land embraced therein and reserving the same for the Manila Seedling Bank
Foundation, Inc., for use in its operation and projects, subject to private rights if any
G.R. No. 148830. April 13, 2005]
NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, BULACAN
GARDEN CORPORATION and MANILA SEEDLING BANK FOUNDATION,
INC., respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is a petition for review[1] seeking to set aside the Decision[2] dated 30 March
2001 of the Court of Appeals (appellate court) in CA-G.R. CV No. 48382, as well as its
Resolution dated 25 June 2001 denying the motion for reconsideration. The appellate
court reversed the Decision[3] of Branch 87 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City
(trial court) dated 8 March 1994 in Civil Case No. Q-53464. The trial court dismissed
the complaint for injunction filed by Bulacan Garden Corporation (BGC) against the
National Housing Authority (NHA). BGC wanted to enjoin the NHA from demolishing
BGCs facilities on a lot leased from Manila Seedling Bank Foundation, Inc. (MSBF).
MSBF allegedly has usufructuary rights over the lot leased to BGC.
Antecedent Facts
On 24 October 1968, Proclamation No. 481 issued by then President Ferdinand
Marcos set aside a 120-hectare portion of land in Quezon City owned by the NHA[4] as
reserved property for the site of the National Government Center (NGC). On 19
September 1977, President Marcos issued Proclamation No. 1670, which removed a
seven-hectare portion from the coverage of the NGC. Proclamation No. 1670 gave
MSBF usufructuary rights over this segregated portion, as follows:
Pursuant to the powers vested in me by the Constitution and the laws of the
Philippines, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Republic of the Philippines,
do hereby exclude from the operation of Proclamation No. 481, dated October 24,
1968, which established the National Government Center Site, certain parcels of
there be, and to future survey, under the administration of the Foundation.
This parcel of land, which shall embrace 7 hectares, shall be determined by the
future survey based on the technical descriptions found in Proclamation No. 481,
and most particularly on the original survey of the area, dated July 1910 to June
1911, and on the subdivision survey dated April 19-25, 1968. (Emphasis added)
MSBF occupied the area granted by Proclamation No. 1670. Over the years,
MSBFs occupancy exceeded the seven-hectare area subject to its usufructuary rights.
By 1987, MSBF occupied approximately 16 hectares. By then the land occupied by
MSBF was bounded by Epifanio de los Santos Avenue (EDSA) to the west, Agham
Road to the east, Quezon Avenue to the south and a creek to the north.
On 18 August 1987, MSBF leased a portion of the area it occupied to BGC and
other stallholders. BGC leased the portion facing EDSA, which occupies 4,590 square
meters of the 16-hectare area.
On 11 November 1987, President Corazon Aquino issued Memorandum Order
No. 127 (MO 127) which revoked the reserved status of the 50 hectares, more or less,
remaining out of the 120 hectares of the NHA property reserved as site of the
National Government Center. MO 127 also authorized the NHA to commercialize the
area and to sell it to the public.
On 15 August 1988, acting on the power granted under MO 127, the NHA gave
BGC ten days to vacate its occupied area. Any structure left behind after the
expiration of the ten-day period will be demolished by NHA.
BGC then filed a complaint for injunction on 21 April 1988 before the trial court.
On 26 May 1988, BGC amended its complaint to include MSBF as its co-plaintiff.
The Trial Courts Ruling
The trial court agreed with BGC and MSBF that Proclamation No. 1670 gave
MSBF the right to conduct the survey, which would establish the seven-hectare area
covered by MSBFs usufructuary rights. However, the trial court held that MSBF failed
to act seasonably on this right to conduct the survey. The trial court ruled that the
previous surveys conducted by MSBF covered 16 hectares, and were thus
inappropriate to determine the seven-hectare area. The trial court concluded that to
allow MSBF to determine the seven-hectare area now would be grossly unfair to the
grantor of the usufruct.
 On 8 March 1994, the trial court dismissed BGCs complaint for injunction. Thus:
Premises considered, the complaint praying to enjoin the National Housing
Authority from carrying out the demolition of the plaintiffs structure, improvements
and facilities in the premises in question is hereby DISMISSED, but the suggestion
for the Court to rule that Memorandum Order 127 has repealed Proclamation No.
1670 is DENIED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.[5]
The NHA demolished BGCs facilities soon thereafter.
The Appellate Courts Ruling
Not content with the trial courts ruling, BGC appealed the trial courts Decision
to the appellate court. Initially, the appellate court agreed with the trial court that
Proclamation No. 1670 granted MSBF the right to determine the location of the
seven-hectare area covered by its usufructuary rights. However, the appellate court
ruled that MSBF did in fact assert this right by conducting two surveys and erecting
its main structures in the area of its choice.
On 30 March 2001, the appellate court reversed the trial courts ruling. Thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated March 8, 1994 of the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 87, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The National Housing Authority is enjoined from demolishing the structures,
facilities and improvements of the plaintiff-appellant Bulacan Garden Corporation
at its leased premises located in Quezon City which premises were covered by
Proclamation No. 1670, during the existence of the contract of lease it (Bulacan
Garden) had entered with the plaintiff-appellant Manila Seedling Bank Foundation,
Inc.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.[6]
The NHA filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied by the appellate
court on 25 June 2001.
Hence, this petition.
The Issues
The following issues are considered by this Court for resolution:
WHETHER THE PETITION IS NOW MOOT BECAUSE OF THE DEMOLITION
OF THE STRUCTURES OF BGC; and
WHETHER THE PREMISES LEASED BY BGC FROM MSBF IS WITHIN THE
SEVEN-HECTARE AREA THAT PROCLAMATION NO. 1670 GRANTED TO
MSBF BY WAY OF USUFRUCT.
The Ruling of the Court
We remand this petition to the trial court for a joint survey to determine finally
the metes and bounds of the seven-hectare area subject to MSBFs usufructuary
rights. Whether the Petition is Moot because of the
Demolition of BGCs Facilities
BGC claims that the issue is now moot due to NHAs demolition of BGCs facilities
after the trial court dismissed BGCs complaint for injunction. BGC argues that there
is nothing more to enjoin and that there are no longer any rights left for adjudication.
We disagree.
BGC may have lost interest in this case due to the demolition of its premises,
but its co-plaintiff, MSBF, has not. The issue for resolution has a direct effect on
MSBFs usufructuary rights. There is yet the central question of the exact location of
the seven-hectare area granted by Proclamation No. 1670 to MSBF. This issue is
squarely raised in this petition. There is a need to settle this issue to forestall future
disputes and to put this 20-year litigation to rest.
On the Location of the Seven-Hectare Area Granted by
Proclamation No. 1670 to MSBF as Usufructuary
Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure limits the jurisdiction of this Court
to the review of errors of law.[7] Absent any of the established grounds for
exception,[8] this Court will not disturb findings of fact of lower courts. Though the
matter raised in this petition is factual, it deserves resolution because the findings of
the trial court and the appellate court conflict on several points.
 The entire area bounded by Agham Road to the east, EDSA to the west, Quezon
Avenue to the south and by a creek to the north measures approximately 16 hectares.
Proclamation No. 1670 gave MSBF a usufruct over only a seven-hectare area. The
BGCs leased portion is located along EDSA.
A usufruct may be constituted for a specified term and under such conditions
as the parties may deem convenient subject to the legal provisions on usufruct. [9] A
usufructuary may lease the object held in usufruct.[10] Thus, the NHA may not evict
BGC if the 4,590 square meter portion MSBF leased to BGC is within the seven-
hectare area held in usufruct by MSBF. The owner of the property must respect the
lease entered into by the usufructuary so long as the usufruct exists.[11] However, the
NHA has the right to evict BGC if BGC occupied a portion outside of the seven-hectare
area covered by MSBFs usufructuary rights.
MSBFs survey shows that BGCs stall is within the seven-hectare area. On the
other hand, NHAs survey shows otherwise. The entire controversy revolves on the
question of whose land survey should prevail.
MSBFs survey plots the location of the seven-hectare portion by starting its
measurement from Quezon Avenue going northward along EDSA up until the creek,
which serves as the northern boundary of the land in question. Mr. Ben Malto
(Malto), surveyor for MSBF, based his survey method on the fact that MSBFs main
facilities are located within this area.
On the other hand, NHAs survey determines the seven-hectare portion by
starting its measurement from Quezon Avenue going towards Agham Road. Mr.
Rogelio Inobaya (Inobaya), surveyor for NHA, based his survey method on the fact
that he saw MSBFs gate fronting Agham Road.
BGC presented the testimony of Mr. Lucito M. Bertol (Bertol), General Manager
of MSBF. Bertol presented a map,[12] which detailed the area presently occupied by
MSBF. The map had a yellow-shaded portion, which was supposed to indicate the
seven-hectare area. It was clear from both the map and Bertols testimony that MSBF
knew that it had occupied an area in excess of the seven-hectare area granted by
Proclamation No. 1670.[13] Upon cross-examination, Bertol admitted that he
personally did not know the exact boundaries of the seven-hectare area.[14] Bertol
also admitted that MSBF prepared the map without consulting NHA, the owner of
the property.[15]
BGC also presented the testimony of Malto, a registered forester and the
Assistant Vice-President of Planning, Research and Marketing of MSBF. Malto
testified that he conducted the land survey, which was used to construct the map
presented by Bertol.[16] Bertol clarified that he authorized two surveys, one in 1984
when he first joined MSBF, and the other in 1986. [17]In both instances, Mr. Malto
testified that he was asked to survey a total of 16 hectares, not just seven hectares.
Malto testified that he conducted the second survey in 1986 on the instruction of
MSBFs general manager. According to Malto, it was only in the second survey that he
was told to determine the seven-hectare portion. Malto further clarified that he
based the technical descriptions of both surveys on a previously existing survey of
the property.[18]
The NHA presented the testimony of Inobaya, a geodetic engineer employed by
the NHA. Inobaya testified that as part of the NHAs Survey Division, his duties
included conducting surveys of properties administered by the NHA.[19] Inobaya
conducted his survey in May 1988 to determine whether BGC was occupying an area
outside the seven-hectare area MSBF held in usufruct.[20] Inobaya surveyed the area
occupied by MSBF following the same technical descriptions used by Malto. Inobaya
also came to the same conclusion that the area occupied by MSBF, as indicated by
the boundaries in the technical descriptions, covered a total of 16 hectares. He
further testified that the seven-hectare portion in the map presented by
BGC,[21] which was constructed by Malto, does not tally with the boundaries BGC and
MSBF indicated in their complaint.
Article 565 of the Civil Code states:
ART. 565. The rights and obligations of the usufructuary shall be those provided in
the title constituting the usufruct; in default of such title, or in case it is deficient,
the provisions contained in the two following Chapters shall be observed.
In the present case, Proclamation No. 1670 is the title constituting the usufruct.
Proclamation No. 1670 categorically states that the seven-hectare area shall be
determined by future survey under the administration of the Foundation subject to
private rights if there be any. The appellate court and the trial court agree that MSBF
has the latitude to determine the location of its seven-hectare usufruct portion within
the 16-hectare area. The appellate court and the trial court disagree, however,
whether MSBF seasonably exercised this right.
It is clear that MSBF conducted at least two surveys. Although both surveys
covered a total of 16 hectares, the second survey specifically indicated a seven-
hectare area shaded in yellow. MSBF made the first survey in 1984 and the second in
1986, way before the present controversy started. MSBF conducted the two surveys
before the lease to BGC. The trial court ruled that MSBF did not act seasonably in
exercising its right to conduct the survey. Confronted with evidence that MSBF did in
fact conduct two surveys, the trial court dismissed the two surveys as self-serving.
This is clearly an error on the part of the trial court. Proclamation No. 1670 authorized
MSBF to determine the location of the seven-hectare area. This authority, coupled
with the fact that Proclamation No. 1670 did not state the location of the seven-
hectare area, leaves no room for doubt that Proclamation No. 1670 left it to MSBF to
choose the location of the seven-hectare area under its usufruct.
 More evidence supports MSBFs stand on the location of the seven-hectare area.
The main structures of MSBF are found in the area indicated by MSBFs survey. These
structures are the main office, the three green houses, the warehouse and the
composting area. On the other hand, the NHAs delineation of the seven-hectare area
would cover only the four hardening bays and the display area. It is easy to distinguish
between these two groups of structures. The first group covers buildings and facilities
that MSBF needs for its operations. MSBF built these structures before the present
controversy started. The second group covers facilities less essential to MSBFs
existence. This distinction is decisive as to which survey should prevail. It is clear that
the MSBF intended to use the yellow-shaded area primarily because it erected its
main structures there.
Inobaya testified that his main consideration in using Agham Road as the
starting point for his survey was the presence of a gate there. The location of the gate
is not a sufficient basis to determine the starting point. MSBFs right as a usufructuary
as granted by Proclamation No. 1670 should rest on something more substantial than
where MSBF chose to place a gate.
To prefer the NHAs survey to MSBFs survey will strip MSBF of most of its main
facilities. Only the main building of MSBF will remain with MSBF since the main
building is near the corner of EDSA and Quezon Avenue. The rest of MSBFs main
facilities will be outside the seven-hectare area.
On the other hand, this Court cannot countenance MSBFs act of exceeding the
seven-hectare portion granted to it by Proclamation No. 1670. A usufruct is not
simply about rights and privileges. A usufructuary has the duty to protect the owners
interests. One such duty is found in Article 601 of the Civil Code which states:
ART. 601. The usufructuary shall be obliged to notify the owner of any act of a third
person, of which he may have knowledge, that may be prejudicial to the rights of
ownership, and he shall be liable should he not do so, for damages, as if they had
been caused through his own fault.
A usufruct gives a right to enjoy the property of another with the obligation of
preserving its form and substance, unless the title constituting it or the law otherwise
provides.[22] This controversy would not have arisen had MSBF respected the limit of
the beneficial use given to it. MSBFs encroachment of its benefactors property gave
birth to the confusion that attended this case. To put this matter entirely to rest, it is
not enough to remind the NHA to respect MSBFs choice of the location of its seven-
hectare area. MSBF, for its part, must vacate the area that is not part of its usufruct.
MSBFs rights begin and end within the seven-hectare portion of its usufruct. This
Court agrees with the trial court that MSBF has abused the privilege given it under
Proclamation No. 1670. The direct corollary of enforcing MSBFs rights within the
seven-hectare area is the negation of any of MSBFs acts beyond it.
The seven-hectare portion of MSBF is no longer easily determinable considering
the varied structures erected within and surrounding the area. Both parties advance
different reasons why their own surveys should be preferred. At this point, the
determination of the seven-hectare portion cannot be made to rely on a choice
between the NHAs and MSBFs survey. There is a need for a new survey, one
conducted jointly by the NHA and MSBF, to remove all doubts on the exact location
of the seven-hectare area and thus avoid future controversies. This new survey
should consider existing structures of MSBF. It should as much as possible include all
of the facilities of MSBF within the seven-hectare portion without sacrificing
contiguity.
A final point. Article 605 of the Civil Code states:
ART. 605. Usufruct cannot be constituted in favor of a town, corporation, or
association for more than fifty years. If it has been constituted, and before the
expiration of such period the town is abandoned, or the corporation or association
is dissolved, the usufruct shall be extinguished by reason thereof. (Emphasis added)
The law clearly limits any usufruct constituted in favor of a corporation or
association to 50 years. A usufruct is meant only as a lifetime grant. Unlike a natural
person, a corporation or associations lifetime may be extended indefinitely. The
usufruct would then be perpetual. This is especially invidious in cases where the
usufruct given to a corporation or association covers public land. Proclamation No.
1670 was issued 19 September 1977,
or 28 years ago. Hence, under Article 605, the usufruct in favor of MSBF has 22
years left.
MO 127 released approximately 50 hectares of the NHA property as reserved
site for the National Government Center. However, MO 127 does not affect MSBFs
seven-hectare area since under Proclamation No. 1670, MSBFs seven-hectare area
was already exclude[d] from the operation of Proclamation No. 481, dated October
24, 1968, which established the National Government Center Site.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 30 March 2001 and its
Resolution dated 25 June 2001 in CA-G.R. CV No. 48382 are SET ASIDE. This case is
REMANDED to Branch 87 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, which shall order
a joint survey by the National Housing Authority and Manila Seedling Bank
Foundation, Inc. to determine the metes and bounds of the seven-hectare portion of
Manila Seedling Bank Foundation, Inc. under Proclamation No. 1670. The seven-
hectare portion shall be contiguous and shall include as much as possible all existing
major improvements of Manila Seedling Bank Foundation, Inc. The parties shall
submit the joint survey to the Regional Trial Court for its approval within sixty days
from the date ordering the joint survey. SO ORDERED.
 children were victims of crossfire between government troops and the insurgents.
Shocked and saddened about this development, she immediately sent money to
G.R. No. 152809 August 3, 2006 Araceli, Arlene’s older sister, with instructions to look for a lot in Davao City where
Arlene and her family could transfer and settle down. This was why she bought the
MERCEDES MORALIDAD, Petitioner, parcel of land covered by TCT No. T-123125.
vs.
SPS. DIOSDADO PERNES and ARLENE PERNES, Respondents. Petitioner acquired the lot property initially for the purpose of letting Arlene move
from Mandug to Davao City proper but later she wanted the property to be also
DECISION available to any of her kins wishing to live and settle in Davao City. Petitioner made
known this intention in a document she executed on July 21, 1986. 3 The document
reads:
GARCIA, J.:

I, MERCEDES VIÑA MORALIDAD, of legal age, single, having been born on the 29th
Under consideration is this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
day of January, 1923, now actually residing at 8021 Lindbergh Boulevard,
Rules of Court to nullify and set aside the following issuances of the Court of
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, U.S.A., wishes to convey my honest intention regarding
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 61610, to wit:
my properties situated at Palm Village Subdivision, Bajada, Davao City, 9501, … and
hereby declare:
1. Decision dated September 27, 2001, 1 affirming an earlier decision of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Davao City which reversed that of the Municipal Trial Court in
1. That it is my desire that Mr. and Mrs. Diosdado M. Pernes may build their house
Cities (MTCC), Davao City, Branch 1, in an action for unlawful detainer thereat
therein and stay as long as they like;
commenced by the petitioner against the herein respondents; and

2. That anybody of my kins who wishes to stay on the aforementioned real property
2. Resolution dated February 28, 2002, 2 denying petitioner’s motion for
should maintain an atmosphere of cooperation, live in harmony and must avoid
reconsideration.
bickering with one another;
At the heart of this controversy is a parcel of land located in Davao City and
3. That anyone of my kins may enjoy the privilege to stay therein and may avail the
registered in the name of petitioner Mercedes Moralidad under Transfer Certificate
use thereof. Provided, however, that the same is not inimical to the purpose
of Title (TCT) No. T-123125 of the Registry of Deeds of Davao City.
thereof;
In her younger days, petitioner taught in Davao City, Quezon City and Manila. While
4. That anyone of my kins who cannot conform with the wishes of the undersigned
teaching in Manila, she had the good fortune of furthering her studies at the
may exercise the freedom to look for his own;
University of Pennsylvania, U.S.A. While schooling, she was offered to teach at the
Philadelphia Catholic Archdiocese, which she did for seven (7) years. Thereafter, she
worked at the Mental Health Department of said University for the next seventeen 5. That any proceeds or income derived from the aforementioned properties shall
(17) years. be allotted to my nearest kins who have less in life in greater percentage and lesser
percentage to those who are better of in standing.
During those years, she would come home to the Philippines to spend her two-
month summer vacation in her hometown in Davao City. Being single, she would xxx xxx xxx
usually stay in Mandug, Davao City, in the house of her niece, respondent Arlene
Pernes, a daughter of her younger sister, Rosario. Following her retirement in 1993, petitioner came back to the Philippines to stay
with the respondents’ on the house they build on the subject property. In the
Back in the U.S.A. sometime in 1986, she received news from Arlene that Mandug course of time, their relations turned sour because members of the Pernes family
at the outskirts of Davao City was infested by NPA rebels and many women and were impervious to her suggestions and attempts to change certain practices
concerning matters of health and sanitation within their compound. For instance, in its decision dated November 17, 1999, 4 the MTCC rendered judgment for the
Arlene’s eldest son, Myco Pernes, then a fourth year veterinary medicine student, petitioner, as plaintiff therein, to wit:
would answer petitioner back with clenched fist and at one time hurled profanities
when she corrected him. Later, Arlene herself followed suit. Petitioner brought the WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of herein plaintiff and against
matter to the local barangay lupon where she lodged a complaint for slander, the defendants, as follows:
harassment, threat and defamation against the Pernes Family. Deciding for
petitioner, the lupon apparently ordered the Pernes family to vacate petitioner’s a) Directing the defendants, their agents and other persons acting on their behalf to
property but not after they are reimbursed for the value of the house they built vacate the premises and to yield peaceful possession thereof to plaintiff;
thereon. Unfortunately, the parties could not agree on the amount, thus prolonging
the impasse between them.
b) Ordering defendants to pay P2,000.00 a month from the filing of this complaint
until they vacate premises;
Other ugly incidents interspersed with violent confrontations meanwhile transpired,
with the petitioner narrating that, at one occasion in July 1998, she sustained cuts
c) Sentencing defendants to pay the sum of P120,000.00 5 as attorney’s fees and to
and wounds when Arlene pulled her hair, hit her on the face, neck and back, while
pay the cost of suit.
her husband Diosdado held her, twisting her arms in the process.
Defendants counterclaim are hereby dismissed except with respect to the claim for
Relations having deteriorated from worse to worst, petitioner, on July 29, 1998,
reimbursement of necessary and useful expenses which should be litigated in an
lodged a formal complaint before the Regional Office of the Ombudsman for
ordinary civil actions. (sic)
Mindanao, charging the respondent spouses, who were both government
employees, with conduct unbecoming of public servants. This administrative case,
Dissatisfied, the respondent spouses appealed to the RTC of Davao City.
however, did not prosper.

In the meantime, petitioner filed a Motion for Execution Pending Appeal. The
Then, on August 3, 1998, petitioner filed with the MTCC of Davao City an unlawful
motion was initially granted by the RTC in its Order of February 29, 2000, but the
detainer suit against the respondent spouses. Petitioner alleged that she is the
Order was later withdrawn and vacated by its subsequent Order dated May 9,
registered owner of the land on which the respondents built their house; that
2000 6 on the ground that immediate execution of the appealed decision was not
through her counsel, she sent the respondent spouses a letter demanding them to
the prudent course of action to take, considering that the house the respondents
vacate the premises and to pay rentals therefor, which the respondents refused to
constructed on the subject property might even be more valuable than the land
heed.
site.
In their defense, the respondents alleged having entered the property in question,
Eventually, in a decision 7 dated September 30, 2000, the RTC reversed that of the
building their house thereon and maintaining the same as their residence with
MTCC, holding that respondents’ possession of the property in question was not, as
petitioner’s full knowledge and express consent. To prove their point, they invited
ruled by the latter court, by mere tolerance of the petitioner but rather by her
attention to her written declaration of July 21, 1986, supra, wherein she expressly
express consent. It further ruled that Article 1678 of the Civil Code on
signified her desire for the spouses to build their house on her property and stay
reimbursement of improvements introduced is inapplicable since said provision
thereat for as long as they like.
contemplates of a lessor-lessee arrangement, which was not the factual milieu
obtaining in the case. Instead, the RTC ruled that what governed the parties’
The MTCC, resolving the ejectment suit in petitioner’s favor, declared that the
relationship are Articles 448 and 546 of the Civil Code, explaining thus:
respondent spouses, although builders in good faith vis-à-vis the house they built
on her property, cannot invoke their bona fides as a valid excuse for not complying
Since the defendants-appellees [respondents] are admittedly possessors of the
with the demand to vacate. To the MTCC, respondents’ continued possession of the
property by permission from plaintiff [petitioner], and builders in good faith, they
premises turned unlawful upon their receipt of the demand to vacate, such
have the right to retain possession of the property subject of this case until they
possession being merely at petitioner’s tolerance, and sans any rental. Accordingly,
have been reimbursed the cost of the improvements they have introduced on the
property.
Indeed, this is a substantive right given to the defendants by law, and this right is
superior to the procedural right to [sic] plaintiff to immediately ask for their
removal by a writ of execution by virtue of a decision which as we have shown is
erroneous, and therefore invalid. (Words in brackets supplied),
and accordingly dismissed petitioner’s appeal, as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Decision appealed from is REVERSED and
declared invalid. Consequently, the motion for execution pending appeal is likewise
denied.
Counter-claims of moral and exemplary damages claimed by defendants are
likewise dismissed. However, attorney’s fees in the amount of fifteen thousand
pesos is hereby awarded in favor of defendants-appellants, and against plaintiffs.
SO ORDERED. 8
Therefrom, petitioner went to the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 61610.
On September 27, 2001, the CA, while conceding the applicability of Articles 448
and 546 of the Civil Code to the case, ruled that it is still premature to apply the
same considering that the issue of whether respondents’ right to possess a portion
of petitioner’s land had already expired or was already terminated was not yet
resolved. To the CA, the unlawful detainer suit presupposes the cessation of
respondents’ right to possess. The CA further ruled that what governs the rights of
the parties is the law on usufruct but petitioner failed to establish that respondents’
right to possess had already ceased. On this premise, the CA concluded that the
ejectment suit instituted by the petitioner was premature. The appellate court thus
affirmed the appealed RTC decision, disposing:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition for review is hereby denied
for lack of merit. Accordingly, the petitioner’s complaint for Unlawful Detainer is
DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
With the CA’s denial of her motion for reconsideration in its Resolution of February
28, 2002, petitioner is now before this Court raising the following issues:
I. WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DISMISSING THE
UNLAWFUL DETAINER CASE FOR BEING PREMATURE WHICH DECISION IS NOT IN
ACCORDANCE WITH LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE.
II. WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN APPLYING ARTICLES 448
AND 546 AND THE PROVISIONS OF THE CODE ON USUFRUCT INSTEAD OF ARTICLE
1678 OF THE CIVIL CODE.
The Court rules for the petitioner.
The Court is inclined to agree with the CA that what was constituted between the
parties herein is one of usufruct over a piece of land, with the petitioner being the
owner of the property upon whom the naked title thereto remained and the
respondents being two (2) among other unnamed usufructuaries who were simply
referred to as petitioner’s kin. The Court, however, cannot go along with the CA’s
holding that the action for unlawful detainer must be dismissed on ground of
prematurity.
Usufruct is defined under Article 562 of the Civil Code in the following wise:
ART. 562. Usufruct gives a right to enjoy the property of another with the obligation
of preserving its form and substance, unless the title constituting it or the law
otherwise provides.
Usufruct, in essence, is nothing else but simply allowing one to enjoy another’s
property. 9 It is also defined as the right to enjoy the property of another
temporarily, including both the jus utendi and the jus fruendi, 10 with the owner
retaining the jus disponendi or the power to alienate the same. 11
It is undisputed that petitioner, in a document dated July 21, 1986, supra, made
known her intention to give respondents and her other kins the right to use and to
enjoy the fruits of her property. There can also be no quibbling about the
respondents being given the right "to build their own house" on the property and to
stay thereat "as long as they like." Paragraph #5 of the same document earmarks
"proceeds or income derived from the aforementioned properties" for the
petitioner’s "nearest kins who have less in life in greater percentage and lesser
percentage to those who are better of (sic) in standing." The established facts
undoubtedly gave respondents not only the right to use the property but also
granted them, among the petitioner’s other kins, the right to enjoy the fruits
thereof. We have no quarrel, therefore, with the CA’s ruling that usufruct was
constituted between petitioner and respondents. It is thus pointless to discuss why
there was no lease contract between the parties.
However, determinative of the outcome of the ejectment case is the resolution of
the next issue, i.e., whether the existing usufruct may be deemed to have been
extinguished or terminated. If the question is resolved in the affirmative, then the
respondents’ right to possession, proceeding as it did from their right of usufruct,
likewise ceased. In that case, petitioner’s action for ejectment in the unlawful
detainer case could proceed and should prosper.
The CA disposed of this issue in this wise:
xxx Section 1, Rule 70 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, provides
xxx
xxx xxx xxx
From the foregoing provision, it becomes apparent that for an action for unlawful
detainer to prosper, the plaintiff [petitioner] needs to prove that defendants’
[respondents’] right to possess already expired and terminated. Now, has
respondents’ right to possess the subject portion of petitioner’s property expired or
terminated? Let us therefore examine respondents’ basis for occupying the same.
It is undisputed that petitioner expressly authorized respondents o occupy portion
of her property on which their house may be built. Thus – "it is my desire that Mr.
and Mrs. Diosdado M. Pernes may build their house therein and stay as long as they
like." From this statement, it seems that petitioner had given the respondents the
usufructuary rights over the portion that may be occupied by the house that the
latter would build, the duration of which being dependent on how long respondents
would like to occupy the property. While petitioner had already demanded from
the respondents the surrender of the premises, this Court is of the opinion that the
usufructuary rights of respondents had not been terminated by the said demand
considering the clear statement of petitioner that she is allowing respondents to
occupy portion of her land as long as the latter want to. Considering that
respondents still want to occupy the premises, petitioner clearly cannot eject
respondents. 12
We disagree with the CA’s conclusion of law on the matter. The term or period of
the usufruct originally specified provides only one of the bases for the right of a
usufructuary to hold and retain possession of the thing given in usufruct. There are
other modes or instances whereby the usufruct shall be considered terminated or
extinguished. For sure, the Civil Code enumerates such other modes of
extinguishment:
ART. 603. Usufruct is extinguished:
(1) By the death of the usufructuary, unless a contrary intention clearly appears;
(2) By expiration of the period for which it was constituted, or by the fulfillment of
any resolutory condition provided in the title creating the usufruct;
(3) By merger of the usufruct and ownership in the same person;
(4) By renunciation of the usufructuary;
(5) By the total loss of the thing in usufruct;
(6) By the termination of the right of the person constituting the usufruct;
(7) By prescription. (Emphasis supplied.)
The document executed by the petitioner dated July 21, 1986 constitutes the title
creating, and sets forth the conditions of, the usufruct. Paragraph #3 thereof states
"[T]hat anyone of my kins may enjoy the privilege to stay therein and may avail the
use thereof. Provided, however, that the same is not inimical to the purpose
thereof" (Emphasis supplied). What may be inimical to the purpose constituting the
usufruct may be gleaned from the preceding paragraph wherein petitioner made it
abundantly clear "that anybody of my kins who wishes to stay on the
aforementioned property should maintain an atmosphere of cooperation, live in
harmony and must avoid bickering with one another." That the maintenance of a
peaceful and harmonious relations between and among kin constitutes an
indispensable condition for the continuance of the usufruct is clearly deduced from
the succeeding Paragraph #4 where petitioner stated "[T]hat anyone of my kins
who cannot conform with the wishes of the undersigned may exercise the freedom
to look for his own." In fine, the occurrence of any of the following: the loss of the
atmosphere of cooperation, the bickering or the cessation of harmonious
relationship between/among kin constitutes a resolutory condition which, by
express wish of the petitioner, extinguishes the usufruct.
From the pleadings submitted by the parties, it is indubitable that there were
indeed facts and circumstances whereby the subject usufruct may be deemed
terminated or extinguished by the occurrence of the resolutory conditions provided
for in the title creating the usufruct, namely, the document adverted to which the
petitioner executed on July 21, 1986.
As aptly pointed out by the petitioner in her Memorandum, respondents’ own
evidence before the MTCC indicated that the relations between the parties "have
deteriorated to almost an irretrievable level." 13 There is no doubt then that what
impelled petitioner to file complaints before the local barangay lupon, the Office of
the Ombudsman for Mindanao, and this instant complaint for unlawful detainer
before the MTCC is that she could not live peacefully and harmoniously with the
Pernes family and vice versa.
Thus, the Court rules that the continuing animosity between the petitioner and the
Pernes family and the violence and humiliation she was made to endure, despite
her advanced age and frail condition, are enough factual bases to consider the
usufruct as having been terminated.
To reiterate, the relationship between the petitioner and respondents respecting
the property in question is one of owner and usufructuary. Accordingly,
respondents’ claim for reimbursement of the improvements they introduced on the
property during the effectivity of the usufruct should be governed by applicable
statutory provisions and principles on usufruct. In this regard, we cite with approval
what Justice Edgardo Paras wrote on the matter:
Out of the generosity of her heart, the petitioner has allowed the respondent
spouses to use and enjoy the fruits of her property for quite a long period of time.
They opted, however, to repay a noble gesture with unkindness. At the end of the
day, therefore, they really cannot begrudge their aunt for putting an end to their
right of usufruct. The disposition herein arrived is not only legal and called for by
the law and facts of the case. It is also right.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision and Resolution of the
CA are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the decision of the MTCC is
REINSTATED with MODIFICATION that all of respondents’ counterclaims are
dismissed, including their claims for reimbursement of useful and necessary
expenses.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

If the builder is a usufructuary, his rights will be governed by Arts. 579 and 580. In
case like this, the terms of the contract and the pertinent provisions of law should
govern (3 Manresa 215-216; se also Montinola vs. Bantug, 71 Phil.
449). 14 (Emphasis ours.)

By express provision of law, respondents, as usufructuary, do not have the right to

reimbursement for the improvements they may have introduced on the property.
We quote Articles 579 and 580 of the Civil Code:

Art. 579. The usufructuary may make on the property held in usufruct such useful
improvements or expenses for mere pleasure as he may deem proper, provided he
does not alter its form or substance; but he shall have no right to be indemnified
therefor. He may, however, remove such improvements, should it be possible to do
so without damage to the property. (Emphasis supplied.)

Art. 580. The usufructuary may set off the improvements he may have made on the
property against any damage to the same.

Given the foregoing perspective, respondents will have to be ordered to vacate the
premises without any right of reimbursement. If the rule on reimbursement or
indemnity were otherwise, then the usufructuary might, as an author pointed out,
improve the owner out of his property. 15 The respondents may, however, remove
or destroy the improvements they may have introduced thereon without damaging
the petitioner’s property.
G.R. No. 124699 July 31, 2003 It was not until 1989 when private respondents discovered the aforementioned
claim of Bomedco on inquiry with the Bureau of Lands. Through their lawyer, they
BOGO-MEDELLIN MILLING CO., INC., Petitioner, immediately demanded the legal basis for Bomedco's claim over Cadastral Lot No.
vs. 954 but their letter of inquiry addressed to petitioner went unheeded, as was their
COURT OF APPEALS AND HEIRS OF MAGDALENO VALDEZ SR., Respondents. subsequent demand for payment of compensation for the use of the land. 6

DECISION On June 8, 1989, respondent heirs filed a "Complaint for Payment of Compensation
and/or Recovery of Possession of Real Property and Damages with Application for
CORONA, J.: Restraining Order/Preliminary Injunction" against Bomedco before the Regional
Trial Court of Cebu.7 Respondent heirs alleged that, before she sold the land to
Valdez, Sr. in 1935, Santillan granted Bomedco, in 1929, a railroad right of way for a
This is an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to annul
period of 30 years. When Valdez, Sr. acquired the land, he respected the grant. The
and set aside the decision1dated November 17, 1995 of the Court of Appeals, Tenth
right of way expired sometime in 1959 but respondent heirs allowed Bomedco to
Division, which reversed the decision2 dated November 27, 1991 of the Regional
continue using the land because one of them was then an employee of the
Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch IX, which ruled in favor of herein petitioner, Bogo-
company.8
Medellin Milling Company, Inc. and dismissed herein private respondents'
complaint for payment of compensation and/or recovery of possession of real
property and damages with application for restraining order or preliminary In support of the complaint, they presented an ancient document ― an original
injunction; and its resolution dated March 2, 1996 denying petitioner's motion for copy of the deed of sale written in Spanish and dated December 9, 19359 ― to
reconsideration. evidence the sale of the land to Magdaleno Valdez, Sr.; several original real estate
tax receipts10 including Real Property Tax Receipt No. 393511 dated 1922 in the
name of Graciano de los Reyes, husband of Feliciana Santillan, and Real Property
The antecedent facts follow.
Tax Receipt No. 0949112 dated 1963 in the name of Magdaleno Valdez, Sr.
Magdaleno Valdez, Jr. also testified for the plaintiffs during the trial.
Magdaleno Valdez, Sr., father of herein private respondents Sergio Valdez, Angelina
Valdez-Novabos, Teresita Argawanon-Mangubat and Daylinda Argawanon-
On the other hand, Bomedco’s principal defense was that it was the owner and
Melendres (hereafter the heirs), purchased from Feliciana Santillan, on December 9,
possessor of Cadastral Lot No. 954, having allegedly bought the same from Feliciana
1935, a parcel of unregistered land covered by Tax Declaration No. 3935 with an
Santillan in 1929, prior to the sale of the property by the latter to Magdaleno
area of one hectare, 34 ares and 16 centares, located in Barrio Dayhagon, Medellin,
Valdez, Sr. in 1935. It also contended that plaintiffs’ claim was already barred by
Cebu.3 He took possession of the property and declared it for tax purposes in his
prescription and laches because of Bomedco’s open and continuous possession of
name.4
the property for more than 50 years.
Prior to the sale, however, the entire length of the land from north to south was
Bomedco submitted in evidence a Deed of Sale13 dated March 18, 1929; seven real
already traversed in the middle by railroad tracks owned by petitioner Bogo-
estate tax receipts14 for the property covering the period from 1930 to 1985; a 1929
Medellin Milling Co., Inc. (hereafter Bomedco). The tracks were used for hauling
Survey Plan of private land for Bogo-Medellin Milling Company;15 a Survey
sugar cane from the fields to petitioner’s sugar mill.
Notification Card;16 Lot Data Computation for Lot No. 954;17 a Cadastral Map for
Medellin Cadastre18 as well as the testimonies of Vicente Basmayor, Geodetic
When Magdaleno Valdez, Sr. passed away in 1948, herein private respondents
Engineer and property custodian for Bomedco, and Rafaela A. Belleza, Geodetic
inherited the land. However, unknown to them, Bomedco was able to have the
Engineer and Chief of the Land Management Services of the DENR, Region VIII.
disputed middle lot which was occupied by the railroad tracks placed in its name in
the Cadastral Survey of Medellin, Cebu in 1965. The entire subject land was divided
In its decision dated November 27, 1991, the trial court19 rejected Bomedco's
into three, namely, Cadastral Lot Nos. 953, 954 and 955. Lot Nos. 953 and 955
defense of ownership on the basis of a prior sale, citing that its evidence – a xerox
remained in the name of private respondents. However, Lot No. 954, the narrow lot
copy of the Deed of Sale dated March 18, 1929 – was inadmissible and had no
where the railroad tracks lay, was claimed by Bomedco as its own and was declared
probative value. Not only was it not signed by the parties but defendant Bomedco
for tax purposes in its name. 5
also failed to present the original copy without valid reason pursuant to Section 4,
Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.20
Nonetheless, the trial court held that Bomedco had been in possession of Cadastral
Lot No. 954 in good faith for more than 10 years, thus, it had already acquired
ownership of the property through acquisitive prescription under Article 620 of the
Civil Code. It explained:
Under Article 620 of the Civil Code, CONTINUOUS and APPARENT easements can be
acquired by prescription after ten (10) years. The "apparent" characteristic of the
questioned property being used by defendant as an easement is no longer at issue,
because plaintiffs themselves had acknowledged that the existence of the railway
tracks of defendant Bomedco was already known by the late Magdaleno Valdez,
herein plaintiffs’ predecessor-in-interest, before the late Magdaleno Valdez
purchased in 1935 from the late Feliciana Santillan the land described in the
Complaint where defendant’s railway tracks is traversing [sic] (TSN of February 5,
1991, pp. 7-8). As to the continuity of defendant’s use of the strip of land as
easement is [sic] also manifest from the continuous and uninterrupted occupation
of the questioned property from 1929 up to the date of the filing of the instant
Complaint. In view of the defendant’s UNINTERRUPTED possession of the strip of
land for more than fifity (50) years, the Supreme Court’s ruling in the case of
Ronquillo, et al. v. Roco, et al. (103 Phil 84) is not applicable. This is because in said
case the easement in question was a strip of dirt road whose possession by the
dominant estate occurs only everytime said dirt road was being used by the
dominant estate. Such fact would necessarily show that the easement’s possession
by the dominant estate was never continuous. In the instant case however, there is
clear continuity of defendant’s possession of the strip of land it had been using as
railway tracks. Because the railway tracks which defendant had constructed on the
questioned strip of land had been CONTINUOUSLY occupying said easement. Thus,
defendant Bomedco’s apparent and continuous possession of said strip of land in
good faith for more than ten (10) years had made defendant owner of said strip of
land traversed by its railway tracks. Because the railway tracks which defendant had
constructed on the questioned strip of land had been continuously occupying said
easement [sic]. Thus, defendant Bomedco’s apparent and continuous possession of
said strip of land in good faith for more than ten (10) years had made defendant
owner of said strip of land traversed by its railway tracks.
Respondent heirs elevated the case to the Court of Appeals which found that
Bomedco did not acquire ownership over the lot. It consequently reversed the trial
court. In its decision dated November 17, 1995, the appellate court held that
Bomedco only acquired an easement of right of way by unopposed and continuous
use of the land, but not ownership, under Article 620 of the Civil Code.
The appellate court further ruled that Bomedco’s claim of a prior sale to it by
Feliciana Santillan was untrue. Its possession being in bad faith, the applicable
prescriptive period in order to acquire ownership over the land was 30 years under
Article 1137 of the Civil Code. Adverse possession of the property started only in
1965 when Bomedco registered its claim in the cadastral survey of Medellin. Since
only 24 years from 1965 had elapsed when the heirs filed a complaint against
Bomedco in 1989, Bomedco’s possession of the land had not yet ripened into
ownership.
And since there was no showing that respondent heirs or their predecessor-in-
interest was ever paid compensation for the use of the land, the appellate court
awarded compensation to them, to be computed from the time of discovery of the
adverse acts of Bomedco.
Its motion for reconsideration having been denied by the appellate court in its
resolution dated March 22, 1996, Bomedco now interposes before us this present
appeal by certiorari under Rule 45, assigning the following errors:
I
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT
REVERSED AND SET ASIDE THE TRIAL COURT’S DECISION DISMISSING
PRIVATE RESPONDENT’S COMPLAINT.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT
ORDERED THE PETITIONER TO PAY THE PRIVATE RESPONDENT THE
REASONABLE VALUE OF LOT 954 AND THE AMOUNT OF TEN THOUSAND
(₱10,000.00) PESOS AS REASONABLE ATTORNEY’S FEES.
Petitioner Bomedco reiterates its claim of ownership of the
land through extraordinary acquisitive prescription under Article 1137 of the Civil
Code and laches to defeat the claim for compensation or recovery of possession by
respondent heirs. It also submits a third ground originally tendered by the trial
court ― acquisition of the easement of right of way by prescription under Article
620 of the Civil Code.
Extraordinary Acquisitive Prescription
Under Art. 1137 of the Civil Code
Petitioner’s claim of ownership through extraordinary acquisitive prescription under
Article 1137 of the Civil Code cannot be sustained.
There is no dispute that the controversial strip of land has been in the continuous
possession of petitioner since 1929. But possession, to constitute the foundation of
a prescriptive right, must be possession under a claim of title, that is, it must be
adverse.21 Unless coupled with the element of hostility towards the true owner,
possession, however long, will not confer title by prescription. 22
After a careful review of the records, we are inclined to believe the version of
respondent heirs that an easement of right of way was actually granted to
petitioner for which reason the latter was able to occupy Cadastral Lot No. 954. We
cannot disregard the fact that, for the years 1930, 1937, 1949, 1962 and 1963,
petitioner unequivocally declared the property to be a "central railroad right of
way" or "sugar central railroad right of way" in its real estate tax receipts when it
could have declared it to be "industrial land" as it did for the years 1975 and
1985.23 Instead of indicating ownership of the lot, these receipts showed that all
petitioner had was possession by virtue of the right of way granted to it. Were it not
so and petitioner really owned the land, petitioner would not have consistently
used the phrases "central railroad right of way" and "sugar central railroad right of
way" in its tax declarations until 1963. Certainly an owner would have found no
need for these phrases. A person cannot have an easement on his own land, since
all the uses of an easement are fully comprehended in his general right of
ownership.24
While it is true that, together with a person’s actual and adverse possession of the
land, tax declarations constitute strong evidence of ownership of the land occupied
by him,25 this legal precept does not apply in cases where the property is declared
to be a mere easement of right of way.
An easement or servitude is a real right, constituted on the corporeal immovable
property of another, by virtue of which the owner has to refrain from doing, or
must allow someone to do, something on his property, for the benefit of another
thing or person. It exists only when the servient and dominant estates belong to
two different owners. It gives the holder of the easement an incorporeal interest on
the land but grants no title thereto. Therefore, an acknowledgment of the
easement is an admission that the property belongs to another. 26
Having held the property by virtue of an easement, petitioner cannot now assert
that its occupancy since 1929 was in the concept of an owner. Neither can it declare
that the 30-year period of extraordinary acquisitive prescription started from that
year.
Petitioner, however, maintains that even if a servitude was merely imposed on the
property in its favor, its possession immediately became adverse to the owner in
the late 1950’s when the grant was alleged by respondent heirs to have expired. It
stresses that, counting from the late 1950’s (1959 as found by the trial court), the
30-year extraordinary acquisitive prescription had already set in by the time
respondent heirs made a claim against it in their letters dated March 1 and April 6,
1989.
We do not think so. The mere expiration of the period of easement in 1959 did not
convert petitioner’s possession into an adverse one. Mere material possession of
land is not adverse possession as against the owner and is insufficient to vest title,
unless such possession is accompanied by the intent to possess as an
owner.27 There should be a hostile use of such a nature and exercised under such
circumstances as to manifest and give notice that the possession is under a claim of
right.
In the absence of an express grant by the owner, or conduct by petitioner sugar mill
from which an adverse claim can be implied, its possession of the lot can only be
presumed to have continued in the same character as when it was acquired (that is,
it possessed the land only by virtue of the original grant of the easement of right of
way),28 or was by mere license or tolerance of the owners (respondent heirs). 29 It is
a fundamental principle of law in this jurisdiction that acts of possessory character
executed by virtue of license or tolerance of the owner, no matter how long, do not
start the running of the period of prescription.30
After the grant of easement expired in 1959, petitioner never performed any act
incompatible with the ownership of respondent heirs over Cadastral Lot No. 954.
On the contrary, until 1963, petitioner continued to declare the "sugar central
railroad right of way" in its realty tax receipts, thereby doubtlessly conceding the
ownership of respondent heirs. Respondents themselves were emphatic that they
simply tolerated petitioner’s continued use of Cadastral Lot No. 954 so as not to
jeopardize the employment of one of their co-heirs in the sugar mill of petitioner.31
The only time petitioner assumed a legal position adverse to respondents’
was when it filed a claim over the property in 1965 during the cadastral survey of
Medellin. Since then (1965) and until the filing of the complaint for the recovery of
the subject land before the RTC of Cebu in 1989, only 24 years had lapsed. Since the
required 30-year extraordinary prescriptive period had not yet been complied with
in 1989, petitioner never acquired ownership of the subject land.
Laches
Neither can petitioner find refuge in the principle of laches. It is not just the lapse of
time or delay that constitutes laches. The essence of laches is the failure or neglect,
for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which, through due
diligence, could or should have been done earlier, thus giving rise to a presumption
that the party entitled to assert it had either abandoned or declined to assert it. 32
Its essential elements are: (a) conduct on the part of the defendant, or of one under
whom he claims, giving rise to the situation complained of; (b) delay in asserting
complainant’s rights after he had knowledge of defendant’s acts and after he has
had the opportunity to sue; (c) lack of knowledge or notice by defendant that the
complainant will assert the right on which he bases his suit; and (d) injury or
prejudice to the defendant in the event the relief is accorded to the complainant. 33
The second element (which in turn has three aspects) is lacking in the case at bar.
These aspects are: (a) knowledge of defendant's action, (b) opportunity to sue
defendant after obtaining such knowledge and (c) delay in the filing of such suit. 34
Records show that respondent heirs only learned about petitioner’s claim on their
property when they discovered the inscription for the cadastral survey in the
records of the Bureau of Lands in 1989. Respondents lost no time in demanding an
explanation for said claim in their letters to the petitioner dated March 1, 1989 and
April 6, 1989. When petitioner ignored them, they instituted their complaint before
the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City on June 8, 1989.
Petitioner’s reliance on Caro vs. Court of Appeals 35 and Vda. de Alberto vs. Court of
Appeals 36 is misplaced. There, laches was applied to bar petitioners from
questioning the ownership of the disputed properties precisely because they had
knowledge of the adverse claims on their properties yet tarried for an extraordinary
period of time before taking steps to protect their rights.
Further, there is no absolute rule on what constitutes laches. It is a rule of equity
and applied not to penalize neglect or sleeping on one’s rights but rather to avoid
recognizing a right when to do so would result in a clearly unfair situation. The
question of laches is addressed to the sound discretion of the court and each case
must be decided according to its particular circumstances.37 It is the better rule that
courts, under the principle of equity, should not be guided or bound strictly by the
statute of limitations or the doctrine of laches if wrong or injustice will result.
It is clear that petitioner never acquired ownership over Cadastral Lot No. 954
whether by extraordinary acquisitive prescription or by laches.
Acquisition of Easement of Right of Way By
Prescription Under Art. 620 of the Civil Code
Petitioner contends that, even if it failed to acquire ownership of the subject land, it
nevertheless became legally entitled to the easement of right of way over said land
by virtue of prescription under Article 620 of the Civil Code:
Continuous and apparent easements are acquired either by virtue of a title or by
prescription of ten years.
The trial court and the Court of Appeals both upheld this view for the reason that
the railroad right of way was, according to them, continuous and apparent in
nature. The more or less permanent railroad tracks were visually apparent and
they continuously occupied the subject strip of land from 1959 (the year the
easement granted by Feliciana Santillan to petitioner expired). Thus, with the lapse
of the 10-year prescriptive period in 1969, petitioner supposedly acquired the
easement of right of way over the subject land.
Following the logic of the courts a quo, if a road for the use of vehicles or the
passage of persons is permanently cemented or asphalted, then the right of way
over it becomes continuous in nature. The reasoning is erroneous.
Under civil law and its jurisprudence, easements are either continuous or
discontinuous according to the manner they are exercised, not according to the
presence of apparent signs or physical indications of the existence of such
easements. Thus, an easement is continuous if its use is, or may be, incessant
without the intervention of any act of man, like the easement of drainage; 38 and it is
discontinuous if it is used at intervals and depends on the act of man, like the
easement of right of way.39
The easement of right of way is considered discontinuous because it is exercised
only if a person passes or sets foot on somebody else’s land. Like a road for the
passage of vehicles or persons, an easement of right of way of railroad tracks is
discontinuous because the right is exercised only if and when a train operated by a
person passes over another's property. In other words, the very exercise of the
servitude depends upon the act or intervention of man which is the very essence of
discontinuous easements.
The presence of more or less permanent railroad tracks does not in any way convert
the nature of an easement of right of way to one that is continuous. It is not the
presence of apparent signs or physical indications showing the existence of an
easement, but rather the manner of exercise thereof, that categorizes such
easement into continuous or discontinuous. The presence of physical or visual signs
only classifies an easement into apparent or non-apparent. Thus, a road (which
reveals a right of way) and a window (which evidences a right to light and view) are
apparent easements, while an easement of not building beyond a certain height is
non-apparent.40
In Cuba, it has been held that the existence of a permanent railway does not make
the right of way a continuous one; it is only apparent. Therefore, it cannot be
acquired by prescription.41 In Louisiana, it has also been held that a right of passage
over another's land cannot be claimed by prescription because this easement is
discontinuous and can be established only by title.42
In this case, the presence of railroad tracks for the passage of petitioner’s trains
denotes the existence of an apparent but discontinuous easement of right of way.
And under Article 622 of the Civil Code, discontinuous easements, whether apparent
or not, may be acquired only by title. Unfortunately, petitioner Bomedco never
acquired any title over the use of the railroad right of way whether by law,
donation, testamentary succession or contract. Its use of the right of way, however
long, never resulted in its acquisition of the easement because, under Article 622,
the discontinuous easement of a railroad right of way can only be acquired by
title and not by prescription.1âwphi1
To be sure, beginning 1959 when the original 30-year grant of right of way given to
petitioner Bomedco expired, its occupation and use of Cadastral Lot No. 954 came
to be by mere tolerance of the respondent heirs. Thus, upon demand by said heirs
in 1989 for the return of the subject land and the removal of the railroad tracks, or,
in the alternative, payment of compensation for the use thereof, petitioner
Bomedco which had no title to the land should have returned the possession
thereof or should have begun paying compensation for its use.
(4) the right of way claimed is at the point least prejudicial to the servient
estate, and, insofar as consistent with this rule, the distance from the
dominant estate to the highway is the shortest.43
None of the above options to acquire title over the railroad right of way was ever
pursued by petitioner despite the fact that simple resourcefulness demanded such
initiative, considering the importance of the railway tracks to its business. No doubt,
it is unlawfully occupying and using the subject strip of land as a railroad right of
way without valid title yet it refuses to vacate it even after demand of the heirs.
Furthermore, it tenaciously insists on ownership thereof despite a clear showing to
the contrary.
We thus uphold the grant by the Court of Appeals of attorney’s fees in the amount
of ₱10,000 considering the evident bad faith of petitioner in refusing respondents’
just and lawful claims, compelling the latter to litigate.44
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The appealed decision dated November 17,
1995 and resolution dated March 2, 1996 of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED
with MODIFICATION. Petitioner Bogo-Medellin Milling Company, Inc. is hereby
ordered to vacate the subject strip of land denominated as Cadastral Lot No. 954,
remove its railway tracks thereon and return its possession to the private
respondents, the heirs of Magdaleno Valdez, Sr. It is also hereby ordered to pay
private respondents attorney's fees in the amount of ₱10,000.
SO ORDERED.

But when is a party deemed to acquire title over the use of such land (that is, title
over the easement of right of way)? In at least two cases, we held that if: (a) it had
subsequently entered into a contractual right of way with the heirs for the
continued use of the land under the principles of voluntary easements or (b) it had
filed a case against the heirs for conferment on it of a legal easement of right of way
under Article 629 of the Civil Code, then title over the use of the land is deemed to
exist. The conferment of a legal easement of right of way under Article 629 is
subject to proof of the following:

(1) it is surrounded by other immovables and has no adequate outlet to a

public highway;

(2) payment of proper indemnity;

(3) the isolation is not the result of its own acts; and
G.R. No. 172077 October 9, 2009
BICOL AGRO-INDUSTRIAL PRODUCERS COOPERATIVE, INC. (BAPCI), Petitioner,
vs.
EDMUNDO O. OBIAS, PERFECTO O. OBIAS, VICTOR BAGASINA, ELENA BENOSA,
MELCHOR BRANDES, ROGELIO MONTERO, PEDRO MONTERO, CLAUDIO RESARI,
PILAR GALON, ANTONIO BUISON, PRUDENCIO BENOSA, JR., MARIA VILLAMER and
ROBERTO PADUA, Respondent.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Before this Court is a Petition for Review on certiorari 1 under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court, seeking to set aside the August 24, 2005 Decision 2 and March 28, 2006
Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 59016.
The facts of the case:
Sometime in 1972, the Bicol Sugar Development Corporation (BISUDECO) was
established at Himaao, Pili, Camarines Sur. In the same year, BISUDECO constructed
a road ("the disputed road") – measuring approximately 7 meters wide and 2.9
kilometers long. The disputed road was used by BISUDECO in hauling and
transporting sugarcane to and from its mill site (Pensumil) and has thus become
indispensable to its sugar milling operations.4
On October 30, 1992, petitioner Bicol Agro-Industrial Producers Cooperative, Inc.
acquired the assets of BISUDECO. On April 19, 1993, petitioner filed a
Complaint5 against respondents Edmundo Obias, Perfecto Obias, Victor Bagasina,
Elena Benosa, Melchor Brandes, Rogelio Montero, Pedro Montero, Claudio Resari,
Pilar Galon, Antonio Buison, Prudencio Benosa, Jr., Victor Bagasina Jr., Maria
Villamer, and Roberto Padua, alleging that on March 27, 1993 and April 3, 1993,
respondents unjustifiably barricaded the disputed road by placing bamboos, woods,
placards and stones across it, preventing petitioner’s and the other sugar planter’s
vehicles from passing through the disputed road, thereby causing serious damage
and prejudice to petitioner.6
Petitioner alleged that BISUDECO constructed the disputed road pursuant to an
agreement with the owners of the ricefields the road traversed. The agreement
provides that BISUDECO shall employ the children and relatives of the landowners
in exchange for the construction of the road on their properties. Petitioner
contends that through prolonged and continuous use of the disputed road,
BISUDECO acquired a right of way over the properties of the landowners, which
right of way in turn was acquired by it when it bought BISUDECO’s assets. Petitioner
prayed that respondents be permanently ordered to restrain from barricading the
disputed road and from obstructing its free passage.7
In an Order8 dated April 19, 1993, the Regional Trial Court of Pili (RTC), Camarines
Sur, 5th Judicial Region, Branch 31, ordered respondents, their agents and
representatives to cease and desist from placing barricades on the disputed road. 9
In their Answer,10 respondents denied having entered into an agreement with
BISUDECO regarding the construction and the use of the disputed road. They
alleged that BISUDECO, surreptitiously and without their knowledge and consent,
constructed the disputed road on their properties and has since then intermittently
and discontinuously used the disputed road for hauling sugarcane despite their
repeated protests. Respondents claimed they tolerated BISUDECO in the
construction and the use of the road since BISUDECO was a government-owned and
controlled corporation, and the entire country was then under Martial Law.
Respondents likewise denied that the road has become a public road, since no
public funds were used for its construction and maintenance. Moreover,
respondents alleged that with the exception of Edmundo and Perfecto Obias, they
are actual tillers of the ricelands, having acquired their rights over said lands under
Presidential Decree No. 27 (PD 27). Edmundo and Perfecto Obias are the owners of
the eastern portion of the property on which a portion of the road going to
BISUDECO was constructed. Respondents denied that they barricaded the road.11
Jaime Manubay and Manolito Maralit, for themselves and in representation of
other sugarcane planters, filed the first complaint-in-intervention.12
Petitioner filed an Amended Complaint13 and with leave of court a Re-Amended
Complaint,14 where it averred, as an alternative cause of action in the event the
lower court does not find merit in its causes of action, that it will avail of the
benefits provided for under Article 64915 of the New Civil Code. Petitioner thus
demanded from respondents a right of way over the disputed road for its use.16
Respondents filed an Answer17 to refute petitioner’s alternative cause of action.
Respondents claimed that the road from the sugarmill to the Maharlika Highway at
Barangay Romero, Bula, Camarines Sur, which exits at the Rural Bank of Bula site,
had a distance of only about 15 kilometers; hence, respondents asserted that said
road was shorter and was a more appropriate right of way than the disputed road. 18
On July 21, 1993, the RTC issued a Writ of Preliminary Injunction19 ordering the
respondents to desist from constructing barricades across the road.
On June 28, 1994, nine other cooperatives20 filed their Complaint-in-Intervention.21
On June 25, 1997 the RTC rendered a Decision,22 the dispositive portion of which
reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, a decision is hereby rendered declaring the Writ
of Preliminary Injunction issued against all the herein defendants, their agents,
representatives and such other persons acting in their behalf, permanent and
perpetual BUT the plaintiff Bicol Agro-Industrial Cooperative, Inc., (BAPCI) is hereby
ordered to pay the owners of the lots affected by the road, viz: Pedro Montero –
₱299,040.00; Pedro Galon – ₱52,920.00; Clara Padua – ₱46,410.00; Antonio Buizon
– ₱35,070.00; Rogelio Montero – ₱41,160.00; Maria Villamer – ₱41,580.00; Melchor
Brandes – ₱76,440.00; Prudencio Benosa – ₱41, 650.00; Elena Benosa – ₱39,550.00;
Victor Bagasina, Jr. – ₱39,410.00; and Claudio Resari – ₱40,950.00. Upon full
payment thereof, the plaintiff shall be declared the absolute owner of the road in
question. Legal rate if interest is hereby imposed upon the plaintiff from the finality
of this decision until fully payment hereof. No costs.
SO ORDERED.23
The RTC ruled that petitioner failed to present any concrete evidence to prove that
there was an agreement between BISUDECO and respondents for the construction
of the disputed road.24 Moreover, it held that petitioner did not acquire the same
by prescription.25 The RTC, however, also held that petitioner was entitled to a
compulsory easement of right of way as provided for under Article 649 of the New
Civil Code upon payment of proper indemnity to respondents. 26
Both parties filed a motion for reconsideration of the RTC Decision. Petitioner
contended that: (1) the value of the land is excessive; (2) the evidence is insufficient
to justify the award; (3) the decision is contrary to law and jurisprudence.
Respondents, on the other hand, alleged that: (1) the trial court erred in declaring
the persons mentioned in the decision’s dispositive portion to be entitled to
indemnity for the construction and the use of the disputed road; (2) BAPCI should
not be declared the absolute owner of the disputed road upon full payment of the
indemnity due to the defendants; and (3) the decision failed to award damages. 27
On September 24, 1997, the RTC denied both motions for reconsideration. 28 The
parties then appealed to the CA.
On August 24, 2005, the CA rendered a Decision, the dispositive portion of which
reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is PARTLY GRANTED. The assailed
decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 31, Pili, Camarines Sur, in Civil Case No.
P-1899 is hereby MODIFIED as follows: the awards of Php46,410.00 to Clara Padua
and Php41,650.00 to Prudencio Benosa are hereby DELETED, and the declaration
that the plaintiff BAPCI shall become the absolute owner of the disputed road upon
full payment of indemnity is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the owners of
the servient estate in the easement of right of way recognized in this Decision shall
retain ownership of the lands affected by the easement in accordance with Art. 630
of the Civil Code. We hereby AFFIRM the appeal in all other respects.
SO ORDERED.29
The CA affirmed the finding of the RTC that there was no conclusive proof to
sufficiently establish the existence of an agreement between BISUDECO and
respondents regarding the construction of the disputed road. 30 Moreover, the CA
also declared that an easement of right of way is discontinuous and as such cannot
be acquired by prescription.31 The CA likewise affirmed the finding of the RTC that
petitioner was entitled to a compulsory easement of right of way upon payment of
proper indemnity to respondents. The CA, however, declared that ownership over
the disputed road should remain with respondents, despite the grant of a
compulsory easement.32Lastly, the CA deleted the awards to Prudencio Benosa
(Benosa) and Clara Padua (Padua), since the former never claimed ownership of any
portion of the lands affected by the disputed road and the latter was not a party to
the proceedings below.33
Petitioner then filed a Motion for Reconsideration alleging among others that the
CA Decision failed to rule on the issue of estoppel and laches. Moreover, Benosa
and Padua filed a Motion for Reconsideration assailing the portion of the CA
Decision deleting the award of indemnity to them. On March 28, 2006, the CA
issued a Resolution denying the same.
Hence, herein petition, with petitioner raising the following assignment of errors, to
wit:
I.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED SERIOUSLY IN NOT FINDING THAT
THERE WAS FORGED AN AGREEMENT BETWEEN BISUDECO MANAGEMENT AND
THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS FOR THE CONTRUCTION OF THE ROAD IN QUESTION.
II.
THE HONORABLE PUBLIC RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT
CONSIDERING THE PRINCIPLES OF PRESCRIPTION, LACHES AND ESTOPPEL IN THE
CASE AT BAR.
 III.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN COMPLETELY DISREGARDING THE
CLASSIFICATION OF THE ROAD IN QUESTION AS BARANGAY ROAD.
IV.
IN THE ALTERNATIVE CAUSE OF ACTION, THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT SERIOUSLY
ERRED IN CONSIDERING THE VALUATION OF THE LANDS AFFECTED BY THE ROAD
IN 1994, AND NOT IN 1974, WHEN SAID ROAD WAS CONSTRUCTED.
V.
THE HONORABLE PUBLIC RESPONDENT ERRED SERIOUSLY WHEN IT FAILED ALSO
TO CONSIDER THE LEGAL PRINCIPLE OF UNJUST ENRIGHTMENT AT THE EXPENSE
OF ANOTHER.34
At the outset, this Court shall address some procedural matters. Quite noticeably,
herein petition is denominated as one filed under Rule 6535 of the Rules of Court
notwithstanding that it seeks to assail the Decision and Resolution of the CA.
Clearly, petitioner had availed of the improper remedy as the appeal from a final
disposition of the CA is a petition for review under Rule 45 and not a special civil
action under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. 36
In Active Realty and Development Corporation v. Fernandez, 37 this Court discussed
the difference between petitions filed under Rule 65 and Rule 45, viz:
A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is proper to correct errors of jurisdiction
committed by the lower court, or grave abuse of discretion which is tantamount to
lack of jurisdiction. This remedy can be availed of when "there is no appeal, or any
plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law."
Appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, on the other hand, is a
mode of appeal available to a party desiring to raise only questions of law from a
judgment or final order or resolution of the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan,
the Regional Trial Court or other courts whenever authorized by law.
x x x The general rule is that the remedy to obtain reversal or modification of
judgment on the merits is appeal. Thus, the proper remedy for the petitioner should
have been a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
since the decision sought to be reversed is that of the CA. The existence and
availability of the right of appeal proscribes a resort to certiorari, because one of
the requisites for availment of the latter is precisely that "there should be no
appeal. The remedy of appeal under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court was still available
to the petitioner.38
Rule 45 is clear that decisions, final orders or resolutions of the Court of Appeals in
any case, i.e., regardless of the nature of the action or proceeding involved, may be
appealed to this Court by filing a petition for review, which would be but a
continuation of the appellate process over the original case. 39 Moreover, it is basic
that one cannot avail of the remedy provided for under Rule 65 when an appeal is
still available. Hence, petitioner should have filed its petition under Rule 45.
The procedural infirmity notwithstanding and in the interest of substantial justice,
this Court shall consider herein petition as one filed under Rule 45 especially since it
was filed well within the reglementary period proscribed under the said Rule. The
Court also takes notice that the assignment of errors raised by petitioner does not
allege grave abuse of discretion or lack of jurisdiction on the part of the CA.
On the Existence of an Agreement between BISUDECO and Respondents
Anent the first error raised, petitioner argues that the CA erred in not finding that
BISUDECO and respondents forged an agreement for the construction of the road in
dispute. Petitioner thus asserts its entitlement to an easement of right of way over
the properties of respondents by virtue of said agreement.
An easement of right of way was succinctly explained by the CA in the following
manner, to wit:
Easement or servitude is an encumbrance imposed upon an immovable for the
benefit of another immovable belonging to a different owner. By its creation,
easement is established either by law (in which case it is a legal easement) or by will
of the parties (a voluntary easement). In terms of use, easement may either be
continuous or discontinuous. The easement of right of way – the privilege of
persons or a particular class of persons to pass over another’s land, usually
through one particular path or linen – is characterized as a discontinuous
easement because its use is in intervals and depends on the act of man. Because
of this character, an easement of a right of way may only be acquired by virtue of
a title.40
Article 622 of the New Civil Code is the applicable law in the case at bar, viz:
Art. 622. Continuous non-apparent easements, and discontinuous ones, whether
apparent or not, may be acquired only by virtue of a title.
Based on the foregoing, in order for petitioner to acquire the disputed road as an
easement of right-of-way, it was incumbent upon petitioner to show its right by title
or by an agreement with the owners of the lands that said road traversed.
While conceding that they have no direct evidence of the alleged agreement,
petitioner posits that they presented circumstantial evidence which, if taken
collectively, would prove its existence.41 Specifically, petitioner cites the following
circumstances, to wit:
a. The agreement was of public knowledge. 42 Allegedly BISUDECO and
respondents entered into an agreement for the construction of the road
provided that the latter, their children or relatives were employed with
BISUDECO.
b. The road was continuously used by BISUDECO and the public in
general.43
c. There was no protest or complaint from respondents for almost a period
of two decades.44
d. The portions of the land formerly belonging to respondents affected by
the road were already segregated and surveyed from the main lots. 45
e. The road in dispute is already a barangay road.
The well-entrenched rule in our jurisdiction is that only questions of law may be
entertained by this Court in a petition for review on certiorari. This rule, however, is
not iron-clad and admits certain exceptions, such as when (1) the conclusion is
grounded on speculations, surmises or conjectures; (2) the inference is manifestly
mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) the
judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) the findings of fact are
conflicting; (6) there is no citation of specific evidence on which the factual findings
are based; (7) the findings of absence of facts are contradicted by the presence of
evidence on record; (8) the findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of
the trial court; (9) the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant and
undisputed facts that, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion;
(10) the findings of the Court of Appeals are beyond the issues of the case; and (11)
such findings are contrary to the admissions of both parties. 46
After a painstaking review of the records, this Court finds no justification to warrant
the application of any exception to the general rule.
Crucial to the petitioner’s cause was its burden of proving the existence of the
alleged agreement between BISUDECO and respondents for the construction of the
road. In this regard, the RTC found that petitioner failed to prove its existence, to
wit:
It is clear that the plaintiff failed to present any concrete evidence to prove that
there was such an agreement between BISUDECO and defendants. Hereunder
quoted are the testimonies of plaintiff’s witnesses regarding the alleged agreement.
Romeo Deveterbo, Transportation Superintendent of BISUDECO testified –
Cross Examination by Atty. Pejo
Q: You also mentioned that there was an agreement between Senator Cea,
Mr. Obias and some of the tenants?
A: Yes.
Q: You mentioned that this was not in writing, am I right?
A: Yes.
Q: How did you know about it that it was not in writing, who told you,
Senator Cea?
A: It was commonly known to all original employees of the BISUDECO.
Q: You know it from the management?
A: From co-employees.
Q: You learned about that agreement from you co-employees?
A: Yes.
Q: In other words, therefore, that is why you said you are confused
between Edmundo Cea and Perfecto Obias because you just learned it
from other employees and you were never present when they talked
about it, am I right?
A: Yes. x x x
To this effect also is the testimony of Angel Lobo, head of the agricultural
Department of BAPCI, to wit:
A: Yes, your Honor?
COURT: From where did you learn?
A: From people whom I talked with at that time and it is a public common
knowledge at that time.
xxx
Atty. Carandang: I repeat my question, Your Honor.
You said you acquired it from or because of common knowledge and you
mentioned some people. Who are those people you are referring to whom
you acquired that knowledge?
A: Most of all, the late Benjamin Bagasina, Barangay Captain at that time
who was our employee in consideration of this agreement, then we have
also a Civil Engineering Head, Civil Engineering Department who is
responsible for the maintenance of this road. I learned from him that this
arrangement established the fact why this road was constructed.
Q: Who is the head of the Engineering Dept?
xxx
COURT: May answer.
A: Engineer Pablo Tordilla who was then the head of our Civil Engineering
Dept.
But this Engineer Pablo Tordilla, Lobo’s alleged source of the information,
was never presented in Court. And, according to the Chief Accountant of
BAPCI, David Severo:
A: When I was interviewing Mrs. Alma Montero Penaflor she filed to me a
certain arrangement related to the used of the land to Himaao as road
going to the central.
COURT: You mean Himaao Millsite road?
A: Yes, sir.
Atty. Carandang:
Q: What arrangement is that supposedly filed to you?
A: She told me in exchange for the use of the road, the relatives or owners
or tenants of the land will be hired by the sugar Central?
COURT:
Q: So, only the tenants not the owners?
A: The tenant’s children the road belongs.
xxx
Finally, intervenor Antonio Austria, in trying to show you that there was
consent and approval on the part of the defendant Edmundo Obias to give
the right of way to BISUDECO at the time to be used in hauling the
sugarcane of the planters to the Central, averred the following uncertain
statements:
A: Well, he has (sic) having a case against PENSUNIL, regarding the
property I think the right of way going to PENSUMIL right now we discuss it
and he said he is allowing it anymore but then I reminded him wayback in
1974 to 1980 he was one of the biggest planters in the part of Partido so
he consented to the late I think Edmundo Cea, the owner of BISUDECO at
that time to pass his property since he is also milling a lot of things at that
time and many other things one of the concession mill was I think some of
the tenants there in Himaao will be employed in the mill.
xxx
These aforequoted testimonies of the plaintiff’s witnesses failed to satisfactorily
establish the plaintiff’s contention that there was such an agreement. Likewise, the
list of the Employees of Defendants’ relatives, son/daughter employed by the
BISUDECO (Exhibit H) does not in any manner prove the alleged agreement. 47
For its part, the CA also ruled that petitioner failed to prove the existence of the
said agreement, to wit:
Like the lower court, we found no conclusive proof to sufficiently establish the
existence of an agreement between BISUDECO and the defendants-appellants
regarding the construction and the use of the disputed road. The lower court
correctly disbelieved the plaintiffs-appellants’ contention that an agreement existed
because there is simply no direct evidence to support this allegation. BAPCI
submitted purely circumstantial evidence that are not sufficiently adequate as basis
for the inference than an agreement existed. By themselves, the circumstances the
plaintiffs-appellants cited – i.e., the employment of sixteen (16) relatives of the
defendants-appellants; the defendants-appellants’ unjustified silence; the fact that
the existence of the agreement is known to everyone, etc. – are events susceptible
of diverse interpretations and do not necessarily lead to BAPCI’s desired conclusion.
Additionally, the testimonies that the plaintiffs-appellants presented are mainly
hearsay, as not one among the witnesses had personal knowledge of the agreement
by reason of direct participation in the agreement or because the witness was
present when the agreement was concluded by the parties. Thus, given the
defendants-appellants’ categorical denial that an agreement existed, we sustain the
lower’s conclusion that no agreement existed between BISUDECO and the
defendants-appellants.48
Based on the foregoing, the inability of petitioner to prove the existence of an
agreement militates its allegations in herein petition. On this score, both the RTC
and the CA are one in ruling that petitioner had failed to prove the existence of the
agreement between BISUDECO and the respondents for the construction of the
road. Also, well-established is the rule that "factual findings of the Court of Appeals
are conclusive on the parties and carry even more weight when the said court
affirms the factual findings of the trial court."49 Hence, this Court finds no reason to
reverse such findings.
On Acquisition by Prescription
Petitioner would have this Court re-examine Costabella Corporation v. Court of
Appeals50 (Costabella) where the Court held that, "It is already well-established that
a right of way is discontinuous and, as such, cannot be acquired by
prescription."51 Petitioner contends that some recognized authorities52 share its
view that an easement of right of way may be acquired by prescription.
Be that as it may, this Court finds no reason to re-examine Costabella. This Court is
guided by Bogo-Medellin Milling Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals53 (Bogo-Medellin),
involving the construction of a railroad track to a sugar mill. In Bogo-Medellin, this
Court discussed the discontinuous nature of an easement of right of way and the
rule that the same cannot be acquired by prescription, to wit:
Continuous and apparent easements are acquired either by virtue of a title or by
prescription of ten years.
The trial court and the Court of Appeals both upheld this view for the reason that
the railroad right of way was, according to them, continuous and apparent in
nature. The more or less permanent railroad tracks were visually apparent and
they continuously occupied the subject strip of land from 1959 (the year the
easement granted by Feliciana Santillan to petitioner expired). Thus, with the lapse
of the 10-year prescriptive period in 1969, petitioner supposedly acquired the
easement of right of way over the subject land.
Following the logic of the courts a quo, if a road for the use of vehicles or the
passage of persons is permanently cemented or asphalted, then the right of way
over it becomes continuous in nature. The reasoning is erroneous.
Under civil law and its jurisprudence, easements are either continuous or
discontinuous according to the manner they are exercised, not according to the
presence of apparent signs or physical indications of the existence of such
easements. Thus, easement is continuous if its use is, or may be, incessant without
the intervention of any act of man, like the easement of drainage; and it is
discontinuous if it is used at intervals and depends on the act of man, like the
easement of right of way.
The easement of right of way is considered discontinuous because it is exercised
only if a person passes or sets foot on somebody else’s land. Like a road for the
passage of vehicles or persons, an easement of right of way of railroad tracks is
discontinuous because the right is exercised only if and when a train operated by a
person passes over another's property. In other words, the very exercise of the
servitude depends upon the act or intervention of man which is the very essence of
discontinuous easements.
The presence of more or less permanent railroad tracks does not, in any way,
convert the nature of an easement of right of way to one that is continuous. It is not
the presence of apparent signs or physical indications showing the existence of an
easement, but rather the manner of exercise thereof, that categorizes such
easement into continuous or discontinuous. The presence of physical or visual signs
only classifies an easement into apparent or non-apparent. Thus, a road (which
reveals a right of way) and a window (which evidences a right to light and view) are
apparent easements, while an easement of not building beyond a certain height is
non-apparent.
In Cuba, it has been held that the existence of a permanent railway does not make
the right of way a continuous one; it is only apparent. Therefore, it cannot be
acquired by prescription. In Louisiana, it has also been held that a right of passage
over another's land cannot be claimed by prescription because this easement is
discontinuous and can be established only by title.
In this case, the presence of railroad tracks for the passage of petitioner’s trains
denotes the existence of an apparent but discontinuous easement of right of way.
And under Article 622 of the Civil Code, discontinuous easements, whether apparent
or not, may be acquired only by title. Unfortunately, petitioner Bomedco never
acquired any title over the use of the railroad right of way whether by law,
donation, testamentary succession or contract. Its use of the right of way, however
long, never resulted in its acquisition of the easement because, under Article 622,
the discontinuous easement of a railroad right of way can only be acquired by
title and not by prescription.54
Applying Bogo-Medellin to the case at bar, the conclusion is inevitable that the road
in dispute is a discontinuous easement notwithstanding that the same may be
apparent. To reiterate, easements are either continuous or discontinuous according
to the manner they are exercised, not according to the presence of apparent signs
or physical indications of the existence of such easements. Hence, even if the road
in dispute has been improved and maintained over a number of years, it will not
change its discontinuous nature but simply make the same apparent. To stress,
Article 622 of the New Civil Code states that discontinuous easements, whether
apparent or not, may be acquired only by virtue of a title.
On Laches and Estoppel
Petitioner argues that estoppel and laches bar respondents from exercising
ownership rights over the properties traversed by the road in dispute. In support of
said argument, petitioner posits that BISUDECO had been peacefully and
continuously using the road without any complaint or opposition on the part of the
respondents for almost twenty years. Respondents, on the other hand, claim that
they merely tolerated the use of their land as BISUDECO was a government-owned
and controlled corporation and considering that the disputed road was constructed
during the time of Martial Law.
There is no absolute rule on what constitutes laches. It is a rule of equity and
applied not to penalize neglect or sleeping on one’s rights, but rather to avoid
recognizing a right when to do so would result in a clearly unfair situation. The
question of laches is addressed to the sound discretion of the court and each case
must be decided according to its particular circumstances.55 It is the better rule that
courts, under the principle of equity, should not be guided or bound strictly by the
statute of limitations or the doctrine of laches if wrong or injustice will result.56
In herein petition, the CA denied petitioner’s argument in the wise:
As previously explained in our Decision, the applicable law is Article 622 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines, which provides:
Art. 622. Continuous non-apparent easements, and discontinuous ones, whether
apparent or not, may be acquired only by virtue of a title.
The eminent jurist, former Senator Arturo M. Tolentino, opines that this provision
seeks to prevent the imposition of a burden on a tenement based purely on the
generosity, tolerance and spirit of neighborliness of the owners thereof.
We applied the cited provision to the case in ruling that no easement of right of way
was acquired; based on the evidence presented, the plaintiff-appellant failed to
satisfactorily prove the existence of an agreement evidencing any right or title to
use the disputed road. We additionally rejected the plaintiff-appellant’s position
that it had acquired the easement of right of way through acquisitive prescription,
as settled jurisprudence states that an easement of right of way cannot be acquired
by prescription.
We hold the same view on the issue of acquisition of an easement of right of way by
laches. To our mind, settled jurisprudence on the application of the principle of
estoppel by laches militates against the acquisition of an easement of right of way
by laches.
Laches is a doctrine in equity and our courts are basically courts of law and not
courts of equity; equity, which has been aptly described as "justice outside legality,"
should be applied only in the absence of, and never against, statutory law; Aeguetas
nunguam contravenit legis. Based on this principle, we find that the positive
mandate of Article 622 of the Civil Code – the statutory provision requiring title as
basis for the acquisition of an easement of a right of way – precludes the
application of the equitable principle of laches.57
This Court agrees with the CA. The fact that the law is categorical that discontinuous
easements cannot be acquired by prescription militates against petitioner’s claim of
laches. To stress, discontinuous easements can only be acquired by title. More
importantly, whether or not the elements of laches are present is a question
involving a factual determination by the trial court.58 Hence, the same being a
question of fact, it cannot be the proper subject of herein petition. On the other
hand, as to the issue of estoppel, this Court likewise agrees with the finding of the
CA that petitioner did not present any evidence that would show an admission,
representation or conduct by respondents that will give rise to estoppel. 59
 Classification of the Road in Dispute as a Barangay Road
Petitioner argues that the CA erred when it disregarded the classification of the
road in question as a barangay road. In support of said argument, petitioner
presented Exhibit Q, a Tax Declaration or Field Appraisal and Assessment
Sheet60 (1991 FAAS) with Survey Number 1688-40 and PIN No. 026-01-009-08-037,
dated April 30, 1991, which they claim proves that the road in dispute is already a
barangay road.
The same is again a question of fact which cannot be the proper subject of herein
petition. Petitioner cannot have this Court re-examine the evidentiary value of the
documents it presented before the RTC as the same is not a function of this Court.
In any case, after a closer scrutiny of the 1991 FAAS, this Court holds that the same
is insufficient to prove petitioner’s claim.
Respondents, in their Comment,61 argue against the classification of the road in
dispute as a barangay road in the wise:
Petitioner also stated that the Honorable Court of Appeals fails to consider the fact
that the owner of the road in question is the Municipality of Pili in the Province of
Camarines Sur and as proof of such claim they presented and marked as Exhibit Q,
tax declaration no. 009-756 or Annex D of their Petition. However, private
respondents wish to call the attention of this Honorable Court to the following:
a. Tax Declaration No. 009-828 attached as Annex C-6 of the Verified
Petition declared in the name of Edmundo Obias (one of the private
respondents);
b. Actual Use portion of said Annex C-6 marked as Exh. No. N-6-a-1 which
states "Road Lot (BISUDECO Road)"; and
c. The Memoranda portion in the second page of Annex C-6 which states:
"Revised to declare the property in The name of the rightful owner,
Edmundo Obias based from the approved subdivision plan, Bsd-05-000055
(OLT) & technical descriptions. Likewise area was made to conform with
the said subdivision plan from 4,773 sq.m. to 11,209 sq.m.
Obviously, the alleged Exhibit Q of the Petitioner is an erroneous tax declaration,
thus, negates the claim of the Petitioner that the same is owned by the Municipality
of Pili and has been declared a barangay road. Private respondents cannot
understand why the herein Petitioner alleged this matter and used it as a proof to
support their claim when they are already in possession of a tax declaration
correcting the same and even attached the same as part of their Petition.62
In its Reply,63 petitioner counters:
II. While Petitioners claim that the road belongs to the Municipal Government of
Pili, yet what they attached to the Petition as Annex "C-7" is a tax declaration of
Edmundo Obias. Petitioners have the following observations:
xxxx
(b) That land of Edmundo Obias covered by Annex "C-6" to the Petition is not
included or involved in this case at bar. His name does not appear to be awarded in
the Decision of the Honorable Court of Appeals and also in the list of beneficiaries
to receive monetary considerations made by Mr. Angel Lobo.64
After a painstaking review of the records, this Court is more inclined to believe the
claim of respondents. The claim of petitioner to the effect that the land of Edmundo
Obias is not included in the case at bar is misleading. It may be true that Edmundo
was not awarded indemnity by the lower courts, however, the same does not mean
that his lands do not form part of the subject matter of herein petition.
It bears to stress that Edmundo claimed in the CA that he was the owner of the
affected ricelands and that respondents were merely his tenants-beneficiaries
under PD 27, otherwise known as the Tenant Emancipation Decree. 65 The CA,
however, dismissed said claim because it was raised for the first time on appeal. It
also held that the averments in the documents submitted by Edmundo in the RTC
described respondents as "owners" of the land they till; hence, the same
constituted binding judicial admissions.66
Based on the foregoing, petitioner's attempt to refute the contents of the 1995
FAAS by claiming that the lands of Edmundo are not involved in the case at bar
must fail. It is clear that respondents are the tenant-beneficiaries of the lands of
Edmundo under PD 27; hence, contrary to the claim of petitioner, the lands of
Edmundo are the subject matter of herein petition.
In addition, it is curious that petitioner relies on the 1991 FAAS yet finds exception
to the contents of the 1995 FAAS. After a closer scrutiny of both documents, it
appears to this Court that the land described in the 1991 FAAS is also the same land
described in the 1995 FAAS. Both FAAS involve land measuring 4,773 square
meters. Likewise, both FAAS have the same PIN Number (026-01-009-08-037) and
Survey Number (1688-40). Accordingly, the annotation contained in the 1995 FAAS,
to the effect that a "BISUDECO road" does not belong to the Municipality of Pili,
serves to weaken petitioner’s claim.1avvphi1
The Court also considers portions of the RTC Decision where it can be gathered that
the road in dispute is not a barangay road, to wit:
At this point, it is important to note that defendants admitted the identity of the
road and the area of the same as reflected in the Commissioner’s Report, during the
Pre-trial held last September 19, 1995.
Engr. Roberto Revilla testified that a portion of the road inside the property of
Edmundo Obias, is a barangay road which are lots A-52 sq.m., B-789 sq.m. and C-
655 sq.m. or a total of 1,497 sq.m. which starts from the intersection of the
National Road and the road to Pensumil up to Corner 9 of Lot 37, Bsc-05-000055
(OCT) in the name of Pedro O. Montero. Engr. Revilla concluded that the actual area
occupied by the road in question is the sum of areas of Lots D-2042 sq.m., E-2230
sq.m., F-756 sq.m., G-663 sq.m., H-501 sq.m. , I-588 sq.m., J-594 sq.m., K-l092 sq.m.,
L-595 sq.m., M-459 sq.m., N-106 sq.m., O-585 sq.m. and P-563 sq.m., or a total of
10,774 square meters. Said road starts from corner 9 of the lot of Pedro Montero
which is equivalent to corner 25 of Lot 40 Bsd-05-000055 (OCT) going to the
Southern Direction and ending at corner 25 of Lot 1688 Cad. 291 Pili Cadastre
covered by OCT No. 120-217 (1276) in the name of spouses Edmundo Obias and
Nelly Valencia and spouses Perfecto Obias and Adelaida Abenojar.67
The RTC findings of fact thus shows that while certain portions of the property of
Edmundo is a barangay road, the same only pertains to Lots A, B and C, or a total of
1,497 square meters, which is distinct from the road in dispute which pertains to
different lots (lots E to P) and covers a total area of 10,774 square meters.
In light of the foregoing, considering that the contents of the 1991 FAAS is
disputable, it was incumbent on petitioner to present documents which would
evidence the expropriation of the road in dispute by the local government as a
barangay road. Under the prevailing circumstances, the documents of the
expropriation proceedings would have been the best evidence available and the
absence thereof is certainly damaging to petitioner’s cause.
Amount of Indemnity Due & On Unjust Enrichment
Petitioner manifested in the RTC its desire, in the alternative, to avail of a
compulsory easement of right of way as provided for under Article 649 the New
Civil Code. Said relief was granted by the RTC because of the unavailability of
another adequate outlet from the sugar mill to the highway. Despite the grant of a
compulsory easement of right of way, petitioner, however, assails both the RTC and
CA Decision with regard to the amount of indemnity due respondents.
Petitioner likens the proceedings at bar to an expropriation proceeding where just
compensation must be based on the value of the land at the time of
taking.68 Petitioner thus maintains that the compensation due to respondents
should have been computed in 1974 when the road was constructed.69
This Court does not agree. Article 649 of the New Civil Code states:
The owner, or any person who by virtue of a real right may cultivate or use any
immovable, which is surrounded by other immovables pertaining to other persons
and without adequate outlet to a public highway, is entitled to demand a right of
way through the neighboring estates, after payment of the proper indemnity.
Should this easement be established in such a manner that its use may be
continuous for all the needs of the dominant estate, establishing a permanent
passage, the indemnity shall consist of the value of the land occupied and the
amount of the damage cause to the servient estate.
Based on the foregoing, it is clear that the law does not provide for a specific
formula for the valuation of the land. Neither does the same state that the value of
the land must be computed at the time of taking. The only primordial consideration
is that the same should consist of the value of the land and the amount of damage
caused to the servient estate. Hence, the same is a question of fact which should be
left to the sound discretion of the RTC. In this regard, the RTC ruled:
The market value per hectare in 1974 or at the time of taking or prior to its
conversion to road is ₱6,500/hectare, the same being a first class riceland irrigated
therefore the total market value is ₱6,864.31. The 1994 Market Value of
₱1,292,880.00 is the value assigned to the property in question after it was already
developed as a road lot where the unit value applied per square meter is ₱120.00
for 5th class residential lot.
It has to be remembered however that the cost of transforming the land to road
was entirely borne by BISUDECO including its maintenance, repair and the cost of
the improvements and by plaintiff after its acquisition. Thus, the ₱120.00 unit value
is exorbitant while the 1974 valuation of ₱6,500/hectare is low and unreasonable.
In fine, this Court will adopt the unit value of ₱70.00 per square meter as shown by
Exhibit "Q," the Real Property Field Assessment Sheet No. 009-756.70
In addition, the CA ruled:
We stress that the amount of proper indemnity due to the landowners does not
only relate to the market value of their property but comprehends as well the
corresponding damage caused to the servient estate. It is undisputed that the
BISUDECO began the construction and used of the disputed road in 1974. While the
maintenance was borne by BISUDECO and now by BAPCI who principally used the
disputed road for their sugar milling operations, the defendants-appellants have
been deprived of the use do their ricefields because of the road’s construction since
1974. Thus, it is but proper to compensate them for this deprivation, over and
above the prevailing market value of the affected property. To our mind, in light of
the circumstances surrounding the acquisition of the affected ricelands and the
construction of the disputed road, particularly the absence of a definitive
agreement to show that the defendants-appellants consented to the road’s
construction, we find the ₱70.00 per square meter indemnity awarded by the lower
court in accordance with the Real Property Field Assessment Sheet No. 009-756, to
be fair and reasonable under the circumstances.71

Withal, this Court finds no error as to the proper amount of indemnity due
respondents as the findings of both the RTC and the CA appear to be fair and
reasonable under the prevailing circumstances and in accordance with the
provisions of Article 649 of the New Civil Code.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The August 24, 2005
Decision and October 27, 2005 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
59016 are hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 130845 November 27, 2000
BRYAN U. VILLANUEVA, petitioner,
vs.
HON. TIRSO D.C. VELASCO in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City, Branch 88, JULIO N. SEBASTIAN and SHIRLEY
LORILLA, respondents.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
This petition for certiorari assails (1) the decision1 dated December 27, 1996 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 39166, dismissing petitioner’s petition for review
under Rule 65 with prayer for the issuance of a cease and desist order and/or
temporary restraining order, and (2) the resolution2 dated August 14, 1997 denying
the subsequent motion for reconsideration.
Petitioner Bryan Villanueva is the registered owner of the parcel of land covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 127862 of the Register of Deeds of Quezon City. He
bought it from Pacific Banking Corporation, the mortgagee of said property. The
bank had acquired it from the spouses Maximo and Justina Gabriel at a public
auction on March 19, 1983. When petitioner bought the parcel of land there was a
small house on its southeastern portion. It occupied one meter of the two-meter
wide easement of right of way the Gabriel spouses granted to the Espinolas,
predecessors-in-interest of private respondents, in a Contract of Easement of Right
of Way. The pertinent portion of the contract dated November 28, 1979, states:
. . . in order to have an access to and from their aforementioned land where their
houses are constructed and to have an outlet to Tandang Sora Ave. which is the
nearest public road and the least burdensome to the servient estate and to third
persons, it would be necessary for them to pass through spouses MAXIMO GABRIEL
and JUSTINA CAPUNO’s land and for this purpose, a path or passageway of not less
than two (2) meters wide of said spouses’ property is necessary for the use of
ROMEO, RODOLFO, NENITA and AURORA ESPINOLA and for all their needs in
entering their property.
xxx
WHEREFORE, in view of the fact that the property of the ESPINOLA had been
bought by them from MAXIMO CAPUNO, father of MAXIMO GABRIEL, spouses
MAXIMO GABRIEL and JUSTINA CAPUNO hereby agree and permit RODOLFO,
ROMEO, NENITA and AURORA ESPINOLA and their families to have a permanent
easementof right of way over the aforementioned property of said spouses limited
to not more than two meters wide, throughout the whole length of the southeast
side of said property and as specifically indicated in the attached plan which is made
an integral part of this Contract as Annex "A";
This Agreement shall be binding between the parties and upon their heirs,
successors, assigns, without prejudice in cases of sale of subject property that will
warrant the circumstances.3
Unknown to petitioner, even before he bought the land, the Gabriels had
constructed the aforementioned small house that encroached upon the two-meter
easement. Petitioner was also unaware that private respondents, Julio Sebastian
and Shirley Lorilla, had filed on May 8, 1991, Civil Case No. Q-91-8703, for
easement, damages and with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction and/or
restraining order against the spouses Gabriel.4 As successors-in-interest, Sebastian
and Lorilla wanted to enforce the contract of easement.
On May 15, 1991, the trial court issued a temporary restraining order. On August
13, 1991, it issued a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction ordering the Gabriels
to provide the right of way and to demolish the small house encroaching on the
easement. On August 15, 1991, the Gabriels filed a motion for reconsideration
which was also denied. Thus, they filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of
Appeals.
On March 26, 1992, the Eighth Division of the Court of Appeals dismissed the
petition and upheld the RTC’s issuances. The decision became final and executory
on July 31, 1992.5
On January 5, 1995, Judge Tirso Velasco of the RTC in Quezon City, Branch 88,
issued an Alias Writ of Demolition. On June 20, 1995, the sheriff tried to demolish
the small house pursuant to the writ. Petitioner filed a Third Party Claim with Prayer
to Quash Alias Writ of Demolition. He maintains that the writ of demolition could
not apply to his property since he was not a party to the civil case. His Third Party
Claim with prayer to quash the writ of demolition was denied for lack of merit on
August 16, 1995.6 The motion for reconsideration as well as the Supplemental
Motion for Reconsideration dated September 12, 1995 were denied on October 19,
1995.7
Petitioner, thereafter, filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals,
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 39166, asserting that the existence of the easement of
right of way was not annotated in his title and that he was not a party to Civil Case
No. Q-91-8703, hence the contract of easement executed by the Gabriels in favor of
the Espinolas could not be enforced against him. The Court of Appeals dismissed
the petition for lack of merit and denied the reconsideration, disposing thus:
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby dismissed by this court for lack of merit.
No costs considering the failure of private respondents to file their comment,
despite notice.8
Hence, this instant petition.
Petitioner now avers that the appellate court erred in declaring,
(1) THAT FOLLOWING THE ESSENCE OF INHERENCE AND
INTRANSMISSIBILITY OF AN EASEMENT, A RIGHT OF WAY CAN EXIST EVEN
IF THEY ARE NOT EXPRESSLY STATED OR ANNOTATED ON THE TORRENS
TITLE;
(2) THAT PETITIONER, AS PROSPECTIVE BUYER, SHOULD HAVE EXERCISED
ORDINARY PRUDENCE BY TAKING THE INITIATIVE TO DETERMINE THAT AN
EASEMENT HAS BEEN CONSTITUTED ON THE PROPERTY HE INTENDS TO
BUY; AND,
(3) THAT IN AS MUCH AS THE HEREIN PETITIONER IS NOT A PARTY TO CIVIL
CASE NO. Q-91-8703, HE CANNOT BE BOUND BY ANY JUDGMENT OR
ORDER RENDERED THEREIN.9
Primarily, the issue is whether the easement on the property binds petitioner.
Petitioner argues it could not be enforced against him. First, he says that a right of
way cannot exist when it is not expressly stated or annotated on the Torrens title.
According to him, even if an easement is inherent and inseparable from the estate
to which it actively belongs as provided in Art. 617 of the Civil Code,10 the same is
extinguished when the servient estate is registered and the easement was not
annotated in said title conformably with Section 39 of the Land Registration
Law. Second, petitioner points out that the trial court erred when it faulted him for
relying solely on the clean title of the property he bought, as it is well-settled that a
person dealing with registered land is not required to go beyond what is recorded in
the title. He adds that it is private respondents who should have made sure their
right of way was safeguarded by having the same annotated on the title with the
Register of Deeds. He adds that Section 76 of P.D. No. 1529 11 also requires that
when a case is commenced involving any right to registered land under the Land
Registration Law (now the Property Registration Decree), any decision on it will only
be effectual between or among the parties thereto, unless a notice of lis pendens of
such action is filed and registered in the registry office where the land is recorded.
There was no such annotation in the title of the disputed land, according to
petitioner. Lastly, since he was not a party to Civil Case No. Q-91-8703, petitioner
argues that he cannot be bound by the writ of demolition and be forcibly divested
of a portion of his land without having his day in court.
Private respondents Sebastian and Lorilla, for their part, adopted the disquisition of
the appellate court as their Comment and asked for the dismissal of the petition
and P100,000.00 in damages. In its decision the appellate court, citing the decision
of the lower court, stressed that unlike other types of encumbrance of real
property, a servitude like a right of way can exist even if they are not expressly
stated or annotated as an encumbrance in a Torrens title because servitudes are
inseparable from the estates to which they actively or passively belong. Moreover,
Villanueva was bound by the contract of easement, not only as a voluntary
easement but as a legal easement. A legal easement is mandated by law, and
continues to exists unless its removal is provided for in a title of conveyance or the
sign of the easement is removed before the execution of the conveyance
conformably with Article 64912 in accordance with Article 61713 of the Civil Code.
At the outset, we note that the subject easement (right of way) originally was
voluntarily constituted by agreement between the Gabriels and the Espinolas. But
as correctly observed by the Court of Appeals, the easement in the instant petition
is both (1) an easement by grant or a voluntary easement, and (2) an easement by
necessity or a legal easement. A legal easement is one mandated by law,
constituted for public use or for private interest, and becomes a continuing
property right.14 As a compulsory easement, it is inseparable from the estate to
which it belongs, as provided for in said Article 617 of the Civil Code. The essential
requisites for an easement to be compulsory are: (1) the dominant estate is
surrounded by other immovables and has no adequate outlet to a public highway;
(2) proper indemnity has been paid; (3) the isolation was not due to acts of the
proprietor of the dominant estate; (4) the right of way claimed is at a point least
prejudicial to the servient estate; and (5) to the extent consistent with the foregoing
rule, where the distance from the dominant estate to a public highway may be the
shortest.15 The trial court and the Court of Appeals have declared the existence of
said easement (right of way). This finding of fact of both courts below is conclusive
on this Court,16 hence we see no need to further review, but only to re-affirm, this
finding. The small house occupying one meter of the two-meter wide easement
obstructs the entry of private respondents’ cement mixer and motor vehicle. One
meter is insufficient for the needs of private respondents. It is well-settled that the
needs of the dominant estate determine the width of the easement.17 Conformably
then, petitioner ought to demolish whatever edifice obstructs the easement in view
of the needs of private respondents’ estate.
Petitioner’s second proposition, that he is not bound by the contract of easement
because the same was not annotated in the title and that a notice of lis pendens of
the complaint to enforce the easement was not recorded with the Register of
Deeds, is obviously unmeritorious. As already explained, it is in the nature of legal
easement that the servient estate (of petitioner) is legally bound to provide the
dominant estate (of private respondents in this case) ingress from and egress to the
public highway.1âwphi1
Petitioner’s last argument that he was not a party to Civil Case No. Q-91-8703 and
that he had not been given his day in court, is also without merit. Rule 39, Sec. 47,
of the Revised Rules of Court:
Simply stated, a decision in a case is conclusive and binding upon the parties to said
case and those who are their successor in interest by title after said case has been
commenced or filed in court.18 In this case, private respondents, Julio Sebastian and
Shirley Lorilla, initiated Civil Case No. Q-91-8703 on May 8, 1991,19 against the
original owners, the spouses Maximo and Justina Gabriel. Title in the name of
petitioner was entered in the Register of Deeds20 on March 24, 1995, after he
bought the property from the bank which had acquired it from the Gabriels. Hence,
the decision in Civil Case No. Q-91-8703 binds petitioner. For, although not a party
to the suit, he is a successor-in-interest by title subsequent to the commencement
of the action in court.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The assailed decision and resolution of
the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

SEC. 47. Effect of judgments or final orders. – The effect of a judgment or final order
rendered by a court of the Philippines, having jurisdiction to pronounce the
judgment or final order, may be as follows:

(a) In case of a judgment or final order against a specific thing, or in respect

to the probate of a will, or the administration of the estate of a deceased
person, or in respect to the personal, political, or legal condition or status
of a particular person or his relationship to another, the judgment or final
order is conclusive upon the title to the thing, the will or administration, or
the condition, status or relationship of the person; however, the probate
of a will or granting of letters of administration shall only
be prima facie evidence of the death of the testator or intestate;

(b) In other cases, the judgment or final order is, with respect to the
matter directly adjudged or as to any other matter that could have been
raised in relation thereto, conclusive between the parties and their
successors in interest by title subsequent to the commencement of the
action or special proceeding, litigating for the same thing and under the
same title and in the same capacity; and

(c) In any other litigation between the same parties or their successors in
interest, that only is deemed to have been adjudged in a former judgment
or final order which appears upon its face to have been so adjudged, or
which was actually and necessarily included therein or necessary thereto.
(Emphasis ours).

HEIRS OF THE LATE JOAQUIN LIMENSE, namely: CONCESA
LIMENSE, Surviving Spouse; and DANILO and JOSELITO,
both surnamed Limense, children,
Petitioners,
- versus -
RITA VDA. DE RAMOS, RESTITUTO RAMOS, VIRGILIO DIAZ,
IRENEO RAMOS, BENJAMIN RAMOS, WALDYTRUDES
RAMOS-BASILIO, TRINIDAD RAMOS-BRAVO, PAZ RAMOS-
PASCUA, FELICISIMA RAMOS-REYES, and JACINTA RAMOS,
Respondents.
X-- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -X
DECISION
PERALTA, J.,
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking
to annul and set aside the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals dated December 20,
2001 in CA-G.R. CV No. 33589 affirming in toto the Decision[2] of the Regional Trial
Court of Manila, Branch 15, dated September 21, 1990 in Civil Case No. 83-16128.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
Dalmacio Lozada was the registered owner of a parcel of land identified as Lot No.
12, Block No. 1074 of the cadastral survey of the City of Manila covered by Original
Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 7036 issued at the City of Manila on June 14,
1927,[3] containing an area of 873.80 square meters, more or less, located in Beata
Street, Pandacan, Manila.
Dalmacio Lozada subdivided his property into five (5) lots, namely: Lot Nos. 12-A, 12-
B, 12-C, 12-D and 12-E. Through a Deed of Donation dated March 9, 1932,[4] he
donated the subdivided lots to his daughters, namely: Isabel, Salud, Catalina, and
Felicidad, all surnamed Lozada. The Deed of Donation was registered with the office
of the Register of Deeds of Manila on March 15, 1932.
G.R. No. 152319
Under the said Deed of Donation, the lots were adjudicated to Dalmacio's daughters
in the following manner:
Present:
a. Lot No. 12-A in favor of Isabel Lozada, married to Isaac Limense;
b. Lot No. 12-B in favor of Catalina Lozada, married to Sotero Natividad;
QUISUMBING,* J., c. Lot No. 12-C in favor of Catalina Lozada, married to Sotero Natividad; Isabel
CARPIO, J., Chairperson, Lozada, married to Isaac Limense; and Salud Lozada, married to Francisco Ramos, in
CHICO-NAZARIO, equal parts;
PERALTA, and d. Lot No. 12-D in favor of Salud Lozada, married to Francisco Ramos; and
ABAD,** JJ. e. Lot No. 12-E in favor of Isabel Lozada, married to Isaac Limense, and Felicidad
Lozada, married to Galicano Centeno.
By virtue of the Deed of Donation executed by Dalmacio Lozada, OCT No. 7036, which
was registered in his name, was cancelled and, in lieu thereof, Transfer Certificates
Promulgated: of Title (TCTs) bearing Nos. 40041, 40042, 40043, 40044, and 40045 were issued in
favor of the donees, except TCT No. 40044, which remained in his name. These new
October 28, 2009 TCTs were annotated at the back of OCT No. 7036.[5]
TCT No. 40043, which covered Lot No. 12-C, was issued in the name of its co-owners
Catalina Lozada, married to Sotero Natividad; Isabel Lozada, married to Isaac
Limense; and Salud Lozada, married to Francisco Ramos. It covered an area of 68.60
square meters, more or less, was bounded on the northeast by Lot No. 12-A, on the
southwest by Calle Beata, and on the northwest by Lot No. 12-D of the subdivision
plan. In 1932, respondents' predecessor-in-interest constructed their residential
building on Lot No. 12-D, adjacent to Lot No. 12-C.
On May 16, 1969, TCT No. 96886[6] was issued in the name of Joaquin Limense
covering the very same area of Lot No. 12-C.
On October 1, 1981, Joaquin Limense secured a building permit for the construction
of a hollow block fence on the boundary line between his aforesaid property and the
adjacent parcel of land located at 2759 Beata Street, Pandacan, Manila, designated
as Lot No. 12-D, which was being occupied by respondents. The fence, however,
could not be constructed because a substantial portion of respondents' residential
building in Lot No. 12-D encroached upon portions of Joaquin Limense's property in
Lot No. 12-C.
Joaquin Limense demanded the removal of the encroached area; however,
respondent ignored both oral and written demands. The parties failed to amicably
settle the differences between them despite referral to the barangay. Thus,
on March 9, 1983, Joaquin Limense, duly represented by his Attorney-in-Fact,
Teofista L. Reyes, instituted a Complaint[7]against respondents before the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 15, for removal of obstruction and damages.
Joaquin Limense prayed that the RTC issue an order directing respondents, jointly
and severally, to remove the portion which illegally encroached upon his property on
Lot No. 12-C and, likewise, prayed for the payment of damages, attorneys fees and
costs of suit.
Respondents, on the other hand, averred in their Answer[8] that they were the
surviving heirs of Francisco Ramos,[9] who, during his lifetime, was married to Salud
Lozada, one of the daughters of Dalmacio Lozada, the original owner of Lot No.
12. After subdividing the said lot, Dalmacio Lozada donated Lot No. 12-C in favor of
his daughters Catalina, married to Sotero Natividad; Isabel, married to Isaac Limense;
and Salud, married to Francisco Ramos. Being the surviving heirs of Francisco Ramos,
respondents later became co-owners of Lot No. 12-C. Lot No. 12-C has served as right
of way or common alley of all the heirs of Dalmacio Lozada since 1932 up to the
present. As a common alley, it could not be closed or fenced by Joaquin Limense
without causing damage and prejudice to respondents.
After trial on the merits, the RTC rendered a Decision [10] dated September 21,
1990 dismissing the complaint of Joaquin Limense. It ruled that an apparent
easement of right of way existed in favor of respondents. Pertinent portions of the
decision read as follows:
The Court finds that an apparent easement of right of way
exists in favor of the defendants under Article 624 of the Civil Code.
It cannot be denied that there is an alley which shows its existence.
It is admitted that this alley was established by the original owner
of Lot 12 and that in dividing his property, the alley established by
him continued to be used actively and passively as such. Even when
the division of the property occurred, the non-existence of the
easement was not expressed in the corresponding titles nor were
the apparent sign of the alley made to disappear before the
issuance of said titles.
The Court also finds that when plaintiff acquired the lot (12-C) which forms
the alley, he knew that said lot could serve no other purpose than as an alley.
That is why even after he acquired it in 1969, the lot continued to be used
by defendants and occupants of the other adjoining lots as an alley. The
existence of the easement of right of way was therefore known to plaintiff
who must respect the same in spite of the fact that his transfer certificate of
title does not mention the lot of defendants as among those listed therein
as entitled to such right of way. It is an established principle that actual
notice or knowledge is as binding as registration.[11]
Aggrieved by said decision, Joaquin Limense filed a notice of appeal. The records of
the case were transmitted to the Court of Appeals (CA). During the pendency of the
appeal with the CA, Joaquin Limense died in 1999.[12]
The CA, Seventh Division, in CA-G.R. CV No. 33589, in its Decision[13] dated December
20, 2001 dismissed the appeal and affirmed in toto the decision of the RTC.
Frustrated by this turn of events, petitioners, as surviving heirs of Joaquin Limense,
elevated the case to this Court via a Petition for Review on Certiorari[14] raising the
following issues:
1. DID THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMIT A GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF
JURISDICTION, IN HOLDING, LIKE THE TRIAL COURT DID, THAT
RESPONDENTS' LOT 12-D HAS AN EASEMENT OF RIGHT OF
WAY OVER JOAQUIN LIMENSE'S LOT 12-C?
2. DID THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMIT A GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION, IN FAILING TO HOLD,
LIKE THE TRIAL COURT DID, THAT THE PROTRUDING PORTIONS OF
RESPONDENTS' HOUSE ON LOT 12-D EXTENDING INTO JOAQUIN LIMENSE'S
LOT 12-C CONSTITUTE A NUISANCE AND, AS SUCH, SHOULD BE REMOVED?
Petitioners aver that the CA erred in ruling that since Lot No. 12-C was covered by
two TCT's, i.e., TCT Nos. 40043 and 96886, and there was no evidence on record to
show how Joaquin Limense was able to secure another title over an already titled
property, then one of these titles must be of dubious origin. According to the CA, TCT
No. 96886, issued in the name of Joaquin Limense, was spurious because the Lozada
sisters never disposed of the said property covered by TCT No. 40043. The CA further
ruled that a co-ownership existed over Lot No. 12-C between petitioners and
respondents. Petitioners countered that TCT No. 96886, being the only and best
legitimate proof of ownership over Lot No. 12-C, must prevail over TCT No. 40043.
Respondents allege that it was possible that TCT No. 96886, in the name of Joaquin
Limense, was obtained thru fraud, misrepresentation or falsification of documents
because the donees of said property could not possibly execute any valid transfer of
title to Joaquin Limense, as they were already dead prior to the issuance of TCT No.
96886 in 1969.Respondents further allege that petitioners failed to produce proof
substantiating the issuance of TCT No. 96886 in the name of Joaquin Limense.
Apparently, respondents are questioning the legality of TCT No. 96886, an issue that
this Court cannot pass upon in the present case. It is a rule that the validity of a
torrens title cannot be assailed collaterally.[15] Section 48 of Presidential Decree (PD)
No. 1529 provides that:
[a] certificate of title shall not be subject to collateral attack. It
cannot be altered, modified, or cancelled except in a direct
proceeding in accordance with law.
In the case at bar, the action filed before the RTC against respondents was an action
for removal of obstruction and damages. Respondents raised the defense that
Joaquin Limense's title could have been obtained through fraud and
misrepresentation in the trial proceedings before the RTC. Such defense is in the
nature of a collateral attack, which is not allowed by law.
Further, it has been held that a certificate of title, once registered, should not
thereafter be impugned, altered, changed, modified, enlarged or diminished, except
in a direct proceeding permitted by law. Otherwise, the reliance on registered titles
would be lost. The title became indefeasible and incontrovertible after the lapse of
one year from the time of its registration and issuance. Section 32 of PD 1529
provides that upon the expiration of said period of one year, the decree of
registration and the certificate of title shall become incontrovertible. Any person
aggrieved by such decree of registration in any case may pursue his remedy by action
for damages against the applicant or other persons responsible for the fraud. [16] It
has, therefore, become an ancient rule that the issue on the validity of
title, i.e., whether or not it was fraudulently issued, can only be raised in an action
expressly instituted for that purpose.[17] In the present case, TCT No. 96886 was
registered in 1969 and respondents never instituted any direct proceeding or action
to assail Joaquin Limense's title.
Additionally, an examination of TCT No. 40043 would readily show that there is an
annotation that it has been CANCELLED.[18] A reading of TCT No. 96886 would also
reveal that said title is a transfer from TCT No. 48866[19] and not TCT 40043. Thus, it
is possible that there was a series of transfers effected from TCT No. 40043 prior to
the issuance of TCT No. 96886. Hence, respondents' position that the issuance of TCT
No. 96886 in the name of Joaquin Limense is impossible, because the registered
owners of TCT No. 40043 were already dead prior to 1969 and could not have
transferred the property to Joaquin Limense, cannot be taken as proof that TCT No.
96886 was obtained through fraud, misrepresentation or falsification of documents.
Findings of fact of the CA, although generally deemed conclusive, may admit review
by this Court if the CA failed to notice certain relevant facts that, if properly
considered, would justify a different conclusion, and if the judgment of the CA is
premised on a misapprehension of facts.[20] As with the present case, the CA's
observation that TCT No.96886 is of dubious origin, as TCT No. 40043 does not
appear to have been disposed of by Catalina, Isabel and Salud Lozada, is improper
and constitutes an indirect attack on TCT No. 96886. As we see it, TCT No. 96886, at
present, is the best proof of Joaquin Limenses ownership over Lot No. 12-C. Thus, the
CA erred in ruling that respondents and petitioners co-owned Lot No. 12-C, as said
lot is now registered exclusively in the name of Joaquin Limense.
Due to the foregoing, Joaquin Limense, as the registered owner of Lot 12-C, and his
successors-in-interest, may enclose or fence his land or tenements by means of walls,
ditches, live or dead hedges, or by any other means without detriment to servitudes
constituted thereon.[21]
However, although the owner of the property has the right to enclose or fence his
property, he must respect servitudes constituted thereon. The question now is
whether respondents are entitled to an easement of right of way.
Petitioners contend that respondents are not entitled to an easement of right of way
over Lot No. 12-C, because their Lot No. 12-D is not duly annotated at the back of TCT
No. 96886 which would entitle them to enjoy the easement, unlike Lot Nos. 12-A-1,
12-A-2, 12-A-3, 12-A-4, 12-A-5, and 12-A-6. Respondents, on the other hand, allege
that they are entitled to an easement of right of way over Lot No. 12-C, which has
been continuously used as an alley by the heirs of Dalmacio Lozada, the residents in
the area and the public in general from 1932 up to the present. Since petitioners are
fully aware of the long existence of the said alley or easement of right of way, they
are bound to respect the same.
As defined, an easement is a real right on another's property, corporeal and
immovable, whereby the owner of the latter must refrain from doing or allowing
somebody else to do or something to be done on his property, for the benefit of
another person or tenement.[22]
Easements may be continuous or discontinuous, apparent or non-apparent.
Continuous easements are those the use of which is or may be incessant, without the
intervention of any act of man. Discontinuous easements are those which are used
at intervals and depend upon the acts of man. Apparent easements are those which
are made known and are continually kept in view by external signs that reveal the
use and enjoyment of the same. Non-apparent easements are those which show no
external indication of their existence.[23]
In the present case, the easement of right of way is discontinuous and apparent. It is
discontinuous, as the use depends upon the acts of respondents and other persons
passing through the property. Being an alley that shows a permanent path going to
and from Beata Street, the same is apparent.

Being a discontinuous and apparent easement, the same can be acquired only by
virtue of a title.[24]
In the case at bar, TCT No. 96886, issued in the name of Joaquin Limense, does not
contain any annotation that Lot No. 12-D was given an easement of right of way over
Lot No. 12-C. However, Joaquin Limense and his successors-in-interests are fully
aware that Lot No. 12-C has been continuously used and utilized as an alley by
respondents and residents in the area for a long period of time.
Joaquin Limense's Attorney-in-Fact, Teofista L. Reyes, testified that respondents and
several other residents in the area have been using the alley to reach Beata
Street since 1932.Thus:
Atty. Manuel B. Tomacruz:
Q: Mrs. Witness, by virtue of that Deed of Donation you claim that
titles were issued to the children of Dalmacio Lozada
namely Salud Lozada, Catalina Lozada and Isabel Lozada,
is that right?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And after the said property was adjudicated to his said children
the latter constructed their houses on their lots.
A: Yes, sir.
Q: As a matter of fact, the herein defendants have constructed
their houses on the premises alloted to them since the
year 1932?
A: Yes, sir, they were able to construct their house fronting Beata
Street.
Q: And that house they have constructed on their lot in 1932 is still
existing today?
A: Yes, sir and they still used the alley in question and they are
supposed to use Beata Street but they are not using Beata
Street.
Q: They are using the alley?
A: Yes, sir, they are using the alley and they do not pass
through Beata Street.
Q: And they have been using the alley since 1932 up to the
present?
A: Yes, sir they have been using the alley since that time. That was
their mistake and they should be using Beata
Street because they are fronting Beata Strret.
Q: As a matter of fact, it is not only herein defendants who have
been using that alley since 1932 up to the present?
A: Yes, sir they are using the alley up to now.
Q: As a matter of fact, in this picture marked as Exh. C-1 the alley is
very apparent. This is the alley?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And there are houses on either side of this alley?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: As a matter of fact, all the residents on either side of the alley
are passing through this alley?
A: Yes, sir, because the others have permit to use this alley and they
are now allowed to use the alley but the Ramos's family
are now [not] allowed to use this alley.[25]
In Mendoza v. Rosel,[26] this Court held that:
Petitioners claim that inasmuch as their transfer certificates of title do not mention
any lien or encumbrance on their lots, they are purchasers in good faith and for value,
and as such have a right to demand from respondents some payment for the use of
the alley. However, the Court of Appeals found, as a fact, that when respondents
acquired the two lots which form the alley, they knew that said lots could serve no
other purpose than as an alley. The existence of the easement of right of way was
therefore known to petitioners who must respect the same, in spite of the fact that
their transfer certificates of title do not mention any burden or easement. It is an
established principle that actual notice or knowledge is as binding as registration.
Every buyer of a registered land who takes a certificate of title for value and in good
faith shall hold the same free of all encumbrances except those noted on said
certificate. It has been held, however, that where the party has knowledge of a prior
existing interest that was unregistered at the time he acquired a right to the same
land, his knowledge of that prior unregistered interest has the effect of registration
as to him.[27]
In the case at bar, Lot No. 12-C has been used as an alley ever since it was donated
by Dalmacio Lozada to his heirs. It is undisputed that prior to and after the
registration of TCT No. 96886, Lot No. 12-C has served as a right of way in favor of
respondents and the public in general. We quote from the RTC's decision:

x x x It cannot be denied that there is an alley which shows its existence. It is
admitted that this alley was established by the original owner of Lot 12 and
that in dividing his property the alley established by him continued to be
used actively and passively as such. Even when the division of the property
occurred, the non-existence of the easement was not expressed in the
corresponding titles nor were the apparent sign of the alley made to
disappear before the issuance of said titles.
The Court also finds that when plaintiff acquired the lot (12-C) which forms
the alley, he knew that said lot could serve no other purpose than as an alley.
That is why even after he acquired it in 1969 the lot continued to be used by
defendants and occupants of the other adjoining lots as an alley. x x x[28]
Thus, petitioners are bound by the easement of right of way over Lot No. 12-C, even
though no registration of the servitude has been made on TCT No. 96886.
However, respondents right to have access to the property of petitioners does not
include the right to continually encroach upon the latters property. It is not disputed
that portions of respondents' house on Lot No. 12-D encroach upon Lot No. 12-C.
Geodetic Engineer Jose Agres, Jr. testified on the encroachment of respondents'
house on Lot No. 12-C, which he surveyed.[29] In order to settle the rights of the
parties relative to the encroachment, We should determine whether respondents
were builders in good faith.
Good faith is an intangible and abstract quality with no technical meaning or
statutory definition; and it encompasses, among other things, an honest belief, the
absence of malice and the absence of a design to defraud or to seek an
unconscionable advantage. An individuals personal good faith is a concept of his own
mind and, therefore, may not conclusively be determined by his protestations
alone. It implies honesty of intention, and freedom from knowledge of
circumstances which ought to put the holder upon inquiry. The essence of good faith
lies in an honest belief in the validity of ones right, ignorance of a superior claim, and
absence of intention to overreach another. Applied to possession, one is considered
in good faith if he is not aware that there exists in his title or mode of acquisition any
flaw which invalidates it.[30]
Good faith is always presumed, and upon him who alleges bad faith on the part of
the possessor rests the burden of proof.[31] It is a matter of record that respondents'
predecessor-in-interest constructed their residential building on Lot No. 12-D,
adjacent to Lot No. 12-C, in 1932.[32] Respondents' predecessor-in-interest owned the
1/3 portion of Lot No. 12-C at the time the property was donated to them by
Dalmacio Lozada in 1932. The Deed of Donation executed by the late Dalmacio
Lozada, dated March 9, 1932, specifically provides that:
I hereby grant, cede and donate in favor of Catalina Lozada married to
Sotero Natividad, Isabel Lozada married to Isaac Simense and Salud Lozada
married to Francisco Ramos, all Filipinos, of legal age, the parcel of land
known as Lot No. 12-C, in equal parts.[33]
The portions of Lot No. 12-D, particularly the overhang, covering 1 meter in width
and 17 meters in length; the stairs; and the concrete structures are all within the 1/3
share alloted to them by their donor Dalmacio Lozada and, hence, there was absence
of a showing that respondents acted in bad faith when they built portions of their
house on Lot No. 12-C.
Using the above parameters, we are convinced that respondents' predecessors-in-
interest acted in good faith when they built portions of their house on Lot 12-
C. Respondents being builders in good faith, we shall now discuss the respective
rights of the parties relative to the portions encroaching upon respondents' house.
Articles 448 and 546 of the New Civil Code provide:
Art. 448. The owner of the land on which anything has
been built, sown or planted in good faith, shall have the right to
appropriate as his own the works, sowing or planting, after
payment of the indemnity provided for in Articles 546 and 548, or
to oblige the one who built or planted to pay the price of the land,
and the one who sowed, the proper rent. However, the builder or
planter cannot be obliged to buy the land if its value is considerably
more than that of the building or trees. In such case, he shall pay
reasonable rent, if the owner of the land does not choose to
appropriate the building or trees after proper indemnity. The
parties shall agree upon the terms of the lease and, in case of
disagreement, the court shall fix the terms thereof.
Art. 546. Necessary expenses shall be refunded to every
possessor; but only the possessor in good faith may retain the thing
until he has been reimbursed therefor.
Useful expenses shall be refunded only to the possessor
in good faith with the same right of retention, the person who has
defeated him in the possession having the option of refunding the
amount of the expenses or of paying the increase in value which
the thing may have acquired by reason thereof.
In Spouses Del Campo v. Abesia,[34] this provision was applied to one whose house,
despite having been built at the time he was still co-owner, overlapped with the land
of another. In that case, this Court ruled:
The court a quo correctly held that Article 448 of the Civil Code cannot apply
where a co-owner builds, plants or sows on the land owned in common for
then he did not build, plant or sow upon the land that exclusively belongs to
another but of which he is a co-owner. The co-owner is not a third person
under the circumstances, and the situation is governed by the rules of co-
ownership.
However, when, as in this case, the ownership is terminated by the partition
and it appears that the house of defendants overlaps or occupies a portion
of 5 square meters of the land pertaining to plaintiffs which the defendants
obviously built in good faith, then the provisions of Article 448 of the new
Civil Code should apply. x x x[35]
In other words, when the co-ownership is terminated by a partition, and it appears
that the house of an erstwhile co-owner has encroached upon a portion pertaining
to another co-owner, but the encroachment was in good faith, then the provisions of
Article 448 should apply to determine the respective rights of the parties. In this case,
the co-ownership was terminated due to the transfer of the title of the whole
property in favor of Joaquin Limense.
Under the foregoing provision, petitioners have the right to appropriate said portion
of the house of respondents upon payment of indemnity to respondents, as provided
for in Article 546 of the Civil Code. Otherwise, petitioners may oblige respondents to
pay the price of the land occupied by their house. However, if the price asked for is
considerably much more than the value of the portion of the house of respondents
built thereon, then the latter cannot be obliged to buy the land. Respondents shall
then pay the reasonable rent to petitioners upon such terms and conditions that they
may agree. In case of disagreement, the trial court shall fix the terms thereof. Of
course, respondents may demolish or remove the said portion of their house, at their
own expense, if they so decide.[36]
The choice belongs to the owner of the land, a rule that accords with the principle of
accession that the accessory follows the principal and not the other way
around.[37] Even as the option lies with the landowner, the grant to him, nevertheless,
is preclusive. He must choose one. He cannot, for instance, compel the owner of the
building to instead remove it from the land.[38]
The obvious benefit to the builder under this article is that, instead of being outrightly
ejected from the land, he can compel the landowner to make a choice between two
options: (1) to appropriate the building by paying the indemnity required by law, or
(2) to sell the land to the builder.[39]
The raison detre for this provision has been enunciated, thus:
Where the builder, planter or sower has acted in good faith, a conflict of
rights arises between the owners, and it becomes necessary to protect the
owner of the improvements without causing injustice to the owner of the
land. In view of the impracticability of creating a state of forced co-
ownership, the law has provided a just solution by giving the owner of the
land the option to acquire the improvements after payment of the proper
indemnity, or to oblige the builder or planter to pay for the land and the
sower the proper rent. He cannot refuse to exercise either option. It is the
owner of the land who is authorized to exercise the option, because his right
is older, and because, by the principle of accession, he is entitled to the
ownership of the accessory thing.[40]
In accordance with Depra v. Dumlao,[41] this case must be remanded to the trial court
to determine matters necessary for the proper application of Article 448 in relation
to Article 546. Such matters include the option that petitioners would take and the
amount of indemnity that they would pay, should they decide to appropriate the
improvements on the lots.
Anent the second issue, although it may seem that the portions encroaching upon
respondents' house can be considered a nuisance, because it hinders petitioners' use
of their property, it cannot simply be removed at respondents' expense, as prayed
for by petitioner. This is because respondents built the subject encroachment in good
faith, and the law affords them certain rights as discussed above.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, the Decision of the Court of Appeals
dated December 20, 2001 in CA-G.R. CV No. 33589 is AFFIRMED with the
following MODIFICATIONS:
1. No co-ownership exists over Lot No. 12-C, covered by TCT No. 96886,
between petitioners and respondents.
2. The case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court, Branch 15, Manila, for
further proceedings without further delay to determine the facts essential to the
proper application of Articles 448 and 546 of the Civil Code.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 147957 July 22, 2009
PRIVATIZATION AND MANAGEMENT OFFICE, Petitioner,
vs.
LEGASPI TOWERS 300, INC., Respondent.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to annul and set aside the
Decision1 dated February 16, 2001, of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No.
48984, affirming the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC).
The factual and procedural antecedents are as follows:
Caruff Development Corporation owned several parcels of land along the stretch of
Roxas Boulevard, Manila. Among them were contiguous lots covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) Nos. 120311, 120312, 120313, and 127649 (now TCT No.
200760).
Sometime in December 1975, Caruff obtained a loan from the Philippine National
Bank (PNB) to finance the construction of a 21-storey condominium along Roxas
Boulevard.2 The loan accommodation was secured by a real estate mortgage over
three (3) parcels of land covered by TCT Nos. 120311, 120312, and 120313,3 where
Caruff planned to erect the condominium.
In 1979, Caruff started constructing a multi-storey building on the mortgaged
parcels of land. Along with the other appurtenances of the building constructed by
Caruff, it built a powerhouse (generating set) and two sump pumps in the adjacent
lot covered by TCT No. 127649 (now TCT No. 200760).
After the completion of the condominium project, it was constituted pursuant to
the Condominium Act (Republic Act No. 4726), as the Legaspi Towers 300, Inc.
However, for Caruff’s failure to pay its loan with PNB, the latter foreclosed the
mortgage and acquired some of the properties of Caruff at the sheriff’s auction sale
held on January 30, 1985.4
Thereafter, Proclamation No. 505 was issued. It was aimed to promote privatization
"for the prompt disposition of the large number of non-performing assets of the
government financial institutions, and certain government-owned and controlled
corporations, which have been found unnecessary or inappropriate for the
government sector to maintain." It also provided for the creation of the Asset
Privatization Trust (APT).
By virtue of Administrative Order No. 14 and the Deed of Transfer executed by PNB,
the National Government, thru the APT, became the assignee and transferee of all
its rights and titles to and interests in its receivables with Caruff, including the
properties it acquired from the foreclosure of Caruff’s mortgage.
Meanwhile, Caruff filed a case against PNB before the RTC of Manila, Branch 2,
whereby Caruff sought the nullification of PNB’s foreclosure of its properties. 6 The
case was docketed as Civil Case No. 85-29512.
A Compromise Agreement7 dated August 31, 1988 was later entered into by Caruff,
PNB, and the National Government thru APT. The parties agreed, among other
things, that Caruff would transfer and convey in favor of the National Government,
thru the APT, the lot covered by TCT No. 127649 (now TCT No. 200760), where it
built the generating set and sump pumps.
On September 9, 1988, the RTC rendered a Decision approving the Compromise
Agreement executed and submitted by the parties. The dispositive portion of said
Decision reads:
x x x and finding the foregoing compromise agreement to be well-taken, the Court
hereby approves the same and renders judgment in accordance with the terms and
conditions set forth [sic] therein and enjoins the parties to comply strictly
therewith.
SO ORDERED.8
Thus, by virtue of the Decision, the subject property was among those properties
that were conveyed by Caruff to PNB and the National Government thru APT.
On July 5, 1989, respondent filed a case for Declaration of the existence of an
easement before the RTC of Manila, docketed as Spec. Proc. No. 89-49563.
Respondent alleged that the act of Caruff of constructing the powerhouse and
sump pumps on its property constituted a voluntary easement in favor of the
respondent. It prayed, among other things, that judgment be rendered declaring
the existence of an easement over the portion of the property covered by TCT No.
127649 (now TCT No. 200760) that was being occupied by the powerhouse and the
sump pumps in its favor, and that the Register of Deeds of Manila annotate the
easement at the back of said certificate of title.9
In its Answer with Counterclaim and Cross-claim,10 APT alleged that respondent had
no cause of action against it, because it was but a mere transferee of the land. It
acquired absolute ownership thereof by virtue of the Compromise Agreement in
Civil Case No. 85-2952, free from any liens and/or encumbrances. It was not a privy
to any transaction or agreement entered into by and between Caruff, respondent,
and the bank. It further alleged that the continued use of the subject property by
respondent and the condominium owners without its consent was an
encroachment upon its rights as absolute owner and for which it should be properly
compensated.
On January 12, 1995, after trial on the merits, the RTC rendered a
Decision11 declaring the existence of an easement over the portion of the land
covered by TCT No. 127649 (TCT No. 200760), the decretal portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the petitioner and against the
respondents hereby declaring the existence of an easement over the portion of land
covered by TCT No. 200760 (previously No. 127649) occupied at present [by the]
powerhouse and sump pumps nos. 1 and 2 only, of Legaspi Towers 300, in favor of
Legaspi Towers 300, Incorporated. The Register of Deeds of Manila is, likewise,
hereby directed to annotate this easement at the back of the said certificate of title.
The counterclaim and cross-claim are dismissed accordingly.
SO ORDERED.
Aggrieved, APT sought recourse before the CA in CA-G.R. CV No. 48984.
Subsequently, the term of existence of APT expired and, pursuant to Section 2,
Article III of Executive Order No. 323, the powers, functions, duties and
responsibilities of APT, as well as all the properties, real or personal assets,
equipments and records held by it and its obligations and liabilities that were
incurred, was transferred to petitioner Privatization and Management Office (PMO).
Thus, the PMO substituted APT in its appeal.
On February 16, 2001, finding no reversible error on the part of the RTC, the CA
rendered a Decision12 affirming the decision appealed from. PMO filed a Motion for
Reconsideration, but it was denied in the Resolution 13 dated May 3, 2001.
Hence, the present petition assigning the following errors:
I
THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE DECISION
OF THE COURT A QUO IN FINDING THAT [THE] PRESENCE OF THE GENERATOR SET
(GENERATING SET) AND SUMP PUMPS CONSTITUES AN EASEMENT.
II
THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE DECISION
OF THE COURT A QUO IN DECLARING THE EXISTENCE OF AN EASEMENT OVER THE
PORTION OF LAND COVERED BY TCT NO. [200760] OCCUPIED BY THE GENERATOR
SET AND SUMP PUMPS NOS. 1 AND 2, PURSUANT TO ARTICLE 688 OF THE CIVIL
CODE.
III
THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE DECISION
OF THE COURT A QUO IN NOT REQUIRING THE RESPONDENT-PETITIONER TO PAY
ANY COMPENSATION TO PETITIONER, THE OWNER OF THE LAND, FOR THE USE OF
ITS PROPERTY.14
Petitioner argues that the presence of the generator set and sump pumps does not
constitute an easement. They are mere improvements and/or appurtenances
complementing the condominium complex, which has not attained the character of
immovability. They were placed on the subject property as accessories or
improvements for the general use and comfort of the occupants of the
condominium complex.
Petitioner maintains that, as the generator set and sump pumps are improvements
of the condominium, the same should have been removed after Caruff undertook
to deliver the subject property free from any liens and encumbrances by virtue of
the Decision of the RTC in Civil Case No. 85-29512 approving the parties’
Compromise Agreement. It adds that, in alienating the property in favor of
APT/PMO, Caruff could not have intended to include as encumbrance the voluntary
easement.
Petitioner posits that respondent failed to present any evidence to prove the
existence of the necessary requisites for the establishment of an easement. There is
no concrete evidence to show that Caruff had a clear and unequivocal intention to
establish the placing of the generator set and sump pumps on the subject property
as an easement in favor of respondent.
Lastly, petitioner contends that respondent is a "squatter" for having encroached
on the former’s property without its consent and without paying any rent or
indemnity. Petitioner submits that respondent’s presence on the subject property is
an encroachment on ownership and, thus, cannot be properly considered an benefit of another thing or person."15 The statutory basis of this right is Article 613
easement. It adds that an easement merely produces a limitation on ownership, but of the Civil Code, which provides:
the general right of ownership of the servient tenement must not be impaired so as
to amount to a taking of property. When the benefit being imposed is so great as to Art. 613. An easement or servitude is an encumbrance imposed upon an immovable
impair usefulness of the servient estate, it would amount to a cancellation of the for the benefit of another immovable belonging to a different owner.
rights of the latter.
The immovable in favor of which the easement is established is called the dominant
Petitioner insists that, for having unjustly enriched itself at the expense of the estate; that which is subject thereto, the servient estate.
National Government and for encroaching on the latter’s rights as the absolute
owner, respondent should rightfully compensate the National Government for the There are two sources of easements: by law or by the will of the owners. Article 619
use of the subject property which dates back to August 28, 1989 up to the of the Civil Code states:
present.1avvphi1
Art. 619. Easements are established either by law or by the will of the owners. The
For its part, respondent argues that it was the intention of Caruff to have a former are called legal and the latter voluntary easements.
voluntary easement in the subject property and for it to remain as such even after
the property was subsequently assigned to APT. It was Caruff who constructed the
In the present case, neither type of easement was constituted over the subject
generating set and sump pumps on its adjacent property for the use and benefit of
property.
the condominium adjoining it. Also, the manner in which the sump pumps were
installed is permanent in nature, since their removal and transfer to another
In its allegations, respondent claims that Caruff constituted a voluntary easement
location would render the same worthless and would cut off the supply of
when it constructed the generating set and sump pumps over the disputed portion
electricity and water to the condominium and its owners.
of the subject property for its benefit. However, it should be noted that when the
appurtenances were constructed on the subject property, the lands where the
Respondent maintains that petitioner cannot assume that Caruff intended to
condominium was being erected and the subject property where the generating set
renounce the voluntary easement over the subject property by virtue of the
and sump pumps were constructed belonged to Caruff. Therefore, Article 613 of the
Compromise Agreement, since such defense can only be presented by Caruff and
Civil Code does not apply, since no true easement was constituted or existed,
not the petitioner. It added that petitioner had actual notice of the presence of the
because both properties were owned by Caruff.
generating set and sump pumps when they were negotiating with Caruff regarding
the compromise agreement and at the time the subject property was transferred to
Also, Article 624 of the Civil Code is controlling, as it contemplates a situation where
petitioner. Also, petitioner cannot claim the payment of rent, considering that there
there exists an apparent sign of easement between two estates established or
was no written demand for respondent to pay rent or indemnity.
maintained by the owner of both. The law provides:
Respondent submits that the mandate of petitioner to privatize or dispose of the
Art. 624. The existence of an apparent sign of easement between two estates,
non-performing assets transferred to it does not conflict with the issue of the
established or maintained by the owner of both, shall be considered, should either
declaration of the easement over the subject property, considering that petitioner
of them be alienated, as a title in order that the easement may continue actively
is not prevented from privatizing the same despite the presence of the voluntary
and passively, unless, at the time the ownership of the two estates is divided, the
easement.
contrary should be provided in the title of conveyance of either of them, or the sign
aforesaid should be removed before the execution of the deed. This provision shall
The petition is meritorious.
also apply in case of the division of a thing owned in common by two or more
persons.16
An easement or servitude is "a real right constituted on another’s property,
corporeal and immovable, by virtue of which the owner of the same has to abstain
From the foregoing, it can be inferred that when the owner of two properties
from doing or to allow somebody else to do something on his property for the
alienates one of them and an apparent sign of easement exists between the two
estates, entitlement to it continues, unless there is a contrary agreement, or the
indication that the easement exists is removed before the execution of the deed.
In relation thereto, the Compromise Agreement, as approved by the court, clearly
states, among other things, that:
xxxx
2.0 That in consideration of the covenants hereunder stipulated, plaintiff [Caruff]
Development Corporation (CDC), hereby terminates the instant case against
defendants Philippine National Bank (PNB) and the National Government/APT, and
hereby:
2.1 Assigns, transfers and conveys in favor of defendant National government thru
APT, CDC’s rights, title and interest in the Maytubig property, situated at the back of
the Legaspi Towers 300 Condominium, consisting of seven (7) contiguous lots with
an aggregate area of 1,504.90 square meters, covered by the following Transfer
Certificate of Title, viz: TCT No. 23663 – Pasay City Registry; TCT No. 142497 – Metro
Manila 1 Registry; TCT No. 142141 – Metro Manila 1 Registry; TCT No. 127649 –
Metro Manila 1 Registry; x x x; all titles, free from any and all liens and
encumbrances, to be delivered, and the necessary papers and documents to be
turned over/executed to effect transfer in favor of the National Government/APT,
upon approval of this Compromise Agreement;
x x x x.17
Thus, when the subject property was assigned to the National Government thru the
APT, no easement arose or was voluntarily created from the transfer of ownership,
considering that the parties, more particularly, Caruff, pledged that it was assigning,
transferring, and conveying the subject property in favor of the National
Government thru the APT "free from any and all liens and encumbrances."
Compromise agreements are contracts, whereby the parties undertake reciprocal
obligations to resolve their differences, thus, avoiding litigation, or put an end to
one already commenced.18 As a contract, when the terms of the agreement are
clear and explicit that they do not justify an attempt to read into it any alleged
intention of the parties; the terms are to be understood literally, just as they appear
on the face of the contract.19 Considering that Caruff never intended to transfer the
subject property to PMO, burdened by the generating set and sump pumps,
respondent should remove them from the subject property.
As regards PMO’s claim for rent, respondent has been enjoying the use of the
subject property for free from the time the rights over the property were
transferred and conveyed by Caruff to the National Government.
We have held that "[t]here is unjust enrichment when a person unjustly retains a
benefit to the loss of another, or when a person retains money or property of
another against the fundamental principles of justice, equity and good conscience."
Article 22 of the Civil Code provides that "[e]very person who, through an act or
performance by another, or any other means, acquires or comes into possession of
something at the expense of the latter, without just or legal ground, shall return the
same to him." The principle of unjust enrichment under Article 22 of the Civil Code
requires two conditions: (1) that a person is benefited without a valid basis or
justification, and (2) that such benefit is derived at another’s expense or damage.20
In the present case, there is no dispute as to who owns the subject property and as
to the fact that the National Government has been deprived of the use thereof for
almost two decades. Thus, it is but just and proper that respondent should pay
reasonable rent for the portion of the subject property occupied by the generating
set and sump pumps, from the time respondent deprived the lawful owner of the
use thereof up to the present. To rule otherwise would be unjust enrichment on the
part of respondent at the expense of the Government.
From the records, APT/PMO submitted, as part of its evidence, a letter 21 dated June
18, 1992, wherein it fixed the monthly rental fee per square meter of the entire
property at ₱56.25, or ₱1.81 per square meter per day. Hence, respondent should
pay the National Government reasonable rent in the amount of ₱56.25 per square
meter per month, to be reckoned from August 28, 1989 up to the time when the
generating set and sump pumps are completely removed therefrom.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court in Spec.
Proc. No. 89-49563 dated January 12, 1995, and the Decision and Resolution of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 48984 dated February 16, 2001 and May 3,
2001, respectively, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Legaspi Towers 300, Inc. is DIRECTED to REMOVE the generating set and sump
pumps 1 and 2 from the property covered by TCT No. 200760 and
to PAY reasonable rent at the rate of ₱56.25 per square meter/per month from
August 28, 1989 until the same are completely removed.
SO ORDERED.
 The decision of the court a quo was affirmed in toto by the Court of Appeals.[2]

[G.R. No. 125018. April 6, 2000] In this Petition for Review on Certiorari REMMAN prays that we pass upon the
findings of the trial court as well as of the appellate court. REMMAN insists that
REMMAN ENTERPRISES, INC., petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and CRISPIN E. factual findings of lower courts may be passed upon, reviewed and reversed: (a)
LAT, respondents. francis when the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or
conjectures; (b) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or
DECISION impossible; (c) when there is grave abuse of discretion; (d) when the judgment is
based on a misapprehension of facts; (e) when the Court of Appeals manifestly
overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties and which, if properly
BELLOSILLO, J.:
considered, would justify a different conclusion; (f) when the conclusions of the
Court of Appeals are not supported by the evidence on record; (g) when facts of
REMMAN ENTERPRISES, INC. (REMMAN), and CRISPIN E. LAT are adjoining
substance were overlooked which, if correctly considered, might have changed the
landowners in Barangay Bugtong Na Pulo, Lipa City. The land of Lat containing an
outcome of the case; and, (h) when the findings of the Court of Appeals are not in
area of 1.8 hectares is agricultural and planted mostly with fruit trees while
accord with what reasonable men would readily accept are the correct inferences
REMMAN occupies a land area of fifteen (15) hectares six (6) hectares of which are
from the evidence extant in the records.[3]
devoted to its piggery business. REMMAN's land is one and a half (1) meters higher
in elevation than that of respondent Lat.
Indeed, in the abovementioned instances, the factual milieu of a particular case
may be passed upon, reversed or modified by this Court. But examination of the
Sometime in July 1984 Lat noticed that REMMAN's waste disposal lagoon was
record reveals that all the above instances are unavailing. From this point of view
already overflowing and inundating one-fourth (1/4) of Lat's plantation. He made
alone the instant petition is dismissible. Nevertheless, we shall discuss them
several representations with REMMAN but they fell on deaf ears. On 14 March
hereunder to dispose finally of the contentions of REMMAN.
1985, after almost one (1) hectare of Lat's plantation was already inundated with
water containing pig manure, as a result of which the trees growing on the flooded
First, REMMAN argues that its liability for the damages suffered by Lat was not
portion started to wither and die, Lat filed a complaint for damages with
clearly established.
preliminary mandatory injunction against REMMAN. Lat alleged that the acidity of
the soil in his plantation increased because of the overflow of the water heavy with
pig manure from REMMAN's piggery farm. We disagree. During the ocular inspection conducted by the lower court where
representatives of both parties were present, it was established that the waste
water containing pig manure was continuously flowing from REMMAN's piggery
REMMAN denied all the allegations of Lat and raised as an affirmative defense that
farm to Lat's plantation. The water was ankle-deep and flooded one (1) hectare of
measures such as the construction of additional lagoons were already adopted to
Lat's plantation. The overflow of the "acidic, malodorous and polluted water"
contain the waste water coming from its piggery to prevent any damage to the
continued from June 1984 to March 1985 thus destroying one (1) jackfruit tree,
adjoining estates.
fifteen (15) coconut trees, one hundred an twenty-two (122) coffee trees, and an
unspecified number of mango trees, bananas and vegetables.[4]
After conducting an ocular inspection and evaluating the evidence of both parties
the Regional Trial Court found that indeed REMMANs waste disposal lagoon
In addition, the appellate court found that there was indeed negligence on the part
overflowed with the contaminated water flooding one (1) hectare of Lat's
of REMMAN which directly caused the damage to the plantation of Lat. Thus -
plantation. The waste water was ankle-deep and caused death and destruction to
novero
one (1) jackfruit tree, fifteen (15) coconut trees, one hundred twenty-two (122)
coffee trees, and an unspecified number of mango trees, bananas and vegetables.
As a consequence, the trial court ordered REMMAN to indemnify Lat P186,975.00 x x x Negligence was clearly established. It is uncontroverted that the land of
for lost profits for three (3) crop years and P30,000.00 as attorney's fees.[1] marie appellee was flooded on account of the overflow of acidic, malodorous and polluted
water coming from the adjacent piggery farm of appellant sometime in May 1984.
This resulted in the impairment of the productivity of appellee's land as well as the
eventual destruction and death of several fruit trees, such as coconuts, coffee,
jackfruits, bananas and other plants x x x x Appellant cannot avoid liability because
their negligence was the proximate cause of the damage. Appellee's property was
practically made a catch-basin of polluted water and other noxious substances
emptying from appellant's piggery which could have been prevented had it not
been for the negligence of appellant arising from its: (a) failure to monitor the
increases in the level of water in the lagoons before, during and after the heavy
downpours which occurred during the rainy months of 1984; (b) failure to augment
the existing lagoons prior to the incident, notwithstanding the fact that at the time
of the flooding, the piggery had grown to a capacity of 11,000 heads, and
considering that it was reasonably forseeable that the existing waste disposal
facilities were no longer adequate to accomodate the increasing volume of waste
matters in such a big farm; and more imporantly, (c) the repeated failure to comply
with their promise to appellee.[5]
Second, REMMAN argues that the trial court as well as the Court of Appeals should
not have rejected its request for the production of Lat's income tax returns.
According to REMMAN had Lat's income tax returns been produced, the issue of the
alleged damages suffered by Lat would have been settled.
This argument is moot, if not trite. For this matter has been laid to rest when we
affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision in an earlier case involving the same
parties.[6] In sustaining the trial court's quashal of the subpoena duces
tecum previously issued compelling Lat to produce his income tax returns for the
years 1982-1986, the appellate court explained that the production of the income
tax returns would not necessarily serve to prove the special and affirmative
defenses set up by REMMAN nor rebut Lat's testimony regarding the losses he
sustained due to the piggery. The tax returns per se could not reflect the total
amount of damages suffered by Lat, as income losses from a portion of the
plantation could be offset by any profit derived from the rest of the plantation or
from other sources of income. Conversely, losses incurred from other sources of
income would be totally unrelated to the income from the particular portion of the
plantation flooded with waste matter coming from REMMAN's piggery. [7]
Third, REMMAN contends that the damages allegedly sustained by Lat have not
been satisfactorily established. nigel
We a not convinced. The factual findings of the court a quo rightly support its
conclusions on this respect -
Coming now to the issue of damages, We find appellant's allegations not well-
taken. Appellant contends that actual and compensatory damages require
evidentiary proof, and there being no evidence presented as to the necessity of the
award for damages, it was erroneous for the lower court to have made such award.
It must be remembered that after the ocular inspection, the court a quo rendered
an inventory of dead and rotten trees and plants found in appellee's property.
Appellee also testified on the approximate annual harvest and fair market value
thereof. Significantly, no opposition or controverting evidence was presented by
appellant on the matter. Hence, appellant is bound thereby and cannot now be
heard to complain. As correctly held by the court a quo:
An ocular inspection has been conducted by the trial court. The inventory of the
trees damaged and the itemized valuation placed therein by private respondent
after the ocular inspection which is not rebutted by the petitioner, is the more
accurate indicator of the said amount prayed for as damages. If the valuation is
indeed unreasonable, petitioner should present controverting evidence of the fair
market value of the crops involved. The trial court held that the private respondent
himself had been subjected to extensive cross and re-cross examination by the
counsel for the petitioner on the amount of damages.[8]
Finally, REMMAN complains that the damages, if any, were due to a fortuitous
event.
Again cannot agree with petitioner. We defer instead to the findings opinions
expressed by the lower courts -
Even assuming that the heavy rains constituted an act of God, by reason of their
negligence, the fortuitous event became humanized, rendering appellants liable for
the ensuing damages. In National Power Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 233 SCRA
649 (1993), the Supreme Court held: ella
Accordingly, petitioners cannot be heard to invoke the act of God or force
majeure to escape liability for the loss or damage sustained by private
respondents since they, the petitioners, were guilty of negligence. This
event then was not occasioned exclusively by an act of God or force
majeure; a human factor - negligence or imprudence - had intervened. The
effect then of the force majeure in question may be deemed to have, even
if only partly, resulted from the participation of man. Thus, the whole
occurrence was thereby humanized, as it were, and removed from the
rules applicable to acts of God.
As regards the alleged natural easement imposed upon the
property of appellee, resort to pertinent provisions of applicable
law is imperative. Under the Civil Code, it is provided:
 Art. 637. Lower estates are obliged to receive the waters which naturally SO ORDERED.
and without the intervention of man descend from the higher estates, as
well as the stones or earth which they carry with them.

The owner of the lower estate cannot construct works which will impede
this easement; neither can the owner of the higher estate make works
which will increase the burden.

A similar provision is found in the Water Code of the Philippines

(P.D. No.1067), which provides:

Art. 50. Lower estates are obliged to receive the water which naturally and
without the intervention of man flow from the higher estates, as well as
the stone or earth which they carry with them.

The owner of the lower estate cannot construct works which will impede
this natural flow, unless he provides an alternative method of drainage;
neither can the owner of the higher estate make works which will increase
this natural flow. marinella

As worded, the two (2) aforecited provisions impose a natural

easement upon the lower estate to receive the waters which
naturally and without the intervention of man descend from
higher states. However, where the waters which flow from a
higher state are those which are artificially collected in man-made
lagoons, any damage occasioned thereby entitles the owner of
the lower or servient estate to compensation.[9]

On the basis of the foregoing discussion, it is crystal clear that REMMAN is directly
accountable to Lat for the damages sustained by him. The negligence of REMMAN
in maintaining the level of waste water in its lagoons has been satisfactorily
established. The extent of damages suffered by Lat remains unrebutted; in fact, has
been proved.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The 19 October 1995 Decision of the Court of
Appeals affirming that of the Regional Trial Court-Br. 16, Lipa City, holding
petitioner Remman Enterprises, Inc. (REMMAN) liable to private respondent Crispin

E. Lat for damages and to indemnify the latter P186,975.00 for lost profits for three
(3) crop years and P30,000.00 as attorneys fees, is AFFIRMED. Costs against
petitioner.
 [G.R. No. 112331. May 29, 1996]
ANASTACIA QUIMEN, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and YOLANDA Q.
OLIVEROS, respondents.
DECISION
BELLOSILLO,J.:
IN EASEMENT OF RIGHT OF WAY that easement where the way is shortest and
will cause least prejudice shall be chosen. However, if the two circumstances do not
concur in a single tenement, the way where damage will be least shall be used even
if not the shortest route.[1] This is so because least prejudice prevails over shortest
distance. This means that the court is not bound to establish what is the shortest
distance; a longer way may be adopted to avoid injury to the servient estate, such as
when there are constructions or walls which can be avoided by a round about way,
or to secure the interest of the dominant owner, such as when the shortest
distance would place the way on a dangerous decline.
Thus we conclude from the succeeding facts: Petitioner Anastacia Quimen
together with her brothers Sotero, Sulpicio, Antonio and sister Rufina inherited a
piece of property situated in Pandi, Bulacan. They agreed to subdivide the property
equally among themselves, as they did, with the shares of Anastacia, Sotero, Sulpicio
and Rufina abutting the municipal road. The share of Anastacia, located at the
extreme left, was designated as Lot No. 1448-B- 1. It is bounded on the right by the
property of Sotero designated as Lot. No. 1448-B-2. Adjoining Soteros property on
the right are Lots Nos. 1448-B-3 and 1448-B-4 originally owned by Rufina and Sulpicio,
respectively, but which were later acquired by a certain Catalina Santos. Located
directly behind the lots of Anastacia and Sotero is the share of their brother Antonio
designated as Lot No. 1448-B-C which the latter divided into two (2) equal parts, now
Lots Nos. 1448-B-6-A and 1448-B-6-B, each with an area of 92 square meters. Lot No.
1448-B-6-A is located behind Anastacias Lot No. 1448-B-1, while Lot No. 1448-B-6-B
is behind the property of Sotero, father of respondent Yolanda.
In February 1982 Yolanda purchased Lot No. 1448-B-6-A from her uncle Antonio
through her aunt Anastacia who was then acting as his administratrix. According to
Yolanda, when petitioner offered her the property for sale she was hesitant to buy as
it had no access to a public road. But Anastacia prevailed upon her to buy the lot with
the assurance that she would give her a right of way on her adjoining property for
P200.00 per square meter.
Thereafter, Yolanda constructed a house on the lot she bought using as her
passageway to the public highway a portion of Anastacia s property. But when
Yolanda finally offered to pay for the use of the pathway Anastacia refused to accept
the payment. In fact she was thereafter barred by Anastacia from passing through
her property.[2]
In February 1986 Yolanda purchased the other lot of Antonio Quimen, Lot No.
1448-B-6-B, located directly behind the property of her parents who provided her a
pathway gratis et amore between their house, extending about nineteen (19) meters
from the lot of Yolanda behind the sari-sari store of Sotero, and Anastacias perimeter
fence. The store is made of strong materials and occupies the entire frontage of the
lot measuring four (4) meters wide and nine meters (9) long. Although the pathway
leads to the municipal road it is not adequate for ingress and egress. The municipal
road cannot be reached with facility because the store itself obstructs the path so
that one has to pass through the back entrance and the facade of the store to reach
the road.
On 29 December 1987 Yolanda filed an action with the proper court praying for
a right of way through Anastacia s property. An ocular inspection upon instruction of
the presiding judge was conducted by the branch clerk of court. The report was that
the proposed right of way was at the extreme right of Anastacias property facing the
public highway, starting from the back of Soteros sari-sari store and extending inward
by one (1) meter to her property and turning left for about five (5) meters to avoid
the store of Sotero in order to reach the municipal road [3]and the way was
unobstructed except for an avocado tree standing in the middle.[4]
But on 5 September 1991 the trial court dismissed the complaint for lack of
cause of action, explaining that the right of way through Soteros property was a
straight path and to allow a detour by cutting through Anastacias property would no
longer make the path straight. Hence the trial court concluded that it was more
practical to extend the existing pathway to the public road by removing that portion
of the store blocking the path as that was the shortest route to the public road and
the least prejudicial to the parties concerned than passing through Anastacias
property.[5]
On appeal by respondent Yolanda, the Court of Appeals reversed the lower
court and held that she was entitled to a right of way on petitioners property and
that the way proposed by Yolanda would cause the least damage and detriment to
the servient estate.[6] The appellate court however did not award damages to private
respondent as petitioner did not act in bad faith in resisting the claim.
Petitioner now comes to us imputing ERROR to respondent Court of Appeals:
(a) in disregarding the agreement of the parties; (b) in considering petitioners
property as a servient estate despite the fact that it does not abut or adjoin the
property of private respondent; and, (c) in holding that the one-meter by five-meter
passage way proposed by private respondent is the least prejudicial and the shortest
distance to the public road.
 Incidentally, petitioner denies having promised private respondent a right of
way. She claims that her agreement with private respondent was to provide the latter
with a right of way on the other lot of Antonio Quimen under her administration
when it was not yet sold to private respondent. Petitioner insists that passing through
the property of Yolandas parents is more accessible to the public road than to make
a detour to her property and cut down the avocado tree standing thereon.
Petitioner further argues that when Yolanda purchased Lot No. 1448-B-6-B in
1986 the easement of right of way she provided her (petitioner) was ipso
jure extinguished as a result of the merger of ownership of the dominant and the
servient estates in one person so that there was no longer any compelling reason to
provide private respondent with a right of way as there are other surrounding lots
suitable for the purpose. Petitioner strongly maintains that the proposed right of way
is not the shortest access to the public road because of the detour and that,
moreover, she is likely to suffer the most damage as she derives a net income of
P600.00 per year from the sale of the fruits of her avocado tree, and considering that
an avocado has an average life span of seventy (70) years, she expects a substantial
earning from it.[7]
But we find no cogent reason to disturb the ruling of respondent appellate court
granting a right of way to private respondent through petitioners property. In fact, as
between petitioner Anastacia and respondent Yolanda their agreement has already
been rendered moot insofar as it concerns the determination of the principal issue
herein presented. The voluntary easement in favor of private respondent, which
petitioner now denies but which the court is inclined to believe, has in fact become
a legal easement or an easement by necessity constituted by law. [8]
As defined, an easement is a real right on anothers property, corporeal and
immovable, whereby the owner of the latter must refrain from doing or allowing
somebody else to do or something to be done on his property, for the benefit of
another person or tenement.[9] It is jus in re aliena, inseparable, indivisible and
perpetual, unless extinguished by causes provided by law. A right of way in particular
is a privilege constituted by covenant or granted by law[10] to a person or class of
persons to pass over anothers property when his tenement is surrounded by realties
belonging to others without an adequate outlet to the public highway. The owner of
the dominant estate can demand a right of way through the servient estate provided
he indemnifies the owner thereof for the beneficial use of his property. [11]
The conditions sine qua non for a valid grant of an easement of right of way are:
(a) the dominant estate is surrounded by other immovables without an adequate
outlet to a public highway; (b) the dominant estate is willing to pay the proper
indemnity; (c) the isolation was not due to the acts of the dominant estate; and, (d)
the right of way being claimed is at a point least prejudicial to the servient estate. [12]
A cursory examination of the complaint of respondent Yolanda for a right of
way[13] readily shows that
[E]ven before the purchase of the said parcels of land the plaintiff was reluctant to
purchase the same for they are enclosed with permanent improvements like a
concrete fence and store and have (sic) no egress leading to the road but because
of the assurance of the defendant that plaintiff will be provided one (1) meter wide
and five (5) meters long right of way in the sum of P200.00 per square meter to be
taken from Anastacias lot at the side of a concrete store until plaintiff reach(es) her
fathers land, plaintiff was induced to buy the aforesaid parcels of land x x x. That
the aforesaid right of way is the shortest, most convenient and the least onerous
leading to the road and being used by the plaintiffs predecessors-in-interest from
the very inception x x x.
The evidence clearly shows that the property of private respondent is hemmed
in by the estates of other persons including that of petitioner; that she offered to pay
P200.00 per square meter for her right of way as agreed between her and petitioner;
that she did not cause the isolation of her property; that the right of way is the least
prejudicial to the servient estate.[14]These facts are confirmed in the ocular inspection
report of the clerk of court, more so that the trial court itself declared that [t]he said
properties of Antonio Quimen which were purchased by plaintiff Yolanda Quimen
Oliveros were totally isolated from the public highway and there appears an
imperative need for an easement of right of way to the public highway. [15]
Petitioner finally insists that respondent court erroneously concluded that the
right of way proposed by private respondent is the least onerous to the parties. We
cannot agree. Article 650 of the New Civil Code explicitly states that the easement of
right of way shall be established at the point least prejudicial to the servient estate
and, insofar as consistent with this rule, where the distance from the dominant estate
to a public highway may be the shortest. The criterion of least prejudice to the
servient estate must prevail over the criterion of shortest distance although this is a
matter ofjudicial appreciation. While shortest distance may ordinarily imply least
prejudice, it is not always so as when there are permanent structures obstructing
the shortest distance; while on the other hand, the longest distance may be free of
obstructions and the easiest or most convenient to pass through. In other words,
where the easement may be established on any of several tenements surrounding
the dominant estate, the one where the way is shortest and will cause the least
damage should be chosen. However, as elsewhere stated, if these two (2)
circumstances do not concur in a single tenement, the way which will cause the least
damage should be used, even if it will not be the shortest.[16] This is the test.
In the trial court, petitioner openly admitted -
Q. You testified during your direct examination about this plan, kindly go over this
and please point to us in what portion of this plan is the house or store of the father
of the (plaintiff)?
A. This one, sir (witness pointed a certain portion located near the proposed right property of Yolanda s father which would mean destroying the sari-sari store made
of way). of strong materials. Absent any showing that these findings and conclusion are
devoid of factual support in the records, or are so glaringly erroneous, this Court
xxx xxx xxx accepts and adopts them. As between a right of way that would demolish a store of
strong materials to provide egress to a public highway, and another right of way
Q. Now, you will agree with me x x x that this portion is the front portion which although longer will only require an avocado tree to be cut down, the second
of the lot owned by the father of the plaintiff and which was (sic) alternative should be preferred. After all, it is not the main function of this Court to
occupied by a store made up of strong materials? analyze or weigh the evidence presented all over again where the petition would
A. It is not true, sir. necessarily invite calibration of the whole evidence considering primarily the
credibility of witnesses, existence and relevancy of specific surrounding
Q. What materials does (sic) this store of the father of the plaintiff made circumstances, their relation to each other, and the probabilities of the
of? situation.[18] In sum, this Court finds that the decision of respondent appellate court
is thoroughly backed up by law and the evidence.
A. Hollow blocks and the side is made of wood, sir.
WHEREFORE, no reversible error having been committed by respondent Court
xxx xxx xxx
of Appeals, the petition is DENIED and the decision subject of review is AFFIRMED.
Q. Just before your brother disposed that 1/2 portion of the lot in Costs against petitioner.
question, what right of way does (sic) he use in reaching the public
SO ORDERED.
road, kindly point to this sketch that he is (sic) using in reaching the
public road?
A. In my property, sir.
Q. Now you will agree with me x x x the main reason why your brother is
(sic) using this property is because there was a store located near
this portion?
A. Yes, and according to the father of Yolanda there is no other way than
this, sir.[17]
The trial court found that Yolandas property was situated at the back of her
fathers property and held that there existed an available space of about nineteen (19)
meters long which could conveniently serve as a right of way between the boundary
line and the house of Yolanda s father; that the vacant space ended at the left back
of Soteros store which was made of strong materials; that this explained why Yolanda
requested a detour to the lot of Anastacia and cut an opening of one (1) meter wide
and five (5) meters long to serve as her right of way to the public highway. But
notwithstanding its factual observations, the trial court concluded, although
erroneously, that Yolanda was not entitled to a right of way on petitioners property
since a detour through it would not make the line straight and would not be the route
shortest to the public highway.
In applying Art. 650 of the New Civil Code, respondent Court of Appeals declared
that the proposed right of way of Yolanda, which is one (1) meter wide and
five (5) meters long at the extreme right of petitioners property, will cause the least
prejudice and/or damage as compared to the suggested passage through the
[G.R. NO. 130845. November 27, 2000]
BRYAN U. VILLANUEVA, petitioner, vs. HON. TIRSO D.C. VELASCO in his capacity as
Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 88,
JULIO N. SEBASTIAN and SHIRLEY LORILLA, respondents.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
This petition for certiorari assails (1) the decision[1] dated December 27, 1996 of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 39166, dismissing petitioners petition for
review under Rule 65 with prayer for the issuance of a cease and desist order and/or
temporary restraining order, and (2) the resolution [2]dated August 14, 1997 denying
the subsequent motion for reconsideration.
Petitioner Bryan Villanueva is the registered owner of the parcel of land covered
by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 127862 of the Register of Deeds of Quezon City. He
bought it from Pacific Banking Corporation, the mortgagee of said property. The bank
had acquired it from the spouses Maximo and Justina Gabriel at a public auction on
March 19, 1983. When petitioner bought the parcel of land there was a small house
on its southeastern portion. It occupied one meter of the two-meter wide easement
of right of way the Gabriel spouses granted to the Espinolas, predecessors-in-interest
of private respondents, in a Contract of Easement of Right of Way. The pertinent
portion of the contract dated November 28, 1979, states:
. . . in order to have an access to and from their aforementioned land where their
houses are constructed and to have an outlet to Tandang Sora Ave. which is the
nearest public road and the least burdensome to the servient estate and to third
persons, it would be necessary for them to pass through spouses MAXIMO GABRIEL
and JUSTINA CAPUNOs land and for this purpose, a path or passageway of not less
than two (2) meters wide of said spouses property is necessary for the use
of ROMEO, RODOLFO, NENITA and AURORA ESPINOLA and for all their needs in
entering their property.
xxx
WHEREFORE, in view of the fact that the property of the ESPINOLA had been
bought by them from MAXIMO CAPUNO, father of MAXIMO GABRIEL, spouses
MAXIMO GABRIEL and JUSTINA CAPUNO hereby agree and permit RODOLFO,
ROMEO, NENITA and AURORA ESPINOLA and their families to have a permanent
easement of right of way over the aforementioned property of said spouses limited
to not more than two meters wide, throughout the whole length of the southeast
side of said property and as specifically indicated in the attached plan which is made
an integral part of this Contract as Annex A;
This Agreement shall be binding between the parties and upon their heirs,
successors, assigns, without prejudice in cases of sale of subject property that will
warrant the circumstances.[3]
Unknown to petitioner, even before he bought the land, the Gabriels had
constructed the aforementioned small house that encroached upon the two-meter
easement. Petitioner was also unaware that private respondents, Julio Sebastian and
Shirley Lorilla, had filed on May 8, 1991, Civil Case No. Q-91-8703, for easement,
damages and with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction and/or restraining order
against the spouses Gabriel.[4] As successors-in-interest, Sebastian and Lorilla wanted
to enforce the contract of easement.
On May 15, 1991, the trial court issued a temporary restraining order. On
August 13, 1991, it issued a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction ordering the
Gabriels to provide the right of way and to demolish the small house encroaching on
the easement. On August 15, 1991, the Gabriels filed a motion for reconsideration
which was also denied. Thus, they filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of
Appeals.
On March 26, 1992, the Eighth Division of the Court of Appeals dismissed the
petition and upheld the RTCs issuances. The decision became final and executory on
July 31, 1992.[5]
On January 5, 1995, Judge Tirso Velasco of the RTC in Quezon City, Branch 88,
issued an Alias Writ of Demolition. On June 20, 1995, the sheriff tried to demolish the
small house pursuant to the writ. Petitioner filed a Third Party Claim with Prayer to
Quash Alias Writ of Demolition. He maintains that the writ of demolition could not
apply to his property since he was not a party to the civil case. His Third Party Claim
with prayer to quash the writ of demolition was denied for lack of merit on August
16, 1995.[6] The motion for reconsideration as well as the Supplemental Motion for
Reconsideration dated September 12, 1995 were denied on October 19, 1995.[7]
Petitioner, thereafter, filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals,
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 39166, asserting that the existence of the easement of
right of way was not annotated in his title and that he was not a party to Civil Case
No. Q-91-8703, hence the contract of easement executed by the Gabriels in favor of
the Espinolas could not be enforced against him. The Court of Appeals dismissed the
petition for lack of merit and denied the reconsideration, disposing thus:
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby dismissed by this court for lack of merit.
No costs considering the failure of private respondents to file their comment,
despite notice.[8]
Hence, this instant petition.
Petitioner now avers that the appellate court erred in declaring,
(1) THAT FOLLOWING THE ESSENCE OF INHERENCE AND INTRANSMISSIBILITY OF AN
EASEMENT, A RIGHT OF WAY CAN EXIST EVEN IF THEY ARE NOT EXPRESSLY STATED
OR ANNOTATED ON THE TORRENS TITLE;
(2) THAT PETITIONER, AS PROSPECTIVE BUYER, SHOULD HAVE EXERCISED
ORDINARY PRUDENCE BY TAKING THE INITIATIVE TO DETERMINE THAT AN
EASEMENT HAS BEEN CONSTITUTED ON THE PROPERTY HE INTENDS TO BUY; AND,
(3) THAT IN AS MUCH AS THE HEREIN PETITIONER IS NOT A PARTY TO CIVIL CASE
NO. Q-91-8703, HE CANNOT BE BOUND BY ANY JUDGMENT OR ORDER RENDERED
THEREIN.[9]
Primarily, the issue is whether the easement on the property binds petitioner.
Petitioner argues it could not be enforced against him. First, he says that a right
of way cannot exist when it is not expressly stated or annotated on
the Torrens title. According to him, even if an easement is inherent and inseparable
from the estate to which it actively belongs as provided in Art. 617 of the Civil
Code,[10] the same is extinguished when the servient estate is registered and the
easement was not annotated in said title conformably with Section 39 of the Land
Registration Law. Second, petitioner points out that the trial court erred when it
faulted him for relying solely on the clean title of the property he bought, as it is well-
settled that a person dealing with registered land is not required to go beyond what
is recorded in the title. He adds that it is private respondents who should have made
sure their right of way was safeguarded by having the same annotated on the title
with the Register of Deeds. He adds that Section 76 of P.D. No. 1529[11] also requires
that when a case is commenced involving any right to registered land under the Land
Registration Law (now the Property Registration Decree), any decision on it will only
be effectual between or among the parties thereto, unless a notice of lis pendens of
such action is filed and registered in the registry office where the land is
recorded. There was no such annotation in the title of the disputed land, according
to petitioner. Lastly, since he was not a party to Civil Case No. Q-91-8703, petitioner
argues that he cannot be bound by the writ of demolition and be forcibly divested of
a portion of his land without having his day in court.
Private respondents Sebastian and Lorilla, for their part, adopted the
disquisition of the appellate court as their Comment and asked for the dismissal of
the petition and P100,000.00 in damages. In its decision the appellate court, citing
the decision of the lower court, stressed that unlike other types of encumbrance of
real property, a servitude like a right of way can exist even if they are not expressly
stated or annotated as an encumbrance in a Torrens title because servitudes are
inseparable from the estates to which they actively or passively belong. Moreover,
Villanueva was bound by the contract of easement, not only as a voluntary easement
but as a legal easement. A legal easement is mandated by law, and continues to
exists unless its removal is provided for in a title of conveyance or the sign of the
easement is removed before the execution of the conveyance conformably with
Article 649[12]in accordance with Article 617[13] of the Civil Code.
At the outset, we note that the subject easement (right of way) originally was
voluntarily constituted by agreement between the Gabriels and the Espinolas. But as
correctly observed by the Court of Appeals, the easement in the instant petition is
both (1) an easement by grant or a voluntary easement, and (2) an easement by
necessity or a legal easement. A legal easement is one mandated by law, constituted
for public use or for private interest, and becomes a continuing property right.[14] As
a compulsory easement, it is inseparable from the estate to which it belongs, as
provided for in said Article 617 of the Civil Code. The essential requisites for an
easement to be compulsory are: (1) the dominant estate is surrounded by other
immovables and has no adequate outlet to a public highway; (2) proper indemnity
has been paid; (3) the isolation was not due to acts of the proprietor of the dominant
estate; (4) the right of way claimed is at a point least prejudicial to the servient estate;
and (5) to the extent consistent with the foregoing rule, where the distance from the
dominant estate to a public highway may be the shortest.[15] The trial court and the
Court of Appeals have declared the existence of said easement (right of way). This
finding of fact of both courts below is conclusive on this Court, [16] hence we see no
need to further review, but only to re-affirm, this finding. The small house occupying
one meter of the two-meter wide easement obstructs the entry of private
respondents cement mixer and motor vehicle. One meter is insufficient for the needs
of private respondents. It is well-settled that the needs of the dominant estate
determine the width of the easement.[17] Conformably then, petitioner ought to
demolish whatever edifice obstructs the easement in view of the needs of private
respondents estate.
Petitioners second proposition, that he is not bound by the contract of
easement because the same was not annotated in the title and that a notice of lis
pendens of the complaint to enforce the easement was not recorded with the
Register of Deeds, is obviously unmeritorious. As already explained, it is in the nature
of legal easement that the servient estate (of petitioner) is legally bound to provide
the dominant estate (of private respondents in this case) ingress from and egress to
the public highway.
 Petitioners last argument that he was not a party to Civil Case No. Q-91-8703
and that he had not been given his day in court, is also without merit. Rule 39, Sec.
47, of the Revised Rules of Court:

SEC. 47. Effect of judgments or final orders. The effect of a judgment or final order
rendered by a court of the Philippines, having jurisdiction to pronounce the
judgment or final order, may be as follows:

(a) In case of a judgment or final order against a specific thing, or in respect to the
probate of a will, or the administration of the estate of a deceased person, or in
respect to the personal, political, or legal condition or status of a particular person
or his relationship to another, the judgment or final order is conclusive upon the
title to the thing, the will or administration, or the condition, status or relationship
of the person; however, the probate of a will or granting of letters of administration
shall only be prima facie evidence of the death of the testator or intestate;

(b) In other cases, the judgment or final order is, with respect to the matter directly
adjudged or as to any other matter that could have been raised in relation
thereto, conclusive between the parties and their successors in interest by title
subsequent to the commencement of the action or special proceeding, litigating
for the same thing and under the same title and in the same capacity; and

(c) In any other litigation between the same parties or their successors in interest,
that only is deemed to have been adjudged in a former judgment or final order
which appears upon its face to have been so adjudged, or which was actually and
necessarily included therein or necessary thereto. (Emphasis ours).

Simply stated, a decision in a case is conclusive and binding upon the parties to
said case and those who are their successor in interest by title after said case has
been commenced or filed in court.[18] In this case, private respondents, Julio
Sebastian and Shirley Lorilla, initiated Civil Case No. Q-91-8703 on May 8,
1991,[19] against the original owners, the spouses Maximo and Justina Gabriel. Title
in the name of petitioner was entered in the Register of Deeds[20] on March 24, 1995,
after he bought the property from the bank which had acquired it from the
Gabriels. Hence, the decision in Civil Case No. Q-91-8703 binds petitioner. For,
although not a party to the suit, he is a successor-in-interest by title subsequent to
the commencement of the action in court.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The assailed decision and
resolution of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
 THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 77628 March 11, 1991
TOMAS ENCARNACION, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and THE INTESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE
EUSEBIO DE SAGUN and THE HEIRS OF THE LATE ANICETA MAGSINO VIUDA DE
SAGUN,* respondents.
FERNAN, C.J.:
Presented for resolution in the instant petition for review is the not-so-usual
question of whether or not petitioner is entitled to a widening of an already existing
easement of right-of-way. Both the trial court and the Appellate Court ruled that
petitioner is not so entitled, hence the recourse to this Court. We reverse.
The facts are undisputed.
Petitioner Tomas Encarnacion and private respondent Heirs of the late Aniceta
Magsino Viuda de Sagun are the owners of two adjacent estates situated in Buco,
Talisay, Batangas. ** Petitioner owns the dominant estate which has an area of
2,590 square meters and bounded on the North by Eusebio de Sagun and Mamerto
Magsino, on the south by Taal Lake, on the East by Felino Matienzo and on the
West by Pedro Matienzo. Private respondents co-own the 405-square-meter
servient estate which is bounded on the North by the National Highway (Laurel-
Talisay Highway), on the South by Tomas Encarnacion, on the East by Mamerto
Magsino and on the West by Felipe de Sagun. In other words, the servient estate
stands between the dominant estate and the national road.
Prior to 1960, when the servient estate was not yet enclosed with a concrete fence,
persons going to the national highway just crossed the servient estate at no
particular point. However, in 1960 when private respondents constructed a fence
around the servient estate, a roadpath measuring 25 meters long and about a
meter wide was constituted to provide access to the highway. One-half meter width
of the path was taken from the servient estate and the other one-half meter
portion was taken from another lot owned by Mamerto Magsino. No compensation
was asked and non was given for the portions constituting the pathway.1
It was also about that time that petitioner started his plant nursery business on his
land where he also had his abode. He would use said pathway as passage to the
highway for his family and for his customers.
Petitioner's plant nursery business through sheer hard work flourished and with
that, it became more and more difficult for petitioner to haul the plants and garden
soil to and from the nursery and the highway with the use of pushcarts. In January,
1984, petitioner was able to buy an owner-type jeep which he could use for
transporting his plants. However, that jeep could not pass through the roadpath
and so he approached the servient estate owners (Aniceta Vda. de Sagun and Elena
Romero Vda. de Sagun) and requested that they sell to him one and one-half (1 1/2)
meters of their property to be added to the existing pathway so as to allow passage
for his jeepney. To his utter consternation, his request was turned down by the two
widows and further attempts at negotiation proved futile.
Petitioner then instituted an action before the Regional Trial Court of Batangas,
Branch 6 (Tanauan) to seek the issuance of a writ of easement of a right of way over
an additional width of at least two (2) meters over the De Saguns' 405-square-meter
parcel of land.2
During the trial, the attention of the lower court was called to the existence of
another exit to the highway, only eighty (80) meters away from the dominant
estate. On December 2, 1985, the lower court rendered judgment dismissing
petitioner's complaint. It ruled:
It is clear, therefore, that plaintiff at present has two outlets to the highway: one,
through the defendants' land on a one meter wide passageway, which is bounded
on both sides by concrete walls and second, through the dried river bed eighty
meters away. The plaintiff has an adequate outlet to the highway through the dried
river bed where his jeep could pass.
The reasons given for his claim that the one-meter passageway through defendants'
land be widened to two and one-half meters to allow the passage of his jeep,
destroying in the process one of the concrete fences and decreasing defendants'
already small parcel to only about 332.5 square meters, just because it is nearer to
the highway by 25 meters compared to the second access of 80 meters or a
difference of only 65 meters and that passage through defendants' land is more
convenient for his (plaintiffs) business and family use are not among the conditions
specified by Article 649 of the Civil Code to entitle the plaintiff to a right of way for
the passage of his jeep through defendant's land.3
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court on January
28, 1987 and rejected petitioner's claim for an additional easement.
In sustaining the trial court, the Court of Appeals opined that the necessity
interposed by petitioner was not compelling enough to justify interference with the
property rights of private respondents. The Appellate Court took into consideration
the presence of a dried river bed only eighty (80) meters away from the dominant
estate and conjectured that petitioner might have actually driven his jeep through
the river bed in order to get to the highway, and that the only reason why he
wanted a wider easement through the De Sagun's estate was that it was more
convenient for his business and family needs.
After evaluating the evidence presented in the case, the Court finds that petitioner
has sufficiently established his claim for an additional easement of right of way,
contrary to the conclusions of the courts a quo.
While there is a dried river bed less than 100 meters from the dominant tenement,
that access is grossly inadequate.1âwphi1 Generally, the right of way may be
demanded: (1) when there is absolutely no access to a public highway, and (2)
when, even if there is one, it is difficult or dangerous to use or is grossly insufficient.
In the present case, the river bed route is traversed by a semi-concrete bridge and
there is no ingress nor egress from the highway. For the jeep to reach the level of
the highway, it must literally jump four (4) to five (5) meters up. Moreover, during
the rainy season, the river bed is impassable due to the floods. Thus, it can only be
used at certain times of the year. With the inherent disadvantages of the river bed
which make passage difficult, if not impossible, it is if there were no outlet at all.
Where a private property has no access to a public road, it has the right of
easement over adjacent servient estates as a matter of law.4
With the non-availability of the dried river bed as an alternative route to the
highway, we transfer our attention to the existing pathway which straddles the
adjoining properties of the De Sagun heirs and Mamerto Magsino.
The courts below have taken against petitioner his candid admission in open court
that he needed a wider pathway for the convenience of his business and family.
(TSN, August 2, 1985, pp. 24-26). We cannot begrudge petitioner for wanting that
which is convenient. But certainly that should not detract from the more pressing
consideration that there is a real and compelling need for such servitude in his
favor.
Article 651 of the Civil Code provides that "(t)he width of the easement of right of
way shall be that which is sufficient for the needs of the dominant estate, and may
accordingly be changed from time to time." This is taken to mean that under the
law, it is the needs of the dominant property which ultimately determine the width
of the passage. And these needs may vary from time to time. When petitioner
started out as a plant nursery operator, he and his family could easily make do with
a few pushcarts to tow the plants to the national highway. But the business grew
and with it the need for the use of modern means of conveyance or transport.
Manual hauling of plants and garden soil and use of pushcarts have become
extremely cumbersome and physically taxing. To force petitioner to leave his
jeepney in the highway, exposed to the elements and to the risk of theft simply
because it could not pass through the improvised pathway, is sheer pigheadedness
on the part of the servient estate and can only be counter-productive for all the
people concerned. Petitioner should not be denied a passageway wide enough to
accomodate his jeepney since that is a reasonable and necessary aspect of the plant
nursery business.
We are well aware that an additional one and one-half (1 1/2) meters in the width
of the pathway will reduce the servient estate to only about 342.5 square meters.
But petitioner has expressed willingness to exchange an equivalent portion of his
land to compensate private respondents for their loss. Perhaps, it would be well for
respondents to take the offer of petitioner seriously. 5 But unless and until that
option is considered, the law decrees that petitioner must indemnify the owners of
the servient estate including Mamerto Magsino from whose adjoining lot 1/2 meter
was taken to constitute the original path several years ago. Since the easement to
be established in favor of petitioner is of a continuous and permanent nature, the
indemnity shall consist of the value of the land occupied and the amount of the
damage caused to the servient estate pursuant to Article 649 of the Civil Code
which states in part:
Art. 649. The owner, or any person who by virtue of a real right may cultivate or use
any immovable, which is surrounded by other immovables pertaining to other
persons and without adequate outlet to a public highway, is entitled to demand a
right of way through the neighboring estates, after payment of the proper
indemnity.
Should this easement be established in such a manner that its use may be
continuous for all the needs of the dominant estate, establishing a permanent
passage, the indemnity shall consist of the value of the land occupied and the
amount of the damage caused to the servient estate.
WHEREFORE, in conformity with the foregoing discussion, the appealed decision of
the Court of Appeals dated January 28, 1987 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner
Tomas Encarnacion is hereby declared entitled to an additional easement of right of
way of twenty-five (25) meters long by one and one-half (1 1/2) meters wide over
the servient estate or a total area of 62.5 square meters after payment of the
proper indemnity.SO ORDERED.
 us at our entire satisfaction by spouses VICTOR and JOECELYN [sic]
VALDEZ, both of legal age, Filipinos and residents of 148 P. Burgos
SPOUSES VICTOR VALDEZ AND JOCELYN VALDEZ, G.R. No. 175510 St., San Fernando, La Union, receipt of which is hereby
represented by their Attorney-In-Fact, VIRGILIO acknowledged, do hereby SELL, CONVEY and TRANSFER by way of
VALDEZ, Present: absolute sale unto the said spouses Victor and Joecelyn Valdez,
Petitioners, their heirs and assigns, the TWO HUNDRED (200) SQUARE
QUISUMBING, J., Chairperson, METERS, EASTERN PORTION of the parcel of land above-described,
CARPIO MORALES, free from all liens and encumbrances.
- versus - TINGA,
VELASCO, JR., and xxxx
SPOUSES FRANCISCO TABISULA AND CARIDAD BRION, JJ.
TABISULA, That now and hereinafter, said VENDEE-SPOUSES VICTOR
Respondents. Promulgated: and JOECELYN [sic] VALDEZ shall be the absolute owners of the said
July 28, 2008 200 sq. meters, eastern portion and that we shall warrant and
forever defend their ownership of the same against the claims of
all persons whomsoever; they shall be provided a
2 1/2 meters [sic] wide road right-of-way on the western sideof
their lot but which is not included in this sale.

x x x.x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Respondents subsequently built a concrete wall on the western side of the

CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Petitioner-spouses Victor and Jocelyn Valdez purchased via a January 11,
1993 Deed of Absolute Sale[1] (the deed) from respondent-spouses
Francisco Tabisula and Caridad Tabisula a 200 square meter (sq.m.) portion (the
subject property) of a 380 sq. m. parcel of land located in San Fernando, La Union,
which 380 sq.m. parcel of land is more particularly described in the deed as follows:
subject property.[2] Believing that that side is the intended road right of way
mentioned in the deed, petitioners, through their representative, reported the
matter to the barangay for mediation and conciliation. Respondents failed to attend
the conferences scheduled by the barangay, however, drawing petitioners to file in
April 1999 or more than six years after the execution of the deed a Complaint for
Specific Performance with Damages[3] against respondents before the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of San Fernando City, La Union.

A parcel of land classified as residential lot, bounded on
the North by Lot No. 25569, on the East, by Lot No. 247, 251, on
the South, by a Creek and on the West, by Lot No. 223-A, declared
under Tax Decl. No. 52820, with an area of 380 square meters,
more or less, and assessed at P 17100.00 for the current year. It is
not registered under Act 496 nor under the Spanish Mortgage
Law. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The pertinent portions of the deed read:
xxxx
That for and in consideration of the sum of SEVENTY
THOUSAND (P70,000.00) PESOS, Philippine Currencyp [sic] paid to
In their complaint, petitioners alleged that they purchased the subject
property on the strength of respondents assurance of providing them a road right of
way. They thus prayed that respondents be ordered to provide the subject property
with a 2-meter wide easement and to remove the concrete wall blocking the same.[4]
Respondents, in their Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim (for damages and
attorneys fees),[5] averred that the 2 -meter easement should be taken from the
western portion of the subject property and not from theirs;[6] and petitioners and
their family are also the owners of two properties adjoining the subject property,
which adjoining properties have access to two public roads or highways the bigger
one which adjoins P. Burgos St. on the north, and the smaller one which abuts an
existing barangay road on the north.[7]
Respondents further averred that they could not have agreed to providing petitioners
an easement on the western side of their lot as there exists a two-storey concrete
house on their lot where the supposed easement is to be located, which was erected
long before the subject property was sold to petitioners. [8] In support of this claim,
respondents submitted a February 20, 2003 letter from the City Engineers Office.[9]
Branch 26 of the RTC of San Fernando dismissed petitioners complaint and granted
respondents Counterclaim by Decision[10] of March 18, 2005, the dispositive portion
of which reads:
WHEREFORE, and in view of all the foregoing, judgment is
hereby rendered finding the defendants as against the plaintiffs
and hereby orders the Complaint dismissed for being
unmeritorious and plaintiffs are hereby ordered to pay the
defendants, the following:
1) P100,000.00 as moral damages;
2) P50,000.00 as exemplary damages;
3) P50,000.00 as attorneys fees;
4) P30,000.00 as expenses of litigation; and
5) To pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.[11] (Underscoring supplied)
On appeal by petitioners, the Court of Appeals, by Decision of May 29,
2006,[12] affirmed that of the trial court, it holding that the deed only conveyed
ownership of the subject property to petitioners, and that the reference therein to
an easement in favor of petitioners is not a definite grant-basis of a voluntary
easement of right of way.[13]
The appellate court went on to hold that petitioners are neither entitled to
a legal or compulsory easement of right of way as they failed to present
circumstances justifying their entitlement to it under Article 649 of the Civil Code. [14]
Petitioners motion for reconsideration[15] having been denied by the Court of Appeals
by Resolution of November 15, 2006, they filed the present petition for review on
certiorari faulting the trial [sic] court
I. . . . IN RULING THAT THE RIGHT OF WAY IS NOT PART OF
THE ABSOLUTE DEED OF SALE DATED JANUARY 11, 1993;
II. . . . IN RULING THAT THE PROVISION OF THE ABSOLUTE
DEED OF SALE GRANTING A RIGHT OF WAY IS VAGUE AND
OBSCURE;
III. . . . IN AWARDING MORAL AND EXEMPLARY
DAMAGES TO THE RESPONDENTS.[16] (Underscoring supplied)
An easement or servitude is a real right constituted on anothers property, corporeal
and immovable, by virtue of which the owner of the same has to abstain from doing
or to allow somebody else to do something on his property for the benefit of another
thing or person.[17] The statutory basis of this right is Article 613 of the Civil Code
which reads:
Art. 613. An easement or servitude is an encumbrance
imposed upon an immovable for the benefit of another immovable
belonging to a different owner.
The immovable in favor of which the easement is
established is called the dominant estate; that which is subject
thereto, the servient estate.
There are two kinds of easements according to source by law or by the will
of the owners. So Article 619 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 619. Easements are established either by law or by
the will of the owners. The former are called legal and the latter
voluntary easements.
From the allegations in petitioners complaint, it is clear that what they seek to
enforce is an alleged grant in the deed by respondents of an easement reading: they
shall be provided a 2 meters wide road right-of-way on the western side of their lot
but which is not included in this sale.
Article 1358 of the Civil Code provides that any transaction involving the sale or
disposition of real property must be in writing.[18] The stipulation harped upon by
petitioners that they shall be provided a 2 meters wide road right-of-way on the
western side of their lot but which is not included in this sale is not a disposition of
real property. The proviso that the intended grant of right of way is not included in
this sale could only mean that the parties would have to enter into a separate and
distinct agreement for the purpose.[19]The use of the word shall, which is imperative
or mandatory in its ordinary signification, should be construed as merely permissive
where, as in the case at bar, no public benefit or private right requires it to be given
an imperative meaning.[20]
Besides, a document stipulating a voluntary easement must be recorded in the
Registry of Property in order not to prejudice third parties. So Articles 708 and 709 of
the Civil Code call for, viz:
Art. 708. The Registry of Property has for its object the
inscription or annotation of acts and contracts relating to the
ownership and other rights over immovable property.
Art. 709. The titles of ownership, or of other rights over
immovable property, which are not duly inscribed or annotated in
the Registry of Property shall not prejudice third persons.
Petitioners are neither entitled to a legal or compulsory easement of right
of way. For to be entitled to such kind of easement, the preconditions under Articles
649 and 650 of the Civil Code must be established, viz:
Art. 649. The owner, or any person who by virtue of a real
right may cultivate or use any immovable, which is surrounded by
other immovables pertaining to other persons, and without
adequate outlet to a public highway, is entitled to demand a right
of way through the neighboring estates, after payment of the
proper indemnity.
xxxx
This easement is not compulsory if the isolation of the
immovable is due to the proprietors own acts. (Underscoring
supplied)
Art. 650. The easement of right of way shall be
established at the point least prejudicial to the servient estate,
and, insofar as consistent with this rule, where the distance from
the dominant estate to a public highway may be the
shortest. (Underscoring supplied)
Thus, to be conferred a legal easement of right of way under Article 649, the following
requisites must be complied with: (1) the property is surrounded by
other immovables and has no adequate outlet to a public highway; (2) proper
indemnity must be paid; (3) the isolation is not the result of the owner of the
dominant estates own acts; (4) the right of way claimed is at the point least
prejudicial to the servient estate; and (5) to the extent consistent with the foregoing
rule, the distance from the dominant estate to a public highway may be the
shortest.[21] The onus of proving the existence of these prerequisites lies on the
owner of the dominant estate,[22] herein petitioners.
As found, however, by the trial court, which is supported by the Sketch[23] (Exhibit B;
Exhibit 1) of the location of the lots of the parties and those adjoining them,
a common evidence of the parties, petitioners and their family are also the owners
of two properties adjoining the subject property which have access to two public
roads or highways.[24]
Since petitioners then have more than adequate passage to two public roads, they
have no right to demand the grant by respondents of an easement on the western
side of [respondents] lot.
It may not be amiss to note at this juncture that at the time the deed was executed
in 1993, the barangay road-Exhibit 1-G, by which petitioners could access Burgos
Street-Exhibit 1-F, was not yet in existence; and that the Interior Street-Exhibit 1-H,
which petitioners via this case seek access to with a right of way, was still
a creek,[25] as reflected in the earlier-quoted particular description of respondents
parcel of land from which the subject property originally formed part.
Respecting the grant of damages in favor of respondents by the trial court which was
affirmed by the appellate court, the Court finds the same baseless.
To merit an award of moral damages, there must be proof of moral
suffering, mental anguish, fright and the like. It is not enough that one suffers
sleepless nights, mental anguish, serious anxiety as a result of the actuation of the
other party.[26] Invariably, such actuation must be shown by clear and convincing
evidence[27] to have been willfully done in bad faith or with ill-motive.
In respondents case, they predicated their Counterclaim for damages on general
allegations of sickness, humiliation and embarrassment, without establishing bad
faith, fraud or ill-motive on petitioners part.[28]
More importantly, respondents are precluded from filing any counterclaim in light of
Article 199 of Rule XXVI of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local
Government Code of 1991 reading:
 xxxx WHEREFORE, the May 29, 2006 Decision and November 15, 2006 Resolution of the
Court of Appeals are MODIFIED in that the grant of the Counterclaim of respondents,
ARTICLE 199. Penalty for Refusal or Failure of Any Party or Spouses Francisco Tabisula and Caridad Tabisula, is reversed and set aside. In all
Witness to Appear before the Lupon or Pangkat. Refusal or willful other respects, the challenged decision is AFFIRMED.
failure of any party or witness to appear before
the lupon or pangkat in compliance with summons issued pursuant
to this Rule may be punished by the city or municipal court as for
indirect contempt of court upon application filed therewith by Costs against petitioners.
the lupon chairman, the pangkat chairman, or by any of the
contending parties. Such refusal or willful failure to appear shall be SO ORDERED.
reflected in the records of the lupon secretary or in the minutes of
the pangkat secretary and shall bar the complainant who fails to
appear, from seeking judicial recourse for the same course of
action, and the respondent who refuses to appear, from filing any
counterclaim arising out of, or necessarily connected with the
complaint.

x x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

While respondent Caridad Tabisula claimed that she always appeared, when
summoned, before the barangay lupon,[29] the following Certificate to File
Action[30] belies the claim.

xxxx

This is to certify that respondents failed to appear for (2)

Mediation Proceeding before our Punong Barangay thus the
corresponding complaint may now be filed in court.

Issued this 24th day of November 1998 at the Multi Purpose

Hall, Barangay 1 City of San Fernando (LU).

x x x x (Underscoring supplied)

The award for moral damages being thus baseless, that for exemplary damages must
too be baseless.

As for the award of attorney's fees and expenses of litigation, respondents

have not shown their entitlement thereto in accordance with Article 2208 of the Civil
Code.
G.R. No. 106082 June 27, 1995
LORETO VDA. DE BALTAZAR and NESTOR BALTAZAR, petitioners, Immediately in front of the plaintiff's aforedescribed property is
vs. Residential Lot 1026 with an area of 119 square meters belonging
COURT OF APPEALS and DANIEL PANGANIBAN, respondents. to herein defendants. On this lot is constructed the residential
house of the defendants, immediately in front of which is the
provincial road. Running along one side of this property is a 1.20-
meter wide, 10.40 meter long passageway which the plaintiff
ROMERO, J.: claims to have previously made use of as an ingress to and egress
from his property in going to or coming from the provincial road,
until some three (3) years before he instituted the instant action
Petitioners assail the decision of the Court of Appeals which reversed the decision
when the defendants somehow prevented him from using the
of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 9, of Malolos and ordered petitioners to grant
same.
the right of way claimed by private respondent.

It is significant to note that, aside from the passageway which the

The instant petition for review on certiorari presents two issues for resolution,
plaintiff seeks to be established as a permanent easement, the
namely: (1) whether or not an easement of right of way can be granted to a person
property of the plaintiff is accessible to and from the provincial
who has two other existing passageways adjacent to his property which he is using
road via two (2) other passageways, viz:
in going to and from his property; and, (2) whether or not an easement of right of
way can be established through the alleged continuous use thereof in light of the
doctrine laid down by this Court in the case of Ronquillo v. Roco 1 which held that an 1) a passageway running immediately alongside
easement of right of way is discontinuous in nature since the dominant estate the concrete fence of the properties of plaintiff
cannot be continually crossing the servient estate but can do so only at intervals. and the defendants, over the properties of
Loreto Bernardo and Jose Legaspi. This
passageway ends in a gate which serves as a
Daniel Panganiban is the owner of a parcel of residential land consisting of 117
point of entry into or exit from the property of
square meters denominated as Lot no. 1027 located at Sta. Ines, Bulacan.
the plaintiff; and
Immediately to the front of said land is Lot 1026 of Loreto Vda. de Baltazar and her
son Nestor Baltazar. Immediately behind is the Sta. Ana River. On either side are
Lots 1025 and 1028 owned by Ricardo Calimon and Jose Legaspi, respectively. 2) a passageway similarly running alongside the
Braulio Street, a provincial road, runs along the frontage of Lots 1025, 1026 and opposite concrete fence of the properties of the
1028. plaintiff and the defendants, over the properties
of Encarnacion Calimon and Ricardo Calimon.
This passageway, which ends in a gate leading
Sometime in 1989, Daniel Panganiban filed a complaint against the Baltazars who
into the plaintiff's property, is the right of way
are owners of Lot 1026 for the establishment of a permanent and perpetual
presently availed of by the plaintiff.
easement of right of way for him to have access to the provincial road. In said
complaint, he prayed for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction.
Daniel Panganiban appealed to the Court of Appeals claiming that the court a
quo erred in dismissing the complaint for reasons of pragmatic considerations and
In their answer, petitioners opposed the prayer for the issuance of a writ of
in flagrant and clear violation of Articles 649 and 650 of the new Civil Code of the
preliminary injunction arguing that there exists two other rights of way adjacent to
Philippines.
private respondent's property. They likewise argue that private respondent had
abandoned the alleged right of way.
The Court of Appeals, in its assailed decision, 2 reversed the order of dismissal of the
court a quo and granted respondent's right of way. The dispositive portion of said
The court a quo, after conducting an ocular inspection and hearings for the issuance
decision states:
of the writ prayed for, dismissed the complaint based on the following findings:
 In view of the foregoing, the order appealed from is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Defendants-appellees are hereby
ordered to grant the right of way of plaintiff-appellant, designated
as Lot 1026-B, after payment of the proper indemnity, to be
determined after hearing in the Court below.
WHEREFORE, the case is hereby ordered remanded to the court of
origin for further proceedings.
SO ORDERED.
The Court of Appeals found the following based on the evidence on record:
1) Plaintiff-appellant's Lot 1027 (Exh. D) is bounded on the south
by Lot 1026-A, owned by defendants-appellees; on the north by
Sta. Ana River; on the east, by Lot 1025 (Legaspi's property); on
the west, by Lot 1028 (Calimon's property) [Exh. 3-T.D. No.
10998];
2) The only accessible road from Lot 1027 is Braulio Street. This
road runs across the frontage of Lot 1025, Lot 1026-A and Lot
1028;
3) The shortest, direct and convenient way to gain access as an
egress and ingress to said Braulio Street from the appellant's
dominant Lot 1027 is to pass through the appellees' servient
estate Lot 1026-A (Exhs. 4-G, A, B, B-1, and C);
4) That Lot 1026-B (Exh. 4-l) which is a strip of land and a portion
of appellees' Lot 1026-A, with steel gates (Exhs. I-1 and F-2), has
been existing, recognized, acknowledged, tolerated and used by
the appellant as a right of way for thirty (30) years during the
lifetime of appellees' grandfather, Fidel, and his father, Onisimo
Baltazar;
5) That it was closed and obstructed by the appellees when it
closed the gate and placed plants across the gate of Lot 1026-B,
when appellees constructed their present residence;
6) That appellant was compelled to request for a temporary
pathway on the eastern side, Lot 1025, and when it was closed, on
the western side, Lot 1028, of his Lot 1027.
It is worth noting that there is a discrepancy in the findings between the court a
quo and the Court of Appeals regarding the existence of two passageways from
respondent Panganiban's property to Braulio Street. The court a quo ruled that
while the passageway through petitioner Baltazar's property is the least prejudicial
to the servient estate and the shortest distance between respondent Panganiban's
property and the provincial road, the claimed easement cannot be granted due to
the strained relations between the parties. 3 The court a quo added that if the other
two passageways will no longer be available to respondent, then the claimed
easement of right of way over petitioner's property would be granted. 4 It appears
that the two passageways are simultaneously existing as alternative pathways for
respondent Panganiban.
The Court of Appeals, however, found that the two passageways mentioned were
mere temporary pathways which respondent Panganiban requested successively
from his two neighbors Calimon and Legaspi when petitioner Baltazar closed the
passageway through his property. When the path on the eastern side (Lot 1025)
was closed to the respondent, he was granted the use of the other on the western
side (Lot 1028). 5
The finding of the Court of Appeals that the existence of the two passageways was
not simultaneous and was granted by respondent's neighbors, Calimon and Legaspi
only upon respondent's request when petitioner Baltazar closed the claimed
passageway is supported by the evidence on record. 6
In light of the above findings of the Court of Appeals, the underlying issue begging
resolution is whether or not respondent Panganiban is entitled to claim an
easement of right of way over the Baltazars' property.
In Locsin v. Climaco, 7 this Court said:
By express provision of Articles 649 and 650 of the New Civil
Code, the owner of an estate may claim a compulsory right of way
only after he has established the existence of four (4) requisites,
namely, (1) the estate is surrounded by other immovables and is
without adequate outlet to a public highway; (2) after payment of
the proper indemnity; (3) the isolation was not due to the
proprietor's own acts; and (4) the right of way claimed is at a
point least prejudicial to the servient estate, and in so far as
consistent with this rule, where the distance from the dominant
estate to a public highway may be the shortest.
For respondent Panganiban to claim a compulsory easement of right of way, he
must, therefore, first establish the existence of the four requisites stated above.
It is not disputed that the first requisite has been established by the court a quo in
its Order dated May 22, 1990. 8Respondent Panganiban's property is indeed
surrounded by immovables on three sides and a river on the fourth.

As for the second requisite, Francisco v. Intermediate Appellate Court 9 states:

There would indeed be some point in looking askance at a reading of the law which
would impute to it a strict requirement to pay "proper indemnity" in advance of a
suit the purpose of which, in addition to creating an easement, is precisely to fix the
amount of the indemnity to be paid therefor.

We agree with the Court of Appeals when it ordered the remand of this case to the
lower court for the purpose of fixing the proper indemnity. 10

With respect to the third requisite, respondent Panganiban was likewise able to
establish that the isolation of his property was not due to his own act for he merely
bought Lot 1027, which was formerly part of the Baltazars' Lot 1026-A, 11 from
petitioner Nestor Baltazar's predecessors-in-interest. The Court of Appeals found
that Lot 1026-B 12which the respondents have been using as a right of way, has
been "existing, recognized, acknowledged, tolerated and used by the appellant as a
right of way for thirty (30) years during the lifetime of petitioner's grandfather, Fidel
and his father, Onisimo Baltazar." 13 It was also established that the right of way was
"closed and obstructed by the petitioners when they closed the gate 14 and placed
plants across the gate of Lot 1026-B when petitioners constructed their present
residence." 15

As regards the fourth requirement, both parties agreed that the passage claimed by
respondent as his right of way, compared to the other passageways, is the shortest
distance from respondent's lot to Braulio Street. 16

Petitioners could not have been inconvenienced by the passageway for, as borne
out by the records, the same is separate and distinct from the gate used by them to
enter their lot and residence. Such being the case, we conclude that respondent is
entitled to claim a compulsory easement of right of way over petitioners' Lot 1026-
B.

WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the decision of the Court of Appeals, the
same is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
APOLINARDITO C. QUINTANILLA G.R. No. 160613
and PERFECTA C. QUINTANILLA,
Petitioners, Present:
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
-versus- Chairperson,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CORONA,*
NACHURA, and
REYES, JJ.
PEDRO ABANGAN and
DARYL'S COLLECTION INTL. INC., Promulgated:
Respondents.
February 12, 2008
x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
RESOLUTION
NACHURA, J.:
Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari[1] under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Civil Procedure seeking the reversal of the Court of Appeals (CA)
Decision[2] dated April 21, 2003, which affirmed the Decision[3] of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 57 of Cebu City, dated June 21, 2000.
This controversy flows from a case for Easement of Right of Way filed by petitioner
Apolinardito C. Quintanilla (Apolinardito) and his mother, petitioner Perfecta C.
Quintanilla (Perfecta) against respondent Pedro Abangan (Pedro) and respondent
Daryl's Collection International, Inc. (DARYL'S).
Sometime in the 1960s, Perfecta bought Lot No. 3771-B-1-A, with an area of 2,244
square meters, located at Inayawan, Cebu City (the dominant estate) from one
Dionisio Abasolo, who formerly owned all the properties therein. Thereafter,
Perfecta donated the dominant estate to Apolinardito, who is now the registered
owner thereof.[4] Petitioners own QC Rattan Inc., a domestic corporation engaged in
the manufacture and export of rattan-made furniture. In the conduct of their
business, they use vans to haul and transport raw materials and finished products. As
they wanted to expand their business and construct a warehouse on their property
(the dominant estate), they asked for a right of way from Pedro sometime in April
1994.
However, it appears that Pedro, who was the owner of Lot No. 3771-A-1, containing
an area of 1,164 square meters[5] (the servient estate) and a lot near the dominant
estate, sold the same to DARYL'S on March 24, 1994,[6] and thereafter, DARYL'S
constructed a warehouse over the servient estate, enclosing the same with a
concrete fence.
Petitioners, thus, sought the imposition of an easement of right of way, six (6) meters
in width, or a total area of 244 square meters, over the servient estate.
On June 21, 2000, the RTC dismissed the case for lack of merit. The RTC held that
petitioners failed to establish that the imposition of the right of way was the least
prejudicial to the servient estate. The RTC noted that there is already a concrete fence
around the area and that six (6) meters from the said concrete fence was a concrete
warehouse. Thus, substantial damage and substantial reduction in area would be
caused the servient estate. Moreover, the RTC observed that petitioners' insistence
on passing through the servient estate would make for easy and convenient access
to the main thoroughfare for their vans. Otherwise, if the right of way were to be
constituted on any of the other surrounding properties, their vans would have to
make a turn. On this premise, the RTC opined that mere convenience to the dominant
estate was not necessarily the basis for setting up a compulsory easement of right of
way.
Aggrieved, petitioners went to the CA on appeal.
In its Decision dated April 21, 2003, the CA affirmed the RTC Decision, holding that
the criterion of least prejudice to the servient estate must prevail over the shortest
distance. A longer way may, thus, be established to avoid injury to the servient
tenement, such as when there are constructions or walls which can be avoided by a
round-about way,[7] as in this case. Petitioners filed a Motion for
Reconsideration,[8] but the same was denied in the CA Resolution[9] dated September
24, 2003.
Hence, the instant petition based on the following grounds:
a) IN A COMPULSORY EASEMENT OF RIGHT OF WAY, AS SET
FORTH IN THE PRECONDITIONS UNDER ARTICLES 649[10] AND
[11]
650 OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE, THE DETERMINATION OF THE
LEAST PREJUDICIAL OR LEAST DAMAGE TO THE SERVIENT ESTATE
SHOULD BE AT THE TIME OF THE FILING OF THE ORIGINAL
COMPLAINT AND NOT AFTER THE FILING, ESPECIALLY WHEN THE
OWNER OF THE SERVIENT ESTATE IS GUILTY OF ABUSE OF RIGHTS
CONSIDERED AS THE GREATEST OF ALL POSSIBLE WRONGS OR BAD
FAITH BY CONSTRUCTING A CONCRETE FENCE AND WAREHOUSE
THEREON THROUGH MISREPRESENTATION TO THE OFFICE OF THE
CEBU CITY BUILDING OFFICIAL THAT IT HAD GRANTED A RIGHT OF
WAY OF SIX (6) METERS TO PETITIONERS; AND
 b) WHETHER OR NOT COMPLIANCE WITH THE PRECONDITIONS SET
FORTH IN ARTICLES 649 AND 650 OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE
IS SUPERIOR TO THE MERE CONVENIENCE RULE AGAINST THE
OWNER OF THE DOMINANT ESTATE.
Petitioners claim that DARYL'S constructed the concrete fence only after petitioners
filed the case for an Easement of Right of Way against Pedro on May 27, 1994. They
submit that the criterion of least prejudice should be applied at the time of the filing
of the original complaint; otherwise, it will be easy for the servient estate to evade
the burden by subsequently constructing structures thereon in order to increase the
damage or prejudice.[12] Moreover, they pointed out that a Notice of Lis Pendens was
annotated on Pedro's title. Thus, petitioners aver that DARYL'S is in bad
faith and is guilty of abuse of rights as provided under Article 19 [13] of the New Civil
Code.[14]
On the other hand, DARYL'S counters that petitioners belatedly imputed bad faith to
it since petitioners' pre-trial brief filed with the RTC contained no allegation of bad
faith or misrepresentation. Moreover, DARYL'S reiterates its position that
establishing a right of way over the servient estate would cause substantial damage,
considering that a concrete fence has already been erected thereon. Most
importantly, DARYL'S submits that petitioners can have adequate ingress to or egress
from the dominant estate by passing through other surrounding vacant lots. Lastly,
DARYL'S points out that when Perfecta bought the dominant estate from Dionisio
Abasolo, the surrounding lots were also owned by the latter. [15]
For his part, Pedro manifests that he is adopting all the defenses invoked by DARYL'S
in the belief that he is no longer a party to the instant case as he had already sold the
servient estate to DARYL'S and a title already issued in the latter's name. [16]
The instant petition lacks merit.
We hold that Apolinardito as owner of the dominant estate together with Perfecta
failed to discharge the burden of proving the existence and concurrence of all the
requisites in order to validly claim a compulsory right of way against respondents.[17]
It should be remembered that to be entitled to a legal easement of right of way, the
following requisites must be satisfied: (1) the dominant estate is surrounded by other
immovables and has no adequate outlet to a public highway; (2) proper indemnity
has been paid; (3) the isolation was not due to acts of the proprietor of the dominant
estate; and (4) the right of way claimed is at the point least prejudicial to the servient
estate.[18]
The fourth requisite is absent.
We are in full accord with the ruling of the CA when it aptly and judiciously held, to
wit:
As provided for under the provisions of Article 650 of the New Civil
Code, the easement of right of way shall be established at the point
least prejudicial to the servient estate, and, insofar as consistent
with this rule, where the distance from the dominant estate to a
public highway may be the shortest. Where there are several
tenements surrounding the dominant estate, and the easement
may be established on any of them, the one where the way is
shortest and will cause the least damage should be chosen. But if
these two circumstances do not concur in a single tenement, as in
the instant case, the way which will cause the least damage should
be used, even if it will not be the shortest. The criterion of least
prejudice to the servient estate must prevail over the criterion of
shortest distance. The court is not bound to establish what is the
shortest; a longer way may be established to avoid injury to the
servient tenement, such as when there are constructions or walls
which can be avoided by a round-about way, as in the case at bar.
As between a right of way that would demolish a fence of strong
materials to provide ingress and egress to a public highway and
another right of way which although longer will only require a van
or vehicle to make a turn, the second alternative should be
preferred. Mere convenience for the dominant estate is not what
is required by law as the basis for setting up a compulsory
easement. Even in the face of necessity, if it can be satisfied
without imposing the easement, the same should not be imposed.
Finally, worthy of note, is the undisputed fact that there is already
a newly opened public road barely fifty (50) meters away from the
property of appellants, which only shows that another requirement
of the law, that is, there is no adequate outlet, has not been met to
establish a compulsory right of way.
Such pronouncement by the CA is in line with this Court's ruling in Quimen v. Court
of Appeals,[19] where we held that as between a right of way that would demolish a
store of strong materials to provide egress to a public highway, and another right of
way which, although longer, will only require an avocado tree to be cut down, the
second alternative should be preferred.
As a rule, findings of fact of the CA, affirming those of the trial court,
are generally final and conclusive on this Court.[20] While this Court has recognized
several exceptions[21] to this rule, none of these exceptions finds application in this
case. Ergo, we find no cogent reason and reversible error to disturb the unanimous
findings of the RTC and the CA as these are amply supported by the law and evidence
on record.

WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The assailed Court of
Appeals Decision, dated April 21, 2003, and Resolution dated September 24,
2003 are hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioners.
SO ORDERED.