becomes the most ‘real’ form of explanation available, and
subjective position,
along with all objec- theoretical postulates and constructs of which it speaks come to be reified.
tive notions of truth Psychoanalytic forms of explanation hence come to be projected onto the
and knowledge, world, onto all kinds of social phenomena, with an unquestionable reality and
wherever possible, in
importance. Here we see one of the central dangers of psychoanalytic thought:
order to grasp the
lived experience of what had claimed to be a mode of interpreting the world comes instead to be a
one’s subject. way of constructing it, of imposing its categories and understandings on it.
British psychoanalysis has been heavily influ- relations’ theory in psychoanalysis because Klein
enced by the work of Melanie Klein, and one of sees the defensive processes as happening inside
the three factions in the British Psychoanalytical the mind of the individual rather than between
Society consists of followers of her ideas. people. The most extreme defences of ‘splitting’
Kleinian psychoanalysis is a good example of into good and bad objects occurs during the
‘essentialist psychoanalysis’. For Kleinians the ‘paranoid-schizoid’ position, and Kleinians claim
unconscious is conceptualised as being like a that there is a developmental shift in the infant
separate space in the mind outside conscious from the paranoid-schizoid position (charac-
awareness that is full of different ‘instincts’ terised by acute fear and hostility and defended
which have direct representation in objects. The by splitting into the good and the bad) to the
mind is assumed to be heterosexual, and this ‘depressive’ position in which we recognise that
basic characteristic is seen as biologically wired- we have ambivalent feelings to other people.
in; the infant already unconsciously knows, for Not only is Klein’s view of the mind very grim,
example, what the difference between men and but she sees these destructive and defensive
women is. The infant (and adult) defends itself processes as universal and unchanging. For
from these unconscious instinctual forces by Kleinians these are ‘developmental’ processes,
using mechanisms such as ‘projective identifica- but they also assume that we flip from one
tion’, in which they expel unpleasant objects ‘position’ to the other throughout adult life, and
from their own minds into the minds of others. so psychoanalysis in this tradition aims to bring
Kleinians are concerned with relations between the patient from a paranoid-schizoid position to
‘objects’, then, but they differ from ‘object- a depressive position.
or applicable copyright law.
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into the new South Africa and make sure that training is conducted according
to its own criteria. IPA-linked organisations in Britain, such as the Tavistock Émigré:
Institute, have also been busy trying to set up local training. One task of critical someone who has
psychologists is to argue that psychoanalysis is a diverse practice and that it left their native
country, often for
should not be defined by any one tradition in any particular organisation. political reasons.
What we are becoming aware of within psychoanalytic discourse, then, is a
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Reify/reification:
very hierarchical approach to truth, a tendency to disqualify opposing inter-
when concepts or pretations and explanations, a tendency to control the way psychoanalysis is
ideas are spoken used to explain. It is small wonder, then, that radical forms of psychoanalytic
about as if they are theory have been underrepresented in the wealth of psychoanalytic discourse
really existing
concrete objects.
that circulates in contemporary culture. Of course, this attempt to control
psychoanalytic discourse is not only a question of regulating psychoanalysis as
a form of knowledge and explanation; it has implications for the structure of
the organisation and for how it categorises and understands people, and its
members. Indeed, there is at the moment a particular danger for gay men and
lesbians, for the IPA training stills treat heterosexuality as ‘normal’, and so
there is a risk of importing some deeply reactionary ideas about the construc-
tion of sexuality (Kottler, 1997).
where aspects of psychology – we need always to ask how a given psychological theory may be
the self are
projected onto the
used, what it may be used to justify ...
other and then There has been a great deal of critical interest in Frantz Fanon’s (1986)
eventually taken insights into processes of racist colonial objectification, insights which focus
back again, or ‘re- on the experience and identities of those subjected to racism, and which have
introjected’.
implications for psychoanalytic accounts (eg Manganyi, 1973). Once again, the
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gists to make the process of research into one which is open to participants as two. Usually the
‘co-researchers’. This approach also makes it difficult to do anything corre- ‘bad’ parts of the
sponding to ‘aaction research’, that is, those forms of research where researcher world become
and research subjects, or, more accurately, research participants, work disowned and
projected upon the
together to produce research and to bring about certain forms of social or external world.
political change. If one treats the interview material as if it were clinical
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Action research:
material that can be subjected to psychoanalytic interpretation, then it is
forms of research understandable that the researcher would not want to negotiate their accounts
where researcher with their participants. Hollway & Jefferson (2000, 100), for example, are
and research happy to talk about the ‘honesty’ with which they approached ‘the data openly
subjects, or, more
accurately, research
and even-handedly’, but because of the nature of the interpretations they are
participants, work making they cannot be honest with their participants, and they say that they
together to produce do not take their interpretations back for feedback for ‘ethical’ reasons. Here
research and to there is a perfectly logical argument, but only if one works on the premise that
bring about certain
critical research should be based on the model of Kleinian clinical practice.
forms of social or
political change. Psychoanalytic ideas that could be useful tactically, then, are turned into a
form of truth that, like many other forms of mainstream psychology, protects
the researcher rather than those they study. These forms of truth, moreover,
are not made available to the scrutiny of those studied, they become protected
‘truths’ – another instance of psychoanalytic discourse being used in a selec-
tive, qualified way, in which certain people can make proclamations about the
world that others cannot question.
then to dissolve or take seriously how forms of identity have been historically linked to certain
transform them once
it has done its
forms of oppression. The strategy here is to speak from a position (of being a
critical work. woman, of being black, for example) because that is the way one is already posi-
tioned by others. It is a ‘strategy’ because it refuses to take for granted the
categories used by others, and it plays with those categories in order to free the
subject from those categories as fixed. Strategic essentialism enables us to grasp
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how we have been made into subjects structured by notions of sex and race (for
example) that are woven into patterns of power. Likewise, strategic essentialism
helps us to grasp how those who have been denied the right to speak may now
exercise that right, precisely in order to dismantle those oppressive structures.
US-American psychoanalysis developed its own into healthy, wholesome activities, then they
culturally specific images of individual psycho- should not be felt to be a problem. The ‘ego’ is
logy after the Second World War. Its main aim also the site of reflexive awareness of who we
was to ensure the healthy functioning of the are and what our relationships are with others.
individual in society. This is why it is a good The US-American vision of the individual is
example of a ‘pragmatic’ way of approaching therefore quite optimistic, closer to humanist
problems and trying to fix them in psycho- psychology, and the ‘development’ of the indi-
analysis. For US-American psychoanalysis the vidual and of civilisation are seen as
unconscious is seen as a part of the mind that progressive linear processes which should go
needs to be integrated into consciousness, and hand-in-hand. The developmental model applied
psychoanalysts working in this tradition assume to parts of the world which are supposedly
that there is a ‘conflict-free’ part of the mind – emerging from a less ‘civilised’ state and the
the ego – which develops as the rational problem- idea that individuals should adapt themselves
solving part of the mind which it is the task of to society in order to behave in a civilised and
psychoanalysis to develop further. Unconscious healthy way are ‘pragmatic’ then; but, of
sexual desires are seen as sometimes disruptive, course, they are ‘pragmatic’ seen from a US-
but the idea is that if they can be channelled American point of view.
The questioning of how the subjectivities of the oppressors and oppressed have
been historically constituted is a more pragmatic use of psychoanalysis. Let us
turn to institutional, clinical and research aspects of this pragmatic approach.
Africa is to be found in Wulf Sachs’s (1996) Black Hamlet, which is a case study
of Sachs’s psychoanalysis of a young black man, John Chavafambira.
Chavafambira was a diviner-healer in Zimbabwe, a ‘nganga’, before coming to
South Africa to work in hotels and restaurants in Durban and Johannesburg.
Black Hamlet (first published in 1937, although followed by a revised
edition 10 years later entitled Black anger), presents an account of everyday
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The approach of
racism in South Africa. The book explores the deep and eventually politicising
strategic essen- effects on John Chavafambira and also the effects on the relationship between
tialism is to speak black indigenous healing and white psychoanalysis (Sodi, 1999). Perhaps it
from a position (of was because Wulf Sachs was a little more sensitive than many other psychoan-
being a woman, of
being black)
alysts of the time to the life difficulties of John Chavafambira that he was able
because that is the to work with the specific questions that his patient raised. Sachs did at least try
way one is posi- to understand that because his patient came from a culture different from his
tioned by others. It own, it would be necessary to work differently. One should also note here that
is a ‘strategy’
Sachs did not use his psychoanalytic encounters with Chavafambira as a basis
because it refuses
to take for granted to posit essentialist categorical differences between black and white, as much
the categories used social science research of the time did (Bertoldi, 1998).
by others, and it None the less, Sachs’s case study raises questions for critical psychologists,
plays with those
such as a concern with how his interpretation is already ‘cued in’ by the title.
categories in order
to free the subject Clearly, ‘Hamlet’ is already a story from Europe about a man’s relationship
from those cate- with his dead father and his rivalry with another figure who has stepped in to
gories as fixed. take the father’s place regarding the affections of his mother. We need ask here
whether even a well-intentioned form of psychoanalytic interpretation might
be seen to be reading a European cultural narrative into the African context.
We should, in addition, also note here that the story of John Chavafambira
is also embedded in a history of psychoanalysis as a peculiar kind of ‘indige-
nous’ healing practice which was brought by Jewish immigrants to South
Africa but which itself was subject to some serious repression during the years
of apartheid. The practice of psychoanalysis itself, in other words, often taken
to be a ‘Jewish science’ scorned and suppressed by anti-Semite and apartheid
forces alike, was also subject to certain forms of social repression. If we look to
Black Hamlet as a kind of historical document, then, as Hayes (2002) has done,
we can see how the history of psychoanalysis in South Africa is also necessarily
a history of racism.
psychoanalysis. The psychoanalytic context for this work was the attempt by
the French psychoanalyst Octave Mannoni (1990) in Prospero and Caliban to
explain, as the subtitle of his book put it, ‘the psychology of colonisation’.
Mannoni drew on his experiences working in Madagascar to elaborate his
understanding of the ‘inferiority complex’ that is suffered by the colonisers,
who play the part of ‘Prospero’ in his account, and the ‘dependency complex’
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that afflicts the colonised – ‘Caliban’ – side of the equation. As with the Kleinian
accounts of racism, the descriptions of the racist mentality as characterised by
‘grave lack of sociability combined with a pathological urge to dominate’
(Mannoni, 1990, 102) are suitably pathologising, and perhaps we are happy to
go along with that, but the descriptions of the colonised are more problematic.
For example, Mannoni claimed that the Malagasy wanted to avoid a sense
of abandonment by the white man, and although there were ‘neither inferior
nor superior’, they were ‘wholly dependent’ (Mannoni, 1990, 157). This diag-
nosis, of course, leads to certain clinical formulations in which the treatment
would focus on trying to address the sense of ‘abandonment’ and bring about
a state of healthy ‘independence’. Fanon quite rightly objected to this psychol-
ogisation of colonialism, and to the implication that the fantasies of rebellion
and revenge on the part of the colonised could be interpreted in terms of a
‘dependency complex’.
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engaged in research involving other people. She (1989) points out that a Transference
‘psychoanalytic perspective makes three assumptions foreign to most sociolo- relationships:
gists’ (25). First, ‘it assumes that much thought and activity takes place outside those relationships
of conscious awareness’ (Hunt, 1989, 25). A reflexive analysis, then, is a place (eg of the
psychotherapist and
for exploring assumptions that we may have taken for granted, and a research client, of psycho-
team or co-supervision may be a good opportunity for turning around and analyst and
looking critically at even the most ‘critical’ research. (In this respect see Kerry analysand) that
Gibson & Leslie Swartz’s chapter in this work: Community psychology: play out patterns of
earlier formative
Emotional processes in political subjects). The second assumption is that
relationships (eg of
unconscious meanings are linked to ‘webs of significance which can ultimately a parental nature).
be traced to childhood experiences’ (Hunt, 1989, 25). What Hunt has in mind Transference
here is the way transference relationships with others in the course of research relationships are
will replay patterns of relationships with others in childhood. The third one of the ways
that unconscious
assumption, according to Hunt, is that the psyche is ‘divided into a tripartite material manifests
system composed of the id, ego and superego’ (1989, 25). itself in
consciousness.
Keeping psychoanalysis at a distance
Now, with respect to the second and third assumptions that Hunt (1989)
outlines, we have to take care once again not to buy into a whole package deal
about what the structure of the mind is really like. Hunt is working in one of
the dominant psychoanalytic traditions in the English-speaking world, partic-
ularly influential in US-America, that of ‘eego-psychology’, and so the way she
describes the mind – with the ego in the middle subject to irrational forces that
make it misperceive others in patterns of transference – reflects that tradition. Ego-psychology:
emphasis by
As we saw earlier, a Kleinian view of the mind organised around ‘projective psychoanalysts
identification’ would see things differently. Nevertheless, Hunt does usefully based mainly in US-
draw attention to the role of subjectivity in research, and there is a connection America (eg Heinz
here with some of the recent innovative work in psychology on the intersection Hartmann, Ernst
Kris and Rudolf
between subjectivity, gender and race (Mama, 1995). As Mama’s (1995) Lowenstein) or in
research makes clear, there is a feminist way of making the argument about Britain (eg Anna
reflexivity which draws on psychoanalytic ideas but which also makes us reflect Freud) after 1945
on the role of psychoanalysis as something that we may want to use strategi- on the development
of the rational ego
cally in our research only as provisional and subject to question. as one of the
These strategic uses of psychoanalysis, which employ some psychoanalytic achievements of
ideas while keeping the approach at a safe distance, would be viewed by civilisation and one
psychoanalysts as indicating an underlying ‘ambivalence’ in the way it is being of the aims of
or applicable copyright law.
psychoanalytic
viewed, for it seems that there is something in it that is fascinating but still
treatment. They
dangerous. In each of these three domains it is possible to be ‘strategic’ about encouraged
what we take to be ‘essential’ at any moment only if we adopt a certain notion identification with
of rationality in which the ego is firmly in charge. That is, we can subject these the ego of the
analyst as the route
approaches to a critical psychological reading that reveals how they rest on
to a cure.
assumptions of ego-psychology, in which the ego is the master of the house and
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Psychoanalysis has
its task is to keep watch on forces that might disturb things. But if we reflect on
become true for the ease with which this notion of ‘ambivalence’ can be wheeled out to
many subjects, and diagnose us, how psychoanalytic language is used, we are led to conceive of
as they speak about psychoanalysis in another way, as part of a culturally specific discourse.
things deep within
they make them-
selves into the kind CULTURAL PSYCHOANALYSIS: WORKING INSIDE AND ALONGSIDE
of subjects for
whom psycho- ITS DISCOURSE
analysis will work. Perhaps we have to take psychoanalysis seriously because it has become true
for many subjects, and as they speak about things deep within they make
themselves into the kind of subjects for whom psychoanalysis will work. Some
of the tools from psychoanalysis for thinking about ideology might really
presuppose that psychoanalysis is true, but at the same time these tools allow
us to reflect on how psychoanalysis itself calls out to us so that we must recog-
nise ourselves within it, and then it might even work as a therapeutic approach.
The study of language, and the language of psychoanalysis, is now one of
the powerful ways of approaching psychology in a critical way, and once again
we shall look at institutional, clinical and research aspects.
French psychoanalysis has been the site for ‘drives’ that are discursively constructed at the
some radical rereadings of Freud’s work, partic- very same moments that the individual
ularly in the tradition of the school of constructs themselves in relation to others. The
psychoanalysis developed by Jacques Lacan image of self, or ‘ego’, is laid down during the
after 1964. This Lacanian tradition is a good mirror stage at about eighteen months old,
example of how psychoanalysis might link with and this image then carries on misleading us as
cultural issues, for good or ill. The Lacanian to where the real stuff of human psychology
vision of the unconscious is of the ‘gaps’ in lies. The unconscious and sexual desire are both
language, of the things that cannot be said by in some sense ‘outside’ us, and the psychoana-
someone when they speak, and each individual lyst has in some way to be ‘outside’ culture in
has their own peculiar ‘gaps’ in speech because order to analyse how it works. The cryptic, diffi-
of their own peculiar history. Sexual desire, for cult, esoteric nature of Lacanian discourse is
the Lacanians, is always ‘desire of the Other’, itself a necessary part of the attempt to try to
intimately linked to what the Other wants or analyse from ‘outside’ everyday taken-for-
what we perceive as being lacking in them. granted assumptions in a culture.
Lacanians do not talk about ‘instincts’ but of
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constructed, reproduced and reinforced each time we respond (Hayes, 1989). Mirror stage:
Althusser likens the process of interpellation to a policeman who calls out ‘hey, seen by Lacan as the
you there’, and our immediate sense is that the call is meant for us, as the guilty moment, at about 18
or good citizen. The interpellation of black citizens of the new South Africa in months old, at which
the infant sees an
the frame of ‘Ubuntu’ can serve, for example, to confirm the essential identity image of itself in a
of a community when it is sent back as a message to the community about how mirror which it then
they should work hard and not contradict power structures. When it is used in ‘misrecognises’ as
this way, it ties the community to certain managerial and economic agendas. being a direct,
accurate reflection.
There are also deep implications for how the interpellation of the good citizen
The image is espe-
may be tied to certain ideas of what a good ‘family’ is (Hayes, 1989). cially alluring
This description also has implications for how we understand the work of because it gives
psychoanalysis itself. We can combine this description of interpellation into some stability, and
ideology with another notion from Lacan that is elaborated in greater detail contrasts with the
uncoordinated move-
by Jacques-Alain Miller, that of ‘eextimacy’. For Miller (1986), ‘the extimacy of ments of its body.
the subject is the Other’’ (77), and interpellation works so powerfully because The ‘ego’ produced
it is a process that works as if it were inside the subject when it is really outside here in front of a
in the organisation of language. The phenomenon of being ‘outside’ thus mirror then lays
down a perception
marks the enduring quality of human experience that psychoanalysis brings
and experience
us face to face with. There are implications here for the role of psychoanalysis which Lacanians call
in culture. Miller comments that perhaps ‘it is this position of the psychoana- the line of the
lyst’s extimacy that makes so distinct and constant the role of the Jew in the ‘Imaginary’.
history of psychoanalysis’ (Miller, 1986, 77). What Miller draws attention to
here is the importance of Jews to the development of psychoanalysis – Freud
and many of his followers in the psychoanalytic movement were Jewish – and
the way that perhaps psychoanalysis was able to develop simultaneously as
something ‘inside’ Western culture and as something ‘outside’ and critical of
it precisely because of the condition of Jews as an important part of the
culture but a part that was also marginalised. Once again, we are brought face
to face with the cultural historical nature of all theories concerning
Extimacy:
psychology.
neologism used by
Lacan and his
Clinical strategies for learning analysis followers – in
particular by his
What this way of thinking of psychoanalysis draws attention to is that psycho-
son-in-law Jacques-
analysis itself has to be learnt and believed in order for it to work. That Alain Miller – to
‘learning’ may not be explicit, for it may be absorbed through ways of speaking capture the way in
that we then take for granted, and then we shall be ‘interpellated’ into the which what seems
or applicable copyright law.
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Jouissance:
Other’s jouissance; it is hatred of the particular way, of the Other’s own way, of
term used by Lacan experiencing jouissance’ (Miller, 1986, 179). This critical take on the clinical
to describe a form psychoanalysis of racism still then needs to be subjected to a critical reading to
of sexual enjoyment ensure that it locates these processes historically, as with any phenomenolog-
that appears
alluring but then
ical account (cf Couve, 1986). During the last years of apartheid, some of the
also goes too far so good clinical work carried out by psychotherapists working in a psychoanalytic
that it turns into framework did actually include an element of teaching, for traumatised youth
pain. The ‘too much’ in the black townships needed to be able to understand what the ‘unconscious’
of jouissance is
was in order for psychoanalytic psychotherapy to function for them (Straker,
designed to charac-
terise something 1988). The operation of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission then
beyond the ‘pleasure operated on a psychotherapeutic discourse in which ‘trauma’ had to be taken
principle’, as a seriously in order that it could be spoken about, and spoken about in such a
domain of satisfac-
way that the speaking subject believed that it would be cathartic to have done
tion that we find
manageable. so (Hayes, 1998). Here you can see the importance of early ideas about
‘catharsis’ in early psychoanalysis and the way these early notions have perco-
lated into popular discourse.
outside, and that is where it should stay. These ways of using psychoanalysis do
help us to work in and against the discipline of Psychology, and in and against
psychoanalysis to stop it turning itself into just another form of psychology,
and to bring it closer to critical psychology.
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Recommended readings
Sachs, W. (1996). Black Hamlet. Johannesburg: Witwatersrand University
Press.
Sey, J., & Moss, D. (eds) (1998). ‘South Africa Special Issue.’ American Imago,
55: 1.
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Chapter
7
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Marxism and
critical psychology
Grahame Hayes
LEARNING OUTCOMES
By the end of this chapter, you should be able to:
Understand what distinguishes Marxism as a theory
Offer an explanation of what Marxism as a theory and practice can offer critical
psychology
Explain some of the basic Marxist concepts of alienation, ideology and dialectics,
and motivate how each may be engaged as a form of analysis and critique
Understand what is meant by a ‘socially situated conception of individuality’, or
how individuality is constructed in and through society or social relations
Explain what could be meant by a materialist psychology of ‘the lived experience
of everyday life’
Appreciate both how theoretically Marxism can be changed through an engagement
with psychology and how psychology can be altered through an engagement with
Marxism.
or applicable copyright law.
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INTRODUCTION
Marxism and psychology
Marxism and psychology have had very little to do with each other throughout
psychology’s century-and-a-quarter’s history. And for the majority of psychol-
ogists this is not a particularly lamentable affair, probably more an occasion to
rejoice! At best psychology has not seen the relevance or usefulness of Marxism
to its theory and practice, and at worst, psychology has been quite hostile Karl Marx
towards Marxism as an ideologically laden totalitarian theory and system. The
‘discrediting’ of Marxist theory was certainly given a boost following the
collapse of the totalitarian regimes of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe
during 1989. Be that as it may, it seems that the period of strident anti-
Marxism is somewhat in decline, and that in fact there are a number of
indications of renewed interest and engagement with Marxism, and even with
Marx’s work. One could advance many reasons for this, or rather these, returns
to Marxism at both a political and a theoretical level, and yet it also needs to be
remembered that many people never left Marxism, so it is not just a case of
returning.
‘De-revising Marxism’
Marxism as a tradition does not need to be given special treatment, and so it
should be appraised according to whether it offers us some useful ways of
thinking about the world and acting upon our worlds and lives. Boris Kagarl-
itsky (2000, vi), the Soviet and Russian intellectual and activist, puts the case
for Marxism quite forcefully in his trilogy entitled Recasting Marxism, where
he writes ‘that Marxism is not only relevant but also needs de-revision’.
Marxism is clearly (and continually) in need of revision, and especially where
this revision means being sensitive to changing historical circumstances.
However, the many calls for the revision of Marxism have also meant a conser-
vative undercutting of its political criticism of the status quo. And so
Kagarlitsky is suggesting that the calls for the ‘revision’ of Marxist thought
themselves need to be questioned, what he calls ‘de-revision’. The issue, then,
is not about a blinkered loyalty and uncritical attachment to Marxism but
rather an attempt to understand what Marxism as a theory and practice can
offer psychology, and other social and human disciplines for that matter.
or applicable copyright law.
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The Left:
was. But in the new conditions, the need for a radical anti-capitalist alternative
political position has become greater, not less’ (emphases added). The point is that Marxism has
that seeks to always been connected to and associated with the Left, and the Left (properly
critique capitalism understood) as a critique of capitalism, and hence part of an anti-capitalist
and develop an
anti-capitalist
alternative. In short, Marxism is a left theory and practice against capitalism,
alternative. and for a different, more egalitarian society.
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(as reflected in the various chapters in this book) does refer to a particular set
of topics or specifiable content, and yet critical psychology should be worried
about its separate identity. On a grander (maybe even grandiose) political
scale, critical psychology should want all of psychology to be critical, and hence
for the label ‘critical psychology’ to become redundant! In the current histor-
ical context Marxism is obviously part of the theoretical and research tools that
a critical psychology needs, and yet Marxism would not be satisfied with its
exclusive enclosure within critical psychology while leaving mainstream
psychology to pursue ‘business as usual’.
DEFINING MARXISM
At the outset it is useful to say some general things about what Marxism is,
bearing in mind that even amongst thinkers who would self-consciously
identify themselves as Marxists there would not be complete agreement
about how to characterise and define Marxism. This points to the vibrancy of
current debates about reinvigorating Marxist theory for the 21st century. For
example, Jameson’s (1997) five theses of Marxism only partly overlap with
what is presented below. The intention is not to discuss in any detail the
following five dimensions of Marxism, which I consider as important defining
characteristics, but merely to present them as definitional maxims or theses,
and as a challenge to a psychology wanting to adopt the label ‘critical’ to
describe itself.
sure that these ‘productions’ are reproduced. In other words, a society must
produce the means of existence, while at the same reproduce (over time, across
generations) the conditions to allow production to occur. Furthermore, and
importantly for psychology, a society needs to reproduce the individuals that
are involved in the production and maintenance of society.
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the world, in various ways; the point is to change it’ (cited in Balibar, 1995, 13).
Thus to engage with Marxism, psychology would need to stop hiding behind
the veil of ‘scientific’ objectivity, and understand that research is part of social
relations. Hence our ‘data’, our ‘findings’ have consequences in the lives of
ordinary people. And so, a psychology in serious dialogue with Marxism
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would combine objective research and analysis with critique. Striving after Positivism:
objectivity is a goal that both Marxism and psychology aspire to, and yet objec- approach to science
tivity must not be confused with the positivist conception of truth and science. that argues that it
is not possible to
go beyond the
Alienation objective,
Marxism as critique, or as a critical social theory, is interested in analysing the observable world,
effects of certain economic, political and social arrangements. One could say and that only those
questions that can
that this was what Marx was doing in Capital – Volume 1, where his interest in be answered from
the specificity of the capitalist mode of production was in determining partic- the application of
ular social relations of production, and the reproduction of those social objective scientific
relations of production. However, clearly, Capital is much more than an method are valid.
analysis of the political economy of capitalism, in so far as this text is redolent
with a critique of the effects of working in a capitalist economy for the majority
of ordinary workers (the working class). As we would say these days, Marx’s Psychology, for
Marxism, needs to
critique of capitalism tends to be a macro-economic analysis, and yet as a polit-
stop hiding behind
ical analysis his critique incorporates the alienation wrought by capitalist the veil of ‘scienti-
relations of production on the working class. fic’ objectivity, to
understand that
Exploitation of workers by capitalists research is part of
social relations, and
According to Marxism, a capitalist economy sets up a conflict of interests, an hence our ‘data’,
antagonism, between workers and those they work for (owners of firms or our ‘findings’ have
businesses, called capitalists). The basic principle of capitalist economies is consequences in the
lives of ordinary
the creation of profit (surpluses) which then is unevenly or unfairly distrib- people.
uted. The workers are paid a fixed wage for their work, for the time that they
spend at work, and the profit (excess, surplus) that is created by the workers
According to
Marxism, a
capitalist economy
sets up a conflict of
interests, an
antagonism,
between workers
and those they work
for. For a surplus or
profit to be created
workers need to be
paid less than they
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Alienation:
is then appropriated by the bosses or the capitalist class (owners of the facto-
consequences or ries and firms). For a surplus or profit to be created workers need to be paid
effects of economic less than they are worth or, to put this another way, workers create more than
relations of the value of their wages. This profit-making or, in Marxist terms, this surplus
exploitation in capi-
talism. Alienation
extraction, is the foundation of the economic exploitation of workers.
occurs in a number Workers do not passively accept these exploitative conditions, and because
of areas: first, the they (workers) resist capitalists are forced to continually ‘renew’ the avenues
person or group for exploitation. For example, it is not so long ago that it was argued that
becomes estranged
women workers did not need to be paid the same as men – for doing the same
from the results or
products of their job – because the primary breadwinner was the male (head of the house-
own labour activity, hold!), and hence women’s wages were seen as ‘extra income’ for families. In
and often from the simple terms, women were, and still are, being exploited for doing the same
activity of work
work as men because of some odd idea that capitalists were paying men a
itself. Secondly, how
people live (or are ‘family wage’.
‘forced’ to live) their
lives. Thirdly, for Alienation from products of one’s own labour
Marxism alienation
is always under- Marxist economic analysis concentrates on the nature and consequences of
stood as self- exploitative working relations in capitalist societies. One of the consequences
alienation in the or effects of economic relations of exploitation is alienation. One of the earliest
sense that the and most elaborate accounts of alienation appears in Marx’s (1977) 1844
person (or huma-
nity) becomes Economic and philosophical manuscripts (although only published in the
estranged from 1932). In this work Marx suggests that alienation occurs in a number of areas:
their fellow human first, the person or group becomes alienated (estranged) from the results or
beings as well as products of their own labour activity, and often from the activity of work itself.
from their own
human potentia-
Take, for example, a worker on the production line of a motor-car manufac-
lities. All three turing firm producing luxury 4x4s. Assume that this worker is well paid and
aspects of alien- earning R6 000 per month! This worker is obviously alienated from the
ation are closely product of his labour as he is never going to be able to afford to buy the 4x4
interlinked and
mutually
that he produces and probably, given his monthly wage, will never be able to
reinforcing. own any new car. Depending on the actual conditions of work on the produc-
tion line – monotony, dirt and dust, noise, danger – this worker might also be
alienated from the activity and process of his work experience. In what sense
does industrial psychology understand ‘job satisfaction’ under these alienating
conditions of work? Without overstating the claim, it could be said that much
of industrial and organisational psychology has operated to adapt workers to
exploitative and alienating conditions of work.
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far) outside the white city centres and the white residential suburbs that were
explicitly created to house a black working class. The difficulties that these
township communities experienced were transport to and from work; lack of
basic infrastructure – electricity, water, street lights; lack of resources – hospi-
tals, libraries, sports fields, parks; and very little sense of belonging and
community identity with these ‘township spaces’. It is not surprising, then,
that these living areas became sites for the most extreme forms of alienation:
rape, murder, child neglect and drunkenness. A challenge facing the demo-
cratic government of South Africa is how to transform these townships from
alienating ‘residential spaces’ into places where people want to live, into
homes, into communities with a sense of belonging. This would also be a chal-
lenge for a critical social psychology to contribute to an understanding of the
current levels of alienation of people’s lived experiences in these post-apartheid
townships, and then to suggest ways to go beyond (transform) these alienating
living conditions.
Self-alienation
Finally, a third area of alienation that Marx refers to is what is called ‘self-
alienation’. For Marxism alienation is always understood as self-alienation in
the sense that the person (or humanity) becomes alienated or estranged from,
their fellow human beings, as well as alienated from their own human possi-
bilities and potentialities. All three aspects of alienation referred to here are
closely interlinked, and mutually reinforcing. (For a lengthier discussion of
alienation, consult Derek Hook’s chapter in this work: Frantz Fanon, Steve
Biko, ‘psychopolitics’ and critical psychology). Through the human activities
and practices of our work (or lack of them – unemployment), where and how
we live, we come to experience ourselves and our social and interpersonal rela-
tionships with others as either fulfilling or alienating. It is difficult to feel
happy, to believe that our lives are meaningful, and that there is scope for us to
realise our potential if we are stuck in some poorly paid temporary job, are Through the human
living in an overcrowded informal settlement, and are struggling to keep our activities and prac-
children at school. The structural and social conditions of alienation tices of our work (or
lack of them –
mentioned above have profound psychological effects in people’s lives, and in unemployment),
how they experience themselves and others. It is interesting to note that early where and how we
psychiatrists were called alienists; in other words, they studied and worked live, we come to
with aliens, the insane, the mad. Psychological disturbance is quite properly a experience ourselves
or applicable copyright law.
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The notion of alienation, given the most elabo- the complex notion of the ‘epistemological
rate and sustained discussion in Marx’s (1977) break’ (between the early Marx and the later
1844 Economic and philosophical manuscripts Marx) (Althusser, 1979). Althusser, and other
(although only published in 1932), has been ‘opponents of the theory of alienation, have
the centre of a controversy about Marx’s work insisted that what was called alienation in the
and how best to understand Marxism. This early Marx was much more adequately described
controversy has centred on the separation of in the later works by scientific terms such as
Marx’s work into two distinct periods: the early, private property, class domination, exploita-
‘humanist’ Marx, still influenced by Hegelian tion, division of labour etc. But it has been
idealism and a philosophical anthropology; and argued in reply that the concepts of alienation
a later more mature Marx of the ‘economic and de-alienation cannot be fully reduced to
writings of the mid-1850s and beyond. This any (or all) of the concepts which have been
separation, or sharp division of Marx’s work into offered as replacements, and that for a truly
two distinct ‘theoretical projects’, was most revolutionary interpretation of Marx the
forcefully argued by the influential French concept of alienation is indispensable’ (in
Marxist philosopher, Louis Althusser, through Bottomore, 1983, 13).
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The contradiction that capitalism finds itself in is one where it can’t actually claim that it ‘pays a
fair day’s wage for a fair day’s work’! Capitalism obscures or conceals this contradiction concerning
the ‘necessary’ exploitation of workers through the ideological practices of the living wage; the
legitimacy of trade unions as the vehicle through which workers are fairly represented; paying
people according to their skill or educational level, and so on.
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Ideology:
the range of vested interests might be that present women as passive and as
(within Marxism) a sex objects? The various presentations of women in this way would be
set of social prac- referred to as ideological practices. Ideology (within Marxism) can be defined
tices, ideas and as a set of social practices, ideas, and meanings that conceal or obscure – or
meanings that
attempt to obscure
more accurately, attempt to obscure and conceal – social contradictions (cf
and conceal social Hayes, 1989). Staying with the example of profit, Marxism would argue that
contradictions. For there are ideological reasons behind the attempt to present profit as a
Marxism, the ‘neutral’ descriptor of economic relations, and in fact profit’s naturalisation is
appearance of social
precisely achieved by (ideologically) concealing or obscuring the social
reality, being the
only reality, is contradiction of exploitative relations of production. The social contradiction
illusory; rather, this is that for capitalists to make a profit, they have to exploit workers. Capi-
reality is represented talism, as a profit-generating economy, would not survive if workers were
by vested interests
paid the full value for their labour time. So the contradiction (or the corner)
in the society.
that capitalism finds itself in is one where it can’t actually claim that it ‘pays a
fair day’s wage for a fair day’s work’! It obscures or conceals this contradiction
concerning the ‘necessary’ exploitation of workers through the ideological
practices of: the living wage; the legitimacy of trade unions as the vehicle
through which workers are fairly represented; paying people according to
their skill or educational level, and so on.
realities. resistant to change and criticism? The answers to these concerns and questions
are complex and multiple, but the least that we can say is that there is more to
them than simply accepting things as they positively appear to us.
A crucial element, then, in the dialogue between psychology and Marxism
would be the notion of ideology, and more specifically for psychology to take
on forms of ideology-critique.
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Dialectics Dialectics:
Dialectics as methodology and as relationship between theory in general, refers to
and practice the fact that pro-
cesses and relations
There are two aspects of dialectics that are worth considering. The one relates are reciprocal,
to dialectics as methodology, and the other the dialectical relationship interwoven and co-
between theory and practice and the rather special place that practice has determining.
Dialectics is a
within Marxist thought. Practice can be understood either as doing theoretical methodology for
research (theoretical practice) or as practical action in the world (being looking at how
involved in a march in support of the Treatment Action Campaign’s call for things, ideas and
universal access to anti-retrovirals), and practice can also be understood as social relations are
constituted,
transformatory or revolutionary practice (changing the social conditions that maintained and
give rise to the rape of women). In general, dialectics refers to the fact that changed. Dialectical
processes and relations are reciprocal, interwoven and co-determining. Dialec- thought is
tics is a way (a methodology) of looking at how things, ideas and social ruthlessly reflective.
In this way, it is
relations are constituted, maintained and changed.
concerned with
reversals, with
Reversals, contradictions, non-identity contrary notions.
Dialectical thought is ruthlessly reflective, and self-reflective in its questioning
of the conditions of possibility of its own categories. Dialectical thought is
concerned with reversals, with contrary notions, with identity located in
identity and non-identity, with being located in being, non-being and
becoming. For example, we don’t define ourselves only positively but nega-
tively as well. Sometimes, young boys (say at the age of about 7) might say: ‘We
don’t play with girls.’ Their increasing confidence and self-consciousness casts
them ‘against’ girls, and is particularly evident when they are in a group
context. So, by asserting ‘we don’t play with girls’, they are asserting something
(opaque) about being boys, about their ‘boyness’. Ten years later, these same
boys are very keen to ‘play with girls’. These boys, now (becoming) young men,
are moving away from being boys (children), and are having to negotiate
different relationships with girls or women, who are simultaneously different
from boys or men (non-males) Yet this difference, this Otherness, is exactly
what interests (heterosexual) young men as they attempt to define themselves
as sexual beings. These sets of developmentally changing identities are dialec-
tically constituted by the myriad practices that young people participate in in
the course of defining who they are and who they aren’t, and who they would
or applicable copyright law.
like to become.
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ted with method, a The above five ‘defining characteristics’ of Marxism could be said to be some of
rule-bound series of the theoretical backbone of Marxism, or abstract terms defining the meta-
steps of analysis theory of Marxism. Most Marxist and non-Marxist scholars would accept the
used in research.
above five concepts as central to an understanding of Marxism, albeit that
different selections would be made depending on an author’s particular disci-
plinary background, and their political convictions concerning Marxism. For
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example, a range of central concepts of Marxism that I have omitted are: mode
of production; labour, or labour power; use value and surplus value; class;
practice or praxis; contradiction; ideology; hegemony; and there are others.
However, it seems that there are two important considerations with regard
to Marxism that a critical psychology needs to attend to. First, psychology
needs to be aware of what kind of theory Marxism is, so that if it engages
Marxism the consequences for psychological theory and practice are at least
clear. Secondly, seeing as I don’t believe that there is such a thing as a Marxist
psychology, the ‘thing’ then that there is, is a dialogue, a dialectical interaction
between psychology and Marxism. Because, as Touraine (2000, 255) writes,
‘the gulf between the Subject and society can never be bridged’, and hence
there can’t be some epistemological ‘solution’ between Marxism and
psychology, but theoretically Marxism can be changed through an engage-
ment with psychology, and so too psychology can be altered through an
engagement with Marxism. What seems more important than the theoretical
‘adjustments’ or changes consequent upon a rapprochement of Marxism and
psychology, is rather how substantive issues (in the world) would be better
understood and improved as a result of the Marxism–psychology dialogue. So
the task (in this chapter) is to understand how psychology might or can be
enhanced by engaging with Marxist thought – which is not to imply that
Marxism isn’t equally in need of ‘enhancement’ through an engagement with
matters psychological.
In an attempt to demonstrate the possible (positive) effects of psychology’s
insertion into Marxist thought I would like to focus on two issues: the theory
of the social; and the notion of the lived experience of everyday life.
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Individualist:
It could be argued that critical psychology has become quite docile over the last
perspective whose 10 years, if ever it was a radical and disruptive challenge to mainstream
primary focus is on psychology. Many reasons could be advanced for this state of affairs. One
the individual and suggestion is that the lack of a social theory to underpin a critical psychology
which maintains the
renders it subject to neutralisation as a radical challenge to psychology, and
belief that individua-
lity can be defined thus it becomes ‘tolerated’ as one of the many alternatives within the so-called
in itself, in isolation, liberal canon of psychology. Human experience, psychological life, is part of
whether in terms of the ensemble of social relations, and does not exist separately in some pre-
biology, psychology,
social sphere. This conception of psychology and psychological reality as part
economic behaviour,
etc. of social relations is a radical displacement from the usual idealist and individ-
ualist conceptions that abound in the discipline. Whether one is thinking
about the individual in cognitive psychology, in personality theory, and even in
industrial psychology, they are often presented in quite abstract ways as
divorced from their social and cultural contexts. It is not just a case of adding
social context to our conception of the individual but realising how individuals
are formed in particular historical, social and cultural contexts, are integral
parts of their social worlds, and if abstractly removed from these contexts they
lose their individuality.
Human experience,
psychological life, in
Marxist thought is
part of the ensemble
of social relations
and does not exist
separately in some
pre-social sphere.
We are always a part
of our social
surroundings.
or applicable copyright law.
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individual and, especially, the fiction of an individuality which could be Organicist: point of
defined in itself, in isolation, whether in terms of biology, psychology, view (also called
economic behaviour or whatever) and the organicist point of view (which, holistic) which sees
today, following Anglo-American usage, is also called the holistic point of view: the whole as
primary and sees
the primacy of the whole, and particularly of society considered as an indivis- society considered
ible unity of which individuals are merely the functional members).’ as an indivisible
unity of which
A socially situated conception of individuality individuals are
merely the func-
The socially situated conception of individuality being advanced here requires tional members.
that we conceptualise the individual and society in relational terms, rather than
in the static appeal to human nature or human essence. What Balibar (1995) is
alerting us to is that Marx was onto something quite different about how to
conceptualise the constitutive relation of human essence or individuality, which
only now, through thinkers (Kojève, Simondon, Lacan) of the 20th century, we It is not just a case
have a word for: trans-individual, trans-individuality. Balibar (1995, 30–32) of adding social
notes that ‘we have, in fact, to think humanity as a trans-individual reality and, context to our
ultimately, to think trans-individuality as such. Not what is ideal “in” each indi- conception of the
individual, but
vidual (as a form or substance), or what would serve, from outside, to classify realising how
that individual, but what exists between individuals by dint of their multiple individuals are
interactions.’ This is very similar to the notion of the subject advanced in post- formed in particular
structuralist psychoanalysis (Lacanian), of the subject constituted through historical, social
and cultural
intersubjectivity – the unconscious as part of intersubjective reality. contexts, are
integral parts of
Trans-individuality their social worlds,
and if abstractly
This trans-individuality or intersubjectivity or, what amounts to the same removed from these
thing, a (more) materialist conception of the individual requires us to say contexts lose their
something about what we think society is. If the ‘human essence’ is constituted individuality.
in and through social relations, we shall understand human psychological indi-
viduality properly only if we theorise this within a conception of the social,
social relations, society or, as Marxism has referred to it, the social formation.
The discussion of the social has been ensnarled by the controversy
surrounding the notion of totality, social totality. The controversy has mostly Trans-individuality:
centred on the implications for the type of society that is ‘generated’ or socially situated
‘produced’ by adopting an idea of the social whole, or social totality. Crudely conception of
individuality in
put, a theory of social totality produces a totalitarian society! Before indicating which the individual
or applicable copyright law.
what some of the problems are in conceiving of society as a social totality, it is and society are
important to define social totality. For example, conceptualised in
relational terms
Social totality in Marxist theory is a structured and historically determined rather than in the
overall complex. ... The significance and limits of an action, measure, achieve- static terms of
ment, law, etc, cannot therefore be assessed except in relation to a dialectical human nature or
grasp of the structure of the totality (in Bottomore, 1983, 480). human essence.
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We will understand
And again, more forcefully referring directly to Marx’s work:
human psycholo- Marx’s conception of historical materialism theorises social development from the
gical individuality totalising vantage point of a ‘world history’ that arises from the objective determi-
properly only if we
nations of material and inter-personal processes (in Bottomore, 1983, 480).
theorise this within
a conception of the
social, social A tendency toward totalisation and determinism
relations or society.
What is at issue here is a distinction between Marxism as ideas, system of
thought, and the politics that have been carried out under, or in the name of
Marxism. It has been noted that the ‘ ... declining influence of Marxism within
European radical and critical theory cannot be accounted for intrinsically ... in
terms of the history of ideas, but must be seen in the context of politics and
society at large’ (Homer, 1998, 5). This is not to suggest that Marxism bears no
Historical
political responsibility. For instance, the collapse of the communist states of
materialism: Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union was not needed to tell us that there are
dialectical some serious problems within Marxist theory. This is not to say that Eastern
materialism holds Europe and the USSR are incidental to a critique of Marxism. They tell us a
that everything is
material and that
great deal about the problems of Marxism, which we should heed, otherwise
human beings Marxism will become a less than useful theory of social life.
create social life The problem of ‘Marxism in power’ points to a tendency of totalisation and
solely in response determinism in its theory and practice of social life. It is no good to say that
to economic needs.
there isn’t really a problem here, as the problem is about Marxism-Leninism
All aspects of
society are and not really about Marxism per se. We have to address the problems of the
considered to link between Marxism in power, Marxist governments, and the problems of
reflect the economic totalitarianism. There is a tension in Marxist theory between its critical and
structure.
explanatory capacity as a theory, and the bothersome tendency to theoretical
Furthermore, classes
in society are totalisation and societal totalitarianism. A necessary vigilance with regard to
determined by their the tendential problems of Marxist theory will begin to curtail the societal and
relationship to the political excesses committed in the name of a liberatory social theory. As with
means of all theory, we should ask the question what Marxism enables us to do (better)
production. The way
in which growth, in psychology, and what it dis-enables us to do, what it gets in the way of us
change, and doing.
development are
conceptualised is as The role of agency and subjectivity
taking place
through a naturally While it is possible to admit that there are theoretical, and political problems
occurring ‘struggle with the notion of totality (in Marxism), it is nonsense to suggest, as many
of opposites’.
or applicable copyright law.
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have laid at the feet of Marxism has had a number of negative effects, both Social totality:
theoretical and practical. An effect of Marxism as a totalising theory of society idea in Marxist
has been to remove agency and subjectivity from any serious consideration of thought that all the
its critique of capitalism. A totalising, scientistic and structuralist Marxism various components
of social life need to
had place for human agency only as the (passive) effect of social processes and be considered
relations. And this form of agency was mostly considered in its collective together, in
expression rather than also incorporating its individual expression. So while conjunction. The
Marxism has glossed agency or individuality at the expense of sociality, the social totality is the
idea of a structured
social whole, the human sciences and psychology, in particular, have operated
and historically
in the opposite direction. However, while critical psychology may have been determined overall
slightly less guilty of this slide to individualism, the counter of a robust social complex. The signifi-
theory of human agency within critical psychology has been lacking. A cance and limits of
an action, measure,
psychology that is concerned to be an integral part of the social world that it
achievement, law
acts on, and thinks (research) about, will need to argue the case for a social etc cannot therefore
theory of human agency that takes seriously the notion of social totality within be assessed except
which individuality operates. in relation to a
dialectical grasp of
the structure of such
The dialectical co-construction of individual and social
a totality.
On a small scale, the least that psychology needs to do in engaging Marxism is
to take on the fact that psychological realities are part of the social worlds
within which they operate, and that this can’t be done in such a mild way as Agency:
merely to invoke the ‘social context’. A much grander and more interesting theoretical term
task for a psychology engaging with Marxism is to develop theoretical used to convey the
belief that an indi-
accounts that are equally sensitive to the constitution and operations of
vidual has the
human individuality, subjectivity and agency, and the constitution and opera- capacity of intention
tions of dimensions of social life and sociality. Not nearly enough theoretical – thus, through
work has been done on the dialectical co-constitution of the individual and the rational thought,
social. For example, do we really know, from a psychological perspective, what free will, motivation
or emotion, to
it is like to be a semi-skilled worker on a production line? Do we really know, direct their behav-
from a psychological perspective, what it means to be young, male and white iour or to make
in South Africa today facing uncertainties and insecurities as the society strug- particular choices.
gles to deracialise? So, just on a theoretical level, it seems that there are a
number of interesting research possibilities that present themselves for a
critical psychology wanting to engage Marxism as a theory of the social. While Marxism has
glossed agency/
individuality at the
THE LIVED EXPERIENCE (MATERIALIST PSYCHOLOGY) OF expense of sociality,
or applicable copyright law.
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Solipsism:
Neither Marxism nor psychology has stood up particularly well to this task or
belief that the self challenge. They have both failed in their own ways, and yet it is my contention
is the only thing that a dialogue between Marxism and psychology could fruitfully contribute to
that can be known a social theoretical account of human individuality that is sensitive to the ordi-
and verified.
nariness of the lived-experience of everyday life. For example, what are the
daily rituals and practices that a traditional Hindu housewife performs in one
of Durban’s ‘Indian townships’, and what psychological consequences are
there for her in this life that she leads?
Marxism’s characterisation of questions concerning human agency and
individuality as inherently idealist, bourgeois and individualist has had the
consequence of rendering the theory of everyday life inadequate and incom-
plete. Psychological dimensions of people’s lives are not intrinsically
personalistic and solipsistic! How could this be so? The personal and the
private are social and historical constructs. A Marxism of everyday life is not
achieved by surrendering questions and issues of human nature, human
agency and individuality to bourgeois thought. Regrettably, many of the
conceptions of the person in psychology have been overly individualistic and
asocial, and subject to the elitist bias of bourgeois thought. As Lucien Sève
(1978) has argued, psychology has produced a view of an abstract individual,
far removed from the concrete materiality of ordinary people’s lives.
How do we
understand the
extraordinariness of
everyday life, the
social contradic-
tions and social
circumstances of
individual lives?
How might a
dialectical inter-
change between
psychology and
Marxism make this
possible?
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of the individual human psyche, about personal relations or about the rela- Materialism:
tions between the state and the individual or between the public and private theory that physical
spheres. Marxism sees the individual as a social product (as Althusserian matter is the only
‘structuralist’, Marxism has stressed) and yet it requires a theory of individual reality and that
everything,
human behaviour and social interaction to underpin historical materialism. Its including thought,
goal (as Marxist humanists have seen) is both to explain and engage in the feeling, mind and
process of bringing about the end of reified social relations of production and will, can be
intercourse, subjugating them ‘to the power of the united individuals’. Why is explained in terms
of matter and
this the Marxist goal? Because, ‘the reality which communism creates is
physical
precisely the basis for rendering it impossible that anything should exist inde- phenomena.
pendently of individuals’ (Bottomore, 1983, 228). (One needs to bear in mind
here, of course, that for Marxism reality is nevertheless ‘only a product of the
preceding intercourse of individuals’ (in Bottomore, 1983, 228).) One starts to
see here, then, at least in these explanations of the goals and key concepts of
Marxism, why an explanation of the individual would be so important. We
might put this slightly differently and say that not only has the inherent struc-
turalism of Marxism sidelined human agency but an opportunity has been lost
to account for the contradictions of social life in contemporary societies (capi- Reify/reification:
when concepts or
talist or socialist). For example, how do we understand what it means to live in ideas are spoken
Cato Crest (a central Durban informal settlement) in the shadow of poverty about as if they are
and requiring treatment for TB?; or what does it mean to be a poor white kid really existing
hooked on crack?; or what does it mean to be a Zimbabwean woman trying to concrete objects.
Psychological
eke out a living on the streets of Johannesburg?; or a jazz musician trying to constructs such as
make a living from his music? Of course, Marxism can tell us a lot about the ‘mind’ and
social circumstances of the lives mentioned here but it can tell us significantly ‘personality’ are
less about the meaning and experience of these people’s lives. good examples.
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working class, or of the insane. A psychology of everyday life takes people’s There are very few
experiences seriously, as well as people’s ability to reflect on their lives. This examples from the
does not mean that people’s accounts or reflections of their lives equal knowl- history of psycho-
edge, but rather that we cannot have knowledge of people’s lives without their logy where the
production of
accounts. It is indeed a strange psychology that has a disdain for ordinary knowledge has
people’s attempts at making sense of their lives. The raw material of a consistently and
psychology of everyday life surely resides in the richness of our ‘expressions’ of unambiguously been
our lives. However, a theory of the psychology of everyday life requires the in the service of the
majority, of ordinary
development of a theoretical conceptualisation which takes us further than
people. A psycho-
people’s accounts of their lives. logy of everyday life
takes people’s expe-
The ‘articulateness’ of ordinary accounts of social life riences seriously, as
well as people’s
One of the theoretical tasks facing Marxism in psychology is to make sense of ability to reflect on
people’s everyday experience and develop an explanation of what it means to their lives.
live in particular social formations in specific historical conjunctures. In other
words, what should a psychology of everyday life, that is sensitive to the ques-
tions of Marxism – class, contradiction, alienation – consist of? As a
beginning, what terms and language should constitute this project? The diffi-
culty in answering these questions point both to psychology’s and Marxism’s
distance from ordinary working and unemployed people’s experiences. How
do people speak about their lives? Why does human and social disciplinary
knowledge still have such an inherent distrust of the potential articulateness of
the ordinary language of social life? This is not to suggest that what we say as
people trying to live and make sense of our lives translates into a coherent
theory of ordinary experience. Theory is not only developed through the alien-
ation of common discourse, as theory can and should be developed in and
through the language of everyday life. This might be less true for physics, but
it certainly pertains to psychology, and especially critical psychology.
appearances, beyond the saids, beyond the inconsistencies; and thinking theo-
retically, as Marxists, entails developing some responses to the conditions, both
emotional and material, of people’s lives which undermine and oppress them.
To the extent that Marxism continues to refuse to talk about the personal,
about emotionality, it allows an unthinking, an unquestioning psychology to
determine the content and substance of human identity and individuality.
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One of the most startling contradictions of so-called personal life under capitalism is
that it is not personal at all. We shall know that substantial social change has taken
place when concerns of how best to organise the economy are replaced by concerns of
how best to organise our emotional lives.
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CONCLUSION
Psychology and the neglect of social life
What do we know about sections of the working class, the unemployed, the
homeless, about middle-class single-parent women, Aids sufferers, the insane?
The list is an indictment of the silence of the psychology of everyday life. This
is not to say that the whole of psychology should be devoted to the study of
the psychology of everyday life. Clearly not, but the continued silence can only
be interpreted as a political choice of the intended neglect of this aspect of
social life.
Where psychology has avoided the political implications of its researches,
Marxism has avoided the psychological implications of its politics. Marxism
as a theory promoting social change is committed to a society free of exploita-
tion and oppression, where people can live in fulfilment of their potential; a
society in which people won’t want for basic human and social needs, where
people will have the possibilities of fulfilling their potential as human and
social beings, and be able to enjoy their lives and be happy. A psychology
locating itself firmly in social life, while at the same time pursuing empirical
analyses of the formation and experience of human individuality, is able to
position itself within the social whole and yet from the vantage point of the
individual offer a critique of alienating social conditions. As stated in the
introduction, a psychology linked to Marxism is a Left psychology, a
psychology prepared to comment critically on the deformations of the human
spirit under capitalism.
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Recommended readings
Parker, I., & Spears, R. (eds) (1996). Psychology and society: Radical theory
and practice. London: Pluto Press. Read the following two chapters:
Introduction by Spears & Parker: Marxist theories: Marxist theses and
psychological themes.
Chapter 11 by Hayes: Marxist theses and psychological themes.
Hayes, G. (1996). ‘The psychology of everyday life: Some Marxist reflections’.
In I. Parker & R. Spears (eds). Psychology and society: Radical theory and
practice. London: Pluto Press (chapter 11).
Spears, R. & Parker, I. (1996). ‘Marxist theses and psychological themes’. In
I. Parker & R. Spears (eds). Psychology and society: Radical theory and
practice. London: Pluto Press (1–17).
or applicable copyright law.
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Chapter
8
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LEARNING OUTCOMES
By the end of this chapter, you should be able to:
Explore how psychology, in particular the psychology of gender, has served to
reproduce and legitimise gender inequality
Understand the way in which psychology as a normative and popularised discourse
has contributed to both women’s oppression and the oppression of gay and lesbian
South Africans
Present contemporary critical perspectives on a psychology of gender towards the
reconstruction of South African psychology.
or applicable copyright law.
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Gender:
INTRODUCTION
concept usually Psychology’s reproduction of gender inequality
referring to the
social construction Psychology as a discipline has long been criticised for its reproduction of
of inherent sexual gender and other inequalities (see, for example, Bohan, 1992; Burman et al,
differences between 1996; Wilkinson, 1986; Wilkinson & Kitzinger, 1995). Such a critique has been
men and women. aimed both at the content of psychological knowledges as well as the practices
Most gender
theorists assume
of psychology, including the realm of academia, intervention and organisa-
that gender is social tional structures. In South Africa it has been well illustrated that white males
whereas sex is have dominated in psychology as a practice and in the production of knowl-
biological; and most edge, particularly as authors, where black and female psychologists have been
also hold that the
term encapsulates a
underrepresented (Levett & Kottler, 1997; Potgieter & De la Rey, 1997; Seedat,
notion of power 1992, 1997; Shefer, Van Niekerk, Duncan & De la Rey, 1997).
inequality. It has also been widely acknowledged that psychology, in particular the
psychology of gender, has been highly problematic in the way in which it repro-
duces and legitimates gender difference and inequality. While debates about
the sexist content of psychological knowledge have been present for a number
Heterosexist: of decades in the international context, there has been little focus on this in
assumption that all South Africa. The need to develop a South African psychology of gender that is
sexuality refers to both local – that is, representing indigenous experiences of gender develop-
heterosexual ment and identities – and critical – in that it problematises the construction of
practices and that
the ideal, accept- gender difference and inequality – is another challenge within the broader
able and ‘normal’ transformation of South African psychology.
sexual practices are
those between men Gender as difference
and women. Such
values and practices Gender has historically been constructed as difference – immutable differ-
are discriminatory ence(s) between men and women – in both popular and academic discourse.
and oppressive. This construction has fuelled and continues to fuel broader gender inequalities
in social contexts. Furthermore, the reproduction of the binary opposites of
male/female contributes (sometimes inadvertently) to the reproduction of
heterosexism and homophobia. The construction of gender as difference is
Discourse: founded on such a binarism and has been theorised within ‘scientific’
complex term that discourses that continue to legitimise, naturalise and rationalise both such a
Foucault used to
refer to bodies of
construction and the inequality it creates.
practice that 'form Psychology has played a large role in perpetuating the notion that men and
the objects of women are deeply different psychical beings, with studies of gender constituting
or applicable copyright law.
which we speak' a massive research program in the discipline (Burman, 1995b; Connell, 1987;
(1969); he analysed
Hare-Mustin & Maracek, 1990a, 1990b, 1990c; 1992; Lott, 1990; Morawski,
professional
discourses on 1990; Unger, 1990). Psychology, and the social sciences more generally, has been
sexuality as con- set up as ‘the authority’ defining ‘normality’ (Hare-Mustin & Maracek, 1990a;
structing sexuality Unger, 1990). Thus the ways in which psychology has construed these differ-
as we know it. ences have played a significant role in (re)producing the dominant construction
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Despite having
one of the most
progressive
constitutions in the
world, South Africa
remains tainted by
heterosexism.
Homophobia:
rejection of
homosexual
practices and
lifestyles. It
frequently emerges
in negative
prejudicial attitudes
and stereotypes,
and discriminatory
and violent practi-
ces towards gays,
lesbians and
bisexuals.
Psychology has
played a large role
in perpetuating the
notion that men
and women are
of gender and consequent power inequalities. Psychology, steeped as it is in deeply different
Western culture’s obsession with dualism and dichotomy, has had a long history psychical beings ...
Psychology, and the
of focusing on individual difference, with gender/sex difference being a primary social sciences more
focus. The discipline’s continued interest in proving or disproving sex or gender generally, has been
differences reveals much about its broader social role(s) and raises significant set up as ‘the
problems with the social dualism of masculinity/femininity. authority’ defining
‘normality’ in
This chapter overviews some of the central ways in which psychology has Western culture.
reproduced gender difference through empirical and theoretical work on Thus the ways in
sex/gender difference and gender development, and attempts to unpack the which psychology
way in which this has served to legitimise gender inequality. has construed these
differences have
played a significant
or applicable copyright law.
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something of a red herring for feminist psychologists’ (Unger, 1990, 102), the
focus on difference continues, albeit amidst increasing debate and murkiness as
to what constitutes masculinity/femininity. In the early years of psychology,
these differences were attributed to biology and as such were universalised,
naturalised and essentialised. Most early psychological research served to
‘prove’ this difference, framing the genders as ‘opposite, complementary, recip-
rocal, and equal’ (Hare-Mustin & Maracek, 1990c, 186). The focus on difference,
with the abstraction of categories of masculine and feminine, therefore served
both to obscure the power inequality between men and women and to legitimate
ideologically the continued reproduction of such difference (and inequality).
Central to the traditional psychology of gender conceptualisation is an
assumption of what Connell (1987) terms a ‘uunitary sexual character’ (167).
The sex/gender research in psychology was based on a central notion that
masculinity and femininity exist as a corpus of traits, including characters,
roles, abilities and temperaments, which are embedded in individual men and
women. Thus a notion of static, stable, unitary gender identity was evident,
which, of course, ignored both the diversity of gendered experience across
other lines of social identity and ‘fixed’ individuals to a singular, enduring
experience of their own gender. The notion of a unitary sexual character
persists in popular culture, and recent analytic studies of how men construct
gender illustrate that the ‘difference discourse’, that is, the depiction of gender
as difference (whether biological or social), is still central to talk on gender and
serves as a rhetorical strategy in legitimating gender inequality (Gough, 1998;
Harris, Lea & Foster, 1995).
Unitary sexual
character:
idea that
masculinity and
feminity exist as a
collection of traits,
roles, abilities and
temperaments
which are embedded
in individual men
and women.
or applicable copyright law.
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Scalar/androgyny
cited in Connell, 1987, 174), these scales perform a reifying function by
model: constructing people as objects – reducing the gendered self to a score (Connell,
conceptual schema 1987). Bem’s androgyny scale, for example, arguing for an integration of the
that hypothesises feminine and masculine for a ‘whole’ healthier self, appears to disentangle
a continuum of
femininity and masculinity from the feminine and the masculine (body), yet
gender from
dominant male still proposes a unitary self (‘in the figure of the androgyne’) (Butler, 1990b,
to dominant female 328). The model prescribes a combination of the two dualistic sexes, thus
characteristics. reproducing the legitimacy of gender categorisation, rather than challenging it
A personality that (Unger, 1990; Wetherell, 1986). Furthermore, the model of androgyny was
scores high on
both male and ironically (and predictably) biased towards ‘masculinity’, with masculinity
female character- scores strongly predictive of androgynous behaviour, and the very construct
istics is named itself based on individualist, male-centred values (such as independence, self-
androgynous. containment and instrumentality) (Morawski, 1990).
Psychology does not only reproduce gender Bernardez (1988) affirms suggestions that the
inequalities at the level of psychological knowl- majority of psychotherapies gender women into
edge; it also reproduces gender inequalities at submissive roles rather than challenging the
the level of practice. Psychotherapy, for example, social conditions that oppresses them. The
has been the target of a great deal of feminist three most common reactions by therapists to
critique, and deservedly so, one might say, female patients in Bernandez’s (1988) study
particularly given the view that, as Miller (1973) were:
puts it: ‘Therapy acts to enforce the whole male (1) the discouragement and disapproval of
structure’ (485). Perhaps the most immediate behaviours that did not conform to tradi-
and most prominent feminist criticism in this tional gender role prescriptions;
respect focuses on how psychotherapy has (2) the disparagement and inhibition of
played a part in enforcing the subordination of expressions of anger, ‘negative’ effects
women in society. As Brown (1973) argues, the and aggressive behaviours not expected of
vast majority of psychotherapies have effectively women, and
attempted to adjust women to living in the (3) the absence of confrontation, interpre-
conditions of a chauvinist world rather than to tation and exploration of passive-
liberate them from it. The feminist critique here,
submissive and compliant behaviour in
then, focuses on demonstrating the extent to
the patient (1988, 26).
which psychotherapy is powerfully politically
active in gendering women into submissive social These qualities (exhibited particularly by male
roles and positions. Burman (1995a) argues therapists) are part of the way in which both
along the following lines: Bernardez (1988) and Nugent (1994) assert
that therapy contributes to a socialisation of
Far from collectivising women’s oppression,
or applicable copyright law.
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traits such as assertiveness and initiative. This disordered or neurotic behaviour is hence
is what Allen (1986) refers to as ‘gender role expected from women. Furthermore, deviations
maintenance’, what Busfield (1996) labels from such conceptions, claims Ussher (1991) –
‘gender regulation’. Ussher (1991) similarly the case of the woman who is adventurous,
draws attention to the insidious and pernicious assertive, competitive, sexually active, inde-
gender stereotypes that, she suggests, implic- pendent or aggressive, the woman who rejects
itly inform the norms and standards of much the role of wife and mother – subsequently runs
psychotherapeutic treatment. Borrowing from the risk of being designated psychologically
the classic study of Broverman et al (1970) – disturbed:
which illustrated clinicians’ gender biases in
In fact, the woman who reports symptoms
conceptions of mental health and illness –
which are seen as ‘male’, such as alcohol
Ussher (1991) argues that culturally normative abuse or aggressive antisocial behaviour,
conceptions of women are defined against will be seen as more psychologically
masculine norms. Hence women are generally disturbed than the man who exhibits the
perceived as being more submissive, less inde- same symptoms (Ussher, 1991, 166).
pendent, less adventurous, more easily Ussher’s agenda here is to emphasise
influenced, less aggressive, less competitive, how thoroughly saturated in patriarchy the
more excitable in minor crises, having their implicit social norms and values of
feelings more easily hurt, being more conceited psychotherapy typically are. More than this,
about their appearance, less objective, and so her agenda is to suggest what Busfield
on. Further still: (1996) calls the ‘Catch 22’ of female mental
health, what we might here understand as
The description of a healthy adult, either
the therapeutic double-bind confronting
male or female, conform[s] ... to the
women patients of (much) psychotherapy.
masculine stereotype, whilst the feminine
On the one hand the norms and values of
stereotypes, of passivity, conformity, less
psychotherapy typically construct or
aggression, lower achievement, motivation,
‘engender’ woman as inferior, as deeply
etc., [are] ... seen as psychologically
problematic. On the other, they patholo-
unhealthy (Ussher, 1991, 166).
gise, with what seems a particular
For both Chesler (1972) and Ussher (1991) it is patriarchal zeal, any attempts by woman to
through the operation of such patriarchal escape these denigratory stereotypes. It is
biases, no matter how discretely implemented, on this basis that Chesler (1972) asserts
that forms of psychological practice continue to that ‘[w]hat we consider “madness” ... in
perpetuate constructions of women as intrinsi- women ... is either the acting out of the
cally more problematic and innately patho- devalued female role or the total or partial
rejection of one’s sex-role stereotype’ (56).
logical than their male counterparts. More
Assumptions about a unitary, fixed and stable gender, residing somewhere term used to des-
cribe a personality
inside of us, whether determined biologically or created socially, are similarly characterised by a
evident in most theories about the development of gender identity (another good balance
area where psychology has reigned as ‘expert authority’). Freudian and of traditionally
Lacanian psychoanalysis, for example, which provides a very complicated male and female
attributes.
story of gender identity development and have been for many feminists the
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Binary:
hope for analysing gender development within patriarchal culture, still ‘tells a
referring to socially story that constructs a discrete gender identity and discursive location which
constructed polar remains relatively fixed’ (Butler, 1990b, 329). Butler illustrates that a theory
opposites such as does not have to be essentialist in order to arrive at this point, as in feminist
man/woman,
white/black. Post-
psychoanalytic theory, which criticises claims of essential femininity or
modern theorists, masculinity (for example, Mitchell, 1975) but still posits an outcome which is
following Derrida, fixed (not only by the age of 6, but also within the cultural prescriptions of sex,
see contemporary gender and desire).
societies, and
Similarly, Chodorow (1978) uses object relations, together with a critique
language itself, as
being founded on of unequal parenting in patriarchal societies, to speak of the development of a
binarisms, where unitary woman’s sexual character which prepares all women for motherhood
the one term takes (Connell, 1987). Although she locates the roots of this development in Western
its value in relation
industrial capitalism, her work reads as an assertion of essential enduring
to the devaluation
of the other – one differences between women and men at a global level, and may be used as a
term always way to legitimate these divides (and inequalities) in spite of her desire to chal-
superior, viewed as lenge social power relations (Hare-Mustin & Maracek, 1992). Furthermore, in
the ‘normal’ and suggesting a change in parenting through the integration of masculine and
‘natural’, in relation
to the inferior, feminine qualities, she subscribes to an androgynous schema which, as
often objectified, pointed out, is based on an acceptance of a universal dualism of masculinity
abnormalised and and femininity, and a ‘normative model of a unified self ’ (Butler, 1990b, 328).
marginalised ‘Other’.
huge differences
between males and of an inevitable female-male polar divide is perpetuated.
females, and that
often idealise or try
to legitimate such Alpha and beta biases
perceived Hare-Mustin & Maracek (1992) argue that these two opposing lines of inquiry
differences.
have led to two incompatible representations of gender: one that sees few
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Forms of psychological practice (such as What this calls attention to is the fact that for
psychotherapy) often then work, as Chesler the most part psychotherapy is not gender-
(1972) suggests, to blind their patients to neutral in its basic assumptions and that it
oppression by conceptualising their unhappi- might be a means of transmitting misogynistic
ness and anger as personal pathology. Likewise, assumptions. As Ussher (1991) puts it: ‘Therapy
psychotherapy in particular might be thought will [after all] merely mirror the oppression and
of as keeping women from exploring, under- systematic treatment of women ... which takes
standing and resolving conflicts produced by place in all organizations in society’ (177).
social determinants. Palming women’s anger off Burman (1995a) describes the situation elo-
as illness, dismissing their misery as the result quently (and it is worth quoting her here at
of some internal flaw – and thus exonerating length):
the male oppressors (or the responsible misog-
Instead of discovering new insights, new
ynistic culture) – is a key tactic of patriarchy,
ways of thinking about oneself and one’s
as Ussher (1995) argues. It is in this way that experiences, it could be argued that the
the transformation of oppression into illness client is being pursuaded to formulate her
might be considered to be one of the (poten- experience within a particular value-laden
tial) patriarchal functions of psychotherapy. framework of meaning ... [T]herapy, and the
Ussher (1995) in fact argues that in most forms discourses and practices it is embedded in,
of psychotherapy is productive: it creates its own objects ...
[t]he woman is taught to see her misery as [one of whom is the] ... client – who ... is
illness, and to direct attention and care at both constituted by, and subjected to, the
herself ... [taught] ... to fixate upon herself therapeutic discourse. Therapy becomes not
as object ... [t]he woman is thus separated a resource for self-knowledge and libera-
from her own feelings, which are compart- tion, but a coercive framework for
mentalised and dismissed. She must constructing and interpreting experience ...
integrate them into a therapeutic [T]herapy give[s] rise to ... [a] range of
‘normality’ ... look for help to relieve her of representations of subjectivity. [Do these]
her ‘illness’ ... [from] those ... firmly notions of selves ... of self-development,
entrenched in the medicalised models ... fulfillment, and actualization, relate to
Her oppressors, the therapists, are imbued normative definitions of the compliant,
with definitions of normality based on responsible citizen? (471–472).
misogynistic assumptions (174–175).
differences between males and females (what they call ‘beta bias’); and one that
sees huge differences, and often idealises or legitimates these differences or
calls for a reintegration of the difference (what they call ‘alpha bias’). They
suggest that both have their inherent problems: alpha bias in exaggerating
or applicable copyright law.
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Normative:
Feminists have become increasingly wary of the very question ‘is there a
referring to difference?’ in the psychology of gender (Unger, 1990). Clearly the need to
behaviours and prove difference has been linked to the prerogative of legitimating the status
practices that are quo of male domination. But in feminist psychologists’ critiques of the ‘differ-
viewed as ‘normal’
and correct in a
ence debate’, one cannot help but notice that much energy is spent on
particular social emphasising a lack of difference. Somewhere in the writing, in spite of the
context. Psychology critique of liberal humanism, seeping in between the lines is an irresistible
plays a particular insistence on women’s equality to men and the consequent de-emphasis of
role in the
difference. The danger in what Hare-Mustin & Maracek call the beta bias (that
processes and
regulation of is, undermining the difference between men and woman) is that existing
socially constructed inequities will be ignored (much like debates in this country about affirmative
standards of action). There are other insidious dangers – one is almost led to believe that
normality.
one should throw up the task of theorising gender altogether, for, after all, it
accounts for only 5% of the variance in social behaviour (Lott, 1990). In this
way, the apparent lack of gender difference (based on characteristics, behav-
iour) serves to obscure gender difference in location and access to power. Once
again we face the invisibilising of the huge differences that still do exist
Acknowledging that between men and women, notwithstanding the multiplicity of forms they take.
gender and differ- Acknowledging that gender and difference are culturally constructed, are
ence are culturally
constructed, are
constantly shifting and changing, and are always mediated by other inequali-
constantly shifting ties, never a unitary, fixed process or identity, should not constitute a denial
and changing, and that gender difference is there, is here, in all its slippery manifestations.
are always mediated
by other inequali-
ties, never a unitary, PATHOLOGISING AND REGULATORY DISCOURSES IN PSYCHOLOGY
fixed process or
‘Gender disorders’
identity, should not
constitute a denial Another area where psychology, together with psychiatry, has played a partic-
that gender ular role in affirming the notion of immutable difference between genders has
difference is there,
been in the pathologisation of those who do not ‘fit’ neatly into the categories
is here, in all
its slippery of prescribed gender/sexual identity. In this respect, the social reproduction of
manifestations. a rigid matrix of relations between sex, gender and sexuality (see Butler,
1990a), involving deterministic relations between biological sex, socialised
gender identity/roles and sexual attraction for the opposite sex, is closely
guarded by psychological and medical ‘science’. This concern is well illustrated
through the psychological diagnostic category of ‘gender disorder’ and histor-
ical attempts by these ‘sciences’ to institute behavioural (eg desensitisation
or applicable copyright law.
programmes for gay and lesbian people), medical (eg hormones) and surgical
(sex-change therapy) procedures to ‘treat’ such ‘disorders’. In the South
African context, a shocking example of such interventions in contemporary
history has been the exposé of the South African Defence Force’s treatment of
gay men (see Mail & Guardian, 28 July–3 August 2000).
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The rigidity of the sex/gender/sexual discourse case mystifying ‘scientific language’ and ‘tech-
has been increasingly highlighted by feminist, nical’ drawings (on closer inspection, a
gay and lesbian, and queer activists and simplistic sketch) are used to construct ‘truth’
academics. The serious threat that challenging and credibility. ‘The pink thumb-print’ is one
this rigid ‘matrix of intelligibility’ poses is which both women and gay men share –
evident in the backlash responses to the absolute proof of shared genetic material! For
cultural, political and intellectual post-modern gay men, this is viewed as a consequence of in
moves to dismantle and subvert sex/gender/ utero abnormalities – stressed mothers,
sexual categories. A small review of the local hormone imbalances. In this way homosexuality
popular press exposes the virulence with which is linked very neatly with femininity, and
the essential and deterministic polarities of masculinity and femininity are kept in ‘their
male/female and heterosexual/homosexual are place’. Lesbian women are now also categoris-
being reinterpreted in the face of the notion of able following another ‘scientific’ study which
multiple and diffuse sexual locations. found that ‘lesbians have a difference in their
Recent local newspaper articles provide inner ears, which makes them slightly harder of
good examples of this. In an article entitled hearing than heterosexual women’ (Sunday
“Rule of thumb” could finger gay criminals’ we Times, 8 March 1998, 5).
see the cultural imperative to ‘prove’ (yet Similar discourses emerge in an article
again, in yet another bizarre way) that homo- documenting the increase of sex changes for
sexuality is genetic and easily identifiable children in Britain (Saturday Weekend Argus, 18
through thumb-prints. The prevailing message October 1997). Here the well-worn concept of
is that, while the majority of people are born ‘gender dysphoria’ or gender disorder is imputed
heterosexual, some are born homosexual – to create ‘order’ in the sexual/gender regime.
there is nothing in between, and it is all There is no need to enter the debate at a moral
scripted in your genes or ‘programmed’ in your level (which is, of course, the ‘natural’ inclina-
brain. It is now possible, so this article main- tion), to argue whether it is ‘better’ or ‘worse’
tains, to ensure that your sexual orientation is for a child to be allowed to change sex if he or
classified at birth (reminiscent of equally irra- she feels in the ‘wrong body’, but what stands
tional historic classification systems closer to out in the article is the increased social need to
home), for it ‘opens the way for a simple test to ‘sort things out’. Better to undertake fairly
help determine a person’s sexual orientation’ extreme surgical and hormonal measures than
(Saturday Weekend Argus, 14 February 1998, 8). to acknowledge identities that subvert the
The same scientists are also hoping to establish gender order. The notion is that a psychical
that ‘sexual orientation may be affected by the consciousness and desires cannot be allowed
type of hormones circulated in the womb and expression if residing in the inappropriate body
that high stress levels in pregnant women could (presumed sex), as one of the psychiatrists
be linked to the birth of homosexual sons’ (8). involved is quoted as saying: ‘Changing the
The need to categorise, establish genetic deter- body to match the mind is increasingly the
mination and pathologise (stress, incorrect accepted way of doing things, ...’. (Saturday
hormones) is clear in this popularisation of Weekend Argus, 18 October 1997, 11). Psychol-
or applicable copyright law.
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(using electric shocks), often against the consent of the patient), which has been legiti-
participants’ will, to ‘reprogramme’ gay men mated and naturalised through medical
into heterosexuality (PsySSA, 1997). expertise (Barnes, in press). Barnes found that
The contemporary focus, in an age of post- texts on intersexuality in South African libraries
modern technology, proposes the surgically and were similarly ‘mutilated’ so that they had to be
hormonally invasive intervention of ‘changing taken off the library shelves to be protected
the body’. Clearly, in a society that insists on a from violation, further highlighting the popular
rigid divide between male/female and intolerance of gender/sexual ambiguity. The
heterosex/homosex, with traditional and scientific and medical worlds are engaged in
heterosexual masculinity and femininity as the reproduction of technologies and ‘truths’
privileged terms, there is an imperative to which sustain and legitimise the rigid system of
position oneself and others categorically. gendering, sexing and sexualising. While
Struggles of intersexual (hermaphrodite) people certain subcultures and individual desires
have particuarly exposed the role of medical continue to challenge such a system by practice
practice in the disciplining of gender/sexual and discourse, with ‘rival and subversive
identity. Intersexuals point out the brutal matrices of gender disorder’ (Butler, 1990a, 17),
treatment of ambiguity in sexuality or gender the dominant medico-scientific regime steps up
(surgical ‘correction’ of the genitals without the gender policing.
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learn much about the social construction of gender discourses and gendered Post-structuralist:
subjectivity. referring to the
A number of contemporary theoretical fields, including queer theory, post- more theoretical and
structuralism, and feminism, have spurred a challenge to the conceptual philosophical side of
the post-modern
binarism inherent in the concept of gender. As already evident in the critique era, characterised by
of mainstream gender/sexuality theorising, post-modern theory has opened a paradigm shift
up a way of moving beyond binary opposites of male–female to acknowledge from structuralist
multiple genders, with multiple sexualities. As mentioned, in line with Michel thinking (eg the
work of Lévi-
Foucault’s influential work on sexuality, many have begun to theorise the way
Strauss) to an
in which sexual identity and practice, including the identities of heterosexual acknowledgment of
and homosexual, are socially and historically constructed and therefore ever- the shifting, non-
changing (eg Richardson, 1996; Rubin, 1984; Tiefer, 1992; Vance, 1984; fixed and fluid
relationships
Weeks,1985; Wilkinson & Kitzinger, 1993) .
between ‘things’,
(eg as the signifier
Gendered subjectivity and signified in
The works cited above facilitate the understanding of gendered/sexed/sexu- language). Post-
alised subjectivity as socially constructed, in relation and in opposition to structuralist theory
has implications for
dominant discourses on gender, sex and sexuality, which are set up within a psychology,
network of prescriptive representations and relations with each other. As including the chal-
human beings, within the dominant discourses which prescribe ‘gender lenging of its
identity’, we are sexed, in that we are named male or female (based on subject of study,
‘the individual’ or
presumed ‘real’ biological differences); we are gendered, in that we are named ‘self’. Whereas most
male or female (with a whole range of prescriptions about dress, behaviour, psychological theory
roles etc to go with that); and we are sexualised, in that we are named hetero- assumes a fixed,
sexual (usually assumed, unless proven otherwise) or homosexual (based on rigid identity
(following develop-
our sexual intimacies or desires with/towards other gendered, sexed, sexualised
ment), post-
subjects or our own identifications). As with the broader post-structuralist structuralist theory
understanding of subjectivity, we understand ourselves, including our bodies, questions such
as both subjected to the dominant discourses on gendered subjectivity and also notions and theo-
as active subjects who are constantly reinterpreting ourselves, sometimes in rises rather a self
that is shifting,
resistance and rebellion, to ‘others’ and the dominant discourse. Thus we may multiple, fluid,
position ourselves in multiple ways to the dominant discourses on sex, gender contextual and
and sexuality; may shift and change in relation to these discourses over time partly irrational
and in different contexts; may resist and reproduce these subjectivities, in often (unconscious). Post-
structuralism also
contradictory and apparently confusing ways. challenges ‘grand
narratives’.
The inscribed body
or applicable copyright law.
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We may position
particularly evident and visual in contemporary globalised capitalism with its
ourselves in powerful consumerist culture. These inscriptions are enacted through discipli-
multiple ways to the nary practices which are historically and contextually bound. Moreover,
dominant discourses different status is embodied in masculinity and femininity, with a woman’s
on sex, gender and
sexuality; may shift
body inscribed with an inferior status (Bartky, 1990).
and change in Historically, in Western society at any rate, the regimentation of the female
relation to these body, has been particularly evident, given that ‘men act and women appear’
discourses over time (Berger, 1972, 47), through the social objectification of women. Much emphasis
and in different
has been placed on women’s body size and shape, facial characteristics, manner
contexts; may resist
and reproduce these of dress, presentation and movement. In all of these areas, prescriptions for the
subjectivities, in construction of ‘ideal femininity’ are set up, and women are expected to work at
often contradictory creating ‘the image’, unattainable for the vast majority of women. Feminists
and apparently have also illustrated how in contemporary Western society the ideal image for
confusing ways.
women is so slim that it is reminiscent of adolescent girls, which is seen as
reflecting and reproducing women’s powerlessness in male-dominated society
(Bartky, 1990; Coward, 1984). In reading such imagery, it is important to
Post-modern: remember that bodily regimes are culturally and historically constructed (for
complex term refer-
ring to both a period
example, slimness in women has not been viewed as beautiful in many African
of time and a theo- cultures), and that the gaze is clearly moving onto the male body within the
retical paradigm. global economy, with the increasing emphasis on male consumerism and
Post-modern under- shifting images of masculinities. While some feminists have argued that men’s
standings of power
bodies and sexuality have been ‘exempted from scrutiny ... because a body
see power as more
complex and fluid defined is a body controlled’ (Coward, 1984, 229), contemporary work is illus-
than modernists, trating that men are no longer exempted from the ‘the look’. Connell (1990), for
which see power as example, in his case study of a ‘champion sportsman’, illustrates how the male
the unchanging body is appropriated by ‘hegemonic masculinity’, such that it may be an obses-
preserve of a group.
Post-modernists
sive focus in the lived experience of some men. A quote from a local magazine,
suggest that power True Love (Ngudle, 1998, 74), in an article on what women think of men’s
can shift and change dressing, is illustrative of a changing discourse on masculinity and the male
depending on the body: ‘The new man takes a lot more time in front of the mirror and defines
context, and that
there are multiple
himself through this clothes.’ But clearly male and female bodies are still
sites of power. inscribed differently and unequally in contemporary society.
Gender ‘othering’
The gendered subject is therefore located within discursive power-relations, so
that men and women are positioned differently and unequally in relation to
or applicable copyright law.
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dictum ‘He is the Subject, he is the Absolute – she is the Other’ (1982, 16),
feminist post-structuralist theorists together with deconstructionists have
reinterpreted this existential-humanist conceptualisation to encompass the
way in which difference colludes with power inequality, thus devaluing and
degrading that which is ‘other’ to the ‘norm’ (the ‘Same’).
Feminists using a critical version of Lacanian psychoanalytic theory* have
particularly drawn on the theoretical framing of woman as ‘other’ to man, to
illustrate how within patriarchy women are always outside the ‘Symbolic’, the
realm of language and culture, which is male-dominated, androcentric, and
founded on women being outside, being ‘Other’. Julia Kristeva, for example,
theorises masculinity and femininity as an aspect of language with masculinity
linked to the ‘Symbolic’ (the rational, cultural realm) and femininity to the
‘Semiotic’ (non-rational, challenges the Symbolic) (cited in Weedon, 1987).
She argues that both aspects are present in language, and open to all irrespec-
tive of their biological sex, and that it is the semiotic in our language and
subjectivities that holds the potential for change, for it is the repression of the
semiotic, the non-rational, the feminine, that preserves the apparent stability
of the subject and fixes the meaning of the Symbolic. While Weedon criticises
Kristeva for an ahistorical construction of femininity and masculinity as
universal aspects of language, and equating the feminine (even if not attached
to women) with the irrational, the theory is clearly useful in facilitating an
understanding of the role of the unconscious in subjectivity and of the subject
‘as an inherently unstable effect of language’ (91).
redefine ourselves
appears to be fixed, that is only because he or she is consistently and conti-
and reconstruct
ourselves as man or
woman. In so doing
* This feminist theoretical work has often been referred to as ‘French’ feminism (also some- we are also a part
times post-Lacanian feminism). Braidotti (1997, 25), however, points out that using of the reproduction
‘nationalist systems of indexation for feminist theories’ is both an ‘inaccurate and [a] reduc-
of such discourses.
tive’ way of categorising feminist debates.
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In a historic paper in the late 80s, West and tivity is produced. Based on the Foucauldian
Zimmerman (1992) spoke about ‘doing gender’ notion that subjects are produced through
as opposed to being a gendered man or woman, discourse, Butler uses performativity to refer to
thus reflecting a ‘new’ view of gender as an ‘that aspect of discourse that has the capacity
active, dynamic process. Through this concep- to produce what it names’ (1994, 33). Butler
tualisation, we begin to understand gender as a cautions that performativity is different from
verb, rather than a static object, such as a role performance. Thus, doing gender is not simply
or a position. Judith Butler uses the term a ‘performance’, which is based on the assump-
performativity to refer to this process by tion of a subject performing in front of others.
which we create our genders by doing them. Rather, the notion of performativity calls into
Through discourses on gender, we are provided question the very notion of the subject, facili-
with the ‘tools’ to enact and re-enact our tating a view of subjectivity as continuously
gender. Thus gender is viewed as an ongoing and repetitively constructed through its
repetitive process, by which gendered subjec- performances within discourse.
Judith Butler’s notion of performativity suggests that we create our genders by doing them. Through
discourses on gender, we are provided with the ‘tools’ to enact and re-enact our gender. Thus gender is
viewed as an ongoing repetitive process.
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notion of the irrational, and the unconscious – the ‘split subject’. The subject’s
interaction with representations of identity, such as woman/man, is always
mediated for ‘they contain a sizable ‘imaginary’ component’ (Braidotti, 1997,
33). It is the intersection of psychoanalysis and post-structuralism that has
allowed for the understanding of the non-rational subject and the power of Performativity:
unconscious identification in the construction of the subject (Parker, 1992; notion that we
create our genders
Hollway, 1984; Weedon, 1987).
by doing them.
Through discourses
The unconscious and the gendered subject on gender, we are
Psychoanalysis, in particular feminist, Lacanian and post-Lacanian reworkings provided with the
‘tools’ to enact and
of Freud’s work, has played a significant role in the theory of subjectivity in re-enact our gender,
post-structuralist thinking, even more so in theorising the gendered subject. which is viewed as
As Weedon (1987) points out, in psychoanalysis the heterosexual organisation an ongoing
of sexuality and gender identity are central in the structuring of the uncon- repetitive process
and by which
scious and conscious mind. She argues, as others have (notably Henriques et
gendered
al, 1984), that the theory of the unconscious is central to the notion of post- subjectivity is
structuralist subjectivity. While classical psychoanalysis reduced the produced.
unconscious to an ahistorical, biologically driven psyche, Weedon argues that
it is possible to conceive of the unconscious as contextual and historical (as
Juliet Mitchell and others have attempted to illustrate). While there is some
tension between the notion of the subject as never fixed, and yet still steeped in
unconscious, unreachable desires, acknowledging the role of the unconscious
and the non-rational does challenge the dominant assumption of psychology’s
rational, unitary self.
The unconscious is also significant in theorising the construction of
dominant subjectivities through the repression of desires that are censured
within the particular social regime. As such, individuals may be seen as both
or applicable copyright law.
‘the site and subjects of discursive struggle for their identity’ (Weedon, 1987,
97). The notion of agency and resistance is central within the feminist post-
structuralist notion of the subject. The subject is active in repeating dominant
constructions of himself or herself as man/woman, but may also be active in
resisting and defying such constructions. Subjects may take on forms of
gendered subjectivity which challenge the dominant discourses. These forms
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The following story was told by a psychology them for the fact that I am not like them.
student at the University of the Western Cape Growing up has some implications, espe-
when asked to describe her gender and sexual cially when there are girls around. My friends
development. The story illustrates the author’s (boys) started proposing and had girlfriends
considerable creativity in enacting her resistance and they would ask me to back off because
to prescribed femininity and sexuality. In partic- they told me that what they were doing was
ular, we see Thandi (not her real name) boys’ things. That really made me feel very
strategically adopting masculine subjectivity and sad, but I told myself that I was still going
to do everything with them and I am going
discourse to achieve her desires. Her story, remi-
to propose to some girls and I am going to
niscent of many tales through history of women
have more girlfriends than what they had. It
assuming male identity, is, however, full of pain
worked, and they protected my identity from
and is further evidence of the damage effected by
those girls who did not know me.
a restrictive gender and sexual regime. They had to pretend as if I am a boy too.
During these 27 years there were some times That worked also, but the problem now was
which one cannot forget because of sexu- that I had to wear a uniform when going to
ality and part of it was really confusing ... school and that was for girls, of course.
I hated myself as a girl for the fact that I Some girls whom my friends dated were in
should sit down when I pass water and the same school with me, so I had to hide
I never loved dresses, even now. During that and if they saw and asked me questions I
time ... people would just say that she would just tell them that ‘I have a twin
(myself) is a tomboy and I thought ‘yes, why brother, maybe you are talking about him’
should they call me a tomboy, therefore that and I really got away with that. It was then
I do have a penis and its hidden inside me that I started, we can say, ‘having sex’.
and maybe if I grow up it will come out’. ... Some said that I am a boy and some
or applicable copyright law.
I did everything that a boy should do said that I am a girl. I did not have any
and I did it five times better than them and problem with the confusion some people had
there was always that discrimination and about my sexual identity.
that did not bother me so much but some- ... even at school I never entered girls’
times it worked me psychologically. I never toilets ... In fact I liked it very much when
mixed with women and I felt superior to they called me a boy. Things started getting
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worse and worse with my parents, especially Thandi’s story takes a surprising (or
my mother. My mother started by not buying not so surprising) turn when she next
any trousers for me and did all these things speaks of having sex with a man:
that girls do and now I was round about the A time of confusion arose when I came
age of 15 ... I valued ... being called a boy to terms that I am a woman and I had sex
because I also thought that I was a boy. I was with a man which did not make me myself
in high school now and things were tough and more because now I was going to be the
because now I could feel love and beautiful mother, not the man I was always fanta-
women in my school knocked me off my feet. sising about.
At school I was a girl but after school I ... I wished that I could go to a place
would quickly run home and change what I where none knew me to start a new life. My
wore and I would wear a trouser and after girlfriend was admitted into hospital at that
changing I would go and visit girls from time because she heard the news about me
another school.. This was a risk because and she suffered from a shock because I was
children from other schools usually know not the kind of man she thought I was and
each other, but for some time it went right all the 9 years we had together as lovers just
until my neighbour blew it one day ... I was went away. I may have faked my identity,
embarrassed and my identity as being a but the only thing which I was honest about
woman came out. I had to leave the school is my undying love for her ...
to go to another school where no one knew
me. I went to a private school and there we Thandi concludes by saying that, while she now
did not wear a uniform, ... I enjoyed life clearly sees herself as a lesbian, she feels very
there because I was living my life the way I ostracised by both men and women:
wanted to ... even my principal liked me very ... I wish I could have a man on campus to
much. Once he told me that I was the most put away the labels they are giving
handsome boy in his school ... Really I can me ...
say that, that made me not to think of myself
as a woman but as a man and I kept asking Is Thandi suffering from what sexologists have
God ‘when is my penis going to appear?’ called ‘gender dysphoria’ (Blanchard et al, cited
When one goes to church, the preacher in Crooks & Baur, 1996, 53)? Or has she got
will tell you that everything is possible with unresolved penis envy according to Freud? Or is
God and, well, I did not want too much but she illustrating a desire to own the phallus and
just a penis. have access to male power, according to Mitchell
(1975)? Or is there a way of constructing
Thandi goes on to speak about attending a
meaning of her story that does not pathologise
summer camp, seducing a woman and beginning
or politicise her or her desires? Clearly, as in
a long-term relationship with her:
Thandi’s experience, pleasure and desire also
The worst part is that she even introduced play a role. She appeared to do quite well
me to her parents and they really loved me without a penis in nine years of a relationship
and her mother even called me her son-in- with her female lover. Were it an option for
law. I loved that because I could see that Thandi to engage in male activities and a loving
they really believed in me, but I knew the
or applicable copyright law.
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fixed. Thus construction does not necessarily restrict agency, but may facilitate
the expression of agency, for there is no possibility of agency outside the
discursive practices. For Butler the task ‘is not whether to repeat, but how to
repeat or, indeed, to repeat and, through a radical proliferation of gender, to
displace the very gender norms that enable the repetition itself ’ (148).
CONCLUSION
Based on develop-
Psychology and the normalisation of gender difference ments in feminist
In spite of decades of critique, psychology continues to play an active role in and post-modern
theory, in particular,
reproducing and legitimating social notions of a rigid divide between male and
new ways of under-
female. Psychology, as theory and practice (through research and clinical and standing gender and
applied practice) continues to play a role in legitimating gender inequality in its relationship with
South Africa, as it does at an international level. This chapter has highlighted, sex and sexualities
in particular, how psychological normalising discourses on gender difference have become
possible. Impor-
serve to rationalise gender inequality as well as the oppression of people who tantly, we begin to
resist traditional gender and sexual identities. The activities of ‘normalisation’ be able to
are dramatically enacted through interventions such as behavioural therapies deconstruct the
and surgical attempts to ‘cure’ people of subversive desires in order to reinstate ‘old’ picture of the
binarism of male–
the current dichotomous prescriptions of gender identity. female, and the
This chapter has presented an alternative version of gendered, sexed and rigid set of
sexualised identities. Based on developments in feminist and post-modern relationships
theory, in particular, new ways of understanding gender and its relationship between biological
sex, cultural gender
with sex and sexualities become possible. Importantly, we begin to be able to and (hetero)sexual
deconstruct the ‘old’ picture of the binarism of male-female, and the rigid set orientations.
of relationships between biological sex, cultural gender and (hetero)sexual
orientations. Emerging out of this ‘new’ and critical view is a subversive and
challenging picture of multiplicity and fluidity, in which almost everything we
assumed as solid and ‘real’, the very assumption of a world divided into male
and female, is overturned. In its place, we can begin to imagine multiple sexes,
genders and sexualities with diverse relationships between bodies, subjectivi-
ties and sexual practices.
Such a challenge can be met only through theoretical and empirical work which
allows for the diversity of not only local experiences of gender development and
subjectivity but also of gender development and subjectivities in all their multi-
plicity. Local stories, such as the one shared in this chapter, which challenge our
traditional understandings and expectations of gendered, sexed and sexualised
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Recommended readings
Judith Butler’s Gender trouble: Feminism and the subversion of identity
(1990) is absolutely central in contemporary gender studies. The book is often
credited with ushering in a new era of feminism, introducing strongly post-
structuralist and Foucaultian forms of critique into the analysis of gendered
identity. Conceptually dense and counter-intuitive, it is difficult at first, but a
continually rewarding read.
Sue Wilkinson’s (1986) Feminist social psychology: Developing theory and
or applicable copyright law.
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Chapter
9
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‘... if the head and body are to be well, you must begin by
curing the soul; that is the first thing. And the cure ...
has to be effected by the use of certain charms, and these
charms are fair words; and by them temperance is implanted
in the soul, and where temperance is, there health is
speedily implanted to the whole body.’
Plato, cited in Wolberg (1977, v)
LEARNING OUTCOMES
By the end of this chapter, you should be able to:
Appreciate and understand the critical value of Foucault’s genealogical approach to
the pre-history of psychology
Understand, how, for Foucault, psychology is powerful in three particular ways: as
a form of knowledge that objectifies; as a form of practice that disciplines, and as
or applicable copyright law.
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INTRODUCTION
The importance of Foucault
Michel Foucault is a pre-eminent figure both in the conceptualisation of the
development of modern forms of power and in the critique of the applied
human (or social-medical) sciences. Whereas many critiques of power in its
applied clinical forms use typically repressive models of understanding (the
work of Szasz (1979, 1984) is a good case in point here, but also that of Brown, Michel Foucault
1973; Chesler, 1972; Cooper, 1967; Masson, 1989, 1994; Ingelby, 1972, 1981)),
Foucault is aware of the fact that power may have positive, or productive
effects, that it may ‘call things into being’. In the same vein, many of these Repressive:
forms of power that
previous critiques have lacked in historical contextualisation and have tended gain control through
to occur in isolation from questions regarding the broader production of negative, punishing,
knowledge (again, the work of Masson, Chesler, Brown). Likewise – such constraining,
critiques have often lacked the finer-grain analyses of an applied attention to prohibiting means,
often relying on
the specific means of shaping docile (that is, obedient) or subservient subjects. physical violence.
In contrast to these approaches, Foucault (1977, 1980a, 1980b) offers a Foucault contrasts
genealogical account; that is to say, he offers a radical historical critique that this characteristic
looks to the forgotten origins of a phenomenon, here that of the human feature of pre-
modern forms of
sciences (which is inclusive of the development of psychology). The human
power with the
sciences are those sciences that take the human subject – that is, individuals – mainly productive,
as their focus, so we are talking about social sciences such as sociology, crimi- or positive, form of
nology and anthropology and so on, in addition to the medical sciences. modern power.
Psychology makes for something of a special case here, in that it fits into both
categories, as both a social science that produces knowledge about individuals Genealogy:
form of radical
and a ‘caring’ pseudo-medical practice which aims to cure or alleviate psycho-
historical critique
logical distress or maladaption in individuals. Foucault is hence able to that looks to
examine power as a positive, productive force that is inextricably tied to the uncover the origins
advent of Western modernity. Further yet, Foucault’s account of the nature of of a phenomenon
modern power is able to explain how power works in ways that produce knowl- generally thought to
be ahistorical,
edge and that ultimately have great efficacy in governing and producing natural or universal.
individuals. The objective of
genealogy is a
The value of historical critique critique of the
present, the desta-
Foucault’s explanation of the birth of the human sciences occurs via an exegesis bilisation of what is
of disciplinary power, the paradigmatic form of power in the modern period, taken-for-granted,
common-sense
or applicable copyright law.
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Modernity:
knowledge that, as Best & Kellner (1994) put it, have ‘created new forms of
historical period of domination in which the emergence of the human sciences, the formation of
the modern, often specific disciplinary apparatuses and the construction of the subject are all
understood to inextricably linked’ (35). The objective of this chapter is to stay as close to
represent a
departure from
Foucault’s texts on disciplinary power (1977, 1980a, 1980b) as possible –
established tradi- particularly the landmark Discipline and punish – as a means of providing a
tions, from the broad-sweep analysis of this concept and of the emergence of the human
values of Classical sciences integral to it.
Antiquity. Different
Writing for a moment in purely methodological terms, Foucault’s
thinkers position
the beginning of genealogical objective in Discipline and punish was, in part, to provide a
the Modern Era at historical ‘surface of emergence’, a ‘history of the present’, in his terms, that
different points in outlined the conditions of possibility which made the development of a disci-
history, though it
pline such as psychology feasible. The goal that Foucault arguably succeeds in
generally coincides
with unprecedented achieving is that of unearthing the determining and central components at the
levels of industriali- origin of these social science practices, components that, he claims, have long
sation, with a new since been discursively buried. It is in this way that Foucault is able to provide
focus on the a deeply rooted kind of criticism that works from the bottom up, uprooting a
apparent autonomy
and independence discipline such as psychology by a systematic engagement with its most signif-
of individuals, and a icant precedents. Hence one may suggest that the genealogical approach
new relationship of adopted by Foucault aims not only to analyse the early development or history
person to knowl- of the social science disciplines but also fundamentally to destabilise their
edge (ie people
knowing themselves
fields of practice by considering their foundations, their pre-history.
and the world
around them in a Foucault’s critical psychology
stable, scientific If critical psychology is, in part, the study of psychology and power, or perhaps
and rational way).
more directly the critical examination of psychology as itself powerful, as a
form of power, then Foucault’s pre-history of psychology is of pivotal impor-
tance to us. Why? Well, Foucault shows how psychological knowledge first
emerges within contexts of control, through attempts to create docile (that is,
obedient or subservient) subjects. In his account, psychology is powerful in
three particular ways: as form of knowledge that objectifies, as a form of
Subject(s): practice that disciplines, and as a form of self-understanding that subjectifies.
Foucault uses the It is crucial that we understand each of these three modes of power, for the
term ‘subjects’
rather than ‘individ-
critique of psychology that critical psychology attempts needs to address each
uals’ because his such mode if it is to be at all sufficient.
approach empha- The chapter is divided into four sections. The first examines two pre-
or applicable copyright law.
sises the various disciplinary eras of power: those of sovereign power and that of the era of
forms of social
humanist reform. The second focuses on disciplinary power and its predomi-
power we are
subjected to and nant themes. The third section provides a synopsis of a typical disciplinary
that subsequently apparatus and reflects on psychology’s status as just such an apparatus. The
bring individuals last section concludes the chapter, briefly introducing a number of criticisms
into being. of Foucault’s theory. A word of caution is necessary here. One should be aware
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not to limit the force of Foucault’s critique here merely to psychology; indeed, Disciplinary power:
the chapter keeps its focus deliberately wide, on the human or sociomedical modern form of
sciences (I use these terms interchangeably) for just this reason. Furthermore, power which, for
one may point out, with some legitimacy, that Foucault’s historical analysis Foucault, is
productive rather
was developed in and for a European context and as such may seem to be than repressive, in
lacking in relevance to a southern African context. This is not strictly true, in the sense of
view of the obvious fact that such modalities of European power were ‘bringing things
imported, in some cases wholesale, into its former colonial domains. As into being’,
producing both
Edward Said (1983) puts it, ‘discipline [here referring to Foucault’s notion of
knowledge (ie the
disciplinary power] was used to administer, study, and reconstruct – the subse- discipline of
quently to occupy, rule, and exploit – almost the whole of the non-European psychology, as a
world’ (222). What is true, though – and Said (1983) also emphasises this fact way of knowing the
– is that some attention needs to be applied to how these particular variations world) and
subjective effects
on disciplinary power were customised to the politics and culture of their (eg individuality,
particular settings. As a result, this chapter features a series of interest boxes the soul, personal
connecting Foucault’s theories to a southern African location, and in this psychology etc).
respect the work of Butchart (1996, 1997, 1999) features prominently, as a way Disciplinary power
is related to a set
of anchoring Foucault in the South African context.
of techniques,
procedures and
PRE-DISCIPLINARY ERAS OF POWER assessments that
measure, monitor
Sovereign power and treat subjects
so as to normalise
Foucault begins Discipline and punish with a vivid example of what was perhaps
deviant ones
the predominant form of punishment in the era of sovereignty: torture. In this further.
early and crude order of power a breach of the law was like an act of war,
requiring a response from the king, whose body (figuratively) had been attacked
in the action of the crime. Accordingly, the criminal had to be physically
attacked, tortured, dismembered, destroyed, in a symbolic display of the sover-
eign’s power. This form of power had several limitations. First, each time the law
was broken such a display of ritual atrocity had to be re-enacted. Furthermore,
this spectacular, brutal and discontinuous form of punishment left untouched
and undeterred a wide-ranging and continuous illegality of less serious and less
detected transgressions. Lastly, it was also at times an unstable form of power, at
least inasmuch as it risked the insurrection of the masses who might choose to
sympathise with the punished criminal rather than with the authorities.
The form of power that Foucault considered to have succeeded monarchical law
was that of the humanist reformers, which was essentially an art of manipulating
representations as a hopeful means of the correct reordering of social life. Several
aspects of this transformation of power are pertinent. For a start, the monarch
lost absolute sovereignty in matters of punishment. Furthermore, public torture
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Sovereign(ty):
was abolished. Because crime was no longer understood as an assault on the
the Sovereign is a person of the king, criminal justice changed its objective from taking revenge on
figure – a king, the king’s behalf to simply punishing. Crime was now an attack on society as a
queen or chief of whole, and the responsibility to punish was now its; the standard of justice was
state – who
exercises supreme
now the ‘humanity’ that all parties of the social contract shared. Serving prima-
authority. By rily the principle of humanity, punishment now had to bring the offender ‘back
sovereignty, to their place in society’; it had basically to requalify the juridical subject, as
Foucault is referring Foucault (1977) puts it. Keeping in mind also the humanity of society as a whole,
to pre-modern forms
punishments now needed to be instrumental in deterring and preventing future
of power arranged
around a sovereign’s crime. Hence begins one of the trajectories that Foucault sees as running right
right to punish the through to the development of the human sciences: that in which the technology
crimes of of power is in fact the same principle as the very humanisation of punitive mech-
wrongdoers in
anisms. (A technology is typically understood as the application of a science to a
brutal, physical and
demonstrative particular objective of mastery or control. Foucault uses the term to refer to a
terms. More discrete set of tactics, knowledges, techniques, procedures, discourses (or tech-
generally, it refers nical forms of language) used by select experts or professionals as part of a stated
to supremacy of objective of increasing relations of control.)
authority or rule.
Individualisation and objectification
In terms of both the demonstrative capacity of punishment and its efficacy in
eradicating the root of the crime, punishment needed now to take into account
‘the profound nature of the criminal ... the presumable degree of his wicked-
ness, the intrinsic quality of his will’ (Foucault, 1977, 98). Hence the penalty
(and its prospective modulation) came to consider that which hitherto had
never been considered: the individual defendants themselves, their nature and
Humanisation:
to imbue with way of life, their attitude of mind, their past, and the ‘quality’ rather than the
humaneness, or simple intention of their will. What therefore began to emerge was the parallel
human kindness; to classification of crimes and punishments, the precise adaptation of punish-
civilise; to respect ments to individual offenders, the individualisation of sentences.
the principle of
humanity. Two points are important to emphasise here. One is that the first appear-
ance of psychological knowledge occurs in a way that is intimately and
inextricably tied to the enforcement of power. The second is that the push
toward individualisation within practices of subjection led towards powerful
collateral processes of objectification. The criminal became a species to be
studied and understood, to be known, the crime something to be exhaustively
coded and classified. As Dreyfus & Rabinow (1982) put it, for proper interven-
Objectification:
or applicable copyright law.
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themselves in the
Within such a power-relation, as between criminals and those in the position to
forms of self-
punish them, one finds the blueprint of a particular way of knowing and trans- knowledge and
forming the subject. This ‘blueprint’ for knowing and changing individual understanding, so
subjects would come to be duplicated throughout the social science disciplines. individuals may be
Indeed, this simultaneous arrangement of objectification (the generation of said to subjectify
themselves.
generalised knowledge about a class of people) and subjectification (the
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power was matched and supported by the spread of a new kind of professional subject through
therapeutic means,
agent of power: the teacher, the prison warden, the military superior, the to increase both the
factory supervisor, the medical expert, the psychologist. docility and the
The efficacy of the control exercised by the disciplinary agent was contin- aptitude of the
gent on the fact that this must be a total power, undisturbed by any third party, body/mind in
question.
which would entirely envelop its subject (Foucault, 1977). Within such power,
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Technology:
furthermore, secrecy and autonomy, particularly in relation to matters of tech-
discrete set of nique, were imperative. Such a disciplinary power needed to maintain ‘its own
tactics, knowledges, functioning, its own rules, its own techniques, its own knowledge; it needed be
techniques, proce- able to fix its own norms and decide its own results’ (Foucault, 1977, 129).
dures, discourses
(technical forms of
It was in this way that disciplinary political technology advanced, by taking
language) used by what were essentially political problems (problems of control), removing them
select experts or from the domain of political discourse, recasting them in the neutral language of
professionals as part science (or that of its associated applications) and transforming them into tech-
of a stated objective
nical problems for the sole attention of specialists and experts (Dreyfus &
of increasing rela-
tions of control. For Rabinow, 1982, 196). The constitutive role that power has played in such
Foucault, technology problems is thus elided in the humanist attention to the development of the
refers to the various specialist technical domains of ‘treatment’. An excellent example of this
minutiae of the is provided by Duncan, Stevens & Bowman (in their chapter in this work):
concrete instruments
and machinery of
Drapetomania – a psychopathology endemic to slaves, an ‘irrestrainable
institutional applica- propensity on the part of the slave to run away, to escape from slaverly’. Here we
tions of power. can see quite clearly that a sociopolitical problem, a problem of social control, is
converted into a pseudo-psychological condition in a way which powerfully
depoliticises the real context/background to the ‘problem’. Thomas Szasz
makes a similar point when he (1973) suggests that ‘[a]ddiction, obesity, starva-
tion (anorexia nervosa) are political problems, not psychiatric: each condenses
and expresses a contest between the individual and some other person or
Orthopaedics: persons in his environment over the control of the individual’s body’ (18).
branch of medicine
that focuses on the ‘Moral orthopaedics’
prevention or correc-
tion of injuries or Perhaps the most dramatic break of disciplinary power from the objectives of
disorders of the body the humanist reformers concerned the body. The body, which had become
through repetitive increasingly unimportant in the previous order, returned now as the primary
therapeutic forms of template, the surface upon which disciplinary power would operate, at least, as
treatment and/or
attention. Moral
Miller (1994) notes, in the early stages of its deployment. This body was not the
orthopaedics is the focus of a power bent on destroying it but rather that of a power intent on
term Foucault coined training, moulding, exercising and supervising it (Foucault, 1977). There was
for the correction or hence a remarkable refinement of punitive measures which came to be essen-
prevention of
injuries or disorders
tially corrective, orthopaedic or therapeutic. Each such correction was like an
of the ‘soul’ (the investment that needed to have a direct return of sorts, that needed to represent
psyche, the mind) an increase in ‘the body’s productive forces’, as Foucault (1977) put it. Each
through repetitive rehabilitative measure had to result in a proportional increase of dominance
therapeutic forms of
or applicable copyright law.
(on the part of the disciplinary agent) and obedience (on the part of the disci-
treatment and/or
attention, such as plinary subject), docility and aptitude (Foucault, 1977). This is what one has in
those dispensed by mind when speaking of psychology, or any other social or medical science, as
psychotherapists, powerfully disciplining the body/mind of the subject, that it attempts to
counsellors, teachers
correct, rehabilitate, mould or develop it through therapeutic means, to
etc.
increase both the docility and the aptitude of the body/mind in question.
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Megan Vaughan brings certain of Foucault’s unable to contain any notion of difference that
concepts and analytical terms to bear on the was not directly tied to the question of inferi-
colonial context. In her book Curing their ills ority and the necessity of subordination’ (115).
(1991), she explores the disciplinary function Vaughan’s point, then, should not be seen as
of African medical, psychiatric and psycholog- simply opposing Foucault’s theory but rather as
ical forms of research. She argues that the augmenting his analysis at a different level.
elaborate classification systems and practices Another potential difference in how
of these types of knowledge played a large role European and African forms of disciplinary
in the operation of colonial power. Indeed, power worked concerned the role of individual-
medicine and its associated disciplines worked, isation. Rather than the strong focus on types
in many of the ways suggested by Foucault, to of individualisation that characterise European
actively construct ‘the African’ as an object of disciplinary power, Vaughan suggests that
knowledge. Colonial psychologists and psychia- unitisation took precedence. ‘Unitisation’
trists seemed to be continually grappling – in means the procedures by which people were
their various different ways – with the question counted, for tax or census purposes ‘weighed
of who ‘the African’ was. In what appears to be and measured ... given medical histories and
a difference from the ways disciplinary power medicalised records’ (11). As she puts it:
worked in European contexts, the definition of In colonial medical discourse and practice
abnormality in colonial African contexts took colonial Africans were conceptualised, first
something of a back seat relative to questions and foremost, as members of groups, rather
of Africanness. ‘The literature on madness in than individuals, who were said to possess
colonial Africa was more concerned with a defi- distinctive psychologies and bodies. In ...
nition of ‘Africanness’ than with a definition of colonial Africa group classification was a
madness’ (119). It was as if ‘Africanness’ was far more important construction than indi-
assumed to be so essentially different from vidualization ... there was a powerful
‘Europeanness’ that it was itself already a strand in the theories of colonial psycholo-
fundamental form of Otherness. One did not gists which denied that Africans might be
need concentrate as much on categories of self-aware individual subjects, so bound
madness and abnormality as one would have in were they thought to be by collective iden-
the European context – one did not need to rely tities (11).
as heavily on these kinds of deviations from the Again, here, Vaughan’s work may be seen as a
norm – because the African was already a kind careful application and extension of Foucault’s
of essential Otherness. Hence, even in his most ideas rather than representing a simple contra-
normative condition, the African is, in compar- diction of the notion of disciplinary power. It is
ison to disciplinary values generated in Europe, not that procedures of individualisation were
already different, abnormal; and, as such, the not implemented in Africa. Rather it is a case
African found his place among the various that the individualising procedures of measure-
‘Others’, the criminals, juvenile delinquents, ment, assessment and comparison were imple-
sexual perverts against which the whole set of mented, but against the group of Africans as a
European norms worked. The African, then, is, whole. It was not really the case that single
or applicable copyright law.
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compared against the European norms. Why was Africans might be self-aware individual subjects,
this the case? Well, the procedures of normali- so bound were they thought to be to their
sation in Europe were used to discipline deviant collective identities’ (11). Colonial psychology,
individuals, to introduce a range of power-rela- medicine, psychology and psychiatry seemed so
tions between them and society so that each busy on objectifying the African, and so focused
such individual could be better scrutinised. It on what made them, as a group, different from
was in this way that they could be better sepa- the European, that subjectifying modes of
rated out from the social mass of which they power seemed to have slipped through the
were originally part, and controlled. Because of cracks somehow. These modes of power were so
the massive racism of colonial Europe, it was locked into producing categories of racial differ-
taken that all Africans were already problematic ence that they did not see Africans as
(in this respect, refer to the earlier chapters in possessing any personal subjectivity apart from
this book on Fanon). Hence such systems of the subjectivity supplied them by their social,
control and understanding that would normally racial, ethnic grouping. In fact, in contrast to
hope to place individual subjects under greater Foucault’s focus on an actively subjectifying
relations of power and surveillance were applied power of modern disciplinary power, Fanon
across the board to the entire racial grouping of (1986) understands the force of colonial power
Africans. Race and racial difference was reiter- in terms of its absolutely objectifying force. For
ated at each point in the workings of colonial Fanon (1986), what we observe in the gaze of
power. The need, in short, to differentiate, to colonial power on the African is more than
separate out, to ‘make other’, to individualise anything an obliteration of subjectivity, an anni-
the problematic subject – the typical func- hilation of the African, a turning of him or her
tioning of individualisation – was most certainly into ‘nothingness’. He (1986) describes the
present in African colonial contexts then, it was realm of blackness, for example, as a ‘zone of
simply applied at a group rather than at a non-being, an extraordinarily sterile and arid
singular level. region’ (10); the experience of colonial racism
One area where the workings of colonial as that of ‘crushing objecthood’, of ‘my body ...
power did differ quite markedly from European abraded into nonbeing ... [a] taking me out of
forms of disciplinary power was with reference the world’ (109). Here it seems important to be
to subjectivity, that is, with reference to the aware of the specific difference between the era
domain of self-knowledge and understanding, of colonial power, and that of modern discipli-
the self-observing functioning of power that nary power. Of course, in the present of
Foucault takes to be so central to modern post-apartheid South Africa, one would need to
power. ‘Indeed,’ claims Vaughan (1991), ‘there be aware of how variations of both such forms of
was a powerful strand in the theories of colonial power might work together in quite complex
psychologists which denied the possibility that ways.
‘soul’. Within this return to the body, the ‘mind’ or ‘soul’ was certainly not
forgotten. The ‘soul’ in fact became far more instrumental in disciplinary power
than it had been in previous orders of power. For Foucault, it was power exer-
cised upon the body that had given rise to the effects of the soul in the first
place. It is the refined, technically elaborated return to the body, the surplus
power exercised upon it that gives reality to this notion (and experience) of soul.
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the typical mode of conversation came to the subjective, personal life of the patient. The
promote this self-attending orientation. Inap- re-use of large segments of the patient’s
propriate questions, personal enquiries and descriptions, of their own words and terms of
overly result-based queries were gradually understanding, similarly ensured that the ther-
extinguished by the therapist’s avoidance of apeutic narrative was, at times, essentially a
providing answers as therapy progressed. Simi- monologue, essentially the narrative of one
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voice, that of the subjective patient’s, even if it what causes these feelings ...’ (Wolberg, 1977,
was repeated, re-emphasised or extended by 1050; emphasis added). The patient’s comment:
the therapist in ways that structured or ‘It’s how I feel about myself that really counts’
directed the session. Take the following (Wolberg, 1977, 1081) provides evidence of this
example, in which the therapist explicitly kind of therapeutic effect, as does the com-
directs the patient towards a self-monitoring ment: ‘Ever since I’ve been coming to see you,
and (emotionally) self-aware form of narrative: I’ve been giving more thought to myself than
Pt. ... I’ve had some disappointments ... I I’ve ever done in my whole life’ (Wolberg, 1977,
took an interest in helping crippled 1079). A useful adjunct here was the emphasis
children ... Normal children hurt little of the words used to reference the patient, the
children, you know ... I feel badly about it, vocal italicisation of the patient’s name, of
but I don’t think that has anything to do mentions of ‘you’: ‘But how do you feel?’, ‘And
with ... what’s happening to me. then what did you do?’.
Th. There are other things?
Pt. It goes further. The placement of such a premium on the
Th. It goes further? It involves your own feel- development of patient subjectivity and reflex-
ings about yourself? (Wolberg, 1977, 1052). ivity was a strong and unremitting pattern
throughout therapeutic protocols. The patient’s
As evidenced in the above extract, the self increasingly became a level of awareness
accessing and reinforcement of subjectivity and a surface of intervention that needed to be
also occurred through therapists’ continual prioritised; more than this it became the vessel
querying of the personal opinion of patients. through which therapists could repeatedly
Typical of this tactic was the therapist’s redi- appeal to the patient’s agency, to their own
rected retort to a direct question: ‘But what do personal prerogative, and responsibility, to
you think?’. More simply: ‘Do you have any idea change.
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We should bear in mind that Foucault uses ‘soul’ as a variant on various Object-effect:
psychological notions of self, or ego. The soul, he claims, is the reality-reference object-effect of
upon which various concepts and domains of analysis have been constructed. power is something
The psyche, subjectivity, the notions of self, personality and consciousness brought into being,
constructed, known,
number among these constructions (Foucault, 1977). Moreover, upon such a understood through
variously articulated ‘soul’ ‘have been built scientific techniques and the a powerful form of
discourses and moral claims of humanism’ (Foucault, 1977, 30). It is this ‘soul’ knowledge. For
in any of its variously constructed forms that is the ‘prison of the body’ example, the various
understandings of
(Foucault, 1977, 30).
self as presented by
Foucault here thus leaves little room for doubt regarding psychology’s psychology, such as
complicity in the procedures and agendas of modern power. This ‘soul’ whose the psyche, the ego,
manipulation and continued substantiation is absolutely central to discipli- personality. These
are objects of power
nary control is both the subject and object of psychology. Psychology’s subject,
inasmuch as they
‘knowable man [sic] (soul, individuality, the self, consciousness, conduct, are prime points of
whatever it is called), is the object-effect of this analytic investment, of this focus for a partic-
domination-observation’ (Foucault, 1977, 305). Indeed, disciplinary power is ular kind of
as such operative on, and the constitutive element within, not only individu- knowledge, that is,
objects of power in
ality, but on all the senses of autonomy, responsibility, subjectivity and that knowledge is
personality predicated upon it. These are all object-effects of disciplinary produced about
power, that in their objectifiable nature will directly inform the ongoing them. However, they
production of knowledge about individuals. As Rose (1991) puts it: are also effects of
power in that they
Psychological theories have played a key role in the birth of this new concept of ‘come into being’
the self, and psychological techniques have had a crucial role in the development through such forms
of those practices and techniques through which modern selves are constructed, of knowledge. For
sustained and remodelled (xii–xiii). Foucault, power and
knowledge can
These object-effects are, moreover, in their subjective nature, also the inter- never be separated
– he prefers ‘power-
nalised instruments (power-effects) adopted by subjects who come to take
knowledge’.
responsibility for making them play upon themselves. It is in this sense that we
can understand Foucault’s deliberate ambiguity in speaking of how discipli-
nary power produces ‘subjects’ – subjects, that is, both in the sense of being
subject to control and in being tied to their own identity through self-knowl-
edge or conscience (Foucault, 1982).
Producing individuals
Foucault extends his earlier suggestions of the individualising capacities of
or applicable copyright law.
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Pt. My big problem ... is what I do to myself made (Wolberg, 1977, 1098).
because I feel no good (Wolberg, 1977, In the above example the patient appears to be
1098). Such a shift in the focus of the instructing the therapist by continually querying
therapeutic narrative, and in the locus of whether he follows her self-instructions. This
attention and responsibility, might typi- adoption of the narrative structure previously
cally be viewed as evidence of therapeutic lent by the therapist frequently ensured that
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clients were able to motivate and guide their client taking on therapist functions, that of the
own treatment with a relative amount of inde- ‘therapeutic corrections’, are the verbal amend-
pendence; similarly, clients often, at this point, ments made by clients to their own narratives.
began to lead their own narrative with ques- Dysfunctional trends and directions within their
tions of a self-probing nature. Furthermore, typical narratives were gradually, systematically
clients often came to provide self-assessments, eliminated and became the subject of clients’
self-recommendations and personal suggestions reflexive criticisms, where they were able to
of reparative behaviour. Continuing, Hook identify such recently highlighted ‘dysfunctions’
(2001) points out that a similar example of the and vocally check their ‘mistakes’.
disciplinary technology that come to have from within the internal position of the subject.
increasing bearing upon their nature, upon what
they most essentially are, will be, or may become. As Best & Kellner (1994)
succinctly put it, borrowing from Foucault (1977): ‘the modern individual
became both an object and subject of knowledge, not “repressed”, but positively
shaped and formed within the matrices of “scientifico-disciplinary
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The work of Alex Butchart (1996, 1997, 1999) other devices for examining the interior of
usefully extends many terms of Foucaultian the African body extended to it the medical
analysis within the South African context. He re- gaze deep within the body ... (103).
emphasises, following Foucault, that the many Butchart here draws particular attention to
techniques through which social scientists study sociomedical anxieties about the African body
the body, mind and society are all components as potential container of disease:
of a ‘productive assembly line’ as he puts it, that
continually creates and sustains our knowledge The African body was ... fabricated as a
and understanding of reality. Through careful container of disease, creating a need for
historical work, he traces how techniques and technologies that could monitor and prevent
procedures of control were the basis for the the transmission of disease between bodies –
development of various forms of sociomedical hence the emergence within mining medicine
study and intervention: and public health of an elaborate system of
barriers and surveillance devices directed to
In South Africa during the 17th and 18th the hygienic supervision of recruitment,
centuries psychology and anthropology were working, sleeping, eating, spitting and all
as unthinkable as epidemiology and social other bodily functions that might enhance
medicine. Instead, the classificatory tech- the spread of disease from body to body
niques of natural history coincided with the (103).
regime of sovereign domination ... Beginning
in the mid-1800s, the African body began to Divergent strands of sociomedical discourse
become a voluminous entity, the practice of were hence unified by a common strategy of
missionary medicine fabricating as its object securing control over African bodies through the
and effect the African loquacious body as extension of techniques for the ‘prevention and
possessed of a spiritual interior ... toward suppression’ of disease. By the 1920s, however,
which the provision of curative care as a form the increasing number of Africans and Europeans
of ‘benevolent conquest’ was directed in an resident in towns and cities meant that this
effort to convert the African from ‘heathe- centralised and objectifying power was no
nism’ to Christianity (103). longer enforceable, ‘since it had little capacity
to govern such intimate activities as sexuality,
The advancement of techniques of health and
bathing, bowel movements and dietary habits’
knowledge were therefore indivisible from the
(Butchart, 1997, 104). This failure was to
development of more sophisticated procedures
provide the condition of possibility for a new set
of control. If missionary practices were the basis
of disciplinary practices that embraced the
for new knowledges and interventions within the
African body in ‘a different strategy of atten-
African soul and body in the 17th and 18th
tions aimed at overcoming these limitations’
centuries, then the mining industry took on this
(104). One such strategy was
role in the 20th century:
or applicable copyright law.
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Normalising technology
Having spoken of the breadth and generalisability of disciplinary power, it
seems now pertinent to address the question as to what holds all these
different moral orthopaedic projects together. How are all their site-specific
objectives actually the same? An answer is provided by Best & Kellner (1994)
in a way that rounds up the crucial characterising aspect of disciplinary power:
‘[t]he ultimate goal and effect of discipline is ‘nnormalisation’, the elimination Normalisation:
of all social and psychological irregularities and the production of useful and elimination of all
social and
docile subjects through a refashioning of minds and bodies’ (47). It was the psychological
possibility of comparison between subjects, enabled through surveillance, and irregularities and
later through their own confessions, that unified the operations of disciplinary the production of
power, that enabled a kind of ‘normalising judgement’. useful and docile
subjects through a
This kind of normalisation, made up of a combination of themes of indi-
refashioning of
vidualisation, objectification and surveillance, was able to solidify the minds and bodies.
punishments of the disciplinary order down to ever finer levels of specification
(Foucault, 1977). Indeed, it operated a ‘micro-penality’ in which infractions too
trivial to have been granted a legal status now became captured by power; ‘the
slightest deviations from the norm were now made punishable’ (Foucault,
1977, 178). Far more extensive in effect than a simple binary opposition of
permitted and forbidden, the norm brings into existence a far wider
continuum of judgement. It is no longer good enough to be judged right or
wrong, good or evil, argues Foucault (1977); one is now locked within a
perpetual relationship to the standard of the norm. Not only were errors and
wrong-doings punishable – so was failing to attain a certain standard – the
whole domain of non-conformity now became punishable. Through the speci-
fication of the most detailed aspects of everyday behaviour and the
establishment of a rigorous set of social norms, the non-conformist, even the
temporary one, became the object of disciplinary attention.
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Confessional technology
Confession is one of the most crucial mechanisms of normalising technology. It
is through confession that the speaking subject tells the disciplinary agent that
which they may not have otherwise been able to see or know. Through the ‘ther-
apeutic’ process of the confession the subject’s fantasies, secret problems and
issues of sexuality are elicited and subjected to the scrutiny of disciplinary
surveillance. Psychology has a prime role to play here. As Butchart (1997)
explains, from the disciplinary focus in medical technologies – that of seeing the
sick body – psychology came (predominantly, although not exclusively) to install
a technology of hearing. This, then, is how we should understand confession; a
technique of intimate surveillance ‘through which the most confidential ideas
and private secrets of everyone are amplified to audibility and lifted into socio-
medical space as devices of disciplinary subjectification’ (Butchart, 1997, 107).
The underlying logic of confession is basic: the more one speaks, the more
one will know oneself, the freer one will be (Foucault, 1980b). The irony of the
deployment of the tool of confession is, as Foucault (1980b) says, that it would
have us believe that it is our liberation that is in the balance. By inducing in the
individual the role of the speaking subject that comes to admit their deepest
secrets and desires, confession is an exemplary means of subjectifying individ-
uals. It places them in the role of the self-examinatory, self-reflective subject
who needs to recognise and tell the truth about their innermost qualities.
However, just as procedures of confession encourage subjectifying forms of
power – that is, self-implemented and self-understanding forms of power – so
they also substantiate the authority of experts. For it is increasingly only
through the mediation of such expert interpreters, says Foucault (1980b), such
as doctors, psychologists and psychiatrists, that the individual can properly
know the truth of their own psyche, sexuality and nature.
No matter how helpful, beneficial or therapeutic such confessional modes of
power may be, they remain central in the attempt to transform the subject,
crucial components of a greater technology of power. To paraphrase Dreyfus &
Rabinow (1982), as long as the interpretative sciences continue to search for deep
truth, proceeding on the assumption that they have privileged access to meaning,
whilst insisting that the truths they uncover lie outside the sphere of power, as
long as this continues, ‘these sciences remain vital strategies of disciplinary
power, despite the privileged externality they would pretend’ (1982, 181).
or applicable copyright law.
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Disciplinary modification
Secondly, the disciplinary apparatus is one with a primarily modificatory
function which requires a particular technology (comprising a discrete knowl-
edges, techniques and the functions of experts) generated by it. Applied
psychology’s objective of facilitating beneficial change or development within
its patients or clients certainly qualifies it as party to the modificatory objec-
tives of the disciplinary power. Applied psychology, like other applications of
disciplinary power, aims not only to change their subjects but to do so by their
own actions, from an internal position. The individualisation of disciplinary
power, so central to its modificatory function, is evident within the particular
functioning of psychotherapy, which appears continually to reiterate and reify
the ‘I’ foundation of the therapeutic narrative, continually referring to and
substantiating the subjectivity of the client. Indeed, it is this quality, as
described both by Cushman (1990, 1992, 1995) and Rose (1991, 1996) that is
thought both to ensure psychotherapeutic efficacy and to distinguish
psychotherapeutic practice from more openly suggestive, prescriptive or
educative forms of influence. Here we see a particular disciplinary dynamic
epitomised, that in which subjects come to inscribe in themselves (to para-
phrase Foucault (1977)), ‘a power relation in which they are the principle of
or applicable copyright law.
Secrecy of operation
In view of a third characteristic of disciplinary technologies – that they
maintain a secretive and autonomous level of functioning – one might again
refer to psychology’s applied practices. Two points are of importance here.
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Soul-effect
Fifthly, as discussed under the rubric of ‘moral orthopaedics’, disciplinary
activity needs to implement a ‘soul-effect’ of sorts. This kind of ‘soul’ provides
a surface of purchase for knowledge (hence constructs such as the mind, the
psyche, personality) as well as something that may be subjectively experienced
(as is the case in constructs such as the self, the soul, subjectivity). Psychology,
both as a domain of learning and as an applied form of practice, certainly
makes for fertile terrain for examination in these terms. Applied psychology,
furthermore, might be seen as typifying the disciplinary institution, at least
inasmuch as it takes the soul/mind/psyche as the optimal site for its normal-
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For writers such as Nikolas Rose (1991, 1996) psychotherapy makes for an exem-
plary example of a disciplinary technology. Rose (1996) is instructive in linking
disciplinary topics of confession, authority and subjectification. The truthful
rendering into speech of who one is and what one does, he (1996) claims, is
both identifying, in that it constructs a self in terms of certain norms of
identity, and subjectifying, in that one becomes a subject at the price of
entering a certain game of authority:
Confession ... characterizes almost all of the proliferating systems of
psychotherapy and counseling ... To speak the truth of one’s feelings and
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Butchart (1997) takes issue with misappropria- teaches us to be somewhat mistrustful of ratio-
tions of Foucault within the domain of South nales of liberation, humanism, freedom and
African sociomedical sciences. Not only is empowerment. Even something like Black
Foucault’s work largely ignored by these Consciousness, following Butchart (1997),
quarters; but, when it is referred to, it is typi- whilst offering to liberate Africans from inter-
cally distorted by being pressed into precisely nalised oppression still manufactured ‘a new
the liberal-humanist and Marxist analyses that and essentialist African personality ... wherein
Foucault was himself so concerned to dispel. If each African was his own overseer, exercising
we sufficiently grasp Foucault, argues Butchart surveillance over and against himself [sic]’
(1997, 1999), we understand that something (104).
like human subjectivity is not the origin of Butchart comments on participatory and
power, nor the source of any answers, but action research initiatives within psychology in
instead the end result and effect of its forces: much the same way:
What makes the psyche conceivable as the These ... novel analytical techniques [whilst]
origin of thought and locus of personal inviting people to empower themselves
identity ...? The Foucaultian answer ... is through the verbal confession of their
that ... such entities exist only in so far as thoughts, feelings and emotions, fashion
they are fabricated and sustained by the subjectivity itself as an object and relay
socio-medical sciences as objects of through which power is articulated in an
positive knowledge ... without psychology ever more anonymous and insidious format
to produce the subject there would be no (104).
notion of subjectivity ... the socio-medical
sciences do not find but invent the objects
To this we might offer the retort that there is
of their investigation, and therefore instead some tactical or instrumental use to be gained
of being appendages to power the socio- in recourse to such discourses or procedures,
medical sciences are in fact its very essence that they do offer, even if only momentarily, a
(Butchart, 1997, 102; emphasis added). different subject-position from which subject
may reassess their political existence within
Given that power is thus so intrinsically a part the world. Here it is also useful to carefully
of such disciplinary procedures, Foucault sees distinguish the aims and level of our political
little potential of meaningful escape, or depar- project. If this project is to be aware of, and try
tures from power within such terms, within and escape from, the insidious levels of a disci-
such forms of knowing and acting. In Foucault’s plinary ‘psychopolitics’ where we produce and
account, even the terms of the most seemingly police ourselves through practices of subjec-
liberationist psychology, are going to inevitably tivity, then a form of political awareness such
reinscribe procedures of subjectification and as Black Consciousness is perhaps not appro-
objectification, which ultimately link up to priate. If, on the other hand, we are concerned
greater programmes of power. What hence with combating a different order of power, say,
makes Foucault so radical, and at times so diffi- for example, that of discursive racism as imple-
cult for us to swallow, is his insistence that mented in institutional and psychological
freedom, empowerment and liberalism are
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trenchant critiques of disciplinary power, one and control them. What we need to be
might suggest that in certain environments the aware of here is the situation, characteristic
struggle against distinct forms of inequality for Butchart (1997) of liberationist South
(such as racism or sexism) may indeed take African sociomedical discourse, where
immediate priority over broader contestations objectives of ‘stripping away the veneers of
of disciplinary subjugation. interests, motives and ideologies mutates
into a machinery of production that
For all this, we should not lose Foucault’s sustains ... the corporeal and the social as
skepticism about forms of politics that take parts of an objectively [and disciplinary]
unqualified objectives of liberation, or given reality’ (106). More simply put, if
truth as their objective. For Foucault, the individuality, personal subjectivity and so
production of knowledge is never separable on are the fundamental creations of mecha-
from the production of power, just as the nisms of disciplinary power, then the more
various objects, identity, personality, we detail and substantiate them – even in
psychology etc of the sociomedical disci- attempts to free them – the more we risk
plines are never independent from the strengthening the grasp of power on
institutional forms of power that bring ourselves.
them into being and continue to monitor
sources (see, for example, Merquior (1985)) and that it cannot be considered a
well-balanced or realist work of history. There is some truth to these claims:
Foucault does appear to neglect a series of important historical documents and
events. One might argue, however, that the book attempts not to be an exhaus-
tive kind of history and is in fact almost intentionally perspectival in that its
foremost objective is to engender and develop criticism against forms of social
power.
Put differently, Foucault is not interested in history for history’s sake, but
in using it in critical ways to theorise insidious forms of modern power. McNay
(1994) therefore comments that a multiplicity of divergent phenomena are
subsumed under a totalising and essentially undifferentiated notion of disci-
plinary power:
the concept of power is generalized to such an extent that it loses analytic force
... [this] lack of differentiation ... results in a reductionist and functionalist
account of processes of social control (105).
Poulantzas (1987) takes up these critiques of reductionism by suggesting that
Foucault has posited a ‘metaphysical’ notion of power as the original source of
or applicable copyright law.
all forms of social control – a situation which means that Foucault ‘obviates a
more complex form of analysis which addresses the institutional specificity of
power and the forms of its spatial and temporal mediation in the state’ (in
McNay, 1994, 105). The point here is that without a textured, nuanced account
of a specific institutional site, one risks overstretching Foucault’s concept of
disciplinarity. These are important comments, warning of the need precisely
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CONCLUSION
Sticking to a close reading of Foucault’s (1977) account of the emergence of
modern disciplinary power, this chapter traced the pre-history of psychology
as a human science discipline through the themes of humanist reform: objecti-
fication, individualisation, humanification and the mind or soul. This
pre-history was then extended through the examination of the disciplinary
themes of visibility and surveillance, secrecy and autonomy, the return to the
body, knowledge-production and the technologies of normalisation and
confession. On the basis of this reading, the discipline of psychology is, for
Foucault, unavoidably, a constituent component of greater overarching forms
of disciplinary power that it supports and extends. Indeed, the extension of
Foucault’s argument is that the ongoing development of psychological forms of
practice, technique and knowledge continue to contribute to the increasingly
sophisticated regulation of individual subjects. Foucault’s analysis of the
human sciences as complex forms of power hence furthers the agendas of
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Suggested readings
Foucault’s (1977) Discipline and punish is the primary text regarding the
notion of disciplinary power. On the ‘down’ side, it is very dense, with multiple
elaborate formulations, and at times an almost poetic turn of phrase, all of
which can make it seem a little elusive at first. On the ‘up’ side, it bears many
rereadings, and seems to become increasingly insightful and powerful in its
analysis of power upon each subsequent read.
or applicable copyright law.
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is perhaps the advanced commentary of choice on Foucault. The text was one
of the first systematic overviews to be produced by US-American scholars; it
came out whilst Foucault was still alive, and has the recommendation of being
endorsed by Foucault himself, who also added an afterword.
Alex Butchart’s (1998) The anatomy of power: European constructions of
the African body is perhaps the best example of a Foucaultian genealogical
analysis carried out in the South African context.
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Chapter
10
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Governmentality
and technologies of
subjectivity
Derek Hook
LEARNING OUTCOMES
By the end of this chapter, you should be able to:
Explain the difference between micro- and macro-politics, and describe how the
two may be thought to function in conjunction
Explain Foucault’s notion of governmentality, along with the subsidiary concepts of
‘government’, ‘disciplinary bio-power’, ‘apparatuses of security’, the ‘police’,
or applicable copyright law.
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INTRODUCTION
How subjectivity is political
One of the conceptual challenges of critical psychology lies in thinking how
subjectivity itself may be thought to have a profoundly political dimension. One
response to this challenge lies in the Marxist assertion (see Grahame Hayes’
earlier chapter: Marxism and critical psychology) that our selves are little more
than ensembles of social relations. Here we are presented quite starkly with the
materialist suggestion that structures and relations of power are at the basis of
our own individual experience. Foucault also rises to this challenge with his
argument, explained in the previous chapter, that power adopts subjective
forms. Foucault suggests that power is internalised in self-monitoring, self-
knowing ways, that it has come to be implemented and applied exactly through
the production of subjectivity. Hence, what we are – at least in the sense of
being subjective individuals – is very difficult to separate out from the effects
that power has had upon us. This is a difficult assertion to grasp. Why? Well, we
typically understand our subjectivities – that is, the sense of our own individu-
ality, our own self-understandings – as independent of structures of power, as
existing before them, and outside their reach. We tend to see such aspects of
ourselves as the basis of our own independence and autonomy, as perhaps our
most vital points of resistance to the workings of power. Foucault’s rather
sobering response is that such cherished notions of individuality, of subjec-
tivity, may themselves already be the outcomes, the object-effects of power.
Power may, in a sense, make our subjectivity; it may, in Foucault’s terms,
produce us and our individuality at the same time that it works upon us. More
than this, the illusion of autonomy from such structures, which is fundamental
to the vast majority of psychology, is enabling to power. It is perhaps the alibi
which best conceals and facilitates the functioning of modern power, a form of
power which, for Foucault, must take psychological or subjective forms if it is
to function efficiently or effectively. This is one of the points where psychology
is at its most ideological, when it depoliticises the realm of human experience,
when it cuts off questions of social, political, economic and historical power
from questions of who and what we are. Foucault’s notion of governmentality
goes some way to redressing this problem in that it attaches questions of
macro-power, that is, notions of the state and the control of populations, on
the one hand, to questions of micro-power, that is, notions of subjectified indi-
viduals who adopt technologies of subjectivity and of self to model their own
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this process. We need to understand how psychology supplies us with types of Government:
subjectivity that are operational in the extension and implementation of any calculated direc-
power. Here we confront another assertion that is difficult to grasp. Not only tion of human
do we intuitively think of our own psychologies as ‘coming before’ power, as conduct. More
broadly, the general
existing beyond it; we also understand the practice and knowledge of regulation of conduct
psychology as benevolent. We view the knowledges and practices of as understood across
psychology as out to help us, to improve our lives, to somehow remove, cure macro- and micro-
or combat forms of psychological discomfort, ailment, maladaption etc. The political levels, that
is, as spreading from
irony here, for Foucault, is that psychology does play a role in this way, it does
questions of the
intervene in very personal ways into our lives, towards the ends of some or regulation and
other kind of betterment, change or improvement. However, that psychology control of the state
may be taken to be benevolent and helpful in these ways does not mean that it and that of far
smaller entities such
is not also a mode of control, that it does not also operate a formidable form
as the family,
of ‘ggovernment’ over us. This is the paradox that we need to grasp if we are to workers, or the self.
understand the full functioning of psychology in power. If we remember that Put differently: a
for Foucault modern power is productive, encouraging, helpful, therapeutic way of acting upon
even, then this paradox becomes easier to appreciate. Indeed, if we under- the lives and
conduct of subjects,
stand his point, we become aware that there is no paradox here at all: power of shaping them in
does, in a sense, ‘make us a better’, does improve us, for these are exactly the desired ways,
routes it takes ever more fully to permeate our lives. Foucault’s notions of through the use of
‘technologies’ of subjectivity and of self, his ideas concerning the psychological various techniques
and devices. Govern-
management or, better still, government of selves, provides a way of under- ment has a
standing this seemingly paradoxical state of affairs. This explanation, population as its
particularly as it is extended by Nikolas Rose (1985, 1991, 1995), suggests that target and involves
the practice of psychology is not only a way of understanding, of making sense kinds of self-govern-
ment as part of its
of our selves; it is also a means of ordering, regulating or controlling ourselves. operations.
Not only is psychology a discipline, it is also a kind of self-discipline, as I shall
go on to show.
The twin challenges of this chapter, first, the ‘thinking’ of how subjectivity
is political, and, secondly, an understanding of how psychology implements
modes of self-regulation, secondly, will be accommodated in two basic theo-
retical formulations: the notions of governmentality and technologies of
subjectivity/self. The basic sections of this chapter will correspond to these
two linked areas of theory. As will become clear in the ensuing discussion, tech-
nologies of subjectivity and self are crucial aspects of what Foucault calls
‘governmentality’.
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Sovereignty:
central challenge that Foucault had set for himself was that of adequately
in general, the conceptualising ‘the powers of state’ without deferring simply to the tradi-
notion refers to tional terms of sovereignty. Foucault’s work on governmentality constituted
supremacy of his most significant attempt to flesh out the ‘middle order’ in his account of
authority or rule.
More directly, an
power, to connect, as Dreyfus & Rabinow (1982) note, a disciplinary focus on
order of power in subjected individuals with that on the anonymous mechanisms of broader
which a sovereign – levels of power, and to do so via a tentative reassertion of limited kinds of
king or queen – has sovereignty.
absolute authority.
Sovereignty may be
considered to be
Limited conceptualisations of ‘government’
homogenous, given One of the first misconceptions that Foucault (1979) hopes to clear up in his
that virtually all theory of governmentality is the idea that questions of government are
instances of power
repeat and extend
predominantly, if not exclusively, questions of the macro-politics of the state.
the will of the There are, rather, Foucault (1979) claims, multiple ‘lower-order’ categories of
sovereign. government; one may reasonably speak of the government of the family, of the
workplace, of one’s relationship to one’s self, and so on. Government here,
following Dean (1999), refers to any calculated direction of human conduct.
Rose adds to this definition. Government, he claims, is a way of acting upon
the lives and conduct of subjects, of shaping them in desired ways, through the
use of various techniques and devices (Rose, 1990). Importantly, then, ques-
tions of government include a focus on the smaller micro-politics of day-to-day
life in addition to macro-political issues. Using the notion of government in
this way ‘gives particular emphasis to issues of the government of human
Macro-/micro-
politics:
conduct in all contexts, by various authorities and agencies, invoking partic-
‘macro-politics’ ular forms of truth, and using definite resources, means and techniques’
refers to large struc- (Dean, 1999, 2; emphasis added).
tures of social Foucault (1979) thus loosens up our notion of government, suggesting that
power, to the state,
there are multiple and variable modes of government that may actually be
its policies, the
structural conditions dissociated from the large-scale macro-political government of the state.
of day-to-day life Importantly, though, despite the fact that such micro-political forms of
(eg apartheid). government may be immanently separable from macro-political forms of
‘Micro-politics’ refers government, these two typically work together, in conjunction, in combina-
to the functioning
of power at indi-
tion. Such combinations are difficult to predict, and should not be understood
vidual or inter- as planned or predetermined. They do not connect in any simple, one-to-one
personal levels (eg or linear way. In fact, such combinations often seem to work in discontinuous
between two or indirect ways. However, and this is the vital point, the micro-politics of
people) or that one
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or tutor in relation to the child or the pupil, so that there are several forms of
government among which the Prince’s relation to his state is only one particular
mode; and on the other hand, all these governments are internal to the states of
society (9).
What we start to find in an ‘arts of government’, argues Foucault (1979), is a
continuity between various levels and types of power which may often seem
totally autonomous.
This continuity works both ‘upwards’ and ‘downwards’, ‘upwards’ in the
sense that the person who governs must first learn how to govern himelf or
herself correctly, and ‘downwards’ in the sense that the head of a family will
know how to look after his family, and in the sense that individuals, in general,
under the sociopolitical power of the state, will behave correctly (McNay, 1994).
We have a wider domain of power in an ‘arts of government’ – a wider collection
of different orders and types of power than we previously did in a state of sover-
eignty. Power is much more flexible now, works in many ways and at many
different levels, and focuses on many more objects than was the case in the oper-
Heterogenous: ation of sovereign power. Governmental activity is heterogenous, pervasive and
made up of multiple multiple, coming to apply, as Dean (1999) notes, to a complex of people and
dissimilar elements
things. It is no longer a case simply of the sovereign’s possessions, his territory,
or parts – not
homogeneous. that concern power, from this point on, there are innumerable objects, relations
and capacities that come to bear the vested interests of governmental power. To
reiterate, in speaking of the ‘arts of government’, we are talking about prolifer-
ating and multitudinous kinds of prospective government, which would come
to fall within the ambit of something far larger, a potentially organising prin-
ciple that we might term precisely as ‘governmentality’.
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the people. Rather than wielding power through the threat of punishment and Population:
recrimination, the governor now wields power predominantly through their notion of the sum
assumed responsibility to advance and improve the standard, quality and total of people
longevity of their subjects’ lives (McNay, 1994). Modern power works to inhabiting a specific
area. Foucault
organise, incite, monitor, optimise, reinforce, control and organise the forces claims that the
within its domain. Power is now bent on generating forces, making them grow, concept emerged in
on ordering them; this is a power which ‘exerts a positive influence on life ... 16th-century Europe
endeavours to administer, optimize and multiply it, subjecting it to precise as a focus of
governmental atten-
controls and comprehensible regulations’ (Foucault, 1980b, 137).
tion, as a means of
conceptualising a
The emergence of populations body of people that
needed to be regu-
It was no longer the case, then, that the rationales and ordering principles of
lated and control-
the sovereign or state could be defined through reference to the betterment or led. Populations
improvement of the sovereign or the state itself, as it had been in eras of sover- were believed to
eignty. The rationales of government now had to take root through the possess their own
regularities, effects,
promise to manage and develop effectively the social body of the state’s popu-
defining characteris-
lation. This notion, of a population, came to be increasingly central in late tics, habits and
16th-century writings on government. This new construct emerged as a focus tendencies.
of governmental attention, as a means of conceptualising a body of people that
needed to be regulated and controlled. Indeed, for Foucault (1990), the target
of the power of government is its population. As such the subject of population
came to represent a growing body of knowledge and came to be seen as
possessing both its own regularities (its own rate of death and diseases, and so
on) and its own intrinsic and aggregate effects (Foucault, 1979). It therefore
became possible to speak of the defining characteristics, habits, activities and
tendencies of ‘a population’. To measure, predict and monitor the population
in all its different dimensions, facets and peculiarities became an absolute
imperative of governance. It is in this way – and here we see the first conspic-
uous suggestion of the role of disciplinary power – that the forms of knowledge Disciplinary power:
and the techniques of the human and social sciences (as discussed in the modern form of
power which
previous chapter) – started to became integral to practices of government.
functions at the
‘capillary’ level of
Disciplinary bio-power individuals,
increasing their
Not only was there great change in how the responsibilities of government docility, optimising
were being conceptualised, there was also a fundamental shift in the way their capabilities,
or applicable copyright law.
power came to work. The great technologies of power in Western modernity, and integrating
them, by self-
claims Foucault (1979), came, around the 18th century, to adopt a radically regulating
new logic and to take on new forms implementation. What was once a ‘power subjectivity, into
of death’ – the sovereign’s right to take away the life of his or her subjects – now systems of efficient
become a ‘power of life’, the state’s responsibility to care for, to cultivate and and economic
control.
even enhance, the life of its citizens. We should be careful not to be too glib in
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Zapiro’s suggestion
that all whites
benefited from
apartheid is a way
of reminding us
that the full effects
of apartheid cannot
be grasped merely
by listing official
apartheid
government policies
or by cataloguing
its institutional
manifestations.
or applicable copyright law.
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Disciplinary
that we may speak of the overriding category of ‘disciplinary bio-power’).
bio-power: Disciplinary power, as we have already seen (in the previous chapter), func-
Foucault’s overriding tioned at the ‘capillary’ (‘bottom-up’) level of individuals, increasing their
category of modern general docility, optimising their capabilities, and integrating them, via the
power, the combined
effects of bio-
route of a self-regulating subjectivity, into systems of efficient and economic
politics and control. Bio-power, coming from ‘the top down’ focused primarily on regu-
disciplinary power, lating the ‘species body’ in all its vicissitudes, and by gathering, as Dreyfus &
the concept that Rabinow (1982) note, a massive body of information on the resources, capaci-
links together the
ties and problems of the population, which was then subjected to multiple
political technolo-
gies of the body, the methods of investigation and analysis. In this way ‘disciplinary bio-power’
knowledge- ‘spread its net down to the smallest twitches of the body and the most minute
producing efforts of stirring of the soul’ (Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1982). Disciplinary bio-power thus is
the human and
the concept which links together the various political technologies of the body,
social sciences, and
the structures of the knowledge-producing efforts of the human and social sciences, and the
state domination. structures of state domination (Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1982).
This conglomerate notion of ‘disciplinary bio-power’ hence usefully
enables Foucault to join ‘bottom-up’ and ‘top-down’ ‘flows’ of power, whilst
maintaining an emphasis on technical and tactical imperatives. Similarly, it
posits the importance, within governmental regimes, of a multiplicity of
diverse and multi-modal forms of social control working in a state of
‘unorchestrated synchronicity’. What it still requires, however, is the provi-
sion of something of a pivot, something of a relay, or a ‘go-between’,
connecting these micro- and macro-‘physics’ of the functioning of power.
Foucault provides just this with his discussion of what he calls the ‘appara-
tuses of security’.
Zapiro’s biting
commentary on the
South African
government’s Aids
policy shows how
modern govern-
mental power is
very much bio-
political in form in
that it takes on the
responsibility of its
population’s
biological processes
or applicable copyright law.
of propagation,
birth, mortality,
disease, life
expectancy etc.
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‘Apparatuses of security’
Apparatuses as ensembles
The apparatus, claims Foucault (1990), is the essential technical means of
governmentality. As McNay (1994) notes, Foucault (1990) uses the designa-
tion ‘apparatuses of security’ to describe the various semi-autonomous
techniques of government necessary for the regulation of the modern state. As
Foucault himself (1980a) elaborates, apparatuses are ‘thoroughly heteroge-
nous ensemble[s] consisting of discourses, institutions ... regulatory decisions, Ensemble:
laws, administrative measures, scientific statements, philosophical, moral and group of
complementary
philanthropic propositions’ (194). In more basic terms, what Foucault has in parts that work
mind here is the loose co-ordination of various ways and means through which together to produce
the principles and power of government come to be applied. It is important a single overriding
here that he uses the notion of an ensemble – that is, a group of diverse yet effect, such as a
group of supporting
complementary parts that all contribute to a single or overriding effect. Each
musicians, dancers
aspect of an ensemble is quite different, they may each have very different or actors who
chores, or roles, and may be played by quite different types of people or things; perform together.
however, each such aspect is an important component part that plays an active
role and retains a kind of autonomy.
intent on analysing, per se, the different institutions and mechanisms of state
power than he is in ‘getting a hold’ on the specific type of political rationality
that the state has produced in these ancillary apparatuses (cf Foucault, 1990).
To reiterate, Foucault is less interested here in the concrete physical conditions
and/or instruments of power than he is in the broad patterns that might be
seen as holding all these the diverse values, instruments, practices, discourses
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Technologies:
and materials of power together. This attention to the political rationalities of
broadly, the the state is absolutely crucial for Foucault; for he will go on to argue that the
concrete government of persons – whether of small or very large groups – will always
instruments and involve, quite indispensably, the elements of state rationality.
mechanisms of
institutional
It is useful here to draw a distinction, within Foucault’s own theoretical
applications of vocabulary, between ‘apparatuses’ and ‘ttechnologies’ of power. The latter, as a
power. More category of analysis, is strongly focused on exactly the minutia of the concrete
specifically, a set of instrumentation and mechanisation of institutional applications of power: the
tactics, knowledges,
former is far more concerned with the broader political ‘logics’ of the state. It
techniques,
procedures and is important to note that focusing, in this way, on the patterning of relations of
discourses (or power, on the rationality of power, enables Foucault to explain better – and for
technical forms of that matter, to gauge better – the spread of power, its existence and ‘rooted-
language) used by
ness’ across social networks.
select experts or
professionals as part
of a stated The ‘police’
objective of
increasing relations The first general apparatus, or ‘rationality of state’, that Foucault discusses is
of control. that of the ‘police’. This may seem unsurprising in the sense that such an appa-
ratus would be absolutely central in terms of the implementation of a successful
regime of government; what is surprising, however, is the unusual historical
inflection Foucault gives the term. Importantly, Foucault is not speaking merely
of the institutionalised office of the police as we commonly understand the
term – that is, those civil servants whose specific job it is to prevent and investi-
Police: gate crime. He speaking about ‘ppolice’ in the sense of a utopian governmental
Foucault uses the project – as present in the work of French and German political thinkers of the
term as it was
17th and 18th centuries – as a set of administrative concerns over people and
originally used in
the work of French things, over the relationships between (in the broadest sense) men, property,
and German produce, exchange, territory and the market (Foucault, 1990).
political thinkers of
the 17th and 18th
centuries, that is,
‘To protect and serve’
in the sense of a This particular notion of the police was very broad, encompassing, amongst
utopian government other things, the maintenance of religion, the upkeep of morals, health, public
project, as a set of
broad adminis-
safety and amenities, trade and so on. Everything, in short, with a bearing on
trative concerns how people lived, and with a bearing on the problems, diseases and accidents
over people and that befell them, lay within the scope of police concerns – anything, that is, that
things, over the could be grouped under the broadest interpretation of the state’s mandate to
relationships
or applicable copyright law.
between men,
‘protect and serve’ its people. Perhaps the most obvious contemporary equiva-
property, produce, lent to this notion would be the portfolios given to the various members of a
exchange, territory state’s parliament. This would seem an apt comparison, given that Foucault
and the market. (1990) claims that the ‘true object’ of the police at this time was ‘man’ [sic] in
all his or her capacities and concern not only over how she or he might survive,
but over how she or he might be improved, expanded and developed.
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Another way of understanding this notion of the police is given by Dreyfus ‘The vocabularies of
& Rabinow (1982) when they point out that the job of the police was the artic- psychology have ...
ulation and administration of techniques of bio-power so as to increase the provided the terms
state’s control over its inhabitants. Perhaps what is most striking about this which enable human
subjectivity to be
account is the degree to which the police were understood as adopting translated into the
undoubtably positive functions within society, such as fostering working and new languages of
trading relationships between persons, encouraging ‘modesty, charity, loyalty, government ... they
industriousness ... honesty’ amongst the citizens of a nation (Foucault, 1990, have constituted
subjectivity as a
77–78). The police, understood in this way, was not simply an altruistic insti-
possible object for
tution. No doubt a prime objective of the police was to keep the population rational management
healthy and happy and to improve the quality of life wherever possible, but ... They make it
this was all in order to serve a higher priority, that of enabling the state to possible to think of
achieving desired
increase its collective power, to exert its strength in full. This is the central
objectives – through
paradox underlying the notion of the police which Foucault outlines when he the systematic
defines the aim of modern government, or state rationality, namely to ‘develop government of the
those elements constitutive of individual’s lives in such a way that their devel- psychological domain’
opment also fosters that of the state’ (1990, 82). (Rose, 1990, 106).
one such language of government for Rose atic’ subjects, to make them more productive
(1990): members of the given organisation, psycholo-
gists are playing a kind of ‘police’ role (in
The vocabularies of the psychological Foucault’s understanding of the term). They are
sciences have made two distinct ... contri-
exercising, through psychology, a kind of
butions to social powers over the last
language and practice that can access the inner
century. Firstly, they provided the terms
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world of the individual, measure and assess it in the invention of diagnostic categories,
relative to a norm (typically through various evaluations, assessments, and tests that
psychological tests), and then treat it. This constructed the subject in a form in which
then is the policing function of psychologists it could be represented in classifications.
for Rose (1990). The power of psychology, he The psychological test was the first device
writes ... Psychology began to claim a capacity
not only to individualise, but also to advise
lay in its promise to provide inscription upon all facets of institutional life, to
devices that would individualise ... trouble- increase efficiency and satisfaction, produc-
some subjects, rendering the human form tivity and contentment (109–110).
into calculable traces. Its contribution lay
Pastoral power/
Pastoral power
pastorate/pastor: A second apparatus of power named by Foucault is that of the pastorate. This
salvation-based notion of the pastorate, or pastoral power, is one that fascinates Foucault,
form of power,
centred on the role
perhaps predominantly because it designates so unique a form of power, one
of a moral or so historically idiosyncratic. The pastor is not a magistrate, nor a prophet, nor
spiritual guardian of an educationalist, nor a sovereign, nor a benefactor, says Foucault (1980b),
sorts (the pastor) even though the influence he or she wields over his or her followers contains
whose charge is to
provide an
elements of all of these leadership roles. Why? Well, at its most basic, the
‘individually kindly’ pastor’s role is that of a spiritual overseer. The model for this kind of guardian-
power, to act as an ship is that of the shepherd in charge of a flock. This charge has several basic
intermediary of a constituents. First, the shepherd’s role is to watch over his or her flock with
greater authority, to
scrupulous attention, to ensure their salvation through ‘constant, individual-
care for each
member of his or ized and final kindness’ (Foucault, 1990, 69). Pastorship is therefore a
her flock, and to salvation-based form of power; more than this, it is a kindly power, one predi-
know their ‘souls’ – cated on the provision of love (Foucault, 1990).
ie to have deep
Secondly, given that the shepherd is an intermediary of a greater power or
knowledge of their
personal life. knowledge – typically that of God – a kind of unquestionable authority comes to
characterise his or her leadership. Thirdly, the pastor is understood as bearing a
kind of responsibility or accountability for the flock. As reiterated by Dean
(1999), the pastor is bound by a particularly complex moral tie to each member
of the flock. The pastor also maintains the charge of properly knowing each
member. This is an in-depth and individualising knowledge that runs deep; the
shepherd needs to know of the needs and deeds, the sins and wishes, the
or applicable copyright law.
contents of the soul, of each member of the flock. As Foucault (1982) explains:
‘this form of power cannot be exercised without knowing the inside of people’s
minds ... exploring their souls, without making them reveal their innermost
secrets. It implies a knowledge of the conscience and an ability to direct it’ (214).
Lastly, the pastoral relationship should result in a developed form of
conscience in its subjects, in the gradual use and understanding of a series of
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Secular ‘pastorships’
Although the pastorate in the strictly religious or spiritual sense may appear to
have lost much of its sway in modern society, more generic forms of pastoral
power have in fact grown and spread throughout modern society. So great is
the multiplication and diffusion of this particular mode of power that Foucault
refers to it as the predominant form of the individualising power characteristic
of modernity (Foucault, 1982). Emblematic of the ‘gentle functioning of
power’, this notion of pastoral guidance is what lies beneath our modern ideas
of a ‘caring’ treatment. What Dean (1999) has in mind here are those tender,
beneficial forms of attention and regulation operating on the basis of the
mechanism of love or some heartfelt duty or ‘calling’, but which none the less
serve state power-interests. The ‘office’ of pastorship has multiplied and frag-
mented into a variety of different public institutions, each of which offered a
dedicated and individualising service to citizens in moral, medical, financial,
social or psychological crises. The rationale and procedures of pastoral power
have come to be exercised by a variety of groups and institutions stretching
from traditional structures (such as families) to welfare institutions, private
ventures (of philanthropists, benefactors) and to state structures (public insti-
tutions such as schools, hospitals etc). The objective of these secular
‘pastorships’ is no longer to lead people to their salvation in the next world.
Their secularised goals of salvation now lie in ensuring the promises of better
health, well-being, wealth, security and protection.
or applicable copyright law.
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As we have seen, the concept of the apparatus that psychological discourse provided a vocab-
is the way Foucault attempts to think of the ulary for the experience of self ‘provoked by an
interaction between micro- and macro-politics, economic system that operates much of the
between bottom-up and top-down forms of time out of people’s control, cloaked and
power. The apparatus tries to understand this encouraged by a cultural climate of commodifi-
complex linkage via the identification of what cation and individualization’ (1997, 3).
he refers to as an overall ‘political rationality’ Importantly, this network is not only the
(1980b). If we are to try to understand the preserve of professional and academic
‘synchronisation’ between these types of power, psychology’; it includes all the varieties of
it makes sense, then, following Foucault’s lead, psychological talk and practice diffused
that we try to isolate a series of similar through the wider community. As Parker (1997)
patterns or regular themes or conceptual puts it, the psy-complex ‘informs day-time tele-
approaches common to both. It is in this vision discussions and “step” programs for
respect that Parker (1997) refers to the psy- self-improvement, and as it sprawls throughout
complex as an apparatus which ‘operates as a the world it carries with it prescriptions for how
network of speculations about the behaviour the modern self should be investigated and
and mental states of individuals and as a range treated’ (4).
of attempts to regulate how people behave and Importantly, the psy-complex entails strong
think’ (123). The psy-complex is a term central aspects of both the examples Foucault gives us
to critical psychology. In more basic terms, the of ‘apparatuses of security’, namely the ‘police’
psy-complex refers to an intricate network of and the pastorate. Psychologists can quite
theories and practices ‘which govern how far we clearly be seen to be representatives of state
may make and remake mind and behaviour and power, that is, examples of ‘police’, inasmuch as
the ways in which emotional ‘deviance’ should the outcomes of their applied treatments are
be comprehended and cured’ (Parker, 1997, (at least ideally) healthier, improved, more
3–4). The psy-complex, as broad network of productive subjects of the state. Furthermore,
psychological forms of knowledge and practice the practice of much applied psychology
– in both their institutionalised/professional or certainly makes use of the procedures, logics
popular/informal forms – hence comes to and techniques of the pastorate (producing
inform our most basic and everyday notions of obedient, self-examining and confessing
self, mind, deviance and normality (cf Ingelby, subjects). In this bringing together of ‘top-
1985; Rose, 1990, 1991; Parker, 1997). Here, down’ and ‘bottom-up’ flows of power – that is,
then, we see bottom-up and top-down flows of in thinking psychologists as officials of state
power joining together, being combined via a power on the one hand, and in the spread of
shared set of themes, concepts or approaches, pastoral practices of self-knowing on the other
through the ‘institutionalised models of mind’ – we can see how the broad application of
provided by psychology. Parker links the psy- psychology, or, more directly perhaps, how the
complex to the development of capitalism in psy-complex may be seen as an exemplary
Europe and North America in his suggestion example of an apparatus of security.
or applicable copyright law.
‘Officers of power’
We have seen that the apparatus is a broad ensemble that entails a pervading
logic of practices and procedures, a collection of concepts, ideas and princi-
ples, and, as evident in the concepts of the pastorate and the ‘police’ a number
of ‘officers’ of sort.
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Psy-complex:
Interestingly, Foucault (1990) here is making room in his account for those
broad network of qualified or professional experts and practitioners who might, in a limited
popular and capacity, be said to ‘dispense’, or ‘conduct’ power. In his earlier analyses of
professionalised/ power, as in Discipline and punish (1977), Foucault shied away from such a
institutionalised
psychological
conceptualisation – he did not want to reduce the complexity of power, its
knowledges and multiple flows and multiple directions, simply to an interchange between a
practices that kind of ‘agent’ of power, and a subject. Such a conceptualisation of power
informs our most seemed to Foucault to resemble too closely a sovereign notion of power, the
basic and everyday
idea that a single monumental power might be reproduced in largely homoge-
notions of self,
mind, deviance and nous ways by multiple agents of the state. The modern power of government is
normality. As an far more complex than this, far more heterogenous, more diverse in its forms
intricate collection and, importantly, largely autonomous in the workings of those people who
of theories and might be taken to be its ‘officers’.
practices, the psy-
complex, is a disci-
A similar point to bear in mind here is that Foucault does not want to use a
plinary apparatus ‘model of exchange’ that risks privileging an exclusively ‘top-down’ model of
that operates as a power and losing sight of how power also flows upwards. However, having
network of specu- made perfectly clear the conceptual implications that Foucault wishes to avoid,
lations about the
it seems that Foucault is allowing for such a category, a category that I am
behaviour and
mental states of tentatively terming that of the ‘officer’. Officer here might be taken to refer to
individuals and as a those persons – such as psychologists – who might be taken to exercise a kind
range of attempts of practical authority, a relation of relative dominance or control, at very
to regulate how specific and discrete points of the social body (ie those areas where their
people behave
and think. expertise is most valued). These points are not merely projections, cascading
downwards, of facets of the sovereign’s great power dispersed through society.
Rather, they are the dispersed ‘points of attachment’, the footholds, that allow
the power of government to ‘build upwards’ to a pinnacle. It is for this reason
that Foucault (1990) comments that for the State to function in the way that it
does, there must be, between people, such officers and their subjects, ‘quite
specific relations of domination which have their own configuration and
relative autonomy’ (187–188).
power. More than this, it has also provided us with an argument which shows
how psychology might be said to be integral to large programs of government,
not only as a crucial means of gathering information on populations but also as
supplying a series of pastors or ‘police’ figures who prove to be central within
the apparatuses which ensure the overall functioning of government. It is vital
that we do not underestimate the role of psychology here. There are two points
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to be made in this respect. The first is to emphasise the extent to which modern
government focuses and and relies upon individuals as the basis of its power.
The second is to reiterate, via the notions of technologies of subjectivity and
self, just how crucial psychological forms of examination and self-knowledge
are to the maintenance of government, that is, how crucial the procedures and
understandings of psychology are to government.
‘States’ of individuals
Earlier in this chapter I quoted Foucault to make the point that ‘the great
strategies of power encrust themselves and depend for their conditions of
exercise on the micro-relations of power’ (1980a, 190). For Foucault one cannot
properly grasp the functioning of large structures of power – such as those of
the state – without a sufficient understanding of the technologies, procedures
and understandings of individualisation, such as those of disciplinary mecha-
nisms and of the pastoral and police apparatuses. Foucault’s overriding
argument is that the aim of modern government lies in developing those
constitutive elements of individuals that foster the overall strength of the state.
In other words, what makes individuals – precisely that part of power that indi-
vidualises and personalises – is exactly what extends the powers of the state. In
Foucault’s own words:
This form of power applies itself to everyday life which categorizes the indi-
vidual, marks him by his [sic] individuality, attaches him to his own identity,
imposes a law of truth on him which he must recognize and which others have to
recognize in him. It is a form of power which makes individuals subjects
(Foucault, 1982, 212).
Foucault is mindful of the role of the state of course – the notions of govern-
ment and governmentality are precisely his way of attempting to account for
its power – although he feels that the role of individualising forms of power is
typically underemphasised in understandings of the state:
I don’t think that we should consider the ‘modern state’ as an entity which was
developed above individuals, ignoring what they are ... their very existence, but
on the contrary as a very sophisticated structure, in which individuals would be
shaped in a new form, and submitted to a set of very specific patterns. In a way,
Structural:
we can see the state as a modern matrix of individualization (Foucault, 1982, of the underlying
214–215). structures or
organisation of
or applicable copyright law.
This is not to elide the importance of the structural powers of state; to reiterate,
society, the
the notions of government and governmentality are exactly the explanations of underlying social,
the formidable kinds of control that modern governments hold over their economic and
citizens. The point here is that the state is never reducible simply to structural political relations
mechanisms of control. Modes of individualising its citizens are just as crucial that ‘pattern’
society.
in its functioning.
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Foucault is not here saying that psychologists are simply the direct agents of
the state who, without any autonomy, simply carry out the orders of the govern-
ment (although this may be the case in certain societies – see, for example, the
chapter on Racism in South African psychology by Duncan, Stevens & Bowman).
It was in order to avoid such an implication that I was somewhat reticent,
earlier in this chapter, to use the term ‘officers’ in the discussion above. (This
term might be said to suggest too close a relationship of proximity between the
state and certain of its ‘officials’.) What Foucault is saying, though, is that
psychologists are officers of the state inasmuch as they are kinds of ‘pastor’ and
‘police’ whose work ultimately supports its overall functioning by increasing the
individual health and capabilities of its individual citizens.
Psychologists, of course, work within a particular political climate where
certain ideas, values and principles come to predominate over others, and many
of these ideas link back up to the ideologies of the state. Here it helps to
remember that an apparatus is as much an ensemble of discourses, understand-
or applicable copyright law.
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Self-government
There is one vital aspect of government that we have neglected somewhat in
the foregoing discussion, and that is the fact that self-government is an essen-
tial component of any successful form of governmental power. In this respect
Dean (1999) refers to government as ‘an assemblage of practices, techniques
and rationalities for the shaping of the behaviour of others and of oneself’ (198;
emphasis added). He also suggests that questions of government can be
broken down into three interlocking domains: of state, of other persons and of
the self. Similarly, he returns to his definition of government as ‘the calculated
direction of human conduct’, to qualify that ‘conduct’ here refers not only to
activities – leading, guiding, directing – but also to self-referential qualities –
reflexivity, self-attentiveness, self-awareness and comportment. There is in
government then an undeniable aspect of ‘self power’, as one might put it, an
acting of self upon self. It is in this connection that Rose (1990) points out that
our desires, aspirations, interests and beliefs are all vital targets of government.
While these ‘identity-effects’ of power have already been touched on (in the
previous chapter, in a description of a moral orthopaedics of power that aims to
leave a trace on the ‘soul’ or subjectivity of the modern subject), Foucault now
seems to be amplifying these contentions, so much so that he presents the distin-
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guishing focus of his very last work as that of ‘the way ... a human being turns
himself – or herself – into a subject’ (1982, 208). It is no longer simply the case
that power has an outcome that might be qualified in terms of subjectivity,
identity or self; it is now the case that power involves these qualities, as indispen-
sable components in the maintenance and spread of power over populations. It
is with this in mind that we now turn to a focus on ‘technologies of subjectivity’.
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Technologies of
TECHNOLOGIES OF SUBJECTIVITY
subjectivity: Self as ‘political capital’
broad set of self-
regulative practices; If it is the case that the self, individual subjectivity, has come to be seen as an
attempts to adjust or irreducible, irreplaceable component in the operation of the modern state, then
to shape ourselves why is this so? Why is it the case that, as Rose (1991) argues, ‘subjectivity has
according to the tech-
become a vital resource in the managing of the affairs of the nation’ (5)? The
niques propounded by
‘experts of the soul’. answer, for Rose (1995), lies in the fact that we maintain a profound belief in the
Such technologies truth of the self. This ‘inner substance’ of the self is taken to be the basis of our
involve modes of self- personhood; we regard the self as the most fundamental thing about us. Here,
inspection,
then, we get a sense of how powerful psychology actually is, given that it is the
self-problematisation
and confession where discourse of the self, at least in much of the Western world. It is for this reason
we evaluate ourselves, that the self has become such a key mechanism in the operations of power – this
account for ourselves, is what we have in mind when speaking of ‘ttechnologies of subjectivity’:
and work upon
ourselves. More As selves, we [are] ... characterized by a profound inwardness: conduct, belief,
technically, these value, and speech [are] ... to be interrogated and rendered explicable in terms of
technologies involve an understanding of an inner space ... This internal universe of the self, this
the operating of a profound ‘psychology’ [lies] ... at the core of those ways of conducting ourselves
kind of power which that are considered normal and that [provide] ... the norm for thinking and
connects the normal-
judging the abnormal. ... Our lives [are] meaningful to the extent that we [can] ...
ising objectives of
certain authorities to discover our self, be our self, express our self, love our self, and be loved for the
the ideals we have for self we really [are] (Rose, 1995, 4).
ourselves. Such tech-
nologies focus on the The psyche as such has become a target of choice for ‘systematic government
inner psychology of its in the pursuit of sociopolitical ends’ (Rose, 1991, 7). (Rose uses psyche here
subjects, for it is this simply as a more technically refined variant of the self, as that version of self
inner psychology that articulated by and hence particularly susceptible to the attention of experts.)
explains their conduct
and strives for kinds The self is thus taken to be a ‘vital element in the networks of power that
of self-realisation and traverse modern societies’ (Rose, 1991, 213). Here we see a reiteration of
self-fulfilment. When Foucault’s notions of bottom-up power; the regulatory apparatus of the
such technologies of modern state is not, for Rose (1991), something imposed from the outside
subjectivity – say, for
example, the terms, upon individuals who remain essentially untouched by it. Rather, it is the case
explanations, proce- that ‘incorporating, shaping, channeling, and enhancing subjectivity have
dures, understandings been intrinsic to the operations of government’ (213).
used by a particular
kind of psychotherapy
– come to be inter- Shaping subjectivity
nalised and Rose is signalling here the role of psychology in the functioning of broader
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the selves each of us want to be’ (213). There resides within these various tech-
nologies a kind of family resemblance in the regulative ideals concerning the
diverse practices operated upon human beings. Furthermore, these technolo-
gies maintain a normalising focus ‘on our existence as individuals inhabited by
an inner psychology that animates and explains our conduct and strives for
self-realization, self-esteem, and self-fulfilment in everyday life’ (Rose, 1995, 3).
When such a mobile and multivalent technology is ‘enfolded into the person
through a variety of schema [such as those] ... of self-inspection, self-suspicion,
self-disclosure, self-decipherment, and self-nurturing’ (Rose, 1995, 26), then it
functions as a technology of self.
We should make a brief qualification here. The notion of the ‘technology’ is
not meant to imply something that is dehumanising, warns Rose (1991),
despite the fact that they are the means through which power is introduced
into the inter- and intrapersonal dimensions of existence. Quite the contrary:
human technologies, despite the apparent paradox, should be understood as
enabling, empowering, as at the very basis of personhood, as producing cures,
reforms, efficiency, education within human conduct (Rose, 1991).
‘Distance government’
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interventions. For this reason ‘governments of subjectivity’ must act upon the
choices, wishes, values and conduct of the individual in an indirect manner
(Barker, 1998). Subjectivity of citizens is hence actively shaped, cultivated,
produced in an encouraging manner rather than being stymied, constrained,
repressed. The ‘indirection’ of this form of power is achieved in a number of
ways, perhaps most obviously through recourse to the category of the expert.
Expertise, after all, provides an important distance between the formal appa-
ratus of laws, courts, and police, on the one hand, and the shaping of the
activities of citizens, on the other.
Expertise, such as that of the psychologist, claims Rose (1991), achieves its
effects not through the threat of violence but by way of the persuasion inherent
in its truths, the attraction exercised by its images of life and of self. Similarly,
technologies of subjectivity do not contain an overt codification of right or
wrong – they are not, at the most obvious level, moralistic enterprises. In this
respect Rose suggests that ‘[p]sychology is potent because it can appear to shift
... judgements from a sphere of values, prejudice, or rule of thumb to the
sphere of human truths, equality of standards, cogently justifiable choices and
objective criteria of efficacy that should reign in a democracy’ (1995, 90).
Rather than the moral judgement of social authorities, and rather than a
system that would attempt to impose a new moral self upon us, we now have
an approach to subjectivity that speaks to our truth as human beings, that
seeks to ‘free the self we truly are, to make it possible for us each to make a
project of our own lives, to fulfil ourselves through the choices we make, and to
shape our existence according to an ethics of autonomy’ (Rose, 1995, 97).
Producing identities
What is becoming apparent, then, is that subjectivity is a clear focus of modern
power. This, though, is a subjectivity that is acted upon tacitly, indirectly, via
the means or activity of someone or something else. We might say, in other
words, that government operates upon the general level of subjectivity via the
medium of the psychological inscriptions of experts. These are the two points
that Rose (1995) wants us to grasp: first, that psychological expertise is deeply
enmeshed with the objectives of government, and, secondly, that such
expertise provides a means for shaping, sustaining, and managing human
beings not in opposition to their personal identity but precisely in order to
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produce their identities. Rose (1995) illustrates this point with reference to the
practice of psychotherapy:
psychotherapies ... aspire to enabling humans to live as free individuals through
subordinating themselves to a form of therapeutic authority: to live as an
autonomous individual, you must learn new techniques for understanding and
practising upon yourself. Freedom, that is to say, is enacted only at the price of
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relying upon experts of the soul. We have been freed from the arbitrary prescrip-
tions of religious and political authorities ... But we have been bound into
relationship with new authorities, which are more profoundly subjectifying
because they appear to emanate from our individual desires to fulfil ourselves in
our everyday lives, to craft our personalities, to discover who we really are (17).
Contradictions of freedom
The ‘contradiction of freedom’ that we face here is the following: when we
exercise our subjectivity, our freedom as subjective, autonomous individuals,
we do so by drawing on the values, norms and ideas already set in place by
broader structures of government – we do so in a space which is already within
the ‘auspices of power’, so to speak. The full irony of the successful implemen-
tation of ‘technologies of subjectivity’ should by now be apparent.
Technologies of subjectivity – be those the concepts of a particular psycholog-
ical theory, the procedures of confession and/or psychotherapy, the
understandings of a popular self-help book or the kinds of advice given by the
radio/television talk show – these are the ways in which we hope to empower
ourselves, to realise ourselves more fully. But as we ‘practise’ ourselves in these
ways, we are also participating in our own subjugation. Here, again, it is useful
to refer directly to Rose:
diverse fragments and components of psy have been incorporated into the
‘ethical’ repertoire of individuals, into the languages that individuals use to speak
of themselves and their own conduct, to judge and evaluate their existence, to
give their lives meaning, and to act upon themselves. This transforms ... our
‘relation with ourselves’ – the way in which we make our being and our existence
intelligible and practicable, our ways of thinking about and enacting our
passions and our aspirations ... [However] ... in making the human subject think-
able according to diverse logics and formulas, and in establishing the possibility
of evaluating ways of thinking about people by scientific means, psychology ...
opens people up to a range of calculated interventions (Rose, 1995, 65).
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the relations that others have with them’ (1991, 10). In this sense there are no
self-dialogues, no deep intrinsic levels of personal subjectivity, that have not
been saturated by the basic norms and values of a greater governmental logic.
If this is true, then it may well be the case that for every ‘top-down’ strand of
power there exists a reciprocating ‘bottom-up’ influence. Indeed, those
bottom-up forms of power that flow from the shaped subjectivity of individ-
uals may be just as important, just as vital to the overall functioning of power,
as top-down forms of power! To understand properly how governmental
power works we need to grasp that these two work together, that there is a kind
of symmetry between them.
In attempting to
understand why
brutal acts of racist
violence persist in
South Africa even
after the demise of
institutionalised
apartheid, it helps
to bear in mind that
the racism of
apartheid was – is –
as much a kind of
racist identity as an
institutionalised set
of racist policies.
Apartheid was just
as much substan-
tiated in the
individual, subjective
racist identities of
the white popula-
tion as in the
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institutional struc-
tures of the state.
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‘Unbecoming ourselves’
If it is the case that our individual subjectivities exist less as essentially private
entities and more as intensely governed facets of our personal existence, then
most, if not all forms of self-knowledge and/or practice – as long as they are
attached to normalising procedures – must be a trap. It is in this respect that
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our days is not to try to liberate the individual from the state, and from the state’s
The languages and
institutions, but to liberate us both from the state and from the type of individu- techniques of
alization which is linked to the state (216). psychology provide
vital relays between
A governmental psychotherapy contemporary
government and the
Perhaps one of the most obvious and concrete examples of how psychology ... technologies by
operates a technology of subjectivity is to be found in the domain of which modern indi-
psychotherapy. Indeed, given the foregoing discussion, it is easy to see how the viduals come to
govern their own
psychotherapeutic exchange might represent a particularly intensive lens
lives ... They
of/for technologies of subjectivity, a lens through which certain logics of the self provide languages of
may be reiterated, reimposed and reintegrated. For Rose (1991) the techniques self-interpretation,
of psychotherapeutics are most certainly in powerful accordance with the new criteria for self-
political rationalities for the government of conduct. By the same token, the evaluation, and
technologies for
whole realm of the psychotherapeutic is linked at a very profound level to the self-rectification
sociopolitical obligations of the modern self and of the modern state (Rose, (Rose, 1995, 79).
1991, 1995). Psychotherapies provide us with languages of self-interpretation,
criteria for self-evaluation, technologies for self-rectification that ‘render exis-
tence into thought as a profoundly psychological affair and make our self
government a matter of choice and our freedom’ (Rose, 1995, 79).
One should be aware of the complexity of this interchange of power,
however, cautions Rose: ‘One would be wise not to overstate the constitutive
powers of psychotherapeutic discourse and practice. Their potency derives
from their confluence with a whole political rationality and government tech-
nology of the self ’ (1991, 245). So, while a practice such as that of
psychodynamic psychotherapy stands beyond the specific jurisdiction of the
state, it none the less occurs in symmetry to ‘the practice of normativity that
have shaped our present in terms of the political apparatus of the state’ (Rose,
1995, 12). Hence the psychotherapeutic arena is one place where the state and
the political have been relocated as shifting zones for the coordination, codi-
fication, and legitimation of certain complex and diverse practices of
governmentality of individuals, and of individuals’ self-governmentality
(Rose, 1995).
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forms of human management. Perhaps the best way to animate many of the
functions and concepts of such technologies of subjectivity is with reference to
Lindy Wilbraham’s later chapter on Discursive practice in which she provides
an extended analysis of a popular news media column dealing with issues of
HIV/Aids.
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CONCLUSION
This chapter has had a number of objectives. It has hoped to extend and elabo-
rate Foucault’s overall theorisation of power, as introduced in the previous
chapter, by fleshing out the notion of governmentality. This notion, of course, is
one, like that of disciplinary power, which finds a very central place for the role
of psychology as a powerful mode of both knowing and practising. The theory
of governmentality offers a way of explaining the interaction between top-down
and bottom-up, or micro- and macro-forms of power. In so doing, it explains
how an ‘arts of subjectivity’ has become essential to the effective government of
populations in modernity, an arts of subjectivity which, as the work of Nikolas
Rose amply demonstrates, relies in large part on the languages, concepts and
procedures of self as supplied by psychology. This is why I suggested, at the
outset of this chapter, that psychology is not only a discipline but also a self-
discipline. Psychology, in short, has become a crucial component in the modern
regulation of populations, in the regimes of modern government.
Recommended readings
As is evident in the chapter, the work of Nikolas Rose is absolutely central in
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Section
2
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Summary
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Peace Kiguwa
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provides several South African examples – the problems and dilemmas faced
by many South African women – to illustrate significant conceptual argu-
ments. The author also engages with the multiple ways in which critical
feminist thought has been, and continues to be, instrumental in contesting
hegemonic thought within psychology as well as the ways in which psychology
has ‘normalised’ women into specific feminine roles.
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Chapter
11
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Feminist critical
psychology in
South Africa
Peace Kiguwa
LEARNING OUTCOMES
By the end of this chapter, you should be able to:
Understand feminisms as a diverse range of approaches
Discuss some major theoretical and research trends of feminist research in
psychology
Explore how alternative ‘routes’ to exploring gender issues may be applied in local
contexts
Use the notion of ‘difference’, along with essentialism, in thinking about, and
or applicable copyright law.
doing, psychology
Discuss some of the major agendas of a critical psychology and the role of an
African feminism within these agendas.
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INTRODUCTION
Feminism as action
Feminism is often mistaken for an exclusively academic pursuit, where femi-
nists (usually women) debate issues of gender and women’s oppression.
Feminists are certainly committed to studying gender relations and how
gender as a cultural construct can be manipulated as a tool of oppression, Gender:
where men are able to occupy positions of social power over women. But there social, cultural and
psychological
is also another aspect to feminism that may not always be understood as an
differences between
extension of feminist theory, and that is that feminism is also action/behav- men and women.
iour. Feminist practice is not just about studying gender and gender relations.
It is also about trying to change those constructs and relations that are seen to
reinforce women’s subordination to men.
Feminists do not all agree on the exact cause of gender inequality.
Depending on one’s theoretical orientation, it is possible to have a range of
different commitments and agendas that one would deem necessary to remedy
women’s unequal status in society. In other words, feminist theories tend to
differ on what they consider to be the causes of women’s oppression as well as
the means by which such oppression can be eliminated.
Plural feminisms
The original feminist idea of Sisterhood – the idea that all women share some Sisterhood:
kind of ‘kindred’ interest – has come under increasing attack and discredit by notion that all
women share the
women (eg so-called ‘Third World’ feminists such as Chandra Mohanty) tradi- same kind of
tionally excluded from mainstream (that is, European and US-American) ‘kindred’ interest by
feminist debate. We now generally accept that common political, economic virtue of being
and social goal(s) cannot be ascribed to women as a group feminist commit- women.
ment has come to mean different things to different women and has taken
many forms in different places (see Table 11.1, overleaf ). Hence it is appro-
priate to talk of feminisms as plural rather than singular. This invites the
question of how these multiple feminist perspectives and interventions may or
may not engage with psychology.
Asymmetrical relationships between groupings of people have come to be
cemented through ostensibly authoritative forms of knowledge such as
psychology. The above description of feminism therefore becomes doubly
important in an African context, because, quite simply, not all feminisms are
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Table 11.1 ‘Feminism and its differences’: Brief summary of major feminist schools of thought
Liberal Traced back to There is no fundamental Liberal feminist The interplay of power
feminism the 18th century, difference between men agendas have been in sustaining unequal
most notably and women. And there- particularly instru- gender relations not
with the publica- fore no real basis for mental in the fully emphasised. A
tion of what has the unequal sharing of establishment of more liberal feminist agenda
come to be resources and gender equity laws, could, for example, be
considered one opportunities which have arguably inadequate in
of the key texts Women’s oppression an improved the quality accounting for ongoing
of the women’s inevitable outcome of a of lives of many male violence in South
suffrage systematic denial of women. South Africa’s African society
movement – opportunity for women post-’94 Constitution, The pervasive effects of
Mary Woll- as enjoyed by men for instance, has past discriminatory
stonecraft’s Female subordination opened the way for gender practices not
(1759–99) A thus a direct result of many women, tradi- fully considered, such
Vindication of the legal constraints tionally marginalised, that those previously
the Rights of women are subject to to pursue career disadvantaged are in
Women and also in patriarchal society interests in politics, many ways still disad-
in the 19th Works from within the law, entrepreneurship, vantaged in the present
century, John structure of mainstream etc. In the words of As is often the case
Stuart Mill’s The society to integrate Tong (1998): ‘... such with any liberal agenda,
Subjection of women into that struc- reforms are to be ‘working from within’
Women in 1869 ture neither trivialised nor the system may often
memorialised as past mean getting very little
accomplishments’ (44) accomplished by way of
radical social change
Challenges sexism
within structures, forms
and relations of left
organizations; later
versions concerned with
intersections of class,
race and sexuality
➲
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Radical Post-liberal era Patriarchy (rather Radical feminist Argues that the
feminism Cutting edge of than class as for emphasis on social patriarchal system
feminist theory Marxist/socialist as opposed to must be destroyed
between 1967 and feminism) is the natural difference completely – but
1975 most fundamental between men and does not say how
Emerged from the cause of women’s women has encour- this is likely to
gay rights move- oppression aged the occur
ments Women’s oppression deconstruction of Rather impractical
exists in any society social/cultural to presume that a
– capitalist/socialist, constructions of system so perva-
communal/individu- gender difference sive as patriarchy
alistic etc can simply be
This system of ‘rooted’ out of
oppression includes existence. Female
even the most subordination is
common and popular both practised and
of institutions, such experienced at
as marriage and the multiple and inter-
family twining levels, eg
This system of ideological,
oppression is not economic, social
easily eradicated by and sexual.
changing legislature Rooting out one
or abolishing capi- level does not
talist economy in necessarily trans-
society late into women’s
Patriarchal system liberation
cannot be reformed Tendency to
– and must therefore romanticise and
be rooted out universalise
completely women’s position
Seeks to question and experiences,
gender roles, eg why without taking
must women adopt account of other
certain roles such as structural inequali-
‘mother’ by virtue of ties between
their biology and women
men alternative roles
also by virtue of
their biology?
We must problema-
tise gender
behaviour by
drawing distinctions
or applicable copyright law.
between biologically
vs culturally deter-
mined gender
behaviour
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Psychoanalytic Stemmed from Fundamental expla- Emphasises the Underplays the role
feminism Freud’s theories nation for women’s role and function of legal, political
about sexuality behaviour is rooted of the psyche in and economic insti-
In the 1970s femi- deep in women’s women’s self- tutions and
nists contested the psyche liberation. Can structures in
biological reduc- Relies on Freudian therefore speak sustaining women’s
tionism of Freud’s concepts of pre- directly to post- oppression in patri-
construction of Oedipal stage and colonial theory’s archal society
femininity and the Oedipal complex focus on ‘mental Tendency to univer-
masculinity, Gender inequality decolonisation’ salise
arguing that femi- rooted in a series of (see also Fanon’s
ninity/masculinity early childhood ‘double conscious-
are in fact socially experiences resulting ness’ and Biko’s
constructed in both men’s and ‘Black Conscious-
Psychoanalytic women’s perceptions ness’ debate, in
feminists of themselves as this work)
attempted to rein- masculine/feminine. Offers a univer-
terpret Freud by Argue that patriar- salist theory of
‘telling the Oedipal chal society psychic construc-
tale in a non-patri- constructs and tion of gender
archal voice’ (Tong, values these identity on basis
1998, 138), by perceptions of repression. By
focusing on pre- differently so doing, it gives
Oedipal as opposed Theorists such as specific answers
to Oedipal stage Chodorow have to how we
Juliet Mitchell’s focused on the need acquire our
key book Psycho- to change contexts gender identities
analysis and of early childrearing as well as how
feminism argues as a means of we internalise
that psycho- reconfiguring gendered norms
analysis provides a gendered and values
description of subjectivities
gender relations
under patriarchy,
including the
constitution of
sexed/gendered
difference, rather
than a prescription
for it. This opened
the way for a
radical re-engage-
ment with
psychoanalysis as a
or applicable copyright law.
way of theorising
resistance, both
against oppressive
conditions and to
change
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Critical Psychology
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Black First formulated Feminist politics among Explicitly addresses the Tends to rely
feminism in US-America black women is – unlike racial discourses of on an essen-
through fiction- Western and mainstream knowledge-production tialist
writing in the feminisms – rarely seri- as well as emphasising position in
works of many ously explored the relevance of cate- its claim that
African-American Black female researchers gories such as ‘black black women
women, as a should seek to develop woman’. This is a exclusively
direct result of new theories and concepts distinct category. For have insight
dissatisfaction which capture actual lived example, a ‘poor black into their
with anti-racist experiences of ‘Third woman’ relates neither experiences
movements World’ women in Africa to poverty nor to racism by virtue of
(largely domi- Identifies white feminism in the same way a ‘poor their socio-
nated by black as misrepresentative and black man’ does. Inter- economic,
men) as well as oppressive to black locking categories of cultural and
feminist women race, gender and class biological
movement are significant tools of heritage
(equally domi- analysis in trying to
nated by white understand the totality
women) of her experience as a
woman
Provides a basis for
consciousness-raising
among black women as
well as emphasising
emotional and psycho-
logical empowerment
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African Has been linked Focus on a reconstruc- Like black feminism and Like womanism,
feminism to Africanist tion of pre-colonial womanism, African African
movements history as a period in feminism seeks to feminism often
which domi- which black women construct anti-imperialist falls prey to a
nantly construct experienced consider- knowledge systems which romantising and
a pre-colonial able political and emphasise an independent essentialising
Africa that is social power and positive sense of tendency in its
free from any identity for many ‘Third nostalgic call
form of oppres- World’/ black women for a pre-
sion Strategic in its subversion colonial Africa
of colonial constructions By so doing it
of racial inferiority of also ceases to
black people. Plays a be sufficiently
mentally decolonising critical of pre-
or applicable copyright law.
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Critical Psychology
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psychology are far from universal and may in fact be oppositional to other
philosophies and forms of practice. Mhkize (in this work) discusses the ways in
which African belief systems may be philosophically and ontologically
different from a Western belief system, such that even the notion of ‘identity’,
for instance, may be understood in conceptually different ways. This difference
may be attributed to the ‘communal’ versus ‘individualistic’ ways of knowing
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Challenging identity
Perhaps even more crucial is the notion of the individual self, implicit in
psychological theory, which asserts that our identities are fixed and connected
to an ‘eessence’. In psychology the notion of ‘identity’ implies a singular, indi- Essence:
vidual subject. Much essentialist construction of knowledge has stemmed true nature of
objects, people.
from this understanding of identity as both unchanging and universal. It is
May be understood
precisely this conceptualisation of a stable and universal identity that has given as any category
much legitimacy to psychology’s presumption to represent and consider its that is assigned to
theoretical constructs as unquestionably applicable to all human groups. objects, people and
experiences that
Mama (2002) has argued that ‘identity’ as a concept has no distinct meaning
are seen to be the
(as would be understood psychologically) in most African languages simply one defining nature
because Africans tend to define themselves in communal terms that indicate or characteristic
their clan or ethnic origins. Psychology’s conceptualisation of identity thus of that person
remains a vexing one to many Africans precisely because it cannot be pinned or experience.
down. Shefer (1997) has shown how women’s gender identity may be
expressed differently depending on the rural or urban setting in which the
individual finds herself, where one setting requires a more ‘traditional’ presen-
tation of self as a married woman would not require this and the subject is free
to discard and adopt a different identity. Identity therefore becomes some-
thing that can be changed and adopted depending on the situation we may
or applicable copyright law.
find ourselves in. We cannot therefore go with the assumption that our identi-
ties are unitary and constant.
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While patriarchy is
and the ways these speak directly to the agendas of a South African critical
universal, the ways psychology. Because feminism is necessarily political in the sense that
in which women feminism is geared toward actual change in social relations, whether at the
may experience this economic or political or sociocultural level, it addresses one of the key tenets
are far from
universal and any
of a critical psychology, which is that the psychological practice can and has
such universalising been put to political use and has been employed to serve specific power
practice inevitably interests.
means the exclusion Traditional feminist practice has largely focused on the ‘universal woman’
and/or marginalisa-
tion of certain
as oppressed. This conceptualisation has relied on a universalist under-
women’s standing of identity/experience/oppression and gender. All women were
experiences. perceived to share similar experiences of gender and oppression by virtue of
being women. Such conceptualisation downplayed other equally crucial cate-
gories that may differentiate women’s experience of gender and oppression.
Categories of race and class, for example, may influence the ways in which a
poor black woman’s experiences of gender may be dramatically different from
Patriarchy: a middle class white woman’s for instance. In other words, while patriarchy is
defines the universal the ways in which women may experience this are far from universal
personal, physical
and institutional
and any such universalising practice inevitably means the exclusion and/or
power that men marginalisation of certain women’s experiences. This is another way in which
exert over women. theoretical and disciplinary power operates.
Although it takes
many forms, patri-
archy is universal. Identities of flux
It is important to Critical feminist practice therefore constantly seeks to interrogate its own
recognise the
cultural, social and
forms of knowledge-production. Traditional feminist ideas of gender
political diversity identity have largely come from psychology’s constructions of these
between patri- concepts, which have generally tended to view these as stable and
archies, but this unchanging, following a set developmental pattern. These terms have,
should not under-
mine the fact that
however, come to be redefined by more critical theorists such as Judith Butler
women experience and Michel Foucault, who have theorised identity to be in constant flux and
oppression as lacking in a fixed essence.
women first and Inasmuch as feminist theory has been criticised for its marginalisation of
foremost.
many women from mainstream debates, it is important to note that this is an
injustice that has been increasingly readdressed by many feminists – both
Western and non-Western. Mama (2001) makes this point too (see Box 4),
arguing that it would be both redundant and theoretically limiting for non-
or applicable copyright law.
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QUESTIONING RESEARCH
Research that constructs identities
The paucity of gender research in psychology and the theoretical and method-
ological limitations attaching to it has been researched and documented in
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290
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factors that should be considered when trying to understand the experiences ‘Psychology is one
of women still remain underresearched (Unger, 1979) and reinterpreted from version of the
the [usually male] researcher’s own framework, with subjects having little or power of the
no space to control her own narrative: ‘Psychology is one version of the power narrative. As with
any power, it can
of the narrative. As with any power, it can be misused to wield power rather be misused to wield
than to empower others’ (Apter, 1994, 41). Because psychologists generally power rather than
tend to occupy more powerful positions in the research process than the to empower others’
subjects they study, any agency for subjects to determine the form their narra- (Apter, 1994, 41).
tives will eventually take is drastically reduced and sometimes even
non-existent. The final outcome may thus often be the researcher’s own inter-
pretation of events and meaning. This inevitably raises some ethical questions
about the conduct of research.
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able to question the structures and institutions in their society that sustain
oppression. Social research is also political and feminists are equally concerned
with the political dimensions of most psychological research on gender issues.
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‘Triple oppression’ is
the term that has
been coined to
describe the
situation in which
many black South
African women find
themselves:
oppressed in terms
of race, class and
gender.
or applicable copyright law.
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Critical Psychology
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The American sociologist Michael Kimmel tells a revealing anecdote about one
of his graduate classes in Women’s Studies in which he heard a dispute going
on between a white and a black woman. The white woman was arguing that the
universal oppression of women by men bound black and white women
together in a common plight. The black woman disagreed and asked, ‘When you
wake up in the morning and look in the mirror, what do you see?’
‘I see a woman,’ the white woman replied.
‘That’s precisely the problem,’ said the black woman. ‘When I wake up in the
morning and look in the mirror, I see a black woman. My race is visible to me
every day because I am not privileged in this culture. Because you are privi-
leged, your race is invisible to you.’
Kimmel was very much struck by this exchange because he realised that
when he looked in the mirror he saw neither his whiteness nor his masculinity.
All he saw was a simple human being.
Source: Kimmel, quoted in Wetherell & Griffin (1991).
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that is used to ‘set outside the norm, and render [...] oppositional to those seen
as traditional’. The term ‘traditional’ evokes a history, by virtue of which the
object is then naturalised. This then confers a moral weight so that it becomes
possible to argue that it ought to be simply because it has been ... the image
that is evoked is of white families, leaving black families already positioned as
Other. The supposedly general concept of family is actually fairly narrow.
Source: Alldred, Pam. (1996). ‘“Fit to parent”? Developmental psychology and “non-
traditional” families.’ In Burman et al Challenging women.
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‘She loved, she tried to love, she screamed instinct which is crowned queen by psychology.
and was not heard, because there was The ‘fathering’ of a child (Lupton & Barclay,
nothing and no one in her surrounding that 1997, 27) does not ensure its healthy develop-
saw her plight as unusual, as anything but ment (Holmes, 1993). Psychiatry cannot be
the homemaker’s plight to her home. She applauded for objective clinical diagnosis as it
became a scapegoat, the one around whom pulls the patriarchal proverbial corsette strings
the darkness of motherhood is allowed to of social control of the feminine subject.
swirl, the invisible violence of the institu- Women are not allowed to extrapolate from its
tion of motherhood.’ pre-definitions of the maternal. The feminine is
Welburn (1998, 132) playdough in the hands of culture, which
assumes to construct her psychopathology.
An exploration of ‘invisible violence of the Women are taught to be depressed rather than
institution of motherhood’ exposes how the defiant. Chesler (1974) suggests that good
feminine is highly enmeshed with the ‘home- mothers ‘will resolve to be more patient and
makers plight to her home’. The maternal as a cling more tightly to what passes for sanity’.
natural feminine entitlement, is one that has Chesler (1974) suggests that women’s psycho-
indeed ‘scapegoated’ women through biological pathology is an expression of the ‘devalued
discourse, psychological theory and culturally feminine role’.
mediated social practice. An alternative explo-
The scapegoat is also an escape valve;
ration of post-natal depression is offered for
through her the passions and blind raging
women who have ‘tried to love’, ‘screamed’ and
waters of suppressed knowledge are
are ‘not heard’ because clinical theory has
permitted to churn, so that they need not
negated to explore the patriarchal assumptions emerge in less extreme situations as lucid
from which it is born. Socially motivated rebellion (Welburn 1974, 132).
biological assumptions may often become
biological realities by which women’s child- Women who show resistance to motherhood may
bearing capacities align themselves with become scapegoats, so that the ‘blind raging
child-caring responsibilities and maternal traits waters’ of suppressed feministic rage does not
(Chodorow, 1978). Motherhood is a role women emerge as lucid rebellion.’ The invisible violence
are expected to adopt and accept readily. This of the institution of motherhood swelling in the
has infringed upon their own personal nourish- belly of the feminine and the patriarchal perils
ment and their ability to construct own of psychiatry cannot offer an objective under-
femininities. standing of post-natal depression.
Psychology’s object relational theory has Source: Kruger, Monique. (2002). Post natal
further trapped women in maternal obligations depression as an expression of rebellion against the
(Doane & Hodges, 1992). It is the maternal maternal role.
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actively engages with every woman’s perceived ‘difference’ and resulting subjec-
tive experience of gender. Hendricks et al argue this same point in their
emphasis on the need to ‘reassess the concepts, methods and models used for
defining feminism, and to develop new ways of identifying and charting
marginalised women’s unique engagement with feminism’ (225).
In July 2001 a workshop hosted by the African Gender Institute and
feminist academic journal Agenda was organised. It was aimed at reflecting on
the multiple meanings of feminism in Africa. Essof (2001) reported on the
distinct understandings that were put forward regarding the theory and
practice of African feminism: ‘... there are those who argue feminism is not
African and thus has no relevance to Africa’s political, social and economic
realities. Rather, it is seen as an elite, bourgeois phenomenon, an invention of
the West with no real value, or meaning for African women’ (124–125).
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BOX 4 ‘Talking about feminism in Africa’: Elaine Salo speaks to Amina Mama
The following extract is adapted from an inter- that, say, global capitalism can be viewed
view with Professor Amina Mama, an activist as an enemy ...
scholar and academic in feminist theory and The constant tirades against ‘white feminists’
practice at the University of Cape Town (UCT). do not have the same strategic relevance as
Elaine Salo lectures at the African Gender Insti- they might have had 20 years ago when we first
tute at UCT. subjected feminism to anti-racist scrutiny.
ES: Would you say that womanism has any Since then many Westerners have not only
relevance for African feminists? listened to the critiques of African and other
AM: ... I have no problems with womanism but so-called ‘Third World’ feminists – they have
changing the terminology doesn’t solve also re-considered their simplistic paradigms
the problem of global domination. I and come up with more complex theories. Post-
choose to stick with the original term, colonial feminism owes much to African, Asian
insist that my own reality inform my and Latin American thinkers. Western feminists
application of it. Words can always be have agreed with much of what we have told
appropriated, for example there is not just them about different women being oppressed
womanism, but Omolara Ogundipe-Leslie’s differently, and the importance of class and
Stiwanism and Catherine Obonulu’s Moth- race and culture in configuring gender rela-
erism – but this does not get away from tions. Having won the battle why would we
the main problem, namely white domina- want to abandon the struggle, leave the
tion of global politics and northern-based semantic territory to others, and find ourselves
white women’s power to define. We should a new word?
define our own terms. To put it bluntly,
Source: (2001) Agenda 50: 58–63.
white feminism has never been strong
enough to be ‘the enemy’ – as the way
those features of African culture which function to the detriment and subordi-
nation of African women. The intention must be one of strengthening and
adapting traditional values that promote or enhance African women’s empow-
erment, seeking to promote their needs through opening up further the
discursive space and strategies inherent in indigenous culture and resisting
those customs that oppress and degrade women.
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Virginity testing
Nowhere is this more necessary than in the cultural constructions of female
sexuality which function to tie many African women to the dominant and
oppressive patriarchal system, through such gendered practices as virginity
testing (Leclerc-Madlala, 2001). An essentialised construction of female sexu-
ality as pure and chaste may, for instance, position many African women as
moral guardians for their respective cultural values and traditions. They are
By placing emphasis imbued with constructions of an ‘ideal’ womanhood with sole responsibility
on women’s gender for maintaining the moral sexual equilibrium as well as reinstalling lost
roles, men are
effectively absolved
cultural values of ‘chastity’. The invoking of a lost value system that needs to be
from any sexual ‘regained’ is inherent in a growing number of male African constructions of an
responsibility, not ‘African renaissance’. Even more disturbing is the self-regulation this pervasive
just with regard to discourse achieves, with many African women themselves actively promoting
curbing the spread
of HIV/Aids but
and organising virginity-testing ceremonies. Such practices are in effect cultur-
also in widespread ally prescribed gender-scripts that legitimate sexual violence against women.
deviant sexual By placing emphasis on women’s gender roles, men are effectively absolved
behaviour such as from any sexual responsibility, not just with regard to curbing the spread of
rape.
HIV/Aids but also in widespread deviant sexual behaviour such as rape.
In September 2001 the Swaziland government announced a five-year sex ban for
young women in a bid to combat the spread of HIV/Aids. The ban was
announced by the leader of Swaziland’s young women, Lungile Ndlovu, who said
the elders of the nation deemed it fitting.
‘During this period you will be expected to observe a five-year sex ban. No
shaking of hands with males, no wearing of pants and you will be expected to
wear woollen tassels wherever you go for the next five years,’ Ndlovu said at the
end of the lengthy celebrations to mark the Swazi king’s 33rd birthday. Ndlovu
did not specify what age group the ban targets, but said women in relationships
and older than 19 would be expected to wear red with black tassels. Those who
are still virgins will wear blue with yellow tassels. Her announcement was met
by howls of protest.
The ban follows an announcement by King Mswati III that Swaziland will
or applicable copyright law.
revive the umchwasho chastity rite to preserve virginity among girls and to
combat Aids. [...] Ndlovu said the tradition of preserving a maiden’s chastity,
known as Imbali YeMaswati (Flower of the Nation), will be policed by traditional
chiefs who still rule over much of Swazi society ...
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fact that women are globally subordinated on the basis of their gender. In any
society – socialist/capitalist, communal/individualistic – a built-in power
inequality can be said to exist between men and women. Many African cultural
practices, for instance, still define intellectual pursuit as an exclusively male
domain. Male education is thus prioritised over female education, enabling
men to have far more competitive career opportunities than women.
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society’s goods and services is systematically disadvantaged ...’ (Tong, 1994, 2):
But this change in legislation has not done much for women’s liberation from
male domination. Not every woman has access to better a livelihood despite
the equality laws that have been enshrined in the new Constitution. There are
other equally significant social categories that still stand in many women’s way,
such as class, education, poverty etc. In other words, many women previously
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and what we tend to consider right or wrong ways of living and developing or
mobilising notions of ‘normal’ and ‘abnormal’. To quote from Hook (2001):
The danger of these scientific categories of ‘normal’ and ‘abnormal’ is that they
become very loaded terms.
... this scientific language is doing little more than replacing notions of
good/bad, right/sinful with new categories normal/abnormal (146).
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Rape
This is especially crucial in a context and notion of rape as a social control
practice, and in many ways one that is socially sanctioned. Stereotypical views
about female and male sexuality are often employed in explaining the inci-
dence of rape, such as the idea that many rape victims ‘ask’ to be raped by
virtue of the fact that they are sexually active or promiscuous (the implicit
understanding being that the active sexual person is naturally male), or that
sexual aggression is merely another instance of men acting out their hormonal
natures (see Hollway, 1989). In South Africa a judge handed down a light
sentence on a 54-year-old father accused of raping his 14-year-old daughter
after his action was considered to embody no signs of any sexual deviance
‘outside the family unit’ by the ruling judge (Sunday Times, October 1999). In
another case, a young man was also given a light sentence for the repeated rape
of two 15-year-old girls, which was attributed to the man’s ‘virility’ and also
because one of the girls had been ‘stout’ (naughty) because she had had sex
with someone else two days before (Sunday Times, August 1999).
The above incidences seem to indicate a deep-seated shared understanding
about sexual aggression toward women, including to what degree this is
considered to be a matter to be sympathised with. The labelling of ‘normal’
and ‘abnormal’ behaviour is proving to be a site where women’s continued
oppression is allowed to continue, and one where feminist psychology can
begin to question the normalising practices a society might have. This is no
more evident than in the controversial anti-rape advertisement shown on
South African television and banned a few years ago after a group of men
accused the advertisers of ‘discrimination against men’ (Monitor, 1999).
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class or gender, for instance. Our sense of who we are is in no way connected to
experiences,
an essence. And because ‘experience’ is subjective in nature – meaning we
common sense and
scientific knowledge attribute meanings to events based on the theoretical resources available to us –
are both produced it becomes difficult to tie knowledge and/or experience to an essence or fixed
and reproduced in property. After all we do not always share the same resources in constructing
human communities.
knowledge. This is irrespective of gender, race etc. Multiple and shifting
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resources may also mean that knowledge may sometimes be dominantly opera- Essentialism hinders
tive at specific historical points in time. The central notion here is truth as any real and
universal (essentialism) versus truth as arbitrary (social constructionism). worthwhile social
change. It does this
quite simply by
Why is essentialism undesirable? constructing
‘If it’s natural we can’t change it.’ oppressive social
relations as natural
Lieven (1981, 203) and, by default,
unnecessary to have
Essentialism is undesirable for crucial reasons. Perhaps most significantly, to submit to any
essentialism hinders any real and worthwhile social change. It does this quite radical change.
simply by constructing oppressive social relations as natural and, by default,
unnecessary to have to submit to any radical change. Foucault (1984) has
described the ways by which women have been controlled historically by being
defined as either ‘hysterical’ or ‘frigid’. This was effectively legitimated through
an employment of medicalised discourses of sexuality. While this under-
standing of female sexuality may now be generally unpopular and regarded as
unscientific, other equally essentialist constructions of a natural female sexu-
ality may still be effective and dominant in patriarchal society. For instance, it
is not uncommon to hear women described as maternal, intuitive, vain, seduc-
tive and sometimes irrational.
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BOX 6 ‘All The Women Are White, All The Blacks Are Men, But Some Of Us Are Brave’
The above title is taken from a fairly recent class and religious minority: ‘... women who are
anthology by black American female writers, at risk of both race and gender discrimination
exploring their discontent with mainstream are also “doubly at risk of violence”, particu-
theoretical tendency to prioritise race over larly if they are from marginalised communities’
gender and vice versa. Indeed, psychology’s (report by Christina Stucky, Sunday Indepen-
reluctance to engage directly with issues simul- dent, 2001). The idea is not to exclude one form
taneously relating to both gender and race – of identity over another, but rather to point out
thereby emphasising the multiple forms of the impracticality of privileging and exploring
identity – has largely worked to the detriment one way of being-in-the-world as a human
of many marginalised women. At the World being. Different societies accord varying levels
Conference Against Racism (WCAR) held in of importance to race, class, gender, ethnicity
Durban in 2001, attention was given to the etc, and therefore it makes sense to assume
double and triple discrimination many women that gender is experienced differently by
face globally because they were of a racial, women all over the world.
Another way of saying this is that in the quest to be ‘different’ feminists may
reproduce differences that are even more harmful than previous constructions
of differences. This is irrespective of approach. Hendricks et al (1994, 218)
emphasise this point further in their assertion that ‘[f]eminists who have
worked under the banner of “African Feminism” have developed essentialist
ideas very similar to those of womanists’.
More than this, we continually need to guard against a one-dimensional
approach to theorising gender issues in which a ‘romanticised’ view of the
social system only serves to further distort gender relations. This is in partic-
ular reference to feminist theories that have been developed as
counter-arguments to the mainstream, and which may often be in danger of
misrepresenting and silencing marginalised women’s experiences of gender.
While mainstream representation of a universal patriarchal system presents a
distorted lens of gender experience, it is equally misleading to assume that a
universal African patriarchal system exists or, even worse, was non-existent
until the advent of colonialism and neo-colonialism. Ogundipe-Leslie (1994,
216) has questioned: ‘What is feminism in the context of Africa ...? We must
define specificities ... we cannot generalize Africa.’
The central tenets of African Feminism at times seem to reinscribe the very
forms of cultural essentialism for which mainstream feminism has been
or applicable copyright law.
condemned. This is even more evident in the assumption that Western, white
feminists are unable to know or even represent African women’s experiences in
a truthful or sympathetic manner. This assumption in effect says ‘only black
African women can research their own experiences of gender’. This is a
misguided notion that inevitably may prove theoretically limiting for many
marginalised women. Post-colonial theorist Edward Said criticises this notion
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as well when he says: ‘I certainly do not believe the limited proposition that
only a black man can write about blacks, a Muslim about Muslims, and so
forth’ (cited in Moore-Gilbert, 1997, 53).
French feminist scholar Colette Guillaumin (1995) has questioned the tendency
towards essentialism evident not just in mainstream psychological theory but
also amongst feminist social constructionist debates. Many constructionists
equally fail to escape essentialism (Fuss, 1989). The practice is to
take diversity into account by fragmenting the subject into multiple identi-
ties: women of colour, white women, bourgeois women, proletarian women,
black proletarian women, and so on. But this operation [...] specifies, and
does not counteract essentialism, as each sub-category is seen as possessing
its own self-referential essence’ (16–17).
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theory and feminism seek to explore and interrogate dominant power struc-
tures that continue to oppress historically marginalised groups in society.
Although the two schools of thought can hardly be said to be complementary
– certain post-colonial theorists would suggest that Western feminism has
itself served implicitly colonial interests (Gandhi, 1998) – they can arguably be
deployed in several respects to form an even stronger force than they tradi-
tionally might be on their own.
The phenomenon of
a double conscious-
ness can be doubly
experienced by
many black women
who would have to
engage with
subjective inferiori-
tisation on more
than one level –
manifested through
racial and patriar-
chal ideology.
realisation that to Hendricks et al (1994) have observed that the feminist trend as is currently
merely invert the
terms of reference played out in South Africa is something resembling a contestation of experience
is not, in itself, a and not collaboration. On the one hand, white women feel caught in a defensive
successful mode of position within which they need continually to reaffirm their right to represent
struggle’ (Abrahams, everyone – white and black – and, on the other hand, black women testify to
2002, 60).
personal oppression as their right to speak for marginalised groups.
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CONCLUSION
Finally, by way of conclusion, Hendricks et al (1994, 217) re-adapt post-
colonial feminist Chandra Mohanty’s guidelines for exploring identity and
meaning. These are challenging issues worth repeating here:
How do different communities of women define feminism?
Whose history do we draw on to chart women’s engagement with
feminism?
How do questions of gender, ‘race’, nation and other identities intersect in
determining feminisms?
How do we produce knowledge about ourselves and others, and with what
assumptions?
What methods do we use to identify and describe different women’s
subjectivity and self-interests?
What are the politics of the production of this knowledge?
Which conventions limit our production of this knowledge?
Perhaps subscribing to the notion of African feminisms is like that of feminist
psychology in naming a site of critique, contestation and debate between its
terms, rather than claiming an integration or harmony between the two
standpoints. Feminist arguments necessarily challenge prevailing patriarchal
structures, while African-centred perspectives need to continue to press femi-
nists to address the cultural and political implications of frameworks that bear
the history and cultural privilege of their European and US-American origins.
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questions about the nature and meaning of difference that have preoccupied
feminist psychology for so long’ (Crawford in Gergen & Davis, 1997, 281).
Using this quotation as a springboard, critically discuss the range of
debates that feminist researchers are compelled to engage with in pursuing
their research (and its consequences) as a form of feminist activism.
2. ‘Anti-essentialism is the key to democracy.’
Critically discuss the ways in which feminist psychology, including the
theories of black and ‘Third World’ women, may be seen sometimes to
reproduce essentialist notions of gender and experience and how theory
can seek to avoid such a non-liberating approach to theorising gender expe-
riences.
3. ‘The destabilisation and uncertainty of accommodating difference and
deconstructing stable categories and concepts have generated anxiety
about whether feminism will abandon its political thrust’ (Hendricks &
Lewis, 1994, 63).
In what ways can a South African critical feminist psychological agenda
be seen to address and speak directly to the particular needs of South
African women while also addressing original feminist principles of a
universal oppression shared by women?
Recommended readings
Squire, C. (1989). Significant differences: Feminism in psychology. London:
Routledge.
Tong, R. (1998). Feminist thought: A more comprehensive introduction. 2nd
edition. Oxford: Westview Press.
Burman, E., Alldred, A., Bewley, C., Goldberg, B., Heenan, C., Marks, D.,
Marshall, J., Taylor, K., Ullah, R., & Warner, S. (eds) (1996). Challenging
women: Psychology’s exclusions, feminist possibilities. London: Open
University Press.
Mama, A. (1995). Beyond the masks: Race, gender and subjectivity. London:
Routledge.
Ogundipe-Leslie, M. (1994). Re-creating ourselves: African women and critical
transformations. Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press.
Acknowledgement
or applicable copyright law.
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Chapter
12
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Critical reflections on
community and psychology
in South Africa
Thabani Ngonyama Ka Sigogo & Oscar Tso Modipa
LEARNING OUTCOMES
After studying this chapter, you should be able to:
Describe and explain critical views in community practice in the context of commu-
nity psychology
Discuss an Africanist perspective on community
Understand challenges to community practice within the African context
Critique community practice within an Africanist perspective.
or applicable copyright law.
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Problematising ‘communities’
It is important here, at the very outset of this chapter, that we discuss some of
the possible connotations of this term. It seems that the use of the term
‘community’ in South Africa has come almost automatically to refer to
economically disadvantaged groups, which, given the history of apartheid, and
the ongoing economic divisions characteristic of the post-apartheid era, are
typically those of black South Africans. As a result, we need to be aware of how
the idea of ‘community’ can come to operate as a code for race and, more than
this, how it might start to work as a term that connotes certain ideas of racial
difference. This is one objection to the term – that it might be a way of
discretely anchoring a sense of racial differences (for how often does one speak
of ‘white communities’, particularly within the domain of South African
community psychology?). This example in fact directs us to a second possible
objection to the use of the term ‘communities’ – that it might be seen as playing
a role in a greater discourse of avoidance of issues of race and privilege. Again,
the fact that one hardly ever hears mention of ‘white communities’ in South
African psychology should alert us to the fact that there is a pressing history of
structural privilege and dispossession in South Africa that should not be
neglected in imagining that all social groupings in South Africa have shared the
same social, political and economic benefits. Every community provides an
opportunity for the development of practices that are critical of power, and the
task of critical psychology is to introduce reflexive critique into the heart of the
or applicable copyright law.
community itself.
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people of southern Africa. They have been part of African societies for
centuries. Folklore, as another example, has sustained and enriched the
learning process of African children. One challenge for psychologists seeking
to value these contributions would include the careful documentation of such
practices and, where possible, participation in the reconstruction of local or
indigenous knowledge. This process of knowledge reconstruction is thus
informed by the traditional cultural practices of the peoples about whom we
write. Their traditional practices are the ordinary ways of doing things or, in
the words of psychologists and sociologists, the everyday practices of daily
living among people who have grown to understand, value, and accept them-
selves and their ways of being and doing.
Certain sociocultural rituals bring a sense of relief and well-being into commu-
nities. Such rituals may act as means of psychosocial adjustment in the face of
continued misfortunes. Particularly important here is the spiritual symbolism of
rites that enable people to communicate with the celestial world. For example,
beer brewing is practised in some African communities to cleanse a family from
bad luck. When there are several unexplained deaths in the family or accidents
that are perceived to be too frequent, such rites are engaged in to rebuild
confidence and a sense of well-being in the family. Ukuthethela is a long- Ukuthethela:
standing tradition among the Nguni people. The ceremony is usually conducted pleading for
after a harvest. The beer for the ceremony is usually made by an elderly woman spiritual well-being
in the community. Specific seeds from sorghum are selected from the harvest and support from
to brew this kind of beer. The seed would be put in water to soak and the owner ancestral spirits.
of the homestead would call all the relatives to report to the ancestors that the
family is in the process of preparing the special beer for the ritualistic
ceremony. If there is any woman occupying the position of a grand mother, she
will be requested to bless the ceremony. The owner of the homestead wakes up
early in the morning and approaches the spiritual beast in the kraal (inkomo
yamadlozi) to report on the occasion of the ceremony, including its purpose.
The beast symbolically stands as a medium of communication between the
living and the ancestral spirits. (For a more detailed discussion of these issues,
Community
see Ndlovu, Ndlovu & Ncube (1995).
psychologists can
play a useful role in
fostering
Community psychologists can play a useful role in fostering and reflexively community
questioning community narratives that re-present such practices – thereby narratives that re-
present such
or applicable copyright law.
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PHILOSOPHICAL ASSUMPTIONS
Within the broad framework of community psychology, community
psychology practitioners can choose from a range of intervention strategies,
each of which has implications for the relationships that the practitioner can
and will develop with the communities with whom they work. Such choices are
influenced by the practitioners’ values, belief systems, and professional orien-
tations. For example, some practitioners adopt the position of advocate or
activist, with a focus on challenging the state’s policies in relation to affected
communities.
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Emuva kuphambili What was behind is now in front Past deeds often have a way of catching up
with a person; so one must take heed how
one acts here and now. Be pleasant to people
now so that they have pleasant memories of
you. Treat someone badly today, tomorrow he
may seek a way of getting his revenge
Induku kayilamuzi/ The knobkerrie has no kraal/home One who keeps beating his wife will end up
Induku kayakhi muzi The knobkerrie does not build a home with no wife and no children
Inkunzi emnyama A black bull spoils the calves A bad leader wields bad influence
iyawona amathole
Kwabo kagwala There is no mourning at the place A coward would not place himself in danger
akulasililo of the coward in any campaign, but he would then preserve
his life. Discretion is better than valour.
Prevention is better than cure
Ubukhosi ngamazolo Kingship is dew Use your power or authority wisely lest it
disappears and you suffer the treatment you
dished out to others under you
Inkomo ehambayo The beast on the move doesn’t Don’t be worried when the unexpected
kayiqedi tshani eat all the grass visitor turns up; he won’t ‘eat you out of
house’, so entertain him with kindness
Isisu somhambi The stomach of a traveller is not When a traveller found himself in a strange
kasinganani, large, it’s only the size of a small place, and was hungry, he would approach
singangophonjwana horn of a goat a kraal, enter and greet the occupants
lwembuzi with this greeting, thus explaining his needs.
Don’t refuse to help a stranger who asks for
sustenance
Kusinwa It is danced and then they give This is the way a dance goes, each person
kudedelwana way to others in turn showing his or her skill and then
giving way to the next. Be fair and let others
have a turn (to speak, to act etc)
Umunwe kawuzikhombi A finger doesn’t point at itself One who points the accusing finger at others
in order to avoid admitting his own faults or
crimes
or applicable copyright law.
and customs have been passed on from one generation to the next and
continue to be valued by the community. For example, circumcision in the
Xhosa community has been regarded by those who practise it as having major
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Given that adult life is considered sacred to the ately closed, and their knees bent into a squat-
Nguni people, the death of a member of the ting position. The person is not buried the
social community is viewed as something of a same day she or he dies for the sake of relatives
threatening event. This is particularly the case who need to bid farewell. If the deceased is the
given that adults are seen as playing an impor- owner of the homestead, the person would be
tant role as protectors or ‘shields’ of the buried next to the kraal before his cattle are
community. If the person is very old and taken for grazing. He or she would be covered
happens to be sick, both the person and the with the skin of the cow that is slaughtered
community are helped to prepare for the death. during the preparation for death ceremony.
All the children of the ill person are called and Historically, the slaughtering of the beast is
informed about the possible end of life. Histor- viewed as extremely significant, as it is
ically, and depending on certain circumstances, believed that the person is going on a long
a cow would be slaughtered and the sick person journey to another world different from the
given its liver in the belief that her or his spirit earth. She or he needs something to eat on the
was waiting, or needing, to be given some way or to carry food for those people ahead of
blood before the ascension to the next world. If the deceased. People would eat after the burial.
the person does not die after this event, then All the tools used for the burial are kept under
one of the pieces of wood (uthungo) that a granary waiting for cleansing, which is
support the roof directly above the door accompanied by cleansing beer (utshwala
entrance is broken. After the eventual death of bamanzi). (For a more detailed description see
or applicable copyright law.
the person in question, their eyes are immedi- Ndlovu, Ndlovu & Ncube (1995).)
Collectivism
Another important assumption underlying African community and well-being
is the sense of collectivism. This sense of collectivism has implications for the
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The needs and concerns of rural African communities have for far too long been
marginalised by Eurocentric forms of psychology.
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African meaning-making
This brief discussion of assumptions underlying life within some African
communities is introductory, not comprehensive. We offer it as a starting point
for community psychology practitioners who seek to develop relationships with
local African communities. We argue that these community psychologists must
also adapt a critical point of departure and work as advocates and activists. This
is necessary because the sense of meaning-making and of being in African
communities or what other psychologists have called the African worldview has
been silenced, distorted and disparaged by the colonial discourse. Practitioners
and theoreticians seeking to develop a critical psychology within an African
context need to engage this material and local communities with a certain
degree of curiosity – and humility. The task of a critical community psycholo-
gist is to be able to speak with members of a community against oppressive
practices, not to lecture them about where they have gone wrong.
to reallocate power nity practice. Some practitioners have developed a combination of methods
(eg modifying the
and strategies that draw families, groups and communities together in order to
structure of
opportunities open articulate needs and problems through processes that draw on their local prac-
to people). tices and beliefs. For example, popular theatre that is culture-specific has been
used in certain communities to help them express their needs and identify
strategies for confronting the problems being faced (see, for example, Hinsdale,
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Lewis, & Waller (1995) or Mda (1993)). Alternative methods and strategies for
engaging the community challenge models for conceptualising and responding
to the needs of the community that treat the community as objects of investiga-
tion rather than as subjects of their own realities (Lykes, 1997; Lykes, 2000).
the services are to a large extent not accessible to the majority of black people in
South Africa (Seedat, 1998). Still others point out that in order to be successful,
community practice must be South African (Swartz & Gibson, 2001). Yet South
Africa is diverse, with more than 22 languages and many cultural traditions.
Thus some challenge this call for the Africanisation of psychology, arguing that
it reflects intolerance of what is regarded as non-African.
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While attempts are being made to correct the wrongs of the past, contem-
porary practitioners and academics seem to have difficulties shaking off the
politics of exclusion, which have been typical of apartheid South Africa. Critical
community practice is challenged to recognise that inclusion is a central tenet
of progressive psychology. This core value of theory and practice is reflected in,
for example, work with African immigrants who are often treated as outsiders.
They constitute South Africa as much as South Africa constitutes what is
African. This core value of a critical community psychology intersects with the
African tradition of hospitality towards outsiders, as exemplified in African
Amazwahlaka- wisdom (amazwahlakaniphileyo). Thus we see, in this concrete example of
niphileyo: work among immigrant communities a possible articulation between critical
words of wisdom.
community psychology and indigenous practices, reflecting the integration of
two knowledge systems towards the development of a third. Moreover,
through this example, we argue that any psychological practice that does not
articulate South Africa’s connections with the rest of the continent can never
be described as progressive, critical or liberatory.
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should avoid becoming merely the instrument or the handmaiden of a polit- Critical community
ical party, and should keep its allegiances firmly fixed on the basic needs of psychology needs to
the members of the communities in which it works. Highly proclaimed polit- be aware of the
ical movements that were identified with the people’s struggles in one exclusionary kinds
of practice and
historical moment can become reactionary and out of touch with the realities discourse that
of everyday life in African communities today. One might take the example of surround political
the ANC government’s contrary position to supplying anti-retroviral drugs to situations such as
sufferers of HIV/Aids or, as another example, the seemingly xenophobic African immigrants
seeking exile in
attitude of the Department of Home Affairs to African immigrants seeking
South Africa. Such a
exile in South Africa. critical community
In diverse sociocultural environments such as South Africa, a critical practice would need
community psychology must rescue itself from an ideology which problema- to be aware of how
the concept of
tises otherness in the absence of a praxis of constructive social engagement
‘otherness’ comes to
across diversities. A critical community psychology would want to be aware of be perpetuated and
the exclusionary kinds of practice and discourse that surround political situa- reified around
tions such as the above, of African immigrants seeking exile in South Africa, of exactly such
the cause of sufferers of HIV/Aids. And, furthermore, such a form of critical political situations.
community practice would want to be aware of how the concept of ‘otherness’
comes to be perpetuated and reified around exactly such political problems.
Within this framework community practitioners enter local contexts with
certain risks and are prepared to do things differently from their ‘comrades’ of
the recent past. Such positioning not only requires a certain level of ideological
sophistication but also a courage and humility that is almost absent in the
writings of scientific and mainstream psychology.
or applicable copyright law.
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role-players, some of whom may have previously been involved in the destruc-
tion and distortion of the values and traditions of black people. This will make
the project of rewriting the histories of the community ever challenging in that
we need to be well aware of the insidious levels of racism that, for instance,
elevate the needs and concerns of white constituencies over those of
black groups.
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Zapiro’s cartoon
draws attention to
the fact that a
variety of
constituencies are
calling for forms of
reparation or special
consideration in the
new South Africa.
Some of these
constituencies may
previously have
been involved in
the destruction and
distortion of the
values and
traditions of black
people.
Intergenerational traditions
Within an Africanist perspective one foundational principle is reflected in the
or applicable copyright law.
statement, ‘if you raise your child correctly, the child will look after you in the
future.’ If that intergenerational connection is broken, there is a lack of satis-
faction and a sense of self-blame for this failure. The same principle extends to
the community at large, that is: if you look after me well, I will do the same in
turn. However, such an expectation is not expressed through spoken language
but rather through behaviours. Moreover, when a stranger asks for help, it is
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one’s duty to take care of the stranger. This creates a sense of community conti-
nuity. These implicit rules govern the behaviour of members of the community
and are taken as givens. A child learns these rules through everyday living and
is expected to follow familial norms and values as doing his or her part in
fostering the continuity of the family and to learn that the family is not always
the best model of what a community is.
Community engagement
Community involvement or engagement is a major feature of African commu-
nities. If there is work to be done at home, one calls community members to
help while having a social drink, referred to above, called ‘ilima’. The
ploughing of fields is a key social event in this regard; indeed, traditional
African communities pride themselves on this event. Here, the sense of
community is further demonstrated by the fact that excess in one family’s
harvest means that neighbours will not starve. Neighbours are invited to
collect baskets of food for their children, thereby ensuring the community’s
continuity while acknowledging its co-existence. It is normative that in the
event that one does not have mealie meal, in such community contexts, one
asks one’s neighbour for assistance. In situations such as this, one is typically
welcomed with a basketful of food, regardless of what time you arrive. When
the harvest improves, you can always do the same in the return of the basket as
an expression of reciprocity and gratitude. This acknowledgement extends to
those outside of the community, as the insistence is to be embracive because ‘a
traveller’s stomach is smaller than the horn of goat’. Rhoads (1997) says that
‘[h]ow we serve others and what we do in action with and for others needs to
reflect what they desire and what they see as important’ (130).
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be recognised as important role players in community building’ (5). Lewis, Community research
Lewis, Daniels & D’Andrea (1998) argue that the greatest contribution practi- as it has been
tioners of psychology can make to society rests in their willingness and ability practised over the
to foster the development of healthy communities. However, Berkowitz & years tended to
objectify
Wolff (1996) note that the track record of psychology as a profession in communities,
building and empowering communities is unimpressive. This they attribute to, particularly
amongst other factors, forms of professional training which do not engender communities
the spirit of critical practice. marginalised from
power and resources
Africanist communities thus offer critical community psychologists
(ie the poor, the
multiple resources and multiple challenges. We have identified some of these illiterate, the
resources and several of these challenges. In what follows we discuss specific disabled).
methods that can be helpful towards developing a psychology that integrates
an Africanist perspective and a critical community psychology towards trans-
formational praxis.
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Critical Psychology
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researcher wielded so much power that the ‘subjects’ were at her or his mercy.
In particular, the marginalised who were in certain instances regarded as
‘deviant cases’ were researched with no consideration of their status as poten-
tial beneficiaries. A call for the reconceptualisation of research methodologies
in the light of general developments in the field of psychology poses serious
challenges to those conducting research in culturally diverse communities, as
is the case in Africa.
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and knowledge construction about communities. Rather, it should focus on The study of the
helping communities to transform and improve themselves. Calvino (1998) community should
alludes to the fact that the training of psychologists tends to centre on psycho- not be a goal in
logical variables and this seems to blind practitioners to other necessary itself, that is,
community research
dimensions of the community such as economic, political and cultural factors, should not be solely
as well as to the traditions that have sustained the lives of community resi- about contempla-
dents. One strategy for dealing with this ‘professional deficit’ is the tion and knowledge
introduction of multidisciplinary teams, by which other professionals would construction about
communities.
address other dimensions of the problems identified.
Rather, it should
focus on helping
Collaborative researcher-community relationships communities to
As noted in the introduction to this chapter, critical community practice transform and
improve themselves.
suggests that practitioners from various fields need to develop even closer
working relationships among themselves to facilitate a collaborative relation-
ship with community members. Yet multidisciplinary team efforts pose
serious challenges and are often difficult to develop and sustain due to,
amongst other things, competition between various professions. It is against
this background that community practitioners are challenged to put profes-
sional interests second to community interests. The ultimate goal in critical
community research should be social restoration and transformation through
strategies that ensure citizen representation and engagement. Social restora-
tion will entail, amongst other things, re-evaluation of personhood, values,
traditions, customs and belief systems, with a view to revitalising those social
systems.
SUMMARY
Debates on the relevance of community psychology need to continue. Such
debates must include the communities’ needs to access any assistance that they
may require from academic institutions. However, this desire for access should
not be interpreted by academics as an invitation to institutionalise commu-
nity-based knowledge-production. The knowledge generated within local
communities should remain under the control of the people who are co-gener-
ating it. Appropriate tools for creating wider access to that knowledge should
be influenced by a genuine interest among community psychologists to partic-
ipate in a helping process. Political awareness of the people’s circumstances is
or applicable copyright law.
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Acknowledgement
The authors thank Brinton Lykes for her detailed comments and suggestions
on an earlier draft of this chapter.
or applicable copyright law.
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Chapter
13
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LEARNING OUTCOMES
By the end of this chapter, you should be able to:
Explain what is meant by the concept of a ‘health-enabling community’
Identify and explain the psychosocial and community-level processes underlying
the impact of collective action on health
Illustrate how each of these processes operates in relation to the promotion of
sexual health and the prevention of HIV/Aids
Elaborate on the way in which each of these processes is shaped by the power rela-
tions associated with poverty, gender and stigma
Justify why health-enhancing social change is most likely to be achieved through
a combination of ‘top-down’ and ‘bottom-up’ efforts
or applicable copyright law.
Speculate about what forms ‘top-down’ and ‘bottom-up’ changes might take to
reduce HIV-transmission in the community in which you live and/or work.
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Critical Psychology
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agencies (eg
government, legal
interventions seek to change individuals by increasing their knowledge about
institutions). They HIV/Aids or their perceived vulnerability to infection or their ability to act
use their power to assertively in sexual encounters. However, such interventions fail to take
influence social account of those features of social context that enable or support the indi-
events and
vidual’s ability to act on this newly acquired knowledge or this increased sense
relations.
of personal vulnerability to HIV/Aids or to transfer the lessons from
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Zapiro’s biting
commentary on the
government’s
HIV/Aids policy
reminds us that
macro-structures are
a crucial part of any
effective HIV/Aids
intervention and
that marginalised
communities often
have little political
or economic
influence over
more powerful
stakeholders.
strategies for social change through instruments of government, politics, law or common problems
or discontents, and
economics. Bottom-up efforts involve the participation of members of margin- work from their
alised communities (who usually suffer from the worst health) in collective position at the
action to improve their health. Such collective action involves collaboration by bottom of the social
grassroots people in identifying the way in which social conditions under- hierarchy to lobby
for social changes.
mine their health and well-being, and in working towards improving such
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Critical Psychology
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Collective action:
conditions. Such improvements, as will be discussed below, are most likely to
collaborative action result from the twin processes of (1) strengthening grassroots communities
by a unified group from within and (2) building bridges between such communities and more
to fight for social powerful actors and agencies in the public and private sectors and civil society
changes that will
realise their quest
who are best placed to assist them in achieving their goals.
for better living
and/or working The need to challenge power
conditions.
This chapter is concerned with the bottom-up drivers of social change and,
more particularly, with the issue of grassroots participation in collective action
for change. This focus on the bottom-up dimensions is justified for two
Grassroots: reasons. First, an emphasis on bottom-up drivers of change is important
the majority of because the voices of grassroots communities have a key role to play in moti-
ordinary people who
form the mass of
vating social change (Beeker, Gray & Raj, 1998). This is because many of the
citizens of a hierar- social factors that shape peoples’ health-related behaviour are linked to the
chically structured unequal distribution of economic and political power – often in favour of a
society, lacking any small group of highly educated and/or wealthy persons, mostly men. The
exceptional social
advantages or social
social changes needed to promote health-enabling communities often involve
power. an increase in the political and/or economic power of women relative to men,
or of poor people relative to wealthier ones. As Bulhan (cited in Seedat, 2001,
17) has argued: ‘Power is never conceded without a demand.’ Elites rarely give
up power without strenuous challenges from those who are exploited or
oppressed. For this reason, the voices and demands of grassroots communities
and their strategic allies have a vital role to play in struggles for sexual health.
Secondly, this chapter focuses on bottom-up drivers of social change
because it is these that fall within the boundaries of critical psychology, the
Individuals are
social creatures.
Attempts to change
their behaviour
need to go hand-in-
hand with attempts
to bring about
social change –
transformations in
the social contexts.
or applicable copyright law.
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focus of this book. The top-down drivers fall within the boundaries of
economics, political science, law, development studies and social policy.
However, as this chapter’s case study will illustrate, efforts to achieve social
change through bottom-up strategies have little hope of succeeding unless they
are supported by top-down efforts. For this reason there is a lot of room for
collaboration between critical psychologists and colleagues from other disci-
plines in developing theories and strategies of change which support and
reinforce one another.
within this tradition is that of community-led peer education, in which health discussion amongst
learners and
programmes are delivered by ‘peers’ rather than health professionals (UN Aids, educators rather
1999). Ideally, peer education uses participatory and democratic educational than through more
techniques where educators and learners are seen as equals and where both powerful or learned
parties are required to be equally active in the learning process. This approach educators instruct-
ing learners.
stands in contrast to more traditional education techniques, where the
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educator is active and the learner is passive, and where the educator is regarded
as superior to the learner. Thus, for example, youth peer educators are trained
in participatory education techniques, such as games, dramas or role-plays,
which enable them to facilitate sexual health education with their peers. Peer
educators seek to promote the sexual health of other youth of a similar age and
social status rather than youth having to rely on the interventions of more
distant adults such as teachers or nurses. Rather than telling their peers how to
behave, peer educators aim to generate debate and discussion about the range
of sexual behaviours available to young people and about the advantages and
disadvantages of each of these options. Thereafter, programme participants are
left to make their own decisions about which option they will pursue rather
than being instructed how to behave by the educators.
The fight against
HIV/Aids requires
collaboration
between colleagues
from a variety of
disciplines in
developing theories
and strategies of
change, prevention
and treatment that
support and
reinforce one
another.
Multi-stakeholder partnerships
The second strategy of community participation involves what are often
Stakeholder: referred to as ‘multi-sstakeholder partnerships’, in which representatives of key
someone who lives local constituencies (eg youth, women, churches, local health departments,
and/or works in a
schools, local industry and so on) work together to support and co-ordinate
particular commu-
nity and has a local HIV-prevention activities such as peer education, STI control, home-
or applicable copyright law.
commitment to the based care of people living with HIV/Aids and so on. The rationale for the
health, success and partnerships approach rests on two insights. The first of these is the insight
general well-being
that the causes and impacts of the HIV/Aids epidemic are too complex and
of other community
members. multi-faceted to be dealt with by any single constituency, and that communi-
ties have the best chance of effective responses if they pool the insights,
resources and efforts of as wide a range of groupings as possible. The second
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insight is that an epidemic is an extraordinary event, which arises because The causes and
existing understandings of health, and existing health services, are inadequate impacts of the
for addressing it. For this reason dealing with an epidemic involves innovative HIV/Aids epidemic
and creative responses which are most likely to arise through the cooperation are too complex and
multi-faceted to be
of a wide range of actors, networks and agencies (Gillies, 1998). dealt with by any
single constituency.
Communities have
TOWARDS A ‘SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF PARTICIPATION’ the best chance of
Psychosocial processes underlying the impact of participation effective responses
on health if they pool the
insights, resources
How might the very public activity of participation in collective action impact and efforts of as
on the very intimate and private nature of the sexual act? The aim of this wide a range of
section is to outline the psychosocial and community-level processes that groupings as
possible.
underlie the potential impact of participation in strategies such as peer educa-
tion and stakeholder partnerships on sexual health. The case study of the
Summertown HIV-prevention programme which follows below will seek to
illustrate how each of these processes are enabled and constrained by the wider
social context within which communities are located, with particular emphasis
on the unequal power dynamics around which South African societies are
structured – particularly the relationships between men and women and
between rich and poor. The view of participation presented in this chapter is
underpinned by the work of the Brazilian social theorist and activist Paulo
Freire (1970, 1973). He argued that individual change is most likely to occur
when people participate in collective action aiming not only to change them-
selves as individuals but also to challenge those negative social conditions that
undermine their interests and well-being.
In critical
community
interventions it is
crucial that we bear
in mind the unequal
power dynamics
around which South
African societies are
structured –
particularly the
relationships
between men and
or applicable copyright law.
women.
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Critical Psychology
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Social identity:
Social identities
knowledge that one Our social identities consist of those aspects of our self-definitions that arise
belongs to a from our memberships of social groups (eg age-linked peer groups or occupa-
particular social
group. This
tional groups such as mineworker or sex workers) or from our positioning
knowledge usually within networks of power relationships shaped by factors such as gender,
goes together with ethnicity or socioeconomic position. Different identities or positionings are
being engaged in a associated with different behavioural options. Thus, for example, a male
set of group-related
behaviours. It may
identity is associated with a different range of behaviours to a female identity.
also be associated In many contexts, males are allowed to be open about their enjoyment of sex
with a sense of and to behave accordingly. Women are given far less opportunity for public
emotional commit- expression of their sexual desire (the denial of the existence of female sexual
ment to in-group
desire is common in many contexts). A woman is far more likely to behave in
values and a sense
of solidarity with a way that hides her sexual activities from the public eye, particularly if she has
other group several partners. All of these identity-linked behaviours have a range of poten-
members. tial consequences for people’s vulnerability to HIV/Aids.
Peer education
Thus, for example, a group of like-minded women who feel unable to insist on
condom use with their (unfaithful) sexual partners may use peer education
settings as a forum for sharing ideas about ways in which they might assert
themselves in their relationships, or about developing income-generation strate-
or applicable copyright law.
gies which make them less dependent on these men. Such discussions may form
the basis of new systems of norms and values in which women have more confi-
dence and power to protect their sexual health. To cite another example, peer
education might result in a group of young men coming together to discuss the
way in which the social construction of masculinity places pressure on them to
indulge in high-risk sex (by perpetuating the notion that ‘real men are not afraid
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to take risks’). They might make a group decision to challenge this stereotype, Macho:
sharing their uncertainties about where to find condoms and how to use them, description of iden-
and engaging in role-plays to develop strategies for responding to friends who tities or behaviours
might tease them about their new risk-avoiding stance. associated with an
exaggerated
interpretation of
Reconstructing social identities masculinity. In
In other words, social identities are not necessarily static or permanent. In some cases these
certain circumstances they can be changed, and collective action strategies are positive (eg an
exaggerated desire
such as peer education can serve as important strategies for bringing about to provide support
such change (Melucci, 1995). In principle, it should be possible for a group of and protection for
young men or young women to make collective decisions to reconstruct the old one’s family). In
social identities that are not consistent with their health or well-being. others, they may be
negative (eg
However, as will be discussed below, there are variations in the degrees of
exerting undemo-
freedom that people have to change their identities and associated high-risk cratic power over
behaviours. A woman whose sexual partners assist her in supporting herself women, or treating
and her children will have limited freedom to refuse sex with a condom- them as sex objects
resistant partner. A young man whose confidence has been dented by repeated rather than as
equals).
failure to find work might be reluctant to give up the macho identity and
behaviours which place his sexual health at risk but which lead to the approval
and admiration of his youth gang.
Given the close relationship between a person’s social identity and the Power-relations:
power-relations characteristic of the society in which they live, attempts to relations between
individuals or
change identities are most likely to be successful if they take place hand in groups – in a
hand with attempts to challenge the social relations that limit people’s degree hierarchically
of freedom to act in ways that meet their needs and interests. Ideally, as will be structured society –
discussed below, peer education efforts should go hand in hand with more with different levels
of access to wealth,
general efforts to improve people’s material life circumstances or to raise the
political influence
levels of respect and recognition they receive from other social groups, as and/or symbolic
women or as youth, for example. respect and
recognition.
Empowerment
The renegotiation of social identities and associated norms and values needs to
go hand in hand with the development of people’s confidence and ability to act Health-enhancing
on collective decisions to engage in health-enhancing behaviour change. behaviour:
People are most likely to feel they can take control of their sexual health if they all behaviours (eg
have positive experiences of exercising control in other areas of their lives condom use,
seeking appropriate
or applicable copyright law.
(Wallerstein, 1992). Many people, particularly those who are marginalised on treatment for other
the grounds of poverty or gender, may have had few such experiences. Peer STIs) that reduce
education seeks to empower participants by transferring health-related knowl- the chance of HIV-
edge and teaching methods – usually the province of health professionals and infection and
promote good
experts – into the hands of ordinary people. It also provides opportunities for
health.
the exercise of leadership (in local health initiatives) by members of tradition-
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Critical Psychology
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Critical
ally excluded social groups – such as youth out of school or commercial sex
consciousness: workers. In so doing it gives people a sense of ‘ownership’ of the problem of
understanding of HIV/Aids, and increases the likelihood that they will feel the problem is their
the way in which own responsibility rather than the responsibility of the more distant agencies
social circumstances
of government or health departments.
serve as obstacles
to people’s health In addition to promoting a more general sense of empowerment, peer
and well-being. education should also empower participants more directly in relation to
Ideally, such an providing them with the practical skills they need to engage in safe sexual
understanding goes behaviour. For example, youth peer education may include role-plays and
hand-in-hand with a
vision of alternative discussions seeking to enhance participants’ assertiveness or sexual negotia-
social relations in tion techniques, familiarising them with condoms, where to obtain them, how
which people’s to use them, and so on. They may also include discussions of the importance
living and/or of prompt and appropriate treatment for other STIs, as well as familiarising
working conditions
were better, as well
participants with the whereabouts of clinics and preparing them for the more
as some insights embarrassing aspects of the STI clinic encounter, such as having to show one’s
into the strategies private parts to a stranger or having to deal with a clinic nurse who is preju-
that might be used diced against sexually active women or young people, for example.
to make such
changes happen.
Critical thinking
People are far more likely to be able to change their behaviour if they have a
realistic understanding of the obstacles that stand in the way of behaviour
change, a belief that such obstacles can be overcome and a vision of alternative
behavioural options (Freire, 1970, 1973). Such understandings constitute a
state of critical consciousness that Freire argues is a precondition for mobil-
Freire sees a state
of ‘critical ising marginalised groupings in collective action to improve their health. In the
consciousness’ as a context of HIV/Aids, this might involve a group of peers developing under-
precondition for standings of the ways in which factors such as the stigmatisation of sexuality
mobilising margin- and STIs, gender inequalities and poverty undermine their sexual health – and
alised groupings in
collective action.
the development of a vision of social relations that were less damaging of their
‘Critical conscious- well-being. Thus, for example, a successful peer education programme might
ness’ involves a provide a group of men with the opportunity to discuss the way in which the
realistic under- achievement of masculine identities was limited by poverty and unemploy-
standing of the
ment, as discussed above. Through debate and discussion these men may
obstacles to behav-
iour change, a belief develop insights into the way in which they compensate for this by adopting an
that such obstacles overly macho and controlling attitude to women in sexual relationships. Such
can be overcome understandings would form the starting point from which men could collec-
and a vision of
or applicable copyright law.
tively work towards redefining their masculine identities in ways that were less
alternative behav-
ioural options. endangering of their sexual health.
HIV/Aids stigma
A key obstacle to the HIV/Aids prevention struggle is the stigmatisation of
people living with HIV/Aids (Vetten & Bhana, 2001) (see Box 1). The fear and
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loathing of HIV positive people serves to drive the disease even further ‘under- Empowerment:
ground’, discouraging others from going for testing or from facing up to the psychosocial state
possibility that they too could become infected and should therefore take in which a group of
precautions. It also causes untold misery for HIV/Aids sufferers. The area of people feel confi-
dent and motivated
stigma is an important arena for critical thinking and debate, in the interests that they can
of raising people’s awareness of the way in which it serves as a key social achieve important
obstacle to the prevention of HIV and to the support of people living with Aids. goals they set
Ideally, peer education could raise participants’ awareness of the importance of themselves, and
where they have the
creating a climate of tolerance and compassion for people living with Aids and
skills and opportu-
developing understandings of the way in which stigma indirectly serves to nities to do so.
hinder people from taking control of their sexual health.
Community:
BOX 1 The social psychology of stigma group of people
who are united
A combination of fear and ignorance has led to a situation in which many through a common
HIV/Aids sufferers are treated with high levels of disrespect and rejection. Joffe identity, interests
(1999) explains stigma in terms of the human fear of the random and uncertain or geographical
nature of life and death, a fear that is dramatically exaggerated in the context residence. The last
of the HIV/Aids epidemic. She says that people cope with this situation by of these is most
projecting their worst fears onto clearly identifiable out-groups, who are then frequently used in
subjected to prejudice and discrimination. This process of stigmatisation or the field of public
‘othering’ is said to result in feelings of comfort and security. It serves to health and health
distance people who hope that they are HIV/Aids-free from a sense of danger, promotion.
giving them a sense of personal invulnerability to the threat of HIV/Aids, a
threat that might otherwise appear too terrifying to contemplate.
Symbolic power:
extent to which
Community-level processes underlying the impact of participation members of
particular social or
on health identity groups
Dimensions of power have access to
respect and the
What are the community contexts most likely to facilitate the processes of recognition of their
identity reshaping, empowerment and critical consciousness outlined above? worth and dignity
And what contexts are most likely to support the goals of participatory HIV- from other members
prevention strategies such as peer education? The arguments in this section of society. Lack of
symbolic power may
rest on two assumptions. The first is that HIV/Aids often tends to flourish in characterise the life
marginalised social groupings (such as young people or women) (Barnett & situations of poor
Whiteside, 2002). These are the social groupings that often have the least people in a
access to three interrelated dimensions of power – economic power (access to materialist society,
or applicable copyright law.
women in a sexist
money and paid work), political power (access to formal political influence)
society, black
and symbolic power (access to respect and recognition from other social people in a racist
groups). For this reason it is extremely unlikely that groups of multiple- society, or people
disempowered youth or women will have the power or influence to promote living with Aids in a
the development of health-enabling environments without the support and context of
stigmatisation.
assistance of more powerful groups. For this reason it is vitally important that
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Social capital:
community-based HIV-prevention programmes provide opportunities for the
community-level building of alliances or partnerships between local HIV-vulnerable groups and
strengths or more powerful constituencies.
resources such as
trust, mutually
Micro- and macro-dynamics of power
supportive
relationships, a The second assumption is that the HIV/Aids epidemic – with its roots in a
positive local series of complex processes ranging from the micro-dynamics of human sexual
identity and high
levels of partici-
desire to the macro-dynamics of gender, economics and politics – is too
pation in informal complex a problem to be solved by any single constituency, such as peer educa-
and formal social tors or schools or health departments. Addressing the challenge requires the
networks of various co-operation of a wide range of sectors both within local communities and
kinds (eg friends or
between local communities and a range of national and even international
neighbours;
voluntary associa- actors and agencies. Building on these two assumptions, it will be argued
tions linked to below that efforts to engage grassroots communities in collective action to
personal develop- achieve improved sexual health are most likely to succeed in communities
ment; activist
characterised by bonding and bridging social capital, and where strong organ-
organisations).
isational initiatives exist to support the mobilisation of collective action.
Social capital
Health-enabling community contexts
It has been argued that people are most likely to undergo health-enhancing
behaviour change if they live in communities characterised by high levels of
social capital (Baum, 1999). Such ‘health-enabling community contexts’ are
believed to enable and support the renegotiation of social identities and the
development of empowerment and critical consciousness outlined above. Social
capital is defined in terms of participation in local networks and organisations
(Putnam, 2000). These may include informal networks of friends and neigh-
bours, voluntary associations linked with hobbies, leisure and personal
development, or community activist groupings concerned with matters of local
interest. Such participation is associated with increased levels of trust, reciprocal
help and support and a positive local community identity amongst local commu-
nity residents. High levels of local participation are associated with high levels of
Perceived
collective efficacy or perceived citizen power (see Box 2). This is a characteristic
citizen power:
situation in which of communities where people feel that their needs and views are respected and
grassroots people valued and where they have channels to participate in making decisions in the
or applicable copyright law.
believe they have context of the family, school and neighbourhood, as well as influencing wider
the power to
political processes which shape their daily lives (Campbell, 2000).
influence the laws,
policies and events
that shape key Creating new social capital
aspects of their
An important determinant of the success of participatory health promotional
lives.
interventions – such as peer education – is the extent to which they mobilise or
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create social capital. Ideally, peer education programmes mobilise existing Collective efficacy:
sources of social capital by drawing on existing community strengths and power or ability of
networks. Ideally, they also create new social capital in the form of strong and a group (or
collection) of
valued peer education networks. Such networks impact on health directly people to succeed
through their efforts to promote healthy behaviours. They also impact on in achieving goals
health indirectly through creating generalised social cohesion and trust that of mutual interest.
not only increases the likelihood of positive health behaviours (eg condom use
in relation to HIV prevention) but also reduces health-damaging stress (which
may undermine the immune systems of people living with HIV/Aids).
have reduced
Community development approaches and participatory strategies such as peer
opportunities for
education tread a thin line between the processes of enablement (grassroots positive and
community agency) and constraint (structural obstacles resulting from empowering
unequal power relations or resistance to social change by powerful groups). It participation in
is often at the very moment that local community development programmes local community
life.
open up the possibility of the empowerment of local people to take control of
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Bonding social
their sexual health that they simultaneously come up against a series of insti-
capital: tutional barriers to such change.
trusting, supportive
relationships Bonding social capital
(‘bonds’) among
members of a group Jovchelovitch (1996) points to the ‘double-edged’ nature of power. Power can
who live/work in be a negative force, something that constrains people and holds them back.
similar conditions, But it can also be ‘a space of possible action’, where previously marginalised
who feel a sense of
commonness with
local people can act together to maximise their collective voice and their collec-
one another and tive impact. The concept of power is relevant to the distinction between
who have similar bridging and bonding social capital. This distinction provides a useful way of
access to economic, conceptualising the types of local community relationship that might
political and
contribute to the development of a health-enabling community (Putnam,
symbolic power (eg
young people in 2000). Bonding social capital refers to inward-looking social capital located
school; sex workers). within homogenous groups, whose members are united through a common
social identity and similar levels of access to the three forms of social power
outlined above (‘within-group’ social capital). Such social capital binds similar
people together in strong horizontal peer groups characterised by trust, recip-
rocal help and support, and a positive common identity. Such relationships
result in the benefits and resources that flow from close trusting relations with
similar others.
which they are united by their mutual interest in promoting healthy sexual
behaviour in the local community. Bridging social capital ensures that tradi-
tionally isolated and disadvantaged groups (eg young people or sex workers)
are put in touch with vertical networks of political and economic influence and
expertise that will assist them in maximising their efforts to address particular
problems.
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Organisational initiatives
The role of an external change agent
What forces are most likely to initiate and drive forward the processes of indi-
vidual and collective change that Freire cites as the hallmarks of successful
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Critical Psychology
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freely available. The programme aimed to achieve these goals through the
processes outlined above. The first of these was to provide opportunities for
the renegotiation of the social and sexual identities that made it unlikely that
sex workers would assert their health interests in the fact of client reluctance.
This would involve examining the way in which both their identities as
women, in a male-dominated society, and as workers in a highly stigmatised
profession undermined their confidence and their negotiating power. The
programme hoped to increase a sense of empowerment amongst women
through placing health-related knowledge – usually the province of outside
experts – in their hands, and through providing them with the opportunities
to exercise leadership of an important health initiative. The dialogical nature
of the peer education approach would encourage development of a sense of
critical consciousness of the social obstacles to behaviour change, and of the
need for collective action to begin to challenge the ways in which these
impacted negatively on their sexual health.
Finally, and most importantly, the programme sought not only to build
bonding social capital within sex worker communities but also to build
bridging social capital to link sex workers to sources of power and influence
beyond their marginalised local settings. This would be created in two ways.
First, through putting this particular sex worker peer educator group in touch
with other similar groups in the region. Secondly, through involving a wide
range of more powerful local community ‘stakeholders’ in supporting the
or applicable copyright law.
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sex workers. Efforts to promote behaviour change amongst sex workers would
have very limited impact without simultaneous efforts to promote such behav-
iour change amongst men. In addition, the programme sought to reduce
women’s total economic dependence on clients through providing opportuni-
ties for alternative forms of income generation (such as savings clubs and small
business opportunities).
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Yet people were far less likely to use condoms when they had been drinking. There is a need for
Another survival strategy in a context of poverty and violence – where women insights into sys-
had little control over their lives – was an attitude of fatalism. This fatalism tems of incentives
discouraged some women from believing that they had any power to control and accountability
that might motivate
their sexual health. powerful groupings
Attempts to generate alternative means of income generation for women – to collaborate with
through setting up child-care schemes or vegetable stalls in the local shack marginalised
settlement – met with little interest. Sex workers pointed out that fellow shack communities who
residents had already exploited existing commercial opportunities to their have little political
or economic power
utmost limit. They saw mainstream income-generating activities as unre- or influence over
warding drudgery in comparison with sex work which, for all its more powerful
disadvantages, yielded financial rewards which were not only immediate, but stakeholders.
also far in excess of what could be raised in a small business.
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In the HIV/Aids field there is currently a strong social dimensions of disease transmission
emphasis on the importance of involving a wide and prevention.
range of stakeholders in prevention efforts. (3) Programmes benefit when they have skills
Whilst such an emphasis makes excellent theo- and capacity in areas such as organisa-
retical and political sense, much remains to be tional development, project management
learned about the complexities of implementing and conflict mediation – which are re-
multi-stakeholder projects, and how best to quired to coordinate groups who may have
avoid the obstacles that inevitably arise when very different skills and worldviews.
diverse groups of people seek to work together. (4) Collaborative projects need to be backed
Five factors are likely to maximise the success up by health systems infrastructure to
of multi-stakeholder HIV-prevention program- facilitate this coordination.
mes (Campbell, 2003): (5) Projects should ensure that there are well-
(1) There should be equal levels of commit- established incentives and procedures to
ment by all stakeholders. ensure the accountability of stakeholders
(2) Programmes should not be dominated by to each other and to grassroots project
biomedically trained people who do not beneficiaries.
always have a strong understanding of the
A health promo- between this group of women and similar sex worker peer educators in similar
tional strategy of settlements in the region, its goals were crucially undermined by its lack of
community partici- success in building bridging social capital, and in particular in mobilising
pation should seek support from more powerful local constituencies, such as the gold mining
not only to change
the behaviour of
industry and its workers.
individuals but also
to promote the
development of CONCLUSION
‘health-enabling This chapter began by specifying the author’s commitment to contributing to
community and
a health psychology that was ‘critical’ through its commitment (1) to high-
social contexts’
which support lighting how social conditions often make it very difficult for people to behave
people’s efforts to in health-enhancing ways; and (2) to broadening the individualistic focus of
be healthy. traditional health psychology to take account of this insight. Within this
context the chapter has focused on community participation as a health
promotional strategy which seeks not only to change the behaviour of individ-
uals but also to promote the development of ‘health-enabling community and
social contexts’ which support people’s efforts to be healthy.
This interest in community participation has been located within the
or applicable copyright law.
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particular emphasis on the way in which these processes are enabled and
constrained by unequal power-relations. The chapter has illustrated the way in
which this conceptual framework informed the evaluation of a community-led
peer education programme amongst sex workers in South Africa. In this
programme, peer education failed to achieve its intended effects in reducing
levels of HIV and other STDs.
One of the many lessons arising from this case study relates to the impor-
tance of building bridging social capital. This lesson highlights the limitations
of behaviour change programmes which focus narrowly on psychosocial and
community-level processes without succeeding in mobilising more powerful
actors and agencies (both inside and outside the community) to assist in
working towards programme goals. The brief case study provided above sought
to highlight the ways in which poverty, stigma and gender oppression under-
mined attempts to promote the collective identity and critical empowerment of
sex workers that underlie successful peer education. Within such a context, it
was unlikely that marginalised sex workers would succeed in improving their
sexual health without significant efforts to change the behaviour of their
psychologically and economically more powerful male clients, for example.
or applicable copyright law.
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Hierarchy:
Collective action by members of marginalised social groupings is unlikely to be
set of social effective in the absence of alliances with more powerful social groupings, which
relations characte- have access to the economic and political power necessary for the success of
rised by an unequal programme goals. As stated earlier in the chapter, attempts to drive social
distribution of
economic power
change through ‘bottom-up’ strategies are unlikely to be successful unless they
and/or political are reinforced by parallel ‘top-down’ efforts to promote the kinds of social
influence. In many changes which are necessary to maximise the possibility of health for all.
societies hierarchical This emphasis on the need for a combination of bottom-up and top-down
social relations can
efforts to promote social change for health is consistent with the UN Aids
be symbolised by a
triangle, with the (2000) analysis of the common features of initiatives that have succeeded in
numerical majority reducing HIV transmission. This analysis highlights the mobilisation and
of less powerful participation of local communities as a necessary precondition for successful
people occupying
HIV prevention. However, on its own, it is not a sufficient condition. Commu-
the broad base of
the triangle, and a nity action is not a ‘magic bullet’. The UN Aids report emphasises that the
decreasing number potential for grassroots participation to bring about health-enhancing social
of increasingly change is shaped and constrained by the quality of the partnerships or alliances
powerful people that local communities develop with a wide range of actors – in government,
occupying the space
as one moves the private sector, civil society and (where appropriate) among project donors.
towards the Participants and facilitators of social psychological and community-level inter-
triangle’s sharp tip. ventions – such as peer education – need to stand side-by-side with a much
wider range of agencies and actors if they are to have optimal benefits in
reducing health inequalities and improving the health of marginalised groups.
The UN Aids emphasis on the role of appropriate alliances and partner-
ships in successful community health interventions resonates with frequently
voiced criticisms of many so-called community action programmes that seek
only to promote local grassroots participation in community health projects.
Such programmes are condemned for failing to pay adequate attention to the
way in which the ability of marginalised communities to improve their health
is constrained by political and economic power relations that lie beyond the
boundaries or influence of local communities (Campbell & Mzaidume, 2001).
They are also criticised for failing to take steps to challenge the political and
economic inequalities that often prevent marginalised people from improving
their health. They have also been charged with ‘victim-blaming’ through
suggesting that politically and economically disempowered groupings are
capable of taking control of their health – when in fact the social contexts in
which they live make it unlikely that they can do so (Seedat, 2001). The sex
or applicable copyright law.
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terrains such as economics, politics, social policy and development studies. Such Collective action by
links are essential for the development of understandings and strategies for members of
synthesising top-down and bottom-up efforts to create community contexts marginalised social
which are most likely to support and enable healthy sexual behaviours. groupings is
unlikely to be
effective in the
Critical thinking tasks
absence of alliances
1. Speculate about some of the economic, political and legal obstacles to with more powerful
effective HIV-prevention in South Africa. To what extent do existing laws social groupings,
which have access
and social policies (in fields such as health, welfare, education, gender and
to the economic
social development) provide an effective starting point for the fight against and political power
HIV, or to what extent are new laws and policies necessary? Which factors necessary for the
stand in the way of the implementation of those positive laws and policies success of
that already exist? programme goals.
2. What kinds of top-down social change are necessary to support the
psychosocial and community-level processes underlying local collective
action, particularly in relation to the challenges of reducing the spread of
HIV and of providing better care and support for people living with Aids?
3. Many would argue that the key factors that facilitate HIV-transmission and
the stigmatisation of people living with Aids lie beyond the disciplinary
boundaries of critical psychology. Outline how you would respond to a
critic who said that psychology had no role to play in the struggle to limit
HIV-transmission in South Africa.
4. Speculate about the processes and mechanisms by which ‘perceived citizen
power’ may (or indeed may not) impact on people’s health – either in terms
of reducing health-damaging stress or in terms of increasing the likelihood
that people will engage in health-enhancing behaviours.
Recommended readings
For a fuller outline of the conceptual arguments laid out in this chapter see
Catherine Campbell (2003) Letting them die: Why HIV/Aids prevention
programmes often fail (Cape Town: Double Storey/Juta). This book also
provides an illustration of the way in which this conceptual framework has
been used to understand the challenges of HIV-prevention amongst youth and
mineworkers, as well as the complexities of creating bridging social capital
amongst the residents of marginalised local communities and more powerful
social actors and agencies.
or applicable copyright law.
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Chapter
14
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LEARNING OUTCOMES
By the end of this chapter, you should be able to:
Explore the historical interface between South African psychology and racism
during the pre-apartheid period
Understand the factors that influenced South African psychology’s active contribu-
tions to and ongoing perpetuation of racist ideologies during the apartheid years
Examine the future prospects for deracialising South African psychology at the
organisational, academic and professional levels.
or applicable copyright law.
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South African psychology and racism: Historical determinants and future prospects
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INTRODUCTION
Two basic aspects of critical psychology
As way of beginning we might isolate two fundamental aspects of critical
psychology. One is an issue of content – a question of subject-matter, the other
is a means of access – a matter of approach. To deal with the content issues
first, critical psychology, is, at its most basic, about the power-relationships
constituted by psychology as a form of knowledge and practice. In the South
African context, this means that a pre-eminent objective of critical psychology
is the critique of how the knowledge, the practice and the organisational struc-
ture of psychology itself came to perpetuate what must be South Africa’s most
characteristic form of power: racism. This, after all, is the particular form of
social asymmetry that has come to condition virtually all aspects of social exis- Social asymmetry:
tence in our country. The second aspect of our attentions here concerns the lack of balance or
symmetry in
question of approach, a method of critical psychology. And the particular
relations of social
means of access we have in mind here, as exemplified in the works of Rose power.
(1991, 1995), is that of historical overview and, more precisely, an overview of
the institutional history of South African psychology. In other words, we are
here concerned not only with the kinds of knowledge produced by the disci-
pline – although this is, of course, of overwhelming importance – we are
concerned also with its own formal and informal conditions of restraint,
oppression and omission, that is, South African psychology’s own inner
politics.
In view of the above approach, then, this chapter traces the history and
trajectory of South African psychology, focusing on its ideological complicity
with the broader racist conditions and discourses that characterised apartheid
South Africa. After examining the history of South African psychology as both
instrument and outcome of the apartheid state, this chapter interrogates the
degree to which South African psychology may be extricated from the racism
so overtly identifiable in its formative years. The possibilities for the establish-
ment of a ‘new’ South African psychology as a discipline of equity and
liberation rather than as an instrument of continued exclusionary practice
inform the concluding discussions of the chapter.
Defining racism
As will become apparent in the chapter, there are a great many types of racism,
or applicable copyright law.
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Critical Psychology
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Racism:
we clarify exactly what we mean by racism. Here, as elsewhere (Duncan, Van
ideology by means Niekerk, De la Ray & Seedat, 2001), we understand racism to be an ideology by
of which racial means of which racial domination is organised and justified. In more precise
domination is organ- terms, and following Foster (1991), we see racism as
ised and justified.
More precisely, a set [a]n ideology through which the domination or marginalization of certain ‘races’
of ideas and discur- by another ‘race’ or ‘races’ is enacted and legitimated ... a set of ideas and discur-
sive and material sive and material practices aimed at (re)producing and justifying systematic
practices aimed at inequalities between ‘races’ or racialized groups (Duncan, Van Niekerk, De la Ray
(re)producing and
& Seedat, 2001, 2).
justifying systematic
inequalities between This approach to racism has at least two distinct advantages. First, it highlights
‘races’ or racialised
groups. Inextricably
the widespread issues of power related to the maintenance, functioning and
tied to processes of perpetuation of racism (Thompson, 1984). In much the same way, it indicates
social, political and the very pervasiveness of racism. Furthermore, despite enormous disagree-
economic domina- ments about the nature of racism, this approach emphasises an aspect that
tion/marginalisa-
most social scientists agree on, namely that racism is linked to processes of
tion, racism involves
skewed relations of social, political and economic domination and marginalisation (Thompson,
power in all spheres 1984). Hence, racism involves systematically skewed relations of power in all
of social major spheres of social organisation. Lastly, despite it seeming an obvious
organisation.
point, one needs to emphasise that any act of racism is an act which has a
victim and a beneficiary. Put slightly differently, in Memmi’s (1982) terms, the
ideology of racism operates ‘to the benefit of the racist and to the detriment of
Ideology: his/her victims’. The benefits that accrued to whites as a result of apartheid,
set of ideas and and the massively destructive effects that racist policies had, and continue to
discursive and have, on the material, social and psychological reality of black South Africans
material practices more than attest to this fact.
aimed at
(re)producing and
justifying certain PSYCHOLOGY AND RACISM PRIOR TO 1994
systematic social
Psychology at the service of humanity
inequalities
between groups of Since its birth more than a century ago, psychology has, in the words of Nell
people. (1990), been viewed as the ‘bright morning science’ (128). Psychologists, in the
same vein, have been seen as ‘eager young scientific evangelists’ (129) offering
up knowledge and delivering humankind towards a ‘shining world’ (129), free
of human suffering and pain. A reading of most basic psychology texts penned
by apartheid era South African psychologists (see, for example, Du Toit & Van
der Merwe, 1976; Louw, 1987; Tyson, 1987) and quite a number of ‘specialist’
or applicable copyright law.
texts (see, for example, Kriegler, 1988; Mauer, 1987; South African Institute of
Clinical Psychology [SAICP], 1986; Strümpfer, 1981), would show that, while
Nell’s choice of words might be somewhat unusual, he was not far off the mark
in his description of the role generally attributed to and claimed by psycholo-
gists and their discipline. A close reading of these texts would show that, in the
main, psychology was traditionally seen as playing ‘an ... important role in the
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South African psychology and racism: Historical determinants and future prospects
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solving of human problems’ (Atkinson, Atkinson & Hilgard, 1983, 5), striving
for ‘the preservation and protection of fundamental human rights’ (SAICP,
34), and being of benefit to humanity (cf Suffla, Stevens & Seedat, 2001).
The School must equip the Bantu to meet the demands which the economic life of South Africa will impose
upon him ... there is no place for him in the European community above the level of certain forms of labour.
What is the use of teaching a Bantu child mathematics when it cannot use it in practice? That is absurd
(Verwoerd, cited in Harrison, 1981, 194).
The collusion of psychology with racism during the apartheid period has been
widely documented in a range of reviews and studies (e.g. Baldwin-Ragaven et
al, 1999; Cooper, Nicholas, Seedat & Statman, 1990; Duncan, 2001; Durrheim
& Mokeki, 1997; Magwaza, 2001; Nicholas, 1990, 2001; Seedat, 2001; Suffla et
al, 2001). Given space constraints, we shall not provide an in-depth discussion
of these reviews and studies here. However, by way of illustration, we shall
briefly consider some of the key findings of five of these studies (also see Boxes
or applicable copyright law.
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available for an inquiry into the ‘poor white’ problem. The inquiry involved
various social scientists, including a significant number of psychologists. This
inquiry, in the words of Louw (in Cooper et al, 1990), certainly provided South
African psychologists ‘with the opportunity to prove their usefulness in the
solution of societal problems’ (3 – 4). However, through its choice of the ‘poor
white’ problem as the social problem most deserving of attention, and through
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very basic forms of discourses and material practices (Essed, 1987; Katz, 1976; Van Dijk, 1991). It
knowing, of is important that we bear a series of fundamental facts in mind here. First,
understanding, of racism permeated all facets of the lives of everyone in South Africa during the
making sense of the
world, which carry a period of apartheid. Secondly, we need be aware of the social class positions of
great deal of weight psychologists in apartheid South Africa, that is, predominantly that of the
in a given society. white middle class, and therefore among the principal beneficiaries of
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apartheid racism. (At the end of the 1970s less than two percent of all regis-
tered psychologists in South Africa were black (Ebersohn, 1983) and at the end
of the 1980s blacks constituted a mere ten per cent of all registered psycholo-
gists (Seedat, 1990).) Thirdly, that such psychologists were the products of an
irredeemably racist society would have made it very likely that South African
psychology would have been motivated to support and in fact reproduce
aspects of the apartheid state’s racist practices and policies. Fourthly, South
African psychology formed part of an international psychology community
that, to this day, still struggles to come to terms with, and consequently, to free
itself of the fetters of, its past collusion with racism in its various manifesta-
tions (Holdstock, 2001; Howitt & Owusu-Bempah, 1994).
There is nothing either in the history of domestic animals or in that of evolution to make us doubt that a
race of sane men may be formed who shall be as much superior mentally and morally to the modern European,
as the modern European is to the lowest of the Negro races (Galton, 1869, x).
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Psychology has
in his Principles of psychology (1870), argued that ‘selective breeding’ was
been complicit with necessary to eliminate ‘unfit’ ‘races’ (Howitt & Owusu-Bempah, 1994). In his
racism, either thinking, black people were inferior to ‘the least worthy white person’ (Howitt
through the & Owusu-Bempah, 1994, 5). Similar to Spencer, Edward Thorndike, who is
advancement of
overtly racist
frequently lauded as a pioneer in the fields of educational and child psychology,
theories and advocated the compulsory sterilisation of the poor and underprivileged ‘races’
discourses or as an alternative to other possible psychological and educational interventions
through a (Howitt & Owusu-Bempah, 1994) (also see Box 3). Another educational
misleading pose of
psychologist, Arthur Jensen, also proposed a variation of Spencer’s basic thesis.
‘scientific
detachment’ which Specifically, he argued that impoverished black American children performed
has served as a more poorly on learning tasks than their more privileged white counterparts,
‘smokescreen for not because of their depressed environments and racial discrimination but
psychology’s racist
because they were genetically inferior to whites (Holdstock, 2001).
work’ (Howitt &
Owus-Bempah,
1994). Psychology and genocide
From the 1930s, the discipline of psychology also appeared to provide Nazi
Germany with some of its most ‘authoritative’ ‘scientific’ justifications for its
genocidal policies which, as we know, culminated in the activation of the ‘final
solution’. In fact, ‘Nazism deferred consistently to the expertise of psychology
in making some of its most genocidal decisions’ (Howitt & Owusu-Bempah,
1994, 20). It comes as little surprise, then, that the discipline of psychology
burgeoned under German National Socialism between 1932 and 1942 (Guil-
laumin, 2002; Howitt & Owusu-Bempah, 1994).
It was within this international context, characterised by the overt collu-
sion between North American and European psychology and the most
inhumane forms and processes of brute racism, genocide and misanthropy,
that South African psychology was born and established itself. It was with this
community of psychology that South African psychology identified and within
which it ensconced itself.
imply that all psychologists, by virtue of their location in South African society,
necessarily would have succumbed to the influence of apartheid racism, and
that they would not have opposed it. That would obviously be too simplistic a
perception to be of much help. As Van Dijk (1987) argues, social scientists’
responses to social inequalities are generally relatively variable and at times
conflict out-and-out with prevailing dominant ideological positions. This is
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largely attributable to the fact that social scientists do not constitute a homog-
enous group (Therborn, 1980). For example, while the majority of
psychologists in apartheid South Africa emanated from the apartheid-
privileged ‘white’ ‘racial’ group and could consequently have been expected
generally to support the policies that favoured them or their group (Seedat,
1990), it could also have been expected that there would have been a number
of psychologists who, because of their links with or, possibly, membership of
the apartheid designated ‘ssubaltern’ racialised groups or, perhaps because of Subaltern:
the dictates of perceived professional ethics and traditions (given the generic term for all
those groups that
dominant view of psychology as a ‘helping’ profession) would have opposed
have been made
these policies (Simon, 1982; Van Dijk, 1991). There were quite a few singular subordinate in
representatives of this grouping of psychologists (Magwaza, 2001). terms of class,
However, to minimise the potential threat which this latter group of gender, race,
ethnicity, religion,
psychologists could have posed to the maintenance of the prevailing racialised
caste etc.
power relations, the apartheid state created many external restraints or checks
to ensure its control over this group as well as the latter’s academic and profes-
sional activities and productions (Baldwin-Ragaven, 1999; Savage, 1981;
Seedat, 1990; Welsh, 1981). This leads to the rest of the factors which might
have had some influence on South African psychology’s responses to the
racism endemic to apartheid society.
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also be considered to have had the potential of limiting their ability to respond
to issues such as racism in a critical manner (Baldwin-Ragaven et al, 1999;
Seedat, 1990). In his content analysis of the articles published over a five-year
period in what was certainly the most progressive psychology journal at the
time, namely, Psychology in society, Seedat (1990), for example, noted that
very few of these articles in fact dealt with the issue of racism. Moreover, none
of the handful of articles dealing with racism so much as mentioned the contri-
butions in this field of study of any black psychologist of note: not even the
works of Bulhan and Fanon, who are both acknowledged as pioneers in the
field of the psychology of racism (Seedat, 1990).
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Apartheid has
come and gone but
racism remains a
reality for most
South Africans.
It manifests itself
in all facets of
human activity.
jailing them, the HSRC appeared to have tried to keep the rest in line by means
of the bestowal or withholding of the funds which it had at its disposal.
Various academics in fact openly accused the HSRC of victimising social
scientists who were critical of the South African government’s policies (espe-
cially its policy of apartheid) by refusing to grant them research funding (cf
Cloete et al, 1986). Now, even though it would be difficult to prove the veracity
of these allegations – the HSRC typically only recorded the studies that it
funded and not those that it did not fund – what is important here is the fact
that for a very long time many social scientists were firmly convinced of this
bias on the part of the HSRC (Cooper et al, 1990). Needless to say, this factor
must have played a significant role in the type of research and publications on
racism that these social scientists produced (cf Baldwin-Ragaven et al, 1999).
Even though it cannot be proved that the HSRC, in its allocation of study
grants, was systematically biased against academic endeavours that were
critical of the apartheid government’s policies, this organisation none the less
had a reputation for being unscrupulously loyal to the government when
editing the reports of projects that it had funded (Cloete et al, 1986). Research
reveals a number of instances where the HSRC had in fact refused to publish
or applicable copyright law.
reports of research conducted with its funds where these reports listed banned
publications in their bibliographies or where they were too critical of govern-
ment policies (Savage, 1981; Welsh, 1981). This bias is, of course, completely
understandable if it is considered that the HSRC’s primary sponsor was the
government and that it was largely controlled by National Party intellectuals
(Cloete & Muller, 1991; Welsh, 1981).
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Publishing as constraint
Publications can be considered to constitute one of the most vital aspects of
academic – and, in particular, research – activity. Publications provide
academics with the opportunity to subject their productions to peer evaluation
and public scrutiny. Furthermore, publications can also be considered to be of
vital importance because they constitute an important criterion for the
appointment and promotion of most academics. In fact, apart from academic
qualifications, publications seem to have always been the single most impor-
tant measure of academics’ worth (Seedat, 1990).
If, however, publications have always represented an important measure of
the academic’s abilities, then, by the same token, they potentially also consti-
tuted one of the biggest obstacles to critical and independent thinking with
which the apartheid-era academic had to contend. Precisely because they were
so important to academics, publications inevitably became the means by
which the apartheid state, through overt and covert pressure on publishing
agencies, universities’ publications boards, and the editorial boards of main-
stream subject journals, could ensure that academics did not pose too much of
a threat to the policies of the government of the day. Consider here, for
or applicable copyright law.
example, the following illustrations: during the early 1970s, the Oxford Univer-
sity Press decided to excise Leo Kuper’s chapter on African Nationalism from
its publication, The Oxford history of South Africa; and this simply because it
contained too many quotations from banned sources (Kuper, 1974; Savage,
1981)! In 1965, a post-graduate student at the University of Pretoria experi-
enced similar problems when submitting a thesis for evaluation and
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publication. Here the problem apparently was that his thesis contained too
many quotations from individuals restricted under the Suppression of
Communism Act. The University of Pretoria ultimately decided that while the
thesis would be examined, the student would not be allowed to have it
published (Welsh, 1981).
Twenty years later, a University of Cape Town academic psychologist, Don
Foster and other collaborators produced a report on detentions and torture in
apartheid South Africa. However, when Foster presented the report at the
Psychological Association of South Africa’s 1985 Conference, it came under
severe public condemnation by the Minister of Police, who had received
advanced warning of the report. Many fellow-psychologists continued the
attack in the ensuing period. Faced by this type of pressure, it should be
expected that very few academics would have been willing to undertake
research on a ‘contentious’ issue such as racism (cf Chesler, 1976).
Professional organisations
The professional psychology organisations that functioned in apartheid South
Africa all had relatively short life spans, and histories that were not particularly
commendable. In order to appreciate these organisations’ potential impact on
South African psychology’s research, training and authorship endeavours,
especially in relation to racism, it would perhaps be apposite to consider
briefly some of the more pertinent aspects of this history. (For a more detailed
account of the history of these organisations see Baldwin-Ragaven et al (1999),
Cooper, et al (1990), Nicholas (1990), and Suffla, et al (2001).)
The first organisation that attempted to organise and represent psychol-
ogists in South Africa, the South African Psychological Association (SAPA),
was founded in 1948 (Ebersohn, 1983). At its establishment it had a total
membership of 34 psychologists, all of whom were white. Soon after its
formation, however, SAPA was confronted by – in the organisation’s own
perception – a major problem. Somehow the association, when drawing up
its constitution, had omitted to specify whether membership would be
restricted to whites or not. When the question of black psychologists’ affilia-
tion to SAPA consequently arose, the executive of the association did not
know what it stood to do. SAPA’s membership itself was effectively split in
two. On the one hand, there were those who contended that when the asso-
ciation was formed the assumption had been that its membership would be
or applicable copyright law.
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debate – in which black psychologists were not once asked to present their
views – SAPA eventually decided, in principle, to open its doors to black
South African psychologists. Very revealing to note here, however, is the fact
that one of the more important factors that ultimately led to this decision
was the fear of jeopardising the association’s membership of the Interna-
tional Union of Scientific Psychology (J. Louw, 1987; Nicholas, 1990;
Psygram, 1960).
divided, with each organisation publishing its own journals and organising
its own congresses, they collaborated in various ways, such as the hosting
of joint conferences and the establishment of a single statutory council to
register psychologists (Nicholas, 1990). In 1983, just more than two decades
and several changes to the South African political scenario later, the two
associations merged to form one organisation, namely, the Psychological
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Association of South Africa (PASA), which was open to all South African
psychologists. Given organised psychology’s patent failure to create the
conditions for the training of black psychologists, however, there were not
many blacks from whose ranks PASA could recruit members (Nicholas, 1990).
PASA too would seem to have made itself guilty (albeit less flagrantly) of this
(mal)practice. Consider here, for example, Biesheuvel’s (1987) keynote address
to PASA’s annual congress in 1986. Certainly, in this address, Biesheuvel (1987)
did not make an overt appeal to psychologists to support and legitimise
apartheid in the way that Robbertse (1968) did. However, to the extent that he,
in this speech, exhorted psychologists to steer clear of politics and of criticising
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social construct and to utilise methodologies and analyses that were frequently
devoid of any critical assessment of racism. In addition, less than one-third of
the total submissions during this period dealt with ‘race’ or racism, with even
fewer having ‘race’ or racism as a central focus. This trend is extremely discon-
certing, given that many of the institutional constraints on psychologists
referred to in the previous section had all but disappeared, and given that
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Holdstock (2000) advances an argument that (1992) cite a study conducted in the late
the practice and knowledge of psychology often Thirties which concluded that ‘objective data
operate as something of a ‘prism’ for politics. point to a marked inferiority on the part of the
Psychologists, he argues, are not neutral truth Native in comparison with Europeans’ (63). In
seekers who follow a value-free pursuit of the same study ‘white’ poverty was understood
knowledge. Rather, it is the case that as a result of the conflict between civilised and
psychology as a ‘neutral science’ can and has uncivilised races. Further still, Nicholas (2001)
been diverted, ‘hijacked’ to serve causes that observes that on the basis of research findings
many psychologists would abhor. Furthermore, such as this, prominent SA psychologists
he draws on Gill & Levidov (1987) to argue that endorsed racial segregation and even recom-
the distinction between science and politics is mended that penalties be imposed on sexual
false in that psychology often replicates and intercourse between races. South African
reproduces precisely the patterns of greater psychology of that time is hence rightly referred
social asymmetry set in place by politics. The to as ‘an apartheid psychology’ in that it could
flourishing of psychology in the apartheid era is, not be freed from the ideology on which it was
for him, a case in point. He (2000) cites Louw’s based, and within which it functioned. Hence
(1997) suggestion that psychological testing the South African situation ‘illustrates in no
played an important role in legitimising uncertain fashion the dangers involved in a
apartheid’s policies – particularly those of psychology that claims to be a science free of
education. Nicholas (1990, 1993) provides values and without acknowledgement of its
ample evidence of how psychological knowledge, ideological foundation’ (Holdstock, 2000, 58).
about racial intelligence, for example, was Underscoring his argument he reiterates that
or applicable copyright law.
produced to serve the ideological interests of ‘Political priorities guide and eventually deter-
the state. As Duncan, Van Niekerk, De la Rey & mine what is regarded as science and what is
Seedat (2001) point out, psychological research researched. Supposedly value-neutral science
into group differences in intelligence informed can ... serve racist society in many subtle ways
racist government policies in the 1920s and and engages the teacher and pupil in main-
1930s. In a further example, Louw & Foster taining structural racism’ (Holdstock, 2000, 57).
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Academic prospects
A further facet of psychology in which racism has historically been embedded
and perpetuated is through the academic pursuits of research and publishing.
Whilst the skewed racialised patterns of knowledge-production have to some
extent been challenged through recent initiatives, research and publishing
remain areas that will require serious redress if we are to prevent the rein-
scription of racialised patterns of knowledge-production.
In the past several years, numerous authorship initiatives have been estab-
lished and successfully completed involving the inclusion of previously
marginalised groups such as women and black authors (see for example,
Duncan, Seedat, Van Niekerk, Gobodo-Madikezela, Simbayi & Bhana, 1997;
Duncan, Van Niekerk, De la Rey & Seedat, 2001; Duncan, Gqola, Hofmeyr,
Shefer, Malunga & Mashige, 2002). Such developments have found a fertile
ground for a number of reasons. First, the publishing context is no longer char-
acterised by the same degree of constraints that existed during the apartheid
period. In fact, black and female authors have been actively courted by some
publishing houses, as they attempt to diversify their authorship portfolios to
reflect South African society more appropriately, so as to increase their profits.
Secondly, previously marginalised authors are now asserting themselves more
visibly, especially in receptive contexts that are coupled with mentorship and
in the presence of a growing body of work that indicates that black and female
scholarship can be successfully undertaken in South Africa. With regard to
research funding, direct funding from the various science councils in South
Africa aimed at increasing the number of black, female and emerging
researchers has increased significantly, thereby increasing access to grants that
were previously not available to large sectors of the research community.
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Symbolic racism:
Cobbing, 2001); and the negative experience of black academics in mainstream
systematic circula- publications has often resulted in their either avoiding publication processes
tion of values, or publishing on the margins of the discipline. Where black academics do find
representations and themselves in positions at historically privileged, white universities, they are
ideas that are
antagonistic towards
also often perceived as affirmative action appointments. The negative attitudes
a certain grouping and opposition to this type of equity process frequently result in such candi-
of people. Symbolic dates being characterised as underqualified and unworthy of the position
racism also takes (Franchi, 2002), thereby further marginalising them to the fringes of potential
very insidious forms,
such as the constant
publication processes. Ultimately, racialised patterns of knowledge-production
devaluation or continue to be perpetuated, and no doubt impact on the content of research
marginalisation of conducted in South African psychology.
ideals and values With regard to research and research funding, black academics are increas-
traditionally associ-
ated with a
ingly being expected to function on the same playing field as many white
particular racial academics, often without their historical disadvantage being considered or
grouping of people. adequately redressed. This denial of and failure to acknowledge the impact and
legacy of racism, as well as the consequent resistance to processes of redress,
can themselves be construed as expressions of symbolic racism (Sears, 1988).
Holdstock (2000) distinguishes between a and pathology. The black family has ... become
series of different types of racism as perpetu- the primary focus of social pathology’ (32).
ated by psychology. Biological racism, to Symbolic racism refers to the circulation of
begin with, ‘expresses itself in terms of the values, representations, ideas that are antago-
notion of a defective genetic structure’ (32). nistic towards a certain grouping of people.
This form of racism is based on a series of Edward Said (1978), for example, calls our
constructions of physical, bodily or genetic attention to the ongoing circulation of
notions of inferiority. Cultural racism refers to negative racial stereotypes of Arabs within the
the degradation of and assault on another American news media, as an example of sym-
race’s culture, their history, language, arts, bolic racism. Importantly, however, symbolic
their modes of expression, their traditional racism also takes very insidious forms, such as
values and ideals as inferior or worthless. Hold- the constant devaluation or marginalisation of
stock provides an example here (2000) – ‘for ideals and values traditionally associated with a
instance ... black family culture has been particular racial grouping.
demeaned as the focus of allegations of deficit
Biological racism: Holdstock (2000) also refers to the concepts of metaracism, aversive racism
or applicable copyright law.
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The role of language is also a major issue here – the continued assertion of Cultural racism:
English as the language of instruction and publication in mainstream systematic
psychology in South Africa obviously favours certain groups over others. degradation of
Furthermore, the introduction of rating systems for researchers by various another race’s
culture, history,
science councils further entrenches research hierarchies, which are then language, arts,
invariably racialised. In addition, the growing pressures to ‘publish or perish’ modes of expression
impacts negatively on the content of research being conducted in many or traditional values
instances. Often, critical social theorising is abandoned for more sterile forms and ideals as
inferior or
of social inquiry, thereby limiting the value of the research as it pertains to
worthless.
deeply entrenched social phenomena such as racism. Even though legal
censorship no longer acts as an obstacle, it is clear that internal forms of
censure still function in an insidious manner to limit critical social theorising Aversive racism:
and publications, as academics are increasingly compelled to ‘write for the form of racism that
market’. Van Dijk (1987) recognises that social scientists’ responses to social centres not on
inequalities such as racism are relatively variable, and it is important to note intentionally
destructive
that South African psychologists remain racialised social agents that have
behaviours but
either benefited from or been disadvantaged through racism, even in post- rather on avoidance
apartheid South Africa. However, whatever the degree of variability in of people of other
responses and the levels of benefit or disadvantage, psychologists’ responses races, or of issues
to racism are likely to continue to reflect the dominant social responses to this or social problems
of racism.
phenomenon in contemporary South Africa. This is critical, as South African
society has thus far generated no comprehensive and systematic strategy
to address the legacy of racism, other than through constitutional and legisla-
Metaracism:
tive guarantees and sporadic interventions by a few community-based not explicit or
organisations. overly prejudiced
form of racism,
Professional prospects rather the
acquiescence in a
A further critical realm within which the interface between psychology and larger culture that
racism is maintained is within the training of professionals. It is in this arena continues the
that the reproduction and transmission of certain forms of knowledge occur, perpetuation of
where professional psychologists are able discursively to perpetuate this racist ideas and
values.
relationship.
With regard to training of psychologists in South Africa, most tertiary insti-
tutions in South Africa have (for whatever reasons) adopted some form of
Regressive racism:
employment equity policy that has increased the number of black staff involved racism of emotional
in the training of students, especially at previously privileged, white institu- arousal, when more
or applicable copyright law.
tions. In addition, several institutions have also attempted to incorporate more sophisticated and
contextually appropriate models of training that are more responsive to the insidious forms of
racism fail, and a
psychosocial needs of a South African population, with varying degrees of prejudice of strong
success. Finally, with regard to standardising training in South Africa, decisions emotion, ie hate,
pertaining to earlier exit points for students – for example, a four-year qualifi- predominates.
cation to practise as opposed to a six-year qualification – also creates the
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Discursively:
potential to broaden the base of potential service deliverers in many communi-
through the means ties that have been historically underresourced.
of ‘knowledge’, that
is, through the The continued use of European and US-American models
means of formal or
informal kinds of Despite the above initiatives, several structural and ideological obstacles
understanding of continue to exist. Stevens (2001) points out that despite the discourses of
the world. transformation and social relevance within professional training courses for
clinicians, most institutions continue to use European and US-American
models that are not always congruent with the context of practice in South
Africa. The result for many black candidates is an alienating and ambiguous
experience, after which they struggle to integrate training within their contexts
Selected focus: of service delivery. Stevens (2001, 53) notes that:
insidious form of
racism in which the This alienates [black] practitioners from organic knowledge that they may have
knowledges acquired as products of these contexts, but also alienates the users from the prac-
produced by South titioner and the discipline.
African psychology
have traditionally Furthermore, the content of most training programmes does not actively facil-
focused on the itate addressing the psychosocial priorities for the majority of people in South
issues and problems Africa. In this sense, training frequently retains its focus on individualised
germane to the
white population,
interventions, and aspirant clinicians are ‘socialised’ into rationalising this
and that have deficit in training. The comment amongst aspirant clinicians that ‘they may
rendered the black not be able to contribute to solving the major psychosocial priorities facing the
subject marginal, if populace, but they would be content with enhancing the functioning of just
not in fact totally
one person’ is not an uncommon articulation, but it does reflect the challenges
invisible. How
South African in transforming training in South Africa to become truly more responsive to
psychology has the legacy of racism as well as to other psychosocial priorities.
been put to work
caring predomi- The continued existence of racialised professional divisions
nantly for ‘white
patients’ in unequal As part of its regulatory functions, PsySSA has focused on a range of issues,
and segregated including training, education and credentialling. In recognising the need to
mental health create greater accessibility to psychological services for the broad population,
services.
earlier exit points for psychology students are being envisaged at the end of
their fourth year of study. While this appears to be addressing a need at face
value, there has been a simultaneous extension of professional training by an
additional year at a doctoral level. In so doing, the possibilities for excluding
candidates (many of whom would be black) increases, due to the additional
or applicable copyright law.
expenses and time costs associated with professional training. The potential
for reinscribing racialised division between predominantly white professionals
and black fourth-year graduates therefore becomes a highly plausible, and
highly worrying, outcome in the future. The role of professional organisations
in perpetuating certain patterns of racialisation within professional training
should not be underestimated, as is evident from our earlier discussion.
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South African psychology and racism: Historical determinants and future prospects
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It is not only the case that South African patients’ in massively unequal and segregated
psychology may be characterised, retrospec- mental health services. Similarly, ‘selected
tively, by a blatant historical racism; it remains focus’ refers to how knowledge has been
threatened to this day by more insidious forms of produced in South African psychology, in ways
racism. Stevens (2001) identifies two strategies that render the black subject marginal, if not
of this ongoing racism: ‘racial expertise’ and totally invisible. The exception to this form of
‘selected focus’. ‘Racial expertise’ refers to the exclusion was the situation where blacks were
nearly complete correspondence between ‘white- objectified as workers, re-examined in such a
ness’ and expertise. In clinical training, for way that the black psychic make-up was ‘made
example, the trainability of potential black to fit into and serve colonial industry’ (Terre
students was the preserve of white gatekeepers, Blanche & Seedat, 2001, 74). It is in view of
who would select candidates according to critical analysis such as this that Duncan, Van
cultural constructs such as psychological sophis- Niekerk, De la Rey & Seedat (2001) warn that
tication. As Stevens (2001) comments, black the racist ideology and practices of South
trainees would need to censure racial interpreta- African psychology have persisted, that the
tions of interactions with white supervisors, and racism of today exists as the residue of white
would often find that racist stereotypes individuals and groupings that have been carried
pertaining to the competence of black practi- over from the past. This makes for a stern
tioners was still in evidence. Racial expertise, in warning against apathy towards issues of race,
terms of questions of trainability, competence prejudice and insidious racism within South
and professional standards, rather than blatant African psychology. More than this, it makes for
racism per se, justified racial practices. a challenge to continue, and to renew, the
‘Selected focus’, on the other hand, refers transformation of the discipline in line with the
to how South African psychology has been put democratic ideals of South Africa’s post-
to work caring predominantly for ‘white apartheid constitution.
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Recommended readings
There is a strong established tradition of an anti-racist critical psychology
within South Africa. Three texts in particular are worth mentioning here.
The first is the 1990 volume edited by Lionel Nicholas & Saths Cooper entitled
Psychology and apartheid, which includes contributions by Mohammed
Seedat, Victor Nell, Alex Butchart and Hussein Bulhan and covers a range of
issues from the idea of psychologist as activist to an engagement with the
psychology of colonialism, the impact of political imprisonment and the hopes
of an Afrocentric form of psychology.
The second title – L.J. Nicholas & S. Cooper (eds) Psychology and apartheid
(1993) – is in many ways an extension of the first, and includes weighty contri-
butions on psychology’s role as a means of racism and oppression, and on how
this might be contested in South Africa. Lionel Nicholas contributes a number
of chapters and Don Foster offers a particularly useful overview of the history
of psychology’s conceptualisation of racism.
The most recent book to engage with South African psychology and racism
is ‘Race’, racism, knowledge production and psychology in South Africa
or applicable copyright law.
(2001), edited by Duncan, Van Niekerk, De la Rey & Seedat. Advancing further
arguments, this text provides both an invaluable historical overview of
academic racism in South African psychology and a look at issues germane
to the implementation of an anti-racist psychology in post-apartheid
South Africa.
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Chapter
15
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LEARNING OUTCOMES
By the end of this chapter, you should be able to:
Sketch the outlines of the development of black US-American psychology
Discuss some of the strengths and weaknesses of black US-American psychology in
relation to contexts other than US-America
Describe the state of (black) psychology in South Africa
Explore the possibility of a radical or critical black-conscious psychology in South
Africa in relation to the need to develop critical/black communities.
or applicable copyright law.
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Critical Psychology
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power structures
knowledge. There is continent, as much as anywhere else in the world by black and African people.
a deep connection
between political
and social power THE BIRTH OF BLACK US-AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGY
and scientific and
The discipline that is called black psychology is a phenomenon of the USA. As
professional truth.
a discipline, its birth can be cautiously dated to the late 1960s. This other birth
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For South African youth, the phrase ghetto the song was, of course, that township life is,
fabulous was not popularised by the artist again to use the language, ‘all that’ or
formerly known as Puff Daddy as much as it was ‘happening’. Ghetto fabulous, in other words, is a
by kwaito exponent, Bonginkosi Dlamini. celebration of (a certain kind of) black cultural
Dlamini, otherwise known as Zola, is an actor, and social life just the way it is. It is also a cele-
television presenter and musician who comes bration of what, again, hip-hop has baptised as
from Zola township, Soweto. The phrase caught ‘bling-bling’ – the fast life evinced by wearing
on because Zola titled a popular song of his gold jewellery, expensive clothes and partying
‘Ghetto fabulous’. While it was the gritty televi- hard. While we do delve into the connections of
sion youth series Yizo Yizo that brought him to this view of black life to black psychology in the
the attention of the youth public, his social and later sections, take a moment now and think,
cultural (if not political) star shone brighter using ‘mind-maps’ or in a couple of paragraphs,
because of the song’s catchy if trite refrain, about the relation of mainstream psychology to
‘Thin’ ekasi, si ghetto fabulous.’ The message of the black ghetto or townships and villages.
(for there is an earlier birth of black psychology which we shall talk about
shortly) follows the wave of black power struggles in that country. It is impor-
tant to take a note of this: that the development of black psychology tracked
black political struggles. The larger point which you may not have been aware
of is not that black psychology is politically informed but rather that knowl-
edge always tracks power, and power structures knowledge. In other words,
there is a deep connection between political and social power and scientific
and professional truth. This is a good place to start, then: at the social, polit-
ical, cultural and, of course, existential and psychic desires that led to the
creation of black psychology.
viewpoint (see eg Du Bois, 1903/1996; Gates & West, 1996; Jones, 1980).
The desire to develop a discipline could be seen, then, as having been more
than just about perspective. It was part of the same longing and permanent
struggle of women and men to be true to themselves and their lived experience.
This is the point that Wade Nobles (1980) made that while back about
developing a black psychology based on African philosophy and values.
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The discipline of
black psychology
arose out of the
existential,
political, social and
cultural yearnings
of black US-
American scholars
to conceive of and
practise psychology
from a ‘true’ black
viewpoint
Photograph by Zenzo
are the former would have challenged Nobles’ proposal that ‘the task of Black psychology
groups’ failure,
defection,
[was] to offer an understanding of the behavioural definition of African philos-
inadequacy, or lack ophy and to document what, if any, modifications it has undergone during
because the latter experiential periods’ (1980, 35). What should be taken exception to, though,
groups are taken to are nature-seeking conceptions of Wade Nobles. This is especially so when we
be the standard.
come to realise his arguments suggest that African people in Africa, as opposed
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to African people in the USA, were supposed to have stopped changing and It is ‘impossible to
developing at some unspecified tribal past. (Note that arguments that seek to understand the life-
show the nature of black or African people are not confined to black US- style of black
American psychologists. In fact, they are quite common throughout the people using
traditional
continent as they are among South African psychologists, both white and psychological
black ones. Indeed, the idea of ghetto fabulous also buys into and recycles a theories developed
certain naturalised notion of urban black people as a hip, happy, fun-loving by white
bunch.) (Descriptions of how certain categories of people come to be natu- psychologists to
explain white
ralised, or essentialised, are discussed by a number of other writers in this
people’ (White,
volume; see particularly Kiguwa & Burman’s Feminist critical psychology in 1980, 5).
South Africa.)
nations of black people and its other Others tend to be dominated by weakness families:
or deficit theory, focused at showing black people’s inferiority in relation to families headed or
whites, specifically white males, whose experiences and behaviours serve as the centred on a
touchstone for most behavioural theory and research findings. What White woman, especially
an elderly woman
was against, then, were theories that explained black experience and behaviour
who is respected.
as resulting from cultural deprivation or matriarchal families. These theories
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Black psychology argues that it is not possible to understand the lifestyle of black people using traditional
psychological theories developed by white psychologists to explain white people.
Photograph by Zenzo
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say something similar or anything different from the black power psychologists? analysing or
breaking up
complex phenomena
Early black US-American psychologists into simper
The formal history of black US-American psychology can be dated – June 1920 constituents or
isolated parts.
– more than forty years before the inauguration of the discipline of black
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psychology. One might entertain oneself with the potential significance of the
date of the birth of black psychology, being the year the founder of ‘white’
psychology, Wilhelm Wundt, died. But I really do not think there is any impor-
tance to the date. What is of importance is that it was in 1920, forty-one years
after the ‘birth’ of mainstream psychology (see Box 2), that Francis Cecil
Sumner became the first black American to get a doctorate in psychology.
Sumner, who for this reason wears the mantle of the father of black
American psychology, studied under G. Stanley Hall. Hall was then president
of Clark University. Hall himself was the first man to receive a PhD in
psychology in the USA, studying under Wundt and later William James.
Among other feats Hall is known for in psychology is as the organiser of the
famous Clark University Conference where he had invited Sigmund Freud, Carl
Jung, Ernest Jones, Sandor Ferenczi and others. For this, and that he estab-
lished the first psychology laboratory in the United States, the first psychology
journal in the United States, and was the first president of the American
Psychological Association, Hall is taken to be the father of organised
psychology as a science and profession; in addition, he was considered by
many to be the father of child and educational psychology in the USA.
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While the notion of father of this or that disci- accorded the mantle of father. His was for
pline or subdiscipline or school of thought is bringing to birth a part of psychology, that is,
one that tends to be used easily, it is intriguing the fact that he offered the first course on
and not without its troublesome aspect. The psychology in 1875 at Harvard.
first thing, of course, is that it rarely happens But among the names many students of
that it is the person who ends up being called psychology will have read about is one Wilhelm
a father who claims parentage of a theoretical Wundt and, of course, next to it, the title of
movement or discipline. As it is said, Karl Marx father of psychology. Wundt, under whom Hall
was not a Marxist and Jesus Christ was not a also studied, started his professional life as a
Christian. Another intriguing aspect of this physiologist and philosopher. Wundt was inter-
situation is that you will hardly hear about ested in the study of conscious experience or
mothers of disciplines or movements. Further- consciousness. This appears to be what led him
more, when it comes to the issue of the to campaign to make psychology an inde-
‘parentage’ of a discipline or school of thought, pendent field of study from under philosophy or
there is no agreed test of what exactly makes physiology. It is important to make a note of
one a father. the fact that Wundt believed that psychology
The title of father of black psychology is should be modelled after physics and chemistry,
accorded to Francis Sumner not because he a notion that lies at base of the scientistic
championed black upliftment nor because he inclinations that psychology maintains up to
wrote a searing treatment of slavery and on this moment. And, of course, this need for
white racism. Sumner became a ‘father’ because scientific respectability is related to the fact of
he was the first black American to be awarded Wundt establishing a laboratory for psychology
a doctorate in psychology (although, again, as studies at the University of Leipzig, Germany,
you will see later in this chapter, the politics of as well as founding the first psychology journal.
Sumner undermine his paternal status to a Interestingly, Wundt’s fatherhood of psychology
psychology). After some racial troubles Sumner comes not from founding the journal but rather
managed to study under G. Stanley Hall for having put up that first psychological labo-
(discussed above). Hall was a student of ratory and, hence, bringing to birth the
William James. James is another who has been discipline of psychology in 1879.
Americans should be limited to industrial and moral training. (By the bye, it is
interesting to note that the views of Sumner and Washington on education
politics bear an uncomfortable similarity to those of Hendrik Verwoerd, ‘the
father of apartheid’, who as Minister of Native Affairs in 1953 famously asked
what the use was of teaching the Bantu child mathematics when they could not
use it in practice.)
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Still, it was Sumner under whom Kenneth Clark, another early black
psychologist or, better still, a politically aware psychologist, sometime studied.
If he should go into the black psychology Hall of Fame, it would be because
Sumner supported Kenneth and Mamie Clark in their famous work on racial
preference, identification and attitudes.
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that is supposed to mean that there are professionals in the country who have
masters and doctoral degrees in psychology and are employed as psychologists.
The irony, you should know, is that I am one of this group of individuals.
tioner? The answer is ‘Of course not.’ But why not? Because the words before
medical practitioner need another answer, one that goes to the identity of the
medical practitioner as well as to that of his or her practice. You may also be
aware that because of the trek of many medical practitioners from South Africa
to greener pastures abroad, some persons who have been brought to help in
our rural hospitals are not South African doctors but Cubans.
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If there is no
politically and
socially ethical
psychology of black
people in South
Africa, there can be
nothing that can
truly be called a
South African
psychology.
Photograph by Zenzo
As in the case of the USA, what I am pointing out the exclusion, neglect, and/or
distortions of black and African experience from and within (white)
psychology.
But the larger context of this position is, of course, that of imperialism,
colonialism, neo-colonialism, and white racism. The larger context, to put it
simply, is that of the deep-running connection of economics and politics on
one side, and social and cultural (including intellectual) production on the
other side, which is to say, power’s intimate relation with knowledge. To
connect again with the discipline of black US-American psychology, we said it
arose as part of black people’s worldwide powerlessness and struggle against
white capital. We said black US-American psychologists operated without a
psychology of their own because they were part of the group that was, and to
some extent still is, on the receiving end of the abovementioned forces. Simi-
larly, the situation we have in this country is one of an entire tribe of
psychologists without a psychology, not in any real sense, because they are at
the wrong end (though not uniformly) of international capital, North-South
relations, and of black South Africans, racism.
What you may want to argue about is the position of whites. For instance, you
may want to know what I think a white psychology student at Rhodes Univer-
sity is doing, then when he or she proposes to study the preferences or
identification of a group of young AmaXhosa boys and Basotho girls, or when
an academic at the University of Cape Town conducts a study into authori-
tarian personality of the Afrikaner, or when psychologists meet once a year to
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give papers and address each other about our work. Is this not South African
psychology? Is it not so by the simple fact that it is done by South African
psychologists or students of the discipline psychology? And, of more impor-
tance, what is to be made of the body of knowledge produced locally within the
discipline of psychology?
To respond to the questions altogether, let us simply say historically there
has been little psychological theory in South Africa that is original. More
crucially, there has been almost no ethically just psychology in our country.
That is to say, even where there has been a spark of original understanding,
psychological work has for the most part been anti-black. (In this connection
see also Duncan, Stevens & Bowman’s chapter: South African psychology and
racism.) If it has not been, at its best, it has been blind to actual black life. All
From the beginning of this is tied to the fact (commented on by several progressive psychologists)
the institutions and
instruments that whatever psychological understanding of black people that has gone on in
of psychology were the past has not been in the service of alleviating their oppression (see eg
co-opted in the Anonymous, 1986; Bulhan, 1993; Nicholas, 1993; Nicholas & Cooper, 1990;
development, Seedat 1993). How can such psychology be a South African psychology? I
elaboration and
justification of
suspect there will be more than a few people who concur that such a
relations of psychology is not for those who have been oppressed with its active collusion
domination or because it stayed silent. And I suspect there will not be many who will agree
between the latter with the reactionary view which would argue that even if it was brutally
class and others.
oppressive that does not make it any less South African.
people in general for that matter, except him- or herself. Such a psychological
study is probably not going to make our lives better any way.
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The discipline of psychology as historically deployed in this country has been used
against black people as it has been used against poor people, against women, against
‘sexual perverts’, against workers, and nearly anyone else who was not a white-collar,
white, heterosexual, working male.
Photographs by Zenzo
‘global’ psychology, Donald Foster (1991) once asked, ‘Have psychologists over
the course of this century contributed to racism?’ Over and above showing the
way psychology has focused on individualism and operated within a positive
science framework, Foster adds his voice to those who have said there has been
a more or less obvious support from psychology for anti-black discrimination
and racism (Bulhan, 1981; Nicholas, 1993). This, Foster (1991) said, can be
read in the form of biologistic and naturalistic explanations, in pathogenesis, Pathogenesis:
the mental testing movement, and the plain prejudice and well-known racism production and
of specific ‘leading’ psychologists. development of
or applicable copyright law.
It is not the case that overt racism has vanished in South Africa. That disease.
racism is far from a spent force can be read from the Human Rights Commis-
sion’s conferences and investigations into racism, which events contradict
such a wish. One can also read it in the media replete with (reports of ) racist
discourses, practices and events. And many would attest that not just ‘new
style’ subtle racism but the blatant form of racism continues to be a political
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and economic problem and an issue in everyday life (Duncan, 2002; Durrheim,
in press; Nicholas & Cooper, 1993).
I am rushing us over racism because racism in its overt manifestations is a
more or less recognisable phenomenon. And since it recognisable, it can be
and is being challenged on many fronts. We can either dismiss it with the disre-
spect it deserves or come down hard on the work of people who are or were
well-known bigots. Perhaps the main reason we can afford to do this is that
good work has been done on them by black critical scholars (see eg Duncan,
2002; Nicholas & Cooper, 1993). For instance, in his doctoral study into
discourses on racism, Norman Duncan (1993) robustly tackles the question of
racism for contemporary South African life. What meanings, he asks, have
South African psychologists given to racism in its local manifestation? In
answer to this question, Duncan traces some of the historical and contempo-
rary factors surrounding psychological research in South Africa and the
reproduction of racist ideology in discourses of psychologists he studied.
(Again, see here Duncan, Stevens & Bowman’s chapter: South African
psychology and racism.) In a way, then, all that is needed to be done with
blatant racists is to out them.
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(Cooper, Nicholas, Seedat, & Statman, 1990; Laubscher & McNeil, 1995;
Nicholas, 1993; Whittaker, 1990).
Manganyi’s psychology
One of the earlier leading African psychologists, Chabani Manganyi (1991),
opined that the best of the psychology practised in South Africa has been a
transplant of Anglo-Saxon (which, of course, extends to the USA) psycholog-
ical theory, research and apparatuses. The best original scholarship, Manganyi
said, has been either racist or apologias for apartheid. The task facing psychol-
ogists, according to him, has been the production of a critical discipline,
something with which we cannot disagree.
On another note, Manganyi made an interesting point about calls for
relevancy:
Dialectic:
I have little interest in the fashionable but sterile notion of a ‘relevant’ psycho-
in the sense that
Hegel, and later logical theory and practice for this country. This form of intellectual tinkering in
Marxists, meant it, the past produced isolated interventions of the ‘Jim-comes-to-Jo’burg’ variety, so-
‘dialectic’ is the called cross-cultural explanations as well as notions about African abilities and
term given to the personality. Others sought, in the idea of a relevant psychology, an opportunity
logical pattern that to reinvent the traditional healer. Yet others have, more recently, sought the
thought follows. spirit of relevance [in] the role of the professional activist inspired more often
Thought, Hegel, than not by a vulgar Marxism (Manganyi, 1991, 121).
said, proceeds by
contradiction and While being wary of vulgar Marxists, and although he favoured a materialist
the reconciliation of psychology, Manganyi might have considered himself a Marxist at one time or
contradiction, the
overall pattern another. He referred to Czeslaw Milosz’s observations about the great yearning
being one of thesis, of every ‘alienated’ intellectual to be with the masses at some point. We sense
antithesis and from his work that, though he had scant regard for such intellectuals,
synthesis. Manganyi positioned himself as a psychologist of the people (Manganyi,
1991). Still, the call he made for a historicised critical discipline that goes
Dialectic beyond moral indignation continues to be relevant and urgent. Such a disci-
materialism: pline would be supported by a dialectic materialist conception of action. And
doctrine held by
Marxists which last, of course, such a psychology would declare itself opposed to oppressive
asserts that matter conditions – and we would add ‘in any guise’.
is fundamental, that
mind is (the highest
form of) matter,
Pretences of political neutrality
that there are laws Over a decade later we cannot but conclude that most of psychology remains
or applicable copyright law.
that govern the ahistorical, and a psychology of black people’s history and everyday remains a
development of
matter, and that
thing of the future. Psychology as practised in our country continues blindly to
these laws are not insist on political neutrality. It recklessly holds on to a belief in objectivity. It
mechanistic but continues arrogantly to assume the status of a science, that is to say, after the
rather dialectical manner of physics and chemistry, rather than that of what are rightfully its
(see Dialectic).
sister disciplines, sociology and anthropology. These are assumptions, values,
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claims and forms of practice which we continue to inculcate in our students in Psychology as
prescribing the textbooks we do (see Smith, 1998; Weiten, 1998). These practised in our
assumptions and claims underlie professional practice despite evidence to the country continues
contrary (Bulhan, 1985; Foster, 1986; Howitt & Owusu-Bempah, 1994; blindly to insist on
political neutrality.
Nicholas & Cooper, 1990; Nicholas, 1993; Whittaker, 1990). In the face of It recklessly holds
these intransigent lies, of political neutrality, objectivity and scientificity, to say on to a belief in
psychological theories and research work are related to practices of politics, the objectivity. It
economy, and social identification is no longer enough on its own. So what continues arrogantly
to assume the
should we be saying?
status of a science.
logical Association in 1905, and Margaret Floy in cultural and subcultural background and
Washburn, the second woman to serve as pres- experience is taking psychology increas-
ident of the Association, one will find reference ingly in the direction of studying these
to black psychologists under headings such as individual difference[s] systematically and
new horizons, culture, diversity, or not at all. including them in theories of human
Take, for instance, these paragraphs taken from behavior (Triandis, 1993). It is important to
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A double-consciousness psychology
But, we suggested, one of the eyes of black US-American psychology is black
while the other is generically US-American. One of the eyes it keeps on the
larger US-American society and the other on itself being watched by that
society. This double consciousness (see Du Bois, 1903/1996) is a condition of
any group that is oppressed or on the margins of a society. Thus, black US-
American psychology flourishes, if it does, from within the belly of the beast
(as the left-leaning hip-hop artist Wyclef Jean chants in his song on murders of
black people such as Biko and Diallo by the police).
Because of its struggles against racism and to express the ‘authentic’ expe-
or applicable copyright law.
riences of black people, its defensive stance and its doubleness, black
US-American psychology at times feels insulated and perhaps self-
worshipping. Although I would not say black studies in general are narcissistic,
as the African American essayist Stanley Crouch (1998) puts it, I shall say a
psychology that sets out to battle the lies of mainstream should not try to find
many uses for the sob stories but also for the drumming.
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It has been shown many times over that most of psychology has been white
and anti-black; it is true that black lives are on the margins of mainstream
psychology; and there is now little argument that the experiences of anybody
else other than white middle-class individuals are not taken that seriously. But
perhaps it is time, especially in South Africa, to quit crying. With regard to
crying, it is one of the dangers of black psychology, just as it is of black US-
American studies. bell hooks speaks on the same phenomena in her essay
‘Loving blackness as a political resistance’:
They wanted to talk black self-hatred, to hear one another confess (especially
students of color) in eloquent narratives about the myriad ways they had tried to
attain whiteness, if only symbolically. They gave graphic details about the ways
they attempted to appear ‘white’ by talking in a certain way, wearing certain
clothing, and even choosing specific groups of white friends (147).
Here hooks is talking specifically about how her students were more interested
in discussing black self-hatred and fear and desire to be white than to love
blackness. Although I think it may be right that love may actually be necessary
for radicals, again, we should tread carefully for we might fall into self-idolatry.
Loving our selves, as rebelling against white mainstream psychology, is not an
individual thing. To be effective it should be tied to critical political conscious-
ness and action. As Henry Louis Gates & Cornel West (1996) have it, ‘loving
one’s community means daring to risk estrangement and alienation from that
very community, in the short run, in order to break the cycle of poverty,
despair, and hopelessness’ (xvi). Black psychologists and black social scientists
generally seem not to want to take enough risks.
A psychology of critique
The warning sounded in the opening paragraph of questions (whether you
have ever experienced your self as in, culturally, politically, or psychically
speaking, because you are black) is exactly this: that if it does not come through
to us as dull clan cheerleading or weeping at the graveyard, black social science ‘[T]here is a
at times feels like ghetto fabulous elevated to the level of politics. If black disturbing tendency,
psychology is uncritical as it seems to be of itself and of certain black practices, in many quarters, to
speak of the black
it can never get out of its birthplace, and more importantly, the ghetto, American as if there
however it is dressed, will never get out of black psychology. This is also to say, was some
if we do write ourselves out of the margins, it will not be because of our black monolithic social
or applicable copyright law.
emblems. Rather, what will make us burgeon in the future in spite of the cruel group involved’
(Guthrie, 1980, 20).
past is hard, rooted, creative critique.
Examples of the risks we have to take to build a psychology with a radical
conscience are not plentiful but they are there. It is fortunate, I would say, that
when one reads some of the work of black US-American scholars who are for
black psychology one finds enough disagreement in spite of the presumption
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of unity about the experiences of being black in the USA. And dissension is
crucial. It is more so when our lives depend on laagering. In this regard, it must
noted that Robert Guthrie, whom we saw is a supporter of black psychology
himself, did warn that ‘there is a disturbing tendency, in many quarters, to
speak of the black American as if there was some monolithic social group
involved’ (1980, 20) Guthrie counselled against this flattening, homogenising
instinct for he saw that ‘there is much diversity in the black community as
there is in any other community. The common bond of blackness and its
resulting strengths have brought about unified concerns across many dimen-
sions, yet differences occur’ (1980, 20).
Close by and more recently, the psychologist and chair of the African
Gender Institute at the University of Cape Town, Amina Mama, has articulated
this criticism in her work on black identity. The Nigerian-born Mama (1995)
has argued that the discipline of psychology, being permeated by racist
discourse as it is, ‘has often legitimised dominant racist assumptions and
construed the African as a single generalised Other in stereotyped ways’ (43).
Mama captured the point we made about the two eyes of US-American black
psychology when she showed that ‘that both mainstream and black
psychology assume a unitary subject – the black man – about whom a great
many generalisations have been made’ (Mama, 1995, 43).
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really no commonalties whatsoever between black and white citizens and When we read the
scholars? Are there no lessons, for instance, that queer intellectuals and black work of those we
heterosexual psychologists can learn one from another, no chance of helping assume to share our
each other to understand their different struggles better? view of the world,
we should be aware
of race employed as
Communities of consciousness epistemic founda-
This is what the idea of ‘communities of consciousness’ answers to, the idea tion, of blackness
as ontology.
being a little more than what I believe Nobles (1980) intended by communali-
ties of experience. But communities of consciousness is an old idea really. It is
in part the idea that communities are formed not naturally but out of a shared
history, or a shared environment, or shared feeling brought about by looking Communities of
at a legacy in a particular manner. Gay and lesbian communities, black consciousness:
idea that commu-
communities, working class communities are not natural entities. So, for
nities are formed
instance, where I have been writing of ‘we’, I am really not sure who I am not naturally but
addressing and including in this. What I am certain of is my attempt to culti- out of a shared
vate a community which cuts across these constructed divisions of sex, race history, or a shared
environment, or a
and class. I am trying to persuade you that we, whoever we are, from these
shared feeling
‘Other’ communities, should come to share a certain emotion about and a way brought about by
of looking way at society, at history, at ourselves looking at society and history. looking at a legacy
I am writing not merely to say something about black psychology and black in a particular
manner.
people, traditional psychology or white people. I am writing to produce a
certain psychology, a certain way of looking at blackness and race, a certain
way of seeing. I am trying to persuade you, then, that I share with you reading
these lines, or that you shall come to share me as this chapter’s author, a way of
thinking. This, then, is one other resource which feeds into or is fed into by the
use of the plural then; it also indirectly suggests that the contributors in this
book to some extent share among each other, a community, a way of thinking
about us, our condition, that they pay due regard to the efforts of both black
and white, male and female scholars and activists on the continent and else-
where who continue to struggle to reverse the ravages and distorting effects of
capitalist, racist, homophobic sexist, and ethnocentric psychology; we, I am
saying, are the ones who committed to true radical liberation and social justice.
I increasingly find occupies my mind. The matter (of how to answer to our
collective and personal past, our given community, and to others one comes
into contact with) arises, for instance, in the context of teaching mostly ‘black’
students – the marks signalling a potential problem. The problem is that some
of these students express their feeling that they do not want to be called black,
while others are never quite sure about whether they are included in my refer-
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A commitment to
ence; and yet others believe it is only them whom I refer to. How I think one
social