HABEAS CORPUS of twenty years' imprisonment the conviction or sentence under which the

petitioner is serving must be regarded as of date November 20, 1901, and that
the case does not come under the provisions of Act No. 272 of the Philippine
Republic of the Philippines Commission.
SUPREME COURT
Manila After reviewing the questions as to the jurisdiction of the military commission,
and apparently reaching the conclusion that the military commission had no
EN BANC jurisdiction to try the petitioner, the judge found that the petitioner came within
the general amnesty proclamation and was entitled to its benefits, and directed
G.R. No. 1251 March 27, 1903 that he be discharged from custody upon his taking and subscribing the oath of
allegiance provided for in the amnesty proclamation.
FRANK MEKIN, petitioner-appellee,
vs. An appeal was taken by the Government from this decision.
GEORGE N. WOLFE, Wardent of Bilibid Prison, respondent-appellant.
Subsequent to the date of the filing of the application for habeas corpus, but
prior to the date of the trial and of the judgment in the case, the Philippine
COOPER, J.:
Commission promulgated Act No. 654, dated March 4, 1903, by the provisions
of which an appeal in habeas corpus proceedings may be taken from the
On the 11th day of February, 1903, application was made by Frank Mekin to the
judgment of the Court of First Instance to this court, the decision of this court
Hon. B. S. Ambler, judge of the Court of First Instance, for a writ of habeas
corpus against George N. Wolfe, Warden of Bilibid Prison, for the illegal having previously been that no appeal would lie in such a case in the absence
imprisonment, detention, and confinement of petitioner by the respondent as of a statute authorizing it.
warden of said prison, and setting forth in substance the following facts:
It is contended by counsel for this petitioner that Act No. 654 is in the nature of
an ex post facto law, and having been enacted subsequent to petitioner's right
That petitioner was a member of the Thirty-seventh Infantry, United States
to the writ of habeas corpus this appeal should not be entertained. This
Volunteers, up to the date of his discharge, which occurred on the ____ day of
contention is unsupported by either precedent or principle. It is difficult to
February, 1901; that after his discharge, to wit, the 13th day of July, 1901, the
conceive any reason for such a conclusion.
petitioner was tried by a military commission composed of officers of the United
States Regular Army on the charge of entering the service of the enemy in
violation of the laws and was found guilty and sentenced by said military An ex post facto law has been defined as one —
commission to twenty years of hard labor in the Presidio of Manila, where he is
(a) Which makes an action done before the passing of the law and which was
at present confined. That the military commission acted without jurisdiction in so
innocent when done criminal, and punishes such action; or
trying and sentencing the petitioner for the reason that it had neither jurisdiction
of the person of the petitioner nor jurisdiction of the crime for which he was tried
and sentenced; that at the time of the trial the petitioner was a civilian, and is (b) Which aggravates a crime or makes it greater than it was when committed;
therefore entitled to the benefit of the amnesty proclamation issued by the or
President of the United States on the 4th day of July, 1902.
(c) Which damages the punishment and inflicts a greater punishment than the
law annexed to the crime when it was committed; or
The writ of habeas corpus was issued and was served upon the respondent,
George N. Wolfe, who made return: That he, as Warden of Bilibid, held said
Frank Mekin imprisoned under authority of the United States of America through (d) Which alters the legal rules of evidence and receives less or different
testimony than the law required at the time of the commission of the offense in
the lawful orders of the commanding general, Division of the Philippines, issued
order to convict the defendant. (Black, Constitutional Law, 595.)
by virtue of a lawful sentence of a duly convened military commission, for an
offense in violation of the laws of war and against the United States of America,
which conviction and sentence was duly approved by the convening authority The case nearly does not come within this definition, nor can it be seen in what
way the act in question alters the situation of petitioner to his disadvantage. It
on September 23, 1901, and which sentence was lawfully commuted to
gives him, as well as the Government, the benefit of the appeal, and is intended
imprisonment at hard labor for the term of twenty years by the said commanding
general of the Division of the Philippines, the record of which conviction and as furnishing the means for the correction of errors. The possibility that the judge
sentence and the approval thereof of the said commuted sentence and order of of the Court of First Instance may commit error in his favor and wrongfully
confinement — in the Presidio of Manila — was set forth in General Orders, No. discharge him appears to be the only foundation for the claim.
362, dated headquarters Division of the Philippines, Manila, P. I., November 30,
A person can have no vested right in such a possibility.
1901, copies of which said record and said order were attached to the return,
and the respondent also attached to his return the certificate of George W.
Davis, major-general, United States Army, commanding the Division of the It would be a sufficient answer to the contention of the petitioner that Act No.
654, allowing an appeal, relates to a habeas corpus proceeding. This character
Philippines, and made it a part of his return.
of proceeding is entirely distinct from the criminal proceedings under which the
prisoner has been tried and convicted. It is a new suit brought by petitioner to
The respondent prayed for the dismissal of the writ of habeas corpus, assigning
enforce a civil right which he claims as against those who are holding him in
as a cause that the court was without jurisdiction to issue the writ of habeas
corpus for the reason that the said Frank Mekin was held as a prisoner by virtue custody under the criminal process. The proceeding is one instituted by himself
of the sentence of the said military commission, awarded prior to October 1, for his liberty and not by the Government to punish him for his crime. (Ex parte
1901, and that the issuance of said writ was in contravention of the statute of Tom Tong, 108 U. S., 556.)
the Philippine Commission, Act No. 272, entitled "An act amending chapter 26,
relating to proceedings in habeas corpus." It is distinctly a civil proceeding, and as such is provided for and regulated in the
Code of Civil Procedure.
The certificate of George W. Davis, major-general, United States Army,
commanding in the Philippines, referred to in the return, is as follows: The doctrine of ex post facto laws refers only to the criminal law.

This case must be determined under the provisions of Act No. 272, "An act
Headquarters Division of the Philippines, Manila, P. I., February 18, 1903. To
amending chapter 26, relating to proceedings of habeas corpus," enacted by
the Hon. B. S. Ambler, judge of the Court of First Instance, Manila, P. I. Sir: I
the Philippine Commission on the 21st day of October, 1901. The history of the
hereby certify that Frank Mekin is held by me as commanding general, Division
legislation embodied in this act is too recent to require a review of the
of the Philippines, in the Presidio of Manila, and at the expense of the United
States, by virtue of a sentence of a military commission, published in General circumstances and conditions under which it was enacted. Its purpose was to
Orders, No. 362, dated headquarters Division of the Philippines, Manila, P. I., prevent a conflict of jurisdiction between the civil and military branches of the
November 20, 1901, (a copy of which order is herewith submitted), as a prisoner Government. By the provisions of this act, when the commanding general or
duly sentenced prior to October 1, 1901, by said commission and duly approved any general officer in command of the department or district certifies in answer
by the reviewing authority prior to said date, and which sentence was duly to a writ of habeas corpus directed a military officer or soldier that the prisoner
is held by him either —
commuted by the commanding general, Division of the Philippines, which
commutation was duly published in said order, and that the said Frank Mekin is
a prisoner who was arrested and held for trial before October 15, 1901, for a (1) As a prisoner of war; or
violation of the laws of war committed before that date, and is now held by
(2) As a member of the Army, a civil employee thereof, or a camp follower
George N. Wolfe, as Warden of Bilibid Prison, as my agent. Very respectfully,
subject to its discipline; or
(signed) Geo. W. Davis, General, United States Army, commanding.
(3) As a prisoner committed by a military court or commision prior to October 1,
On February 18, 1903, a hearing of the habeas corpus proceedings was had,
1901; or
the Government being represented by the Prosecuting Attorney and by the
Judge-Advocate-General, Divsion of the Philippines, and on the 9th day of
March, 1903, the judge of the Court of First Instance rendered his decision, in (4) As a prisoner arrested and held for trial before a military court or commission,
which it was determined that the approval and commutation of the sentence before October 15, 1901, for a violation of the laws of war committed before the
same date; or
under which the prisoner is now serving was promulgated on the 20th day of
November, 1901; that the trial before the military commission not being
(5) As a person guilty of the violation of the laws of was committed in certain
disclosed by the evidence, the sentence of the military commission had no other
unpacified provinces and territories named —
effect than to hold the prisoner awaiting the approval of the commanding
general; that the commanding general having seen fit to commute the sentence
Page 1 of 99
such certificate shall be a conclusive answer to a writ of habeas corpus against
a military officer or soldier, and a sufficient excuse for not producing the prisoner.
It is not disputed that the respondent holds the petitioner by and through the
orders of the commanding general Division of the Philippines, and that he is in
the custody of the Unites States Government through the respondent, the
Warden of Bilibid, as the agent and representative of the military, such agency
appears in the certificate of the commanding general and also in the return of
the respondent.
It is equally clear that the certificate of General Davis of date the 18th day of
February, 1903, is in compliance with Act No. 272, from which it appears
distinctly that the petitioner is a prisoner committed by a military commission
prior to October 1, 1901; and further that he is a prisoner arrested and held for
trial before October 15, 1901, for a violation of the laws of war committed before
the same date.
We think the certificate of the commanding general is in strict compliance with
the provisions of the law, and was a conclusive return to the writ of habeas
corpus.
The power of the court to either issue the writ or discharge the prisoner is ended
when such return has been made and the proceedings must there end.
While the power conceded to the commanding general is of vital imprortance
and an abuse of it would be attended with great evil, still, the high position of
those to whom it has been confided was doubtless believed to be a sufficient
guaranty that it would not be exercised except after careful investigation and
with a due appreaciation of the delicate nature of the power reposed in the
commanding general by the legislative authority.
In view of the disposition which the law requires us to make of the case it is
unnecessary to discuss other interesting questions raised by counsel for the
petitioner.
The order and decision of the judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila
ordering that the prisoner be discharged from custody of the respondent must
be reversed, the proceedings dismissed, and the prisoner remanded to the
custody of the respondent. It is so ordered and directed. Costs of proceedings
will be adjudged against the petitioner.
Torres, Willard, Mapa and Ladd, JJ., concur.
Arellano, C. J., Torres, did not sit in this case.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-14639 March 25, 1919
ZACARIAS VILLAVICENCIO, ET AL., petitioners,
vs.
JUSTO LUKBAN, ET AL., respondents.
MALCOLM, J.:
The annals of juridical history fail to reveal a case quite as remarkable as the
one which this application for habeas corpus submits for decision. While hardly
to be expected to be met with in this modern epoch of triumphant democracy,
yet, after all, the cause presents no great difficulty if there is kept in the forefront
of our minds the basic principles of popular government, and if we give
expression to the paramount purpose for which the courts, as an independent
power of such a government, were constituted. The primary question is — Shall
the judiciary permit a government of the men instead of a government of laws
to be set up in the Philippine Islands?
Omitting much extraneous matter, of no moment to these proceedings, but
which might prove profitable reading for other departments of the government,
the facts are these: The Mayor of the city of Manila, Justo Lukban, for the best
of all reasons, to exterminate vice, ordered the segregated district for women of
ill repute, which had been permitted for a number of years in the city of Manila,
closed. Between October 16 and October 25, 1918, the women were kept
confined to their houses in the district by the police. Presumably, during this
period, the city authorities quietly perfected arrangements with the Bureau of
Labor for sending the women to Davao, Mindanao, as laborers; with some
government office for the use of the coastguard cutters Corregidor and Negros,
and with the Constabulary for a guard of soldiers. At any rate, about midnight of
October 25, the police, acting pursuant to orders from the chief of police, Anton
Hohmann and the Mayor of the city of Manila, Justo Lukban, descended upon
the houses, hustled some 170 inmates into patrol wagons, and placed them
aboard the steamers that awaited their arrival. The women were given no
opportunity to collect their belongings, and apparently were under the
impression that they were being taken to a police station for an investigation.
They had no knowledge that they were destined for a life in Mindanao. They had
not been asked if they wished to depart from that region and had neither directly
nor indirectly given their consent to the deportation. The involuntary guests were
received on board the steamers by a representative of the Bureau of Labor and
a detachment of Constabulary soldiers. The two steamers with their unwilling
passengers sailed for Davao during the night of October 25.
Page 2 of 99
The vessels reached their destination at Davao on October 29. The women
were landed and receipted for as laborers by Francisco Sales, provincial
governor of Davao, and by Feliciano Yñigo and Rafael Castillo. The governor
and the hacendero Yñigo, who appear as parties in the case, had no previous
notification that the women were prostitutes who had been expelled from the
city of Manila. The further happenings to these women and the serious charges
growing out of alleged ill-treatment are of public interest, but are not essential
to the disposition of this case. Suffice it to say, generally, that some of the
women married, others assumed more or less clandestine relations with men,
others went to work in different capacities, others assumed a life unknown and
disappeared, and a goodly portion found means to return to Manila.
To turn back in our narrative, just about the time the Corregidor and the Negros
were putting in to Davao, the attorney for the relatives and friends of a
considerable number of the deportees presented an application for habeas
corpus to a member of the Supreme Court. Subsequently, the application,
through stipulation of the parties, was made to include all of the women who
were sent away from Manila to Davao and, as the same questions concerned
them all, the application will be considered as including them. The application
set forth the salient facts, which need not be repeated, and alleged that the
women were illegally restrained of their liberty by Justo Lukban, Mayor of the
city of Manila, Anton Hohmann, chief of police of the city of Manila, and by
certain unknown parties. The writ was made returnable before the full court. The
city fiscal appeared for the respondents, Lukban and Hohmann, admitted certain
facts relative to sequestration and deportation, and prayed that the writ should
not be granted because the petitioners were not proper parties, because the
action should have been begun in the Court of First Instance for Davao,
Department of Mindanao and Sulu, because the respondents did not have any
of the women under their custody or control, and because their jurisdiction did
not extend beyond the boundaries of the city of Manila. According to an exhibit
attached to the answer of the fiscal, the 170 women were destined to be
laborers, at good salaries, on the haciendas of Yñigo and Governor Sales. In
open court, the fiscal admitted, in answer to question of a member of the court,
that these women had been sent out of Manila without their consent. The court
awarded the writ, in an order of November 4, that directed Justo Lukban, Mayor
of the city of Manila, Anton Hohmann, chief of police of the city of Manila,
Francisco Sales, governor of the province of Davao, and Feliciano Yñigo, an
hacendero of Davao, to bring before the court the persons therein named,
alleged to be deprived of their liberty, on December 2, 1918.
Before the date mentioned, seven of the women had returned to Manila at their
own expense. On motion of counsel for petitioners, their testimony was taken
before the clerk of the Supreme Court sitting as commissioners. On the day
named in the order, December 2nd, 1918, none of the persons in whose behalf
the writ was issued were produced in court by the respondents. It has been
shown that three of those who had been able to come back to Manila through
their own efforts, were notified by the police and the secret service to appear
before the court. The fiscal appeared, repeated the facts more comprehensively,
reiterated the stand taken by him when pleading to the original petition copied a
telegram from the Mayor of the city of Manila to the provincial governor of Davao
and the answer thereto, and telegrams that had passed between the Director of
Labor and the attorney for that Bureau then in Davao, and offered certain
affidavits showing that the women were contained with their life in Mindanao
and did not wish to return to Manila. Respondents Sales answered alleging that
it was not possible to fulfill the order of the Supreme Court because the women
had never been under his control, because they were at liberty in the Province
of Davao, and because they had married or signed contracts as laborers.
Respondent Yñigo answered alleging that he did not have any of the women
under his control and that therefore it was impossible for him to obey the
mandate. The court, after due deliberation, on December 10, 1918, promulgated
a second order, which related that the respondents had not complied with the
original order to the satisfaction of the court nor explained their failure to do so,
and therefore directed that those of the women not in Manila be brought before
the court by respondents Lukban, Hohmann, Sales, and Yñigo on January 13,
1919, unless the women should, in written statements voluntarily made before
the judge of first instance of Davao or the clerk of that court, renounce the right,
or unless the respondents should demonstrate some other legal motives that
made compliance impossible. It was further stated that the question of whether
the respondents were in contempt of court would later be decided and the
reasons for the order announced in the final decision.
Before January 13, 1919, further testimony including that of a number of the
women, of certain detectives and policemen, and of the provincial governor of
Davao, was taken before the clerk of the Supreme Court sitting as commissioner
and the clerk of the Court of First Instance of Davao acting in the same capacity.
On January 13, 1919, the respondents technically presented before the Court
the women who had returned to the city through their own efforts and eight
others who had been brought to Manila by the respondents. Attorneys for the
respondents, by their returns, once again recounted the facts and further
endeavored to account for all of the persons involved in the habeas corpus. In
substance, it was stated that the respondents, through their representatives and
agents, had succeeded in bringing from Davao with their consent eight women;
that eighty-one women were found in Davao who, on notice that if they desired
they could return to Manila, transportation fee, renounced the right through
sworn statements; that fifty-nine had already returned to Manila by other means,
and that despite all efforts to find them twenty-six could not be located. Both
counsel for petitioners and the city fiscal were permitted to submit memoranda.
The first formally asked the court to find Justo Lukban, Mayor of the city of
Manila, Anton Hohmann, chief of police of the city of Manila, Jose Rodriguez
and Fernando Ordax, members of the police force of the city of Manila, Feliciano
Yñigo, an hacendero of Davao, Modesto Joaquin, the attorney for the Bureau
of Labor, and Anacleto Diaz, fiscal of the city of Manila, in contempt of court.
The city fiscal requested that the replica al memorandum de los recurridos,
(reply to respondents' memorandum) dated January 25, 1919, be struck from
the record.
In the second order, the court promised to give the reasons for granting the writ
of habeas corpus in the final decision. We will now proceed to do so.
One fact, and one fact only, need be recalled — these one hundred and seventy
women were isolated from society, and then at night, without their consent and
without any opportunity to consult with friends or to defend their rights, were
forcibly hustled on board steamers for transportation to regions unknown.
Despite the feeble attempt to prove that the women left voluntarily and gladly,
that such was not the case is shown by the mere fact that the presence of the
police and the constabulary was deemed necessary and that these officers of
the law chose the shades of night to cloak their secret and stealthy acts. Indeed,
this is a fact impossible to refute and practically admitted by the respondents.
With this situation, a court would next expect to resolve the question — By
authority of what law did the Mayor and the Chief of Police presume to act in
deporting by duress these persons from Manila to another distant locality within
the Philippine Islands? We turn to the statutes and we find —
Alien prostitutes can be expelled from the Philippine Islands in conformity with
an Act of congress. The Governor-General can order the eviction of undesirable
aliens after a hearing from the Islands. Act No. 519 of the Philippine Commission
and section 733 of the Revised Ordinances of the city of Manila provide for the
conviction and punishment by a court of justice of any person who is a common
prostitute. Act No. 899 authorizes the return of any citizen of the United States,
who may have been convicted of vagrancy, to the homeland. New York and
other States have statutes providing for the commitment to the House of Refuge
of women convicted of being common prostitutes. Always a law! Even when the
health authorities compel vaccination, or establish a quarantine, or place a
leprous person in the Culion leper colony, it is done pursuant to some law or
order. But one can search in vain for any law, order, or regulation, which even
hints at the right of the Mayor of the city of Manila or the chief of police of that
city to force citizens of the Philippine Islands — and these women despite their
being in a sense lepers of society are nevertheless not chattels but Philippine
citizens protected by the same constitutional guaranties as are other citizens —
to change their domicile from Manila to another locality. On the contrary,
Philippine penal law specifically punishes any public officer who, not being
expressly authorized by law or regulation, compels any person to change his
residence.
In other countries, as in Spain and Japan, the privilege of domicile is deemed
so important as to be found in the Bill of Rights of the Constitution. Under the
American constitutional system, liberty of abode is a principle so deeply
imbedded in jurisprudence and considered so elementary in nature as not even
to require a constitutional sanction. Even the Governor-General of the Philippine
Islands, even the President of the United States, who has often been said to
exercise more power than any king or potentate, has no such arbitrary
prerogative, either inherent or express. Much less, therefore, has the executive
of a municipality, who acts within a sphere of delegated powers. If the mayor
and the chief of police could, at their mere behest or even for the most
praiseworthy of motives, render the liberty of the citizen so insecure, then the
presidents and chiefs of police of one thousand other municipalities of the
Philippines have the same privilege. If these officials can take to themselves
such power, then any other official can do the same. And if any official can
exercise the power, then all persons would have just as much right to do so.
And if a prostitute could be sent against her wishes and under no law from one
locality to another within the country, then officialdom can hold the same club
over the head of any citizen.
Law defines power. Centuries ago Magna Charta decreed that — "No freeman
shall be taken, or imprisoned, or be disseized of his freehold, or liberties, or free
customs, or be outlawed, or exiled, or any other wise destroyed; nor will we pass
upon him nor condemn him, but by lawful judgment of his peers or by the law of
the land. We will sell to no man, we will not deny or defer to any man either
justice or right." (Magna Charta, 9 Hen., 111, 1225, Cap. 29; 1 eng. stat. at
Large, 7.) No official, no matter how high, is above the law. The courts are the
forum which functionate to safeguard individual liberty and to punish official
transgressors. "The law," said Justice Miller, delivering the opinion of the
Supreme Court of the United States, "is the only supreme power in our system
of government, and every man who by accepting office participates in its
functions is only the more strongly bound to submit to that supremacy, and to
observe the limitations which it imposes upon the exercise of the authority which
it gives." (U.S. vs. Lee [1882], 106 U.S., 196, 220.) "The very idea," said Justice
Matthews of the same high tribunal in another case, "that one man may be
compelled to hold his life, or the means of living, or any material right essential
to the enjoyment of life, at the mere will of another, seems to be intolerable in
any country where freedom prevails, as being the essence of slavery itself."
(Yick Wo vs. Hopkins [1886], 118 U.S., 356, 370.) All this explains the motive in
issuing the writ of habeas corpus, and makes clear why we said in the very
beginning that the primary question was whether the courts should permit a
government of men or a government of laws to be established in the Philippine
Islands.
What are the remedies of the unhappy victims of official oppression? The
remedies of the citizen are three: (1) Civil action; (2) criminal action, and (3)
habeas corpus.
The first is an optional but rather slow process by which the aggrieved party may
recoup money damages. It may still rest with the parties in interest to pursue
Page 3 of 99
such an action, but it was never intended effectively and promptly to meet any
such situation as that now before us.
As to criminal responsibility, it is true that the Penal Code in force in these
Islands provides:
Any public officer not thereunto authorized by law or by regulations of a general
character in force in the Philippines who shall banish any person to a place more
than two hundred kilometers distant from his domicile, except it be by virtue of
the judgment of a court, shall be punished by a fine of not less than three
hundred and twenty-five and not more than three thousand two hundred and
fifty pesetas.
Any public officer not thereunto expressly authorized by law or by regulation of
a general character in force in the Philippines who shall compel any person to
change his domicile or residence shall suffer the penalty of destierro and a fine
of not less than six hundred and twenty-five and not more than six thousand two
hundred and fifty pesetas. (Art. 211.)
We entertain no doubt but that, if, after due investigation, the proper prosecuting
officers find that any public officer has violated this provision of law, these
prosecutors will institute and press a criminal prosecution just as vigorously as
they have defended the same official in this action. Nevertheless, that the act
may be a crime and that the persons guilty thereof can be proceeded against,
is no bar to the instant proceedings. To quote the words of Judge Cooley in a
case which will later be referred to — "It would be a monstrous anomaly in the
law if to an application by one unlawfully confined, ta be restored to his liberty,
it could be a sufficient answer that the confinement was a crime, and therefore
might be continued indefinitely until the guilty party was tried and punished
therefor by the slow process of criminal procedure." (In the matter of Jackson
[1867], 15 Mich., 416, 434.) The writ of habeas corpus was devised and exists
as a speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint, and
as the best and only sufficient defense of personal freedom. Any further rights
of the parties are left untouched by decision on the writ, whose principal purpose
is to set the individual at liberty.
Granted that habeas corpus is the proper remedy, respondents have raised
three specific objections to its issuance in this instance. The fiscal has argued
(l) that there is a defect in parties petitioners, (2) that the Supreme Court should
not a assume jurisdiction, and (3) that the person in question are not restrained
of their liberty by respondents. It was finally suggested that the jurisdiction of the
Mayor and the chief of police of the city of Manila only extends to the city limits
and that perforce they could not bring the women from Davao.
The first defense was not presented with any vigor by counsel. The petitioners
were relatives and friends of the deportees. The way the expulsion was
conducted by the city officials made it impossible for the women to sign a petition
for habeas corpus. It was consequently proper for the writ to be submitted by
persons in their behalf. (Code of Criminal Procedure, sec. 78; Code of Civil
Procedure, sec. 527.) The law, in its zealous regard for personal liberty, even
makes it the duty of a court or judge to grant a writ of habeas corpus if there is
evidence that within the court's jurisdiction a person is unjustly imprisoned or
restrained of his liberty, though no application be made therefor. (Code of
Criminal Procedure, sec. 93.) Petitioners had standing in court.
The fiscal next contended that the writ should have been asked for in the Court
of First Instance of Davao or should have been made returnable before that
court. It is a general rule of good practice that, to avoid unnecessary expense
and inconvenience, petitions for habeas corpus should be presented to the
nearest judge of the court of first instance. But this is not a hard and fast rule.
The writ of habeas corpus may be granted by the Supreme Court or any judge
thereof enforcible anywhere in the Philippine Islands. (Code of Criminal
Procedure, sec. 79; Code of Civil Procedure, sec. 526.) Whether the writ shall
be made returnable before the Supreme Court or before an inferior court rests
in the discretion of the Supreme Court and is dependent on the particular
circumstances. In this instance it was not shown that the Court of First Instance
of Davao was in session, or that the women had any means by which to advance
their plea before that court. On the other hand, it was shown that the petitioners
with their attorneys, and the two original respondents with their attorney, were
in Manila; it was shown that the case involved parties situated in different parts
of the Islands; it was shown that the women might still be imprisoned or
restrained of their liberty; and it was shown that if the writ was to accomplish its
purpose, it must be taken cognizance of and decided immediately by the
appellate court. The failure of the superior court to consider the application and
then to grant the writ would have amounted to a denial of the benefits of the writ.
The last argument of the fiscal is more plausible and more difficult to meet.
When the writ was prayed for, says counsel, the parties in whose behalf it was
asked were under no restraint; the women, it is claimed, were free in Davao,
and the jurisdiction of the mayor and the chief of police did not extend beyond
the city limits. At first blush, this is a tenable position. On closer examination,
acceptance of such dictum is found to be perversive of the first principles of the
writ of habeas corpus.
A prime specification of an application for a writ of habeas corpus is restraint of
liberty. The essential object and purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to
inquire into all manner of involuntary restraint as distinguished from voluntary,
and to relieve a person therefrom if such restraint is illegal. Any restraint which
will preclude freedom of action is sufficient. The forcible taking of these women
from Manila by officials of that city, who handed them over to other parties, who
deposited them in a distant region, deprived these women of freedom of
locomotion just as effectively as if they had been imprisoned. Placed in Davao
without either money or personal belongings, they were prevented from
exercising the liberty of going when and where they pleased. The restraint of
liberty which began in Manila continued until the aggrieved parties were
returned to Manila and released or until they freely and truly waived his right.
Consider for a moment what an agreement with such a defense would mean.
The chief executive of any municipality in the Philippines could forcibly and
illegally take a private citizen and place him beyond the boundaries of the
municipality, and then, when called upon to defend his official action, could
calmly fold his hands and claim that the person was under no restraint and that
he, the official, had no jurisdiction over this other municipality. We believe the
true principle should be that, if the respondent is within the jurisdiction of the
court and has it in his power to obey the order of the court and thus to undo the
wrong that he has inflicted, he should be compelled to do so. Even if the party
to whom the writ is addressed has illegally parted with the custody of a person
before the application for the writ is no reason why the writ should not issue. If
the mayor and the chief of police, acting under no authority of law, could deport
these women from the city of Manila to Davao, the same officials must
necessarily have the same means to return them from Davao to Manila. The
respondents, within the reach of process, may not be permitted to restrain a
fellow citizen of her liberty by forcing her to change her domicile and to avow
the act with impunity in the courts, while the person who has lost her birthright
of liberty has no effective recourse. The great writ of liberty may not thus be
easily evaded.
It must be that some such question has heretofore been presented to the courts
for decision. Nevertheless, strange as it may seem, a close examination of the
authorities fails to reveal any analogous case. Certain decisions of respectable
courts are however very persuasive in nature.
A question came before the Supreme Court of the State of Michigan at an early
date as to whether or not a writ of habeas corpus would issue from the Supreme
Court to a person within the jurisdiction of the State to bring into the State a
minor child under guardianship in the State, who has been and continues to be
detained in another State. The membership of the Michigan Supreme Court at
this time was notable. It was composed of Martin, chief justice, and Cooley,
Campbell, and Christiancy, justices. On the question presented the court was
equally divided. Campbell, J., with whom concurred Martin, C. J., held that the
writ should be quashed. Cooley, J., one of the most distinguished American
judges and law-writers, with whom concurred Christiancy, J., held that the writ
should issue. Since the opinion of Justice Campbell was predicated to a large
extent on his conception of the English decisions, and since, as will hereafter
appear, the English courts have taken a contrary view, only the following
eloquent passages from the opinion of Justice Cooley are quoted:
I have not yet seen sufficient reason to doubt the power of this court to issue the
present writ on the petition which was laid before us. . . .
It would be strange indeed if, at this late day, after the eulogiums of six centuries
and a half have been expended upon the Magna Charta, and rivers of blood
shed for its establishment; after its many confirmations, until Coke could declare
in his speech on the petition of right that "Magna Charta was such a fellow that
he will have no sovereign," and after the extension of its benefits and securities
by the petition of right, bill of rights and habeas corpus acts, it should now be
discovered that evasion of that great clause for the protection of personal liberty,
which is the life and soul of the whole instrument, is so easy as is claimed here.
If it is so, it is important that it be determined without delay, that the legislature
may apply the proper remedy, as I can not doubt they would, on the subject
being brought to their notice. . . .
The second proposition — that the statutory provisions are confined to the case
of imprisonment within the state — seems to me to be based upon a
misconception as to the source of our jurisdiction. It was never the case in
England that the court of king's bench derived its jurisdiction to issue and
enforce this writ from the statute. Statutes were not passed to give the right, but
to compel the observance of rights which existed. . . .
The important fact to be observed in regard to the mode of procedure upon this
writ is, that it is directed to and served upon, not the person confined, but his
jailor. It does not reach the former except through the latter. The officer or person
who serves it does not unbar the prison doors, and set the prisoner free, but the
court relieves him by compelling the oppressor to release his constraint. The
whole force of the writ is spent upon the respondent, and if he fails to obey it,
the means to be resorted to for the purposes of compulsion are fine and
imprisonment. This is the ordinary mode of affording relief, and if any other
means are resorted to, they are only auxiliary to those which are usual. The
place of confinement is, therefore, not important to the relief, if the guilty party
is within reach of process, so that by the power of the court he can be compelled
to release his grasp. The difficulty of affording redress is not increased by the
confinement being beyond the limits of the state, except as greater distance
may affect it. The important question is, where the power of control exercised?
And I am aware of no other remedy. (In the matter of Jackson [1867], 15 Mich.,
416.)
The opinion of Judge Cooley has since been accepted as authoritative by other
courts. (Rivers vs. Mitchell [1881], 57 Iowa, 193; Breene vs. People [1911],
Colo., 117 Pac. Rep., 1000; Ex parte Young [1892], 50 Fed., 526.)
The English courts have given careful consideration to the subject. Thus, a child
had been taken out of English by the respondent. A writ of habeas corpus was
issued by the Queen's Bench Division upon the application of the mother and
her husband directing the defendant to produce the child. The judge at
chambers gave defendant until a certain date to produce the child, but he did
not do so. His return stated that the child before the issuance of the writ had
Page 4 of 99
been handed over by him to another; that it was no longer in his custody or
control, and that it was impossible for him to obey the writ. He was found in
contempt of court. On appeal, the court, through Lord Esher, M. R., said:
A writ of habeas corpus was ordered to issue, and was issued on January 22.
That writ commanded the defendant to have the body of the child before a judge
in chambers at the Royal Courts of Justice immediately after the receipt of the
writ, together with the cause of her being taken and detained. That is a
command to bring the child before the judge and must be obeyed, unless some
lawful reason can be shown to excuse the nonproduction of the child. If it could
be shown that by reason of his having lawfully parted with the possession of the
child before the issuing of the writ, the defendant had no longer power to
produce the child, that might be an answer; but in the absence of any lawful
reason he is bound to produce the child, and, if he does not, he is in contempt
of the Court for not obeying the writ without lawful excuse. Many efforts have
been made in argument to shift the question of contempt to some anterior period
for the purpose of showing that what was done at some time prior to the writ
cannot be a contempt. But the question is not as to what was done before the
issue of the writ. The question is whether there has been a contempt in
disobeying the writ it was issued by not producing the child in obedience to its
commands. (The Queen vs. Bernardo [1889], 23 Q. B. D., 305. See also to the
same effect the Irish case of In re Matthews, 12 Ir. Com. Law Rep. [N. S.], 233;
The Queen vs. Barnardo, Gossage's Case [1890], 24 Q. B. D., 283.)
A decision coming from the Federal Courts is also of interest. A habeas corpus
was directed to the defendant to have before the circuit court of the District of
Columbia three colored persons, with the cause of their detention. Davis, in his
return to the writ, stated on oath that he had purchased the negroes as slaves
in the city of Washington; that, as he believed, they were removed beyond the
District of Columbia before the service of the writ of habeas corpus, and that
they were then beyond his control and out of his custody. The evidence tended
to show that Davis had removed the negroes because he suspected they would
apply for a writ of habeas corpus. The court held the return to be evasive and
insufficient, and that Davis was bound to produce the negroes, and Davis being
present in court, and refusing to produce them, ordered that he be committed to
the custody of the marshall until he should produce the negroes, or be otherwise
discharged in due course of law. The court afterwards ordered that Davis be
released upon the production of two of the negroes, for one of the negroes had
run away and been lodged in jail in Maryland. Davis produced the two negroes
on the last day of the term. (United States vs. Davis [1839], 5 Cranch C.C., 622,
Fed. Cas. No. 14926. See also Robb vs. Connolly [1883], 111 U.S., 624; Church
on Habeas, 2nd ed., p. 170.)
We find, therefore, both on reason and authority, that no one of the defense
offered by the respondents constituted a legitimate bar to the granting of the writ
of habeas corpus.
There remains to be considered whether the respondent complied with the two
orders of the Supreme Court awarding the writ of habeas corpus, and if it be
found that they did not, whether the contempt should be punished or be taken
as purged.
The first order, it will be recalled, directed Justo Lukban, Anton Hohmann,
Francisco Sales, and Feliciano Yñigo to present the persons named in the writ
before the court on December 2, 1918. The order was dated November 4, 1918.
The respondents were thus given ample time, practically one month, to comply
with the writ. As far as the record discloses, the Mayor of the city of Manila
waited until the 21st of November before sending a telegram to the provincial
governor of Davao. According to the response of the attorney for the Bureau of
Labor to the telegram of his chief, there were then in Davao women who desired
to return to Manila, but who should not be permitted to do so because of having
contracted debts. The half-hearted effort naturally resulted in none of the parties
in question being brought before the court on the day named.
For the respondents to have fulfilled the court's order, three optional courses
were open: (1) They could have produced the bodies of the persons according
to the command of the writ; or (2) they could have shown by affidavit that on
account of sickness or infirmity those persons could not safely be brought before
the court; or (3) they could have presented affidavits to show that the parties in
question or their attorney waived the right to be present. (Code of Criminal
Procedure, sec. 87.) They did not produce the bodies of the persons in whose
behalf the writ was granted; they did not show impossibility of performance; and
they did not present writings that waived the right to be present by those
interested. Instead a few stereotyped affidavits purporting to show that the
women were contended with their life in Davao, some of which have since been
repudiated by the signers, were appended to the return. That through ordinary
diligence a considerable number of the women, at least sixty, could have been
brought back to Manila is demonstrated to be found in the municipality of Davao,
and that about this number either returned at their own expense or were
produced at the second hearing by the respondents.
The court, at the time the return to its first order was made, would have been
warranted summarily in finding the respondents guilty of contempt of court, and
in sending them to jail until they obeyed the order. Their excuses for the non-
production of the persons were far from sufficient. The, authorities cited herein
pertaining to somewhat similar facts all tend to indicate with what exactitude a
habeas corpus writ must be fulfilled. For example, in Gossage's case, supra, the
Magistrate in referring to an earlier decision of the Court, said: "We thought that,
having brought about that state of things by his own illegal act, he must take the
consequences; and we said that he was bound to use every effort to get the
child back; that he must do much more than write letters for the purpose; that
he must advertise in America, and even if necessary himself go after the child,
and do everything that mortal man could do in the matter; and that the court
would only accept clear proof of an absolute impossibility by way of excuse." In
other words, the return did not show that every possible effort to produce the
women was made by the respondents. That the court forebore at this time to
take drastic action was because it did not wish to see presented to the public
gaze the spectacle of a clash between executive officials and the judiciary, and
because it desired to give the respondents another chance to demonstrate their
good faith and to mitigate their wrong.
In response to the second order of the court, the respondents appear to have
become more zealous and to have shown a better spirit. Agents were
dispatched to Mindanao, placards were posted, the constabulary and the
municipal police joined in rounding up the women, and a steamer with free
transportation to Manila was provided. While charges and counter-charges in
such a bitterly contested case are to be expected, and while a critical reading of
the record might reveal a failure of literal fulfillment with our mandate, we come
to conclude that there is a substantial compliance with it. Our finding to this effect
may be influenced somewhat by our sincere desire to see this unhappy incident
finally closed. If any wrong is now being perpetrated in Davao, it should receive
an executive investigation. If any particular individual is still restrained of her
liberty, it can be made the object of separate habeas corpus proceedings.
Since the writ has already been granted, and since we find a substantial
compliance with it, nothing further in this connection remains to be done.
The attorney for the petitioners asks that we find in contempt of court Justo
Lukban, Mayor of the city of Manila, Anton Hohmann, chief of police of the city
of Manila, Jose Rodriguez, and Fernando Ordax, members of the police force
of the city of Manila, Modesto Joaquin, the attorney for the Bureau of Labor,
Feliciano Yñigo, an hacendero of Davao, and Anacleto Diaz, Fiscal of the city
of Manila.
The power to punish for contempt of court should be exercised on the
preservative and not on the vindictive principle. Only occasionally should the
court invoke its inherent power in order to retain that respect without which the
administration of justice must falter or fail. Nevertheless when one is
commanded to produce a certain person and does not do so, and does not offer
a valid excuse, a court must, to vindicate its authority, adjudge the respondent
to be guilty of contempt, and must order him either imprisoned or fined. An
officer's failure to produce the body of a person in obedience to a writ of habeas
corpus when he has power to do so, is a contempt committed in the face of the
court. (Ex parte Sterns [1888], 77 Cal., 156; In re Patterson [1888], 99 N. C.,
407.)
With all the facts and circumstances in mind, and with judicial regard for human
imperfections, we cannot say that any of the respondents, with the possible
exception of the first named, has flatly disobeyed the court by acting in
opposition to its authority. Respondents Hohmann, Rodriguez, Ordax, and
Joaquin only followed the orders of their chiefs, and while, under the law of
public officers, this does not exonerate them entirely, it is nevertheless a
powerful mitigating circumstance. The hacendero Yñigo appears to have been
drawn into the case through a misconstruction by counsel of telegraphic
communications. The city fiscal, Anacleto Diaz, would seem to have done no
more than to fulfill his duty as the legal representative of the city government.
Finding him innocent of any disrespect to the court, his counter-motion to strike
from the record the memorandum of attorney for the petitioners, which brings
him into this undesirable position, must be granted. When all is said and done,
as far as this record discloses, the official who was primarily responsible for the
unlawful deportation, who ordered the police to accomplish the same, who made
arrangements for the steamers and the constabulary, who conducted the
negotiations with the Bureau of Labor, and who later, as the head of the city
government, had it within his power to facilitate the return of the unfortunate
women to Manila, was Justo Lukban, the Mayor of the city of Manila. His
intention to suppress the social evil was commendable. His methods were
unlawful. His regard for the writ of habeas corpus issued by the court was only
tardily and reluctantly acknowledged.
It would be possible to turn to the provisions of section 546 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, which relates to the penalty for disobeying the writ, and in pursuance
thereof to require respondent Lukban to forfeit to the parties aggrieved as much
as P400 each, which would reach to many thousands of pesos, and in addition
to deal with him as for a contempt. Some members of the court are inclined to
this stern view. It would also be possible to find that since respondent Lukban
did comply substantially with the second order of the court, he has purged his
contempt of the first order. Some members of the court are inclined to this
merciful view. Between the two extremes appears to lie the correct finding. The
failure of respondent Lukban to obey the first mandate of the court tended to
belittle and embarrass the administration of justice to such an extent that his
later activity may be considered only as extenuating his conduct. A nominal fine
will at once command such respect without being unduly oppressive — such an
amount is P100.
In resume — as before stated, no further action on the writ of habeas corpus is
necessary. The respondents Hohmann, Rodriguez, Ordax, Joaquin, Yñigo, and
Diaz are found not to be in contempt of court. Respondent Lukban is found in
contempt of court and shall pay into the office of the clerk of the Supreme Court
within five days the sum of one hundred pesos (P100). The motion of the fiscal
of the city of Manila to strike from the record the Replica al Memorandum de los
Recurridos of January 25, 1919, is granted. Costs shall be taxed against
respondents. So ordered.
In concluding this tedious and disagreeable task, may we not be permitted to
express the hope that this decision may serve to bulwark the fortifications of an
Page 5 of 99
orderly government of laws and to protect individual liberty from illegal
encroachment.
Arellano, C.J., Avanceña and Moir, JJ., concur.
Johnson, and Street, JJ., concur in the result.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-4855 October 11, 1951
JOSE M. NAVA ET AL., petitioners,
vs.
HON. MAGNO GATMAITAN, ETC., respondent.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. L-4964 October 11, 1951
AMADO V. HERNANDEZ, petitioner, vs. HON, AGUSTIN P. MONTESA, ETC.,
respondent.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. L-5102 October 11, 1951
EUGENIO ANGELES, ETC., petitioner, vs. HON. GAVINO S. ABAYA, ETC.,
respondent.
PARAS, C.J.:
By express mandate of the Constitution (Article III, Section 1, Paragraph 14),
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended except in cases
of invasion, insurrection, or rebellion, when the public safety requires it, in any
of which events the same may be suspended whenever during such period the
necessity for such suspension shall exist. The power to suspend the privileges
of the writ of habeas corpus in case of invasion, insurrection, or rebellion, or
imminent danger thereof, when the public safety requires it, has been lodged by
the Constitution (Article VII, Section 10, Paragraph 2) in the President.
On January 31, 1905, for the first time in Philippine history, the writ of habeas
corpus was suspended in the provinces of Batangas and Cavite under the
following Executive Order issued by governor General Luke E. Wright:
WHEREAS, certain organized bands of ladrones exist in the Provinces of Cavite
and Batangas who are levying forced contributions upon the people, who
frequently require them, under compulsion, to join their bands, and who kill or
maim the most barbarous manner those who fail to respond to their unlawful
demands, and are therefore terrifying the law-abiding and inoffensive people of
those provinces; and
WHEREAS, these bands have in several instances attacked police and
constabulary detachments, and are in open insurrection against the constituted
authorities, and it is believed that the said bands have numerous agents and
confederates living within the municipalities of said provinces; and
WHEREAS, because of the foregoing conditions there exists a state of
insecurity and terrorism among the people which makes it impossible in the
ordinary way to conduct preliminary investigations before the justices of the
peace and other judicial officers:
In the interest of public safety, it is hereby ordered that the writ of habeas corpus
is from this date suspended in the Provinces of Cavite and Batangas.
On October 22, 1950, for the second time in the Philippine history, the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus was decreed by virtue
of the following Proclamation No. 210 issued by the President:
WHEREAS, lawless elements of the country have committed overt acts of
sedition, insurrection and rebellion for the purpose of overthrowing the duly
constituted authorities and, in pursuance thereof, have created a state of
lawlessness and disorder affecting public safety and the security of the state;
WHEREAS, these acts of sedition, insurrection and rebellion consisiting of
armed raids, sorties and ambushes and the wanton acts of murder, rape,
spoilage, looting, arson, planned destruction of public and private buildings, and
attacks against civilian lives and properties, as reported by the Commanding
General of the Armed Forces, have seriously endangered and still continue to
endanger the public safety;
WHEREAS, these acts of sedition, insurrection and rebellion have been
perpetrated by various groups of persons well organized for concerted action
and well armed with machine guns, rifles, pistols and other automatic weapons,
by reason whereof there is actual danger of rebellion which may extend
throughout the country;
WHEREAS, 100 leading members of these lawless elements have been
apprehended and are presently under detention, and strong and convincing
evidence has been found in their possession to show that they are engaged in
rebellious, seditiuos and otherwise subersive acts as above set forth; and

WHEREAS, public safety requires that immediate and effective action be taken
to insure the peace and security of the population and to maintain the authority
of the government;
NOW, THEREFORE, I, ELPIDIO QUIRINO, President of the Philippines, by
virtue of the powers vested upon me by Article VII, section 10, Paragraph (2) of
the Constitution, do hereby suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus
for the persons presently detained, as well as all others who may be hereafter
similarly detained for the crimes of sedition, insurrection or rebellion, and all
other crimes and offenses committed by them in furtherance or on the occassion
thereof, or incident thereto, or in connection therewith.
The writ of habeas corpus was devised and exists as a speedy and effectual
remedy to relive persons from unlawful restraint, and as the best and only
sufficient defense of personal freedom. (Villavicencio vs, Lukban, 39 Phil.,
778,788.) It secures to a prisoner the right to have the cause of his detention
examined and determined by a court of justice, and to have ascertained if he is
held under lawful authority. (Quintos vs. Director of Prisons, 55 Phil., 304, 306.)
The necessity for suspending the writ of habeas corpus in 1905 arose obviously
from the fact that it was "impossible in the ordinary way to conduct preliminary
investigations before the justice of the peace and other judicial officers," so that
undoubtedly it was never aimed at the indefinite detention of suspects, but at an
investigation (other than judicial) to determine whether there is evidence
sufficient for the filing in court of the necessary information.
The immediate cause for the issuance of Proclamation No. 210 on October 22,
1950, was the apprehension and detention of 100 alleged leading members of
lawless elements in whose possession strong and convincing evidence was
allegedly found showing that they are engaged in rebellious, seditious and
otherwise subversive acts. The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus had to be
suspended not only because it was desirable for the prosecuting officials to have
sufficient time to investigate and file the necessary charges in court, but also
because a public officer or employee who shall detain any person for some legal
ground and shall fail to deliver such person to the proper judicial authorities
within the period of six hours, shall suffer the penalties provided in article 125 of
the Revised Penal Code. In other words, the only effect of Proclamation No. 210
is that any person detained thereunder has no right to have the cause of his
detention examined and determined by a court of justice through a writ of
habeas corpus.
The important question is whether or not, after a person covered by the
Proclamation has been formally indicted in court by the filing against him of an
information charging rebellion with multiple murder, arson and robberies, he
may be entitled to bail.
Under paragraph 16, Section 1, Areticle II of the Constitution, all persons shall
before conviction be bailable by sufficientsureties, except those charged with
capital offenses when evidence of guilt is strong. The crime of rebellion or
insurrection is certainly not a capital offense, because it is penalized only by
prision mayor and a fine not to exceed 20,000pesos. The privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus and the right to bail guaranteed under the Bill of Rights are
separate and co-equal. If the intention of the framers of the Constitution was
that the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus carries or
implies the suspension of the right to bail, they would have very easily provided
that all persons shall before conviction be bailable by sufficient sureties, except
those charged with capital offenses when evidence of guilt is strong and except
when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. As stated in the
case of Ex parte Miligan, 4 Wall. 2, 18 Law Ed. 297, the Constitution limited the
suspension to only one great right, leaving the rest to remain forever inviolable.
It is essential to the safety of every government that, in a great crisis, like the
one we have just passed through, there should be a power somewhere of
suspending the writ of habeas corpus. In every war, there are men of previously
good character, wicked enough to counsel their fellow citizens to resist the
measures deemed necessary by a good government to sustain its just authority
and overthrow its enemies; and their influence may lead to dangerous
combinations. In the emergency of the times, an immediate public investigation
according to law may not be possible; and yet, the peril to the country may be
too imminent to suffer such persons to go at large. Unquestionably, there is then
an exigency which demands that the government, if it should see fit, in the
exercise of a proper discretion, to make arrests, should not be required to
produce the person arrested in answer to a writ of habeas corpus. The
constitution goes no further. It does not say after a writ of habeas corpus is
denied a citizen, that he shall be tried otherwise than by the course of common
law. If it had intended this result, it was easy by the use of direct words to have
accomplished it. The illustrious men who framed that instrument were guarding
the foundations of civil liberty against the abuses of unlimited power; they were
full of wisdom, and the lessons of history informed them that a trial by an
established court, asisted by an impartial jury, was the only sure way of
protecting the citizen against oppression and wrong. Knowing this, they limited
the suspension of one great right, and left the rest to remain forever inviolable.
The purpose of the proclamation has already been accomplished inrespect of
those who are now facing charges in court, to be dealtwith necessarily in
accordance with the constitution and the law.The court, in passing upon
petitions to bail and granting thesame in proper cases, does not inquire into the
cause of their detention which is plainly under and by virtue of
commitmentsissued by the court upon the filing of the information forrebellion
with multiple murder, arson and robberies. The court, therefore, cannot be said
to be interfering in an act of theExecutive, for it cannot be seriously contended
that, after thefiling of the information, the accused continues to be
Page 6 of 99
underdetention as a result of an executive commitment and stillcovered by the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. otherwise, the
suspension will operate as a judgment of conviction, in violation of the
constitutional mandate that no person shall be held to answer for criminal
offense without due process of law (Article III, section 1, Paragraph 15). "The
laws which protect the liberties of the whole people must not be violated or set
aside in order to inflict, even upon the guilty, unauthorized though merited
justice." Ex parte Milligan, supra.
The right to bail, along with the right of an accused to be heard by himself and
counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him,
to have a speedy and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to
have compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses in his behalf
(Article III, Section 1, Paragraph 17, of the Constitution), tends to aid the
accused to prove his innocence and obtain acquittal. If it be contended that the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus includes the suspension
of the distinct right to bail or to be provisionally at liberty, it would a fortiori imply
the suspension of all his other rights (even the rights to be tried by a court) that
may win for him ultimate acquittal and, hence, absolute freedom. The latter
result is not insisted upon for being patently untenable. it is not correct to say
that, if a person covered by Proclamation No. 210 is not entitled to be released
before he is indicted in court, there is more reason to hold that he should not be
released after an information is filed against him, because it is then logical to
assume that the Government holds sufficient evidence. If he cannot secure his
release before the filing of the information, it is because, in view of the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, the court cannot look
into the legality of his detention under an executive act, and not because he is
assumed to be guilty. As already stated, after the filing of the information, in
granting to bail in proper cases, the court does not determine the legality of his
prior detention which has already been superseded by a detention underjudicial
process, but merely proceeds with and carries into effect its jurisdiction over the
criminal case and grants a right guaranteed by the Constitution. Besides, it is
significant that in all criminal prosecutions the accused shall be presumed to be
innocent (Article III, Section 1, Paragraph 17).
We are not insensitive to the proposition that the very nature of the crime of
rebellion suggests the likehood that a person accused thereof will jump his bail.
The remedy, however, is unfortunately not in the hands of the court. The
lawmakers or the framers of the Constitution should have made the offense
capital or even unbailable.
In the cases now before us, the accused have been charged with rebellion so
complexed with other offenses as to make them capital. Their right to bail is
accordingly not absolute and may be denied when evidence of guilt is strong.
The filing of the information implies that the prosecution holds sufficient
evidence for conviction, and it is fair to suppose that the court will duly exercise
its judgment when called upon to pass on the question of whether or not the
evidence of guilt is strong. At any rate, on admission to bail, the accused is
delivered to the custody of his sureties as a continuance of the original
detention. (U.S. vs. Sunico and Ng Chiong, 40 Phil. 826).
And it should be borne in mind that if the worse comes to the worst — to the
extent that the security of the State is in factimperiled and the regular
constitutional processes can no longerbe observed with general safety to the
people, — the President isauthorized by the Constitution (Article VIII, Section
10, Paragraph 2) to "place the Philippines or any part thereof undermartial law."
Even then, the primordial objective should be a"regime of justice" as
contemplated in the Preamble of the Constitution. The stubborn fact, however,
is that the meresuspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is
anadmission that the courts can function and are functioningnormal; otherwise,
there is no need for the suspension as therewill be no court to grant the writ.
Reyes and Jugo, JJ., concur.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-14819 March 19, 1959
ALFREDO B. SAULO, petitioner,
vs.
BRIG. GEN. PELAGIO CRUZ, ETC., respondent.
CONCEPCION, J.:
Upon the filing of the petition herein, praying for the reasons therein stated, that
a writ a habeas corpus be issued, and that, after appropriate proceedings, the
petitioner be discharged, upon the ground that he is illegally detained and
deprived of his liberty, this Court issued a resolution, dated December 24, 1958,
ordering respondent Brig. Gen. Pelagio Cruz, Commanding General of the
Philippine Constabulary, to file, within five (5) days from notice, an answer
returnable to the Court of First Instance of Manila. In due course, thereafter, or
on January 14, 1959, said court issued an order stating that the facts set forth
in the petition — with the exception of the conclusion therein made, relative to
the alleged illegality of petitioner's detention — had been substantially admitted
in the answer of said respondent, who, however, assailed the jurisdiction of said
Court of First Instance, under section 2, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court, to pass
upon the issues in this case, namely:
May a person be arrested without warrant for an alleged violation of an Act which
expressly provides that no prosecution thereunder shall be made unless a
preliminary investigation has been conducted by the proper Court of First
Instance?
When such person has been so arrested, is he entitled to be released during
the time the preliminary investigation is being conducted?
and directing, without passing upon the said question of jurisdiction, that the
record of the case — including the transcript of the proceedings had, during the
hearing, and the memoranda of the parties — be forwarded to this Supreme
Court for further proceedings.
Section 2 of Rule 102 of the Rules of Court provides:
The writ of habeas corpus may be granted by the Supreme Court, or any
member thereof, on any day and at any time, or by the Court of Appeals or any
member thereof in the instances authorized by law, and if so granted it shall be
enforceable anywhere in the Philippines, and many be made returnable before
the court or any member thereof, or before a Court of First Instance, or any
judge thereof. It may also be granted by a Court of First Instance, or a judge
thereof, on any day and at any time, and returnable before himself, enforceable
only within his judicial district. (Emphasis ours.)
Pursuant to this provision, the writ of habeas corpus may be granted, either by
an appellate court, or any member thereof, or by a court of first instance. If
granted by the Supreme Court, or any member thereof, or by the Court of
Appeals, or any member thereof, in the instances authorized law, "it shall be
enforceable anywhere in the Philippines, and may be made returnable before
the court or any member thereof, or before a Court of First Instance or any judge
thereof." If granted by a court of first instance or a judge thereof, it shall be
"returnable before himself, enforceable only within his judicial district."
The case at bar falls under the first alternative, the writ of habeas corpus herein
having been issued by this Court. Conformably with the first sentence of said
section 2 the writ was made returnable before the Court of First Instance of
Manila. Respondent, however, maintains that the court of first instance alluded
to in said section 2, is "the court of first instance within whose jurisdiction the
petitioner is confined", under the theory, presumably, that the decision of such
court would be "enforceable only within his judicial district." This view is devoid
of merit. It is borne out, neither by said section 2 of the rules, nor by the language
of the law pertinent thereto or the established practice thereon.
Although the last sentence of section 2 declares that the writ of habeas corpus
granted by a court of first instance shall be enforceable only within his judicial
district, this limitation is not in point, the writ in this case having been granted by
the Supreme Court and, as provided in said section, "it shall be enforceable
anywhere in the Philippines,"
Moreover, it is apparent from sections 12 to 151 of said Rule 102 (which are
quoted hereunder), that the court or judge to whom the writ is returned shall
have the authority and the duty to inquire into the facts and the law pertinent to
the legality or illegality of petitioner's detention and o order his discharge from
confinement, should it appear satisfactorily "that he is unlawfully imprisoned or
restrained." It should be noted, also, that the procedure set forth in the Rules of
Court is in line with the provisions of Act No. 654 of the Philippine Commission,
section 7 of which reads:
In cases where an original petition for habeas corpus is filed in the Supreme
Court, the Supreme Court shall have the power either to decide on the face of
the petition filed that no case has been made for the issuing of a writ, or should
such a case appear by the allegations of the petition, to issue the writ and make
the same returnable and direct the hearing, either before the Supreme Court as
a whole, or any judge thereof, or any judge of a Court of First Instance.
This section is, in turn, substantially identical to section 81 of General Orders
No. 59, quoted on the margin.
Respondent's pretense is, seemingly, based upon the belief that the "writ of
habeas corpus" mentioned in section 2 of Rule 102 — which, if issued by a court
of first instance or a judge thereof shall be "enforceable only within his judicial
district" — is the same order of "discharge", referred to in section 15 of said rule.
However, the writ alluded to in said section 2 is nothing but the one specifically
described in section 6 of Rule 102, reading:
In case of imprisonment or restraint by an officer, the writ shall be directed to
him, and shall command him to have the body of the person restrained of his
liberty before the court or judge designated in the writ at the time and place
therein specified. In case of imprisonment or restraint by a person not an officer,
the writ shall be directed to an officer, and shall command him to take and have
the body of the person restrained of his liberty before the court or judge
designated in the writ at the time and place therein specified, and to summon
the person by whom he is restrained then and there to appear before said court
or judge to show the cause of the imprisonment or restraint.
In other words, said writ of habeas corpus plays a role somewhat comparable
to a summons, in ordinary civil actions, in that, by service of said writ, the court
acquires jurisdiction over the person of the respondent. Once authority over the
latter has thus been established, the appellate court issuing the writ, or the court
of first instance to which the writ has been made returnable — acting in place of
the appellate court — may render a decision, which — like other decisions of
the Supreme Court and of courts of first instance — may be enforced anywhere
in the Philippines.
Page 7 of 99
In point of practice, when a writ of habeas corpus is, comformably to law, made
returnable to a court other than that issuing the writ, the court to which the writ
is returned or the judge thereof possesses full authority to examine all issues
raised in the case and to settle the same. In the language of the American
Jurisprudence:
After a return to a writ, the court or judge to whom the return is made pass upon
all questions of both law and fact and determine the ultimate question whether
the prisoner is wrongfully restrained of his liberty. It is necessary for the court to
determine the weight and credibility of the evidence where the testimony is
conflicting.
. . . With further reference to habeas corpus proceedings in Federal courts, it is
expressly provided by statute that the court or judge before whom the prisoner
may be brought shall proceed in a summary way to determine the facts of the
case, by hearing the testimony and arguments, and thereupon to dispose of the
prisoner as law and justice may require. (25 Am. Jur., p. 245; Emphasis ours.)
Accordingly, the Court of First Instance of Manila may validly inquire in to legality
of petitioner's restraints and issue such orders, in connection therewith, as may
be proper, in the light of the facts proven and the law applicable thereto.
Would it not be advisable that the merits of the case be adjudicated here and
now? It is the considered opinion of this Court that it would be best that this task
be under taken by the Court of First Instance of Manila, inasmuch as: (1) said
court has already acquired jurisdiction thereon, owing to the writ made
returnable, and returned, thereto, and (2) said court has been conducting, and
is still conducting, the preliminary investigation in Criminal Case No. 46410
thereof, against petitioner herein, which respondent invokes in justification for
his (petitioner's) detention, so that the lower court is better situated, than we are,
to ascertain the pertinent facts and to make a reasonable appraisal thereof.
This should not be construed, in any manner whatsoever, as indicating that we
sanction the indefinite detention of an individual, without either a warrant of
arrest or an order of commitment, or that one charged with a violation of the
Anti-Subversion Act (Republic Act No. 1700), penalized therein "by prison
mayor to death", may be kept under custody, without said warrant of arrest or
order of commitments, regardless of the duration of the preliminary investigation
conducted pursuant to the provisions of said Act. The importance of a warrant
of arrest and/or said order of commitment; the effect, upon the legality or
illegality of a detention without warrant, of the filing of a complaint or information
after the expiration of the period fixed by law for the delivery of the of the period
fixed by law for the delivery of the detainee to the corresponding judicial
authority (Art. 125, Revised Penal Code, as amended by Act No. 3940); the
steps to be taken after said delivery; the purpose of a preliminary investigation;
the period of time within which the same should be completed; and the
alternatives that may be availed of when no warrant of arrest or order of
commitment has been issued and the preliminary investigation is not
seasonably undertaken or can not be finished promptly, have been thoroughly
elucidated in the decisions of this Court in Lino vs. Fuguso (77 Phil., 933) and
Sayo vs. Chief of Police of Manila (80 Phil., 859), and in the resolution on the
motion for reconsideration filed in the latter case, and it is not our intention in
the present resolution to alter the view thus expressed in said cases.
Wherefore, let the record of the case at bar be remanded to the lower court for
appropriate action. It is so ordered.
Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes, A., Bautista Angelo,
Labrador, Reyes, J.B.L. and Endencia, JJ., concur.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-15474 August 31, 1960
ALFREDO B. SAULO, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
BRIG. GENERAL PELAGIO CRUZ, ETC., respondent-appellee.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
In G.R. No. L-14819, a petition for habeas corpus was filed before this Court by
and in behalf of petitioner Alfredo B. Saulo. We issued, on December 24, 1958,
a writ ordering respondent Pelagio Cruz, as the Commanding General of the
Philippine Constabulary, to submit, within five (5) days from notice, an answer
returnable to the Court of First Instance of Manila.
At the hearing in the court below, respondent questioned the jurisdiction of the
lower court on the ground that, inasmuch as petitioner was confined in the
Philippine Constabulary stockade at Camp Crame, Quezon City, the Manila
court was without jurisdiction to entertain the case consonant with Section 2,
Rule 102 of the Rules of Court. Upon the remanding of the particular issue to us
by the trial judge, we overruled this contention in our resolution of March 19,
1959, and accordingly, we ordered the return of the records to the lower court
for its appropriate action on the merits of the petition.
The case was submitted to the lower court for decision solely on the facts
appearing in petitioner's pleadings and admitted by the respondent. According
to the lower court:
After successfully evading arrest since September, 1950, in connection with
three criminal cases (Nos. 13681, 19166 and 39253, CFI, Manila) one for
inciting to rebellion with murders, arsons, robberies and kidnappings, Alfredo B.
Saulo, in whose behalf the present petition for a writ of habeas corpus has been
presented, finally showed up at the Indonesian Embassy, Manila, on November
12, 1958, to seek refuge therein. As a result of negotiations had, the Indonesian
Embassy surrendered him to the Philippine Government on November 18,
1958, since which date he has remained in the custody of the Philippine
Constabulary at Camp Crame, Quezon City. One of the two criminal cases for
rebellion having been dismissed with respect to him on motion of the
prosecution, Saulo put up bail in the two remaining cases (Nos. 13681 and
39253). When the corresponding order for his temporary release was served,
the herein respondent Commanding General of the Philippine Constabulary
commanded one of his subordinates to with hold the release of Saulo on
account of Criminal Case No. 46410 the Court of First Instance of Manila. Said
criminal case is a complaint against Saulo, filed on November 19, 1958, by the
Fiscal of Manila, for alleged violation of Republic Act No. 1700, otherwise known
as the Anti-Subversion Act, punishable by prision mayor to death, so that the
said Court of First Instance might conduct the corresponding preliminary
investigation, as provided in the Act. While said preliminary investigation was
still going on, that is, on December 23, 1958, petitioner applied for a writ of
habeas corpus with the Supreme Court, as already stated, on the ground that
his detention, without warrant of arrest, by reason of the pendency of the
aforesaid Criminal Case No. 46410, is illegal and void. Said court gave due
course to the application and directed the respondent Commanding General of
the Philippine Constabulary to file answer, returnable to the Court of First
Instance of Manila.
Respondent filed answer, as directed, admitting practically all the facts above
related and alleged in the application, with the plea that "the pendency of
Criminal Case No. 46410 for violation of Republic Act No. 1700 filed before the
Court of First Instance of Manila is sufficient reason for continuing the detention
of the petitioner, in the absence of an order of the Court for his discharge under
the case aforesaid."
Upon such findings, the lower rendered decision, concluding that the filing of
Criminal Case No. 46410 amounted to the delivery of accused-petitioner, who
was arrested without warrant, to the proper court as provided under Section 17,
Rule 109 of the Rules of Court (citing Sayo, et al. vs. Chief of Police, 80 Phil.,
859). The Court consequently denied the petition for habeas corpus. Hence, this
appeal.
However, petitioner's appeal to have been filed out of time, as pointed out by
the Solicitor General. The records disclose that the notice of appeal was filed
eleven (11) days after a copy of the lower court's decision, denying the petition,
was served upon petitioner's counsel (on May 12, 1959 as per sheriff's return).
As provided by Section 18, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, petitioner should have
perfected his appeal within twenty-four (24) hours from notice of judgment:
Sec. 18. Appeal in habeas corpus cases, how taken. — An appeal in habeas
corpus case shall be perfected by filing with the clerk of the court or the judge
who rendered the judgment, within twenty-four (24) hours of notice of such
judgment, a statement that the person making it appeals from the judgment
rendered.
It has been consistently held that the reglementary period for appeal is not
mandatory but jurisdictional on the courts and that an appeal filed out of the time
may be sought to be dismissed at any stage of the proceedings in the appellate
court.1
In petitioner's "manifestation" dated October 12, 1959 it is contented that since
the case for habeas corpus was heard by the Manila Court of First Instance,
"not by virtue of its original jurisdiction but merely by delegation", this Court
should have the final say regarding the issues raised in the petition, and only its
decision, not that of the Court of First Instance, should be regarded as operative.
The logic is more than real. While the petition for habeas corpus was originally
filed with this Court, the only question that was immediately involved was the
propriety of the issuance of a writ that would order the respondent to show cause
why the detention of the person in whose behalf the writ was asked for should
not be considered illegal, and that, therefore, the petitioner be ordered
discharged from custody. The Rules authorize that once the writ is issued, the
same may be made returnable before a Court of First Instance (Sec. 2, Rule
102, Rules of Court), and not necessarily to us. The court designated does not
thereby become merely a recommendatory body, whose findings and
conclusion are devoid of effect, unless and until we decide to act on the
"recommendation". By filing a notice of appeal with the Court below, the
appellant impliedly admitted that the decision appealed was not merely
recommendatory or fact-finding.
In our resolution dated March 19, 1959, resolving the question of jurisdiction of
the lower court, we stated the following:
Moreover, it is apparent from sections 12 to 15 of said Rule 102 that the court
or judge to whom the writ is returned shall have the authority and the duty to
inquire into the facts and the law pertinent to the legality or illegality of
petitioner's detention and to order his discharge from confinement, should it
appear satisfactorily "that he is unlawfully imprisoned or restrained.
xxx xxx xxx
Page 8 of 99
In point of practice, when a writ of habeas corpus is, conformably to law, made
returnable to a court other than that issuing the writ, the court to which the writ
is returned, or the judge thereof, possesses full authority to examine all issues
raised in the case and to settle the same. In the language of the American
jurisprudence:
"After a return to a writ, the court or judge to whom the return is made must pass
upon all questions of both law and fact and determine the ultimate question
whether the prisoner is wrongfully restrained of his liberty. It is necessary for the
court to determine the eight and credibility of the evidence where the testimony
is conflicting.
". . . With further reference to habeas corpus proceedings in Federal courts, it is
expressly provided by statute that the court or judge before whom the prisoner
may be brought shall proceed in a summary way to determine the facts of the
case, by hearing the testimony and arguments, and thereupon to dispose of the
prisoner as law and justice may require." (25 Am. Jur., p. 245, Emphasis ours)
In other words, the court or the judge to whom the writ is made returnable takes
the case for determination on the merits (See 39 C.J.S. p. 603, sec. 58 and case
cited therein), and its findings, either for the release of the detainee or for
sustaining his continued custody, if not appealed on time, can become final just
as it may in an ordinary case.
We, accordingly, have no alternative than to dismiss the appeal.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby dismissed, with costs against petitioner-
appellant.
Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Barrera and
Gutierrez David, JJ., concur.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-29169 August 19, 1968
ROGER CHAVEZ, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES and THE WARDEN OF THE CITY JAIL OF MANILA,
respondents.
SANCHEZ, J.:
The thrust of petitioner's case presented in his original and supplementary
petitions invoking jurisdiction of this Court is that he is entitled, on habeas
corpus, to be freed from imprisonment upon the ground that in the trial which
resulted in his conviction1 he was denied his constitutional right not to be
compelled to testify against himself. There is his prayer, too, that, should he fail
in this, he be granted the alternative remedies of certiorari to strike down the
two resolutions of the Court of Appeals dismissing his appeal for failure to file
brief, and of mandamus to direct the said court to forward his appeal to this
Court for the reason that he was raising purely questions of law.
The indictment in the court below — the third amended information — upon
which the judgment of conviction herein challenged was rendered, was for
qualified theft of a motor vehicle, one (1) Thunderbird car, Motor No. H9YH-
143003, with Plate No. H-16648 Pasay City '62 together with its accessories
worth P22,200.00. Accused were the following: Petitioner herein, Roger
Chavez, Ricardo Sumilang alias "Romeo Vasquez", Edgardo P. Pascual alias
"Ging" Pascual, Pedro Rebullo alias "Pita", Luis Asistio alias "Baby" Asistio,
Lorenzo Meneses alias "Lory" Meneses, Peter Doe, Charlie Doe and Paul
Doe.2
Averred in the aforesaid information was that on or about the 14th day of
November, 1962, in Quezon City, the accused conspired, with intent of gain,
abuse of confidence and without the consent of the owner thereof, Dy Sun Hiok
y Lim, in asporting the motor vehicle above-described.
Upon arraignment, all the accused, except the three Does who have not been
identified nor apprehended, pleaded not guilty.
On July 23, 1963, trial commenced before the judge presiding Branch IX of the
Court of First Instance of Rizal in Quezon City.
The trial opened with the following dialogue, which for the great bearing it has
on this case, is here reproduced:
COURT:
The parties may proceed.
FISCAL GRECIA:
Our first witness is Roger Chavez [one of the accused].
ATTY. CARBON [Counsel for petitioner Chavez]:
I am quite taken by surprise, as counsel for the accused Roger Chavez, with The court will give counsel time within which to prepare his cross-examination
this move of the Fiscal in presenting him as his witness. I object. of this witness.

COURT: ATTY. CRUZ:

On what ground, counsel?
ATTY. CARBON:
On the ground that I have to confer with my client. It is really surprising that at
this stage, without my being notified by the Fiscal, my client is being
presented as witness for the prosecution. I want to say in passing
that it is only at this very moment that I come to know about this strategy of the
prosecution.
COURT (To the Fiscal):
I labored under the impression that the witnesses for the prosecution in this
criminal case are those only listed in the information.
I did not know until this morning that one of the accused will testify as witness
for the prosecution.
COURT:
That's the reason why the court will go along with counsels for the accused and
will give them time within which to prepare for their cross-examination of this
witness.

You are not withdrawing the information against the accused Roger Chavez by The court will not defer the taking of the direct examination of the witness.
making [him a] state witness?
Call the witness to the witness stand.
FISCAL GRECIA:
EVIDENCE FOR THE PROSECUTION
I am not making him as state witness, Your Honor.
I am only presenting him as an ordinary witness. ROGER CHAVEZ, 31 years old, single, buy and sell merchant, presently
detained at the Manila Police Department headquarters, after being duly sworn
ATTY. CARBON: according to law, declared as follows:

As a matter of right, because it will incriminate my client, I object. ATTY. IBASCO [Counsel for defendant Luis Asistio]:

COURT: WITH THE LEAVE OF THE COURT:

The Court will give counsel for Roger Chavez fifteen minutes within which to This witness, Roger Chavez is one of the accused in this case No. Q-5311.
confer and explain to his client about the giving of his testimony.
The information alleges conspiracy. Under Rule 123, Section 12, it states:
xxx xxx xxx
'The act or declaration of a conspirator relating to the conspiracy and during its
COURT: [after the recess] existence, may be given in evidence against the co-conspirator after the
conspiracy is shown by evidence other than such act or declaration.'
Are the parties ready?
COURT:
FISCAL:
That is premature, counsel. Neither the court nor counsels for the accused know
We are ready to call on our first witness, Roger Chavez. what the prosecution events to establish by calling this witness to the witness
stand.
ATTY. CARBON:
ATTY. IBASCO:
As per understanding, the proceeding was suspended in order to enable me to
confer with my client. I submit.

I conferred with my client and he assured me that he will not testify for the
prosecution this morning after I have explained to him the consequences of what
will transpire.
COURT:
What he will testify to does not necessarily incriminate him, counsel.
COURT: The Fiscal may proceed.3
And so did the trial proceed. It began with the "direct examination" of Roger
Chavez by "Fiscal Grecia".
Came the judgment of February 1, 1965. The version of the prosecution as
found by the court below may be briefly narrated as follows:

And there is the right of the prosecution to ask anybody to act as witness on the A few days before November 12, 1962, Roger Chavez saw Johnson Lee, a
witness-stand including the accused. Chinese, driving a Thunderbird car. With Ricardo Sumilang (movie actor Romeo
Vasquez) in mind, whom he knew was in the market for such a car, Chavez
If there should be any question that is incriminating, then that is the time for asked Lee whether his car was for sale. Lee answered affirmatively and left his
counsel to interpose his objection and the court will sustain him if and when the address with Chavez. Then, on November 12, Chavez met Sumilang at a
court feels that the answer of this witness to the question would incriminate him. barbershop informed him about the Thunderbird. But Sumilang said that he had
changed his mind about buying a new car. Instead, he told Chavez that he
Counsel has all the assurance that the court will not require the witness to wanted to mortgage his Buick car for P10,000.00 to cover an indebtedness in
answer questions which would incriminate him. Pasay City. Upon the suggestion of Chavez, they went to see Luis Asistio, who
he knew was lending money on car mortgages and who, on one occasion,
But surely, counsel could not object to have the accused called on the already lent Romeo Vasquez P3,000.00 on the same Buick car. Asistio however
witnessstand. told the two that he had a better idea on how to raise the money. His plan was
to capitalize on Romeo Vasquez' reputation as a wealthy movie star, introduce
ATTY. CARBON: him as a buyer to someone who was selling a car and, after the deed of sale is
signed, by trickery to run away with the car. Asistio would then register it, sell it
I submit. to a third person for a profit. Chavez known to be a car agent was included in
the plan. He furnished the name of Johnson Lee who was selling his
xxx xxx xxx Thunderbird. 1äwphï1.ñët

ATTY. CRUZ [Counsel for defendants Pascual and Meneses]: .
MAY IT PLEASE THE COURT:
This incident of the accused Roger Chavez being called to testify for the
prosecution is something so sudden that has come to the knowledge of this
counsel.
This representation has been apprised of the witnesses embraced in the
information.
For which reason I pray this court that I be given at least some days to meet
whatever testimony this witness will bring about. I therefore move for
postponement of today's hearing.
COURT:
Page 9 of 99
In the morning of November 14, Chavez telephoned Johnson Lee and arranged
for an appointment. Sometime in the afternoon. Chavez and Sumilang met Lee
in his Thunderbird on Highway 54. Sumilang was introduced as the interested
buyer. Sumilang's driver inspected the car, took the wheel for a while. After
Sumilang and Lee agreed on the purchase price (P21.000.00), they went to
Binondo to Johnson Lee's cousin, Dy Sun Hiok, in whose name the car was
registered. Thereafter, they went to see a lawyer notary public in Quezon City,
known to Chavez for the drafting of the deed of sale. After the deed of sale was
drawn up, it was signed by Sumilang as the vendee, Dy Sun Hiok the vendor,
and Sumilang's driver and Johnson Lee the witnesses thereto.
As payment was to be made at Eugene's restaurant in Quezon City, all of them
then drove in the Thunderbird car to that place. The deed of sale and other
papers remained in the pockets of Johnson Lee.
At Eugene's, a man approached Sumilang with a note which stated that the
money was ready at the Dalisay Theater. Sumilang then wrote on the same note
that the money should be brought to the restaurant. At the same time he
requested Lee to exhibit the deed of sale of the car to the note bearer.4
Then, the two Chinese were left alone in the restaurant. For Sumilang, who had
left the table to pose for pictures with some fans and come back, again left never
to return. So did Chavez, who disappeared after he left on the pretext of buying
cigarettes. The two Chinese could not locate Sumilang and Chavez. They went
out to the place where the Thunderbird was parked, found that it was gone. They
then immediately reported its loss to the police. Much later, the NBI recovered
the already repainted car and impounded it.
Right after the meeting at Eugene's, Chavez, Sumilang and Asistio converged
that same day at Barrio Fiesta, a restaurant at Highway 54 near the Balintawak
monument in Caloocan. There, Asistio handed to Sumilang P1,000.00 cash and
a golf set worth P800.00 as the latter's share in the transaction. On the 14th of
November, the registration of the car was transferred in the name of Sumilang
in Cavite City, and three days later, in the name of Asistio in Caloocan.
From the court's decision, Ricardo Sumilang's version, corroborated in part by
Asistio, may be condensed as follows:
In the last week of September, 1962, Sumilang saw Roger Chavez at a gas
station. The latter informed him that there was a Thunderbird from Clark Field
for sale for a price between P20,000.00 and P22,000.00. Chavez said that it
could be held for him with a down payment of P10,000.00.
To raise this sum, Sumilang and Chavez, on October 1, went to the house of a
certain Nena Hernaez de los Reyes who wrote out a check for P5,000.00 as a
loan to Sumilang. That check was exhibited in court. Sumilang and Chavez then
went to Pasay City to see a certain Mario Baltazar, an agent of the Pasay City
Mayor, and Narsing Cailles, Chief of the Fire Department. Sumilang asked the
two for a P10,000-loan backed up by the P5,000.00-check aforesaid on
condition that it should not be cashed immediately as there were not enough
funds therefor. Baltazar and Cailles agreed to give the money the nextday as
long as the check would be left with them and Sumilang would sign a promissory
note for P10,000.00. Baltazar later informed Sumilang that Chavez picked up
the money the next day. Four or five days afterwards, Chavez returned
P4,000.00 to Sumilang because P6,000.00 was enough for the deposit. And so,
Sumilang gave back the P4,000.00 to Baltazar.
About the end of October or at the beginning of November, Chavez asked
Sumilang for another P3,000.00. Sumilang sent Chavez to Baltazar and Cailles,
with a note requesting that they accommodate him once more. He also sent a
check, again without funds. Baltazar gave the money after verifying the
authenticity of the note.
On November 14, Chavez appeared at Sumilang's house with the news that the
car was ready if Sumilang was ready with the rest of the money. So Sumilang
got P9,000.00 from his mother and another P4,000.00 from his aparador. He
immediately gave P6,000.00 to Chavez, intending to pay out the balance upon
the car's delivery. It was then that Chavez told Sumilang that the car was already
bought by a Chinese who would be the vendor.
The purchase price finally agreed upon between Sumilang and Johnson Lee
was P21,000.00, plus P500.00 agents commission at the expense of the buyer.
Sumilang told Lee that he already paid part of the price to Chavez.
At Eugene's, Chavez asked Sumilang for the balance. Sumilang
accommodated. There, Sumilang, also saw a friend, "Ging" Pascual. In the
course of their conversation at the bar, Sumilang mentioned the proposed
transaction thru Chavez. Pascual warned that Chavez was a "smart" agent and
advised that Sumilang should have a receipt for his money. A certain Bimbo, a
friend of Pascual, offered to make out a receipt for Chavez to sign.
After Sumilang returned from posing for some photographs with some of his
fans, Bimbo showed him the receipt already signed by Chavez. Sumilang
requested Pascual and Bimbo to sign the receipt as witnesses. And they did.
This receipt was offered as an exhibit by the prosecution and by Sumilang.
When Sumilang was ready to leave Eugene's, Johnson Lee turned over to him
the deed of sale, the registration papers and the keys to the car. After shaking
hands with Lee, Sumilang drove away in the car with his driver at the wheel.
Two or three days afterwards, Sumilang dropped by the Barrio Fiesta on his
way to a film shooting at Bulacan. He saw Asistio with many companions. Asistio
liked his Thunderbird parked outside. Asistio offered to buy it from him for
P22,500.00. As the offer was good, and knowing Asistio's and his friends'
reputation for always getting what they wanted, Sumilang consented to the sale.
Asistio tendered a down payment of P1,000.00; the balance he promised to pay
the next day after negotiating with some financing company. Before said
balance could be paid, the car was impounded.
The trial court gave evidence to Sumilang's averment, strengthened by
Baltazar's and Cailles' corroborations, that he paid good money for the car.
Sumilang was thus cleared. So was Asistio whom the trial court believed to be
a mere buyer of the car. And so, the prosecution's theory of conspiracy was
discounted.
As to the other accused, the court found no case against Pedro Rebullo alias
"Pita" and Lorenzo Meneses alias "Lory". The accused "Ging" Pascual was also
acquitted for in the first place he was not identified by Johnson Lee in court.
Page 10 of 99
As to Roger Chavez, however, the court had this to say: "Roger Chavez does
not offer any defense. As a matter of fact, his testimony as witness for the
prosecution establishes his guilt beyond reasonable doubt."5 The trial court
branded him "a self-confessed culprit".6 The court further continued:
It is not improbable that true to the saying that misery loves company Roger
Chavez tried to drag his co-accused down with him by coloring his story with
fabrications which he expected would easily stick together what with the
newspaper notoriety of one and the sensationalism caused by the other. But
Roger Chavez' accusations of Asistio's participation is utterly uncorroborated.
And coming, as it does, from a man who has had at least two convictions for
acts not very different from those charged in this information, the Court would
be too gullible if it were to give full credence to his words even if they concerned
a man no less notorious than himself.7
The trial court then came to the conclusion that if Johnson Lee was not paid for
his car, he had no one but Roger Chavez to blame.
The sum of all these is that the trial court freed all the accused except Roger
Chavez who was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of qualified
theft. He was accordingly sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of not
less than ten (10) years, one (1) day, as minimum and not more than fourteen
(14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day as maximum, to indemnify Dy Sun
Hiok and/or Johnson Lee in the sum of P21,000.00 without subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency, to undergo the accessory penalties
prescribed by law, and to pay the costs. The Thunderbird car then in the custody
of the NBI was ordered to be turned over to Ricardo Sumilang, who was directed
to return to Asistio the sum of P1,000.00 unless the latter chose to pay
P21,500.00, representing the balance of the contract price for the car.
The foregoing sentence was promulgated on March 8, 1965. Roger Chavez
appealed to the Court of Appeals.
On April 18, 1968, the Court of Appeals required Atty. Natividad Marquez,
counsel for Roger Chavez, to show cause within ten days from notice why
Chavez' appeal should not be considered abandoned and dismissed. Reason
for this is that said lawyer received notice to file brief on December 28, 1967 and
the period for the filing thereof lapsed on January 27, 1968 without any brief
having been filed.
On May 13, 1968, Atty. Marquez registered a detailed written explanation. She
also stated that if she were allowed to file appellant's brief she would go along
with the factual findings of the court below but will show however that its
conclusion is erroneous.8
On May 14, 1968, the Court of Appeals, despite the foregoing explanation,
resolved to dismiss the appeal. A move to reconsider was unavailing. For, on
June 21, 1968, the Court of Appeals, through a per curiam resolution, disposed
to maintain its May 14 resolution dismissing the appeal, directed the City
Warden of Manila where Chavez is confined by virtue of the warrant of arrest
issued by the Court of Appeals, to turn him over to Muntinlupa Bilibid Prisons
pending execution of the judgment below, and ordered remand of the case to
the Quezon City court for execution of judgment.
It was at this stage that the present proceedings were commenced in this Court.
Upon the petitions, the return, and the reply, and after hearing on oral
arguments, we now come to grips with the main problem presented.
We concentrate attention on that phase of the issues which relates petitioner's
assertion that he was compelled to testify against himself. For indeed if this one
question is resolved in the affirmative, we need not reach the others; in which
case, these should not be pursued here.
1. Petitioner's plea on this score rests upon his averment, with proof, of violation
of his right — constitutionally entrenched — against self-incrimination. He asks
that the hand of this Court be made to bear down upon his conviction; that he
be relieved of the effects thereof. He asks us to consider the constitutional
injunction that "No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself,"9
fully echoed in Section 1, Rule 115, Rules of Court where, in all criminal
prosecutions, the defendant shall be entitled: "(e) To be exempt from being a
witness against himself." .
It has been said that forcing a man to be a witness against himself is at war with
"the fundamentals of a republican government"; 10 that [i]t may suit the
purposes of despotic power but it can not abide the pure atmosphere of political
liberty and personal freedom."11 Mr. Justice Abad Santos recounts the historical
background of this constitutional inhibition, thus: " "The maxim Nemo tenetur
seipsum accusare had its origin in a protest against the inquisitorial and
manifestly unjust methods of interrogating accused persons, which has long
obtained in the continental system, and, until the expulsion of the Stuarts from
the British throne in 1688, and the erection of additional barriers for the
protection of the people against the exercise of arbitrary power, was not
uncommon even in England. While the admissions of confessions of the
prisoner, when voluntarily and freely made, have always ranked high in the
scale of incriminating evidence, if an accused person be asked to explain his
apparent connection with a crime under investigation, the ease with which the
questions put to him may assume an inquisitorial character, the temptation to
press, the witness unduly, to browbeat him if he be timid or reluctant, to push
him into a corner, and to entrap him into fatal contradictions, which is so painfully
evident in many of the earlier state trials, notably in those of Sir Nicholas
Throckmorton, and Udal, the Puritan minister, made the system so odious as to
give rise to a demand for its total abolition. The change in the English criminal
procedure in that particular seems to be founded upon no statute and no judicial
opinion, but upon a general and silent acquiescence of the courts in a popular
demand. But, however adopted, it has become firmly embedded in English, as
well as in American jurisprudence. So deeply did the iniquities of the ancient
system impress themselves upon the minds of the American colonists that the
states, with one accord, made a denial of the right to question an accused
person a part of their fundamental law, so that a maxim which in England was a
mere rule of evidence, became clothed in this country with the impregnability of
a constitutional enactment." (Brown vs. Walker, 161 U.S., 591, 597; 40 Law.
ed., 819, 821)." 12 Mr. Justice Malcolm, in expressive language, tells us that
this maxim was recognized in England in the early days "in a revolt against the
thumbscrew and the rack." 13 An old Philippine case [1904] 14 speaks of this
constitutional injunction as "older than the Government of the United States"; as
having "its origin in a protest against the inquisitorial methods of interrogating
the accused person"; and as having been adopted in the Philippines "to wipe
out such practices as formerly prevailed in these Islands of requiring accused
persons to submit to judicial examinations, and to give testimony regarding the
offenses with which they were charged."
So it is then that this right is "not merely a formal technical rule the enforcement
of which is left to the discretion of the court"; it is mandatory; it secures to a
defendant a valuable and substantive right; 15 it is fundamental to our scheme
of justice. Just a few months ago, the Supreme Court of the United States
(January 29, 1968), speaking thru Mr. Justice Harlan warned that "[t]he
constitutional privilege was intended to shield the guilty and imprudent as well
as the innocent and foresighted." 16
It is in this context that we say that the constitutional guarantee may not be
treated with unconcern. To repeat, it is mandatory; it secures to every defendant
a valuable and substantive right. Tañada and Fernando (Constitution of the
Philippines, 4th ed., vol. I, pp. 583-584) take note of U.S. vs. Navarro, supra,
which reaffirms the rule that the constitutional proscription was established on
broad grounds of public policy and humanity; of policy because it would place
the witness against the strongest temptation to commit perjury, and of humanity
because it would be to extort a confession of truth by a kind of duress every
species and degree of which the law abhors. 17
Therefore, the court may not extract from a defendant's own lips and against his
will an admission of his guilt. Nor may a court as much as resort to compulsory
disclosure, directly or indirectly, of facts usable against him as a confession of
the crime or the tendency of which is to prove the commission of a crime.
Because, it is his right to forego testimony, to remain silent, unless he chooses
to take the witness stand — with undiluted, unfettered exercise of his own free,
genuine will.
Compulsion as it is understood here does not necessarily connote the use of
violence; it may be the product of unintentional statements. Pressure which
operates to overbear his will, disable him from making a free and rational choice,
or impair his capacity for rational judgment would in our opinion be sufficient. So
is moral coercion "tending to force testimony from the unwilling lips of the
defendant." 18
2. With the foregoing as guideposts, we now turn to the facts. Petitioner is a
defendant in a criminal case. He was called by the prosecution as the first
witness in that case to testify for the People during the first day of trial thereof.
Petitioner objected and invoked the privilege of self-incrimination. This he
broadened by the clear cut statement that he will not testify. But petitioner's
protestations were met with the judge's emphatic statement that it "is the right
of the prosecution to ask anybody to act as witness on the witness stand
including the accused," and that defense counsel "could not object to have the
accused called on the witness stand." The cumulative impact of all these is that
accused-petitioner had to take the stand. He was thus peremptorily asked to
create evidence against himself. The foregoing situation molds a solid case for
petitioner, backed by the Constitution, the law, and jurisprudence.
Petitioner, as accused, occupies a different tier of protection from an ordinary
witness. Whereas an ordinary witness may be compelled to take the witness
stand and claim the privilege as each question requiring an incriminating answer
is shot at him, 19 and accused may altogether refuse to take the witness stand
and refuse to answer any and all questions. 20 For, in reality, the purpose of
calling an accused as a witness for the People would be to incriminate him. 21
The rule positively intends to avoid and prohibit the certainly inhuman procedure
of compelling a person "to furnish the missing evidence necessary for his
conviction." 22 This rule may apply even to a co-defendant in a joint trial.23
And the guide in the interpretation of the constitutional precept that the accused
shall not be compelled to furnish evidence against himself "is not the probability
of the evidence but it is the capability of abuse." 24 Thus it is, that it was
undoubtedly erroneous for the trial judge to placate petitioner with these words:.
What he will testify to does not necessarily incriminate him, counsel.
And there is the right of the prosecution to ask anybody to act as witness on the
witness-stand including the accused.
If there should be any question that is incriminating, then that is the time for
counsel to interpose his objection and the court will sustain him if and when the
court feels that the answer of this witness to the question would incriminate him.
Counsel has all the assurance that the court will not require the witness to
answer questions which would incriminate him.
Page 11 of 99
But surely, counsel could not object to have the accused called on the witness
stand.
Paraphrasing Chief Justice Marshall in Aaron Burr's Trial, Robertsons Rep. I,
208, 244, quoted in VIII Wigmore, p. 355, 25 While a defendant's knowledge of
the facts remains concealed within his bosom, he is safe; but draw it from
thence, and he is exposed" — to conviction.
The judge's words heretofore quoted — "But surely counsel could not object to
have the accused called on the witness stand" — wielded authority. By those
words, petitioner was enveloped by a coercive force; they deprived him of his
will to resist; they foreclosed choice; the realities of human nature tell us that as
he took his oath to tell the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth, no
genuine consent underlay submission to take the witness stand. Constitutionally
sound consent was absent.
3. Prejudice to the accused for having been compelled over his objections to be
a witness for the People is at once apparent. The record discloses that by
leading questions Chavez, the accused, was made to affirm his statement given
to the NBI agents on July 17, 1963 at 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon. 26 And this
statement detailed the plan and execution thereof by Sumilang (Vasquez),
Asistio and himself to deprive the Chinese of his Thunderbird car. And he
himself proceeded to narrate the same anew in open court. He identified the
Thunderbird car involved in the case. 27
The decision convicting Roger Chavez was clearly of the view that the case for
the People was built primarily around the admissions of Chavez himself. The
trial court described Chavez as the "star witness for the prosecution". Indeed,
the damaging facts forged in the decision were drawn directly from the lips of
Chavez as a prosecution witness and of course Ricardo Sumilang for the
defense. There are the unequivocal statements in the decision that "even
accused Chavez" identified "the very same Thunderbird that Johnson Lee had
offered for sale"; that Chavez "testimony as witness for the prosecution
establishes his guilt beyond reasonable doubt and that Chavez is "a self-
confessed culprit". 1äwphï1.ñët
4. With all these, we have no hesitancy in saying that petitioner was forced to
testify to incriminate himself, in full breach of his constitutional right to remain
silent. It cannot be said now that he has waived his right. He did not volunteer
to take the stand and in his own defense; he did not offer himself as a witness;
on the contrary, he claimed the right upon being called to testify. If petitioner
nevertheless answered the questions inspite of his fear of being accused of
perjury or being put under contempt, this circumstance cannot be counted
against him. His testimony is not of his own choice. To him it was a case of
compelled submission. He was a cowed participant in proceedings before a
judge who possessed the power to put him under contempt had he chosen to
remain silent. Nor could he escape testifying. The court made it abundantly clear
that his testimony at least on direct examination would be taken right then and
thereon the first day of the trial.
It matters not that, after all efforts to stave off petitioner's taking the stand
became fruitless, no objections to questions propounded to him were made.
Here involve is not a mere question of self-incrimination. It is a defendant's
constitutional immunity from being called to testify against himself. And the
objection made at the beginning is a continuing one. 1äwphï1.ñët
There is therefore no waiver of the privilege. "To be effective, a waiver must be
certain and unequivocal, and intelligently, understandably, and willingly made;
such waiver following only where liberty of choice has been fully accorded. After
a claim a witness cannot properly be held to have waived his privilege on vague
and uncertain evidence." 28 The teaching in Johnson vs. Zerbst 29 is this: "It
has been pointed out that "courts indulge every reasonable presumption against
waiver" of fundamental constitutional rights and that we "do not presume
acquiescence in the loss of fundamental rights." A waiver is ordinarily an
intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege."
Renuntiatio non praesumitur.
The foregoing guidelines, juxtaposed with the circumstances of the case
heretofore adverted to, make waiver a shaky defense. It cannot stand. If, by his
own admission, defendant proved his guilt, still, his original claim remains valid.
For the privilege, we say again, is a rampart that gives protection - even to the
guilty. 30
5. The course which petitioner takes is correct. Habeas corpus is a high
prerogative writ. 31 It is traditionally considered as an exceptional remedy to
release a person whose liberty is illegally restrained such as when the accused's
constitutional rights are disregarded. 32 Such defect results in the absence or
loss of jurisdiction 33 and therefore invalidates the trial and the consequent
conviction of the accused whose fundamental right was violated. 34 That void
judgment of conviction may be challenged by collateral attack, which precisely
is the function of habeas corpus. 35 This writ may issue even if another remedy
which is less effective may be availed of by the defendant. 36 Thus, failure by
the accused to perfect his appeal before the Court of Appeals does not preclude
a recourse to the writ. 37 The writ may be granted upon a judgment already
final. 38 For, as explained in Johnson vs. Zerbst, 39 the writ of habeas corpus
as an extraordinary remedy must be liberally given effect 40 so as to protect
well a person whose liberty is at stake. The propriety of the writ was given the
nod in that case, involving a violation of another constitutional right, in this wise:
Since the Sixth Amendment constitutionally entitles one charged with crime to
the assistance of Counsel, compliance with this constitutional mandate is an
essential jurisdictional prerequisite to a Federal Court's authority. When this
right is properly waived, the assistance of Counsel is no longer a necessary
element of the Court's jurisdiction to proceed to conviction and sentence. If the
accused, however, is not represented by Counsel and has not competently and
intelligently waived his constitutional right, the Sixth Amendment stands as a
jurisdictional bar to a valid conviction and sentence depriving him of his liberty.
A court's jurisdiction at the beginning of trial may be lost "in the course of the
proceedings" due to failure to complete the court — as the Sixth Amendment
requires — by providing Counsel for an accused who is unable to obtain
Counsel, who has not intelligently waived this constitutional guaranty, and
whose life or liberty is at stake. If this requirement of the Sixth Amendment is
not complied with, the court no longer has jurisdiction to proceed. The judgment
of conviction pronounced by a court without jurisdiction is void, and one
imprisoned thereunder may obtain release of habeas corpus. 41
Under our own Rules of Court, to grant the remedy to the accused Roger
Chavez whose case presents a clear picture of disregard of a constitutional right
is absolutely proper. Section 1 of Rule 102 extends the writ, unless otherwise
expressly provided by law, "to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by
which any person is deprived of his liberty, or by which the rightful custody of
any person is withheld from the person entitled thereto.
Just as we are about to write finis to our task, we are prompted to restate that:
"A void judgment is in legal effect no judgment. By it no rights are divested. From
it no rights can be obtained. Being worthless in itself, all proceedings founded
upon it are equally worthless. It neither binds nor bars any one. All acts
performed under it and all claims flowing out of it are void. The parties attempting
to enforce it may be responsible as trespassers. ... " 42
6. Respondents' return 43 shows that petitioner is still serving under a final and
valid judgment of conviction for another offense. We should guard against the
improvident issuance of an order discharging a petitioner from confinement. The
position we take here is that petitioner herein is entitled to liberty thru habeas
corpus only with respect to Criminal Case Q-5311 of the Court of First Instance
of Rizal, Quezon City Branch, under which he was prosecuted and convicted.
Upon the view we take of this case, judgment is hereby rendered directing the
respondent Warden of the City Jail of Manila or the Director of Prisons or any
other officer or person in custody of petitioner Roger Chavez by reason of the
judgment of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City Branch, in Criminal
Case Q-5311, entitled "People of the Philippines, plaintiff, vs. Ricardo Sumilang,
et al., accused," to discharge said Roger Chavez from custody, unless he is
held, kept in custody or detained for any cause or reason other than the said
judgment in said Criminal Case Q-5311 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal,
Quezon City Branch, in which event the discharge herein directed shall be
effected when such other cause or reason ceases to exist.
No costs. So ordered.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Angeles and
Fernando, JJ., concur. Castro, J., concurs in a separate opinion.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-33964 December 11, 1971
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF TEODOSIO
LANSANG RODOLFO DEL ROSARIO, and BAYANI ALCALA, petitioners,
vs.
BRIGADIER-GENERAL EDUARDO M. GARCIA, Chief, Philippine
Constabulary, respondent.
G.R. No. L-33965 December 11, 1971
ROGELIO V. ARIENDA, petitioner, vs. SECRETARY OF NATIONAL
DEFENSE, and CHIEF, PHIL. CONSTABULARY, respondents.
G.R. No. L-33973 December 11, 1971
LUZVIMINDA DAVID, petitioner, vs. GEN. EDUARDO GARCIA, in his capacity
as Chief, Philippine Constabulary, COL. N. C. CAMELLO, in his capacity as
Chief of Staff, Philippine Constabulary and HON. JUAN PONCE ENRILE in his
capacity as Secretary, Department of National defense, respondents.
G.R. No. L-33982 December 11, 1971
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF NEMESIO
E. PRUDENTE FELICIDAD G. PRUDENTE, petitioners, vs. GENERAL
MANUEL YAN, GEN. EDU GARCIA, respondents.
G.R. No. L-34004 December 11, 1971
IN THE MATTER OF THE APPLICATION FOR HABEAS CORPUSIN BEHALF
OF GERARDO TOMAS, ALSO KNOWN AS "GERRY TOMAS" AND FOR
RETURN OF DOCUMENTS ILLEGALLY SEIZED. DOMINGO E. DE LARA, in
his capacity as Chairman, Committee on Legal Assistance, Philippine Bar
Association, petitioner, vs. BRIG. GENERAL EDUARDO M. GARCIA, CHIEF,
PHILIPPINE CONSTABULARY, respondent.
G.R. No. L-34013 December 11, 1971
Page 12 of 99
REYNALDO RIMANDO, petitioner, vs. BRIG. GEN. EDUARDO M. GARCIA,
Chief of the Philippine Constabulary, respondent.
G.R. No. L-34039 December 11, 1971
IN THE MATTER OF THE APPLICATION FOR HABEAS CORPUSIN BEHALF
OF SGT. FILOMENO M. DE CASTRO AND HIS WIFE, MRS. BARCELISA C.
DE CASTRO. CARLOS C. RABAGO, in his capacity as President of the
Conference Delegates Association of the Philippines (CONDA) petitioner, vs.
BRIG. GEN. EDUARDO M. GARCIA, Chief, Philippine Constabulary,
respondent.
G.R. No. L-34265 December 11, 1971
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF ANTOLIN
ORETA, JR. ANTOLIN ORETA, JR., petitioner, vs. GEN. EDUARDO GARCIA
and COL. PROSPERO OLIVAS, respondents.
G.R. No. L-34339 December 11, 1971
GARY B. OLIVAR, assisted by his father, GEORGE OLIVAR, petitioner, vs.
GEN. EDUARDO GARCIA, in his capacity as Chief, Philippine Constabulary, et
al., respondents.
CONCEPCION, C.J.:
In the evening of August 21, 1971, at about 9 p.m., while the Liberal Party of the
Philippines was holding a public meeting at Plaza Miranda, Manila, for the
presentation of its candidates in the general elections scheduled for November
8, 1971, two (2) hand grenades were thrown, one after the other, at the platform
where said candidates and other persons were. As a consequence, eight (8)
persons were killed and many more injured, including practically all of the
aforementioned candidates, some of whom sustained extensive, as well as
serious, injuries which could have been fatal had it not been for the timely
medical assistance given to them.
On August 23, soon after noontime, the President of the Philippines announced
the issuance of Proclamation No. 889, dated August 21, 1971, reading as
follows:
WHEREAS, on the basis of carefully evaluated information, it is definitely
established that lawless elements in the country, which are moved by common
or similar ideological conviction, design and goal and enjoying the active moral
and material support of a foreign power and being guided and directed by a well-
trained, determined and ruthless group of men and taking advantage of our
constitutional liberties to promote and attain their ends, have entered into a
conspiracy and have in fact joined and banded their forces together for the
avowed purpose of actually staging, undertaking and waging an armed
insurrection and rebellion in order to forcibly seize political power in this country,
overthrow the duly constituted government, and supplant our existing political
social, economic and legal order with an entirely new one whose form of
government, whose system of laws, whose conception of God and religion,
whose notion of individual rights and family relations, and whose political, social
and economic precepts are based on the Marxist-Leninist-Maoist teachings and
beliefs;
WHEREAS, these lawless elements, acting in concert through front
organizations that are seemingly innocent and harmless, have continuously and
systematically strengthened and broadened their memberships through
sustained and careful recruiting and enlistment of new adherents from among
our peasantry, laborers, professionals, intellectuals, students, and mass media
personnel, and through such sustained and careful recruitment and enlistment
have succeeded in infiltrating almost every segment of our society in their
ceaseless determination to erode and weaken the political, social, economic
and moral foundations of our existing government and to influence many
peasant, labor, professional, intellectual, student and mass media organizations
to commit acts of violence and depredations against our duly constituted
authorities, against the members of our law enforcement agencies, and worst of
all, against the peaceful members of our society;
WHEREAS, these lawless elements have created a state of lawlessness and
disorder affecting public safety and the security of the State, the latest
manifestation of which has been the dastardly attack on the Liberal Party rally
in Manila on August 21, 1971, which has resulted in the death and serious injury
of scores of persons;
WHEREAS, public safety requires that immediate and effective action be taken
in order to maintain peace and order, secure the safety of the people and
preserve the authority of the State;
NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines,
by virtue of the powers vested upon me by Article VII, Section 10, Paragraph (2)
of the Constitution, do hereby suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus,
for the persons presently detained, as well as others who may be hereafter
similarly detained for the crimes of insurrection or rebellion, and all other crimes
and offenses committed by them in furtherance or on the occasion thereof, or
incident thereto, or in connection therewith.
Presently, petitions for writ of habeas corpus were filed, in the above-entitled
cases, by the following persons, who, having been arrested without a warrant
therefor and then detained, upon the authority of said proclamation, assail its
validity, as well as that of their detention, namely:

1. TEDORO LANSANG, RODOLFO DEL ROSARIO and BAYANI
ALCALA, the petitioners in Case No. L-33964 — filed on August 24, 1971 —
who, on August 22, 1971, between 8 a.m. and 6 p.m., were "invited" by agents
of the Philippine Constabulary — which is under the command of respondent
Brig. Gen. Eduardo M. Garcia — to go and did go to the headquarters of the
Philippine Constabulary, at Camp Crame, Quezon City, for interrogation, and
thereafter, detained;
2. ROGELIO V. ARIENDA, the petitioner in Case No. L-33965 — filed,
also, on August 24, 1971 — who was picked up in his residence, at No. 55 Road,
3, Urduja Village, Quezon City, by members of the Metrocom and then detained;
3. Soon after the filing of the petition in Case No. L-33965 — or on
August 28, 1971 — the same was amended to include VICENTE ILAO and
JUAN CARANDANG, as petitioners therein, although, apart from stating that
these additional petitioners are temporarily residing with the original petitioner,
Rogelio V. Arienda, the amended petition alleged nothing whatsoever as
regards the circumstances under which said Vicente Ilao and Juan Carandang
are said to be illegally deprived of their liberty;
4. LUZVIMINDO DAVID, petitioner in Case No. L-33973 — filed on
August 25, 1971 — who was similarly arrested in his residence, at No. 131-B
Kamias Road, Quezon City, and detained by the Constabulary;
5. Felicidad G. Prudente, who filed the petition in Case No. L-33982 —
on August 27, 1971 — upon the ground that her father, Dr. NEMESIO E.
PRUDENTE, had, on August 22, 1971, at about 8 p.m., been apprehended by
Constabulary agents in his house, at St. Ignatius Village, Quezon City, and then
detained at the Camp Crame stockade, Quezon City;
6. ANGELO DE LOS REYES, who was allowed — on August 30, 1971
— to intervene as one of the petitioners in Cases Nos. L-33964, L-33965 and L-
33973, he having been arrested by members of the Constabulary on August 22,
1971, between 6:30 and 7:30 p.m., in his residence, at 86 Don Manuel Street,
Sta. Mesa Heights, Quezon City, and brought to Camp Crame, Quezon City,
where he is detained and restrained of liberty;
7. VICTOR FELIPE, who was similarly allowed to intervene as one of
the petitioners in said three (3) cases, upon the ground that, on August 23, 1971,
at about 8 a.m., he was, likewise, apprehended at Sta. Rosa, Laguna, by
members of the Philippine Constabulary and brought, first to the Constabulary
headquarters at Canlubang, Laguna, and, then, to Camp Crame, Quezon City,
where he is detained and restrained of liberty;
8. TERESITO SISON, who was, also, allowed to intervene as one of
the petitioners in the same three (3) cases, he having been arrested in his
residence, at 318 Lakandula St., Angeles City, on August 22, 1971, between 6
and 7 p.m., and taken to the PC offices at Sto. Domingo, Angeles City, then to
Camp Olivas, San Fernando, Pampanga, and eventually to Camp Crame,
Quezon City, where he is restrained and deprived of liberty;
9. GERARDO TOMAS, alias Gerry Tomas, a 17-year old second year
college students of St. Louis University, Baguio City, on whose behalf, Domingo
E. de Lara — in his capacity as Chairman, Committee on Legal Assistance,
Philippine Bar Association — filed on September 3, 1971, the petition in Case
No. L-34004, upon the ground that said Gerardo Tomas had, on August 23,
1971, at about 6 a.m., been arrested by Constabulary agents, while on his way
to school in the City of Baguio, then brought to the Constabulary premises
therein at Camp Holmes, and, thereafter, taken, on August 24, 1971, to Camp
Olivas, Pampanga, and thence, on August 25, 1971, to the Constabulary
headquarters at Camp Crame, Quezon City, where he is detained;
10. REYNALDO RIMANDO, petitioner in Case No. L-34013 — filed on
September 7, 1971 — a 19-year old student of the U.P. College in Baguio city
— who, while allegedly on his way home, at Lukban Road, Baguio, on August
23, 1971, at about 1 a.m., was joined by three (3) men who brought him to the
Burnham Park, thence, to Camp Olivas at San Fernando, Pampanga, and,
thereafter, to Camp Crame, Quezon City, where he is detained;
11. Sgt. FILOMENO M. DE CASTRO and his wife, Mrs. BARCELISA C.
DE CASTRO, on whose behalf Carlos C. Rabago — as President of the
Conference Delegates Association of the Philippines (CONDA) — filed the
petition in Case No. L-34039 — on September 14, 1971 — against Gen.
Eduardo M. Garcia, alleging that, on August 27, 1971, at about 3 p.m., Mrs. De
Castro was arrested, while at Liamzon Subdivision, Rosario, Pasig, Rizal, by
agents of the Constabulary, and taken to the PC headquarters at Camp Crame,
where, later, that same afternoon, her husband was brought, also, by PC agents
and both are detained;
12. ANTOLIN ORETA, JR., who filed the petition in Case No. L-34265
— on October 26, 1971 — against said Gen. Garcia, as Chief of the
Constabulary, and Col. Prospero Olivas, Chief of the Central Intelligence
Service (CIS), Philippine Constabulary, alleging that, upon invitation from said
CIS, he went, on October 20, 1971, to Camp Aguinaldo, Quezon City, to see
Gen. Manuel Yan, Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, who
referred petitioner to Col. Laroya of the CIS; that the latter, in turn, referred him
to CIS Investigator Atty. Berlin Castillo and another CIS against, whose name is
unknown to the petitioner; and that, after being interrogated by the two (2),
petitioner was detained illegally; and
13. GARY OLIVAR, petitioner in Case No. L-34339 — filed on
November 10, 1971 — who was apprehended, by agents of the Constabulary,
Page 13 of 99
in the evening of November 8, 1941, in Quezon City, and then detained at Camp
Crame, in the same City.
Upon the filing of the aforementioned cases, the respondents were forthwith
required to answer the petitions therein, which they did. The return and answer
in L-33964 — which was, mutatis mutandis, reproduced substantially or by
reference in the other cases, except L-34265 — alleges, inter alia, that the
petitioners had been apprehended and detained "on reasonable belief" that they
had "participated in the crime of insurrection or rebellion;" that "their continued
detention is justified due to the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus pursuant to Proclamation No. 889 of the President of the Philippines;"
that there is "a state of insurrection or rebellion" in this country, and that "public
safety and the security of the State required the suspension of the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus," as "declared by the President of the Philippines in
Proclamation No. 889; that in making said declaration, the "President of the
Philippines acted on relevant facts gathered thru the coordinated efforts of the
various intelligence agents of our government but (of) which the Chief Executive
could not at the moment give a full account and disclosure without risking
revelation of highly classified state secrets vital to its safely and security"; that
the determination thus made by the President is "final and conclusive upon the
court and upon all other persons" and "partake(s) of the nature of political
question(s) which cannot be the subject of judicial inquiry," pursuant to Barcelon
v. Baker, 5 Phil. 87, and Montenegro v. Castañeda, 91 Phil. 882; that petitioners
"are under detention pending investigation and evaluation of culpabilities on the
reasonable belief" that they "have committed, and are still committing,
individually or in conspiracy with others, engaged in armed struggle, insurgency
and other subversive activities for the overthrow of the Government; that
petitioners cannot raise, in these proceedings for habeas corpus, "the question
of their guilt or innocence"; that the "Chief of Constabulary had petitioners taken
into custody on the basis of the existence of evidence sufficient to afford a
reasonable ground to believe that petitioners come within the coverage of
persons to whom the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus has been
suspended"; that the "continuing detention of the petitioners as an urgent bona
fide precautionary and preventive measure demanded by the necessities of
public safety, public welfare and public interest"; that the President of the
Philippines has "undertaken concrete and abundant steps to insure that the
constitutional rights and privileges of the petitioners as well as of the other
persons in current confinement pursuant to Proclamation 889 remain
unimpaired and unhampered"; and that "opportunities or occasions for abuses
by peace officers in the implementation of the proclamation have been greatly
minimized, if not completely curtailed, by various safeguards contained in
directives issued by proper authority."
These safeguards are set forth in:
1. A letter of the President to the Secretary of National Defense, dated
August 21, 1971, directing, inter alia, in connection with the arrest or detention
of suspects pursuant to Proclamation No. 889, that, except when caught in
flagrante delicto, no arrest shall be made without warrant authorized in writing
by the Secretary of National Defense; that such authority shall not be granted
unless, "on the basis of records and other evidences," it appears satisfactorily,
in accordance with Rule 113, section 6(b), of the Rules of Court, that the person
to be arrested is probably guilty of the acts mentioned in the proclamation; that,
if such person will be charged with a crime subject to an afflictive penalty under
the Anti-Subversion Act, the authorization for his arrest shall not be issued
unless supported by signed intelligence reports citing at least one reliable
witness to the same overt act; that no unnecessary or unreasonable force shall
be used in effecting arrests; and that arrested persons shall not be subject to
greater restraint than is necessary for their detention;
2. Communications of the Chief of the Constabulary, dated August 23,
27, and 30, 1971, to all units of his command, stating that the privilege of the
writ is suspended for no other persons than those specified in the proclamation;
that the same does not involve material law; that precautionary measures
should be taken to forestall violence that may be precipitated by improper
behavior of military personnel; that authority to cause arrest under the
proclamation will be exercised only by the Metrocom, CMA, CIS, and "officers
occupying position in the provinces down to provincial commanders"; that there
shall be no indiscriminate or mass arrests; that arrested persons shall not be
harmed and shall be accorded fair and humane treatment; and that members of
the detainee's immediate family shall be allowed to visit him twice a week;
3. A memorandum of the Department of National Defense, dated
September 2, 1971, directing the Chief of the Constabulary to establish
appropriate Complaints and Action Bodies/Groups to prevent and/or check any
abuses in connection with the suspension of the privilege of the writ; and
4. Executive Order No. 333, dated August 26, 1971, creating a
Presidential Administrative Assistance Committee to hear complaints regarding
abuses committed in connection with the implementation of Proclamation No.
889.
Respondents in L-33965 further alleged that therein petitioners Vicente Ilao and
Juan Carandang had been released from custody on August 31, 1971, "after it
had been found that the evidence against them was insufficient."
In L-34265, the "Answer and Return" filed by respondents therein traversed
some allegations of fact and conclusions of law made in the petition therein and
averred that Antolin Oreta, Jr., the petitioner therein, had been and is detained
"on the basis of a reasonable ground to believe that he has committed overt
acts in furtherance of rebellion or insurrection against the government" and,
accordingly, "comes within the class of persons as to whom the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus has been suspended by Proclamation No. 889, as 7. San Carlos (Negros Occ.) 20. Cebu
amended," the validity of which is not contested by him. 8. Cadiz 21. Mandaue
9. Silay 22. Danao
On August 30, 1971, the President issued Proclamation No. 889-A, amending 10. Bacolod 23. Toledo
Proclamation No. 889, so as to read as follows: 11. Bago 24. Tacloban
12. Canlaon 25. Ormoc
WHEREAS, on the basis of carefully evaluated information, it is definitely 13. La Carlota 26. Calbayog
established that lawless elements in the country, which are moved by common
or similar ideological conviction, design and goal and enjoying the active moral On September 25, 1971, the President issued Proclamation No. 889-C,
and material support of a foreign power and being guided and directed by a well- restoring the privilege of the writ in the following provinces and cities:
trained, determined and ruthless group of men and taking advantage of our
constitutional liberties to promote and attain their ends, have entered into a A. PROVINCES:
conspiracy and have in fact joined and banded their forces together for the
avowed purpose of [actually] staging, undertaking, [and] wagging and are 1. Surigao del Norte 8. Agusan del Sur
actually engaged in an armed insurrection and rebellion in order to forcibly seize 2. Surigao del Sur 9. Misamis Or.
political power in this country, overthrow the duly constituted government, and 3. Davao del Norte 10. Misamis Occ.
supplant our existing political, social, economic and legal order with an entirely 4. Davao del Sur 11. Zamboanga del Norte
new one whose form of government, whose system of laws, whose conception 5. Davao Oriental 12. Basilan
of God and religion, whose notion of individual rights and family relations, and 6. Bukidnon 13. Pagadian
whose political, social and economic precepts are based on the Marxist- 7. Agusan del Norte
Leninist-Maoist teaching and beliefs;
B. CITIES:
WHEREAS, these lawless elements, acting in concert through front
organizations that are seemingly innocent and harmless, have continuously and 1. Surigao 8. Tangub
systematically strengthened and broadened their memberships through 2. Davao 9. Dapitan
sustained and careful recruiting and enlistment of new adherents from among 3. Butuan 10. Dipolog
our peasantly, laborers, professionals, intellectuals, students, and mass media 4. Cagayan 11. Zamboanga
personnel, and through such sustained and careful recruitment and enlistment 5. Gingoong 12. Basilan
have succeeded in infiltrating almost every segment of our society in their 6. Ozamiz 13. Pagadian.
ceaseless determination to erode and weaken the political, social, economic 7. Oroquieta
and moral foundations of our existing government and influence many peasant,
labor, professional, intellectual, student and mass media organizations to On October 4, 1971, the suspension of the privilege was further lifted by
commit acts of violence and depredations against our duly constituted Proclamation No. 889-D, in the following places:
authorities, against the members of our law enforcement agencies, and worst of
all, against the peaceful members of our society; A. PROVINCES:

WHEREAS, these lawless elements, by their acts of rebellion and insurrection, 1. Cagayan 5. Camarines
have created a state of lawlessness and disorder affecting public safety and 2. Cavite 6. Albay
security of the State, the latest manifestation of which has been the dastardly 3. Mountain Province 7. Sorsogon
attack on the Liberal Party rally in Manila on August 21, 1971, which has resulted 4. Kalinga-Apayao
in the death and serious injury of scores of persons;
B. CITIES:
WHEREAS, public safety requires that immediate and effective action be taken
in order to maintain peace and order, secure the safety of the people and 1. Cavite City 3. Trece Martires
preserve the authority of the State; 2. Tagaytay 4. Legaspi

NOW THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines, As a consequence, the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is still suspended
by virtue of the powers vested upon me by Article VII, Section 10, Paragraph (2) in the following eighteen (18) provinces, two (2) sub-provinces and eighteen (18)
of the Constitution, do hereby suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus cities, to wit:
for the persons presently detained, as well as all others who may be hereafter
similarly detained for the crimes of insurrection or rebellion [,] and [all] other A. PROVINCE:
[crimes and offenses] overt acts committed by them in furtherance [or on the
occasion] thereof[,]. [or incident thereto, or in connection therewith.]1 1. Bataan 10. North Cotabato
2. Benguet 11. Nueva Ecija
On September 1, 1971, Cases Nos. L-33964, L-33965, L-33973 and L-33982 3. Bulacan 13. Pampanga
were jointly heard and then the parties therein were allowed to file memoranda, 4. Camarines Sur 14. Quezon
which were submitted from September 3 to September 9, 1971. 5. Ifugao 15. Rizal
6. Isabela 16. South Cotabato
Soon thereafter, or on September 18, 1971, Proclamation No. 889 was further 7. Laguna 17. Tarlac
amended by Proclamation No. 889-B, lifting the suspension of the privilege of 8. Lanao del Norte 18. Zambales
the writ of habeas corpus in the following provinces, sub-provinces and cities of 9. Lanao del Norte
the Philippine, namely:
B. SUB-PROVINCES:
A. PROVINCES:
1. Aurora 2. Quirino
1. Batanes 15. Negros Occ.
2. Ilocos Norte 16. Negros Or. C. CITIES:
3. Ilocos Sur 17. Cebu
4. Abra 18. Bohol 1. Angeles 10. Manila
5. Abra 19. Capiz 2. Baguio 11. Marawi
6. Pangasinan 20. Aklan 3. Cabanatuan 12. Naga
7. Batangas 21. Antique 4. Caloocan 13. Olongapo
8. Catanduanes 22. Iloilo 5. Cotabato 14. Palayan
9. Masbate 23. Leyte 6. General Santos 15. Pasay
10. Romblon 24. Leyte del Sur 7. Iligan 16. Quezon
11. Marinduque 25. Northern Samar 8 Iriga 17. San Jose
12. Or. Mindoro 26. Eastern Samar 9 Lucena 18. San Pablo
13. Occ. Mindoro 27. Western Samar
14. Palawan. The first major question that the Court had to consider was whether it would
adhere to the view taken in Barcelon v. Baker,2 and reiterated in Montenegro v.
B. SUB-PROVINCES: Castañeda,3 pursuant to which, "the authority to decide whether the exigency
has arisen requiring suspension (of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus)
1. Guimaras 3. Siquior belongs to the President and his 'decision is final and conclusive' upon the
2. Biliran courts and upon all other persons." Indeed, had said question been decided in
the affirmative the main issue in all of these cases, except L-34339, would have
C. CITIES: been settled, and, since the other issues were relatively of minor importance,
said cases could have been readily disposed of. Upon mature deliberation, a
1. Laog 14. Bais majority of the Members of the Court had, however, reached, although
2. Dagupan 15. Dumaguete tentatively, a consensus to the contrary, and decided that the Court had
3. San Carlos 16. Iloilo authority to and should inquire into the existence of the factual bases required
4. Batangas 17. Roxas by the Constitution for the suspension of the privilege of the writ; but before
5. Lipa 18. Tagbilaran proceeding to do so, the Court deemed it necessary to hear the parties on the
6. Puerto Princesa 19. Lapu-lapu nature and extent of the inquiry to be undertaken, none of them having
Page 14 of 99
previously expressed their views thereof. Accordingly, on October 5, 1971, the
Court issued, in L-33964, L-33965, L-33973 and L-33982, a resolution stating
in part that —
... a majority of the Court having tentatively arrived at a consensus that it may
inquire in order to satisfy itself of the existence of the factual bases for the
issuance of Presidential Proclamations Nos. 889 and 889-A (suspending the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus for all persons detained or to be detained
for the crimes of rebellion or insurrection throughout the Philippines, which area
has lately been reduced to some eighteen provinces, two subprovinces and
eighteen cities with the partial lifting of the suspension of the privilege effected
by Presidential Proclamations Nos. 889-B, 889-C and 889-D) and thus
determine the constitutional sufficiency of such bases in the light of the
requirements of Article III, sec. 1, par. 14, and Article VII, sec. 10, par. 2, of the
Philippine Constitution; and considering that the members of the Court are not
agreed on the precise scope and nature of the inquiry to be made in the
premises, even as all of them are agreed that the Presidential findings are
entitled to great respect, the Court RESOLVED that these cases be set for
rehearing on October 8, 1971 at 9:30 A.M.
xxx xxx xxx
On October 8, 1971, said four cases were, therefore, heard, once again, but,
this time jointly with cases Nos. L-34004, L-34013, and L-34039, and the parties
were then granted a period to file memoranda, in amplification of their respective
oral arguments, which memoranda were submitted from October 12 to October
21, 1971.
Respondents having expressed, during the oral arguments, on September 1
and October 8, 1971, their willingness to impart to the Court classified
information relevant to these cases, subject to appropriate security measures,
the Court met at closed doors, on October 28 and 29, 1971, and, in the presence
of three (3) attorneys for the petitioners, chosen by the latter, namely, Senator
Jose W. Diokno, Senator Salvador H. Laurel, and Atty. Leopoldo Africa, as well
as of the Solicitor General and two (2) members of his staff, was briefed, by
Gen. Manuel Yan, Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, Gen.
Fidel Ramos, Deputy Chief of Staff, Gen. Felizardo Tanabe, Col. Tagumpay
Nanadiego, Judge Advocate General, JAGS (GSC), and other ranking officers
of said Armed Forces, on said classified information, most of which was
contained in reports and other documents already attached to the records.
During the proceedings, the members of the Court, and, occassionally, counsel
for the petitioners, propounded pertinent questions to said officers of the Armed
Forces. Both parties were then granted a period of time within which to submit
their respective observations, which were filed on November 3, 1971, and
complemented by some documents attached to the records on November 6,
1971, and a summary, submitted on November 15, 1971, of the aforesaid
classified information.
In the meantime, cases Nos. L-34265 (Oreta) and L-34339 (Olivar) had been
filed and the parties therein were heard in oral argument on November 4, and
16, 1971, respectively.
On November 15, 1971, the Solicitor General filed manifestations — motions
stating that on November 13, 1971, the following petitioners were:
(a) released from custody:
(1) Teodosio Lansang -- G.R. No. L-33964
(2) Bayani Alcala -- " " L-33964
(3) Rogelio Arienda -- " " L-33965
(4) Nemesio Prudente -- " " L-33982
(5) Gerardo Tomas -- " " L-34004
(6) Reynaldo Rimando -- " " L-34013
(7) Filomeno M. de Castro -- " " L-34039
(8) Barcelisa de Castro -- " " L-34039
(9) Antolin Oreta, Jr. -- " " L-34264.
(b) charged, together with other persons named in the criminal
complaint filed therefor, with a violation of Republic Act No. 1700 (Anti-
Subversion Act), in the City Fiscal's Office of Quezon City:
(1) Angelo de los Reyes -- G.R. No. L-22982 *
(2) Teresito Sison -- " " L-33982 *
(c) accused, together with many others named in the criminal complaint
filed therefor, of a violation of section 4 of Republic Act No. 1700 (Anti-
Subversion Act), in the Court of First Instance of Rizal:
(1) Rodolfo del Rosario -- G.R. No. L-33969 **
(2) Luzvimindo David -- " " L-33973
(3) Victor Felipe -- " " L-33982 *
and continue under detention pursuant to Proclamation No. 889, as amended,
and praying that the petitions in G.R. Nos. L-33964, L-33965, L-33982, L-34004,
L-34013 and L-34039 be dismissed, without prejudice to the resolution of the
remaining cases. Copy of the criminal complaint filed, as above stated, with the
Court of First Instance of Rizal and docketed therein as Criminal Case No. Q-
1623 of said court — which was appended to said manifestations-motions of the
respondent as Annex 2 thereof — shows that Gary Olivar, the petitioner in L-
34339, is one of the defendants in said case.
Required to comment on said manifestations-motions, Luzvimindo David,
petitioner in L-33973, in his comment dated November 23, 1971, urged the
Page 15 of 99
Court to rule on the merits of the petitions in all of these cases, particularly on
the constitutionality of Presidential Proclamation No. 889, as amended, upon
the ground that he is still detained and that the main issue is one of public
interest involving as it does the civil liberties of the people. Angelo de los Reyes,
one of the petitioners in L-33964, L-33965 and L-33973, Nemesio E. Prudente
and Gerardo Tomas, for whose respective benefit the petitions in L-33982 and
L-34004 have been filed, maintained that the issue in these cases is not moot,
not even for the detainees who have been released, for, as long as the privilege
of the writ remains suspended, they are in danger of being arrested and
detained again without just cause or valid reason. In his reply, dated and filed
on November 29, 1971, the Solicitor General insisted that the release of the
above-named petitioners rendered their respective petitions moot and
academic.
I
Petitioners herein, except Antolin Oreta, Jr. in L-34265, question the formal
validity of the proclamation suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus. In this connection, it should be noted that, as originally formulated,
Proclamation No. 889 was contested upon the ground that it did not comply with
the pertinent constitutional provisions, namely, paragraph (14) of section 1,
Article III of our Constitution, reading:
The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended except in
cases of invasion, insurrection, or rebellion, when the public safety requires it,
in any way of which events the same may be suspended wherever during such
period the necessity for such suspension shall exist.
and paragraph (2), section 10, Article VII of the same instrument, which provides
that:
The President shall be commander-in-chief of all armed forces of the
Philippines, and whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed
forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion, insurrection, or
rebellion. In case of invasion, insurrection, or rebellion, or imminent danger
thereof when the public safety requires it, he may suspend the privileges of the
writ of habeas corpus, or place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial
law.
Regardless of whether or not the President may suspend the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus in case of "imminent danger" of invasion, insurrection or
rebellion — which is one of the grounds stated in said paragraph (2), section 10
of Art. VII of the Constitution, but not mentioned in paragraph (14), section 1 of
its Bill of Rights — petitioners maintained that Proclamation No. 889 did not
declare the existence of actual "invasion insurrection or rebellion or imminent
danger thereof," and that, consequently, said Proclamation was invalid. This
contention was predicated upon the fact that, although the first "whereas" in
Proclamation No. 889 stated that "lawless elements" had "entered into a
conspiracy and have in fact joined and banded their forces together for the
avowed purpose of actually staging, undertaking and waging an armed
insurrection and rebellion," the actuality so alleged refers to the existence, not
of an uprising that constitutes the essence of a rebellion or insurrection, but of
the conspiracy and the intent to rise in arms.
Whatever may be the merit of this claim, the same has been rendered moot and
academic by Proclamation No. 889-A, issued nine (9) days after the
promulgation of the original proclamation, or on August 30, 1971. Indeed, said
Proclamation No. 889-A amended, inter alia, the first "whereas" of the original
proclamation by postulating the said lawless elements "have entered into a
conspiracy and have in fact joined and banded their forces together for the
avowed purpose of staging, undertaking, waging and are actually engaged in
an armed insurrection and rebellion in order to forcibly seize political power in
this country, overthrow the duly constituted government, and supplant our
existing political, social, economic and legal order with an entirely new one ...."
Moreover, the third "whereas" in the original proclamation was, likewise,
amended by alleging therein that said lawless elements, "by their acts of
rebellion and insurrection," have created a state of lawlessness and disorder
affecting public safety and the security of the State. In other words, apart from
adverting to the existence of actual conspiracy and of the intent to rise in arms
to overthrow the government, Proclamation No. 889-A asserts that the lawless
elements "are actually engaged in an armed insurrection and rebellion" to
accomplish their purpose.
It may not be amiss to note, at this juncture, that the very tenor of the original
proclamation and particularly, the circumstances under which it had been
issued, clearly suggest the intent to aver that there was and is, actually, a state
of rebellion in the Philippines, although the language of said proclamation was
hardly a felicitous one, it having in effect, stressed the actuality of the intent to
rise in arms, rather than of the factual existence of the rebellion itself. The
pleadings, the oral arguments and the memoranda of respondents herein have
consistently and abundantly emphasized — to justify the suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus — the acts of violence and subversion
committed prior to August 21, 1971, by the lawless elements above referred to,
and the conditions obtaining at the time of the issuance of the original
proclamation. In short, We hold that Proclamation No. 889-A has superseded
the original proclamation and that the flaws attributed thereto are purely formal
in nature.
II
Let us now consider the substantive validity of the proclamation, as amended.
Pursuant to the above-quoted provisions of the Constitution, two (2) conditions
must concur for the valid exercise of the authority to suspend the privilege to the
writ, to wit: (a) there must be "invasion, insurrection, or rebellion" or — pursuant
to paragraph (2), section 10 of Art. VII of the Constitution — "imminent danger
thereof," and (b) "public safety" must require the suspension of the privilege.
The Presidential Proclamation under consideration declares that there has been
and there is actually a state of rebellion and that4 "public safety requires that
immediate and effective action be taken in order to maintain peace and order,
secure the safety of the people and preserve the authority of the State."
Are these findings conclusive upon the Court? Respondents maintain that they
are, upon the authority of Barcelon v. Baker5 and Montenegro v. Castañeda.6
Upon the other hand, petitioners press the negative view and urge a
reexamination of the position taken in said two (2) cases, as well as a reversal
thereof.
The weight of Barcelon v. Baker, as a precedent, is diluted by two (2) factors,
namely: (a) it relied heavily upon Martin v. Mott7 involving the U.S. President's
power to call out the militia, which — he being the commander-in-chief of all the
armed forces — may be exercised to suppress or prevent any lawless violence,
even without invasion, insurrection or rebellion, or imminent danger thereof, and
is, accordingly, much broader than his authority to suspend the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus, jeopardizing as the latter does individual liberty; and (b)
the privilege had been suspended by the American Governor-General, whose
act, as representative of the Sovereign, affecting the freedom of its subjects,
can hardly be equated with that of the President of the Philippines dealing with
the freedom of the Filipino people, in whom sovereignty resides, and from whom
all government authority emanates. The pertinent ruling in the Montenegro case
was based mainly upon the Barcelon case, and hence, cannot have more
weight than the same. Moreover, in the Barcelon case, the Court held that it
could go into the question: "Did the Governor-General" — acting under the
authority vested in him by the Congress of the United States, to suspend the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus under certain conditions — "act in
conformance with such authority?" In other words, it did determine whether or
not the Chief Executive had acted in accordance with law. Similarly, in the
Montenegro case, the Court held that petitioner therein had "failed to overcome
the presumption of correctness which the judiciary accords to acts of the
Executive ...." In short, the Court considered the question whether or not there
really was are rebellion, as stated in the proclamation therein contested.
Incidentally, even the American jurisprudence is neither explicit nor clear on the
point under consideration. Although some cases8 purport to deny the judicial
power to "review" the findings made in the proclamations assailed in said cases,
the tenor of the opinions therein given, considered as a whole, strongly suggests
the court's conviction that the conditions essential for the validity of said
proclamations or orders were, in fact, present therein, just as the opposite view
taken in other cases9 had a backdrop permeated or characterized by the belief
that said conditions were absent. Hence, the dictum of Chief Justice Taney to
the effect that "(e)very case must depend on its own circumstances." 10 One of
the important, if not dominant, factors, in connection therewith, was intimated in
Sterling v. Constantin, 11 in which the Supreme Court of the United States,
speaking through Chief Justice Hughes, declared that:
.... When there is a substantial showing that the exertion of state power has
overridden private rights secured by that Constitution, the subject is necessarily
one for judicial inquiry in an appropriate proceeding directed against the
individuals charged with the transgression. To such a case the Federal judicial
power extends
(Art. 3, sec. 2) and, so extending, the court has all the authority appropriate to
its exercise. .... 12
In our resolution of October 5, 1971, We stated that "a majority of the Court" had
"tentatively arrived at a consensus that it may inquire in order to satisfy itself of
the existence of the factual bases for the issuance of Presidential Proclamations
Nos. 889 and 889-A ... and thus determine the constitutional sufficiency of such
bases in the light of the requirements of Article III, sec. 1, par. 14, and Article
VII, sec. 10, par 2, of the Philippine Constitution...." Upon further deliberation,
the members of the Court are now unanimous in the conviction that it has the
authority to inquire into the existence of said factual bases in order to determine
the constitutional sufficiency thereof.
Indeed, the grant of power to suspend the privilege is neither absolute nor
unqualified. The authority conferred by the Constitution, both under the Bill of
Rights and under the Executive Department, is limited and conditional. The
precept in the Bill of Rights establishes a general rule, as well as an exception
thereto. What is more, it postulates the former in the negative, evidently to stress
its importance, by providing that "(t)he privilege of the writ of habeas corpus
shall not be suspended ...." It is only by way of exception that it permits the
suspension of the privilege "in cases of invasion, insurrection, or rebellion" —
or, under Art VII of the Constitution, "imminent danger thereof" — "when the
public safety requires it, in any of which events the same may be suspended
wherever during such period the necessity for such suspension shall exist." 13
For from being full and plenary, the authority to suspend the privilege of the writ
is thus circumscribed, confined and restricted, not only by the prescribed setting
or the conditions essential to its existence, but, also, as regards the time when
and the place where it may be exercised. These factors and the aforementioned
setting or conditions mark, establish and define the extent, the confines and the
limits of said power, beyond which it does not exist. And, like the limitations and
restrictions imposed by the Fundamental Law upon the legislative department,
adherence thereto and compliance therewith may, within proper bounds, be
inquired into by courts of justice. Otherwise, the explicit constitutional provisions
thereon would be meaningless. Surely, the framers of our Constitution could not
have intended to engage in such a wasteful exercise in futility.
Page 16 of 99
Much less may the assumption be indulged in when we bear in mind that our
political system is essentially democratic and republican in character and that
the suspension of the privilege affects the most fundamental element of that
system, namely, individual freedom. Indeed, such freedom includes and
connotes, as well as demands, the right of every single member of our citizenry
to freely discuss and dissent from, as well as criticize and denounce, the views,
the policies and the practices of the government and the party in power that he
deems unwise, improper or inimical to the commonwealth, regardless of
whether his own opinion is objectively correct or not. The untrammelled
enjoyment and exercise of such right — which, under certain conditions, may
be a civic duty of the highest order — is vital to the democratic system and
essential to its successful operation and wholesome growth and development.
Manifestly, however, the liberty guaranteed and protected by our Basic Law is
one enjoyed and exercised, not in derogation thereof, but consistently therewith,
and, hence, within the framework of the social order established by the
Constitution and the context of the Rule of Law. Accordingly, when individual
freedom is used to destroy that social order, by means of force and violence, in
defiance of the Rule of Law — such as by rising publicly and taking arms against
the government to overthrow the same, thereby committing the crime of
rebellion — there emerges a circumstance that may warrant a limited withdrawal
of the aforementioned guarantee or protection, by suspending the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus, when public safety requires it. Although we must be
forewarned against mistaking mere dissent — no matter how emphatic or
intemperate it may be — for dissidence amounting to rebellion or insurrection,
the Court cannot hesitate, much less refuse — when the existence of such
rebellion or insurrection has been fairly established or cannot reasonably be
denied — to uphold the finding of the Executive thereon, without, in effect,
encroaching upon a power vested in him by the Supreme Law of the land and
depriving him, to this extent, of such power, and, therefore, without violating the
Constitution and jeopardizing the very Rule of Law the Court is called upon to
epitomize.
As heretofore adverted to, for the valid suspension of the privilege of the writ:
(a) there must be "invasion, insurrection or rebellion" or — pursuant to
paragraph (2), section 10 of Art. VII of the Constitution — "imminent danger
thereof"; and (b) public safety must require the aforementioned suspension. The
President declared in Proclamation No. 889, as amended, that both conditions
are present.
As regards the first condition, our jurisprudence 14 attests abundantly to the
Communist activities in the Philippines, especially in Manila, from the late
twenties to the early thirties, then aimed principally at incitement to sedition or
rebellion, as the immediate objective. Upon the establishment of the
Commonwealth of the Philippines, the movement seemed to have waned
notably; but, the outbreak of World War II in the Pacific and the miseries, the
devastation and havoc, and the proliferation of unlicensed firearms concomitant
with the military occupation of the Philippines and its subsequent liberation,
brought about, in the late forties, a resurgence of the Communist threat, with
such vigor as to be able to organize and operate in Central Luzon an army —
called HUKBALAHAP, during the occupation, and renamed Hukbong
Mapagpalaya ng Bayan (HMP) after liberation — which clashed several times
with the armed forces of the Republic. This prompted then President Quirino to
issue Proclamation No. 210, dated October 22, 1950, suspending the privilege
of the writ of habeas corpus, the validity of which was upheld in Montenegro v.
Castañeda. 15 Days before the promulgation of said Proclamation, or on
October 18, 1950, members of the Communist Politburo in the Philippines were
apprehended in Manila. Subsequently accused and convicted of the crime of
rebellion, they served their respective sentences. 16
The fifties saw a comparative lull in Communist activities, insofar as peace and
order were concerned. Still, on June 20, 1957, Rep. Act No. 1700, otherwise
known as the Anti-Subversion Act, was approved, upon the ground — stated in
the very preamble of said statute — that.
... the Communist Party of the Philippines, although purportedly a political party,
is in fact an organized conspiracy to overthrow the Government of the Republic
of the Philippines, not only by force and violence but also by deceit, subversion
and other illegal means, for the purpose of establishing in the Philippines a
totalitarian regime subject to alien domination and control;
... the continued existence and activities of the Communist Party of the
Philippines constitutes a clear, present and grave danger to the security of the
Philippines; 17 and
... in the face of the organized, systematic and persistent subversion, national
in scope but international in direction, posed by the Communist Party of the
Philippines and its activities, there is urgent need for special legislation to cope
with this continuing menace to the freedom and security of the country....
In the language of the Report on Central Luzon, submitted, on September 4,
1971, by the Senate Ad Hoc Committee of Seven — copy of which Report was
filed in these cases by the petitioners herein —
The years following 1963 saw the successive emergence in the country of
several mass organizations, notably the Lapiang Manggagawa (now the
Socialist Party of the Philippines) among the workers; the Malayang Samahan
ng mga Magsasaka (MASAKA) among the peasantry; the Kabataang
Makabayan (KM) among the youth/students; and the Movement for the
Advancement of Nationalism (MAN) among the intellectuals/professionals. The
PKP has exerted all-out effort to infiltrate, influence and utilize these
organizations in promoting its radical brand of nationalism.
Meanwhile, the Communist leaders in the Philippines had been split into two (2)
groups, one of which — composed mainly of young radicals, constituting the
Maoist faction — reorganized the Communist Party of the Philippines early in
1969 and established a New People's Army. This faction adheres to the Maoist
concept of the "Protracted People's War" or "War of National Liberation." Its
"Programme for a People's Democratic Revolution" states, inter alia:
The Communist Party of the Philippines is determined to implement its general
programme for a people's democratic revolution. All Filipino communists are
ready to sacrifice their lives for the worthy cause of achieving the new type of
democracy, of building a new Philippines that is genuinely and completely
independent, democratic, united, just and prosperous ...
xxx xxx xxx
The central task of any revolutionary movement is to seize political power. The
Communist Party of the Philippines assumes this task at a time that both the
international and national situations are favorable of asking the road of armed
revolution ... 19
In the year 1969, the NPA had — according to the records of the Department of
National Defense — conducted raids, resorted to kidnappings and taken part in
other violent incidents numbering over 230, in which it inflicted 404 casualties,
and, in turn, suffered 243 losses. In 1970, its records of violent incidents was
about the same, but the NPA casualties more than doubled.
At any rate, two (2) facts are undeniable: (a) all Communists, whether they
belong to the traditional group or to the Maoist faction, believe that force and
violence are indispensable to the attainment of their main and ultimate objective,
and act in accordance with such belief, although they may disagree on the
means to be used at a given time and in a particular place; and (b) there is a
New People's Army, other, of course, that the arm forces of the Republic and
antagonistic thereto. Such New People's Army is per se proof of the existence
of a rebellion, especially considering that its establishment was announced
publicly by the reorganized CPP. Such announcement is in the nature of a public
challenge to the duly constituted authorities and may be likened to a declaration
of war, sufficient to establish a war status or a condition of belligerency, even
before the actual commencement of hostilities.
We entertain, therefore, no doubts about the existence of a sizeable group of
men who have publicly risen in arms to overthrow the government and have
thus been and still are engaged in rebellion against the Government of the
Philippines.
In fact, the thrust of petitioners' argument is that the New People's Army proper
is too small, compared with the size of the armed forces of the Government, that
the Communist rebellion or insurrection cannot so endanger public safety as to
require the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. This
argument does not negate, however, the existence of a rebellion, which, from
the constitutional and statutory viewpoint, need not be widespread or attain the
magnitude of a civil war. This is apparent from the very provision of the Revised
Penal Code defining the crime of rebellion, 20 which may be limited in its scope
to "any part" of the Philippines, and, also, from paragraph (14) of section 1,
Article III of the Constitution, authorizing the suspension of the privilege of the
writ "wherever" — in case of rebellion — "the necessity for such suspension
shall exist." In fact, the case of Barcelon v. Baker referred to a proclamation
suspending the privilege in the provinces of Cavite and Batangas only. The case
of In re Boyle 21 involved a valid proclamation suspending the privilege in a
smaller area — a country of the state of Idaho.
The magnitude of the rebellion has a bearing on the second condition essential
to the validity of the suspension of the privilege — namely, that the suspension
be required by public safety. Before delving, however, into the factual bases of
the presidential findings thereon, let us consider the precise nature of the Court's
function in passing upon the validity of Proclamation No. 889, as amended.
Article VII of the Constitution vests in the Executive the power to suspend the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus under specified conditions. Pursuant to
the principle of separation of powers underlying our system of government, the
Executive is supreme within his own sphere. However, the separation of
powers, under the Constitution, is not absolute. What is more, it goes hand in
hand with the system of checks and balances, under which the Executive is
supreme, as regards the suspension of the privilege, but only if and when he
acts within the sphere allotted to him by the Basic Law, and the authority to
determine whether or not he has so acted is vested in the Judicial Department,
which, in this respect, is, in turn, constitutionally supreme.
In the exercise of such authority, the function of the Court is merely to check —
not to supplant 22 — the Executive, or to ascertain merely whether he had gone
beyond the constitutional limits of his jurisdiction, not to exercise the power
vested in him or to determine the wisdom of his act. To be sure, the power of
the Court to determine the validity of the contested proclamation is far from
being identical to, or even comparable with, its power over ordinary civil or
criminal cases elevated thereto by ordinary appeal from inferior courts, in which
cases the appellate court has all of the powers of the court of origin.
Under the principle of separation of powers and the system of checks and
balances, the judicial authority to review decisions of administrative bodies or
agencies is much more limited, as regards findings of fact made in said
decisions. Under the English law, the reviewing court determines only whether
there is some evidentiary basis for the contested administrative findings; no
quantitative examination of the supporting evidence is undertaken. The
administrative findings can be interfered with only if there is no evidence
Page 17 of 99
whatsoever in support thereof, and said finding is, accordingly, arbitrary,
capricious and obviously unauthorized. This view has been adopted by some
American courts. It has, likewise, been adhered to in a number of Philippine
cases. Other cases, in both jurisdictions, have applied the "substantial
evidence" rule, which has been construed to mean "more than a mere scintilla"
or "relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support
a conclusion," 23 even if other minds equally reasonable might conceivably
opine otherwise.
Manifestly, however, this approach refers to the review of administrative
determinations involving the exercise of quasi-judicial functions calling for or
entailing the reception of evidence. It does not and cannot be applied, in its
aforesaid form, in testing the validity of an act of Congress or of the Executive,
such as the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, for, as a
general rule, neither body takes evidence — in the sense in which the term is
used in judicial proceedings — before enacting a legislation or suspending the
writ. Referring to the test of the validity of a statute, the Supreme Court of the
United States, speaking through Mr. Justice Roberts, expressed, in the leading
case of Nebbia v. New York, 24 the view that:
... If the laws passed are seen to have a reasonable relation to a proper
legislative purpose, and are neither arbitrary nor discriminatory, the
requirements of due process are satisfied, and judicial determination to that
effect renders a court functus officio ... With the wisdom of the policy adopted,
with the adequacy or practically of the law enacted to forward it, the courts are
both incompetent and unauthorized to deal ...
Relying upon this view, it is urged by the Solicitor General —
... that judicial inquiry into the basis of the questioned proclamation can go no
further than to satisfy the Court not that the President's decision is correct and
that public safety was endanger by the rebellion and justified the suspension of
the writ, but that in suspending the writ, the President did not act arbitrarily.
No cogent reason has been submitted to warrant the rejection of such test.
Indeed, the co-equality of coordinate branches of the Government, under our
constitutional system, seems to demand that the test of the validity of acts of
Congress and of those of the Executive be, mutatis mutandis, fundamentally the
same. Hence, counsel for petitioner Rogelio Arienda admits that the proper
standard is not correctness, but arbitrariness.
Did public safety require the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus decreed in Proclamation No. 889, as amended? Petitioners submit a
negative answer upon the ground: (a) that there is no rebellion; (b) that, prior to
and at the time of the suspension of the privilege, the Government was
functioning normally, as were the courts; (c) that no untoward incident,
confirmatory of an alleged July-August Plan, has actually taken place after
August 21, 1971; (d) that the President's alleged apprehension, because of said
plan, is non-existent and unjustified; and (e) that the Communist forces in the
Philippines are too small and weak to jeopardize public safety to such extent as
to require the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.
As above indicated, however, the existence of a rebellion is obvious, so much
so that counsel for several petitioners herein have admitted it.
With respect to the normal operation of government, including courts, prior to
and at the time of the suspension of the privilege, suffice it to say that, if the
conditions were such that courts of justice no longer functioned, a suspension
of the privilege would have been unnecessary, there being no courts to issue
the writ of habeas corpus. Indeed, petitioners' reference to the normal operation
of courts as a factor indicative of the illegality of the contested act of the
Executive stems, perhaps, from the fact that this circumstance was adverted to
in some American cases to justify the invalidation therein decreed of said act of
the Executive. Said cases involved, however, the conviction by military courts
of members of the civilian population charged with common crimes. It was
manifestly, illegal for military courts to assume jurisdiction over civilians so
charged, when civil courts were functioning normally.
Then, too, the alleged absence of any untoward incident after August 21, 1971,
does not necessarily bear out petitioners' view. What is more, it may have been
due precisely to the suspension of the privilege. To be sure, one of its logical
effects is to compel those connected with the insurrection or rebellion to go into
hiding. In fact, most of them could not be located by the authorities, after August
21, 1971.
The alleged July-August Plan to terrorize Manila is branded as incredible, upon
the theory that, according to Professor Egbal Ahman of Cornell University,
"guerrilla use of terror ... is sociological and psychologically selective," and that
the indiscriminate resort to terrorism is bound to boomerang, for it tends to
alienate the people's symphaty and to deprive the dissidents of much needed
mass support. The fact, however, is that the violence used is some
demonstrations held in Manila in 1970 and 1971 tended to terrorize the bulk of
its inhabitants. It would have been highly imprudent, therefore, for the Executive
to discard the possibility of a resort to terrorism, on a much bigger scale, under
the July-August Plan.
We will now address our attention to petitioners' theory to the effect that the New
People's Army of the Communist Party of the Philippines is too small to pose a
danger to public safety of such magnitude as to require the suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. The flaw in petitioners' stand becomes
apparent when we consider that it assumes that the Armed Forces of the
Philippines have no other task than to fight the New People's Army, and that the
latter is the only threat — and a minor one — to our security. Such assumption
is manifestly erroneous.
The records before Us show that, on or before August 21, 1971, the Executive
had information and reports — subsequently confirmed, in many respects, by
the abovementioned Report of the Senate Ad-Hoc Committee of Seven 25 —
to the effect that the Communist Party of the Philippines does not merely adhere
to Lenin's idea of a swift armed uprising; that it has, also, adopted Ho Chi Minh's
terrorist tactics and resorted to the assassination of uncooperative local official;
that, in line with this policy, the insurgents have killed 5 mayors, 20 barrio
captains and 3 chiefs of police; that there were fourteen (14) meaningful
bombing incidents in the Greater Manila Area in 1970; that the Constitutional
Convention Hall was bombed on June 12, 1971; that, soon after the Plaza
Miranda incident, the NAWASA main pipe, at the Quezon City-San Juan
boundary, was bombed; that this was followed closely by the bombing of the
Manila City Hall, the COMELEC building, the Congress Building and the
MERALCO substation at Cubao, Quezon City; and that the respective
residences of Senator Jose J. Roy and Congressman Eduardo Cojuangco were,
likewise, bombed, as were the MERALCO main office premises, along Ortigas
Avenue, and the Doctor's Pharmaceuticals, Inc. Building, in Caloocan City.
Petitioners, similarly, fail to take into account that — as per said information and
reports — the reorganized Communist Party of the Philippines has, moreover,
adopted Mao's concept of protracted people's war, aimed at the paralyzation of
the will to resist of the government, of the political, economic and intellectual
leadership, and of the people themselves; that conformably to such concept, the
Party has placed special emphasis upon a most extensive and intensive
program of subversion by the establishment of front organizations in urban
centers, the organization of armed city partisans and the infiltration in student
groups, labor unions, and farmer and professional groups; that the CPP has
managed to infiltrate or establish and control nine (9) major labor organizations;
that it has exploited the youth movement and succeeded in making Communist
fronts of eleven (11) major student or youth organizations; that there are,
accordingly, about thirty (30) mass organizations actively advancing the CPP
interests, among which are the Malayang Samahan ng Magsasaka (MASAKA),
the Kabataang Makabayan (KM), the Movement for the Advancement of
Nationalism (MAN), the Samahang Demokratiko ng Kabataan (SDK), the
Samahang Molave (SM) and the Malayang Pagkakaisa ng Kabataang
Pilipino(MPKP); that, as of August, 1971, the KM had two hundred forty-five
(245) operational chapters throughout the Philippines, of which seventy-three
(73) were in the Greater Manila Area, sixty (60) in Northern Luzon, forty-nine
(49) in Central Luzon, forty-two (42) in the Visayas and twenty-one (21) in
Mindanao and Sulu; that in 1970, the Party had recorded two hundred fifty-eight
(258) major demonstrations, of which about thirty-three (33) ended in violence,
resulting in fifteen (15) killed and over five hundred (500) injured; that most of
these actions were organized, coordinated or led by the aforementioned front
organizations; that the violent demonstrations were generally instigated by a
small, but well-trained group of armed agitators; that the number of
demonstrations heretofore staged in 1971 has already exceeded those of 1970;
and that twenty-four (24) of these demonstrations were violent, and resulted in
the death of fifteen (15) persons and the injury of many more.
Subsequent events — as reported — have also proven that petitioners' counsel
have underestimated the threat to public safety posed by the New People's
Army. Indeed, it appears that, since August 21, 1971, it had in Northern Luzon
six (6) encounters and staged one (1) raid, in consequence of which seven (7)
soldiers lost their lives and two (2)others were wounded, whereas the insurgents
suffered five (5) casualties; that on August 26, 1971, a well-armed group of NPA,
trained by defector Lt. Victor Corpus, attacked the very command port of TF
LAWIN in Isabela, destroying two (2) helicopters and one (1) plane, and
wounding one (1) soldier; that the NPA had in Central Luzon a total of four (4)
encounters, with two (2) killed and three (3) wounded on the side of the
Government, one (1) BSDU killed and three (3) NPA casualties; that in an
encounter at Botolan, Zambales, one (1) KM-SDK leader, an unidentified
dissident, and Commander Panchito, leader of the dissident group were killed;
that on August 26, 1971, there was an encounter in the barrio of San Pedro.
Iriga City, Camarines Sur, between the PC and the NPA, in which a PC and two
(2) KM members were killed; that the current disturbances in Cotabato and the
Lanao provinces have been rendered more complex by the involvement of the
CPP/NPA, for, in mid-1971, a KM group, headed by Jovencio Esparagoza,
contacted the Higa-onan tribes, in their settlement in Magsaysay, Misamis
Oriental, and offered them books, pamphlets and brochures of Mao Tse Tung,
as well as conducted teach-ins in the reservation; that Esparagoza an operation
of the PC in said reservation; and that there are now two (2) NPA cadres in
Mindanao.
It should, also, be noted that adherents of the CPP and its front organizations
are, according to intelligence findings, definitely capable of preparing powerful
explosives out of locally available materials; that the bomb used in the
Constitutional Convention Hall was a "clay-more" mine, a powerful explosive
device used by the U.S. Army, believed to have been one of many pilfered from
the Subic Naval Base a few days before; that the President had received
intelligence information to the effect that there was a July-August Plan involving
a wave of assassinations, kidnappings, terrorism and mass destruction of
property and that an extraordinary occurence would signal the beginning of said
event; that the rather serious condition of peace and order in Mindanao,
particularly in Cotabato and Lanao, demanded the presence therein of forces
sufficient to cope with the situation; that a sizeable part of our armed forces
discharge other functions; and that the expansion of the CPP activities from
Central Luzon to other parts of the country, particularly Manila and its suburbs,
the Cagayan Valley, Ifugao, Zambales, Laguna, Quezon and Bicol Region,
required that the rest of our armed forces be spread thin over a wide area.
Page 18 of 99
Considering that the President was in possession of the above data — except
those related to events that happened after August 21, 1971 — when the Plaza
Miranda bombing took place, the Court is not prepared to hold that the Executive
had acted arbitrarily or gravely abused his discretion when he then concluded
that public safety and national security required the suspension of the privilege
of the writ, particularly if the NPA were to strike simultaneously with violent
demonstrations staged by the two hundred forty-five (245) KM chapters, all over
the Philippines, with the assistance and cooperation of the dozens of CPP front
organizations, and the bombing or water mains and conduits, as well as electric
power plants and installations — a possibility which, no matter how remote, he
was bound to forestall, and a danger he was under obligation to anticipate and
arrest.
He had consulted his advisers and sought their views. He had reason to feel
that the situation was critical — as, indeed, it was — and demanded immediate
action. This he took believing in good faith that public safety required it. And, in
the light of the circumstances adverted to above, he had substantial grounds to
entertain such belief.
Petitioners insist that, nevertheless, the President had no authority to suspend
the privilege in the entire Philippines, even if he may have been justified in doing
so in some provinces or cities thereof. At the time of the issuance of
Proclamation No. 889, he could not be reasonably certain, however, about the
placed to be excluded from the operation of the proclamation. He needed some
time to find out how it worked, and as he did so, he caused the suspension to
be gradually lifted, first, on September 18, 1971, in twenty-seven (27) provinces,
three (3) sub-provinces and twenty six (26) cities; then, on September 25, 1971,
in order fourteen (14) provinces and thirteen (13) cities; and, still later, on
October 4, 1971, in seven (7) additional provinces and four (4) cities, or a total
of forty-eight (48) provinces, three (3) sub-provinces and forth-three (43) cities,
within a period of forty-five (45) days from August 21, 1971.
Neither should We overlook the significance of another fact. The President could
have declared a general suspension of the privilege. Instead, Proclamation No.
889 limited the suspension to persons detained "for crimes of insurrection or
rebellion, and all other crimes and offenses committed by them in furtherance
or on the occasion thereof, or incident thereto, or in connection therewith." Even
this was further limited by Proclamation No. 889-A, which withdrew from the
coverage of the suspension persons detained for other crimes and offenses
committed "on the occasion" of the insurrection or rebellion, or "incident thereto,
in or connection therewith." In fact, the petitioners in L-33964, L-33982 and L-
34004 concede that the President had acted in good faith.
In case of invasion, insurrection or rebellion or imminent danger thereof, the
President has, under the Constitution, three (3) courses of action open to him,
namely: (a) to call out the armed forces; (b) to suspend the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus; and (c) to place the Philippines or any part thereof under
martial law. He had, already, called out the armed forces, which measure,
however, proved inadequate to attain the desired result. Of the two (2) other
alternatives, the suspension of the privilege is the least harsh.
In view of the foregoing, it does not appear that the President has acted arbitrary
in issuing Proclamation No. 889, as amended, nor that the same is
unconstitutional.
III
The next question for determination is whether petitioners herein are covered
by said Proclamation, as amended. In other words, do petitioners herein belong
to the class of persons as to whom privilege of the writ of habeas corpus has
been suspended?
In this connection, it appears that Bayani Alcala, one of the petitioners in L-
33964, Gerardo Tomas, petitioner in L-34004, and Reynaldo Rimando,
petitioner in L-34013, were, on November 13, 1971, released "permanently" —
meaning, perhaps, without any intention to prosecute them — upon the ground
that, although there was reasonable ground to believe that they had committed
an offense related to subversion, the evidence against them is insufficient to
warrant their prosecution; that Teodosio Lansang, one of the petitioners in L-
33964, Rogelio Arienda, petitioner in L-33965, Nemesio Prudente, petitioner in
L-33982, Filomeno de Castro and Barcelisa C. de Castro, for whose benefit the
petition in L-34039 was filed, and Antolin Oreta, Jr., petitioner in L-34265, were,
on said date, "temporarily released"; that Rodolfo del Rosario, one of the
petitioners in L-33964, Victor Felipe, an intervenor in L-33964, L-33965 and L-
33973, as well as Luzvimindo David, petitioner in L-33973, and Gary Olivar,
petitioner in L-34339, are still under detention and, hence, deprived of their
liberty, they — together with over forty (40) other persons, who are at large —
having been accused, in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, of a violation of
section 4 of Republic Act No. 1700 (Anti-Subversion Act); and that Angelo delos
Reyes and Teresito Sison, intervenors in said L-33964, L-33965 and L-33973,
are, likewise, still detained and have been charged — together with over fifteen
(15) other persons, who are, also, at large — with another violation of said Act,
in a criminal complaint filed with the City Fiscal's Office of Quezon City.
With respect to Vicente Ilao and Juan Carandang — petitioners in L-33965 —
who were released as early as August 31, 1971, as well as to petitioners
Nemesio Prudente, Teodosio Lansang, Rogelio Arienda, Antolin Oreta, Jr.,
Filomeno de Castro, Barcelisa C. de Castro, Reynaldo Rimando, Gerardo
Tomas and Bayani Alcala, who were released on November 13, 1971, and are
no longer deprived of their liberty, their respective petitions have, thereby,
become moot and academic, as far as their prayer for release is concerned, and
should, accordingly, be dismissed, despite the opposition thereto of counsel for
Nemesio Prudente and Gerardo Tomas who maintain that, as long as the
privilege of the writ remains suspended, these petitioners might be arrested and
detained again, without just cause, and that, accordingly, the issue raised in
their respective petitions is not moot. In any event, the common constitutional
and legal issues raised in these cases have, in fact, been decided in this joint
decision.
Must we order the release of Rodolfo del Rosario, one of the petitioner’s in L-
33964, Angelo de los Reyes, Victor Felipe and Teresito Sison, intervenors in L-
33964, L-33965 and L-33973, Luzvimindo David, petitioner in L-33973, and
Gary Olivar, petitioner in L-34339, who are still detained? The suspension of the
privilege of the writ was decreed by Proclamation No. 889, as amended, for
persons detained "for the crimes of insurrection or rebellion and other overt acts
committed by them in furtherance thereof."
The records shows that petitioners Luzvimindo David, Rodolfo del Rosario,
Victor Felipe, Angelo de los Reyes, Teresito Sison and Gary Olivar are accused
in Criminal Case No. Q-1623 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal with a
violation of the Anti-Subversion Act and that the similar charge against
petitioners Angelo de los Reyes and Teresito Sison in a criminal complaint,
originally filed with the City Fiscal of Quezon City, has, also, been filed with said
court. Do the offenses so charged constitute one of the crimes or overt acts
mentioned in Proclamation No. 889, as amended?
In the complaint in said Criminal Case No. 1623, it is alleged:
That in or about the year 1968 and for sometime prior thereto and thereafter up
to and including August 21, 1971, in the city of Quezon, Philippines, and
elsewhere in the Philippines, within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused knowingly, wilfully and by overt acts became officers
and/or ranking leaders of the Communist Party of the Philippines, a subversive
association as defined by Republic Act No. 1700, which is an organized
conspiracy to overthrow the government of the Republic of the Philippines by
force, violence, deceit, subversion and other illegal means, for the purpose of
establishing in the Philippines a communist totalitarian regime subject to alien
domination and control;
That all the above-named accused, as such officers and/or ranking leaders of
the Communist Party of the Philippines conspiring, confederating and mutual
helping one another, did then and there knowingly, wilfully, and feloniously and
by overt acts committed subversive acts all intended to overthrow the
government of the Republic of the Philippines, as follows:
1. By rising publicly and taking arms against the forces of the
government, engaging in war against the forces of the government, destroying
property or committing serious violence, exacting contributions or diverting
public lands or property from the law purposes for which they have been
appropriated;
2. By engaging by subversion thru expansion and requirement
activities not only of the Communist Party of the Philippines but also of the united
front organizations of the Communist Party of the Philippines as the Kabataang
Makabayan (KM), Movement for the Democratic Philippines (MDP), Samahang
Demokratikong Kabataan (SDK), Students' Alliance for National Democracy
(STAND), MASAKA Olalia-faction, Student Cultural Association of the
University of the Philippines (SCAUP), KASAMA, Pagkakaisa ng Magbubukid
ng Pilipinas (PMP) and many others; thru agitation promoted by rallies,
demonstration and strikes some of them violent in nature, intended to create
social discontent, discredit those in power and weaken the people's confidence
in the government; thru consistent propaganda by publications, writing, posters,
leaflets of similar means; speeches, teach-ins, messages, lectures or other
similar means; or thru the media as the TV, radio or newspapers, all intended
to promote the Communist pattern of subversion;
3. Thru urban guerilla warfare characterized by assassinations,
bombings, sabotage, kidnapping and arson, intended to advertise the
movement, build up its morale and prestige, discredit and demoralize the
authorities to use harsh and repressive measures, demoralize the people and
weaken their confidence in the government and to weaken the will of the
government to resist.
That the following aggravating circumstances attended the commission of the
offense:
a. That the offense was committed in contempt of and with insult to the
public authorities;
b. That some of the overt acts were committed in the Palace of the
Chief Executive;
c. That craft, fraud, or disguise was employed;
d. That the offense was committed with the aid of armed men;
e. That the offense was committed with the aid of persons under fifteen
(15) years old.
Identical allegations are made in the complaint filed with the City Fiscal of
Quezon City, except that the second paragraph thereof is slightly more
elaborate than that of the complaint filed with the CFI, although substantially the
same. 26
In both complaints, the acts imputed to the defendants herein constitute
rebellion and subversion, of — in the language of the proclamation — "other
Page 19 of 99
overt acts committed ... in furtherance" of said rebellion, both of which are
covered by the proclamation suspending the privilege of the writ. It is clear,
therefore, that the crime for which the detained petitioners are held and deprived
of their liberty are among those for which the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus has been suspended.
Up to this point, the Members of the Court are unanimous on the legal principles
enunciated.
After finding that Proclamation No. 889, as amended, is not invalid and that
petitioners Luzvimindo David, Victor Felipe, Gary Olivar, Angelo de los Reyes,
Rodolfo del Rosario and Teresito Sison are detained for and actually accused
of an offense for which the privilege of the writ has been suspended by said
proclamation, our next step would have been the following: The Court, or a
commissioner designated by it, would have received evidence on whether — as
stated in respondents' "Answer and Return" — said petitioners had been
apprehended and detained "on reasonable belief" that they had "participated in
the crime of insurrection or rebellion."
It is so happened, however, that on November 13, 1971 — or two (2) days
before the proceedings relative to the briefing held on October 28 and 29, 1971,
had been completed by the filing 27 of the summary of the matters then taken
up — the aforementioned criminal complaints were filed against said petitioners.
What is more, the preliminary examination and/or investigation of the charges
contained in said complaints has already begun. The next question, therefore,
is: Shall We now order, in the cases at hand, the release of said petitioners
herein, despite the formal and substantial validity of the proclamation
suspending the privilege, despite the fact that they are actually charged with
offenses covered by said proclamation and despite the aforementioned criminal
complaints against them and the preliminary examination and/or investigations
being conducted therein?
The Members of the Court, with the exception of Mr. Justice Fernando, are of
the opinion, and, so hold, that, instead of this Court or its Commissioner taking
the evidence adverted to above, it is best to let said preliminary examination
and/or investigation to be completed, so that petitioners' released could be
ordered by the court of first instance, should it find that there is no probable
cause against them, or a warrant for their arrest could be issued, should a
probable cause be established against them. Such course of action is more
favorable to the petitioners, inasmuch as the preliminary examination or
investigation requires a greater quantum of proof than that needed to establish
that the Executive had not acted arbitrary in causing the petitioners to be
apprehended and detained upon the ground that they had participated in the
commission of the crime of insurrection or rebellion. And, it is mainly for the
reason that the Court has opted to allow the Court of First Instance of Rizal to
proceed with the determination of the existence of probable cause, although
ordinarily the Court would have merely determined the existence of the
substantial evidence of petitioners' connection with the crime of rebellion.
Besides, the latter alternative would require the reception of evidence by this
Court and thus duplicate the proceedings now taking place in the court of first
instance. What is more, since the evidence involved in the same proceedings
would be substantially the same and the presentation of such evidence cannot
be made simultaneously, each proceeding would tend to delay the other.
Mr. Justice Fernando is of the opinion — in line with the view of Mr. Justice
Tuason, in Nava v. Gatmaitan, 28 to the effect that "... if and when formal
complaint is presented, the court steps in and the executive steps out. The
detention ceases to be an executive and becomes a judicial concern ..." — that
the filing of the above-mentioned complaint against the six (6) detained
petitioners herein, has the effect of the Executive giving up his authority to
continue holding them pursuant to Proclamation No. 889, as amended, even if
he did not so intend, and to place them fully under the authority of courts of
justice, just like any other person, who, as such, cannot be deprived of his liberty
without lawful warrant, which has not, as yet, been issued against anyone of
them, and that, accordingly, We should order their immediate release. Despite
the humanitarian and libertarian spirit with which this view had been espoused,
the other Members of the Court are unable to accept it because:
(a) If the proclamation suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus is valid — and We so hold it to be — and the detainee is covered by the
proclamation, the filing of a complaint or information against him does not affect
the suspension of said privilege, and, consequently, his release may not be
ordered by Us;
(b) Inasmuch as the filing of a formal complaint or information does not
detract from the validity and efficacy of the suspension of the privilege, it would
be more reasonable to construe the filing of said formal charges with the court
of first instance as an expression of the President's belief that there are sufficient
evidence to convict the petitioners so charged and that hey should not be
released, therefore, unless and until said court — after conducting the
corresponding preliminary examination and/or investigation — shall find that the
prosecution has not established the existence of a probable cause. Otherwise,
the Executive would have released said accused, as were the other petitioners
herein;
(c) From a long-range viewpoint, this interpretation — of the act of the
President in having said formal charges filed — is, We believe, more beneficial
to the detainees than that favored by Mr. Justice Fernando. His view —
particularly the theory that the detainees should be released immediately,
without bail, even before the completion of said preliminary examination and/or
investigation — would tend to induce the Executive to refrain from filing formal
charges as long as it may be possible. Manifestly, We should encourage the
early filing of said charges, so that courts of justice could assume jurisdiction
over the detainees and extend to them effective protection.
Although some of the petitioners in these cases pray that the Court decide
whether the constitutional right to bail is affected by the suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, We do not deem it proper to pass upon
such question, the same not having been sufficiently discussed by the parties
herein. Besides, there is no point in settling said question with respect to
petitioners herein who have been released. Neither is necessary to express our
view thereon, as regards those still detained, inasmuch as their release without
bail might still be decreed by the court of first instance, should it hold that there
is no probable cause against them. At any rate, should an actual issue on the
right to bail arise later, the same may be brought up in appropriate proceedings.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:
1. Declaring that the President did not act arbitrarily in issuing
Proclamation No. 889, as amended, and that, accordingly, the same is not
unconstitutional;
2. Dismissing the petitions in L-33964, L-33965, L-33982, L-34004, L-
34013, L-34039 and L-34265, insofar as petitioners Teodosio Lansang, Bayani
Alcala, Rogelio Arienda, Vicentellao, Juan Carandang, Nemesio E. Prudente,
Gerardo Tomas, Reynaldo Rimando, Filomeno M. de Castro, Barcelisa C. de
Castro and Antolin Oreta, Jr. are concerned;
3. The Court of First Instance of Rizal is hereby directed to act with
utmost dispatch in conducting the preliminary examination and/or investigation
of the charges for violation of the Anti-Subversion Act filed against herein
petitioners Luzvimindo David, Victor Felipe, Gary Olivar, Angelo de los Reyes,
Rodolfo del Rosario and Teresito Sison, and to issue the corresponding
warrants of arrest, if probable cause is found to exist against them, or, otherwise,
to order their release; and
4. Should there be undue delay, for any reason whatsoever, either in
the completion of the aforementioned preliminary examination and/or
investigation, or in the issuance of the proper orders or resolution in connection
therewith, the parties may by motion seek in these proceedings the proper relief.
5. Without special pronouncement as to costs. It is so ordered.
Reyes, J.B.L., Makalintal, Zaldivar, Teehankee, Barredo, Villamor and
Makasiar, JJ., concur.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-30026 January 30, 1971
MARIO GUMABON, BLAS BAGOLBAGOL, GAUDENCIO AGAPITO,
EPIFANIO PADUA and PATERNO PALMARES, petitioners,
vs.
THE DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF PRISONS, respondent.
FERNANDO, J.:
Habeas corpus, the great writ of liberty, is relied upon by petitioners, five in
number, for their release from imprisonment. Meted out life terms for the
complex crime of rebellion with murder and other crimes, they would invoke the
People v. Hernandez1 doctrine, negating the existence of such an offense, a
ruling that unfortunately for them was not handed down until after their
convictions had become final. Nor is this the first instance, a proceeding of this
character was instituted, as in Pomeroy v. Director of Prisons,2 likewise a
petition for habeas corpus, a similar question was presented. The answer given
was in the negative. Petitioners plead for a new look on the matter. They would
premise their stand on the denial of equal protection if their plea would not be
granted. Moreover, they did invoke the codal provision that judicial decisions
shall form part of the legal system of the Philippines,3 necessarily resulting in
the conclusion that the Hernandez decision once promulgated calls for a
retroactive effect under the explicit mandate of the Revised Penal Code as to
penal laws having such character even if at the time of their application a final
sentence has been rendered "and the convict is serving the same."4 These
arguments carry considerable persuasion. Accordingly, we find for petitioners,
without going so far as to overrule Pomeroy.
Petitioner Mario Gumabon, after pleading guilty, was sentenced on May 5, 1953
to suffer reclusion perpetua for the complex crime of rebellion with multiple
murder, robbery, arson and kidnapping. Petitioners Gaudencio Agapito, Paterno
Palmares and Epifanio Padua, likewise pleaded guilty to the complex crime of
rebellion with multiple murder and other offenses, and were similarly made to
suffer the same penalty in decisions rendered, as to the first two, on March 8,
1954 and, as to the third, on December 15, 1955. The last petitioner, Blas
Bagolbagol, stood trial also for the complex crime of rebellion with multiple
murder and other offenses and on January 12, 1954 penalized with reclusion
perpetua. Each of the petitioners has been since then imprisoned by virtue of
the above convictions. Each of them has served more than 13 years.5
Page 20 of 99
Subsequently, in People v. Hernandez,6 as above noted, this Court ruled that
the information against the accused in that case for rebellion complexed with
murder, arson and robbery was not warranted under Article 134 of the Revised
Penal Code, there being no such complex offense.7 In the recently-decided
case of People vs. Lava,8 we expressly reaffirmed the ruling in the Hernandez
case rejecting the plea of the Solicitor General for the abandonment of such
doctrine. It is the contention of each of the petitioners that he has served, in the
light of the above, more than the maximum penalty that could have been
imposed upon him. He is thus entitled to freedom, his continued detention being
illegal.9
The fear that the Pomeroy ruling stands as an obstacle to their release on a
habeas corpus proceeding prompted petitioners, as had been mentioned, to ask
that it be appraised anew and, if necessary, discarded. We can resolve the
present petition without doing so. The plea there made was unconvincing, there
being a failure to invoke the contentions now pressed vigorously by their
counsel, Attorney Jose W. Diokno, as to the existence of a denial of a
constitutional right that would suffice to raise a serious jurisdictional question
and the retroactive effect to be given a judicial decision favorable to one already
sentenced to a final judgment under Art. 22 of the Revised Penal Code. To
repeat, these two grounds carry weight. We have to grant this petition.
1. The fundamental issue, to repeat, is the availability of the writ of
habeas corpus under the circumstances disclosed. Its latitudinarian scope to
assure that illegality of restraint and detention be avoided is one of the truisms
of the law. It is not known as the writ of liberty for nothing. The writ imposes on
judges the grave responsibility of ascertaining whether there is any legal
justification for a deprivation of physical freedom. Unless there be such a
showing, the confinement must thereby cease. If there be a valid sentence it
cannot, even for a moment, be extended beyond the period provided for by law.
Any deviation from the legal norms call for the termination of the imprisonment.
Rightly then could Chafee refer to the writ as "the most important human rights
provision" in the fundamental law. 10 Nor is such praise unique. Cooley spoke
of it as "one of the principal safeguards to personal liberty." 11 For Willoughby,
it is "the greatest of the safeguards erected by the civil law against arbitrary and
illegal imprisonment by whomsoever detention may be exercised or ordered."
12 Burdick echoed a similar sentiment, referring to it as "one of the most
important bulwarks of liberty." 13 Fraenkel made it unanimous, for to him,
"without it much else would be of no avail." 14 Thereby the rule of law is assured.
A full awareness of the potentialities of the writ of habeas corpus in the defense
of liberty coupled with its limitations may be detected in the opinions of former
Chief Justices Arellano, 15 Avanceña, 16 Abad Santos, 17 Paras, 18 Bengzon,
19 and the present Chief Justice. 20 It fell to Justice Malcolm's lot, however to
emphasize quite a few times the breadth of its amplitude and of its reach. In
Villavicencio v. Lukban, 21 the remedy came in handy to challenge the validity
of the order of the then respondent Mayor of Manila who, for the best of reasons
but without legal justification, ordered the transportation of more than 150
inmates of houses of ill-repute to Davao. After referring to the writ of habeas
corpus as having been devised and existing "as a speedy and effectual remedy
to relieve persons from unlawful restraint" the opinion of Justice Malcolm
continued: "The essential object and purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to
inquire into all manner of involuntary restraint as distinguished from voluntary,
and to relieve a person therefrom if such restraint is illegal. Any restraint which
will preclude freedom of action is sufficient." 22
The liberality with which the judiciary is to construe habeas corpus petitions
even if presented in pleadings on their face devoid of merit was demonstrated
in Ganaway v. Quilen, 23 where this Court, again through Justice Malcolm,
stated: "As standing alone the petition for habeas corpus was fatally defective
in its allegations, this court, on its motion, ordered before it the record of the
lower court in the case entitled Thomas Casey, et al. v. George Ganaway." 24
It is to Justice Malcolm likewise in Conde v. Rivera, 25 to whom is traceable the
doctrine, one that broadens the field of the operation of the writ, that a disregard
of the constitutional right to speedy trial ousts the court of jurisdiction and entitles
the accused if "restrained of his liberty, by habeas corpus to obtain his
freedom." 26
So it is in the United States. An 1830 decision 27 of Chief Justice Marshall put
the matter thus: "The writ of habeas corpus is a high prerogative writ, known to
the common law, the great object of which is the liberation of those who may be
imprisoned without sufficient cause." Then there is this affirmation from an 1869
decision 28 of the then Chief Justice Chase: "The great writ of habeas corpus
has been for centuries esteemed the best and only sufficient defense of
personal freedom." The passing of the years has only served to confirm its
primacy as a weapon on in the cause of liberty. Only the other year, Justice
Fortas spoke for the United States Supreme Court thus: "The writ of habeas
corpus is the fundamental instrument for safeguarding individual freedom
against arbitrary and lawless state action. ... The scope and flexibility of the writ
— its capacity to reach all manner of illegal detention — its ability to cut through
barriers of form and procedural mazes — have always been emphasized and
jealously guarded by courts and lawmakers. The very nature of the writ
demands that it be administered with the initiative and flexibility essential to
insure that miscarriages of justice within its reach are surfaced and corrected."
29 Justice Fortas explicitly made reference to Blackstone, who spoke of it as
"the great and efficacious writ, in all manner of illegal confinement." Implicit in
his just estimate of its pre-eminent role is his adoption of Holmes' famous
dissent in Frank v. Mangum: 30 "But habeas corpus cuts through all forms and
goes to the very tissue of the structure."
2. Where, however, the detention complained of finds its origin in what
has been judicially ordained, the range of inquiry in a habeas corpus proceeding
is considerably narrowed. For if "the person alleged to be restrained of his liberty
is in the custody of an officer under process issued by a court or judge or by
virtue of a judgment or order of a court of record, and that the court or judge had
jurisdiction to issue the process, render the judgment, or make the order," the
writ does not lie. 31 That principle dates back to 1902, 32 when this Court
announced that habeas corpus was unavailing where the person detained was
in the custody of an officer under process issued by a court or magistrate. This
is understandable, as during the time the Philippines was under American rule,
there was necessarily an adherence to authoritative doctrines of constitutional
law there followed.
One such principle is the requirement that there be a finding of jurisdictional
defect. As summarized by Justice Bradley in Ex parte Siebold, an 1880 decision:
"The only ground on which this court, or any court, without some special statute
authorizing it, will give relief on habeas corpus to a prisoner under conviction
and sentence of another court is the want of jurisdiction in such court over the
person or the cause, or some other matter rendering its proceedings void." 33
There is the fundamental exception though, that must ever be kept in mind.
Once a deprivation of a constitutional right is shown to exist, the court that
rendered the judgment is deemed ousted of jurisdiction and habeas corpus is
the appropriate remedy to assail the legality of the detention. 34
3. Petitioners precisely assert a deprivation of a constitutional right,
namely, the denial of equal protection. According to their petition: "In the case
at bar, the petitioners were convicted by Courts of First Instance for the very
same rebellion for which Hernandez, Geronimo, and others were convicted. The
law under which they were convicted is the very same law under which the latter
were convicted. It had not and has not been changed. For the same crime,
committed under the same law, how can we, in conscience, allow petitioners to
suffer life imprisonment, while others can suffer only prision mayor?" 35
They would thus stress that, contrary to the mandate of equal protection, people
similarly situated were not similarly dealt with. What is required under this
required constitutional guarantee is the uniform operation of legal norms so that
all persons under similar circumstances would be accorded the same treatment
both in the privileges conferred and the liabilities imposed. As was noted in a
recent decision: "Favoritism and undue preference cannot be allowed. For the
principle is that equal protection and security shall be given to every person
under circumstances, which if not identical are analogous. If law be looked upon
in terms of burden or charges, those that fall within a class should be treated in
the same fashion, whatever restrictions cast on some in the group equally
binding on the rest." 36
The argument of petitioners thus possesses a persuasive ring. The continued
incarceration after the twelve-year period when such is the maximum length of
imprisonment in accordance with our controlling doctrine, when others similarly
convicted have been freed, is fraught with implications at war with equal
protection. That is not to give it life. On the contrary, it would render it nugatory.
Otherwise, what would happen is that for an identical offense, the only
distinction lying in the finality of the conviction of one being before the
Hernandez ruling and the other after, a person duly sentenced for the same
crime would be made to suffer different penalties. Moreover, as noted in the
petition before us, after our ruling in People v. Lava, petitioners who were mere
followers would be made to languish in jail for perhaps the rest of their natural
lives when the leaders had been duly considered as having paid their penalty to
society, and freed. Such a deplorable result is to be avoided.
4. Petitioners likewise, as was made mention at the outset, would rely
on Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code which requires that penal judgment be
given a retroactive effect. In support of their contention, petitioners cite U.S. v.
Macasaet, 37 U.S. vs. Parrone, 38 U.S. v. Almencion, 39 People v. Moran, 40
and People v. Parel. 41 While reference in the above provision is made not to
judicial decisions but to legislative acts, petitioners entertain the view that it
would be merely an exaltation of the literal to deny its application to a case like
the present. Such a belief has a firmer foundation. As was previously noted, the
Civil Code provides that judicial decisions applying or interpreting the
Constitution, as well as legislation, form part of our legal system. Petitioners
would even find support in the well-known dictum of Bishop Hoadley:
"Whoever hath an absolute authority to interpret any written or spoken laws, it
is he who is truly the law-giver to all intents and purposes, and not the person
who first thought or spoke them." It is to be admitted that constitutional law
scholars, notably
Frankfurter, 42 Powell, 43 and Thayer, 44 in discussing judicial review as well
as the jurist John Chipman Gray, were much impressed with the truth and the
soundness of the above observations. We do not have to go that far though.
Enough for present purposes that both the Civil Code and the Revised Penal
Code allow, if they do not call for, a retroactive application.
It being undeniable that if the Hernandez ruling were to be given a retroactive
effect petitioners had served the full term for which they could have been legally
committed, is habeas corpus the appropriate remedy? The answer cannot be in
doubt. As far back as 1910 the prevailing doctrine was announced in Cruz v.
Director of Prisons. 45 Thus: "The courts uniformly hold that where a sentence
imposes punishment in excess of the power of the court to impose, such
sentence is void as to the excess, and some of the courts hold that the sentence
is void in toto; but the weight of authority sustains the proposition that such a
sentence is void only as to the excess imposed in case the parts are separable,
the rule being that the petitioner is not entitled to his discharge on a writ of
habeas corpus unless he has served out so much of the sentence as was valid."
46 There is a reiteration of such a principle in Director v. Director of Prisons 47
where it was explicitly announced by this Court "that the only means of giving
Page 21 of 99
retroactive effect to a penal provision favorable to the accused ... is the writ of
habeas corpus." 48 While the above decision speaks of a trial judge losing
jurisdiction over the case, insofar as the remedy of habeas corpus is concerned,
the emphatic affirmation that it is the only means of benefiting the accused by
the retroactive character of a favorable decision holds true. Petitioners clearly
have thus successfully sustained the burden of justifying their release.
WHEREFORE, the petition for habeas corpus is granted, and it is ordered that
petitioners be forthwith set at liberty.
Dizon and Zaldivar, JJ., concur. Concepcion, C.J., concurs in the result. Castro
and Makasiar, JJ., took no part.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-63345 January 30, 1986
EFREN C. MONCUPA, petitioner,
vs.
JUAN PONCE ENRILE, FABIAN C. VER, GALILEO KINTANAR, FERNANDO
GOROSPE, AND JOSE CASTRO, respondents.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
As early as 1919, in the leading case of Villavicencio v. Lukban (39 Phil. 778,
790), this Court ruled:
A prime specification of al application for a writ of habeas corpus is restraint of
liberty. The essential object and purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to
inquire into all manner of involuntary restraint as distinguished from voluntary,
and to relieve a person therefrom if such restraint is illegal. Any restraint which
will preclude freedom of action is sufficient. ...
This latitudinarian scope of the writ of habeas-corpus has, in law, remained
undiminished up to the present. The respondents' contention that the petition
has become moot and academic must necessarily be denied. Efren C. Moncupa
may have been released from his detention cell. The restraints attached to his
temporary release, however, preclude freedom of action and under the
Villavicencio v. Lukban rule warrant this Court's inquiry into the nature of his
involuntary restraint and our relieving him of such restraints as may be illegal.
Petitioner Efren C. Moncupa, together with others, was arrested on April 22,
1982 at about 10:50 P.M., at the corner of D. Street and Quezon Avenue,
Quezon City. Moncupa D. Tuazon was brought to MIG-15 Camp Bago Bantay,
Quezon City where he was detained. On April 23, 1982, on the allegation that
he was a National Democratic Front (NDF) staff member, a Presidential
Commitment Order (PCO) was issued against him and eight (8) other persons.
After two separate investigations, conducted first, by Lieutenant Colonel
Gerardo Lantoria, Jr., Chief of Task Force Makabansa Investigation Group and
second, by Investigating Fiscal Amado Costales of Quezon City, it was
ascertained that the petitioner was not a member of any subversive
organization. Both investigators recommended the prosecution of the petitioner
only for illegal possession of firearms and illegal possession of subversive
documents under Presidential Decree No. 33.
Consequently, two separate informations were filed against the petitioner, one,
for illegal possession of firearms before the Court of First Instance of Rizal and
the other for violation of P.D. 33 before the City Court of Quezon City. Against
the other accused, however, the cases filed were for violation of P.D. 885 as
amended. Significantly, the petitioner was excluded from the charge under the
Revised Anti-Subversion Law. During the pendency of this petition, it is
significant that his arraignment and further proceedings have not been pursued.
And yet, the petitioner's motions for bail were denied by the lower court.
Hence, the petitioner filed the instant petition.
The respondents, in their return of the writ justified the validity of petitioner's
detention on the ground that the privilege of the writ had been suspended as to
the petitioner. However, on August 30, 1983, the respondents filed a motion to
dismiss stating that on May 11, 1983, the petitioner was temporarily released
from detention on orders of the Minister temporary of National Defense with the
approval of the President. The respondents stated. "Since the petitioner is free
and no longer under the custody of the respondents, the present petition for
habeas corpus may be deemed moot and academic as in similar cases.
The issue to be resolved is whether or not the instant petition has become moot
and academic in view of the petitioner's temporary release.
It is to be noted that attached to the petitioner's temporary release are
restrictions imposed on him. These are:
1) His freedom of movement is curtailed by the condition that petitioner
gets the approval of respondents for any travel outside Metro Manila.
2) His liberty of abode is restricted because prior approval of
respondents is also required in case petitioner wants to change his place of
residence.
3) His freedom of speech is muffled by the prohibition that he should
not "participate in any interview conducted by any local or foreign mass media
representatives nor give any press release or information that is inimical to the
interest of national security."
4) He is required to report regularly to respondents or their
representatives.
The petitioner argues that although admittedly his temporary release is an
improvement upon his actual detention, the restrictions imposed by the
respondents constitute an involuntary and illegal restraint on his freedom.
The petitioner stresses that his temporary release did not render the instant
petitioner moot and academic but that "it merely shifted the inquiry from the
legality of his actual detention to the legality of the conditions imposed by the
respondents."
We agree with the petitioner.
The reservation of the military in the form of restrictions attached to the
temporary release of the petitioner constitute restraints on the liberty of Mr.
Moncupa. Such restrictions limit the freedom of movement of the petitioner. It is
not physical restraint alone which is inquired into by the writ of habeas corpus.
In Villavicencio v. Lukban, the women who had been illegally seized and
transported against their will to Davao were no longer under any official restraint.
Unlike petitioner Moncupa, they were free to change their domicile without
asking for official permission. Indeed, some of them managed to return to
Manila. Yet, the Court condemned the involuntary restraints caused by the
official action, fined the Mayor of Manila and expressed the hope that its
"decision may serve to bulwark the fortifications of an orderly government of
laws and to protect individual liberty from Megal encroachment."
In the light of the above ruling, the present petition for habeas corpus has not
become moot and academic. Other precedents for such a conclusion are not
wanting.
The decision in Caunca v. Salazar (82 Phil. 851) states:
An employment agency, regardless of the amount it may advance to a
prospective employee or maid, has absolutely no power to curtail her freedom
of movement. The fact that no physical force has been exerted to keep her in
the house of the respondent does not make less real the deprivation of her
personal freedom of movement, freedom to transfer from one place to another,
from to choose one's residence. Freedom may be lost due to external moral
compulsion, to founded or groundless fear, to erroneous belief in the existence
of the will. If the actual effect of such psychological spell is to place a person at
the mercy of another, the victim is entitled to the protection of courts of justice
as much as the individual who is illigally deprived of liberty by deprived or
physical coercion.
In Tibo v. The Provincial Commander (85 SCRA 564), this Court ruled:
Although the release in the custody of the Deputy Minister did not signify that
petitioners could once again enjoy their full freedom, the application could have
been dismissed, as it could be withdrawn by the parties themselves. That is a
purely voluntary act. When the hearing was held on September 7, 1978, it turned
out that counsel for petitioner Bonifacio V. Tupaz could have academic in a
hasty manner when he set forth the above allegations in his manifestation of
August 30, 1978, for Attorney Jose C. Espinas, who appeared for petitioners,
while conceding that there was such a release from confinement, also alleged
that it was conditioned on their restricting their activities as labor union leaders
to the premises of the Trade Unions of the Philippines and ABSOLUTE
Services, presumably in Macaraig as well as the Ministry of labor. As the voting
was to take place in the business firm in Bataan, the acts set would nullify
whatever efforts they could have exerted. To that extent, and with the prohibition
against their going to Bataan, the restraint on liberty was undeniable. If so, the
moot and academic character of the petition was far from clear.
More recently, we had occasion to rule squarely on whether or not a temporary
release from detention renders the petition for writ of habeas corpus moot and
academic. As in this case of Moncupa, the petitioners in Toyoto, et al v. Hon.
Fidel Ramos, et al, G.R. No. 69270, October 15, 1985, were temporarily
released from detention. The respondents filed a motion to dismiss the petition
for habeas corpus on the ground that the petitioners had been temporarily
released and their case had, therefore, become moot and academic. The
petitioners insisted, however, that their case may be considered moot and
academic only "if their release would be permanent." In ruling for the petitioners,
we said:
Ordinarily, a petition for habeas corpus becomes moot and academic when the
restraint on the liberty of the petitioners is lifted either temporarily or
permanently. We have so held in a number of cases. But the instant case
presents a different situation. The question to be resolved is whether the State
can reserve the power to re-arrest a person for an offense after a court of
competent jurisdiction has absolved him of the offense. An affirmative answer
is the one suggested by the respondents because the release of the petitioners
being merely 'temporary' it follows that they can be re-arrested at anytime
despite their acquittal by a court of competent jurisdiction. We hold that such a
Page 22 of 99
reservation is repugnant to the government of laws and not of men principle.
Under this principle the moment a person is acquitted on a criminal charge he
can no longer be detained or re-arrested for the same offense. This concept is
so basic and elementary that it needs no elaboration.
In effect the principle is clear. A release that renders a petition for a writ of
habeas corpus moot and academic must be one which is free from involuntary
restraints. Where a person continues to be unlawfully denied one or more of his
constitutional freedoms, where there is present a denial of due process, where
the restraints are not merely involuntary but appear to be unnecessary, and
where a deprivation of freedom originally valid has, in the light of subsequent
developments, become arbitrary, the person concerned or those applying in his
behalf may still avail themselves of the privilege of the writ.
The respondents have failed to show why the writ may not issue and why the
restraints on the petitioner's freedom of movement should not be lifted.
WHEREFORE, the PETITION is GRANTED. The conditions attached to the
temporary release of the petitioner are declared null and void. The temporary
release of the petitioner is declared ABSOLUTE. No costs,
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee, Concepcion, Jr., Abad Santos, Melencio-Herrera, Escolin De la
Fuente, Cuevas, Alampay and Patajo, JJ., concur. Aquino, C.J., took no part.
Plana, J., I reserve my vote.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 79173 December 1, 1987
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF ROLANDO
N. ABADILLA, SUSAN S. ABADILLA, in her own behalf and in behalf of the
minors JUNE ELIZABETH, ROLANDO, JR., DAPHINE JENNIFER, MA.
THERESA, ANNA ROSANNA, VINCENT MARCUS and BART JOSEPH, all
surnamed ABADILLA, petitioners,
vs.
General FIDEL V. RAMOS, Chief of Staff, AFP; Major General RENATO DE
VILLA, Commanding General, Philippine Constabulary & Vice-Chief of
Staff, AFP; and Brigadier General ALEXANDER AGUIRRE, Commanding
General, CAPCOM, PC, respondents.
GANCAYCO, J.:
The validity of the detention of an individual is challenged in this Petition for
habeas corpus. The petitioners are the spouse and minor children of the
detainee while the respondents are ranking officers of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines (AFP).
The record of the case discloses that on January 27, 1987, a group of officers
and enlisted men of the AFP seized control of the radio-television broadcasting
facilities of the Republic Broadcasting System (GMA-Channel 7) located in
Quezon City ostensibly for the purpose of toppling the existing constitutional
government. While the takeover might have been a prelude to similar operations
throughout the national capital, it did not succeed. On January 29, 1987, the
mutineers surrendered to the military authorities and the possession of the
facility was restored to the owners and managers thereof. Soon thereafter, the
military authorities conducted an investigation of the matter.
On April 18, 1987, a group of enlisted men staged a mutiny inside the Fort
Bonifacio military facility in Makati, Metropolitan Manila. The mutiny, dubbed as
"The Black Saturday Revolt," 1 did not succeed either. After the incident, the
military authorities also conducted an investigation.
The first investigation was concluded on March 12, 1987. The investigation
disclosed that Colonel Rolando N. Abadilla of the Philippine Constabulary (PC)
of the AFP was one of the leaders of the unsuccessful takeover of the GMA
radio-television facilities. 2 The Board of Officers investigating the matter
recommended that the case of Colonel Abadilla be endorsed for pre-trial
investigation and that the appropriate charges be filed against him for violation
of Article of War 67 (Mutiny or Sedition). Article of War 94 (Various Crimes) in
relation to Article 139 of the Revised Penal Code and Section 1 of Presidential
Decree No. 1866, and such other offenses that may be warranted by the
evidence. Accordingly, a charge sheet was prepared against the Colonel.
The investigation conducted on "The Black Saturday Revolt" ended on May 27,
1987. It was found at said investigation that Colonel Abadilla was also involved
in the mutiny. The Board of Officers conducting the investigation and
recommended that the case be endorsed for pre-trial investigation and that the
appropriate charges be filed against the Colonel. 3 The Colonel was likewise
charged, accordingly.
Colonel Abadilla was at large when both investigations were conducted.
On May 4, 1987 or some two weeks before the second investigation was
concluded, herein respondent Major General Renato De Villa, Commanding
General of the PC and Vice-Chief of Staff of the AFP issued an Order for the
arrest and confinement of Colonel Abadilla. 4
On May 21, 1987, respondent AFP Chief of Staff General Fidel V. Ramos issued
General Orders No. 342 dropping Colonel Abadilla from the rolls of regular
officers of the AFP. 5 The pertinent portions of the said General Orders are as
follows-
DROPPING FROM THE ROLLS OF REGULAR OFFICERS
The names of the following officers are dropped from the rolls of Regular
Officers, Armed Forces of the Philippines for cause effective as of 9 May 1987
pursuant to Article of War 117. (Authority: Letter from the President, dated 9
May 1987).
BRIGADIER GENERAL JOSE MARIA CARLOS ZUMEL ...
COLONEL ROLANDO N ABADILLA 0-4937 PHILIPPINE CONSTABULARY
(GENERAL STAFF CORPS)
MAJOR REYNALDO C CABAUATAN ...
BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE:
xxx xxx xxx
On July 7, 1987, the Assistant City Fiscal of Quezon City filed an Information for
Slight Physical Injuries with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Metropolitan Manila
in Quezon City against Colonel Abadilla. 6 The case was docketed as Criminal
Case No. 0237558.
On July 27, 1987, a combined element of the Philippine Army and Philippine
Constabulary arrested Colonel Abadilla. 7 He was detained first in Camp Crame
in Quezon City and later, up to the present, in Fort Bonifacio in Makati.
On July 30, 1987, another Information, this time for violation of Presidential
Decree No. 1866 (Illegal Possession of Firearms and Ammunition) was filed by
the Assistant City Fiscal of Quezon City against Colonel Abadilla. 8 The case
was assigned to Branch 104 of the Regional Trial Court in Quezon City and was
docketed as Criminal Case No. Q- 53382.
On the same date, July 30, 1987, Mrs. Susan S. Abadilla the spouse of Colonel
Abadilla together with their minor children June Elizabeth, Rolando, Jr. Daphine
Jennifer, Ma. Theresa, Anna Rosanna, Vincent Marcus and Bart Joseph, went
to this Court and filed the instant Petition for habeas corpus, challenging the
validity of the detention of Colonel Abadilla. 9
The main arguments in the Petition are as follows —
(1) When Colonel Abadilla was dropped from the rolls of officers
effective May 9, 1987, he became a civilian and as such, the order for his arrest
and confinement is null and void because he was no longer subject to military
law;
(2) His detention is illegal because he is not charged with any criminal
offense, either before a civil court or a court-martial;
(3) Even assuming that the order for the arrest and confine- ment of
Colonel Abadilla was valid at the initial stage, the said order became functus
officio and/or moot and academic when the Colonel was dropped from the rolls
of officers;
(4) Even assuming that Colonel Abadilla is subject to military law, his
detention remains illegal because under Article of War 70, a person subject to
military law can be detained only if he is charged with a crime or a serious
offense under the Articles of War.
In the meantime, the Regional Trial Court, with Judge Maximiano O. Asuncion
presiding therein, granted the Motion to Quash and the Supplement thereto filed
by the counsel of Colonel Abadilla. Accordingly, the Information in Criminal
Case No. Q-53382 was dismissed by the trial court. 10
In a resolution dated August 4, 1987, this Court resolved to issue the writ of
habeas corpus. The respondents were required to make a return of the writ on
August 10, 1987. 11
On August 10, 1987, the respondents, represented by the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG), submitted the Return of the writ. 12 The main arguments in the
Return are as follows —
(1) In the event that proceedings with a view to military trial are
commenced against a Person subject to military law before the termination of
military service, military jurisdiction will fully attach on the said person.;
(2) The confinement of Colonel Abadilla as a person subject to military
jurisdiction is authorized by Article of War 70; and
(3) The continued confinement of Colonel Abadilla in Fort Bonifacio is
imperative and justified on account of the criminal case/s filed against him by
both the military and civil authorities.
Page 23 of 99
As instructed by this Court, the petitioners submitted their Reply to the Return
of the writ on September 7, 1987. 13 The main arguments in the Reply are as
follows —
(1) The pendency of a case in the civil courts has no relevance to the
issue of military jurisdiction over Colonel Abadilla. This view notwithstanding,
Criminal Case No. Q-53382 filed against Colonel Abadilla has been dismissed
by the trial court. The pendency of Criminal Case No. 0237558 filed against the
Colonel does not warrant his continued confinement inasmuch as the Colonel
has posted bail for his provisional liberty;
(2) Colonel Abadilla is not in the active service of the AFP nor is he a
person under sentence adjudged by courts-martial. As such, he does not fall
under the category of a person subject to military law as defined by Article of
War 2;
(3) An officer dropped from the rolls by order of the President is fully
separated from the service and is no longer subject to military law (Citing Gloria,
Philippine Military Law Annotated).;
(4) Under Section 10 of the Manual for Courts-Martial, Philippine Army,
court-martial jurisdiction over officers in the military service of the Philippines
ceases on discharge or separation from the service. The case of Colonel
Abadilla does not fall under any of the exceptions to this rule. This observation
has been upheld in Martin v. Ver, 123 SCRA 745 (1983);
(5) The pronouncement of the United States Supreme Court in Toth v.
Quarles, 350 U.S. 11 (1955), cited in Olaguer v. Military Commission No. 34,
G.R. Nos. 54558 and 69882, May 22, 1987, supports the stand taken by the
herein petitioners and
(6) Under the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1850, as amended
by Presidential Decree No. 1952, court-martial jurisdiction over the person of
accused military personnel Cannot be exercised if they are already separated
from the active service, provided that jurisdiction has not attached beforehand
unless otherwise provided by law.
On September 9, 1987, the petitioners submitted their Traverse to the Return of
the writ. 14 It is contended therein that, contrary to the view of the Solicitor
General, jurisdiction over a person is acquired not by the mere filing of a charge
or information, or by the commencement of an investigation, but by the arrest of
the defendant. The petitioners stress that inasmuch as Colonel Abadilla was
arrested after he had become a civilian, the charge sheets prepared against him
by the military authorities are nun and void for lack of jurisdiction over the person
of the Colonel.
On September 24, 1987, the petitioners submitted their Additional Traverse
together with a Motion to Decide the Petition. 15 On the issue of military
jurisdiction, and in support of their contentions, they cite the treatise of Colonel
William Winthrop entitled Military Law and Precedents. 16
Inasmuch as the parties herein had already presented their respective
arguments, the case was, therefore, deemed submitted for deliberation.
The sole issue in habeas corpus proceedings is the legality of the detention. 17
Therefore, the issue that must be resolved by this Court is this: Is the detention
of Colonel Abadilla illegal? The resolution of this issue will, of course, relate to
the jurisdiction of the military authorities over the person of Colonel Abadilla.
I.
We shall first resolve the problem of jurisdiction.
In Olaguer v. Military Commission No. 34, 18 this Court held that a military
commission or tribunal cannot try and exercise jurisdiction over civilians for
offenses allegedly committed by them as long as the civil courts are open and
functioning, and that any judgment rendered by such body relating to a civilian
is null and void for lack of jurisdiction on the part of the military tribunal
concerned. For the same reasons, the doctrine announced in Aquino, Jr. v.
Military Commission No. 2 19 and all decided cases affirming the same, in so
far as they are inconsistent with the Olaguer pronouncement, were deemed
abandoned. There is no doubt, therefore, that military authorities cannot try
civilians.
The petitioners contend that the Olaguer doctrine applies to Colonel Abadilla on
the ground that he had become a civilian since May 9, 1987 when he was
dropped from the rolls of officers of the AFP. They argue that on account of his
civilian status, Colonel Abadilla is no longer subject to military law. In support of
their arguments, the petitioners cite the Articles of War, 20 the Manual for
Courts-Martial of the AFP, 21 Presidential Decree No. 1850, as amended, as
well as the dissertations on military law of Colonel William Winthrop 22 and
Colonel Claro Gloria. 23 They likewise invoke the pronouncement of this Court
in Martin v. Ver 24 and that of the Supreme Court of the United States in Toth
v. Quarles. 25
On the other hand, the Solicitor General contends that military jurisdiction had
fully attached on Colonel Abadilla inasmuch as proceedings were initiated
against him before the termination of his service in the military.
We agree.
As early as March, 1987, months before Colonel Abadilla was dropped from the
rolls of officers, the military authorities began the institution of proceedings
against him. As of that time, he was certainly subject to military law. He was
under investigation for his alleged participation in the unsuccessful mutinies
when he was an officer of the AFP. As a military officer, it was incumbent upon
him to appear before his superior officers conducting the investigation even for
the purpose of clearing his name. He did not do so. His superiors could not
confine him during the period of investigation because as stated earlier, he was
at large. This disregard for military duty and responsibility may have prompted
his superiors to cause him to be dropped from the rolls of officers.
It is clear that from the very start of this controversy, the military authorities
intended to try Colonel Abadilla as a person subject to military law. This can be
gleaned from the charge sheets prepared against him.
The fact that Colonel Abadilla was dropped from the rolls of officers cannot and
should not lead to the conclusion that he is now beyond the jurisdiction of the
military authorities. If such a conclusion were to prevail, his very own refusal to
clear his name and protect his honor before his superior officers in the manner
prescribed for and expected from a ranking military officer would be his shield
against prosecution in the first place. His refusal to report for duty or to surrender
when ordered arrested, which led to his name being dropped from the roll of
regular officers of the military, cannot thereby render him beyond the jurisdiction
of the military courts for offenses he committed while still in the military service.
This Court cannot countenance such an absurd situation. Established principles
in remedial law call for application.
The military authorities had jurisdiction over the person of Colonel Abadilla at
the time of the alleged offenses. This jurisdiction having been vested in the
military authorities, it is retained up to the end of the proceedings against
Colonel Abadilla. Well-settled is the rule that jurisdiction once acquired is not
lost upon the instance of the parties but continues until the case is terminated.
26
The petitioners stress that jurisdiction over a person is acquired not by the mere
filing of a charge or an information, or by the commencement of an investigation,
but by the arrest of the defendant. They maintain that the Colonel was arrested
when he was already a civilian.
The argument is untenable.
The rule that jurisdiction over a person is acquired by his arrest applies only to
criminal proceedings instituted before the regular courts. It does not apply to
proceedings under military law. At the time the military investigations were
commenced, Colonel Abadilla was an officer of the AFP subject to military law.
As such, the military authorities had jurisdiction over his person pursuant to
Article of War 2 and Section 8 of the Manual for Courts-Martial, AFP, which
provide as follows-
Art. 2. Persons Subject to Military Law. — The following persons are subject to
these articles and shall be understood as included in the term 'any person
subject to military law or persons subject to military law whenever used in these
articles:
(a) All officers and soldiers in the active service of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines or of the Philippine Constabulary; ... ; and
8. COURTS-MARTIAL — Jurisdiction in general — Persons. — The
following persons are subject to military law:
(a) All officers and soldiers in the active service of the Armed Forces of the
Philippine Constabulary; ...
xxx xxx xxx
As mentioned earlier, his earlier arrest could not be effected because he was at
large. The initial stages of the investigations had against him before his arrest
were, therefore, not improper.
As a whole, the authorities cited and relied upon by the petitioners do not
satisfactorily support their contentions.
Article of War 2 enumerates who are subject to military law. In March, 1987,
Colonel Abadilla was a military officer. Under this Article, he was subject to
military law.
Section 10 of the Manual for Courts-Martial, AFP, which discusses court- martial
jurisdiction in general, states the general rule to be:
The general rule is that court-martial jurisdiction over officers, cadets, soldiers,
and others in the military service of the Philippines ceases on discharge or other
separation from such service, and that jurisdiction as to an offense committed
during a period of service thus terminated is not revived by a re-entry into the
military service.
Attention is called to the exception mentioned in the last sentence of the Section,
to wit —
So also, where a dishonorably discharged general prisoner is tried for an
offense committed while a soldier and prior to his dishonorable discharge, such
discharge does not terminate his amenability to trial for the offense.
This exception applies to the case of Colonel Abadilla inasmuch as he is at
present confined in Fort Bonifacio upon the orders of his superior officers, and
Page 24 of 99
his having been dropped from the rolls of officers amounts to a dishonorable
discharge.
Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 1850, as amended, even acknowledges
instances where military jurisdiction fully attaches on an individual even after he
shall have been separated from active service, to wit —
SECTION 1. Court martial jurisdiction over Integrated National Police and
Members of the Amed Forces ...
(b) all persons subject to military law under Article 2 of the aforecited Articles of
War who commit any crime or offense shall be exclusively tried by courts-martial
or their case disposed of under the said Articles of War; Provided, that in either
of the aforementioned situations, the case shall be disposed of or tried by the
proper civil or judicial authorities when court- martial jurisdiction over the offense
has prescribed under Article 38 of Commonwealth Act No. 408, as amended, or
court-martial jurisdiction over the person of the accused military or Integrated
National Police can no longer be exercised by virtue of their separation from the
active service without jurisdiction having duly attached beforehand unless
otherwise provided by law; ... (Emphasis supplied.)
The dissertations of Colonels Winthrop and Gloria are, at most, persuasive
authorities. Indeed, this Court has cited the treatise of Colonel Winthrop in at
least three cases 27 on account of the scholarly discussions contained therein.
Works of this nature provide insight and information which have been of
tremendous help to this Court in many judicial controversies. Regardless of their
great value, they cannot prevail over opposing but nonetheless settled doctrines
in Philippine jurisprudence.
These observations notwithstanding, We have gone through the treatise of
Colonel Winthrop and We find the following passage which goes against the
contention of the petitioners, viz —
3. Offenders in general — Attaching of jurisdiction. It has further been
held, and is now settled law, in regard to military offenders in general, that if the
military jurisdiction has once duly attached to them previous to the date of the
termination of their legal period of service, they may be brought to trial by court-
martial after that date, their discharge being meanwhile withheld. This principle
has mostly been applied to cases where the offense was committed just prior to
the end of the term. In such cases the interests of discipline clearly forbid that
the offender should go unpunished. It is held therefore that if before the day on
which his service legally terminates and his right to a discharge is complete,
proceedings with a view to trial are commenced against him — as by arrest or
the service of charges, — the military jurisdiction will fully attach, and once
attached may be continued by a trial by court-martial ordered and held after the
end of the term of the enlistment of the accused ... 28
The case of Martin v. Ver 29 cited by the petitioners is not in point. In Martin this
Court took the opportunity to discuss the general rule that "court-martial
jurisdiction over persons in the military service of the Philippines ceases upon
discharge or separation from such service" and an exception to the general rule
recited in Article of War 95 regarding frauds against the Government.
The case of Toth v. Quarles 30 decided by the Supreme Court of the United
States is also inapplicable.
Toth involves a former serviceman named Audrey M. Toth who, five months
after his honorable discharge from the U.S. Air Force, was arrested by military
authorities on a charge of murder allegedly committed in Korea when he was
still an airman. A divided Supreme Court 31 held that Congress has no power
to subject a discharged serviceman to trial by court-martial for offenses
committed by him while in the military service and so to deprive him of the
constitutional safeguards protecting persons accused of crime in a federal court.
The Toth ruling is inapplicable to the instant case for two reasons.
First — Toth was honorably discharged from the military service. The
arrangement was voluntary on the part of the serviceman. There was an
ostensible intention on his part to live the life of a civilian again. Colonel Abadilla
was not honorably discharged. On the contrary, he was dropped from the rolls
of regular officers of the AFP. This arrangement did not have his express
consent. In fact, he was at large at that time.
Second — The proceedings against Toth began after his honorable discharge
from the service. The proceedings against Colonel Abadilla were commenced
when he was still a regular officer of the AFP.
Moreover, the doctrine in Toth is not a unanimous pronouncement as there were
some persuasive dissenting views.
Although Toth was cited in Olaguer v. Military Commission No. 34, 32 the
citation should not be construed as a sweeping endorsement of the entire
doctrine therein. Toth was cited in Olaguer only for the purpose of emphasizing
that military commissions or tribunals cannot try civilians. In Olaguer, this Court
relied on the doctrine announced in Ex-parte Milligan, 33 and not the one in
Toth, in arriving at the Decision of the Court.
Another point should be mentioned regarding the matter of jurisdiction. We
agree with the respondents in their assertion that the pendency of a case in the
civil courts has no relevance to the problem of military jurisdiction over Colonel
Abadilla. The argument is well-taken.
II.

The matter of jurisdiction having been settled, We now proceed to discuss the
remaining contentions of the petitioners.
The petitioners argue that even if it were to be assumed that Colonel Abadilla is
subject to military law, his confinement remains illegal because under Article of
War 70, a person subject to military law can be detained only if he is charged
with a crime or a serious offense under the Articles of War.
The record of the case discloses that Colonel Abadilla has been charged by the
military authorities for violation of Article of War 67 (Mutiny or Sedition) which is
a serious offense, and the corresponding charge sheets have been prepared
against him.
The important issue in this Petition has been resolved-the detention of Colonel
Abadilla under the circumstances obtaining in this case is not illegal. For this
reason, the instant Petition for habeas corpus should be dismissed for lack of
merit.
In the light of the foregoing discussion, the motion of petitioners to hold
respondent General Ramos in contempt of court for approving the filing of court
martial proceedings against Colonel Abadilla during the pendency of this case
should be and is hereby denied. The Court has not issued a restraining order
enjoining such proceedings. In fact We now find that the court martial
proceedings may proceed inasmuch as the military authorities have jurisdiction
over Colonel Abadilla in the above-stated cases.
One last word. The man in uniform belongs to the elite in public service. His
eminent credential is his absolute loyalty to the Constitution, the flag, his country
and his people. He is the guardian against external and internal aggression.
He is a man of honor and courage. He is a gentleman. He is given arms to insure
his capability as an instrument of peace. When he is drafted in the Philippine
Constabulary he becomes a peace officer, a law enforcer, a law man. Respect
for the law is his article of faith.
However, when he wavers and fails to live up to the highest standard of fidelity
to his country and people, when he defies authority and discipline, when he
commits offenses or when he turns against the very people and government he
is sworn to protect, he becomes an outlaw and a disgrace to his uniform. The
state has a right to hold him to account for his transgressions and to see to it
that he can not use the awesome powers of his status to jeopardize the security
and peace of the citizenry.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant Petition for habeas corpus
is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. We make no pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee, C.J., Yap, Fernan, Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz,
Paras, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento and Cortes, JJ., concur.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 83251 January 23, 1991
RENATO B. SUAREZ, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, HON. ZENAIDA BALTAZAR as Presiding Judge of
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 153, Pasig, Metro Manila, and
ROSEMARIE MANESE, respondents.
MEDIALDEA, J.:
This is a petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals dismissing
the special civil action for certiorari and prohibition filed by petitioner to annul
and set aside the orders of the trial court and to enjoin the latter from proceeding
with the petition for custody of and support of minor Rafael Carlos Suarez
docketed as Sp. Proc. No. 840-J filed by respondent Manese.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
On December 11, 1986, respondent Manese filed with the trial court a petition
for writ of habeas corpus against petitioner Renato Suarez, his mother Paz
Suarez and his sister Milagros Suarez docketed as Sp. Proc. No. 734-J.
On February 23, 1987, before she could finish the presentation of her evidence,
respondent Manese filed a motion to dismiss without prejudice to her right to file
another action for custody of minor under Rule 99 of the Rules of Court,
contending that the issue as to who between the parties has the rightful and
legal custody of the minor child could be fully adjudicated in another action and
not in the present action for writ of habeas corpus.
On February 24, 1987, the trial court issued a resolution granting the motion
with prejudice.1âwphi1
Page 25 of 99
Thereafter, respondent Manese filed another action for custody of minor and
support on May 27, 1987 before the trial court, docketed as Sp. Proc. No. 840-
J against petitioner. The latter moved to dismiss the action on the ground of bar
by prior judgment rendered in Sp. Proc. No. 734-J dismissing the same with
prejudice. On October 1, 1987, the motion to dismiss by petitioner was denied
by the trial court. Petitioner, however, moved for the reconsideration of the
denial which was also denied.
Respondent Manese filed on December 1, 1987 a motion for visitorial rights and
on December 14, 1987, a motion for custody of the minor during the Christmas
season.
On December 15, 1987, the trial court issued an order denying petitioner's
motion for reconsideration and granting respondent Manese's two motions.
On January 22, 1988, the trial court issued another order setting aside its order
dated December 15, 1987, which granted the petitioner's motion for visitorial
rights over the minor, and setting the pre-trial of the case on a scheduled date.
Not satisfied with the orders of the trial court, petitioner filed with respondent
appellate court a petition for certiorari and prohibition with application for
restraining order/preliminary injunction, seeking to set aside the orders of the
trial court of October 1, 1987 and December 15, 1987.
On February 12, 1988, the Court of Appeals rendered judgment dismissing the
special civil action.
Hence, this petition was filed with the petitioner assigning the following errors of
the respondent appellate court:
I
THE ORDER OF THE HONORABLE JUDGE EUTROPIO MIGRINO IN SP.
PROC. NO. 734-J DISMISSING THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS IS A
VALID JUDGMENT.
II
UNDER SECTION 2, RULE 17 OF THE RULES OF COURT, THE HON.
JUDGE MIGRINO HAS THE RIGHT TO DISMISS THE HABEAS CORPUS
CASE FILED BY MANESE WITH PREJUDICE.
III
THE PROPRIETY OR VALIDITY OF JUDGE MIGRINO'S ORDER OF
DISMISSAL (ANNEX 'D') OF THE HABEAS CORPUS CASE CANNOT BE
PASSED UPON BY THE COURT OF APPEALS, BECAUSE IT WAS NOT
APPEALED.
IV
IN THE LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING, MANESE'S CAUSE OF ACTION
(PETITION FOR CUSTODY OF MINOR) IS BARRED BY A PRIOR
RESOLUTION (SEC. 1, PAR. (F), RULE 16 OF THE RULES OF COURT).
V
GRANTING IN GRATIA ARGUMENTI THAT THE ORDER OF DISMISSAL BY
JUDGE MIGRINO IS NULL AND VOID UNDER THE CONSTITUTION, WHICH
SUAREZ VEHEMENTLY DENIES, NEVERTHELESS, THE PETITION FOR
CUSTODY OF MINOR SHOULD STILL BE DISMISSED ON THE GROUND OF
LITIS PENDENTIA.
VI
GRANTING, FURTHER, THAT THE ORDER OF DISMISSAL IS NOT A VALID
JUDGMENT, WHICH SUAREZ VEHEMENTLY DENIES, NEVERTHELESS,
RESPONDENT JUDGE BALTAZAR COMMITTED NOT ONLY GRAVE ABUSE
OF DISCRETION BUT EXCEEDED HER JURISDICTION WHEN SHE
GRANTED MANESE'S MOTION FOR CUSTODY OF THE MINOR (ANNEX
"M") IN HER ORDER OF 15 DECEMBER 1987 (ANNEX "N").
The assigned errors boil down to the following issues: 1) Whether or not the
order of dismissal with prejudice in the action for the writ of habeas corpus,
docketed as Sp. No. 734-J is res judicata to the present action for custody of
minor and support docketed as Sp. No. 840-J; 2) whether or not the respondent
appellate court committed grave abuse of discretion in granting custody to the
private respondent during the Christmas season as stated in the questioned
order of December 15, 1987.
We find the petition devoid of merit.
Anent the first issue, petitioner contends that the petition for custody of minor
cannot prosper due to the prior judgment dismissing the petition for writ of
habeas corpus and the principle of res judicata applies even if the party changed
the form of its cause of action in filing the present action for custody of minor.
There are four well known requisites to the principle of res judicata: (1) there
must be a final judgment or order; (2) the court rendering the same must have
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the parties; (3) the former judgment is a
judgment on the merits; and (4) there is between the first and the second action
identity of parties, of subject matter, and of causes of action (Filipinas
Investment Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. 66059-60, December 4,
1989). However, the foregoing requisites should be subservient to the most
significant requirement that the former judgment must be a valid one. We agree
with the conclusion of the Court of Appeals that the former order issued by the
trial court in Sp. Proc. No. 734-J, dismissing the habeas corpus case is null and
void for having been rendered in violation of the constitutional mandate that no
decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and
distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based (Article VIII, Section 14, 1987
Constitution). Further, the circumstances surrounding the dismissal of the case
show that the order of the trial court was issued whimsically and capriciously
and with grave abuse of discretion tantamount to nullity of the order.
Records show that the motion to dismiss of respondent Manese, who was the
plaintiff in the trial court was filed during the trial and hearing stage of the petition
for writ of habeas corpus. The general rule governing dismissal of actions by the
plaintiff after the answer has been served is laid down in Rule 17 of the Revised
Rules of Court, which rule is summarized as follows — an action shall not be
dismissed at the request of the plaintiff after the service of the answer except by
order of the court and upon such terms and conditions as the court deems
proper. Hence, the trial court has the judicial discretion in ruling on a motion to
dismiss at the instance of the plaintiff, but this discretion should be exercised
within reasonable limits. In such case, the trial court has to decide whether the
dismissal of the case should be allowed, and if so on what terms and conditions.
In the case at bar, the motion to dismiss filed by the plaintiff states that it was
without prejudice to the filing of an action for the custody of minor on the ground
that the issue as to the custody of the child would be properly determined in a
second action to be filed under Rule 99 of the Revised Rules of Court. Clearly,
the purpose of the plaintiff in dismissing the first action for a writ of habeas
corpus was not to end litigation concerning the right of the former to the custody
of her child but on the contrary, to pursue it in a second action, this time for
custody of minor. It is worthy to note that the ground upon which respondent
Manese filed her motion for dismissal is erroneous since the question as to who
shall have the custody of the child can be sufficiently resolved in the petition for
writ of habeas corpus pursuant to Rule 102, Revised Rules of Court without the
necessity of filing a separate action under Rule 99 of the said rules for that
purpose. Nevertheless, it is error for the trial court to dismiss the first case with
prejudice to the filing of the second action without stating the reasons or basis
thereof This should not prevent the filing of the second action for custody of
minor, since no opportunity was granted by the trial court to the plaintiff to raise
this issue for the determination of the court in the habeas corpus case. Hence,
We believe that the order of dismissal of the petition for the writ of habeas corpus
cannot be considered as a valid adjudication on the merits which would serve
as a bar to the second action for custody of minor.
Assuming in gratia argumenti that the prior judgment of dismissal with prejudice
was validly rendered within the lawful discretion of the court and could be
considered as an adjudication on the merits, nonetheless, the principle of res
judicata should be disregarded if its application would involve the sacrifice of
justice to technicality (Republic v. De los Angeles, No. L-30240, March 25, 1988,
159 SCRA 264). The application of the said principle, under the particular facts
obtaining, would amount to denial of justice and/or bar to a vindication of a
legitimate grievance (Ronquillo v. Marasigan, No. L-11621, May 31, 1962, 5
SCRA 304). It is worth stating here that the controversy in the instant case is
not just an ordinary suit between parties over a trivial matter but a litigation
initiated by the natural mother over the welfare and custody of her child, in which
the State has a paramount interest. The fundamental policy of the State as
embodied in the Constitution in promoting and protecting the welfare of children
shall not be disregarded by the courts by mere technicality in resolving disputes
which involve the family and the youth.
The other issue raised by petitioner concerning grave abuse of discretion of the
trial court in granting the custody of the child to respondent Manese during the
Christmas season from December 18, 1987 to January 2, 1988 is already moot
and academic.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is hereby DENIED and the decision of the
respondent Court of Appeals dated February 12, 1988 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, Cruz, Gancayco and Grino-Aquino, JJ., concur.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 115576 August 4, 1994
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF
LEONARDO PAQUINTO AND JESUS CABANGUNAY.
CHAIRMAN SEDFREY A. ORDOÑEZ, COMM. SAMUEL M. SORIANO,
COMM. HESIQUIO R. MALLILLIN, COMM. NARCISO C. MONTEIRO, COMM.
PAULYNN PAREDES-SICAM, THE COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS,
petitioners,
vs.
DIRECTOR OF PRISONS, respondent.
CRUZ, J.:
Page 26 of 99
Why are Leonardo Paquinto and Jesus Cabangunay still in prison?
These persons are among the civilians who were tried by the military
commissions during the period of martial law. Both were originally condemned
to die by musketry, but their sentence was commuted by the new Constitution
to reclusion perpetua.
Their convictions were subsequently nullified by this Court in the case of
Olaguer v. Military Commission No. 34, 1 where we held that the military
tribunals had no jurisdiction to try civilians when the courts of justice were
functioning.
Accordingly, in the case of Cruz v. Ponce Enrile, 2 this Court directed the
Department of Justice to file the corresponding informations in the civil courts
against the petitioners within 180 days from notice of the decision.
No information has so far been filed against Paquinto and Cabangunay, but they
have remained under detention.
On May 27, 1992, Ernesto Abaloc, together with Cabangunay and Paquinto,
wrote to the United Nations Human Rights Committee (UNHRC) complaining
that their continued detention violated their rights under Articles 6, 7, 9, 10, 14,
and 26 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 3
In its decision dated October 14, 1993, the UNHRC declared their
communication as admissible and requested the Republic of the Philippines to
submit a written explanation of their complaint within six months from the date
of transmittal. 4
The Department of Foreign Affairs furnished the Commission on Human Rights
with a copy of the decision. Thereupon, the Commission, through its Chairman
Sedfrey A. Ordoñez wrote the Secretary of Justice of its intention to sue for the
release of the complaints unless criminal charges had already been filed against
them. 5
On June 7, 1994, the Department of Justice informed the Commission that
Abaloc had been released on September 29, 1992, and that Paquinto and
Cabangunay were still detained at the National Penitentiary. There was the
intimation that it would not object to a petition for habeas corpus that the
Commission might choose to file for Paquinto and Cabangunay.6 This
assurance was later confirmed in a letter from the Department dated May 31,
1994.7
The present petition for habeas corpus was filed with this Court on June 13,
1994. The writ was immediately issued, returnable on or before June 22, 1994,
on which date a hearing was also scheduled.
At the hearing, Chairman Ordoñez argued for the prisoners and pleaded for their
immediate release in view of the failure of the Department of Justice to file
charges against them within the period specified in the Cruz case. He stressed
that their continued detention despite the nullification of their convictions was a
clear violation of their human rights.
For its part, the Office of the Solicitor General, as counsel for the respondent
Director of Prisons, argued that under our ruling in Tan v. Barrios, 8 the Olaguer
decision could not be retroactively applied to decisions of the military tribunals
that have already become final or to persons who were already serving their
sentence. It suggested that, under the circumstances, the only recourse of the
prisoners was to reiterate and pursue their applications for executive clemency.
It has been seven years since the Olaguer decision nullifying the convictions of
Paquinto and Cabangunay by the military commissions was promulgated. It has
been six years since our decision in the Cruz case directed the Secretary of
Justice to file the appropriate informations against the civilians still detained
under convictions rendered by the military tribunals. The prisoners have been
confined since 1974. We can only guess at the validity of their convictions as
the records of their cases have allegedly been burned.
The loss of these records is the main reason the Department gives for its failure
to file the corresponding charges against the two detainees before the civil
courts. It is unacceptable, of course. It is not the fault of the prisoners that the
records cannot now be found. If anyone is to be blamed, it surely cannot be the
prisoners, who were not the custodian of those records. It is illogical and even
absurd to suggest that because the government cannot prosecute them, the
prisoners' detention must continue.
The other excuse of the government must also be rejected. During the hearing,
the Office of the Solicitor General contended that the prisoners had themselves
opted to serve their sentences rather than undergo another trial. Their ultimate
objective, so it was maintained, was to secure their release by applying for
executive clemency. To prove this, counsel submitted a letter from one
Atty. Anselmo B. Mabuti to the Secretary of Justice manifesting that Leonardo
B. Paquinto "chooses to complete the service of his sentence so that the Board
of Pardons and Parole has jurisdiction over his case." 9 No mention was made
of Jesus Cabangunay.
Upon direct questioning from the Court during the hearing, both Paquinto and
Cabangunay disowned Atty. Mabuti as their counsel and said they had never
seen nor talked to him before. Paquinto denied ever having authorized him to
write the letter. Instead, the two prisoners reiterated their plea to be released on
the strength of the Olaguer decision.
The petitioners further contend in their memorandum that a re-examination of
the ruling in Cruz v. Enrile 10 in relation to the case of Tan v. Barrios, 11 is
necessary in view of certain supervening events. These are the failure of the
Department of Justice to file the informations against the prisoners; the decision
of the UNHRC declaring admissible the communication
No. 503/1992 of Abaloc, Paquinto and Cabangunay and thus suggesting the
violation of their liberty as guaranteed under the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights; and the assurance of the Department of Justice that it would
have no objection to the filing of a petition for habeas corpus by the Commission
on behalf of Paquinto and Cabangunay.
The Court stresses that in its en banc resolution dated February 26, 1991, it
declared, citing the Tan case, that "those civilians who were convicted by
military courts and who have been serving (but not yet completed) their
sentences of imprisonment for the past many years" . . . "may be given the
option either to complete the service of their sentence, or be tried anew by the
civil courts. Upon conviction, they should be credited in the service of their
sentence for the full period of their previous imprisonment. Upon acquittal, they
should be set free."
Accordingly, it directed "the Department of Justice to forthwith comply with the
directive in the "Cruz Cases" for the filing of the necessary informations against
them in the courts having jurisdiction over the offenses involved, without
prejudice to said petitioners' exercise of the option granted to them by this
Court's ruling in G.R. Nos. 85481-82, William Tan, et al. v. Hernani T. Barrios,
etc., et al., supra."
The Office of the Solicitor General submitted its memorandum after its second
motion for extension was denied, in view of the necessity to decide this petition
without further delay. 12 The memorandum was admitted just the same, but we
find it adds nothing to the respondent's original arguments.
There is absolutely no question that the prisoners' plea should be heeded. The
government has failed to show that their continued detention is supported by a
valid conviction or by the pendency of charges against them or by any legitimate
cause whatsoever. If no information can be filed against them because the
records have been lost, it is not the prisoners who should be made to suffer. In
the eyes of the law, Paquinto and Cabangunay are not guilty or appear to be
guilty of any crime for which they may be validly held. Hence, they are entitled
to be set free.
Liberty is not a gift of the government but the right of the governed. Every person
is free, save only for the fetters of the law that limit but do not bind him unless
he affronts the rights of others or offends the public welfare. Liberty is not
derived from the sufferance of the government or its magnanimity or even from
the Constitution itself, which merely affirms but does not grant it. Liberty is a
right that inheres in every one of us as a member of the human family. When a
person is deprived of this right, all of us are diminished and debased for liberty
is total and indivisible.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Jesus Cabangunay and Leonardo
Paquinto should not be detained in prison a minute longer. They are ordered
released IMMEDIATELY.
Narvasa, C.J., Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero,
Bellosillo, Melo, Quiason, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan and Mendoza, JJ., concur.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 118644 July 7, 1995
DIRECTOR EPIMACO A. VELASCO, as Director of the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI), NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION SPECIAL
OPERATIONS GROUP (SOG), SPECIAL INVESTIGATORS III FLOR L.
RESURRECCION and ANTONIO M. ERUM, JR., and THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, FELICITAS S. CUYAG, for and in behalf of
LAWRENCE A. LARKINS, respondents.
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
The high prerogative writ of habeas corpus, whose origin is lost in antiquity,1
was devised and exists as a speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons
from unlawful restraint and as the best and only sufficient defense of personal
freedom.2 More specifically, its vital purposes are to obtain immediate relief
from illegal confinement, to liberate those who may be imprisoned without
sufficient cause, and to deliver them from unlawful custody. It is then essentially
a writ of inquiry and is granted to test the right under which a person is
detained.3
Under our Constitution, the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus cannot be
suspended except in cases of invasion or rebellion when the public safety
requires it.4 Pursuant to Section 1, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court, it extends,
except as otherwise provided by law, to all cases of illegal confinement or
detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty, or by which the rightful
custody of any person is withheld from the person entitled thereto. It is not
Page 27 of 99
available, however, under the instances enumerated in Section 4 of the said
Rule which reads:
Sec. 4. When writ not allowed or discharge authorized. — If it appears that
the person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer
under process issued by a court or judge or by virtue of a judgment or order of
a court of record, and that the court or judge had jurisdiction to issue the
process, render the judgment, or make the order, the writ shall not be allowed;
or if the jurisdiction appears after the writ is allowed, the person shall not be
discharged by reason of any informality or defect in the process, judgment, or
order. Nor shall anything in this rule be held to authorize the discharge of a
person charged with or convicted of an offense in the Philippines, or of a person
suffering imprisonment under lawful judgment.
In this petition for review, the petitioners want us to set aside and reverse the
decision of 1 February 1995 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 36273,5
a petition for habeas corpus and certiorari with a prayer for a temporary
restraining order, ordering the herein petitioners to immediately release
Lawrence A. Larkins from their custody and declaring moot the alternative relief
of certiorari.
The antecedent facts of the case as culled from the challenged decision and the
pleadings of the parties are neither complicated nor disputed.
On 16 September 1993, a warrant of arrest was issued by Judge Manuel
Padolina of Branch 162 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig, Metro
Manila, against accused Lawrence Larkins in Criminal Cases Nos. 101189-92
for violations of B.P. Blg. 22.
On 20 November 1994, a certain Desiree Alinea executed and filed before the
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) a complaint-affidavit accusing Larkins of
the crime of rape allegedly committed against her on 19 November 1994 at 2:00
a.m. in Victoria Valley Subdivision, Valley Golf, Antipolo, Rizal.6
Acting on the basis of the complaint of Alinea, petitioners Special Investigators
Flor L. Resurreccion and Antonio M. Erum, Jr. proceeded to the office of Larkins
in Makati, Metro Manila, on 21 November 1994 and arrested the latter, who was
thereupon positively identified by Alinea as her rapist. 7 Larkins was then
detained at the Detention Cell of the NBI, Taft Avenue, Manila.
On 22 November 1994, Larkins posted his bail of P4,000.00 in Criminal Cases
Nos. 101189-92. Judge Padolina forthwith issued an order recalling and setting
aside the warrant of arrest issued on 16 September 1993 and directing the Jail
Warden of the NBI Detention Cell to release Larkins from confinement "unless
otherwise detained for some other cause."
Special Investigators Resurreccion and Erum refused to release Larkins
because he was still detained for another cause, specifically for the crime of
rape for which he would be held for inquest.
On 23 November 1994, a complaint against Larkins for rape was executed by
Alinea.8 It contains a certification by Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Ma. Paz
Reyes Yson that it is "filed pursuant to Section 7, Rule 112 of the 1985 Rules
on Criminal Procedure, as amended, the accused not having opted to avail of
his right to preliminary investigation and not having executed a waiver pursuant
to Article 125 of the RPC. . . ." The complaint was filed with the RTC of Antipolo
on 2 December 1994, docketed therein as Criminal Case No. 94-11794, and
assigned to Branch 71 of the court, presided by Judge Felix S. Caballes.
On 2 December 1994, Larkins, through his counsel Mauricio C. Ulep, filed an
Urgent Motion for Bail9 wherein he alleged, inter alia, that the evidence of guilt
against him for rape is not strong, as he had no carnal knowledge of the
complainant and the medical report indicates that her hymen was neither
lacerated nor ruptured; that he is entitled as a matter of right to bail; and that he
has no intention of going out of the country or hiding away from the law.
On 6 December 1994, Larkins, through his new counsel, Atty. Theodore O. Te,
filed in Criminal Case No. 94-11794 an Urgent Omnibus Motion for the Dismissal
of the Complaint and for Immediate Release,10 principally based on the alleged
illegality of his warrantless arrest. This motion met vigorous opposition from the
private complainant.11
In the order of 5 January 1995,12 the trial court denied the aforesaid motions,
thus:
After a careful appreciation of the arguments of the prosecution and the
defense, the Court finds no legal or valid grounds to dismiss the complaint or
release the accused, or to grant him bail. The filing of this case against the
accused, which is [a] very serious offense, justifies the grant of the motion of the
prosecution for the issuance of a hold departure order.
WHEREFORE, the motions of the accused are hereby denied for lack of merit,
and as prayed for by the prosecution the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation
is hereby directed to include the name of the accused, Lawrence A. Larkins, in
its hold order departure list until further order from this Court.
Unable to accept the ruling, Larkins' common-law wife, Felicitas S. Cuyag, filed
before the Court of Appeals a petition for habeas corpus with certiorari.
Impleaded as respondents were the herein petitioners and Judge Felix S.
Caballes.
Subsequently, the Court of Appeals issued a resolution13 ordering the
respondents therein to appear and produce Lawrence A. Larkins before the
court on 31 January 1995 at 10:30 a.m. and to show cause why Larkins' liberty
is being restrained.
On the said date, Special Investigators Resurreccion and Erum appeared and
produced Larkins at the hearing. Atty. Orlando Dizon of the NBI acted as their
counsel. 14 The Office of the Solicitor General representing the People of the
Philippines made no appearance.15 Neither did Judge Caballes, for he had not
received a copy of the resolution. On the other hand, the petitioner therein,
Felicitas S. Cuyag, appeared with her counsel, who manifested that should the
court order the release of Larkins the alternative prayer for certiorari would be
deemed abandoned. 16
After hearing the arguments of the parties, the Court of Appeals rendered the
challenged decision, holding that:
From the arguments presented by the parties, we resolve to order the immediate
release of Larkins from his present confinement on the ground that the
complaint presented to the NBI by complainant Desiree Alinea on the basis of
which Larkins was detained without a warrant of arrest for rape did not meet the
legal requirements provided for in Rule 113 of the Rules of Court.
Furthermore, on the day the detention of Larkins commenced, i.e., immediately
after the NBI was served with the Order of the Pasig RTC for his release on bail
in connection with the BP 22 cases, no other criminal complaint or information
had been filed or pending in any court. It was only sometime between November
25, 1994 (when filing of the complaint was approved by the Rizal Provincial
Prosecutor) and November 29, 1994 (the date appearing on the Urgent Motion
for Bail filed by Larkins's former counsel, said Atty. Ulep) that the complaint for
rape was filed with the Antipolo RTC.
The petitioners insist that the respondent court erred in granting the petition for
habeas corpus because Larkins had already been charged with the crime of
rape and the trial court had denied his application for bail. They further claim
that the warrantless arrest in this case is valid for it was made under Section
5(b), Rule 113 of the Rules of Court.
On the other hand, the private respondent contends that habeas corpus is
rendered unavailing not by the mere filing of an information, but by the issuance
of a warrant of arrest or warrant of commitment, which are the only two
processes recognized by law to justify deprivation of liberty, and the order of
Judge Caballes of 5 January 1995 denying the petition for bail does not qualify
as such. She asserts that the petitioners have miscomprehended Paredes vs.
Sandiganbayan17 because that case did not rule that the writ is no longer
available after an information (or criminal complaint for rape as in this case) is
filed against the person detained; what it stated is that the writ of habeas corpus
will not issue when the person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the
custody of an officer under a process issued by the court which has jurisdiction
to do so. She submits that the controlling doctrine is that enunciated in Ilagan
vs. Ponce Enrile,18 adverted to in Sanchez vs. Demetriou,19 that "[t]he filing of
charges, and the issuance of the corresponding warrant of arrest, against a
person invalidly detained will cure the defect of that detention or at least deny
him the right to be released because of such defect."
We find for the petitioners.
But, before we take up the substantive merits of this petition, we shall first delve
into the propriety of the petition for habeas corpus and certiorari filed by private
respondent Cuyag with the Court of Appeals.
Concededly, the private respondent has the personality to institute on behalf of
her common-law spouse, Lawrence Larkins, the habeas corpus aspect of the
petition, as she falls within the purview of the term "some person" under Section
3, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court, which means any person who has a legally
justified interest in the freedom of the person whose liberty is restrained or who
shows some authorization to make the application.20 She is not, however, the
real party in interest in the certiorari aspect of the petition. Only Larkins could
institute a petition for certiorari to set aside the order denying his motions for bail
and for the dismissal of the complaint against him.
It does not, however, follow that if certiorari is available to Larkins, an application
for a writ of habeas corpus will absolutely be barred. While ordinarily, the writ of
habeas corpus will not be granted when there is an adequate remedy by writ of
error or appeal or by writ of certiorari, it may, nevertheless, be available in
exceptional cases, for the writ should not be considered subservient to
procedural limitations which glorify form over substance.21 It must be kept in
mind that although the question most often considered in both habeas corpus
and certiorari proceedings is whether an inferior court has exceeded its
jurisdiction, the former involves a collateral attack on the judgment and "reaches
the body but not the record," while the latter assails directly the judgment and
"reaches the record but not the body."22
And now on the merits of the petition.
The Court of Appeals granted the writ of habeas corpus because it found that
the warrantless arrest of Larkins for the crime of rape "did not meet the legal
requirements provided for in Rule 113 of the Rules of Court." It could have in
mind Section 5 thereof on lawful warrantless arrest.
Even if the arrest of a person is illegal, supervening events may bar his release
or discharge from custody. What is to be inquired into is the legality of his
detention as of, at the earliest, the filing of the application for a writ of habeas
corpus, for even if the detention is at its inception illegal, it may, by reason of
some supervening events, such as the instances mentioned in Section 4 of Rule
Page 28 of 99
102, be no longer illegal at the time of the filing of the application. Among such
supervening events is the issuance of a judicial process preventing the
discharge of the detained person. Thus, in Sayo vs. Chief of Police of Manila,23
this Court held:
[W]e hold that petitioners are being illegally restrained of their liberty, and their
release is hereby ordered unless they are now detained by virtue of a process
issued by a competent court of justice. (emphasis supplied)
Another is the filing of a complaint or information for the offense for which the
accused is detained, as in the instant case. By then, the restraint of liberty is
already by virtue of the complaint or information and, therefore, the writ of
habeas corpus is no longer available. Section 4 of Rule 102 reads in part as
follows: "Nor shall anything in this rule be held to authorize the discharge of a
person charged with . . . an offense in the Philippines."
Thus, in Matsura vs. Director of Prisons,24 where petitioners Macario Herce and
Celso Almadovar claimed to have been illegally detained for more than one year
without any complaint or information filed against them, this Court denied the
petition for a writ of habeas corpus, for at the time they filed the petition they had
already been charged with the crime of treason and confined by reason thereof.
Harvey vs. Defensor-Santiago25 reiterates Matsura.
In Cruz vs. Montoya,26 this Court dismissed the petition for habeas corpus for
having become academic because the information for estafa against the party
whose liberty was allegedly illegally restrained had already been filed and a
warrant for his arrest had been issued, and whatever illegality might have
originally infected his detention had been cured.
In Umil vs. Ramos27 this Court, applying the last sentence of Section 4 of Rule
102, held that the writ of habeas corpus should not be allowed after the party
sought to be released had been charged before any court. Thus:
It is to be noted that, in all the petitions here considered, criminal charges have
been filed in the proper courts against the petitioners. The rule is, that if a person
alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under process
issued by a court or judge, and that the court or judge had jurisdiction to issue
the process or make the order, or if such person is charged before any court,
the writ of habeas corpus will not be allowed. Section 4, Rule 102, Rules of
Court, as amended is quite explicit in providing that:
Sec. 4. . . . Nor shall anything in this rule be held to authorize the discharge
of a person charged with or convicted of an offense in the Philippines or of a
person suffering from imprisonment under lawful judgment.28 (emphasis
supplied)
It may also be said that by filing his motion for bail, Larkins admitted that he was
under the custody of the court and voluntarily submitted his person to its
jurisdiction. In De Asis vs. Romero,29 this Court stated:
De Asis could have, right after his arrest, objected to the regularity of the
issuance of the warrant of arrest in question. Instead he not only filed a petition
for bail with the lower court, thereby accepting the court's jurisdiction over his
person, but he also pleaded, on arraignment, to the information filed against
him. (emphasis supplied)
The filing of a petition or motion for bail in cases where no bail is recommended
has the same legal import and effect as the posting of bail in cases where bail
is recommended. It is settled that the giving or posting of bail by the accused is
tantamount to submission of his person to the jurisdiction of the court. In the
case of Carrington vs. Peterson,30 this Court declared:
When a defendant in a criminal case is brought before a competent court by
virtue of a warrant of arrest or otherwise, in order to avoid the submission of his
body to the jurisdiction of the court he must raise the question of the court's
jurisdiction over his person at the very earliest opportunity. If he gives bail,
demurs to the complaint or files any dilatory plea or pleads to the merits, he
thereby gives the court jurisdiction over his person. (State ex rel. John Brown
vs. Fitzgerald, 51 Minn., 534)
In United States vs. Grant,31 this Court held:
Conceding again that the warrant issued in this case was void for the reason
that no probable cause was found by the court before issuing it, the defendant
waived all his rights to object to the same by appearing and giving bond.
While it may be true that on 6 December 1994, or four days after the filing of the
Urgent Motion for Bail, Larkins, thru a new counsel, filed an Urgent Omnibus
Motion for Dismissal of the Complaint and for Immediate Release based on the
alleged illegality of his warrantless arrest, the said motion was a mere
afterthought which came too late in the day. By then, the trial court had firmly
acquired jurisdiction over his person.
Moreover, the trial court's order of 5 January 1995 denying the urgent motion
for bail was an unequivocal assertion of its authority to keep in custody the
person of Larkins. This order comes under the purview of the word order under
the first sentence of Section 4 of Rule 102 reading: "If it appears that the person
alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer . . .
by virtue of [an] order of a court of record, and that the court or judge had
jurisdiction to . . . make the order, the writ shall not be allowed. . . ."
The foregoing renders untenable the private respondent's claim that it is the rule
in Ilagan vs. Enrile32 which must govern, that the writ may not be allowed only
where the person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an
officer under process issued by the court or judge, and that there are only two
recognized processes which justify deprivation of liberty, viz., (1) commitment
order and (2) warrant of arrest. The contention is not only a deliberate
misreading of Section 4 of Rule 102 limiting its application to the first part of the
first sentence and disregarding the rest, but is also an undue and unwarranted
restriction of the term process. A commitment order and a warrant of arrest are
but species of judicial process.
In Malaloan vs. Court of Appeals,33 this Court stated:
Invariably a judicial process is defined as a writ, warrant, subpoena, or other
formal writing issued by authority of law; also, the means of accomplishing an
end, including judicial proceedings, or all writs, warrants, summonses and
orders of courts of justice or judicial officers. It is likewise held to include a writ,
summons or order issued in a judicial proceeding to acquire jurisdiction of a
person or his property, to expedite the cause or enforce the judgment, or a writ,
warrant, mandate or other process issuing from a court of justice.
In Macondray & Co., Inc. vs. Bernabe,34 this Court quoted Corpus Juris'
definition of the term "process," to wit:
As a legal term, process is a generic word of very comprehensive signification
and many meanings. In its broadest sense, it is equivalent to, or synonymous
with "proceedings" or procedure and embraces all the steps and proceedings in
a cause from its commencement to its conclusion. Sometimes the term is also
broadly defined as the means whereby a court compels a compliance with its
demands. (50 C.J. 441)
We thus rule that the order of 5 January 1995 of the trial court also qualifies as
a process within the meaning of Section 4 of Rule 102.
Hence, even granting that Larkins was illegally arrested, still the petition for a
writ of habeas corpus will not prosper because his detention has become legal
by virtue of the filing before the trial court of the complaint against him and by
the issuance of the 5 January 1995 order.
Even as we thus decide in favor of the petitioners, we are, nevertheless,
disturbed by certain incidents relative to the warrantless arrest of Larkins. Firstly,
assuming that it was lawful, the facts before us disclose that the arresting
officers failed to strictly comply with (1) the last paragraph of Section 5, Rule
113 of the Rules of Court requiring that the person lawfully arrested without a
warrant shall forthwith be delivered to the nearest police station or jail and shall
be proceeded against in accordance with Section 7, Rule 112; and (2) Article
125 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, providing that he be delivered to
the proper judicial authorities within thirty-six hours, the crime with which Larkins
was charged being punishable by an afflictive penalty. Although the arrest was
made in Makati where there is a police station and a municipal (now city) jail,
Larkins was brought to the NBI Detention Cell at Taft Avenue, Manila, and
though the complaint of the offended party was executed on 23 November 1994,
it was not until 2 December 1994 that the said complaint was actually filed in
court.
Unless satisfactorily explained, the non-compliance by the arresting officers with
the said provisions merits nothing but disapproval from the Court. In the
performance of their duty and in their commendable pursuit to stamp out crimes
and bring criminals to the bar of justice, law enforcement authorities should
make no shortcuts, but must comply with all procedures to safeguard the
constitutional and statutory rights of accused persons. The rule of law must
always be upheld. What this Court said in Beltran vs. Garcia35 needs to be
repeated:
It certainly does not speak well of officialdom, whether civilian or military, if a
person deprived of his liberty had to go to court before his rights are respected.
The good name of the administration is jeopardized, without any fault on its part,
by such inefficiency or inattention to duty. Every precaution should be taken
against its repetition. Otherwise, the parties responsible for this state of affairs
would justly lay themselves open to the accusation that the greatest danger to
constitutional rights comes from public officials, men of zeal, concededly well-
meaning, but without sufficient understanding of the implication of the rule of
law.
We also note that the trial court did not conduct a hearing of the urgent motion
for bail, as required under Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court. The grant
or denial of bail must be based upon the court's determination as to whether or
not the evidence of guilt is strong. This discretion may only be exercised after
evidence is submitted at the hearing conducted for that
purpose.36 The court's order granting or refusing bail must contain a summary
of the evidence for the prosecution followed by its conclusion whether or not the
evidence of guilt is strong; otherwise, the order would be defective and voidable.
37 In fact, even if the prosecutor refuses to adduce evidence in opposition to
the application to grant and fix bail, the court may ask the prosecution such
questions as would ascertain the strength of the State's evidence or judge the
adequacy of the amount of bail.38 It was thus incumbent upon the trial court to
receive the evidence for the prosecution on the urgent motion for bail. For this
procedural shortcoming, Larkins should also be partly blamed. He did not press
for a hearing after the scheduled hearing on 5 December 1994 was cancelled
because, as he claimed, the presiding Judge was out of the country.39
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED, and the decision of the Court
of Appeals of 1 February 1995 in CA-G.R. SP No. 36273 is hereby SET ASIDE
and ANNULLED.
Page 29 of 99
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Padilla, Bellosillo, Quiason and Kapunan, JJ., concur.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 122954 February 15, 2000
NORBERTO FERIA Y PACQUING, petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF
CORRECTIONS, MUNTINLUPA, METRO MANILA (IN PLACE OF THE JAIL
WARDEN OF THE MANILA CITY JAIL), THE PRESIDING JUDGE OF
BRANCH II, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MANILA, and THE CITY
PROSECUTOR, CITY OF MANILA, respondents.
QUISUMBING, J.:
The mere loss or destruction of the records of a criminal case subsequent to
conviction of the accused will not render the judgment of conviction void, nor will
it warrant the release of the convict by virtue of a writ of habeas corpus. The
proper remedy is the reconstitution of judicial records which is as much a duty
of the prosecution as of the defense.
Subject of this petition for review on certiorari are (1) the Decision dated April
28, 1995, of the Eighth Division of the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the
dismissal of the petition for habeas corpus filed by petitioner, and (2) the
Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated December 1, 1995, which denied the
Motion for Reconsideration. As hereafter elucidated, we sustain the judgment of
respondent appellate court.
Based on the available records and the admissions of the parties, the
antecedents of the present petition are as follows:
Petitioner Norberto Feria y Pacquing has been under detention since May 21,
1981, up to present1 by reason of his conviction of the crime of Robbery with
Homicide, in Criminal Case No. 60677, by the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
Branch 2, for the jeepney hold-up and killing of United States Peace Corps
Volunteer Margaret Viviene Carmona.
Some twelve (12) years later, or on June 9, 1993, petitioner sought to be
transferred from the Manila City Jail to the Bureau of Corrections in Muntinlupa
City,2 but the Jail Warden of the Manila City Jail informed the Presiding Judge
of the RTC-Manila, Branch 2, that the transfer cannot be effected without the
submission of the requirements, namely, the Commitment Order or Mittimus,
Decision, and Information.3 It was then discovered that the entire records of the
case, including the copy of the judgment, were missing. In response to the
inquiries made by counsel of petitioner, both the Office of the City Prosecutor of
Manila and the Clerk of Court of Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 2
attested to the fact that the records of Criminal Case No. 60677 could not be
found in their respective offices. Upon further inquiries, the entire records
appear to have been lost or destroyed in the fire which occurred at the second
and third floor of the Manila City Hall on November 3, 1986.4
On October 3, 1994, petitioner filed a Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of
Habeas Corpus5 with the Supreme Court against the Jail Warden of the Manila
City Jail, the Presiding Judge of Branch 2, Regional Trial Court of Manila, and
the City Prosecutor of Manila, praying for his discharge from confinement on the
ground that his continued detention without any valid judgment is illegal and
violative of his constitutional right to due process.
In its Resolution dated October 10, 1994,6 the Second Division of this Court
resolved —
. . . (a) to ISSUE the Writ of Habeas Corpus; (b) to ORDER the Executive Judge
of the Regional Trial Court of Manila to conduct an immediate RAFFLE of this
case among the incumbent judges thereof; and (c) to REQUIRE [1] the Judge
to whom this case is raffled to SET the case for HEARING on Thursday, October
13, 1994 at 8:30 A.M., try and decide the same on the merits and thereafter
FURNISH this Court with a copy of his decision thereon; [2] the respondents to
make a RETURN of the Writ on or before the close of office hours on
Wednesday, October 12, 1994 and APPEAR PERSONALLY and PRODUCE
the person of Norberto Feria y Pa[c]quing on the aforesaid date and time of
hearing to the Judge to whom this case is raffled, and [3] the Director General,
Philippine National Police, through his duly authorized representative(s) to
SERVE the Writ and Petition, and make a RETURN thereof as provided by law
and, specifically, his duly authorized representative(s) to APPEAR
PERSONALLY and ESCORT the person of Norberto Feria y Pa[c]quing at the
aforesaid date and time of hearing.
The case was then raffled to Branch 9 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
which on November 15, 1994, after hearing, issued an Order7 dismissing the
case on the ground that the mere loss of the records of the case does not
invalidate the judgment or commitment nor authorize the release of the
petitioner, and that the proper remedy would be reconstitution of the records of
the case which should be filed with the court which rendered the decision.
Petitioner duly appealed said Order to the Court of Appeals, which on April 28,
1995, rendered the assailed Decisions8 affirming the decision of the trial court
with the modification that "in the interest of orderly administration of justice" and
"under the peculiar facts of the case" petitioner may be transferred to the Bureau
of Corrections in Muntinlupa City without submission of the requirements
(Mittimus, Decision and Information) but without prejudice to the reconstitution
of the original records.
The Motion for Reconsideration of the aforesaid Order having been denied for
lack of merit,9 petitioner is now before us on certiorari, assigning the following
errors of law:10
I. WHETHER OR NOT, UNDER THE PECULIAR CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS
CASE, WHERE THE RECORDS OF CONVICTION WERE LOST, THE
PETITIONER'S CONTINUED INCARCERATION IS JUSTIFIED UNDER THE
LAW.
COROLLARY TO THIS, WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS'
RESOLUTION, AFFIRMING THE DENIAL OF HEREIN APPELLANT'S
PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS IS, IN CONTEMPLATION OF LAW, A
JUDGMENT OR A SUBSTITUTE JUDGMENT, WHICH CAN BE UTILIZED AS
A SUFFICIENT BASIS FOR HIS INCARCERATION.
II. WHETHER OR NOT THE RECONSTITUTION OF OFFICIAL RECORDS
LOST/DESTROYED SHOULD BE INITIATED BY THE GOVERNMENT AND
ITS ORGANS, WHO ARE IN CUSTODY OF SUCH, OR BY THE PRISONER,
WHOSE LIBERTY IS RESTRAINED.
Petitioner argues that his detention is illegal because there exists no copy of a
valid judgment as required by Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 120 of the Rules of
Court,11 and that the evidence considered by the trial court and Court of
Appeals in the habeas corpus proceedings did not establish the contents of such
judgment. Petitioner further contends that our ruling in Gunabe v. Director of
Prisons, 77 Phil. 993, 995 (1947), that "reconstitution is as much the duty of the
prosecution as of the defense" has been modified or abandoned in the
subsequent case of Ordonez v. Director of Prisons, 235 SCRA 152, 155 (1994),
wherein we held that "[i]t is not the fault of the prisoners that the records cannot
now be found. If anyone is to be blamed, it surely cannot be the prisoners, who
were not the custodians of those records."
In its Comment,12 the Office of the Solicitor General contends that the sole
inquiry in this habeas corpus proceeding is whether or not there is legal basis
to detain petitioner. The OSG maintains that public respondents have more than
sufficiently shown the existence of a legal ground for petitioner's continued
incarceration, viz., his conviction by final judgment, and under Section 4 of Rule
102 of the Rules of Court, the discharge of a person suffering imprisonment
under lawful judgment is not authorized. Petitioner's remedy, therefore, is not a
petition for habeas corpus but a proceeding for the reconstitution of judicial
records.
The high prerogative writ of habeas corpus, whose origin is traced to antiquity,
was devised and exists as a speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons
from unlawful restraint, and as the best and only sufficient defense of personal
freedom.13 It secures to a prisoner the right to have the cause of his detention
examined and determined by a court of justice, and to have the issue
ascertained as to whether he is held under lawful authority.14 Consequently,
the writ may also be availed of where, as a consequence of a judicial
proceeding, (a) there has been a deprivation of a constitutional right resulting in
the restraint of a person, (b) the court had no jurisdiction to impose the sentence,
or (c) an excessive penalty has been imposed, as such sentence is void as to
such excess.15 Petitioner's claim is anchored on the first ground considering,
as he claims, that his continued detention, notwithstanding the lack of a copy of
a valid judgment of conviction, is violative of his constitutional right to due
process.
Based on the records and the hearing conducted by the trial court, there is
sufficient evidence on record to establish the fact of conviction of petitioner
which serves as the legal basis for his detention. Petitioner made judicial
admissions, both verbal and written, that he was charged with and convicted of
the crime of Robbery with Homicide, and sentenced to suffer imprisonment
"habang buhay".
In its Order dated October 17, 1994, the RTC-Manila, Branch 9, made the
finding that —16
During the trial and on manifestation and arguments made by the accused, his
learned counsel and Solicitor Alexander G. Gesmundo who appeared for the
respondents, it appears clear and indubitable that:
(A) Petitioner had been charged with Robbery with Homicide in Criminal Case
No. 60677, Illegal Possession of Firearm in Criminal Case No. 60678 and
Robbery in Band in Criminal Case No. 60867. . . In Criminal Case No. 60677
(Robbery with Homicide) the accused admitted in open Court that a decision
was read to him in open Court by a personnel of the respondent Court (RTC
Branch II) sentencing him to Life Imprisonment (Habang buhay) . . . (emphasis
supplied).
Further, in the Urgent Motion for the Issuance of Commitment Order of the
Above Entitled Criminal Case dated June 8, 1993,17 petitioner himself stated
that —
Page 30 of 99
COMES NOW, the undersigned accused in the above entitled criminal case and
unto this Honorable Court most respectfully move:
1. That in 1981 the accused was charge of (sic) Robbery with Homicide;
2. That after four years of trial, the court found the accused guilty and given a
Life Sentence in a promulgation handed down in 1985; (emphasis supplied).
3. That after the sentence was promulgated, the Presiding Judge told the
councel (sic) that accused has the right to appeal the decision;
4. That whether the de oficio counsel appealed the decision is beyond the
accused comprehension (sic) because the last time he saw the counsel was
when the decision was promulgated.
5. That everytime there is change of Warden at the Manila City Jail attempts
were made to get the Commitment Order so that transfer of the accused to the
Bureau of Corrections can be affected, but all in vain;
Petitioner's declarations as to a relevant fact may be given in evidence against
him under Section 23 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. This rule is based upon
the presumption that no man would declare anything against himself, unless
such declaration were true,18 particularly with respect to such grave matter as
his conviction for the crime of Robbery with Homicide. Further, under Section 4
of Rule 129, "[a]n admission, verbal or written, made by a party in the course of
the proceedings in the same case, does not require proof. The admission may
be contradicted only by a showing that it was made through palpable mistake or
that no such admission was made." Petitioner does not claim any mistake nor
does he deny making such admissions.
The records also contain a certified true copy of the Monthly Report dated
January 198519 of then Judge Rosalio A. De Leon, attesting to the fact that
petitioner was convicted of the crime of Robbery with Homicide on January 11,
1985. Such Monthly Report constitutes an entry in official records under Section
44 of Rule 130 of the Revised Rules on Evidence, which is prima facie evidence
of facts therein stated.
Public respondents likewise presented a certified hue copy of People's Journal
dated January 18, 1985, page 2,20 issued by the National Library, containing a
short news article that petitioner was convicted of the crime of Robbery with
Homicide and was sentenced to "life imprisonment." However, newspaper
articles amount to "hearsay evidence, twice removed"21 and are therefore not
only inadmissible but without any probative value at all whether objected to or
not,22 unless offered for a purpose other than proving the truth of the matter
asserted. In this case, the news article is admissible only as evidence that such
publication does exist with the tenor of the news therein stated.
As a general rule, the burden of proving illegal restraint by the respondent rests
on the petitioner who attacks such restraint. In other words, where the return is
not subject to exception, that is, where it sets forth process which on its face
shows good ground for the detention of the prisoner, it is incumbent on petitioner
to allege and prove new matter that tends to invalidate the apparent effect of
such process.23 If the detention of the prisoner is by reason of lawful public
authority, the return is considered prima facie evidence of the validity of the
restraint and the petitioner has the burden of proof to show that the restraint is
illegal. Thus, Section 13 of Rule 102 of the Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 13. When the return evidence, and when only a plea. — If it appears that
the prisoner is in custody under a warrant of commitment in pursuance of law,
the return shall be considered prima facie evidence of the cause of restraint, but
if he is restrained of his liberty by any alleged private authority, the return shall
be considered only as a plea of the facts therein set forth, and the party claiming
the custody must prove such facts.
Public respondents having sufficiently shown good ground for the detention,
petitioner's release from confinement is not warranted under Section 4 of Rule
102 of the Rules of Court which provides that —
Sec. 4. When writ not allowed or discharge authorized. — If it appears that the
person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under
process issued by a court or judge or by virtue of a judgment or order of a court
of record, and that the court or judge had jurisdiction to issue the process, render
the judgment, or make the order, the writ shall not be allowed; or if the
jurisdiction appears after the writ is allowed, the person shall not be discharged
by reason of any informality or defect in the process, judgment, or order. Nor
shall anything in this rule be held to authorize the discharge of a person charged
with or convicted of an offense in the Philippines, or of a person suffering
imprisonment under lawful judgment.
In the case of Gomez v. Director of Prisons, 77 Phil. 458 (1946), accused was
convicted by the trial court of the crime of rape, and was committed to the New
Bilibid Prison. Pending appeal with the Court of Appeals, the records of the case
were, for reasons undisclosed, completely destroyed or lost. Accused then filed
a petition for the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus with the Supreme Court.
The Court denied the petition, ruling thus:
The petition does not make out a case. The Director of Prisons is holding the
prisoner under process issued by a competent court in pursuance of a lawful,
subsisting judgment. The prisoner himself admits the legality of his detention.
The mere loss or destruction of the record of the case does not invalidate the
judgment or the commitment, or authorize the prisoner's release.
Note further that, in the present case, there is also no showing that petitioner
duly appealed his conviction of the crime of Robbery with Homicide, hence for
all intents and purposes, such judgment has already become final and
executory. When a court has jurisdiction of the offense charged and of the party
who is so charged, its judgment, order, or decree is not subject to collateral
attack by habeas corpus.24 Put another way, in order that a judgment may be
subject to collateral attack by habeas corpus, it must be void for lack of
jurisdiction.25 Thus, petitioner's invocation of our ruling in Reyes v. Director of
Prisons, supra, is misplaced. In the Reyes case, we granted the writ and ordered
the release of the prisoner on the ground that "[i]t does not appear that the
prisoner has been sentenced by any tribunal duly established by a competent
authority during the enemy occupation" and not because there were no copies
of the decision and information. Here, a copy of the mittimus is available. And,
indeed, petitioner does not raise any jurisdictional issue.
The proper remedy in this case is for either petitioner or public respondents to
initiate the reconstitution of the judgment of the case under either Act No.
3110,26 the general law governing reconstitution of judicial records, or under
the inherent power of courts to reconstitute at any time the records of their
finished cases in accordance with Section 5 (h) of Rule 135 of the Rules of
Court.27 Judicial records are subject to reconstitution without exception,
whether they refer to pending cases or finished cases.28 There is no sense in
limiting reconstitution to pending cases; finished cases are just as important as
pending ones, as evidence of rights and obligations finally adjudicated.29
Petitioner belabors the fact that no initiative was taken by the Government to
reconstitute the missing records of the trial court. We reiterate, however, that
"reconstitution is as much the duty of the prosecution as of the defense."30
Petitioner's invocation of Ordoñez v. Director of Prisons, 235 SCRA 152 (1994),
is misplaced since the grant of the petition for habeas corpus therein was
premised on the loss of records prior to the filing of Informations against the
prisoners, and therefore "[t]he government has failed to show that their
continued detention is supported by a valid conviction or by the pendency of
charges against them or by any legitimate cause whatsoever." In this case, the
records were lost after petitioner, by his own admission, was already convicted
by the trial court of the offense charged. Further, the same incident which gave
rise to the filing of the Information for Robbery with Homicide also gave rise to
another case for Illegal Possession of Firearm,31 the records of which could be
of assistance in the reconstitution of the present case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit, and the decision of the
Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, Mendoza, Buena and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 139789. May 12, 2000
ERLINDA K. ILUSORIO, petitioner, vs. ERLINDA I. BILDNER and SYLVIA
K. ILUSORIO, JOHN DOE and JANE DOE, respondents. Mesm
G.R. No. 139808. May 12, 2000
POTENCIANO ILUSORIO, MA. ERLINDA I. BILDNER, and SYLVIA ILUSORIO,
petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and ERLINDA K. ILUSORIO,
respondents.
DECISION
PARDO, J.:
May a wife secure a writ of habeas corpus to compel her husband to live with
her in conjugal bliss? The answer is no. Marital rights including coverture and
living in conjugal dwelling may not be enforced by the extra-ordinary writ of
habeas corpus.
A writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or detention,1
or by which the rightful custody of a person is withheld from the one entitled
thereto.2
"Habeas corpus is a writ directed to the person detaining another, commanding
him to produce the body of the prisoner at a designated time and place, with the
day and cause of his capture and detention, to do, submit to, and receive
whatsoever the court or judge awarding the writ shall consider in that behalf."3
It is a high prerogative, common-law writ, of ancient origin, the great object of
which is the liberation of those who may be imprisoned without sufficient
cause.4 It is issued when one is deprived of liberty or is wrongfully prevented
from exercising legal custody over another person.5
The petition of Erlinda K. Ilusorio6 is to reverse the decision7 of the Court of
Appeals and its resolution8 dismissing the application for habeas corpus to have
the custody of her husband, lawyer Potenciano Ilusorio and enforce consortium
as the wife.
Page 31 of 99
On the other hand, the petition of Potenciano Ilusorio9 is to annul that portion of
the decision of the Court of Appeals giving Erlinda K. Ilusorio visitation rights to
her husband and to enjoin Erlinda and the Court of Appeals from enforcing the
visitation rights.
The undisputed facts are as follows:
Erlinda Kalaw Ilusorio is the wife of lawyer Potenciano Ilusorio.
Potenciano Ilusorio is about 86 years of age possessed of extensive property
valued at millions of pesos. For many years, lawyer Potenciano Ilusorio was
Chairman of the Board and President of Baguio Country Club.
On July 11, 1942, Erlinda Kalaw and Potenciano Ilusorio contracted matrimony
and lived together for a period of thirty (30) years. In 1972, they separated from
bed and board for undisclosed reasons. Potenciano lived at Urdaneta
Condominium, Ayala Ave., Makati City when he was in Manila and at Ilusorio
Penthouse, Baguio Country Club when he was in Baguio City. On the other
hand, Erlinda lived in Antipolo City.
Out of their marriage, the spouses had six (6) children, namely: Ramon Ilusorio
(age 55); Erlinda Ilusorio Bildner (age 52); Maximo (age 50); Sylvia (age 49);
Marietta (age 48); and Shereen (age 39).
On December 30, 1997, upon Potenciano’s arrival from the United States, he
stayed with Erlinda for about five (5) months in Antipolo City. The children, Sylvia
and Erlinda (Lin), alleged that during this time, their mother gave Potenciano an
overdose of 200 mg instead of 100 mg Zoloft, an antidepressant drug prescribed
by his doctor in New York, U.S.A. As a consequence, Potenciano’s health
deteriorated.
On February 25, 1998, Erlinda filed with the Regional Trial Court, Antipolo City
a petition10 for guardianship over the person and property of Potenciano
Ilusorio due to the latter’s advanced age, frail health, poor eyesight and impaired
judgment.
On May 31, 1998, after attending a corporate meeting in Baguio City,
Potenciano Ilusorio did not return to Antipolo City and instead lived at Cleveland
Condominium, Makati.
On March 11, 1999, Erlinda filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for habeas
corpus to have the custody of lawyer Potenciano Ilusorio. She alleged that
respondents11 refused petitioner’s demands to see and visit her husband and
prohibited Potenciano from returning to Antipolo City.
After due hearing, on April 5, 1999, the Court of Appeals rendered decision the
dispositive portion of which reads:
"WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing disquisitions, judgment is hereby
rendered:
"(1) Ordering, for humanitarian consideration and upon petitioner’s
manifestation, respondents Erlinda K. Ilusorio Bildner and Sylvia Ilusorio-Yap,
the administrator of Cleveland Condominium or anywhere in its place, his
guards and Potenciano Ilusorio’s staff especially Ms. Aurora Montemayor to
allow visitation rights to Potenciano Ilusorio’s wife, Erlinda Ilusorio and all her
children, notwithstanding any list limiting visitors thereof, under penalty of
contempt in case of violation of refusal thereof; xxx
"(2) ORDERING that the writ of habeas corpus previously issued be recalled
and the herein petition for habeas corpus be DENIED DUE COURSE, as it is
hereby DISMISSED for lack of unlawful restraint or detention of the subject of
the petition.
"SO ORDERED."12
Hence, the two petitions, which were consolidated and are herein jointly
decided.
As heretofore stated, a writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal
confinement or detention,13 or by which the rightful custody of a person is
withheld from the one entitled thereto. It is available where a person continues
to be unlawfully denied of one or more of his constitutional freedoms, where
there is denial of due process, where the restraints are not merely involuntary
but are unnecessary, and where a deprivation of freedom originally valid has
later become arbitrary.14 It is devised as a speedy and effectual remedy to
relieve persons from unlawful restraint, as the best and only sufficient defense
of personal freedom.15
The essential object and purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to inquire into
all manner of involuntary restraint, and to relieve a person therefrom if such
restraint is illegal.16
To justify the grant of the petition, the restraint of liberty must be an illegal and
involuntary deprivation of freedom of action.17 The illegal restraint of liberty
must be actual and effective, not merely nominal or moral.18
The evidence shows that there was no actual and effective detention or
deprivation of lawyer Potenciano Ilusorio’s liberty that would justify the issuance
of the writ. The fact that lawyer Potenciano Ilusorio is about 86 years of age, or
under medication does not necessarily render him mentally incapacitated.
Soundness of mind does not hinge on age or medical condition but on the
capacity of the individual to discern his actions.

After due hearing, the Court of Appeals concluded that there was no unlawful
restraint on his liberty.
The Court of Appeals also observed that lawyer Potenciano Ilusorio did not
request the administrator of the Cleveland Condominium not to allow his wife
and other children from seeing or visiting him. He made it clear that he did not
object to seeing them.
As to lawyer Potenciano Ilusorio’s mental state, the Court of Appeals observed
that he was of sound and alert mind, having answered all the relevant questions
to the satisfaction of the court.
Being of sound mind, he is thus possessed with the capacity to make choices.
In this case, the crucial choices revolve on his residence and the people he opts
to see or live with. The choices he made may not appeal to some of his family
members but these are choices which exclusively belong to Potenciano. He
made it clear before the Court of Appeals that he was not prevented from leaving
his house or seeing people. With that declaration, and absent any true restraint
on his liberty, we have no reason to reverse the findings of the Court of Appeals.
With his full mental capacity coupled with the right of choice, Potenciano Ilusorio
may not be the subject of visitation rights against his free choice. Otherwise, we
will deprive him of his right to privacy. Needless to say, this will run against his
fundamental constitutional right.
The Court of Appeals exceeded its authority when it awarded visitation rights in
a petition for habeas corpus where Erlinda never even prayed for such right.
The ruling is not consistent with the finding of subject’s sanity.
When the court ordered the grant of visitation rights, it also emphasized that the
same shall be enforced under penalty of contempt in case of violation or refusal
to comply. Such assertion of raw, naked power is unnecessary.
The Court of Appeals missed the fact that the case did not involve the right of a
parent to visit a minor child but the right of a wife to visit a husband. In case the
husband refuses to see his wife for private reasons, he is at liberty to do so
without threat of any penalty attached to the exercise of his right.
No court is empowered as a judicial authority to compel a husband to live with
his wife. Coverture cannot be enforced by compulsion of a writ of habeas corpus
carried out by sheriffs or by any other mesne process. That is a matter beyond
judicial authority and is best left to the man and woman’s free choice.
WHEREFORE, in G. R. No. 139789, the Court DISMISSES the petition for lack
of merit. No costs.
In G. R. No. 139808, the Court GRANTS the petition and nullifies the decision
of the Court of Appeals insofar as it gives visitation rights to respondent Erlinda
K. Ilusorio. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Puno, Kapunan, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ.,
concur.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 172813 July 20, 2006
IVY JOAN P. REYES-TABUJARA, petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and ERNESTO A. TABUJARA III, respondents.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Before Us is a Petition for Certiorari seeking the reversal of the Resolutions
dated 2 June 2006 and 7 June 2006 rendered by the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. SP No. 94699.1 The 2 June 2006 Resolution restrained Judge Fatima
Gonzales-Asdala, Pairing Judge of Quezon City Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 86, from enforcing her Order dated 31 May 2006 while the Resolution
of 7 June 2006 set aside and nullified the Order she issued on 1 June 2006.
In her Petition, petitioner alleges that she and private respondent were married
on 26 November 2000 at the Basilica of the Immaculate Conception, Intramuros,
Manila. Their union was blessed with a son, Carlos Iñigo, who was born on 5
July 2002. Apparently, the couple's marital bliss was only short-lived for
immediately after their wedding, their relationship was already beset by frequent
squabbles which persisted even after the birth of their son. Despite their
problems, petitioner and private respondent, together with their son, stayed at
their conjugal home in Capitol Homes, Quezon City.
Since 11 March 2006, however, petitioner had been staying at her sister's house
in Brixton Hills, Quezon City, because they were awaiting the arrival of their
mother from abroad. On 14 March 2006, private respondent picked up Carlos
Page 32 of 99
Iñigo, who was with petitioner at that time. The following day, petitioner notified
private respondent that she would fetch the child since she and her sister
decided to go to San Fernando, Pampanga. Private respondent allegedly asked
her to wait for him at their conjugal abode as he had something to give her.
Thinking that private respondent was going to hand over to her the documents
pertaining to their separation, petitioner acceded to his request. While waiting
for private respondent, petitioner decided to bring her and Carlos Iñigo's clothes
to the car so they could leave as soon as private respondent arrived. Much to
petitioner's surprise, however, private respondent refused to allow her to take
their child. When petitioner remonstrated, private respondent purportedly
berated, insulted, and told her that she could no longer see their son without his
permission. Petitioner also averred that when she tried to wrest Carlos Iñigo
away from private respondent, the latter hit her several times and started
choking her. Finally, private respondent boarded his car and sped away with
their son in tow.
Petitioner then proceeded to the East Avenue Medical Center to have her
injuries treated and also to Camp Karingal, Sikatuna Village, Quezon City, to
report the matter.2
Since the 15 March 2006 incident, petitioner has never seen her son and has
been barred by private respondent from going back to their conjugal home. Left
with no recourse and prompted by her longing to see her son Carlos Iñigo,
petitioner filed a Petition for Habeas Corpus with the RTC, Quezon City, to
compel private respondent to produce their son before the court.3 The Petition,
docketed as Spec. Proc. No. Q-06-57984, was initially raffled off to Branch 102
of RTC, Quezon City, which issued an Order dated 23 May 20064 the pertinent
portion of which provides:
ORDER
Filed before this Court is a verified Petition for Habeas Corpus filed by IVY JOAN
P. REYES-TABUJARA, through counsel, seeking for the production of the minor
CARLOS IÑIGO R. TABUJARA, who is reportedly in the custody of the
respondent Ernesto Tabujara III, residing at No. 72 Berlin Street, Capitol
Homes, Quezon City.
Finding the Petition to be sufficient in form and substance, the same is hereby
given due course.
ACCORDINGLY, the respondent Ernesto A. Tabujara III is hereby directed to
produce the living person of the minor CARLOS IÑIGO R. TABUJARA, before
the Court during the hearing of this Petition which for that purpose is hereby set
on 25 May 2006 at 10:00 A.M., and to show cause why, as alleged, the subject
minor has been allegedly restrained of his liberty and detained by him.
Observance of the Order is a way of effecting the return of this writ, as required
by law.5
On the scheduled hearing, private respondent appeared before the court without
Carlos Iñigo. According to him, Carlos Iñigo was then vacationing at Tagaytay
Highlands and that he did not have sufficient time to fetch the child for the
hearing since he was informed of the court's order only on the evening of 24
March 2006.6
In the same hearing, petitioner's counsel moved for the consolidation of this
case with that pending before the RTC, Quezon City, Branch 86, docketed as
Civil Case No. Q-06-57760, for violation of Republic Act No. 9262 or the "Anti-
Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004." This motion was
granted by the court.7
On 25 May 2006, petitioner filed with the RTC, Quezon City, Branch 86, an
Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to Hear Writ of Habeas Corpus on 26 May 2006 at 8:30
A.M.8
Subsequently, Presiding Judge Teodoro Bay of the RTC, Quezon City, Branch
86, issued, in chambers, an Order dated 31 May 2006 resolving, among other
things, the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus for the person of Carlos Iñigo –
After considering the records of the three (3) cases consolidated before this
Court,9 the Court resolves as follows:
1. the child Carlos Iñigo R. Tabujara shall continue to be under the custody of
the respondent Ernesto Tabujara III until the Court shall have resolved the issue
of custody of said child. This is necessary to protect the child from emotional
and psychological violence due to the misunderstanding now existing between
his parents.
2. the Motion to Admit Amended Petition with Prayer for Temporary Protection
Order is GRANTED. The Temporary Protection Order dated 19 April 2006 is
hereby extended until the prayer for Permanent Protection is resolved.
3. the respondent Ernesto Tabujara III is hereby ordered to bring the child Carlos
Iñigo Tabujara to this Court during the hearing of these cases on July 14, 2006
at 8:00 in the morning.
4. the motion for support pendente lite shall be resolved after sufficient details
are presented to support said motion.
5. the respondent, as previously ordered, is directed to turn over the possession
of one of the family's car to the petitioner.10
On 31 May 2006, petitioner filed an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to Order
Respondent to Comply with the Writ of Habeas Corpus with Urgent Motion for
Partial Reconsideration of the Order dated 31 May 2006.11 The Motion for
partial reconsideration pertained to that portion of Judge Bay's Order granting
private respondent continued custody over Carlos Iñigo in alleged violation of
Article 213 of the Family Code stating:
Art. 213. In case of separation of the parents, parental authority shall be
exercised by the parent designated by the court. The court shall take into
account all relevant considerations, especially the choice of the child over seven
years of age, unless the parent chosen is unfit.
No child under seven years of age shall be separated from the mother, unless
the court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise.
This motion was referred by the branch clerk of court to Judge Fatima Gonzales-
Asdala, Pairing Judge of Branch 86, because Judge Bay was to go on official
leave effective 1 June 2006.
Acting on said Motion, Judge Gonzales-Asdala issued an Order dated 31 May
2006, to wit:
WHEREFORE, Ernesto A. Tabujara III or any person or persons acting for and
in his behalf and under his direction is hereby directed to produce the person of
minor Carlos Iñigo R. Tabujara before the Session Hall, Branch 87, located at
114, Hall of Justice, Quezon City on June 1, 2006 at 9:00 o'clock in the morning.
Failing which, the more coercive process of a Bench Warrant will be issued
against said respondent, without prejudice to a declaration of contempt which
may be due under the obtaining circumstances.12
As it turned out, private respondent failed to appear before Judge Gonzales-
Asdala on 1 June 2006. Consequently, through the Order dated 1 June 2006,
he was declared in contempt of court and a bench warrant for his arrest was
issued.13
Aggrieved by the Order, respondent filed a Petition for Certiorari before the
Court of Appeals praying for the issuance of a temporary restraining order
and/or writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin Judge Gonzales-Asdala from:
issuing a bench warrant against private respondent; implementing her Order of
31 May 2006; requiring private respondent to turn over custody of Carlos Iñigo
to petitioner; and taking further action on Civil Cases No. Q-06-57760, No. Q-
06-57857,14 and Spec. Proc. No. Q-06-57984.15
On 2 June 2006, the Court of Appeals issued a Resolution restraining the
implementation of Judge Gonzales-Asdala's Order of 31 May 2006.
Later, another Resolution was issued by the Court of Appeals setting aside and
nullifying the 1 June 2006 Order of Judge Gonzales-Asdala.
Hence, this Petition for Certiorari raising the following grounds:
JUDGE FATIMA GONZALES-GONZALES-ASDALA ACTED WITHIN BOUNDS
OF JURISDICTION IN ISSUING THE ORDER DATED 31 MAY 2006, AS WELL
AS THE ORDER AND BENCH WARRANTS ISSUED ON JUNE 1, 2006 IN HER
CAPACITY AS PAIRING JUDGE OF BRANCH 86 IN THE ABSENCE OF ITS
PRESIDING JUDGE.
THE ORDER OF MAY 31, 2006 HAS ALREADY BEEN IMPLEMENTED
BEFORE THE ISSUANCE OF SUBJECT TRO ON JUNE 2, 2006, THUS, THE
TRO IS ALREADY MOOT AND ACADEMIC
SIMILARLY, THE ORDER OF JUNE 1, 2006 AND BENCH WARRANT HAVE
ALREADY BEEN ISSUED AND SERVED UPON PRIVATE RESPONDENT ON
1 JUNE 2006 OR EVEN BEFORE THE TRO WAS ISSUED BY RESPONDENT
COURT.
THE MATTER OF THE HABEAS CORPUS HAS BEEN SQUARELY RAISED
BEFORE RESPONDENT COURT IN SUBJECT PETITION, AND
RESPONDENT COURT ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AND
MANIFEST PARTIALITY IN DENYING HEREIN PETITIONER'S MOTION TO
PRODUCE THE 4-YEAR OLD MINOR BEFORE THE RESPONDENT COURT.
THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS MUST BE IMMEDIATELY EFFECTED
SINCE PETITIONER IS ENTITLED TO SOLE CUSTODY OF THE MINOR
WHO CANNOT BE SEPARATED FROM HER UNDER ART. 213 OF THE
FAMILY CODE.
Petitioner contends that the subject Petition filed before the Court of Appeals
shows that Judge Gonzales-Asdala was impleaded in her capacity as Presiding
Judge of Branch 87 when in fact, she issued the 31 May 2006 and 1 June 2006
Orders when she was acting as the Pairing Judge of Branch 86. Private
respondent's ploy, petitioner argues, has misled the Court of Appeals into
believing that Judge Gonzales-Asdala's Orders violated the rule proscribing the
interference by a court with the processes of another court of co-equal
jurisdiction.
Also, petitioner maintains that the temporary restraining order issued by the
Court of Appeals had already been rendered moot by the incidents which
occurred prior to their issuance. For one, the hearing on 1 June 2006 took place
as scheduled thereby rendering useless the 2 June 2006 Resolution of the Court
of Appeals. Similarly, the 7 June 2006 Resolution of the Court of Appeals
enjoining the issuance of the bench warrant became inutile as the bench warrant
for arrest was not only issued by Judge Gonzales-Asdala but said warrant was
actually served upon private respondent on 1 June 2006.16
Petitioner also claims that private respondent violated Article 213 of the Family
Code when he prevented petitioner from having access to their conjugal abode
and by forcibly separating her from Carlos Iñigo beginning 15 March 2006.
Page 33 of 99
In addition, petitioner takes exception to the ruling of Judge Bay giving private
respondent continued custody over Carlos Iñigo. Petitioner argues that said
Order not only contravenes Article 213 of the Family Code but the same is also
utterly lacking in any legal and factual bases.
Lastly, in an attempt to bolster her claim that she should have custody over
Carlos Iñigo, petitioner cites the Court of Appeals' Resolution dated 4 July
200317 granting private respondent a mere visitorial right to their son. This
Resolution was issued by the Court of Appeals in connection with CA-G.R. SP.
No. 77707.18
In his Comment, private respondent argues that the Court of Appeals committed
no grave abuse of discretion in issuing the assailed Resolutions. He contends
that Judge Gonzales-Asdala, as the Pairing Judge of Quezon City RTC, Branch
86, has the authority "to step into and take action in a case only when the
presiding judge is on leave, absent, incapacitated, or otherwise unavailable."19
In this case, however, she exceeded such authority when she issued her 31
May 2006 Order considering that Judge Bay, the Presiding Judge was yet to go
on leave on 1 June 2006. It was therefore improper for her to take over the
consolidated cases involving the parties herein since Judge Bay was still
performing his duty on 31 May 2006.
Private respondent also disputes petitioner's assertion that the acts sought to
be restrained by the Court of Appeals' Resolutions were already fait accompli.
According to him, the fact that Judge Gonzales-Asdala's Orders of 31 May and
1 June 2006 were served upon his counsel does not mean that these were
successfully implemented. He avers that, in fact, one of the grounds of his
Petition for Certiorari before the Court of Appeals was the undue haste with
which these Orders were successively issued thereby depriving him of
substantial and procedural due process.20 As the party aggrieved, private
respondent insists that he has the right to question Judge Gonzales-Asdala's
Orders before a higher court.
In addition, private respondent asserts that petitioner is guilty of forum shopping.
He points out that in petitioner's original complaint in Civil Case No. Q-06-57760,
she prayed that she be granted the "sole custody and charge" of Carlos Iñigo21
but this was denied by Judge Bay in his Order dated 19 April 2006.22 Later,
petitioner filed a Petition for Habeas Corpus before the Quezon City RTC where
she again raised the issue relating to the custody of Carlos Iñigo. Private
respondent insists that petitioner is clearly trying to circumvent the rule against
forum shopping by seeking to regain custody over Carlos Iñigo in the habeas
corpus case – a relief that was already denied her by Judge Bay in Civil Case
No. Q-06-57760.
Private respondent is also of the view that jurisdiction over the petition for
habeas corpus properly lies with the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 86, which has
acquired prior jurisdiction over the matter. He points out that Judge Bay had
even scheduled the hearing of the consolidated cases on 14 July 2006 at which
time he is supposed to bring Carlos Iñigo to the court.
Preliminarily, we shall address the procedural infirmity obtaining in this Petition.
Petitioner herself admits that the present Petition was filed without her first
seeking the reconsideration of the two assailed Resolutions of the Court of
Appeals. She contends, however, that there were instances in the past when
this Court allowed the filing of a petition for certiorari sans prior recourse to a
motion for reconsideration citing the cases of Candido v. Camacho23 and Metro
Transit Organization, Inc. v. Court of Appeals.24
In the case of Candido, this Court held that:
We have ruled that "(a) prior motion for reconsideration is not indispensable for
commencement of certiorari proceedings if the errors sought to be corrected in
such proceedings had been duly heard and passed upon or were similar to the
issues already resolved by the tribunal or agency below. Accordingly, the Court
has excused the non-filing of a motion for reconsideration when such motion
would be basically pro-forma in nature and content, and where x x x the
questions raised are essentially legal in nature." In the case at bar, the parties
have argued their positions and have been duly heard by the RTC before it
issued the assailed injunction order. Moreover, as the issues involved therein
are essentially legal, the filing of motion for reconsideration assailing the RTC's
injunction order may be properly dispensed with.25
In Metro Transit Organization, Inc., we declared the general rule to be "that a
motion for reconsideration is indispensable before resort to the special civil
action for certiorari to afford the court or tribunal the opportunity to correct its
error, if any."26 The rule however allows the following exceptions:
(a) where the order is a patent of nullity, as where the court a quo has no
jurisdiction;
(b) where the questions raised in the certiorari proceedings have been duly
raised and passed upon by the lower court, or are the same as those raised and
passed upon in the lower court;
(c) where there is an urgent necessity for the resolution of the question and any
further delay would prejudice the interests of the Government or of the petitioner
or the subject matter of the action is perishable;
(d) where, under the circumstances, a motion for reconsideration would be
useless;
(e) where petitioner was deprived of due process and there is extreme urgency
for relief;

(f) where, in a criminal case, relief from an order of arrest is urgent and the
granting of such relief by the trial court is improbable;
(g) where the proceedings in the lower court are a nullity for lack of due process;
(h) where the proceedings was ex parte or in which the petitioner had no
opportunity to object; and
(i) where the issue raised is one purely of law or where public interest is
involved.27
An examination of the records reveals the measures that the parties herein have
undertaken to have custody of their only child. Thus, while petitioner has
continuously pressed on to regain custody of Carlos Iñigo, private respondent
has been steadfast in ensuring that the minor child stays with him. If only to
protect Carlos Iñigo from the ill-effects of this virtual tug-of-war between his
parents, and to allow the Court of Appeals to proceed with the resolution of the
Petition for Certiorari filed by private respondent, this Court deems it proper to
give due course to this Petition. We believe that the urgent necessity for the
resolution of this Petition is for the benefit of the minor Carlos Iñigo and not so
much to protect the interest of any of the parties herein.
In this case, we do not agree with petitioner's argument that the questioned
Resolutions of the Court of Appeals have already become moot. To reiterate,
Judge Gonzales-Asdala was enjoined by said 2 June 2006 Resolution from
performing the following:
(1) implementation and/or issuance of a bench warrant of arrest of petitioner;
(2) implementation of the Order of respondent Judge dated 31 May 2006;
(3) requiring petitioner to turn over custody of his minor son Carlos Iñigo
Tabujara to private respondent (petitioner herein);
(4) taking further action and trying Civil Cases Nos. Q-06-57760, Q-06-57857,
and Spec. Proc. No. Q-06-57984.28
The general rule contemplates that injunction is only proper to restrain acts
being committed or about to be committed. Nevertheless, consummated acts
which are continuing in nature may still be enjoined by a temporary restraining
order.29
In this case, it appears from the sheriff's return dated 5 June 200630 that Judge
Gonzales-Asdala's Order of 1 June 2006 was indeed served upon private
respondent at his office in Makati City, as well as at his father's house in UP
Diliman, Quezon City, and yet it is not shown that his arrest had been
implemented. Clearly then, the Resolutions of the Court of Appeals had not
become useless as alleged by petitioner.
Even assuming that, as petitioner insists, the issuance of the bench warrant for
the arrest of private respondent and the conduct of the 1 June 2006 hearing
may no longer be restrained still, the remainder of the acts sought to be enjoined
remain the proper subjects of the temporary restraining order issued on 2 June
2006. Thus, said Resolution was still able to restrain Judge Gonzales-Asdala
from compelling private respondent to turn over custody of Carlos Iñigo to
petitioner and from taking any further action with respect to the consolidated
cases before the RTC, Quezon City, Branch 86. For these, petitioner's
contention regarding the mootness of the impugned Resolutions does not
deserve merit.
As regards the issue of whether the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse
of discretion in issuing the impugned Resolutions, we rule in the negative.
It is settled doctrine that grave abuse of discretion is present "when there is a
capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction, such as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic
manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and it must be so patent and
gross so as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to
perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law."31
In this case, we perceive no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Court
of Appeals. The assailed Resolutions were not issued whimsically nor
capriciously. As alleged in the Petition before the Court of Appeals, Judge
Gonzales-Asdala was poised to find private respondent in contempt of court and
to issue a bench warrant for his arrest should he fail to comply with her Order
dated 31 May 2006. Bearing in mind that the validity of said Order has yet to be
resolved by the Court of Appeals, it was only proper that the temporary
restraining order was issued; otherwise, private respondent would have suffered
irreparable injury should the Court of Appeals decide not to sustain the validity
of the 31 May 2006 Order.
Petitioner also prays that we direct the Court of Appeals to effect the writ of
habeas corpus issued by the RTC, Quezon City, Branch 102, by ordering private
respondent to immediately produce the minor child Carlos Iñigo either before
the Court of Appeals itself or the RTC, Quezon City, Branch 86.
This, we cannot do.
It is worthy to recall here the rule with regard to jurisdiction over habeas corpus
cases which this Court had the opportunity to clarify through In the Matter of
Application for the Issuance of a Writ of Habeas Corpus Richard Brian Thornton
for and in behalf of the minor child Sequeira Jennifer Delle Francisco Thornton
v. Adelfa Francisco Thornton.32 In said case, we declared that both this Court
Page 34 of 99
and the Court of Appeals still retain their jurisdiction over habeas corpus cases
despite the passage of Republic Act No. 836933 – the law conferring upon
family courts the exclusive jurisdiction over habeas corpus cases, thus:
The Court of Appeals opines that RA 8369 impliedly repealed RA 7902 and BP
129 since, by giving family courts exclusive jurisdiction over habeas corpus
cases, the lawmakers intended it to be the sole court which can issue writs of
habeas corpus. To the court a quo, the word "exclusive" apparently cannot be
construed any other way.
We disagree with the CA's reasoning because it will result in an iniquitous
situation, leaving individuals like petitioner without legal recourse in obtaining
custody of their children. Individuals who do not know the whereabouts of
minors they are looking for would be helpless since they cannot seek redress
from family courts whose writs are enforceable only in their respective territorial
jurisdictions. Thus, if a minor is being transferred from one place to another,
which seems to be the case here, the petitioner in a habeas corpus case will be
left without legal remedy. This lack of recourse could not have been the intention
of the lawmakers when they passed the Family Courts Act of 1997. x x x
xxxx
The primordial consideration is the welfare and best interests of the child. We
rule therefore that RA 8369 did not divest the Court of Appeals and the Supreme
Court of their jurisdiction over habeas corpus cases involving the custody of
minors. x x x34 (Emphasis supplied.)
It is clear from the foregoing that the trial court, the Court of Appeals, and this
Court have concurrent jurisdiction over habeas corpus cases. As the Petition for
Habeas Corpus was filed by petitioner before the trial court, the latter has
acquired jurisdiction over the petition to the exclusion of all others. To hold
otherwise would be to risk instances where courts of concurrent jurisdiction
might have conflicting orders.35 And, jurisdiction once acquired by a court is not
lost upon the instance of the parties but continues until the case is terminated.36
In view of this, we hold that petitioner's motion for the production of the minor
Carlos Iñigo should be resolved by the trial court. We cannot act on said motion
without overstepping the boundary laid down by the law with respect to
jurisdiction over habeas corpus cases. Parenthetically, Judge Bay had already
acted on a similar motion filed by petitioner37 and had, in fact, set the hearing
of the consolidated cases on 14 July 2006 during which time private respondent
should present Carlos Iñigo before the trial court.38
Anent the alleged violation of Article 213 of the Family Code, suffice it to state
here that this issue is still the subject of a Motion for Reconsideration pending
before the trial court.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition for Certiorari is hereby
DIMISSED. The assailed Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated 2 June 2006,
restraining the execution of Judge Fatima Gonzales-Asdala's Order dated 31
May 2006, and the Court of Appeals' Resolution dated 7 June 2006 setting aside
and nullifying Judge Gonzales-Asdala's 1 June 2006 Order, are hereby
AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Panganiban, C.J., Ynares-Santiago, Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr., J.J., concur.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 184769 October 5, 2010
MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY, ALEXANDER S. DEYTO and RUBEN A.
SAPITULA, Petitioners,
vs.
ROSARIO GOPEZ LIM, Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
The Court is once again confronted with an opportunity to define the evolving
metes and bounds of the writ of habeas data. May an employee invoke the
remedies available under such writ where an employer decides to transfer her
workplace on the basis of copies of an anonymous letter posted therein ─
imputing to her disloyalty to the company and calling for her to leave, which
imputation it investigated but fails to inform her of the details thereof?
Rosario G. Lim (respondent), also known as Cherry Lim, is an administrative
clerk at the Manila Electric Company (MERALCO).
On June 4, 2008, an anonymous letter was posted at the door of the Metering
Office of the Administration building of MERALCO Plaridel, Bulacan Sector, at
which respondent is assigned, denouncing respondent. The letter reads:
Cherry Lim:
MATAPOS MONG LAMUNIN LAHAT NG BIYAYA NG MERALCO, NGAYON
NAMAN AY GUSTO MONG PALAMON ANG BUONG KUMPANYA SA MGA
BUWAYA NG GOBYERNO. KAPAL NG MUKHA MO, LUMAYAS KA RITO,
WALANG UTANG NA LOOB….1
Copies of the letter were also inserted in the lockers of MERALCO linesmen.
Informed about it, respondent reported the matter on June 5, 2008 to the Plaridel
Station of the Philippine National Police.2
By Memorandum3 dated July 4, 2008, petitioner Alexander Deyto, Head of
MERALCO’s Human Resource Staffing, directed the transfer of respondent to
MERALCO’s Alabang Sector in Muntinlupa as "A/F OTMS Clerk," effective July
18, 2008 in light of the receipt of "… reports that there were accusations and
threats directed against [her] from unknown individuals and which could possibly
compromise [her] safety and security."
Respondent, by letter of July 10, 2008 addressed to petitioner Ruben A.
Sapitula, Vice-President and Head of MERALCO’s Human Resource
Administration, appealed her transfer and requested for a dialogue so she could
voice her concerns and misgivings on the matter, claiming that the "punitive"
nature of the transfer amounted to a denial of due process. Citing the grueling
travel from her residence in Pampanga to Alabang and back entails, and
violation of the provisions on job security of their Collective Bargaining
Agreement (CBA), respondent expressed her thoughts on the alleged threats to
her security in this wise:
xxxx
I feel that it would have been better . . . if you could have intimated to me the
nature of the alleged accusations and threats so that at least I could have found
out if these are credible or even serious. But as you stated, these came from
unknown individuals and the way they were handled, it appears that the veracity
of these accusations and threats to be [sic] highly suspicious, doubtful or are
just mere jokes if they existed at all.
Assuming for the sake of argument only, that the alleged threats exist as the
management apparently believe, then my transfer to an unfamiliar place and
environment which will make me a "sitting duck" so to speak, seems to betray
the real intent of management which is contrary to its expressed concern on my
security and safety . . . Thus, it made me think twice on the rationale for
management’s initiated transfer. Reflecting further, it appears to me that instead
of the management supposedly extending favor to me, the net result and effect
of management action would be a punitive one.
Respondent thus requested for the deferment of the implementation of her
transfer pending resolution of the issues she raised.
No response to her request having been received, respondent filed a petition5
for the issuance of a writ of habeas data against petitioners before the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Bulacan, docketed as SP. Proc. No. 213-M-2008.
By respondent’s allegation, petitioners’ unlawful act and omission consisting of
their continued failure and refusal to provide her with details or information about
the alleged report which MERALCO purportedly received concerning threats to
her safety and security amount to a violation of her right to privacy in life, liberty
and security, correctible by habeas data. Respondent thus prayed for the
issuance of a writ commanding petitioners to file a written return containing the
following:
a) a full disclosure of the data or information about respondent in relation to the
report purportedly received by petitioners on the alleged threat to her safety and
security; the nature of such data and the purpose for its collection;
b) the measures taken by petitioners to ensure the confidentiality of such data
or information; and
c) the currency and accuracy of such data or information obtained.
Additionally, respondent prayed for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining
Order (TRO) enjoining petitioners from effecting her transfer to the MERALCO
Alabang Sector.
By Order6 of August 29, 2008, Branch 7 of the Bulacan RTC directed petitioners
to file their verified written return. And by Order of September 5, 2008, the trial
court granted respondent’s application for a TRO.
Petitioners moved for the dismissal of the petition and recall of the TRO on the
grounds that, inter alia, resort to a petition for writ of habeas data was not in
order; and the RTC lacked jurisdiction over the case which properly belongs to
the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC).7
By Decision of September 22, 2008, the trial court granted the prayers of
respondent including the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction directing
petitioners to desist from implementing respondent’s transfer until such time that
petitioners comply with the disclosures required.
The trial court justified its ruling by declaring that, inter alia, recourse to a writ of
habeas data should extend not only to victims of extra-legal killings and political
activists but also to ordinary citizens, like respondent whose rights to life and
security are jeopardized by petitioners’ refusal to provide her with information or
data on the reported threats to her person.
Page 35 of 99
Hence, the present petition for review under Rule 45 of 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure and the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data9 contending that 1) the
RTC lacked jurisdiction over the case and cannot restrain MERALCO’s
prerogative as employer to transfer the place of work of its employees, and 2)
the issuance of the writ is outside the parameters expressly set forth in the Rule
on the Writ of Habeas Data.101avvphi1
Maintaining that the RTC has no jurisdiction over what they contend is clearly a
labor dispute, petitioners argue that "although ingeniously crafted as a petition
for habeas data, respondent is essentially questioning the transfer of her place
of work by her employer"11 and the terms and conditions of her employment
which arise from an employer-employee relationship over which the NLRC and
the Labor Arbiters under Article 217 of the Labor Code have jurisdiction.
Petitioners thus maintain that the RTC had no authority to restrain the
implementation of the Memorandum transferring respondent’s place of work
which is purely a management prerogative, and that OCA-Circular No. 79-2003
expressly prohibits the issuance of TROs or injunctive writs in labor-related
cases.
Petitioners go on to point out that the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data directs
the issuance of the writ only against public officials or employees, or private
individuals or entities engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or
information regarding an aggrieved party’s person, family or home; and that
MERALCO (or its officers) is clearly not engaged in such activities.
The petition is impressed with merit.
Respondent’s plea that she be spared from complying with MERALCO’s
Memorandum directing her reassignment to the Alabang Sector, under the
guise of a quest for information or data allegedly in possession of petitioners,
does not fall within the province of a writ of habeas data.
Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data provides:
Section 1. Habeas Data. – The writ of habeas data is a remedy available to any
person whose right to privacy in life, liberty or security is violated or threatened
by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee or of a private
individual or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or
information regarding the person, family, home and correspondence of the
aggrieved party. (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The habeas data rule, in general, is designed to protect by means of judicial
complaint the image, privacy, honor, information, and freedom of information of
an individual. It is meant to provide a forum to enforce one’s right to the truth
and to informational privacy, thus safeguarding the constitutional guarantees of
a person’s right to life, liberty and security against abuse in this age of
information technology.
It bears reiteration that like the writ of amparo, habeas data was conceived as a
response, given the lack of effective and available remedies, to address the
extraordinary rise in the number of killings and enforced disappearances. Its
intent is to address violations of or threats to the rights to life, liberty or security
as a remedy independently from those provided under prevailing Rules.13
Castillo v. Cruz underscores the emphasis laid down in Tapuz v. del Rosario
that the writs of amparo and habeas data will NOT issue to protect purely
property or commercial concerns nor when the grounds invoked in support of
the petitions therefor are vague or doubtful.16 Employment constitutes a
property right under the context of the due process clause of the Constitution. It
is evident that respondent’s reservations on the real reasons for her transfer - a
legitimate concern respecting the terms and conditions of one’s employment -
are what prompted her to adopt the extraordinary remedy of habeas data.
Jurisdiction over such concerns is inarguably lodged by law with the NLRC and
the Labor Arbiters.
In another vein, there is no showing from the facts presented that petitioners
committed any unjustifiable or unlawful violation of respondent’s right to privacy
vis-a-vis the right to life, liberty or security. To argue that petitioners’ refusal to
disclose the contents of reports allegedly received on the threats to
respondent’s safety amounts to a violation of her right to privacy is at best
speculative. Respondent in fact trivializes these threats and accusations from
unknown individuals in her earlier-quoted portion of her July 10, 2008 letter as
"highly suspicious, doubtful or are just mere jokes if they existed at all."18 And
she even suspects that her transfer to another place of work "betray[s] the real
intent of management]" and could be a "punitive move." Her posture unwittingly
concedes that the issue is labor-related.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed September 22, 2008
Decision of the Bulacan RTC, Branch 7 in SP. Proc. No. 213-M-2008 is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. SP. Proc. No. 213-M-2008 is, accordingly,
DISMISSED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 193636 July 24, 2012
MARYNETTE R. GAMBOA, Petitioner,
vs.
P/SSUPT. MARLOU C. CHAN, in his capacity as the PNP-Provincial
Director of Ilocos Norte, and P/SUPT. WILLIAM 0. FANG, in his capacity as
Chief, Intelligence Division, PNP Provincial Office, Ilocos Norte,
Respondents.
DECISION
SERENO, J.:
Before this Court is an Appeal by Certiorari (Under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court)
filed pursuant to Rule 191 of the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data,2 seeking a
review of the 9 September 2010 Decision in Special Proc. No. 14979 of the
Regional Trial Court, First Judicial Region, Laoag City, Branch 13 (RTC Br. 13).3
The questioned Decision denied petitioner the privilege of the writ of habeas
data.4
At the time the present Petition was filed, petitioner Marynette R. Gamboa
(Gamboa) was the Mayor of Dingras, Ilocos Norte.5 Meanwhile, respondent
Police Senior Superintendent (P/SSUPT.) Marlou C. Chan was the Officer-in-
Charge, and respondent Police Superintendent (P/SUPT.) William O. Fang was
the Chief of the Provincial Investigation and Detective Management Branch,
both of the Ilocos Norte Police Provincial Office.6
On 8 December 2009, former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued
Administrative Order No. 275 (A.O. 275), "Creating an Independent
Commission to Address the Alleged Existence of Private Armies in the
Country."7 The body, which was later on referred to as the Zeñarosa
Commission,8 was formed to investigate the existence of private army groups
(PAGs) in the country with a view to eliminating them before the 10 May 2010
elections and dismantling them permanently in the future.9 Upon the conclusion
of its investigation, the Zeñarosa Commission released and submitted to the
Office of the President a confidential report entitled "A Journey Towards
H.O.P.E.: The Independent Commission Against Private Armies’ Report to the
President" (the Report).10
Gamboa alleged that the Philippine National Police in Ilocos Norte (PNP–Ilocos
Norte) conducted a series of surveillance operations against her and her
aides,11 and classified her as someone who keeps a PAG.12 Purportedly
without the benefit of data verification, PNP–Ilocos Norte forwarded the
information gathered on her to the Zeñarosa Commission,13 thereby causing
her inclusion in the Report’s enumeration of individuals maintaining PAGs.14
More specifically, she pointed out the following items reflected therein:
(a) The Report cited the PNP as its source for the portion regarding the status
of PAGs in the Philippines.
(b) The Report stated that "x x x the PNP organized one dedicated Special Task
Group (STG) for each private armed group (PAG) to monitor and counteract
their activities."
(c) Attached as Appendix "F" of the Report is a tabulation generated by the PNP
and captioned as "Status of PAGs Monitoring by STGs as of April 19, 2010,"
which classifies PAGs in the country according to region, indicates their identity,
and lists the prominent personalities with whom these groups are associated.17
The first entry in the table names a PAG, known as the Gamboa Group, linked
to herein petitioner Gamboa.
(d) Statistics on the status of PAGs were based on data from the PNP, to wit:
The resolutions were the subject of a national press conference held in
Malacañang on March 24, 2010 at which time, the Commission was also asked
to comment on the PNP report that out of one hundred seventeen (117) partisan
armed groups validated, twenty-four (24) had been dismantled with sixty-seven
(67) members apprehended and more than eighty-six (86) firearms confiscated.
Commissioner Herman Basbaño qualified that said statistics were based on
PNP data but that the more significant fact from his report is that the PNP has
been vigilant in monitoring the activities of these armed groups and this vigilance
is largely due to the existence of the Commission which has continued
communicating with the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and PNP
personnel in the field to constantly provide data on the activities of the PAGs.
Commissioner Basbaño stressed that the Commission’s efforts have preempted
the formation of the PAGs because now everyone is aware that there is a body
monitoring the PAGs movement through the PNP. Commissioner Lieutenant
General Edilberto Pardo Adan also clarified that the PAGs are being
destabilized so that their ability to threaten and sow fear during the election has
been considerably weakened.
(e) The Report briefly touched upon the validation system of the PNP:
Also, in order to provide the Commission with accurate data which is truly
reflective of the situation in the field, the PNP complied with the Commission’s
recommendation that they revise their validation system to include those PAGs
Page 36 of 99
previously listed as dormant. In the most recent briefing provided by the PNP
on April 26, 2010, there are one hundred seven (107) existing PAGs. Of these
groups, the PNP reported that seven (7) PAGs have been reorganized.
On 6 and 7 July 2010, ABS-CBN broadcasted on its evening news program the
portion of the Report naming Gamboa as one of the politicians alleged to be
maintaining a PAG.21 Gamboa averred that her association with a PAG also
appeared on print media.22 Thus, she was publicly tagged as someone who
maintains a PAG on the basis of the unverified information that the PNP-Ilocos
Norte gathered and forwarded to the Zeñarosa Commission.23 As a result, she
claimed that her malicious or reckless inclusion in the enumeration of
personalities maintaining a PAG as published in the Report also made her, as
well as her supporters and other people identified with her, susceptible to
harassment and police surveillance operations.24
Contending that her right to privacy was violated and her reputation maligned
and destroyed, Gamboa filed a Petition dated 9 July 2010 for the issuance of a
writ of habeas data against respondents in their capacities as officials of the
PNP-Ilocos Norte.25 In her Petition, she prayed for the following reliefs: (a)
destruction of the unverified reports from the PNP-Ilocos Norte database; (b)
withdrawal of all information forwarded to higher PNP officials; (c) rectification
of the damage done to her honor; (d) ordering respondents to refrain from
forwarding unverified reports against her; and (e) restraining respondents from
making baseless reports.26
The case was docketed as Special Proc. No. 14979 and was raffled to RTC Br.
13, which issued the corresponding writ on 14 July 2010 after finding the Petition
meritorious on its face.27 Thus, the trial court (a) instructed respondents to
submit all information and reports forwarded to and used by the Zeñarosa
Commission as basis to include her in the list of persons maintaining PAGs; (b)
directed respondents, and any person acting on their behalf, to cease and desist
from forwarding to the Zeñarosa Commission, or to any other government entity,
information that they may have gathered against her without the approval of the
court; (c) ordered respondents to make a written return of the writ together with
supporting affidavits; and (d) scheduled the summary hearing of the case on 23
July 2010.28
In their Return of the Writ, respondents alleged that they had acted within the
bounds of their mandate in conducting the investigation and surveillance of
Gamboa.29 The information stored in their database supposedly pertained to
two criminal cases in which she was implicated, namely: (a) a Complaint for
murder and frustrated murder docketed as NPS DOC No. 1-04-INQ-091-00077,
and (b) a Complaint for murder, frustrated murder and direct assault upon a
person in authority, as well as indirect assault and multiple attempted murder,
docketed as NPS DOCKET No. 1-04-INV-10-A-00009.30
Respondents likewise asserted that the Petition was incomplete for failing to
comply with the following requisites under the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data:
(a) the manner in which the right to privacy was violated or threatened with
violation and how it affected the right to life, liberty or security of Gamboa; (b)
the actions and recourses she took to secure the data or information; and (c)
the location of the files, registers or databases, the government office, and the
person in charge, in possession or in control of the data or information. They
also contended that the Petition for Writ of Habeas Data, being limited to cases
of extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances, was not the proper
remedy to address the alleged besmirching of the reputation of Gamboa.
RTC Br. 13, in its assailed Decision dated 9 September 2010, dismissed the
Petition. The trial court categorically ruled that the inclusion of Gamboa in the
list of persons maintaining PAGs, as published in the Report, constituted a
violation of her right to privacy, to wit:
In this light, it cannot also be disputed that by her inclusion in the list of persons
maintaining PAGs, Gamboa’s right to privacy indubitably has been violated. The
violation understandably affects her life, liberty and security enormously. The
untold misery that comes with the tag of having a PAG could even be
insurmountable. As she essentially alleged in her petition, she fears for her
security that at any time of the day the unlimited powers of respondents may
likely be exercised to further malign and destroy her reputation and to transgress
her right to life.
By her inclusion in the list of persons maintaining PAGs, it is likewise undisputed
that there was certainly intrusion into Gamboa’s activities. It cannot be denied
that information was gathered as basis therefor. After all, under Administrative
Order No. 275, the Zeñarosa Commission was tasked to investigate the
existence of private armies in the country, with all the powers of an investigative
body under Section 37, Chapter 9, Book I of the Administrative Code of 1987.
xxx xxx xxx
By her inclusion in the list of persons maintaining PAGs, Gamboa alleged as
she accused respondents, who are public officials, of having gathered and
provided information that made the Zeñarosa Commission to include her in the
list. Obviously, it was this gathering and forwarding of information supposedly
by respondents that petitioner barks at as unlawful. x x x.34
Despite the foregoing findings, RTC Br. 13 nevertheless dismissed the Petition
on the ground that Gamboa failed to prove through substantial evidence that the
subject information originated from respondents, and that they forwarded this
database to the Zeñarosa Commission without the benefit of prior verification.35
The trial court also ruled that even before respondents assumed their official
positions, information on her may have already been acquired.36 Finally, it held
that the Zeñarosa Commission, as the body tasked to gather information on
PAGs and authorized to disclose information on her, should have been
impleaded as a necessary if not a compulsory party to the Petition.37
Gamboa then filed the instant Appeal by Certiorari dated 24 September 2010,38
raising the following assignment of errors:
1. The trial court erred in ruling that the Zeñarosa Commission be impleaded as
either a necessary or indispensable party;
2. The trial court erred in declaring that Gamboa failed to present sufficient proof
to link respondents as the informant to [sic] the Zeñarosa Commission;
3. The trial court failed to satisfy the spirit of Habeas Data;
4. The trial court erred in pronouncing that the reliance of the Zeñarosa
Commission to [sic] the PNP as alleged by Gamboa is an assumption;
5. The trial court erred in making a point that respondents are distinct to PNP as
an agency.39
On the other hand, respondents maintain the following arguments: (a) Gamboa
failed to present substantial evidence to show that her right to privacy in life,
liberty or security was violated, and (b) the trial court correctly dismissed the
Petition on the ground that she had failed to present sufficient proof showing
that respondents were the source of the report naming her as one who maintains
a PAG.
Meanwhile, Gamboa argues that although A.O. 275 was a lawful order, fulfilling
the mandate to dismantle PAGs in the country should be done in accordance
with due process, such that the gathering and forwarding of unverified
information on her must be considered unlawful.41 She also reiterates that she
was able to present sufficient evidence showing that the subject information
originated from respondents.
In determining whether Gamboa should be granted the privilege of the writ of
habeas data, this Court is called upon to, first, unpack the concept of the right
to privacy; second, explain the writ of habeas data as an extraordinary remedy
that seeks to protect the right to informational privacy; and finally, contextualize
the right to privacy vis-à-vis the state interest involved in the case at bar.
The Right to Privacy
The right to privacy, as an inherent concept of liberty, has long been recognized
as a constitutional right. This Court, in Morfe v. Mutuc, thus enunciated:
The due process question touching on an alleged deprivation of liberty as thus
resolved goes a long way in disposing of the objections raised by plaintiff that
the provision on the periodical submission of a sworn statement of assets and
liabilities is violative of the constitutional right to privacy. There is much to be
said for this view of Justice Douglas: "Liberty in the constitutional sense must
mean more than freedom from unlawful governmental restraint; it must include
privacy as well, if it is to be a repository of freedom. The right to be let alone is
indeed the beginning of all freedom." As a matter of fact, this right to be let alone
is, to quote from Mr. Justice Brandeis "the most comprehensive of rights and
the right most valued by civilized men."
The concept of liberty would be emasculated if it does not likewise compel
respect for his personality as a unique individual whose claim to privacy and
interference demands respect. xxx.
xxx xxx xxx
In the leading case of Griswold v. Connecticut, Justice Douglas, speaking for
five members of the Court, stated: "Various guarantees create zones of privacy.
The right of association contained in the penumbra of the First Amendment is
one, as we have seen. The Third Amendment in its prohibition against the
quartering of soldiers ‘in any house’ in time of peace without the consent of the
owner is another facet of that privacy. The Fourth Amendment explicitly affirms
the ‘right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.’ The Fifth Amendment in
its Self-Incrimination Clause enables the citizen to create a zone of privacy
which government may not force him to surrender to his detriment. The Ninth
Amendment provides: ‘The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights,
shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people." After
referring to various American Supreme Court decisions, Justice Douglas
continued: "These cases bear witness that the right of privacy which presses for
recognition is a legitimate one."
xxx xxx xxx
So it is likewise in our jurisdiction. The right to privacy as such is accorded
recognition independently of its identification with liberty; in itself, it is fully
deserving of constitutional protection. The language of Prof. Emerson is
particularly apt: "The concept of limited government has always included the
idea that governmental powers stop short of certain intrusions into the personal
life of the citizen. This is indeed one of the basic distinctions between absolute
and limited government. Ultimate and pervasive control of the individual, in all
aspects of his life, is the hallmark of the absolute state. In contrast, a system of
limited government, safeguards a private sector, which belongs to the individual,
firmly distinguishing it from the public sector, which the state can control.
Protection of this private sector — protection, in other words, of the dignity and
integrity of the individual — has become increasingly important as modern
society has developed. All the forces of a technological age — industrialization,
Page 37 of 99
urbanization, and organization — operate to narrow the area of privacy and
facilitate intrusion into it. In modern terms, the capacity to maintain and support
this enclave of private life marks the difference between a democratic and a
totalitarian society."
In Ople v. Torres, this Court traced the constitutional and statutory bases of the
right to privacy in Philippine jurisdiction, to wit:
Indeed, if we extend our judicial gaze we will find that the right of privacy is
recognized and enshrined in several provisions of our Constitution. It is
expressly recognized in section 3 (1) of the Bill of Rights:
Sec. 3. (1) The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be
inviolable except upon lawful order of the court, or when public safety or order
requires otherwise as prescribed by law.
Other facets of the right to privacy are protected in various provisions of the Bill
of Rights, viz:
Sec. 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due
process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws.
Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and
for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest
shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the
judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched
and the persons or things to be seized.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 6. The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits
prescribed by law shall not be impaired except upon lawful order of the court.
Neither shall the right to travel be impaired except in the interest of national
security, public safety, or public health as may be provided by law.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 8. The right of the people, including those employed in the public and
private sectors, to form unions, associations, or societies for purposes not
contrary to law shall not be abridged.
Sec. 17. No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself.
Zones of privacy are likewise recognized and protected in our laws. The Civil
Code provides that "every person shall respect the dignity, personality, privacy
and peace of mind of his neighbors and other persons" and punishes as
actionable torts several acts by a person of meddling and prying into the privacy
of another. It also holds a public officer or employee or any private individual
liable for damages for any violation of the rights and liberties of another person,
and recognizes the privacy of letters and other private communications. The
Revised Penal Code makes a crime the violation of secrets by an officer, the
revelation of trade and industrial secrets, and trespass to dwelling. Invasion of
privacy is an offense in special laws like the Anti-Wiretapping Law, the Secrecy
of Bank Deposits Act and the Intellectual Property Code. The Rules of Court on
privileged communication likewise recognize the privacy of certain information.
Unlike the dissenters, we prescind from the premise that the right to privacy is
a fundamental right guaranteed by the Constitution, hence, it is the burden of
government to show that A.O. No. 308 is justified by some compelling state
interest and that it is narrowly drawn. x x x.46 (Emphases supplied)
Clearly, the right to privacy is considered a fundamental right that must be
protected from intrusion or constraint. However, in Standard Chartered Bank v.
Senate Committee on Banks,47 this Court underscored that the right to privacy
is not absolute, viz:
With respect to the right of privacy which petitioners claim respondent has
violated, suffice it to state that privacy is not an absolute right. While it is true
that Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution, guarantees respect for the rights
of persons affected by the legislative investigation, not every invocation of the
right to privacy should be allowed to thwart a legitimate congressional inquiry.
In Sabio v. Gordon, we have held that the right of the people to access
information on matters of public concern generally prevails over the right to
privacy of ordinary financial transactions. In that case, we declared that the right
to privacy is not absolute where there is an overriding compelling state interest.
Employing the rational basis relationship test, as laid down in Morfe v. Mutuc,
there is no infringement of the individual’s right to privacy as the requirement to
disclosure information is for a valid purpose, in this case, to ensure that the
government agencies involved in regulating banking transactions adequately
protect the public who invest in foreign securities. Suffice it to state that this
purpose constitutes a reason compelling enough to proceed with the assailed
legislative investigation.48
Therefore, when the right to privacy finds tension with a competing state
objective, the courts are required to weigh both notions. In these cases,
although considered a fundamental right, the right to privacy may nevertheless
succumb to an opposing or overriding state interest deemed legitimate and
compelling.
The Writ of Habeas Data
The writ of habeas data is an independent and summary remedy designed to
protect the image, privacy, honor, information, and freedom of information of an
individual, and to provide a forum to enforce one’s right to the truth and to
informational privacy.49 It seeks to protect a person’s right to control information
regarding oneself, particularly in instances in which such information is being
collected through unlawful means in order to achieve unlawful ends.50 It must
be emphasized that in order for the privilege of the writ to be granted, there must
exist a nexus between the right to privacy on the one hand, and the right to life,
liberty or security on the other. Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data
reads:
Habeas data. – The writ of habeas data is a remedy available to any person
whose right to privacy in life, liberty or security is violated or threatened by an
unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual
or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data information
regarding the person, family, home and correspondence of the aggrieved party.
The notion of informational privacy is still developing in Philippine law and
jurisprudence. Considering that even the Latin American habeas data, on which
our own Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data is rooted, finds its origins from the
European tradition of data protection,51 this Court can be guided by cases on
the protection of personal data decided by the European Court of Human Rights
(ECHR). Of particular note is Leander v. Sweden,52 in which the ECHR
balanced the right of citizens to be free from interference in their private affairs
with the right of the state to protect its national security. In this case, Torsten
Leander (Leander), a Swedish citizen, worked as a temporary replacement
museum technician at the Naval Museum, which was adjacent to a restricted
military security zone.53 He was refused employment when the requisite
personnel control resulted in an unfavorable outcome on the basis of information
in the secret police register, which was kept in accordance with the Personnel
Control Ordinance and to which he was prevented access.54 He claimed,
among others, that this procedure of security control violated Article 8 of the
European Convention of Human Rights55 on the right to privacy, as nothing in
his personal or political background would warrant his classification in the
register as a security risk.56
The ECHR ruled that the storage in the secret police register of information
relating to the private life of Leander, coupled with the refusal to allow him the
opportunity to refute the same, amounted to an interference in his right to
respect for private life.57 However, the ECHR held that the interference was
justified on the following grounds: (a) the personnel control system had a
legitimate aim, which was the protection of national security,58 and (b) the
Personnel Control Ordinance gave the citizens adequate indication as to the
scope and the manner of exercising discretion in the collection, recording and
release of information by the authorities.59 The following statements of the
ECHR must be emphasized:
58. The notion of necessity implies that the interference corresponds to a
pressing social need and, in particular, that it is proportionate to the legitimate
aim pursued (see, inter alia, the Gillow judgment of 24 November 1986, Series
A no. 109, p. 22, § 55).
59. However, the Court recognises that the national authorities enjoy a margin
of appreciation, the scope of which will depend not only on the nature of the
legitimate aim pursued but also on the particular nature of the interference
involved. In the instant case, the interest of the respondent State in protecting
its national security must be balanced against the seriousness of the
interference with the applicant’s right to respect for his private life.
There can be no doubt as to the necessity, for the purpose of protecting national
security, for the Contracting States to have laws granting the competent
domestic authorities power, firstly, to collect and store in registers not accessible
to the public information on persons and, secondly, to use this information when
assessing the suitability of candidates for employment in posts of importance
for national security.
Admittedly, the contested interference adversely affected Mr. Leander’s
legitimate interests through the consequences it had on his possibilities of
access to certain sensitive posts within the public service. On the other hand,
the right of access to public service is not as such enshrined in the Convention
(see, inter alia, the Kosiek judgment of 28 August 1986, Series A no. 105, p. 20,
§§ 34-35), and, apart from those consequences, the interference did not
constitute an obstacle to his leading a private life of his own choosing.
In these circumstances, the Court accepts that the margin of appreciation
available to the respondent State in assessing the pressing social need in the
present case, and in particular in choosing the means for achieving the
legitimate aim of protecting national security, was a wide one.
xxx xxx xxx
66. The fact that the information released to the military authorities was not
communicated to Mr. Leander cannot by itself warrant the conclusion that the
interference was not "necessary in a democratic society in the interests of
national security", as it is the very absence of such communication which, at
least partly, ensures the efficacy of the personnel control procedure (see,
mutatis mutandis, the above-mentioned Klass and Others judgment, Series A
no. 28, p. 27, § 58).
The Court notes, however, that various authorities consulted before the issue of
the Ordinance of 1969, including the Chancellor of Justice and the
Parliamentary Ombudsman, considered it desirable that the rule of
communication to the person concerned, as contained in section 13 of the
Page 38 of 99
Ordinance, should be effectively applied in so far as it did not jeopardise the
purpose of the control (see paragraph 31 above).
67. The Court, like the Commission, thus reaches the conclusion that the
safeguards contained in the Swedish personnel control system meet the
requirements of paragraph 2 of Article 8 (art. 8-2). Having regard to the wide
margin of appreciation available to it, the respondent State was entitled to
consider that in the present case the interests of national security prevailed over
the individual interests of the applicant (see paragraph 59 above). The
interference to which Mr. Leander was subjected cannot therefore be said to
have been disproportionate to the legitimate aim pursued. (Emphases supplied)
Leander illustrates how the right to informational privacy, as a specific
component of the right to privacy, may yield to an overriding legitimate state
interest. In similar fashion, the determination of whether the privilege of the writ
of habeas data, being an extraordinary remedy, may be granted in this case
entails a delicate balancing of the alleged intrusion upon the private life of
Gamboa and the relevant state interest involved.
The collection and forwarding of information by the PNP vis-à-vis the interest of
the state to dismantle private armies.
The Constitution explicitly mandates the dismantling of private armies and other
armed groups not recognized by the duly constituted authority.60 It also
provides for the establishment of one police force that is national in scope and
civilian in character, and is controlled and administered by a national police
commission.61
Taking into account these constitutional fiats, it is clear that the issuance of A.O.
275 articulates a legitimate state aim, which is to investigate the existence of
PAGs with the ultimate objective of dismantling them permanently.
To enable the Zeñarosa Commission to achieve its goals, A.O. 275 clothed it
with the powers of an investigative body, including the power to summon
witnesses, administer oaths, take testimony or evidence relevant to the
investigation and use compulsory processes to produce documents, books, and
records.62 A.O. 275 likewise authorized the Zeñarosa Commission to deputize
the Armed Forces of the Philippines, the National Bureau of Investigation, the
Department of Justice, the PNP, and any other law enforcement agency to
assist the commission in the performance of its functions.63
Meanwhile, the PNP, as the national police force, is empowered by law to (a)
enforce all laws and ordinances relative to the protection of lives and properties;
(b) maintain peace and order and take all necessary steps to ensure public
safety; and (c) investigate and prevent crimes.64
Pursuant to the state interest of dismantling PAGs, as well as the foregoing
powers and functions accorded to the Zeñarosa Commission and the PNP, the
latter collected information on individuals suspected of maintaining PAGs,
monitored them and counteracted their activities.65 One of those individuals is
herein petitioner Gamboa.
This Court holds that Gamboa was able to sufficiently establish that the data
contained in the Report listing her as a PAG coddler came from the PNP.
Contrary to the ruling of the trial court, however, the forwarding of information
by the PNP to the Zeñarosa Commission was not an unlawful act that violated
or threatened her right to privacy in life, liberty or security.
The PNP was rationally expected to forward and share intelligence regarding
PAGs with the body specifically created for the purpose of investigating the
existence of these notorious groups. Moreover, the Zeñarosa Commission was
explicitly authorized to deputize the police force in the fulfillment of the former’s
mandate, and thus had the power to request assistance from the latter.
Following the pronouncements of the ECHR in Leander, the fact that the PNP
released information to the Zeñarosa Commission without prior communication
to Gamboa and without affording her the opportunity to refute the same cannot
be interpreted as a violation or threat to her right to privacy since that act is an
inherent and crucial component of intelligence-gathering and
investigation.1âwphi1 Additionally, Gamboa herself admitted that the PNP had
a validation system, which was used to update information on individuals
associated with PAGs and to ensure that the data mirrored the situation on the
field.66 Thus, safeguards were put in place to make sure that the information
collected maintained its integrity and accuracy.
Pending the enactment of legislation on data protection, this Court declines to
make any further determination as to the propriety of sharing information during
specific stages of intelligence gathering. To do otherwise would supplant the
discretion of investigative bodies in the accomplishment of their functions,
resulting in an undue encroachment on their competence.
However, to accord the right to privacy with the kind of protection established in
existing law and jurisprudence, this Court nonetheless deems it necessary to
caution these investigating entities that information-sharing must observe strict
confidentiality. Intelligence gathered must be released exclusively to the
authorities empowered to receive the relevant information. After all, inherent to
the right to privacy is the freedom from "unwarranted exploitation of one’s
person or from intrusion into one’s private activities in such a way as to cause
humiliation to a person’s ordinary sensibilities."67
In this case, respondents admitted the existence of the Report, but emphasized
its confidential nature.1âwphi1 That it was leaked to third parties and the media
was regrettable, even warranting reproach. But it must be stressed that Gamboa
failed to establish that respondents were responsible for this unintended
disclosure. In any event, there are other reliefs available to her to address the
purported damage to her reputation, making a resort to the extraordinary
remedy of the writ of habeas data unnecessary and improper.
Finally, this Court rules that Gamboa was unable to prove through substantial
evidence that her inclusion in the list of individuals maintaining PAGs made her
and her supporters susceptible to harassment and to increased police
surveillance. In this regard, respondents sufficiently explained that the
investigations conducted against her were in relation to the criminal cases in
which she was implicated. As public officials, they enjoy the presumption of
regularity, which she failed to overcome.
It is clear from the foregoing discussion that the state interest of dismantling
PAGs far outweighs the alleged intrusion on the private life of Gamboa,
especially when the collection and forwarding by the PNP of information against
her was pursuant to a lawful mandate. Therefore, the privilege of the writ of
habeas data must be denied.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review is DENIED. The assailed Decision
in Special Proc. No. 14979 dated 9 September 2010 of the Regional Trial Court,
Laoag City, Br. 13, insofar as it denies Gamboa the privilege of the writ of
habeas data, is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO
Associate justice
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
UDK No. 14817 January 13, 2014
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF MINOR
SHANG KO VINGSON YU SHIRLY VINGSON@ SHIRLY VINGSON
DEMAISIP, Petitioner,
vs.
JOVY CABCABAN, Respondent.
DECISION
ABAD, J.:
Petitioner Shirly Vingson (Shirly) alleged that Shang Ko Vingson Yu (Shang
Ko),1 her 14-year-old daughter, ran away from home on September 23, 2011.
On November 2, 2011 Shirly went to the police station in Bacolod City upon
receipt of information that Shang Ko was in the custody of respondent Jovy
Cabcaban Cabcaban), a police officer in that station. Since Cabcaban refused
to release Shang Ko to her, Shirly sought the help of the National Bureau of
Investigation NBI) to rescue her child. An NBI agent, Arnel Pura Pura), informed
Shirly that Shang Ko was no longer with Cabcaban but was staying with a
private organization called Calvary Kids. Pura told her, however, that the child
was fine and had been attending school.
This prompted petitioner Shirly to file a petition for habeas corpus against
respondent Cabcaban and the unnamed officers of Calvary Kids before the
Court of Appeals rather than the Regional Trial Court of Bacolod City citing as
reason several threats against her life in that city.
In a Resolution dated December 18, 2012, the CA resolved in CA-G.R. SP
07261 to deny the petition for its failure to clearly allege who has custody of
Shang Ko. According to the CA, habeas corpus may not be used as a means of
obtaining evidence on the whereabouts of a person or as a means of finding out
who has specifically abducted or caused the disappearance of such person.3
The CA denied petitioner Shirly’s motion for reconsideration on January 8, 2013,
hence, this petition for review.
In her Comment, respondent Cabcaban claimed that on September 28, 2011
police officers found Shang Ko crying outside a church. When queried, the latter
refused to give any information about herself. Thus, they indorsed her case to
the Bacolod City Police Women and Children Protection Desk that Cabcaban
headed. After the initial interview, Cabcaban referred Shang Ko to Balay
Pasilungan, a temporary shelter for abused women and children.
Respondent Cabcaban further claimed that on the next day, a social worker sat
with the minor who said that her mother Shirly had been abusive in treating her.
She narrated that on September 27, 2011 Shirly instructed another daughter to
give Shang Ko ₱280.00 and take her to the pier to board a boat going to Iloilo
City.5 Shang Ko was told to look for a job there and to never come back to
Bacolod City. Since she had nowhere to go when she arrived in Iloilo City,
Shang Ko decided to return to Bacolod City with the money given her. She went
to her best friend’s house but was turned away for fear of Shirly. She called her
sister so that she and her boyfriend could get her but they, too, turned her down.
Respondent Cabcaban also claimed that Shang Ko pleaded with the police and
the social worker not to return her to her mother. As a result, the Bacolod City
Police filed a complaint against petitioner Shirly for violation of Republic Act
Page 39 of 99
7610 or the Special Protection of Children Against Abuse, Exploitation, and
Discrimination Act. The police sent notice to Shirly inviting her to a conference
but she refused to receive such notice. Two days later, however, she came and
spoke to Cabcaban, pointing out that Shang Ko had been a difficult child with a
tendency to steal. From their conversation, Cabcaban surmised that Shirly did
not want to take her daughter back, having offered to pay for her daily expenses
at the shelter.
Respondent Cabcaban said that on October 29, 2011 she decided to turn over
Shang Ko to the Calvary Kids, a private organization that gave sanctuary and
schooling to abandoned and abused children. On November 2, 2011 petitioner
Shirly showed up at the police station asking for her daughter. Cabcaban told
her that Shang Ko was in a sanctuary for abandoned children and that the police
officer had to first coordinate with it before she can disclose where Shang Ko
was. But Shirly was adamant and threatened her with a lawsuit. Cabcaban
claimed that Shang Ko’s father was a Taiwanese and that Shirly wanted the
child back to use her as leverage for getting financial support from him.
Respondent Cabcaban further claimed that one year later, NBI agents led by
Pura went to the police station to verify Shirly’s complaint that Cabcaban had
kidnapped Shang Ko. Cabcaban accompanied the NBI agents to Calvary Kids
to talk to the institution’s social worker, school principal, and director. They
provided the NBI agents with the child’s original case study report9 and told
them that it was not in Shang Ko’s best interest to return her to her mother who
abused and maltreated her. Shang Ko herself told the NBI that she would rather
stay at Calvary Kids because she was afraid of what would happen to her if she
returned home. As proof, Shang Ko wrote a letter stating that, contrary to her
mother’s malicious insinuations, Cabcaban actually helped her when she had
nowhere to go after her family refused to take her back.
Under Section 1, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court, the writ of habeas corpus is
available, not only in cases of illegal confinement or detention by which any
person is deprived of his liberty, but also in cases involving the rightful custody
over a minor. The general rule is that parents should have custody over their
minor children. But the State has the right to intervene where the parents, rather
than care for such children, treat them cruelly and abusively, impairing their
growth and well-being and leaving them emotional scars that they carry
throughout their lives unless they are liberated from such parents and properly
counseled.
Since this case presents factual issues and since the parties are all residents of
Bacolod City, it would be best that such issues be resolved by a Family Court in
that city. Meantime, considering the presumption that the police authorities
acted regularly in placing Shang Ko in the custody of Calvary Kids the Court
believes that she should remain there pending hearing and adjudication of this
custody case. Besides she herself has expressed preference to stay in that
place.
WHEREFORE, the Court SETS ASIDE the Court of Appeals Resolutions in CA-
G.R. SP 07261 dated December 18, 2012 and January 8, 2013 and ORDERS
this custody case forwarded to the Family Court of Bacolod City for hearing and
adjudication as the evidence warrants. Meantime until such court orders
otherwise let the minor Shang Ko Vingson remain in the custody of Calvary Kids
of Bacolod City.
Further the Court ORDERS petitioner Shirly Vingson Shirly Vingson Demaisip
to pay the balance of the docket and other legal fees within 10 days from receipt
of this Resolution.
SO ORDERED.
ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 197597, April 08, 2015
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF DATUKAN
MALANG SALIBO, DATUKAN MALANG SALIBO, Petitioner, v. WARDEN,
QUEZON CITY JAIL ANNEX, BJMP BUILDING, CAMP BAGONG DIWA,
TAGUIG CITY AND ALL OTHER PERSONS ACTING ON HIS BEHALF
AND/OR HAVING CUSTODY OF DATUKAN MALANG SALIBO,
Respondents.
DECISION
LEONEN, J.:
Habeas corpus is the proper remedy for a person deprived of liberty due to
mistaken identity. In such cases, the person is not under any lawful process and
is continuously being illegally detained.
This is a Petition for Review1 on Certiorari of the Court of Appeals Decision2
reversing the Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 153, Pasig City
(Taguig Hall of Justice) granting Datukan Malang Salibo's Petition for Habeas
Corpus.

From November 7, 2009 to December 19, 2009, Datukan Malang Salibo
(Salibo) and other Filipinos were allegedly in Saudi Arabia for the Hajj
Pilgrimage.4 "While in Saudi Arabia, . . . Salibo visited and prayed in the cities
of Medina, Mecca, Arpa, Mina and Jeddah."5 He returned to the Philippines on
December 20, 2009.6
On August 3, 2010, Salibo learned that police officers of Datu Hofer Police
Station in Maguindanao suspected him to be Butukan S. Malang.7
Butukan S. Malang was one of the 197 accused of 57 counts of murder for
allegedly participating in the November 23, 2009 Maguindanao Massacre. He
had a pending warrant of arrest issued by the trial court in People of the
Philippines v. Datu Andal Ampatuan, Jr., et al.8
Salibo presented himself before the police officers of Datu Hofer Police Station
to clear his name. There, he explained that he was not Butukan S. Malang and
that he could not have participated in the November 23, 2009 Maguindanao
Massacre because he was in Saudi Arabia at that time.9
To support his allegations, Salibo presented to the police "pertinent portions of
his passport, boarding passes and other documents"10 tending to prove that a
certain Datukan Malang Salibo was in Saudi Arabia from November 7 to
December 19, 2009.11
The police officers initially assured Salibo that they would not arrest him
because he was not Butukan S. Malang.12
Afterwards, however, the police officers apprehended Salibo and tore off page
two of his passport that evidenced his departure for Saudi Arabia on November
7, 2009. They then detained Salibo at the Datu Hofer Police Station for about
three (3) days.13
The police officers transferred Salibo to the Criminal Investigation and Detection
Group in Cotabato City, where he was detained for another 10 days. While in
Cotabato City, the Criminal Investigation and Detention Group allegedly made
him sign and affix his thumbprint on documents.14
On August 20, 2010, Salibo was finally transferred to the Quezon City Jail
Annex, Bureau of Jail Management and Penology Building, Camp Bagong
Diwa, Taguig City, where he is currently detained.15
On September 17, 2010, Salibo filed before the Court of Appeals the Urgent
Petition for Habeas Corpus16 questioning the legality of his detention and
deprivation of his liberty.17 He maintained that he is not the accused Butukan
S. Malang.18
In the Resolution19 dated September 21, 2010, the Court of Appeals issued a
Writ of Habeas Corpus, making the Writ returnable to the Second Vice Executive
Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Pasig City (Taguig Hall of Justice).20 The
Court of Appeals ordered the Warden of the Quezon City Jail Annex to file a
Return of the Writ one day before the scheduled hearing and produce the person
of Salibo at the 10:00 a.m. hearing set on September 27, 2010.21
Proceedings before the trial court
On September 27, 2010, the jail guards of the Quezon City Jail Annex brought
Salibo before the trial court. The Warden, however, failed to file a Return one
day before the hearing. He also appeared without counsel during the hearing.22
Thus, the trial court canceled the hearing and reset it to September 29, 2010 at
2:00 p.m.23
On September 28, 2010, the Warden filed the Return of the Writ. However,
during the September 29, 2010 hearing on the Return, the Warden appeared
with Atty. Romeo L. Villante, Jr., Legal Officer/Administering Officer of the
Bureau of Jail Management and Penology.24
Salibo questioned the appearance of Atty. Romeo L. Villante, Jr. on behalf of
the Warden and argued that only the Office of the Solicitor General has the
authority to appear on behalf of a respondent in a habeas corpus proceeding.25
The September 29, 2010 hearing, therefore, was canceled. The trial court reset
the hearing on the Return to October 1, 2010 at 9:00 a.m.26
The Return was finally heard on October 1, 2010. Assistant Solicitors Noel Salo
and Isar Pepito appeared on behalf of the Warden of the Quezon City Jail Annex
and argued that Salibo's Petition for Habeas Corpus should be dismissed. Since
Salibo was charged under a valid Information and Warrant of Arrest, a petition
for habeas corpus was "no longer availing."27
Salibo countered that the Information, Amended Information, Warrant of Arrest,
and Alias Warrant of Arrest referred to by the Warden all point to Butukan S.
Malang, not Datukan Malang Salibo, as accused. Reiterating that he was not
Butukan S. Malang and that he was in Saudi Arabia on the day of the
Maguindanao Massacre, Salibo pleaded the trial court to order his release from
detention.28
The trial court found that Salibo was not "judicially charged"29 under any
resolution, information, or amended information. The Resolution, Information,
and Amended Information presented in court did not charge Datukan Malang
Salibo as an accused. He was also not validly arrested as there was no Warrant
Page 40 of 99
of Arrest or Alias Warrant of Arrest against Datukan Malang Salibo. Salibo, the
trial court ruled, was not restrained of his liberty under process issued by a
court.30
The trial court was likewise convinced that Salibo was not the Butukan S.
Malang charged with murder in connection with the Maguindanao Massacre.
The National Bureau of Investigation Clearance dated August 27, 2009 showed
that Salibo has not been charged of any crime as of the date of the certificate.31
A Philippine passport bearing Salibo's picture showed the name "Datukan
Malang Salibo."32
Moreover, the trial court said that Salibo "established that [he] was out of the
country"33 from November 7, 2009 to December 19, 2009. This fact was
supported by a Certification34 from Saudi Arabian Airlines confirming Salibo's
departure from and arrival in Manila on board its flights.35 A Flight Manifest
issued by the Bureau of Immigration and Saudi Arabian Airlines Ticket No.
0652113 also showed this fact.36
Thus, in the Decision dated October 29, 2010, the trial court granted Salibo's
Petition for Habeas Corpus and ordered his immediate release from detention.
Proceedings before the Court of Appeals
On appeal37 by the Warden, however, the Court of Appeals reversed and set
aside the trial court's Decision.38 Through its Decision dated April 19, 2011, the
Court of Appeals dismissed Salibo's Petition for Habeas Corpus.
Contrary to the trial court's finding, the Court of Appeals found that Salibo's
arrest and subsequent detention were made under a valid Information and
Warrant of Arrest.39 Even assuming that Salibo was not the Butukan S. Malang
named in the Alias Warrant of Arrest, the Court of Appeals said that "[t]he orderly
course of trial must be pursued and the usual remedies exhausted before the
writ [of habeas corpus] may be invoked[.]"40 According to the Court of Appeals,
Salibo's proper remedy was a Motion to Quash Information and/or Warrant of
Arrest.41
Salibo filed a Motion for Reconsideration,42 which the Court of Appeals denied
in the Resolution43 dated July 6, 2011.
Proceedings before this court
On July 28, 2011,44 petitioner Salibo filed before this court the Petition for
Review (With Urgent Application for a Writ of Preliminary
Mandatory Injunction). Respondent Warden filed a Comment,45 after which
petitioner Salibo filed a Reply.46
Petitioner Salibo maintains that he is not the Butukan S. Malang charged with
57 counts of murder before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 221, Quezon City.
Thus, contrary to the Court of Appeals' finding, he, Datukan Malang Salibo, was
not duly charged in court. He is being illegally deprived of his liberty and,
therefore, his proper remedy is a Petition for Habeas Corpus.47
Petitioner Salibo adds that respondent Warden erred in appealing the Decision
of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 153, Pasig City before the Court of Appeals.
Although the Court of Appeals delegated to the trial court the authority to hear
respondent Warden on the Return, the trial court's Decision should be deemed
a Decision of the Court of Appeals. Therefore, respondent Warden should have
directly filed his appeal before this court.48
As for respondent Warden, he maintains that petitioner Salibo was duly charged
in court. Even assuming that he is not the Butukan S. Malang named in the Alias
Warrant of Arrest, petitioner Salibo should have pursued the ordinary remedy of
a Motion to Quash Information, not a Petition for Habeas Corpus.49
The issues for our resolution are:
First, whether the Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 153, Pasig City
on petitioner Salibo's Petition for Habeas Corpus was appealable to the Court
of Appeals; and Second, whether petitioner Salibo's proper remedy is to file a
Petition for Habeas Corpus.
We grant the Petition.
I
Contrary to petitioner Salibo's claim, respondent Warden correctly appealed
before the Court of Appeals.
An application for a writ of habeas corpus may be made through a petition filed
before this court or any of its members,50 the Court of Appeals or any of its
members in instances authorized by law,51 or the Regional Trial Court or any
of its presiding judges.52 The court or judge grants the writ and requires the
officer or person having custody of the person allegedly restrained of liberty to
file a return of the writ.53 A hearing on the return of the writ is then conducted.54
The return of the writ may be heard by a court apart from that which issued the
writ.55 Should the court issuing the writ designate a lower court to which the writ
is made returnable, the lower court shall proceed to decide the petition of
habeas corpus. By virtue of the designation, the lower court "acquire[s] the
power and authority to determine the merits of the [petition for habeas
corpus.]"56 Therefore, the decision on the petition is a decision appealable to
the court that has appellate jurisdiction over decisions of the lower court.57
In Saulo v. Brig. Gen. Cruz, etc,58 "a petition for habeas corpus was filed before
this Court . . . [o]n behalf of. . . Alfredo B. Saulo [(Saulo)]."59 This court issued
a Writ of Habeas Corpus and ordered respondent Commanding General of the
Philippine Constabulary to file a Return of the Writ. This court made the Writ
returnable to the Court of First Instance of Manila.60
After hearing the Commanding General on the Return, the Court of First
Instance denied Saulo's Petition for Habeas Corpus.61
Saulo appealed before this court, arguing that the Court of First Instance heard
the Petition for Habeas Corpus "not by virtue of its original jurisdiction but merely
delegation[.]"62 Consequently, "this Court should have the final say regarding
the issues raised in the petition, and only [this court's decision] . . . should be
regarded as operative."63
This court rejected Sciulo's argument and stated that his "logic is more apparent
than real."64 It ruled that when a superior court issues a writ of habeas corpus,
the superior court only resolves whether the respondent should be ordered to
show cause why the petitioner or the person in whose behalf the petition was
filed was being detained or deprived of his or her liberty.65 However, once the
superior court makes the writ returnable to a lower court as allowed by the Rules
of Court, the lower court designated "does not thereby become merely a
recommendatory body, whose findings and conclusion[s] are devoid of
effect[.]"66 The decision on the petition for habeas corpus is a decision of the
lower court, not of the superior court.
In Medina v. Gen. Yan,67 Fortunato Medina (Medina) filed before this court a
Petition for Habeas Corpus. This court issued a Writ of Habeas Corpus, making
it returnable to the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City. After trial on
the merits, the Court of First Instance granted Medina's Petition for Habeas
Corpus and ordered that Medina be released from detention.68
The Office of the Solicitor General filed a Notice of Appeal before the Court of
Appeals.69
Atty. Amelito Mutuc, counsel for Medina, filed before the Court of Appeals a
"Motion for Certification of Appeal to the Supreme Court." The Court of Appeals,
however, denied the Motion.70
This court ruled that the Court of Appeals correctly denied the "Motion for
Certification of Appeal to the Supreme Court," citing Saulo as legal basis.71 The
Court of First Instance of Rizal, in deciding Medina's Petition for Habeas Corpus,
"acquired the power and authority to determine the merits of the case[.]"72
Consequently, the decision of the Court of First Instance of Rizal on Medina's
Petition for Habeas Corpus was appealable to the Court of Appeals.73
In this case, petitioner Salibo filed his Petition for Habeas Corpus before the
Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals issued a Writ of Habeas Corpus, making
it returnable to the Regional Trial Court, Branch 153, Pasig City. The trial court
then heard respondent Warden on his Return and decided the Petition on the
merits.
Applying Saulo and Medina, we rule that the trial court "acquired the power and
authority to determine the merits"74 of petitioner Salibo's Petition. The decision
on the Petition for Habeas Corpus, therefore, was the decision of the trial court,
not of the Court of Appeals. Since the Court of Appeals is the court with
appellate jurisdiction over decisions of trial courts,75 respondent Warden
correctly filed the appeal before the Court of Appeals.
II
Called the "great writ of liberty[,]"76 the writ of habeas corpus "was devised and
exists as a speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons from unlawful
restraint, and as the best and only sufficient defense of personal freedom."77
The remedy of habeas corpus is extraordinary78 and summary79 in nature,
consistent with the law's "zealous regard for personal liberty."80
Under Rule 102, Section 1 of the Rules of Court, the writ of habeas corpus "shall
extend to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by which any person is
deprived of his liberty, or by which the rightful custody of any person is withheld
from the person entitled thereto."81 The primary purpose of the writ "is to inquire
into all manner of involuntary restraint as distinguished from voluntary, and to
relieve a person therefrom if such restraint is illegal."82 "Any restraint which will
preclude freedom of action is sufficient."83
The nature of the restraint of liberty need not be related to any offense so as to
entitle a person to the efficient remedy of habeas corpus. It may be availed of
as a post-conviction remedy84 or when there is an alleged violation of the liberty
of abode.85 In other words, habeas corpus effectively substantiates the implied
autonomy of citizens constitutionally protected in the right to liberty in Article III,
Section 1 of the Constitution.86 Habeas corpus being a remedy for a
constitutional right, courts must apply a conscientious and deliberate level of
scrutiny so that the substantive right to liberty will not be further curtailed in the
labyrinth of other processes.87
In Gumabon, et al. v. Director of the Bureau of Prisons,88 Mario Gumabon
(Gumabon), Bias Bagolbagol (Bagolbagol), Gaudencio Agapito (Agapito),
Epifanio Padua (Padua), and Paterno Palmares (Palmares) were convicted of
the complex crime of rebellion with murder. They commenced serving their
respective sentences of reclusion perpetua.89
Page 41 of 99
While Gumabon, Bagolbagol, Agapito, Padua, and Palmares were serving their
sentences, this court promulgated People v. Hernandez90 in 1956, ruling that
the complex crime of rebellion with murder does not exist.91
Based on the Hernandez ruling, Gumabon, Bagolbagol, Agapito, Padua, and
Palmares filed a Petition for Habeas Corpus. They prayed for their release from
incarceration and argued that the Hernandez doctrine must retroactively apply
to them.92
This court ruled that Gumabon, Bagolbagol, Agapito, Padua, and Palmares
properly availed of a petition for habeas corpus.93 Citing Harris v. Nelson,94
this court said:
[T]he writ of habeas corpus is the fundamental instrument for safeguarding
individual freedom against arbitrary and lawless state action. . .. The scope and
flexibility of the writ — its capacity to reach all manner of illegal detention — its
ability to cut through barriers of form and procedural mazes — have always
been emphasized and jealously guarded by courts and lawmakers. The very
nature of the writ demands that it be administered with the initiative and flexibility
essential to insure that miscarriages of justice within its reach are surfaced and
corrected.95
In Rubi v. Provincial Board of Mindoro,96 the Provincial Board of Mindoro issued
Resolution No. 25, Series of 1917. The Resolution ordered the Mangyans
removed from their native habitat and compelled them to permanently settle in
an 800-hectare reservation in Tigbao. Under the Resolution, Mangyans who
refused to establish themselves in the Tigbao reservation were imprisoned.97
An application for habeas corpus was filed before this court on behalf of Rubi
and all the other Mangyans being held in the reservation.98 Since the
application questioned the legality of deprivation of liberty of Rubi and the other
Mangyans, this court issued a Writ of Habeas Corpus and ordered the Provincial
Board of Mindoro to make a Return of the Writ.99
A Writ of Habeas Corpus was likewise issued in Villavicencio v. Lukban.100
"[T]o exterminate vice,"101 Mayor Justo Lukban of Manila ordered the brothels
in Manila closed. The female sex workers previously employed by these
brothels were rounded up and placed in ships bound for Davao. The women
were expelled from Manila and deported to Davao without their consent.102
On application by relatives and friends of some of the deported women, this
court issued a Writ of Habeas Corpus and ordered Mayor Justo Lukban, among
others, to make a Return of the Writ. Mayor Justo Lukban, however, failed to
make a Return, arguing that he did not have custody of the women.103
This court cited Mayor Justo Lukban in contempt of court for failure to make a
Return of the Writ.104 As to the legality of his acts, this court ruled that Mayor
Justo Lukban illegally deprived the women he had deported to Davao of their
liberty, specifically, of their privilege of domicile.105 It said that the women,
"despite their being in a sense lepers of society[,] are nevertheless not chattels
but Philippine citizens protected by the same constitutional guaranties as are
other citizens[.]"106 The women had the right "to change their domicile from
Manila to another locality."107
The writ of habeas corpus is different from the final decision on the petition for
the issuance of the writ. It is the writ that commands the production of the body
of the person allegedly restrained of his or her liberty. On the other hand, it is in
the final decision where a court determines the legality of the restraint.
Between the issuance of the writ and the final decision on the petition for its
issuance, it is the issuance of the writ that is essential. The issuance of the writ
sets in motion the speedy judicial inquiry on the legality of any deprivation of
liberty. Courts shall liberally issue writs of habeas corpus even if the petition for
its issuance "on [its] face [is] devoid of merit[.]"108 Although the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus may be suspended in cases of invasion, rebellion, or when
the public safety requires it,109 the writ itself may not be suspended.110
III
It is true that a writ of habeas corpus may no longer be issued if the person
allegedly deprived of liberty is restrained under a lawful process or order of the
court.111 The restraint then has become legal,112 and the remedy of habeas
corpus is rendered moot and academic.113 Rule 102, Section 4 of the Rules of
Court provides:
SEC. 4. When writ not allowed or discharge authorized.—If it appears that the
person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under
process issued by a court or judge or by virtue of a judgment or order of a court
of record, and that the court or judge had jurisdiction to issue the process, render
the judgment, or make the order, the writ shall not be allowed; or if the
jurisdiction appears after the writ is allowed, the person shall not be discharged
by reason of any informality or defect in the process, judgment, or order. Nor
shall anything in this rule be held to authorize the discharge of a person charged
with or convicted of an offense in the Philippines, or of a person suffering
imprisonment under lawful judgment.
In Ilagan v. Hon. Ponce Enrile,114 elements of the Philippine Constabulary-
Integrated National Police arrested Atty. Laurente C. Ilagan (Atty. Ilagan) by
virtue of a Mission Order allegedly issued by then Minister of National Defense,
Juan Ponce Enrile (Minister Enrile). On the day of Atty. Ilagan's arrest,115 from
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Davao Chapter visited Atty. Ilagan in Camp
Catitipan, where he was detained.115
Among Atty. Ilagan's visitors was Atty. Antonio Arellano (Atty. Arellano). Atty.
Arellano, however, no longer left Camp Catitipan as the military detained and
arrested him based on an unsigned Mission Order.116
Three (3) days after the arrest of Attys. Ilagan and Arellano, the military informed
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Davao Chapter of the impending arrest of
Atty. Marcos Risonar (Atty. Risonar). To verify his arrest papers, Atty. Risonar
went to Camp Catitipan. Like Atty. Arellano, the military did not allow Atty.
Risonar to leave. He was arrested based on a Mission Order signed by General
Echavarria, Regional Unified Commander.117
The Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the Free Legal Assistance Group, and the
Movement of Attorneys for Brotherhood, Integrity and Nationalism filed before
this court a Petition for Habeas Corpus in behalf of Attys. Ilagan, Arellano, and
Risonar.118
This court issued a Writ of Habeas Corpus and required Minister Enrile, Armed
Forces of the Philippines Acting Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Fidel V.
Ramos (General Ramos), and Philippine Constabulary-Integrated National
Police Regional Commander Brigadier General Dionisio Tan-Gatue (General
Tan-Gatue) to make a Return of the Writ.119 This court set the hearing on the
Return on May 23, 1985.120
In their Return, Minister Enrile, General Ramos, and General Tan-Gatue
contended that the privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus was suspended as to
Attys. Ilagan, Arellano, and Risonar by virtue of Proclamation No. 2045-A.121
The lawyers, according to respondents, allegedly "played active roles in
organizing mass actions of the Communist Party of the Philippines and the
National Democratic Front."122
After hearing respondents on their Return, this court ordered the temporary
release of Attys. Ilagan, Arellano, and Risonar on the recognizance of their
counsels, retired Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion and retired Associate
Justice Jose B.L. Reyes.123
Instead of releasing Attys. Ilagan, Arellano, and Risonar, however, Minister
Enrile, General Ramos, and General Tan-Gatue filed a Motion for
Reconsideration.124 They filed an Urgent Manifestation/Motion stating that
Informations for rebellion were filed against Attys. Ilagan, Arellano, and Risonar.
They prayed that this court dismiss the Petition for Habeas Corpus for being
moot and academic.125
The Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the Free Legal Assistance Group, and the
Movement of Attorneys for Brotherhood, Integrity and Nationalism opposed the
motion. According to them, no preliminary investigation was conducted before
the filing of the Information. Attys. Ilagan, Arellano, and Risonar were deprived
of their right to due process. Consequently, the Information was void.126
This court dismissed the Petition for Habeas Corpus, ruling that it became moot
and academic with the filing of the Information against Attys. Ilagan, Arellano,
and Risonar in court:127
As contended by respondents, the petition herein has been rendered moot and
academic by virtue of the filing of an Information against them for Rebellion, a
capital offense, before the Regional Trial Court of Davao City and the issuance
of a Warrant of Arrest against them. The function of the special proceeding of
habeas corpus is to inquire into the legality of one's detention. Now that the
detained attorneys' incarceration is by virtue of a judicial order in relation to
criminal cases subsequently filed against them before the Regional Trial Court
of Davao City, the remedy of habeas corpus no longer lies. The Writ had served
its purpose.128 (Citations omitted)
This court likewise dismissed the Petitions for habeas corpus in Umil v.
Ramos.129 Roberto Umil, Rolando Dural, Renato Villanueva, Amelia Roque,
Wilfredo Buenaobra, Atty. Domingo Anonuevo, Ramon Casiple, Vicky A. Ocaya,
Deogracias Espiritu, and Narciso B. Nazareno were all arrested without a
warrant for their alleged membership in the Communist Party of the
Philippines/New People's Army.130
During the pendency of the habeas corpus proceedings, however, Informations
against them were filed before this court. The filing of the Informations,
according to this court, rendered the Petitions for habeas corpus moot and
academic, thus:131
It is to be noted that, in all the petitions here considered, criminal charges have
been filed in the proper courts against the petitioners. The rule is, that if a person
alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under process
issued by a court or judge, and that the court or judge had jurisdiction to issue
the process or make the order, or if such person is charged before any court,
the writ of habeas corpus will not be allowed.132 (Emphasis in the original)
In such cases, instead of availing themselves of the extraordinary remedy of a
petition for habeas corpus, persons restrained under a lawful process or order
of the court must pursue the orderly course of trial and exhaust the usual
remedies.133 This ordinary remedy is to file a motion to quash the information
or the warrant of arrest.134
At any time before a plea is entered,135 the accused may file a motion to quash
complaint or information based on any of the grounds enumerated in Rule 117,
Section 3 of the Rules of Court:
SEC. 3. Grounds — The accused may move to quash the complaint or
information on any of the following grounds:
Page 42 of 99
(a) That the facts charged do not constitute an offense;
(b) That the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the offense charged;
(c) That the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the person of the
accused;
(d) That the officer who filed the information had no authority to do so;
(e) That it does not conform substantially to the prescribed form;
(f) That more than one offense is charged except when a single punishment for
various offenses is prescribed by law;
(g) That the criminal action or liability has been extinguished;
(h) That it contains averments which, if true, would constitute a legal excuse or
justification; and
(i) That the accused has been previously convicted or acquitted of the offense
charged, or the case against him was dismissed or otherwise terminated without
his express consent.
In filing a motion to quash, the accused "assails the validity of a criminal
complaint or information filed against him [or her] for insufficiency on its face in
point of law, or for defects which are apparent in the face of the information."136
If the accused avails himself or herself of a motion to quash, the accused
"hypothetical[ly] admits the facts alleged in the information."137 "Evidence
aliunde or matters extrinsic from the information are not to be considered."138
"If the motion to quash is based on an alleged defect of the complaint or
information which can be cured by amendment, the court shall order [the]
amendment [of the complaint or information]."139 If the motion to quash is
based on the ground that the facts alleged in the complaint or information do not
constitute an offense, the trial court shall give the prosecution "an opportunity to
correct the defect by amendment."140 If after amendment, the complaint or
information still suffers from the same defect, the trial court shall quash the
complaint or information.141
IV
However, Ilagan142 and Umil do not apply to this case. Petitioner Salibo was
not arrested by virtue of any warrant charging him of an offense. He was not
restrained under a lawful process or an order of a court. He was illegally
deprived of his liberty, and, therefore, correctly availed himself of a Petition for
Habeas Corpus.
The Information and Alias Warrant of Arrest issued by the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 221, Quezon City in People of the Philippines v. Datu Andal Ampatuan,
Jr., et al. charged and accused Butukan S. Malang, not Datukan Malang Salibo,
of 57 counts of murder in connection with the Maguindanao Massacre.
Furthermore, petitioner Salibo was not validly arrested without a warrant. Rule
113, Section 5 of the Rules of Court enumerates the instances when a
warrantless arrest may be made:
SEC. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful.—A peace officer or a private
person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to
believe based on- personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person
to be arrested has committed it;
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily
confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from
one confinement to another.
In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) above, the person arrested without
a warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail and
shall be proceeded against in accordance with section 7 of Rule 112.
It is undisputed that petitioner Salibo presented himself before the Datu Hofer
Police Station to clear his name and to prove that he is not the accused Butukan
S. Malang. When petitioner Salibo was in the presence of the police officers of
Datu Hofer Police Station, he was neither committing nor attempting to commit
an offense. The police officers had no personal knowledge of any offense that
he might have committed. Petitioner Salibo was also not an escapee prisoner.
The police officers, therefore, had no probable cause to arrest petitioner Salibo
without a warrant. They deprived him of his right to liberty without due process
of law, for which a petition for habeas corpus may be issued.
The arrest of petitioner Salibo is similar to the arrest of Atty. Risonar in the
"disturbing"143 case of Ilagan.144 Like petitioner Salibo, Atty. Risonar went to
Camp Catitipan to verify and contest any arrest papers against him. Then and
there, Atty. Risonar was arrested without a warrant. In his dissenting opinion in
Ilagan,145 Justice Claudio Teehankee stated that the lack of preliminary
investigation deprived Atty. Risonar, together with Attys. Ilagan and Arellano, of
his right to due process of law — a ground for the grant of a petition for habeas
corpus:146
The majority decision holds that the filing of the information without preliminary
investigation falls within the exceptions of Rule 112, sec. 7 and Rule 113, sec.
5 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure. Again, this is erroneous premise.
The fiscal misinvoked and misapplied the cited rules. The petitioners are not
persons "lawfully arrested without a warrant." The fiscal could not rely on the
stale and inoperative PDA of January 25, 1985. Otherwise, the rules would be
rendered nugatory, if all that was needed was to get a PDA and then serve it at
one's whim and caprice when the very issuance of the PDA is premised on its
imperative urgency and necessity as declared by the President himself. The
majority decision then relies on Rule 113, Sec. 5 which authorizes arrests
without warrant by a citizen or by a police officer who witnessed the arrestee in
flagrante delicto, viz. in the act of committing the offense. Quite obviously, the
arrest was not a citizen's arrest nor were they caught in flagrante delicto violating
the law. In fact, this Court in promulgating the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure
have tightened and made the rules more strict. Thus, the Rule now requires that
an offense "has in fact just been committed." This connotes immediacy in point
of time and excludes cases under the old rule where an offense "has in fact
been committed" no matter how long ago. Similarly, the arrestor must have
"personal knowledge of facts indicating that the [arrestee] has committed it"
(instead of just "reasonable ground to believe that the [arrestee] has committed
it" under the old rule). Clearly, then, an information could not just be filed against
the petitioners without due process and preliminary investigation.147 (Emphasis
in the original, citation omitted)
Petitioner Salibo's proper remedy is not a Motion to Quash Information and/or
Warrant of Arrest. None of the grounds for filing a Motion to Quash Information
apply to him. Even if petitioner Salibo filed a Motion to Quash, the defect he
alleged could not have been cured by mere amendment of the Information
and/or Warrant of Arrest. Changing the name of the accused appearing in the
Information and/or Warrant of Arrest from "Butukan S. Malang" to "Datukan
Malang Salibo" will not cure the lack of preliminary investigation in this case.
A motion for reinvestigation will' not cure the defect of lack of preliminary
investigation. The Information and Alias Warrant of Arrest were issued on the
premise that Butukan S. Malang and Datukan Malang Salibo are the same
person. There is evidence, however, that the person detained by virtue of these
processes is not Butukan S. Malang but another person named Datukan Malang
Salibo.
Petitioner Salibo presented in evidence his Philippine passport,148 his
identification card from the Office on Muslim Affairs,149 his Tax Identification
Number card,150 and clearance from the National Bureau of Investigation151
all bearing his picture and indicating the name "Datukan Malang Salibo." None
of these government-issued documents showed that petitioner Salibo used the
alias "Butukan S. Malang."
Moreover, there is evidence that petitioner Salibo was not in the country on
November 23, 2009 when the Maguindanao Massacre occurred.
A Certification152 from the Bureau of Immigration states that petitioner Salibo
departed for Saudi Arabia on November 7, 2009 and arrived in the Philippines
only on December 20, 2009. A Certification153 from Saudi Arabian Airlines
attests that petitioner Salibo departed for Saudi Arabia on board Saudi Arabian
Airlines Flight SV869 on November 7, 2009 and that he arrived in the Philippines
on board Saudi Arabian Airlines SV870 on December 20, 2009.cralawlawlibrary
V In their Answer4 dated 14 May 2006, the petitioners denied the material
People of the Philippines v. Datu Andal Ampatuan, Jr., et al. is probably the
most complex case pending in our courts. The case involves 57 victims154 and
197 accused, two (2) of which have become state witnesses.155 As of
November 23, 2014, 111 of the accused have been arraigned, and 70 have filed
petitions for bail of which 42 have already been resolved.156 To require
petitioner Salibo to undergo trial would be to further illegally deprive him of his
liberty. Urgency dictates that we resolve his Petition in his favor given the strong
evidence that he is not Butukan S. Malang.
In ordering petitioner Salibo's release, we are prejudging neither his guilt nor his
innocence. However, between a citizen who has shown that he was illegally
deprived of his liberty without due process of law and the government that has
all the "manpower and the resources at [its] command"157 to properly indict a
citizen but failed to do so, we will rule in favor of the citizen.
Should the government choose to prosecute petitioner Salibo, it must pursue
the proper remedies against him as provided in our Rules. Until then, we rule
that petitioner Salibo is illegally deprived of his liberty. His Petition for Habeas
Corpus must be granted.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is GRANTED. The Court of
Appeals Decision dated April 19, 2011 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Respondent Warden, Quezon City Jail Annex, Bureau of Jail Management and
Penology Building, Camp Bagong Diwa, Taguig, is ORDERED to immediately
RELEASE petitioner Datukan Maiang Salibo from detention.
The Letter of the Court of Appeals elevating the records of the case to this court
is hereby NOTED.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio, (Chairperson), Brion, Del Castillo, and Mendoza, JJ., concur.
AMPARO
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
Page 43 of 99
G.R. No. 182484 June 17, 2008
DANIEL MASANGKAY TAPUZ, AURORA TAPUZ-MADRIAGA, LIBERTY M.
ASUNCION, LADYLYN BAMOS MADRIAGA, EVERLY TAPUZ MADRIAGA,
EXCEL TAPUZ, IVAN TAPUZ AND MARIAN TIMBAS, petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE JUDGE ELMO DEL ROSARIO, in his capacity as Presiding
Judge of RTC Br. 5 Kalibo, SHERIFF NELSON DELA CRUZ, in his capacity
as Sheriff of the RTC, THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE stationed in
Boracay Island, represented by the PNP STATION COMMANDER, THE
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS IN CEBU 18th DIVISION, SPOUSES
GREGORIO SANSON & MA. LOURDES T. SANSON, respondents.
RESOLUTION
BRION, J.:
Before us for the determination of sufficiency of form and substance (pursuant
to Sections 1 and 4 of Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court; Sections 1 and 5
of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo;1 and Sections 1 and 6 of the Rule on the
Writ of Habeas Data2) is the petition for certiorari and for the issuance of the
writs of amparo and habeas data filed by the above-named petitioners against
the Honorable Judge Elmo del Rosario [in his capacity as presiding judge of
RTC Br. 5, Kalibo], Sheriff Nelson de la Cruz [in his capacity as Sheriff of the
RTC], the Philippine National Police stationed in Boracay Island, represented
by the PNP Station Commander, the Honorable Court of Appeals in Cebu, 18th
Division, and the spouses Gregorio Sanson and Ma. Lourdes T. Sanson,
respondents.
The petition and its annexes disclose the following material antecedents:
The private respondents spouses Gregorio Sanson and Ma. Lourdes T. Sanson
(the "private respondents"), filed with the Fifth Municipal Circuit Trial Court of
Buruanga-Malay, Aklan (the "MCTC") a complaint3 dated 24 April 2006 for
forcible entry and damages with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction against the petitioners Daniel Masangkay Tapuz, Aurora
Tapuz-Madriaga, Liberty M. Asuncion, Ladylyn Bamos Madriaga, Everly Tapuz
Madriaga, Excel Tapuz, Ivan Tapuz and Marian Timbas (the "petitioners") and
other John Does numbering about 120. The private respondents alleged in their
complaint that: (1) they are the registered owners under TCT No. 35813 of a
1.0093-hectare parcel of land located at Sitio Pinaungon, Balabag, Boracay,
Malay, Aklan (the "disputed land"); (2) they were the disputed land's prior
possessors when the petitioners - armed with bolos and carrying suspected
firearms and together with unidentified persons numbering 120 - entered the
disputed land by force and intimidation, without the private respondents'
permission and against the objections of the private respondents' security men,
and built thereon a nipa and bamboo structure.
allegations of the complaint. They essentially claimed that: (1) they are the
actual and prior possessors of the disputed land; (2) on the contrary, the private
respondents are the intruders; and (3) the private respondents' certificate of title
to the disputed property is spurious. They asked for the dismissal of the
complaint and interposed a counterclaim for damages.
The MCTC, after due proceedings, rendered on 2 January 2007 a decision5 in
the private respondents' favor. It found prior possession - the key issue in
forcible entry cases - in the private respondents' favor, thus:
"The key that could unravel the answer to this question lies in the Amended
Commissioner's Report and Sketch found on pages 245 to 248 of the records
and the evidence the parties have submitted. It is shown in the Amended
Commissioner's Report and Sketch that the land in question is enclosed by a
concrete and cyclone wire perimeter fence in pink and green highlighter as
shown in the Sketch Plan (p. 248). Said perimeter fence was constructed by the
plaintiffs 14 years ago. The foregoing findings of the Commissioner in his report
and sketch collaborated the claim of the plaintiffs that after they acquired the
land in question on May 27, 1993 through a Deed of Sale (Annex 'A', Affidavit
of Gregorio Sanson, p. 276, rec.), they caused the construction of the perimeter
fence sometime in 1993 (Affidavit of Gregorio Sanson, pp. 271-275, rec.).
From the foregoing established facts, it could be safely inferred that the plaintiffs
were in actual physical possession of the whole lot in question since 1993 when
it was interrupted by the defendants (sic) when on January 4, 2005 claiming to
(sic) the Heirs of Antonio Tapuz entered a portion of the land in question with
view of inhabiting the same and building structures therein prompting plaintiff
Gregorio Sanson to confront them before BSPU, Police Chief Inspector Jack L.
Wanky and Barangay Captain Glenn Sacapaño. As a result of their
confrontation, the parties signed an Agreement (Annex 'D', Complaint p. 20)
wherein they agreed to vacate the disputed portion of the land in question and
agreed not to build any structures thereon.
The foregoing is the prevailing situation of the parties after the incident of
January 4, 2005 when the plaintiff posted security guards, however, sometime
on or about 6:30 A.M. of April 19, 2006, the defendants some with bolos and
one carrying a sack suspected to contain firearms with other John Does
numbering about 120 persons by force and intimidation forcibly entered the
premises along the road and built a nipa and bamboo structure (Annex 'E',
Complaint, p. 11) inside the lot in question which incident was promptly reported
to the proper authorities as shown by plaintiffs' Certification (Annex 'F',
Complaint, p. 12) of the entry in the police blotter and on same date April 19,
2006, the plaintiffs filed a complaint with the Office of the Lupong
Tagapamayapa of Barangay Balabag, Boracay Island, Malay, Aklan but no
settlement was reached as shown in their Certificate to File Action (Annex 'G',
Complaint, p. 13); hence the present action.
Defendants' (sic) contend in their answer that 'prior to January 4, 2005, they
were already occupants of the property, being indigenous settlers of the same,
under claim of ownership by open continuous, adverse possession to the
exclusion of other (sic)'. (Paragraph 4, Answer, p. 25).
The contention is untenable. As adverted earlier, the land in question is
enclosed by a perimeter fence constructed by the plaintiffs sometime in 1993 as
noted by the Commissioner in his Report and reflected in his Sketch, thus, it is
safe to conclude that the plaintiffs where (sic) in actual physical possession of
the land in question from 1993 up to April 19, 2006 when they were ousted
therefrom by the defendants by means of force. Applying by analogy the ruling
of the Honorable Supreme Court in the case of Molina, et al. vs. De Bacud, 19
SCRA 956, if the land were in the possession of plaintiffs from 1993 to April 19,
2006, defendants' claims to an older possession must be rejected as untenable
because possession as a fact cannot be recognized at the same time in two
different personalities.
Defendants likewise contend that it was the plaintiffs who forcibly entered the
land in question on April 18, 2006 at about 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon as
shown in their Certification (Annex 'D', Defendants' Position Paper, p. 135, rec.).
The contention is untenable for being inconsistent with their allegations made to
the commissioner who constituted (sic) the land in question that they built
structures on the land in question only on April 19, 2006 (Par. D.4,
Commissioner's Amended Report, pp. 246 to 247), after there (sic) entry thereto
on even date.
Likewise, said contention is contradicted by the categorical statements of
defendants' witnesses, Rowena Onag, Apolsida Umambong, Ariel Gac, Darwin
Alvarez and Edgardo Pinaranda, in their Joint Affidavit (pp. 143- '144, rec.) [sic]
categorically stated 'that on or about April 19, 2006, a group of armed men
entered the property of our said neighbors and built plastic roofed tents. These
armed men threatened to drive our said neighbors away from their homes but
they refused to leave and resisted the intruding armed men'.
From the foregoing, it could be safely inferred that no incident of forcible entry
happened on April 18, 2006 but it was only on April 19, 2006 when the
defendants overpowered by their numbers the security guards posted by the
plaintiffs prior to the controversy.
Likewise, defendants (sic) alleged burnt and other structures depicted in their
pictures attached as annexes to their position paper were not noted and
reflected in the amended report and sketch submitted by the Commissioner,
hence, it could be safely inferred that these structures are built and (sic) situated
outside the premises of the land in question, accordingly, they are irrelevant to
the instant case and cannot be considered as evidence of their actual
possession of the land in question prior to April 19, 20066."
The petitioners appealed the MCTC decision to the Regional Trial Court ("RTC,"
Branch 6 of Kalibo, Aklan) then presided over by Judge Niovady M. Marin
("Judge Marin").
On appeal, Judge Marin granted the private respondents' motion for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction through an Order dated
26 February 2007, with the issuance conditioned on the private respondents'
posting of a bond. The writ7 - authorizing the immediate implementation of the
MCTC decision - was actually issued by respondent Judge Elmo F. del Rosario
(the "respondent Judge") on 12 March 2007 after the private respondents had
complied with the imposed condition. The petitioners moved to reconsider the
issuance of the writ; the private respondents, on the other hand, filed a motion
for demolition.
The respondent Judge subsequently denied the petitioners' Motion for
Reconsideration and to Defer Enforcement of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction
in an Order dated 17 May 20078.
Meanwhile, the petitioners opposed the motion for demolition.9 The respondent
Judge nevertheless issued via a Special Order10 a writ of demolition to be
implemented fifteen (15) days after the Sheriff's written notice to the petitioners
to voluntarily demolish their house/s to allow the private respondents to
effectively take actual possession of the land.
The petitioners thereafter filed on 2 August 2007 with the Court of Appeals,
Cebu City, a Petition for Review11 (under Rule 42 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure) of the Permanent Mandatory Injunction and Order of Demolition of
the RTC of Kalibo, Br. 6 in Civil Case No. 7990.
Meanwhile, respondent Sheriff Nelson R. dela Cruz issued the Notice to Vacate
and for Demolition on 19 March 2008.12
It was against this factual backdrop that the petitioners filed the present petition
last 29 April 2008. The petition contains and prays for three remedies, namely:
a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court; the issuance
of a writ of habeas data under the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data; and finally,
the issuance of the writ of amparo under the Rule on the Writ of Amparo.
To support the petition and the remedies prayed for, the petitioners present
factual positions diametrically opposed to the MCTC's findings and legal
reasons. Most importantly, the petitioners maintain their claims of prior
possession of the disputed land and of intrusion into this land by the private
Page 44 of 99
respondents. The material factual allegations of the petition - bases as well of
the petition for the issuance of the writ of amparo - read:
"29. On April 29, 2006 at about 9:20 a.m. armed men sporting 12 gauge shot
guns intruded into the property of the defendants [the land in dispute]. They
were not in uniform. They fired their shotguns at the defendants. Later the
following day at 2:00 a.m. two houses of the defendants were burned to ashes.
30. These armed men [without uniforms] removed the barbed wire fence put up
by defendants to protect their property from intruders. Two of the armed men
trained their shotguns at the defendants who resisted their intrusion. One of
them who was identified as SAMUEL LONGNO y GEGANSO, 19 years old,
single, and a resident of Binun-an, Batad, Iloilo, fired twice.
31. The armed men torched two houses of the defendants reducing them to
ashes. [...]
32. These acts of TERRORISM and (heinous crime) of ARSON were reported
by one of the HEIRS OF ANTONIO TAPUZ [...]. The terrorists trained their
shotguns and fired at minors namely IVAN GAJISAN and MICHAEL
MAGBANUA, who resisted their intrusion. Their act is a blatant violation of the
law penalizing Acts of Violence against women and children, which is
aggravated by the use of high-powered weapons.
[…]
34. That the threats to the life and security of the poor indigent and unlettered
petitioners continue because the private respondents Sansons have under their
employ armed men and they are influential with the police authorities owing to
their financial and political clout.
35. The actual prior occupancy, as well as the ownership of the lot in dispute by
defendants and the atrocities of the terrorists [introduced into the property in
dispute by the plaintiffs] are attested by witnesses who are persons not related
to the defendants are therefore disinterested witnesses in the case namely:
Rowena Onag, Apolsida Umambong, Ariel Gac, Darwin Alvarez and Edgardo
Penarada. Likewise, the affidavit of Nemia T. Carmen is submitted to prove that
the plaintiffs resorted to atrocious acts through hired men in their bid to unjustly
evict the defendants.13"
The petitioners posit as well that the MCTC has no jurisdiction over the
complaint for forcible entry that the private respondents filed below. Citing
Section 33 of The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, as amended by
Republic Act No. 7691,14 they maintain that the forcible entry case in fact
involves issues of title to or possession of real property or an interest therein,
with the assessed value of the property involved exceeding P20,000.00; thus,
the case should be originally cognizable by the RTC. Accordingly, the petitioners
reason out that the RTC - to where the MCTC decision was appealed - equally
has no jurisdiction to rule on the case on appeal and could not have validly
issued the assailed orders.
OUR RULING
We find the petitions for certiorari and issuance of a writ of habeas data fatally
defective, both in substance and in form. The petition for the issuance of the writ
of amparo, on the other hand, is fatally defective with respect to content and
substance.
The Petition for Certiorari
We conclude, based on the outlined material antecedents that led to the petition,
that the petition for certiorari to nullify the assailed RTC orders has been filed
out of time. It is not lost on us that the petitioners have a pending petition with
the Court of Appeals (the "CA petition") for the review of the same RTC orders
now assailed in the present petition, although the petitioners never disclosed in
the body of the present petition the exact status of their pending CA petition.
The CA petition, however, was filed with the Court of Appeals on 2 August 2007,
which indicates to us that the assailed orders (or at the very least, the latest of
the interrelated assailed orders) were received on 1 August 2007 at the latest.
The present petition, on the other hand, was filed on April 29, 2008 or more than
eight months from the time the CA petition was filed. Thus, the present petition
is separated in point of time from the assumed receipt of the assailed RTC
orders by at least eight (8) months, i.e., beyond the reglementary period of sixty
(60) days15 from receipt of the assailed order or orders or from notice of the
denial of a seasonably filed motion for reconsideration.
We note in this regard that the petitioners' counsel stated in his attached
"Certificate of Compliance with Circular #1-88 of the Supreme Court"16
("Certificate of Compliance") that "in the meantime the RTC and the Sheriff
issued a NOTICE TO VACATE AND FOR DEMOLITION not served to counsel
but to the petitioners who sent photo copy of the same NOTICE to their counsel
on April 18, 2008 by LBC." To guard against any insidious argument that the
present petition is timely filed because of this Notice to Vacate, we feel it best
to declare now that the counting of the 60-day reglementary period under Rule
65 cannot start from the April 18, 2008 date cited by the petitioners' counsel.
The Notice to Vacate and for Demolition is not an order that exists independently
from the RTC orders assailed in this petition and in the previously filed CA
petition. It is merely a notice, made in compliance with one of the assailed
orders, and is thus an administrative enforcement medium that has no life of its
own separately from the assailed order on which it is based. It cannot therefore
be the appropriate subject of an independent petition for certiorari under Rule
65 in the context of this case. The April 18, 2008 date cannot likewise be the
material date for Rule 65 purposes as the above-mentioned Notice to Vacate is
not even directly assailed in this petition, as the petition's Prayer patently
shows.17
Based on the same material antecedents, we find too that the petitioners have
been guilty of willful and deliberate misrepresentation before this Court and, at
the very least, of forum shopping.
By the petitioners' own admissions, they filed a petition with the Court of Appeals
(docketed as CA - G.R. SP No. 02859) for the review of the orders now also
assailed in this petition, but brought the present recourse to us, allegedly
because "the CA did not act on the petition up to this date and for the petitioner
(sic) to seek relief in the CA would be a waste of time and would render the case
moot and academic since the CA refused to resolve pending urgent motions
and the Sheriff is determined to enforce a writ of demolition despite the defect
of LACK OF JURISDICTION."18
Interestingly, the petitioners' counsel - while making this claim in the body of the
petition - at the same time represented in his Certificate of Compliance19 that:
"x x x
(e) the petitioners went up to the Court of Appeals to question the WRIT OF
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION copy of the petition is attached (sic);
(f) the CA initially issued a resolution denying the PETITION because it held that
the ORDER TO VACATE AND FOR DEMOLITION OF THE HOMES OF
PETITIONERS is not capable of being the subject of a PETITION FOR RELIEF,
copy of the resolution of the CA is attached hereto; (underscoring supplied)
(g) Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration on August 7, 2007 but up to this
date the same had not been resolved copy of the MR is attached (sic).
x x x"
The difference between the above representations on what transpired at the
appellate court level is replete with significance regarding the petitioners'
intentions. We discern -- from the petitioners' act of misrepresenting in the body
of their petition that "the CA did not act on the petition up to this date" while
stating the real Court of Appeals action in the Certification of Compliance -- the
intent to hide the real state of the remedies the petitioners sought below in order
to mislead us into action on the RTC orders without frontally considering the
action that the Court of Appeals had already undertaken.
At the very least, the petitioners are obviously seeking to obtain from us, via the
present petition, the same relief that it could not wait for from the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 02859. The petitioners' act of seeking against the
same parties the nullification of the same RTC orders before the appellate court
and before us at the same time, although made through different mediums that
are both improperly used, constitutes willful and deliberate forum shopping that
can sufficiently serve as basis for the summary dismissal of the petition under
the combined application of the fourth and penultimate paragraphs of Section
3, Rule 46; Section 5, Rule 7; Section 1, Rule 65; and Rule 56, all of the Revised
Rules of Court. That a wrong remedy may have been used with the Court of
Appeals and possibly with us will not save the petitioner from a forum-shopping
violation where there is identity of parties, involving the same assailed
interlocutory orders, with the recourses existing side by side at the same time.
To restate the prevailing rules, "forum shopping is the institution of two or more
actions or proceedings involving the same parties for the same cause of action,
either simultaneously or successively, on the supposition that one or the other
court would make a favorable disposition. Forum shopping may be resorted to
by any party against whom an adverse judgment or order has been issued in
one forum, in an attempt to seek a favorable opinion in another, other than by
appeal or a special civil action for certiorari. Forum shopping trifles with the
courts, abuses their processes, degrades the administration of justice and
congest court dockets. Willful and deliberate violation of the rule against it is a
ground for summary dismissal of the case; it may also constitute direct
contempt."20
Additionally, the required verification and certification of non-forum shopping is
defective as one (1) of the seven (7) petitioners - Ivan Tapuz - did not sign, in
violation of Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 7; Section 3, Rule 46; Section 1, Rule 65;
all in relation with Rule 56 of the Revised Rules of Court. Of those who signed,
only five (5) exhibited their postal identification cards with the Notary Public.
In any event, we find the present petition for certiorari, on its face and on the
basis of the supporting attachments, to be devoid of merit. The MCTC correctly
assumed jurisdiction over the private respondents' complaint, which specifically
alleged a cause for forcible entry and not - as petitioners may have misread or
misappreciated - a case involving title to or possession of realty or an interest
therein. Under Section 33, par. 2 of The Judiciary Reorganization Act, as
amended by Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7691, exclusive jurisdiction over forcible
entry and unlawful detainer cases lies with the Metropolitan Trial Courts,
Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts. These first-level courts
have had jurisdiction over these cases - called accion interdictal - even before
the R.A. 7691 amendment, based on the issue of pure physical possession (as
opposed to the right of possession). This jurisdiction is regardless of the
assessed value of the property involved; the law established no distinctions
based on the assessed value of the property forced into or unlawfully detained.
Separately from accion interdictal are accion publiciana for the recovery of the
right of possession as a plenary action, and accion reivindicacion for the
recovery of ownership.21 Apparently, these latter actions are the ones the
petitioners refer to when they cite Section 33, par. 3, in relation with Section 19,
Page 45 of 99
par. 2 of The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, as amended by Republic
Act No. 7691, in which jurisdiction may either be with the first-level courts or the
regional trial courts, depending on the assessed value of the realty subject of
the litigation. As the complaint at the MCTC was patently for forcible entry, that
court committed no jurisdictional error correctible by certiorari under the present
petition.
In sum, the petition for certiorari should be dismissed for the cited formal
deficiencies, for violation of the non-forum shopping rule, for having been filed
out of time, and for substantive deficiencies.
The Writ of Amparo
To start off with the basics, the writ of amparo was originally conceived as a
response to the extraordinary rise in the number of killings and enforced
disappearances, and to the perceived lack of available and effective remedies
to address these extraordinary concerns. It is intended to address violations of
or threats to the rights to life, liberty or security, as an extraordinary and
independent remedy beyond those available under the prevailing Rules, or as a
remedy supplemental to these Rules. What it is not, is a writ to protect concerns
that are purely property or commercial. Neither is it a writ that we shall issue on
amorphous and uncertain grounds. Consequently, the Rule on the Writ of
Amparo - in line with the extraordinary character of the writ and the reasonable
certainty that its issuance demands - requires that every petition for the issuance
of the Pwrit must be supported by justifying allegations of fact, to wit:
"(a) The personal circumstances of the petitioner;
(b) The name and personal circumstances of the respondent responsible for the
threat, act or omission, or, if the name is unknown or uncertain, the respondent
may be described by an assumed appellation;
(c) The right to life, liberty and security of the aggrieved party violated or
threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of the respondent, and
how such threat or violation is committed with the attendant circumstances
detailed in supporting affidavits;
(d) The investigation conducted, if any, specifying the names, personal
circumstances, and addresses of the investigating authority or individuals, as
well as the manner and conduct of the investigation, together with any report;
(e) The actions and recourses taken by the petitioner to determine the fate or
whereabouts of the aggrieved party and the identity of the person responsible
for the threat, act or omission; and
(f) The relief prayed for.
The petition may include a general prayer for other just and equitable reliefs."22
The writ shall issue if the Court is preliminarily satisfied with the prima facie
existence of the ultimate facts determinable from the supporting affidavits that
detail the circumstances of how and to what extent a threat to or violation of the
rights to life, liberty and security of the aggrieved party was or is being
committed.
The issuance of the writ of amparo in the present case is anchored on the factual
allegations heretofore quoted,23 that are essentially repeated in paragraph 54
of the petition. These allegations are supported by the following documents:
"(a) Joint Affidavit dated 23 May 2006 of Rowena B. Onag, Apolsida
Umambong, Ariel Gac, Darwin Alvarez and Edgardo Pinaranda, supporting the
factual positions of the petitioners, id., petitioners' prior possession, private
respondents' intrusion and the illegal acts committed by the private respondents
and their security guards on 19 April 2006;
(b) Unsubscribed Affidavit of Nemia Carmen y Tapuz, alleging the illegal acts
(firing of guns, etc.) committed by a security guard against minors - descendants
of Antonio Tapuz;
(c) Unsubscribed Affidavit of Melanie Tapuz y Samindao, essentially
corroborating Nemia's affidavit;
(d) Certification dated 23 April 2006 issued by Police Officer Jackson Jauod
regarding the incident of petitioners' intrusion into the disputed land;
(e) Certification dated 27 April 2006 issued by Police Officer Allan R. Otis,
narrating the altercation between the Tapuz family and the security guards of
the private respondents, including the gun-poking and shooting incident
involving one of the security guards;
(f) Certification issued by Police Officer Christopher R. Mendoza, narrating that
a house owned by Josiel Tapuz, Jr., rented by a certain Jorge Buenavente, was
accidentally burned by a fire."
On the whole, what is clear from these statements - both sworn and unsworn -
is the overriding involvement of property issues as the petition traces its roots to
questions of physical possession of the property disputed by the private parties.
If at all, issues relating to the right to life or to liberty can hardly be discerned
except to the extent that the occurrence of past violence has been alleged. The
right to security, on the other hand, is alleged only to the extent of the threats
and harassments implied from the presence of "armed men bare to the waist"
and the alleged pointing and firing of weapons. Notably, none of the supporting
affidavits compellingly show that the threat to the rights to life, liberty and
security of the petitioners is imminent or is continuing.
A closer look at the statements shows that at least two of them - the statements
of Nemia Carreon y Tapuz and Melanie Tapuz are practically identical and
unsworn. The Certification by Police Officer Jackson Jauod, on the other hand,
simply narrates what had been reported by one Danny Tapuz y Masangkay, and
even mentions that the burning of two residential houses was "accidental."
As against these allegations are the cited MCTC factual findings in its decision
in the forcible entry case which rejected all the petitioners' factual claims. These
findings are significantly complete and detailed, as they were made under a full-
blown judicial process, i.e., after examination and evaluation of the contending
parties' positions, evidence and arguments and based on the report of a court-
appointed commissioner.
We preliminarily examine these conflicting factual positions under the backdrop
of a dispute (with incidents giving rise to allegations of violence or threat thereof)
that was brought to and ruled upon by the MCTC; subsequently brought to the
RTC on an appeal that is still pending; still much later brought to the appellate
court without conclusive results; and then brought to us on interlocutory
incidents involving a plea for the issuance of the writ of amparo that, if decided
as the petitioners advocate, may render the pending RTC appeal moot.
Under these legal and factual situations, we are far from satisfied with the prima
facie existence of the ultimate facts that would justify the issuance of a writ of
amparo. Rather than acts of terrorism that pose a continuing threat to the
persons of the petitioners, the violent incidents alleged appear to us to be purely
property-related and focused on the disputed land. Thus, if the petitioners wish
to seek redress and hold the alleged perpetrators criminally accountable, the
remedy may lie more in the realm of ordinary criminal prosecution rather than
on the use of the extraordinary remedy of the writ of amparo.
Nor do we believe it appropriate at this time to disturb the MCTC findings, as
our action may carry the unintended effect, not only of reversing the MCTC
ruling independently of the appeal to the RTC that is now in place, but also of
nullifying the ongoing appeal process. Such effect, though unintended, will
obviously wreak havoc on the orderly administration of justice, an overriding
goal that the Rule on the Writ of Amparo does not intend to weaken or negate.
Separately from these considerations, we cannot fail but consider too at this
point the indicators, clear and patent to us, that the petitioners' present recourse
via the remedy of the writ of amparo is a mere subterfuge to negate the assailed
orders that the petitioners sought and failed to nullify before the appellate court
because of the use of an improper remedial measure. We discern this from the
petitioners' misrepresentations pointed out above; from their obvious act of
forum shopping; and from the recourse itself to the extraordinary remedies of
the writs of certiorari and amparo based on grounds that are far from forthright
and sufficiently compelling. To be sure, when recourses in the ordinary course
of law fail because of deficient legal representation or the use of improper
remedial measures, neither the writ of certiorari nor that of amparo -
extraordinary though they may be - will suffice to serve as a curative substitute.
The writ of amparo, particularly, should not issue when applied for as a
substitute for the appeal or certiorari process, or when it will inordinately interfere
with these processes - the situation obtaining in the present case.
While we say all these, we note too that the Rule on the Writ of Amparo provides
for rules on the institution of separate actions,24 for the effect of earlier-filed
criminal actions,25 and for the consolidation of petitions for the issuance of a
writ of amparo with a subsequently filed criminal and civil action.26 These rules
were adopted to promote an orderly procedure for dealing with petitions for the
issuance of the writ of amparo when the parties resort to other parallel
recourses.
Where, as in this case, there is an ongoing civil process dealing directly with the
possessory dispute and the reported acts of violence and harassment, we see
no point in separately and directly intervening through a writ of amparo in the
absence of any clear prima facie showing that the right to life, liberty or security
- the personal concern that the writ is intended to protect - is immediately in
danger or threatened, or that the danger or threat is continuing. We see no legal
bar, however, to an application for the issuance of the writ, in a proper case, by
motion in a pending case on appeal or on certiorari, applying by analogy the
provisions on the co-existence of the writ with a separately filed criminal case.
The Writ of Habeas Data
Section 6 of the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data requires the following material
allegations of ultimate facts in a petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas
data:
"(a) The personal circumstances of the petitioner and the respondent;
(b) The manner the right to privacy is violated or threatened and how it affects
the right to life, liberty or security of the aggrieved party;
(c) The actions and recourses taken by the petitioner to secure the data or
information;
(d) The location of the files, registers or databases, the government office, and
the person in charge, in possession or in control of the data or information, if
known;
Page 46 of 99
(e) The reliefs prayed for, which may include the updating, rectification,
suppression or destruction of the database or information or files kept by the
respondent.
In case of threats, the relief may include a prayer for an order enjoining the act
complained of; and
(f) Such other relevant reliefs as are just and equitable."
Support for the habeas data aspect of the present petition only alleges that:
"1. [ … ] Similarly, a petition for a WRIT OF HABEAS DATA is prayed for so that
the PNP may release the report on the burning of the homes of the petitioners
and the acts of violence employed against them by the private respondents,
furnishing the Court and the petitioners with copy of the same;
[…]
66. Petitioners apply for a WRIT OF HABEAS DATA commanding the Philippine
National Police [PNP] to produce the police report pertaining to the burning of
the houses of the petitioners in the land in dispute and likewise the investigation
report if an investigation was conducted by the PNP."
These allegations obviously lack what the Rule on Writ of Habeas Data requires
as a minimum, thus rendering the petition fatally deficient. Specifically, we see
no concrete allegations of unjustified or unlawful violation of the right to privacy
related to the right to life, liberty or security. The petition likewise has not alleged,
much less demonstrated, any need for information under the control of police
authorities other than those it has already set forth as integral annexes. The
necessity or justification for the issuance of the writ, based on the insufficiency
of previous efforts made to secure information, has not also been shown. In
sum, the prayer for the issuance of a writ of habeas data is nothing more than
the "fishing expedition" that this Court - in the course of drafting the Rule on
habeas data - had in mind in defining what the purpose of a writ of habeas data
is not. In these lights, the outright denial of the petition for the issuance of the
writ of habeas data is fully in order.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby DISMISS the present petition
OUTRIGHT for deficiencies of form and substance patent from its body and
attachments.
SO ORDERED.
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 180906 October 7, 2008
THE SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE, THE CHIEF OF STAFF,
ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioners,
vs.
RAYMOND MANALO and REYNALDO MANALO, respondents.
DECISION
PUNO, C.J.:
While victims of enforced disappearances are separated from the rest of the
world behind secret walls, they are not separated from the constitutional
protection of their basic rights. The constitution is an overarching sky that covers
all in its protection. The case at bar involves the rights to life, liberty and security
in the first petition for a writ of Amparo filed before this Court.
This is an appeal via Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court in
relation to Section 191 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo, seeking to reverse
and set aside on both questions of fact and law, the Decision promulgated by
the Court of Appeals in C.A. G.R. AMPARO No. 00001, entitled "Raymond
Manalo and Reynaldo Manalo, petitioners, versus The Secretary of National
Defense, the Chief of Staff, Armed Forces of the Philippines, respondents."
This case was originally a Petition for Prohibition, Injunction, and Temporary
Restraining Order (TRO)2 filed before this Court by herein respondents (therein
petitioners) on August 23, 2007 to stop herein petitioners (therein respondents)
and/or their officers and agents from depriving them of their right to liberty and
other basic rights. Therein petitioners also sought ancillary remedies, Protective
Custody Orders, Appointment of Commissioner, Inspection and Access Orders,
and all other legal and equitable reliefs under Article VIII, Section 5(5)3 of the
1987 Constitution and Rule 135, Section 6 of the Rules of Court. In our
Resolution dated August 24, 2007, we (1) ordered the Secretary of the
Department of National Defense and the Chief of Staff of the AFP, their agents,
representatives, or persons acting in their stead, including but not limited to the
Citizens Armed Forces Geographical Unit (CAFGU) to submit their Comment;
and (2) enjoined them from causing the arrest of therein petitioners, or otherwise
restricting, curtailing, abridging, or depriving them of their right to life, liberty, and
other basic rights as guaranteed under Article III, Section 14 of the 1987
Constitution.5
While the August 23, 2007 Petition was pending, the Rule on the Writ of Amparo
took effect on October 24, 2007. Forthwith, therein petitioners filed a
Manifestation and Omnibus Motion to Treat Existing Petition as Amparo
Petition, to Admit Supporting Affidavits, and to Grant Interim and Final Amparo
Reliefs. They prayed that: (1) the petition be considered a Petition for the Writ
of Amparo under Sec. 266 of the Amparo Rule; (2) the Court issue the writ
commanding therein respondents to make a verified return within the period
provided by law and containing the specific matter required by law; (3) they be
granted the interim reliefs allowed by the Amparo Rule and all other reliefs
prayed for in the petition but not covered by the Amparo Rule; (4) the Court,
after hearing, render judgment as required in Sec. 187 of the Amparo Rule; and
(5) all other just and equitable reliefs.8
On October 25, 2007, the Court resolved to treat the August 23, 2007 Petition
as a petition under the Amparo Rule and further resolved, viz:
WHEREFORE, let a WRIT OF AMPARO be issued to respondents requiring
them to file with the CA (Court of Appeals) a verified written return within five (5)
working days from service of the writ. We REMAND the petition to the CA and
designate the Division of Associate Justice Lucas P. Bersamin to conduct the
summary hearing on the petition on November 8, 2007 at 2:00 p.m. and decide
the petition in accordance with the Rule on the Writ of Amparo.9
On December 26, 2007, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision in favor of
therein petitioners (herein respondents), the dispositive portion of which reads,
viz:
ACCORDINGLY, the PRIVILEGE OF THE WRIT OF AMPARO is GRANTED.
The respondents SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE and AFP CHIEF OF
STAFF are hereby REQUIRED:
1. To furnish to the petitioners and to this Court within five days from notice of
this decision all official and unofficial reports of the investigation undertaken in
connection with their case, except those already on file herein;
2. To confirm in writing the present places of official assignment of M/Sgt Hilario
aka Rollie Castillo and Donald Caigas within five days from notice of this
decision.
3. To cause to be produced to this Court all medical reports, records and charts,
reports of any treatment given or recommended and medicines prescribed, if
any, to the petitioners, to include a list of medical and (sic) personnel (military
and civilian) who attended to them from February 14, 2006 until August 12, 2007
within five days from notice of this decision.
The compliance with this decision shall be made under the signature and oath
of respondent AFP Chief of Staff or his duly authorized deputy, the latter's
authority to be express and made apparent on the face of the sworn compliance
with this directive.
SO ORDERED.10
Hence, this appeal. In resolving this appeal, we first unfurl the facts as alleged
by herein respondents:
Respondent Raymond Manalo recounted that about one or two weeks before
February 14, 2006, several uniformed and armed soldiers and members of the
CAFGU summoned to a meeting all the residents of their barangay in San
Idelfonso, Bulacan. Respondents were not able to attend as they were not
informed of the gathering, but Raymond saw some of the soldiers when he
passed by the barangay hall.11
On February 14, 2006, Raymond was sleeping in their house in Buhol na
Mangga, San Ildefonso, Bulacan. At past noon, several armed soldiers wearing
white shirts, fatigue pants and army boots, entered their house and roused him.
They asked him if he was Bestre, but his mother, Ester Manalo, replied that he
was Raymond, not Bestre. The armed soldier slapped him on both cheeks and
nudged him in the stomach. He was then handcuffed, brought to the rear of his
house, and forced to the ground face down. He was kicked on the hip, ordered
to stand and face up to the light, then forcibly brought near the road. He told his
mother to follow him, but three soldiers stopped her and told her to stay.12
Among the men who came to take him, Raymond recognized brothers Michael
de la Cruz, Madning de la Cruz, "Puti" de la Cruz, and "Pula" de la Cruz, who
all acted as lookout. They were all members of the CAFGU and residing in
Manuzon, San Ildefonso, Bulacan. He also recognized brothers Randy
Mendoza and Rudy Mendoza, also members of the CAFGU. While he was
being forcibly taken, he also saw outside of his house two barangay councilors,
Pablo Cunanan and Bernardo Lingasa, with some soldiers and armed men.13
The men forced Raymond into a white L300 van. Once inside, he was
blindfolded. Before being blindfolded, he saw the faces of the soldiers who took
him. Later, in his 18 months of captivity, he learned their names. The one who
drove the van was Rizal Hilario alias Rollie Castillo, whom he estimated was
about 40 years of age or older. The leader of the team who entered his house
and abducted him was "Ganata." He was tall, thin, curly-haired and a bit old.
Another one of his abductors was "George" who was tall, thin, white-skinned
and about 30 years old.14
Page 47 of 99
The van drove off, then came to a stop. A person was brought inside the van
and made to sit beside Raymond. Both of them were beaten up. On the road,
he recognized the voice of the person beside him as his brother Reynaldo's.
The van stopped several times until they finally arrived at a house. Raymond
and Reynaldo were each brought to a different room. With the doors of their
rooms left open, Raymond saw several soldiers continuously hitting his brother
Reynaldo on the head and other parts of his body with the butt of their guns for
about 15 minutes. After which, Reynaldo was brought to his (Raymond's) room
and it was his (Raymond's) turn to be beaten up in the other room. The soldiers
asked him if he was a member of the New People's Army. Each time he said he
was not, he was hit with the butt of their guns. He was questioned where his
comrades were, how many soldiers he had killed, and how many NPA members
he had helped. Each time he answered none, they hit him.15
In the next days, Raymond's interrogators appeared to be high officials as the
soldiers who beat him up would salute them, call them "sir," and treat them with
respect. He was in blindfolds when interrogated by the high officials, but he saw
their faces when they arrived and before the blindfold was put on. He noticed
that the uniform of the high officials was different from those of the other soldiers.
One of those officials was tall and thin, wore white pants, tie, and leather shoes,
instead of combat boots. He spoke in Tagalog and knew much about his parents
and family, and a habeas corpus case filed in connection with the respondents'
abduction.16 While these officials interrogated him, Raymond was not
manhandled. But once they had left, the soldier guards beat him up. When the
guards got drunk, they also manhandled respondents. During this time,
Raymond was fed only at night, usually with left-over and rotten food.17
On the third week of respondents' detention, two men arrived while Raymond
was sleeping and beat him up. They doused him with urine and hot water, hit
his stomach with a piece of wood, slapped his forehead twice with a .45 pistol,
punched him on the mouth, and burnt some parts of his body with a burning
wood. When he could no longer endure the torture and could hardly breathe,
they stopped. They then subjected Reynaldo to the same ordeal in another
room. Before their torturers left, they warned Raymond that they would come
back the next day and kill him.18
The following night, Raymond attempted to escape. He waited for the guards to
get drunk, then made noise with the chains put on him to see if they were still
awake. When none of them came to check on him, he managed to free his hand
from the chains and jumped through the window. He passed through a helipad
and firing range and stopped near a fishpond where he used stones to break
his chains. After walking through a forested area, he came near a river and an
Iglesia ni Kristo church. He talked to some women who were doing the laundry,
asked where he was and the road to Gapan. He was told that he was in Fort
Magsaysay.19 He reached the highway, but some soldiers spotted him, forcing
him to run away. The soldiers chased him and caught up with him. They brought
him to another place near the entrance of what he saw was Fort Magsaysay.
He was boxed repeatedly, kicked, and hit with chains until his back bled. They
poured gasoline on him. Then a so-called "Mam" or "Madam" suddenly called,
saying that she wanted to see Raymond before he was killed. The soldiers
ceased the torture and he was returned inside Fort Magsaysay where Reynaldo
was detained.20
For some weeks, the respondents had a respite from all the torture. Their
wounds were treated. When the wounds were almost healed, the torture
resumed, particularly when respondents' guards got drunk.21
Raymond recalled that sometime in April until May 2006, he was detained in a
room enclosed by steel bars. He stayed all the time in that small room measuring
1 x 2 meters, and did everything there, including urinating, removing his bowels,
bathing, eating and sleeping. He counted that eighteen people22 had been
detained in that bartolina, including his brother Reynaldo and himself.23
For about three and a half months, the respondents were detained in Fort
Magsaysay. They were kept in a small house with two rooms and a kitchen. One
room was made into the bartolina. The house was near the firing range, helipad
and mango trees. At dawn, soldiers marched by their house. They were also
sometimes detained in what he only knew as the "DTU."24
At the DTU, a male doctor came to examine respondents. He checked their
body and eyes, took their urine samples and marked them. When asked how
they were feeling, they replied that they had a hard time urinating, their
stomachs were aching, and they felt other pains in their body. The next day, two
ladies in white arrived. They also examined respondents and gave them
medicines, including orasol, amoxicillin and mefenamic acid. They brought with
them the results of respondents' urine test and advised them to drink plenty of
water and take their medicine. The two ladies returned a few more times.
Thereafter, medicines were sent through the "master" of the DTU, "Master" Del
Rosario alias Carinyoso at Puti. Respondents were kept in the DTU for about
two weeks. While there, he met a soldier named Efren who said that Gen.
Palparan ordered him to monitor and take care of them.25
One day, Rizal Hilario fetched respondents in a Revo vehicle. They, along with
Efren and several other armed men wearing fatigue suits, went to a detachment
in Pinaud, San Ildefonso, Bulacan. Respondents were detained for one or two
weeks in a big two-storey house. Hilario and Efren stayed with them. While
there, Raymond was beaten up by Hilario's men.26
From Pinaud, Hilario and Efren brought respondents to Sapang, San Miguel,
Bulacan on board the Revo. They were detained in a big unfinished house inside
the compound of "Kapitan" for about three months. When they arrived in
Sapang, Gen. Palparan talked to them. They were brought out of the house to
a basketball court in the center of the compound and made to sit. Gen. Palparan
was already waiting, seated. He was about two arms' length away from
respondents. He began by asking if respondents felt well already, to which
Raymond replied in the affirmative. He asked Raymond if he knew him.
Raymond lied that he did not. He then asked Raymond if he would be scared if
he were made to face Gen. Palparan. Raymond responded that he would not
be because he did not believe that Gen. Palparan was an evil man.27
Raymond narrated his conversation with Gen. Palparan in his affidavit, viz:
Tinanong ako ni Gen. Palparan, "Ngayon na kaharap mo na ako, di ka ba
natatakot sa akin?"
Sumagot akong, "Siyempre po, natatakot din..."
Sabi ni Gen. Palparan: "Sige, bibigyan ko kayo ng isang pagkakataon na
mabuhay, basta't sundin n'yo ang lahat ng sasabihin ko... sabihin mo sa
magulang mo - huwag pumunta sa mga rali, sa hearing, sa Karapatan at sa
Human Right dahil niloloko lang kayo. Sabihin sa magulang at lahat sa bahay
na huwag paloko doon. Tulungan kami na kausapin si Bestre na sumuko na sa
gobyerno."28
Respondents agreed to do as Gen. Palparan told them as they felt they could
not do otherwise. At about 3:00 in the morning, Hilario, Efren and the former's
men - the same group that abducted them - brought them to their parents'
house. Raymond was shown to his parents while Reynaldo stayed in the Revo
because he still could not walk. In the presence of Hilario and other soldiers,
Raymond relayed to his parents what Gen. Palparan told him. As they were
afraid, Raymond's parents acceded. Hilario threatened Raymond's parents that
if they continued to join human rights rallies, they would never see their children
again. The respondents were then brought back to Sapang.29
When respondents arrived back in Sapang, Gen. Palparan was about to leave.
He was talking with the four "masters" who were there: Arman, Ganata, Hilario
and Cabalse.30 When Gen. Palparan saw Raymond, he called for him. He was
in a big white vehicle. Raymond stood outside the vehicle as Gen. Palparan told
him to gain back his strength and be healthy and to take the medicine he left for
him and Reynaldo. He said the medicine was expensive at Php35.00 each, and
would make them strong. He also said that they should prove that they are on
the side of the military and warned that they would not be given another
chance.31 During his testimony, Raymond identified Gen. Palparan by his
picture.32
One of the soldiers named Arman made Raymond take the medicine left by
Gen. Palparan. The medicine, named "Alive," was green and yellow. Raymond
and Reynaldo were each given a box of this medicine and instructed to take one
capsule a day. Arman checked if they were getting their dose of the medicine.
The "Alive" made them sleep each time they took it, and they felt heavy upon
waking up.33
After a few days, Hilario arrived again. He took Reynaldo and left Raymond at
Sapang. Arman instructed Raymond that while in Sapang, he should introduce
himself as "Oscar," a military trainee from Sariaya, Quezon, assigned in
Bulacan. While there, he saw again Ganata, one of the men who abducted him
from his house, and got acquainted with other military men and civilians.34
After about three months in Sapang, Raymond was brought to Camp Tecson
under the 24th Infantry Battalion. He was fetched by three unidentified men in a
big white vehicle. Efren went with them. Raymond was then blindfolded. After a
30-minute ride, his blindfold was removed. Chains were put on him and he was
kept in the barracks.35
The next day, Raymond's chains were removed and he was ordered to clean
outside the barracks. It was then he learned that he was in a detachment of the
Rangers. There were many soldiers, hundreds of them were training. He was
also ordered to clean inside the barracks. In one of the rooms therein, he met
Sherlyn Cadapan from Laguna. She told him that she was a student of the
University of the Philippines and was abducted in Hagonoy, Bulacan. She
confided that she had been subjected to severe torture and raped. She was
crying and longing to go home and be with her parents. During the day, her
chains were removed and she was made to do the laundry.36
After a week, Reynaldo was also brought to Camp Tecson. Two days from his
arrival, two other captives, Karen Empeño and Manuel Merino, arrived. Karen
and Manuel were put in the room with "Allan" whose name they later came to
know as Donald Caigas, called "master" or "commander" by his men in the 24th
Infantry Battalion. Raymond and Reynaldo were put in the adjoining room. At
times, Raymond and Reynaldo were threatened, and Reynaldo was beaten up.
In the daytime, their chains were removed, but were put back on at night. They
were threatened that if they escaped, their families would all be killed.37
On or about October 6, 2006, Hilario arrived in Camp Tecson. He told the
detainees that they should be thankful they were still alive and should continue
along their "renewed life." Before the hearing of November 6 or 8, 2006,
respondents were brought to their parents to instruct them not to attend the
hearing. However, their parents had already left for Manila. Respondents were
brought back to Camp Tecson. They stayed in that camp from September 2006
to November 2006, and Raymond was instructed to continue using the name
"Oscar" and holding himself out as a military trainee. He got acquainted with
soldiers of the 24th Infantry Battalion whose names and descriptions he stated
in his affidavit.38
On November 22, 2006, respondents, along with Sherlyn, Karen, and Manuel,
were transferred to a camp of the 24th Infantry Battalion in Limay, Bataan. There
Page 48 of 99
were many huts in the camp. They stayed in that camp until May 8, 2007. Some
soldiers of the battalion stayed with them. While there, battalion soldiers whom
Raymond knew as "Mar" and "Billy" beat him up and hit him in the stomach with
their guns. Sherlyn and Karen also suffered enormous torture in the camp. They
were all made to clean, cook, and help in raising livestock.39
Raymond recalled that when "Operation Lubog" was launched, Caigas and
some other soldiers brought him and Manuel with them to take and kill all
sympathizers of the NPA. They were brought to Barangay Bayan-bayanan,
Bataan where he witnessed the killing of an old man doing kaingin. The soldiers
said he was killed because he had a son who was a member of the NPA and
he coddled NPA members in his house.40 Another time, in another "Operation
Lubog," Raymond was brought to Barangay Orion in a house where NPA men
stayed. When they arrived, only the old man of the house who was sick was
there. They spared him and killed only his son right before Raymond's eyes.41
From Limay, Raymond, Reynaldo, Sherlyn, Karen, and Manuel were transferred
to Zambales, in a safehouse near the sea. Caigas and some of his men stayed
with them. A retired army soldier was in charge of the house. Like in Limay, the
five detainees were made to do errands and chores. They stayed in Zambales
from May 8 or 9, 2007 until June 2007.42
In June 2007, Caigas brought the five back to the camp in Limay. Raymond,
Reynaldo, and Manuel were tasked to bring food to detainees brought to the
camp. Raymond narrated what he witnessed and experienced in the camp, viz:
Isang gabi, sinabihan kami ni Donald (Caigas) na matulog na kami. Nakita ko si
Donald na inaayos ang kanyang baril, at nilagyan ng silenser. Sabi ni Donald
na kung mayroon man kaming makita o marinig, walang nangyari.
Kinaumagahan, nakita naming ang bangkay ng isa sa mga bihag na dinala sa
kampo. Mayroong binuhos sa kanyang katawan at ito'y sinunog. Masansang
ang amoy.
Makaraan ang isang lingo, dalawang bangkay and ibinaba ng mga
unipormadong sundalo mula sa 6 x 6 na trak at dinala sa loob ng kampo. May
naiwang mga bakas ng dugo habang hinihila nila ang mga bangkay. Naamoy
ko iyon nang nililinis ang bakas.
Makalipas ang isa o dalawang lingo, may dinukot sila na dalawang Ita. Itinali
sila sa labas ng kubo, piniringan, ikinadena at labis na binugbog. Nakita kong
nakatakas ang isa sa kanila at binaril siya ng sundalo ngunit hindi siya tinamaan.
Iyong gabi nakita kong pinatay nila iyong isang Ita malapit sa Post 3; sinilaban
ang bangkay at ibinaon ito.
Pagkalipas ng halos 1 buwan, 2 pang bangkay ang dinala sa kampo. Ibinaba
ang mga bangkay mula sa pick up trak, dinala ang mga bangkay sa labas ng
bakod. Kinaumagahan nakita kong mayroong sinilaban, at napakamasangsang
ang amoy.
May nakilala rin akong 1 retiradong koronel at 1 kasama niya. Pinakain ko sila.
Sabi nila sa akin na dinukot sila sa Bataan. Iyong gabi, inilabas sila at hindi ko
na sila nakita.
xxx xxx xxx
Ikinadena kami ng 3 araw. Sa ikatlong araw, nilabas ni Lat si Manuel dahil
kakausapin daw siya ni Gen. Palparan. Nakapiring si Manuel, wala siyang suot
pang-itaas, pinosasan. Nilakasan ng mga sundalo ang tunog na galing sa istiryo
ng sasakyan. Di nagtagal, narinig ko ang hiyaw o ungol ni Manuel. Sumilip ako
sa isang haligi ng kamalig at nakita kong sinisilaban si Manuel.
Kinaumagahan, naka-kadena pa kami. Tinanggal ang mga kadena mga 3 o 4
na araw pagkalipas. Sinabi sa amin na kaya kami nakakadena ay dahil
pinagdedesisyunan pa ng mga sundalo kung papatayin kami o hindi.
Tinanggal ang aming kadena. Kinausap kami ni Donald. Tinanong kami kung
ano ang sabi ni Manuel sa amin. Sabi ni Donald huwag na raw naming hanapin
ang dalawang babae at si Manuel, dahil magkakasama na yung tatlo. Sabi pa
ni Donald na kami ni Reynaldo ay magbagong buhay at ituloy namin ni Reynaldo
ang trabaho. Sa gabi, hindi na kami kinakadena.43
On or about June 13, 2007, Raymond and Reynaldo were brought to
Pangasinan, ostensibly to raise poultry for Donald (Caigas). Caigas told
respondents to also farm his land, in exchange for which, he would take care of
the food of their family. They were also told that they could farm a small plot
adjoining his land and sell their produce. They were no longer put in chains and
were instructed to use the names Rommel (for Raymond) and Rod (for
Reynaldo) and represent themselves as cousins from Rizal, Laguna.44
Respondents started to plan their escape. They could see the highway from
where they stayed. They helped farm adjoining lands for which they were paid
Php200.00 or Php400.00 and they saved their earnings. When they had saved
Php1,000.00 each, Raymond asked a neighbor how he could get a cellular
phone as he wanted to exchange text messages with a girl who lived nearby. A
phone was pawned to him, but he kept it first and did not use it. They earned
some more until they had saved Php1,400.00 between them.
There were four houses in the compound. Raymond and Reynaldo were housed
in one of them while their guards lived in the other three. Caigas entrusted
respondents to Nonong, the head of the guards. Respondents' house did not
have electricity. They used a lamp. There was no television, but they had a
radio. In the evening of August 13, 2007, Nonong and his cohorts had a drinking
session. At about 1:00 a.m., Raymond turned up the volume of the radio. When
none of the guards awoke and took notice, Raymond and Reynaldo proceeded
towards the highway, leaving behind their sleeping guards and barking dogs.
They boarded a bus bound for Manila and were thus freed from captivity.45
Reynaldo also executed an affidavit affirming the contents of Raymond's
affidavit insofar as they related to matters they witnessed together. Reynaldo
added that when they were taken from their house on February 14, 2006, he
saw the faces of his abductors before he was blindfolded with his shirt. He also
named the soldiers he got acquainted with in the 18 months he was detained.
When Raymond attempted to escape from Fort Magsaysay, Reynaldo was
severely beaten up and told that they were indeed members of the NPA because
Raymond escaped. With a .45 caliber pistol, Reynaldo was hit on the back and
punched in the face until he could no longer bear the pain.
At one point during their detention, when Raymond and Reynaldo were in
Sapang, Reynaldo was separated from Raymond and brought to Pinaud by
Rizal Hilario. He was kept in the house of Kapitan, a friend of Hilario, in a
mountainous area. He was instructed to use the name "Rodel" and to represent
himself as a military trainee from Meycauayan, Bulacan. Sometimes, Hilario
brought along Reynaldo in his trips. One time, he was brought to a market in
San Jose, del Monte, Bulacan and made to wait in the vehicle while Hilario was
buying. He was also brought to Tondo, Manila where Hilario delivered boxes of
"Alive" in different houses. In these trips, Hilario drove a black and red vehicle.
Reynaldo was blindfolded while still in Bulacan, but allowed to remove the
blindfold once outside the province. In one of their trips, they passed by Fort
Magsaysay and Camp Tecson where Reynaldo saw the sign board, "Welcome
to Camp Tecson."46
Dr. Benito Molino, M.D., corroborated the accounts of respondents Raymond
and Reynaldo Manalo. Dr. Molino specialized in forensic medicine and was
connected with the Medical Action Group, an organization handling cases of
human rights violations, particularly cases where torture was involved. He was
requested by an NGO to conduct medical examinations on the respondents
after their escape. He first asked them about their ordeal, then proceeded with
the physical examination. His findings showed that the scars borne by
respondents were consistent with their account of physical injuries inflicted upon
them. The examination was conducted on August 15, 2007, two days after
respondents' escape, and the results thereof were reduced into writing. Dr.
Molino took photographs of the scars. He testified that he followed the Istanbul
Protocol in conducting the examination.47
Petitioners dispute respondents' account of their alleged abduction and torture.
In compliance with the October 25, 2007 Resolution of the Court, they filed a
Return of the Writ of Amparo admitting the abduction but denying any
involvement therein, viz:
13. Petitioners Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo were not at any time arrested,
forcibly abducted, detained, held incommunicado, disappeared or under the
custody by the military. This is a settled issue laid to rest in the habeas corpus
case filed in their behalf by petitioners' parents before the Court of Appeals in
C.A.-G.R. SP No. 94431 against M/Sgt. Rizal Hilario aka Rollie Castillo, as head
of the 24th Infantry Battalion; Maj. Gen. Jovito Palparan, as Commander of the
7th Infantry Division in Luzon; Lt. Gen. Hermogenes Esperon, in his capacity as
the Commanding General of the Philippine Army, and members of the Citizens
Armed Forces Geographical Unit (CAFGU), namely: Michael dela Cruz, Puti
dela Cruz, Madning dela Cruz, Pula dela Cruz, Randy Mendoza and Rudy
Mendoza. The respondents therein submitted a return of the writ... On July 4,
2006, the Court of Appeals dropped as party respondents Lt. Gen. Hermogenes
C. Esperon, Jr., then Commanding General of the Philippine Army, and on
September 19, 2006, Maj. (sic) Jovito S. Palparan, then Commanding General,
7th Infantry Division, Philippine Army, stationed at Fort Magsaysay, Palayan
City, Nueva Ecija, upon a finding that no evidence was introduced to establish
their personal involvement in the taking of the Manalo brothers. In a Decision
dated June 27, 2007..., it exonerated M/Sgt. Rizal Hilario aka Rollie Castillo for
lack of evidence establishing his involvement in any capacity in the
disappearance of the Manalo brothers, although it held that the remaining
respondents were illegally detaining the Manalo brothers and ordered them to
release the latter.48
Attached to the Return of the Writ was the affidavit of therein respondent (herein
petitioner) Secretary of National Defense, which attested that he assumed office
only on August 8, 2007 and was thus unaware of the Manalo brothers' alleged
abduction. He also claimed that:
7. The Secretary of National Defense does not engage in actual military
directional operations, neither does he undertake command directions of the
AFP units in the field, nor in any way micromanage the AFP operations. The
principal responsibility of the Secretary of National Defense is focused in
providing strategic policy direction to the Department (bureaus and agencies)
including the Armed Forces of the Philippines;
8. In connection with the Writ of Amparo issued by the Honorable Supreme
Court in this case, I have directed the Chief of Staff, AFP to institute immediate
action in compliance with Section 9(d) of the Amparo Rule and to submit report
of such compliance... Likewise, in a Memorandum Directive also dated October
31, 2007, I have issued a policy directive addressed to the Chief of Staff, AFP
that the AFP should adopt the following rules of action in the event the Writ of
Amparo is issued by a competent court against any members of the AFP:
(1) to verify the identity of the aggrieved party;
Page 49 of 99
(2) to recover and preserve evidence related to the death or disappearance of
the person identified in the petition which may aid in the prosecution of the
person or persons responsible;
(3) to identify witnesses and obtain statements from them concerning the death
or disappearance;
(4) to determine the cause, manner, location and time of death or disappearance
as well as any pattern or practice that may have brought about the death or
disappearance;
(5) to identify and apprehend the person or persons involved in the death or
disappearance; and
(6) to bring the suspected offenders before a competent court.49
Therein respondent AFP Chief of Staff also submitted his own affidavit, attached
to the Return of the Writ, attesting that he received the above directive of therein
respondent Secretary of National Defense and that acting on this directive, he
did the following:
3.1. As currently designated Chief of Staff, Armed Forces of the Philippines
(AFP), I have caused to be issued directive to the units of the AFP for the
purpose of establishing the circumstances of the alleged disappearance and the
recent reappearance of the petitioners.
3.2. I have caused the immediate investigation and submission of the result
thereof to Higher headquarters and/or direct the immediate conduct of the
investigation on the matter by the concerned unit/s, dispatching Radio Message
on November 05, 2007, addressed to the Commanding General, Philippine
Army (Info: COMNOLCOM, CG, 71D PA and CO 24 IB PA). A Copy of the Radio
Message is attached as ANNEX "3" of this Affidavit.
3.3. We undertake to provide result of the investigations conducted or to be
conducted by the concerned unit relative to the circumstances of the alleged
disappearance of the persons in whose favor the Writ of Amparo has been
sought for as soon as the same has been furnished Higher headquarters.
3.4. A parallel investigation has been directed to the same units relative to
another Petition for the Writ of Amparo (G.R. No. 179994) filed at the instance
of relatives of a certain Cadapan and Empeño pending before the Supreme
Court.
3.5. On the part of the Armed Forces, this respondent will exert earnest efforts
to establish the surrounding circumstances of the disappearances of the
petitioners and to bring those responsible, including any military personnel if
shown to have participated or had complicity in the commission of the
complained acts, to the bar of justice, when warranted by the findings and the
competent evidence that may be gathered in the process.50
Also attached to the Return of the Writ was the affidavit of Lt. Col. Felipe
Anontado, INF (GSC) PA, earlier filed in G.R. No. 179994, another Amparo case
in this Court, involving Cadapan, Empeño and Merino, which averred among
others, viz:
10) Upon reading the allegations in the Petition implicating the 24th Infantry
Batallion detachment as detention area, I immediately went to the 24th IB
detachment in Limay, Bataan and found no untoward incidents in the area nor
any detainees by the name of Sherlyn Cadapan, Karen Empeño and Manuel
Merino being held captive;
11) There was neither any reports of any death of Manuel Merino in the 24th IB
in Limay, Bataan;
12) After going to the 24th IB in Limay, Bataan, we made further inquiries with
the Philippine National Police, Limay, Bataan regarding the alleged detentions
or deaths and were informed that none was reported to their good office;
13) I also directed Company Commander 1st Lt. Romeo Publico to inquire into
the alleged beachhouse in Iba, Zambales also alleged to be a detention place
where Sherlyn Cadapan, Karen Empeño and Manuel Merino were detained. As
per the inquiry, however, no such beachhouse was used as a detention place
found to have been used by armed men to detain Cadapan, Empeño and
Merino.51
It was explained in the Return of the Writ that for lack of sufficient time, the
affidavits of Maj. Gen Jovito S. Palparan (Ret.), M/Sgt. Rizal Hilario aka Rollie
Castillo, and other persons implicated by therein petitioners could not be
secured in time for the submission of the Return and would be subsequently
submitted.52
Herein petitioners presented a lone witness in the summary hearings, Lt. Col.
Ruben U. Jimenez, Provost Marshall, 7th Infantry Division, Philippine Army,
based in Fort Magsaysay, Palayan City, Nueva Ecija. The territorial jurisdiction
of this Division covers Nueva Ecija, Aurora, Bataan, Bulacan, Pampanga, Tarlac
and a portion of Pangasinan.53 The 24th Infantry Battalion is part of the 7th
Infantry Division.54
On May 26, 2006, Lt. Col. Jimenez was directed by the Commanding General
of the 7th Infantry Division, Maj. Gen. Jovito Palaran,55 through his Assistant
Chief of Staff,56 to investigate the alleged abduction of the respondents by
CAFGU auxiliaries under his unit, namely: CAA Michael de la Cruz; CAA Roman
de la Cruz, aka Puti; CAA Maximo de la Cruz, aka Pula; CAA Randy Mendoza;
ex-CAA Marcelo de la Cruz aka Madning; and a civilian named Rudy Mendoza.
He was directed to determine: (1) the veracity of the abduction of Raymond and
Reynaldo Manalo by the alleged elements of the CAFGU auxiliaries; and (2) the
administrative liability of said auxiliaries, if any.57 Jimenez testified that this
particular investigation was initiated not by a complaint as was the usual
procedure, but because the Commanding General saw news about the
abduction of the Manalo brothers on the television, and he was concerned about
what was happening within his territorial jurisdiction.58
Jimenez summoned all six implicated persons for the purpose of having them
execute sworn statements and conducting an investigation on May 29, 2006.59
The investigation started at 8:00 in the morning and finished at 10:00 in the
evening.60 The investigating officer, Technical Sgt. Eduardo Lingad, took the
individual sworn statements of all six persons on that day. There were no other
sworn statements taken, not even of the Manalo family, nor were there other
witnesses summoned and investigated61 as according to Jimenez, the directive
to him was only to investigate the six persons.62
Jimenez was beside Lingad when the latter took the statements.63 The six
persons were not known to Jimenez as it was in fact his first time to meet
them.64 During the entire time that he was beside Lingad, a subordinate of his
in the Office of the Provost Marshall, Jimenez did not propound a single question
to the six persons.65
Jimenez testified that all six statements were taken on May 29, 2006, but
Marcelo Mendoza and Rudy Mendoza had to come back the next day to sign
their statements as the printing of their statements was interrupted by a power
failure. Jimenez testified that the two signed on May 30, 2006, but the jurats of
their statements indicated that they were signed on May 29, 2006.66 When the
Sworn Statements were turned over to Jimenez, he personally wrote his
investigation report. He began writing it in the afternoon of May 30, 2006 and
finished it on June 1, 2006.67 He then gave his report to the Office of the Chief
of Personnel.68
As petitioners largely rely on Jimenez's Investigation Report dated June 1, 2006
for their evidence, the report is herein substantially quoted:
III. BACKGROUND OF THE CASE
4. This pertains to the abduction of RAYMOND MANALO and REYNALDO
MANALO who were forcibly taken from their respective homes in Brgy. Buhol
na Mangga, San Ildefonso, Bulacan on 14 February 2006 by unidentified armed
men and thereafter were forcibly disappeared. After the said incident, relatives
of the victims filed a case for Abduction in the civil court against the herein
suspects: Michael dela Cruz, Madning dela Cruz, Puti Dela Cruz, Pula Dela
Cruz, Randy Mendoza and Rudy Mendoza as alleged members of the Citizen
Armed Forces Geographical Unit (CAFGU).
a) Sworn statement of CAA Maximo F. dela Cruz, aka Pula dated 29 May 2006
in (Exhibit "B") states that he was at Sitio Mozon, Brgy. Bohol na Mangga, San
Ildefonso, Bulacan doing the concrete building of a church located nearby his
residence, together with some neighbor thereat. He claims that on 15 February
2006, he was being informed by Brgy. Kagawad Pablo Umayan about the
abduction of the brothers Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo. As to the allegation
that he was one of the suspects, he claims that they only implicated him because
he was a CAFGU and that they claimed that those who abducted the Manalo
brothers are members of the Military and CAFGU. Subject vehemently denied
any participation or involvement on the abduction of said victims.
b) Sworn statement of CAA Roman dela Cruz y Faustino Aka Puti dtd 29 May
2006 in (Exhibit "C") states that he is a resident of Sitio Muzon, Brgy. Buhol na
Mangga, San Ildefonso, Bulacan and a CAA member based at Biak na Bato
Detachment, San Miguel, Bulacan. He claims that Raymond and Reynaldo
Manalo being his neighbors are active members/sympathizers of the CPP/NPA
and he also knows their elder Rolando Manalo @ KA BESTRE of being an NPA
Leader operating in their province. That at the time of the alleged abduction of
the two (2) brothers and for accusing him to be one of the suspects, he claims
that on February 14, 2006, he was one of those working at the concrete chapel
being constructed nearby his residence. He claims further that he just came only
to know about the incident on other day (15 Feb 06) when he was being
informed by Kagawad Pablo Kunanan. That subject CAA vehemently denied
any participation about the incident and claimed that they only implicated him
because he is a member of the CAFGU.
c) Sworn Statement of CAA Randy Mendoza y Lingas dated 29 May 2006 in
(Exhibit "O") states that he is a resident of Brgy. Buhol na Mangga, San
Ildefonso, Bulacan and a member of CAFGU based at Biak na Bato
Detachment. That being a neighbor, he was very much aware about the
background of the two (2) brothers Raymond and Reynaldo as active supporters
of the CPP NPA in their Brgy. and he also knew their elder brother "KUMANDER
BESTRE" TN: Rolando Manalo. Being one of the accused, he claims that on 14
February 2006, he was at Brgy. Magmarate, San Miguel, Bulacan in the house
of his aunt and he learned only about the incident when he arrived home in their
place. He claims further that the only reason why they implicated him was due
to the fact that his mother has filed a criminal charge against their brother
Rolando Manalo @ KA BESTRE who is an NPA Commander who killed his
father and for that reason they implicated him in support of their brother. Subject
CAA vehemently denied any involvement on the abduction of said Manalo
brothers.
d) Sworn Statement of Rudy Mendoza y Lingasa dated May 29, 2006 in (Exhibit
"E") states that he is a resident of Brgy. Marungko, Angat, Bulacan. He claims
that Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo are familiar to him being his barriomate
when he was still unmarried and he knew them since childhood. Being one of
Page 50 of 99
the accused, he claims that on 14 February 2006, he was at his residence in
Brgy. Marungko, Angat, Bulacan. He claims that he was being informed only
about the incident lately and he was not aware of any reason why the two (2)
brothers were being abducted by alleged members of the military and CAFGU.
The only reason he knows why they implicated him was because there are those
people who are angry with their family particularly victims of summary execution
(killing) done by their brother @ KA Bestre Rolando Manalo who is an NPA
leader. He claims further that it was their brother @ KA BESTRE who killed his
father and he was living witness to that incident. Subject civilian vehemently
denied any involvement on the abduction of the Manalo brothers.
e) Sworn statement of Ex-CAA Marcelo dala Cruz dated 29 May 2006 in (Exhibit
"F") states that he is a resident of Sitio Muzon, Brgy. Buhol na Mangga, San
Ildefonso, Bulacan, a farmer and a former CAA based at Biak na Bato, San
Miguel, Bulacan. He claims that Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo are familiar to
him being their barrio mate. He claims further that they are active supporters of
CPP/NPA and that their brother Rolando Manalo @ KA BESTRE is an NPA
leader. Being one of the accused, he claims that on 14 February 2006, he was
in his residence at Sitio Muzon, Brgy. Buhol na Mangga, San Ildefonso,
Bulacan. That he vehemently denied any participation of the alleged abduction
of the two (2) brothers and learned only about the incident when rumors reached
him by his barrio mates. He claims that his implication is merely fabricated
because of his relationship to Roman and Maximo who are his brothers.
f) Sworn statement of Michael dela Cruz y Faustino dated 29 May 2006 in
(Exhibit "G") states that he is a resident of Sitio Muzon, Brgy. Buhol na Mangga,
San Ildefonso, Bulacan, the Chief of Brgy. Tanod and a CAFGU member based
at Biak na Bato Detachment, San Miguel, Bulacan. He claims that he knew very
well the brothers Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo in their barangay for having
been the Tanod Chief for twenty (20) years. He alleged further that they are
active supporters or sympathizers of the CPP/NPA and whose elder brother
Rolando Manalo @ KA BESTRE is an NPA leader operating within the area.
Being one of the accused, he claims that on 14 Feb 2006 he was helping in the
construction of their concrete chapel in their place and he learned only about
the incident which is the abduction of Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo when one
of the Brgy. Kagawad in the person of Pablo Cunanan informed him about the
matter. He claims further that he is truly innocent of the allegation against him
as being one of the abductors and he considers everything fabricated in order
to destroy his name that remains loyal to his service to the government as a
CAA member.
IV. DISCUSSION
5. Based on the foregoing statements of respondents in this particular case, the
proof of linking them to the alleged abduction and disappearance of Raymond
and Reynaldo Manalo that transpired on 14 February 2006 at Sitio Muzon, Brgy.
Buhol na Mangga, San Ildefonso, Bulacan, is unsubstantiated. Their alleged
involvement theretofore to that incident is considered doubtful, hence, no basis
to indict them as charged in this investigation.
Though there are previous grudges between each families (sic) in the past to
quote: the killing of the father of Randy and Rudy Mendoza by @ KA BESTRE
TN: Rolando Manalo, this will not suffice to establish a fact that they were the
ones who did the abduction as a form of revenge. As it was also stated in the
testimony of other accused claiming that the Manalos are active
sympathizers/supporters of the CPP/NPA, this would not also mean, however,
that in the first place, they were in connivance with the abductors. Being their
neighbors and as members of CAFGU's, they ought to be vigilant in protecting
their village from any intervention by the leftist group, hence inside their village,
they were fully aware of the activities of Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo in so
far as their connection with the CPP/NPA is concerned.
V. CONCLUSION
6. Premises considered surrounding this case shows that the alleged charges
of abduction committed by the above named respondents has not been
established in this investigation. Hence, it lacks merit to indict them for any
administrative punishment and/or criminal liability. It is therefore concluded that
they are innocent of the charge.
VI. RECOMMENDATIONS
7. That CAAs Michael F. dela Cruz, Maximo F. Dela Cruz, Roman dela Cruz,
Randy Mendoza, and two (2) civilians Maximo F. Dela Cruz and Rudy L.
Mendoza be exonerated from the case.
8. Upon approval, this case can be dropped and closed.69
In this appeal under Rule 45, petitioners question the appellate court's
assessment of the foregoing evidence and assail the December 26, 2007
Decision on the following grounds, viz:
I.
THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY AND GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN
BELIEVING AND GIVING FULL FAITH AND CREDIT TO THE INCREDIBLE,
UNCORROBORATED, CONTRADICTED, AND OBVIOUSLY SCRIPTED,
REHEARSED AND SELF-SERVING AFFIDAVIT/TESTIMONY OF HEREIN
RESPONDENT RAYMOND MANALO.
II.
THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY AND GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN
REQUIRING RESPONDENTS (HEREIN PETITIONERS) TO: (A) FURNISH TO
THE MANALO BROTHER(S) AND TO THE COURT OF APPEALS ALL
OFFICIAL AND UNOFFICIAL REPORTS OF THE INVESTIGATION
UNDERTAKEN IN CONNECTION WITH THEIR CASE, EXCEPT THOSE
ALREADY IN FILE WITH THE COURT; (B) CONFIRM IN WRITING THE
PRESENT PLACES OF OFFICIAL ASSIGNMENT OF M/SGT. HILARIO aka
ROLLIE CASTILLO AND DONALD CAIGAS; AND (C) CAUSE TO BE
PRODUCED TO THE COURT OF APPEALS ALL MEDICAL REPORTS,
RECORDS AND CHARTS, AND REPORTS OF ANY TREATMENT GIVEN OR
RECOMMENDED AND MEDICINES PRESCRIBED, IF ANY, TO THE
MANALO BROTHERS, TO INCLUDE A LIST OF MEDICAL PERSONNEL
(MILITARY AND CIVILIAN) WHO ATTENDED TO THEM FROM FEBRUARY
14, 2006 UNTIL AUGUST 12, 2007.70
The case at bar is the first decision on the application of the Rule on the Writ of
Amparo (Amparo Rule). Let us hearken to its beginning.
The adoption of the Amparo Rule surfaced as a recurring proposition in the
recommendations that resulted from a two-day National Consultative Summit
on Extrajudicial Killings and Enforced Disappearances sponsored by the Court
on July 16-17, 2007. The Summit was "envisioned to provide a broad and fact-
based perspective on the issue of extrajudicial killings and enforced
disappearances,"71 hence "representatives from all sides of the political and
social spectrum, as well as all the stakeholders in the justice system"72
participated in mapping out ways to resolve the crisis.
On October 24, 2007, the Court promulgated the Amparo Rule "in light of the
prevalence of extralegal killing and enforced disappearances."73 It was an
exercise for the first time of the Court's expanded power to promulgate rules to
protect our people's constitutional rights, which made its maiden appearance in
the 1987 Constitution in response to the Filipino experience of the martial law
regime.74 As the Amparo Rule was intended to address the intractable problem
of "extralegal killings" and "enforced disappearances," its coverage, in its
present form, is confined to these two instances or to threats thereof. "Extralegal
killings" are "killings committed without due process of law, i.e., without legal
safeguards or judicial proceedings."75 On the other hand, "enforced
disappearances" are "attended by the following characteristics: an arrest,
detention or abduction of a person by a government official or organized groups
or private individuals acting with the direct or indirect acquiescence of the
government; the refusal of the State to disclose the fate or whereabouts of the
person concerned or a refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of liberty which
places such persons outside the protection of law."76
The writ of Amparo originated in Mexico. "Amparo" literally means "protection"
in Spanish.77 In 1837, de Tocqueville's Democracy in America became
available in Mexico and stirred great interest. Its description of the practice of
judicial review in the U.S. appealed to many Mexican jurists.78 One of them,
Manuel Crescencio Rejón, drafted a constitutional provision for his native state,
Yucatan,79 which granted judges the power to protect all persons in the
enjoyment of their constitutional and legal rights. This idea was incorporated into
the national constitution in 1847, viz:
The federal courts shall protect any inhabitant of the Republic in the exercise
and preservation of those rights granted to him by this Constitution and by laws
enacted pursuant hereto, against attacks by the Legislative and Executive
powers of the federal or state governments, limiting themselves to granting
protection in the specific case in litigation, making no general declaration
concerning the statute or regulation that motivated the violation.80
Since then, the protection has been an important part of Mexican
constitutionalism.81 If, after hearing, the judge determines that a constitutional
right of the petitioner is being violated, he orders the official, or the official's
superiors, to cease the violation and to take the necessary measures to restore
the petitioner to the full enjoyment of the right in question. Amparo thus
combines the principles of judicial review derived from the U.S. with the
limitations on judicial power characteristic of the civil law tradition which prevails
in Mexico. It enables courts to enforce the constitution by protecting individual
rights in particular cases, but prevents them from using this power to make law
for the entire nation.82
The writ of Amparo then spread throughout the Western Hemisphere, gradually
evolving into various forms, in response to the particular needs of each
country.83 It became, in the words of a justice of the Mexican Federal Supreme
Court, one piece of Mexico's self-attributed "task of conveying to the world's
legal heritage that institution which, as a shield of human dignity, her own painful
history conceived."84 What began as a protection against acts or omissions of
public authorities in violation of constitutional rights later evolved for several
purposes: (1) Amparo libertad for the protection of personal freedom, equivalent
to the habeas corpus writ; (2) Amparo contra leyes for the judicial review of the
constitutionality of statutes; (3) Amparo casacion for the judicial review of the
constitutionality and legality of a judicial decision; (4) Amparo administrativo for
the judicial review of administrative actions; and (5) Amparo agrario for the
protection of peasants' rights derived from the agrarian reform process.85
In Latin American countries, except Cuba, the writ of Amparo has been
constitutionally adopted to protect against human rights abuses especially
committed in countries under military juntas. In general, these countries adopted
an all-encompassing writ to protect the whole gamut of constitutional rights,
including socio-economic rights.86 Other countries like Colombia, Chile,
Germany and Spain, however, have chosen to limit the protection of the writ of
Amparo only to some constitutional guarantees or fundamental rights.87
Page 51 of 99
In the Philippines, while the 1987 Constitution does not explicitly provide for the
writ of Amparo, several of the above Amparo protections are guaranteed by our
charter. The second paragraph of Article VIII, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution,
the Grave Abuse Clause, provides for the judicial power "to determine whether
or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government."
The Clause accords a similar general protection to human rights extended by
the Amparo contra leyes, Amparo casacion, and Amparo administrativo.
Amparo libertad is comparable to the remedy of habeas corpus found in several
provisions of the 1987 Constitution.88 The Clause is an offspring of the U.S.
common law tradition of judicial review, which finds its roots in the 1803 case of
Marbury v. Madison.89
While constitutional rights can be protected under the Grave Abuse Clause
through remedies of injunction or prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
and a petition for habeas corpus under Rule 102,90 these remedies may not be
adequate to address the pestering problem of extralegal killings and enforced
disappearances. However, with the swiftness required to resolve a petition for a
writ of Amparo through summary proceedings and the availability of appropriate
interim and permanent reliefs under the Amparo Rule, this hybrid writ of the
common law and civil law traditions - borne out of the Latin American and
Philippine experience of human rights abuses - offers a better remedy to
extralegal killings and enforced disappearances and threats thereof. The
remedy provides rapid judicial relief as it partakes of a summary proceeding that
requires only substantial evidence to make the appropriate reliefs available to
the petitioner; it is not an action to determine criminal guilt requiring proof
beyond reasonable doubt, or liability for damages requiring preponderance of
evidence, or administrative responsibility requiring substantial evidence that will
require full and exhaustive proceedings.91
The writ of Amparo serves both preventive and curative roles in addressing the
problem of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances. It is preventive in
that it breaks the expectation of impunity in the commission of these offenses;
it is curative in that it facilitates the subsequent punishment of perpetrators as it
will inevitably yield leads to subsequent investigation and action. In the long run,
the goal of both the preventive and curative roles is to deter the further
commission of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances.
In the case at bar, respondents initially filed an action for "Prohibition, Injunction,
and Temporary Restraining Order"92 to stop petitioners and/or their officers and
agents from depriving the respondents of their right to liberty and other basic
rights on August 23, 2007,93 prior to the promulgation of the Amparo Rule. They
also sought ancillary remedies including Protective Custody Orders,
Appointment of Commissioner, Inspection and Access Orders and other legal
and equitable remedies under Article VIII, Section 5(5) of the 1987 Constitution
and Rule 135, Section 6 of the Rules of Court. When the Amparo Rule came
into effect on October 24, 2007, they moved to have their petition treated as an
Amparo petition as it would be more effective and suitable to the circumstances
of the Manalo brothers' enforced disappearance. The Court granted their
motion.
With this backdrop, we now come to the arguments of the petitioner. Petitioners'
first argument in disputing the Decision of the Court of Appeals states, viz:
The Court of Appeals seriously and grievously erred in believing and giving full
faith and credit to the incredible uncorroborated, contradicted, and obviously
scripted, rehearsed and self-serving affidavit/testimony of herein respondent
Raymond Manalo.94
In delving into the veracity of the evidence, we need to mine and refine the ore
of petitioners' cause of action, to determine whether the evidence presented is
metal-strong to satisfy the degree of proof required.
Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo provides for the following causes of
action, viz:
Section 1. Petition. - The petition for a writ of Amparo is a remedy available to
any person whose right to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with
violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a
private individual or entity.
The writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats
thereof. (emphasis supplied)
Sections 17 and 18, on the other hand, provide for the degree of proof required,
viz:
Sec. 17. Burden of Proof and Standard of Diligence Required. - The parties shall
establish their claims by substantial evidence.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 18. Judgment. - ... If the allegations in the petition are proven by substantial
evidence, the court shall grant the privilege of the writ and such reliefs as may
be proper and appropriate; otherwise, the privilege shall be denied. (emphases
supplied)
Substantial evidence has been defined as such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.95
After careful perusal of the evidence presented, we affirm the findings of the
Court of Appeals that respondents were abducted from their houses in Sito
Muzon, Brgy. Buhol na Mangga, San Ildefonso, Bulacan on February 14, 2006
and were continuously detained until they escaped on August 13, 2007. The
abduction, detention, torture, and escape of the respondents were narrated by
respondent Raymond Manalo in a clear and convincing manner. His account is
dotted with countless candid details of respondents' harrowing experience and
tenacious will to escape, captured through his different senses and etched in
his memory. A few examples are the following: "Sumilip ako sa isang haligi ng
kamalig at nakita kong sinisilaban si Manuel."96 "(N)ilakasan ng mga sundalo
ang tunog na galing sa istiryo ng sasakyan. Di nagtagal, narinig ko ang hiyaw o
ungol ni Manuel."97 "May naiwang mga bakas ng dugo habang hinihila nila ang
mga bangkay. Naamoy ko iyon nang nililinis ang bakas."98 "Tumigil ako sa may
palaisdaan kung saan ginamit ko ang bato para tanggalin ang mga kadena."99
"Tinanong ko sa isang kapit-bahay kung paano ako makakakuha ng cell phone;
sabi ko gusto kong i-text ang isang babae na nakatira sa malapit na lugar."100
We affirm the factual findings of the appellate court, largely based on
respondent Raymond Manalo's affidavit and testimony, viz:
...the abduction was perpetrated by armed men who were sufficiently identified
by the petitioners (herein respondents) to be military personnel and CAFGU
auxiliaries. Raymond recalled that the six armed men who barged into his house
through the rear door were military men based on their attire of fatigue pants
and army boots, and the CAFGU auxiliaries, namely: Michael de la Cruz,
Madning de la Cruz, Puti de la Cruz and Pula de la Cruz, all members of the
CAFGU and residents of Muzon, San Ildefonso, Bulacan, and the brothers
Randy Mendoza and Rudy Mendoza, also CAFGU members, served as
lookouts during the abduction. Raymond was sure that three of the six military
men were Ganata, who headed the abducting team, Hilario, who drove the van,
and George. Subsequent incidents of their long captivity, as narrated by the
petitioners, validated their assertion of the participation of the elements of the
7th Infantry Division, Philippine Army, and their CAFGU auxiliaries.
We are convinced, too, that the reason for the abduction was the suspicion that
the petitioners were either members or sympathizers of the NPA, considering
that the abductors were looking for Ka Bestre, who turned out to be Rolando,
the brother of petitioners.
The efforts exerted by the Military Command to look into the abduction were, at
best, merely superficial. The investigation of the Provost Marshall of the 7th
Infantry Division focused on the one-sided version of the CAFGU auxiliaries
involved. This one-sidedness might be due to the fact that the Provost Marshall
could delve only into the participation of military personnel, but even then the
Provost Marshall should have refrained from outrightly exculpating the CAFGU
auxiliaries he perfunctorily investigated...
Gen. Palparan's participation in the abduction was also established. At the very
least, he was aware of the petitioners' captivity at the hands of men in uniform
assigned to his command. In fact, he or any other officer tendered no
controversion to the firm claim of Raymond that he (Gen. Palparan) met them
in person in a safehouse in Bulacan and told them what he wanted them and
their parents to do or not to be doing. Gen. Palparan's direct and personal role
in the abduction might not have been shown but his knowledge of the dire
situation of the petitioners during their long captivity at the hands of military
personnel under his command bespoke of his indubitable command policy that
unavoidably encouraged and not merely tolerated the abduction of civilians
without due process of law and without probable cause.
In the habeas proceedings, the Court, through the Former Special Sixth Division
(Justices Buzon, chairman; Santiago-Lagman, Sr., member; and Romilla-
Lontok, Jr., member/ponente.) found no clear and convincing evidence to
establish that M/Sgt. Rizal Hilario had anything to do with the abduction or the
detention. Hilario's involvement could not, indeed, be then established after
Evangeline Francisco, who allegedly saw Hilario drive the van in which the
petitioners were boarded and ferried following the abduction, did not testify.
(See the decision of the habeas proceedings at rollo, p. 52)
However, in this case, Raymond attested that Hilario drove the white L-300 van
in which the petitioners were brought away from their houses on February 14,
2006. Raymond also attested that Hilario participated in subsequent incidents
during the captivity of the petitioners, one of which was when Hilario fetched
them from Fort Magsaysay on board a Revo and conveyed them to a
detachment in Pinaud, San Ildefonso, Bulacan where they were detained for at
least a week in a house of strong materials (Exhibit D, rollo, p. 205) and then
Hilario (along with Efren) brought them to Sapang, San Miguel, Bulacan on
board the Revo, to an unfinished house inside the compound of Kapitan where
they were kept for more or less three months. (Exhibit D, rollo, p. 205) It was
there where the petitioners came face to face with Gen. Palparan. Hilario and
Efren also brought the petitioners one early morning to the house of the
petitioners' parents, where only Raymond was presented to the parents to relay
the message from Gen. Palparan not to join anymore rallies. On that occasion,
Hilario warned the parents that they would not again see their sons should they
join any rallies to denounce human rights violations. (Exhibit D, rollo, pp. 205-
206) Hilario was also among four Master Sergeants (the others being Arman,
Ganata and Cabalse) with whom Gen. Palparan conversed on the occasion
when Gen. Palparan required Raymond to take the medicines for his health.
(Exhibit D, rollo, p. 206) There were other occasions when the petitioners saw
that Hilario had a direct hand in their torture.
It is clear, therefore, that the participation of Hilario in the abduction and forced
disappearance of the petitioners was established. The participation of other
military personnel like Arman, Ganata, Cabalse and Caigas, among others, was
similarly established.
xxx xxx xxx
Page 52 of 99
As to the CAFGU auxiliaries, the habeas Court found them personally involved
in the abduction. We also do, for, indeed, the evidence of their participation is
overwhelming.101
We reject the claim of petitioners that respondent Raymond Manalo's
statements were not corroborated by other independent and credible pieces of
evidence.102 Raymond's affidavit and testimony were corroborated by the
affidavit of respondent Reynaldo Manalo. The testimony and medical reports
prepared by forensic specialist Dr. Molino, and the pictures of the scars left by
the physical injuries inflicted on respondents,103 also corroborate respondents'
accounts of the torture they endured while in detention. Respondent Raymond
Manalo's familiarity with the facilities in Fort Magsaysay such as the "DTU," as
shown in his testimony and confirmed by Lt. Col. Jimenez to be the "Division
Training Unit,"104 firms up respondents' story that they were detained for some
time in said military facility.
In Ortiz v. Guatemala,105 a case decided by the Inter-American Commission
on Human Rights, the Commission considered similar evidence, among others,
in finding that complainant Sister Diana Ortiz was abducted and tortured by
agents of the Guatemalan government. In this case, Sister Ortiz was kidnapped
and tortured in early November 1989. The Commission's findings of fact were
mostly based on the consistent and credible statements, written and oral, made
by Sister Ortiz regarding her ordeal.106 These statements were supported by
her recognition of portions of the route they took when she was being driven out
of the military installation where she was detained.107 She was also examined
by a medical doctor whose findings showed that the 111 circular second degree
burns on her back and abrasions on her cheek coincided with her account of
cigarette burning and torture she suffered while in detention.108
With the secret nature of an enforced disappearance and the torture perpetrated
on the victim during detention, it logically holds that much of the information and
evidence of the ordeal will come from the victims themselves, and the veracity
of their account will depend on their credibility and candidness in their written
and/or oral statements. Their statements can be corroborated by other evidence
such as physical evidence left by the torture they suffered or landmarks they
can identify in the places where they were detained. Where powerful military
officers are implicated, the hesitation of witnesses to surface and testify against
them comes as no surprise.
We now come to the right of the respondents to the privilege of the writ of
Amparo. There is no quarrel that the enforced disappearance of both
respondents Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo has now passed as they have
escaped from captivity and surfaced. But while respondents admit that they are
no longer in detention and are physically free, they assert that they are not "free
in every sense of the word"109 as their "movements continue to be restricted
for fear that people they have named in their Judicial Affidavits and testified
against (in the case of Raymond) are still at large and have not been held
accountable in any way. These people are directly connected to the Armed
Forces of the Philippines and are, thus, in a position to threaten respondents'
rights to life, liberty and security."110 (emphasis supplied) Respondents claim
that they are under threat of being once again abducted, kept captive or even
killed, which constitute a direct violation of their right to security of person.111
Elaborating on the "right to security, in general," respondents point out that this
right is "often associated with liberty;" it is also seen as an "expansion of rights
based on the prohibition against torture and cruel and unusual punishment."
Conceding that there is no right to security expressly mentioned in Article III of
the 1987 Constitution, they submit that their rights "to be kept free from torture
and from incommunicado detention and solitary detention places112 fall under
the general coverage of the right to security of person under the writ of Amparo."
They submit that the Court ought to give an expansive recognition of the right
to security of person in view of the State Policy under Article II of the 1987
Constitution which enunciates that, "The State values the dignity of every human
person and guarantees full respect for human rights." Finally, to justify a liberal
interpretation of the right to security of person, respondents cite the teaching in
Moncupa v. Enrile113 that "the right to liberty may be made more meaningful
only if there is no undue restraint by the State on the exercise of that liberty"114
such as a requirement to "report under unreasonable restrictions that amounted
to a deprivation of liberty"115 or being put under "monitoring and
surveillance."116
In sum, respondents assert that their cause of action consists in the threat to
their right to life and liberty, and a violation of their right to security.
Let us put this right to security under the lens to determine if it has indeed been
violated as respondents assert. The right to security or the right to security of
person finds a textual hook in Article III, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution which
provides, viz:
Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers
and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and
for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest
shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the
judge...
At the core of this guarantee is the immunity of one's person, including the
extensions of his/her person - houses, papers, and effects - against government
intrusion. Section 2 not only limits the state's power over a person's home and
possessions, but more importantly, protects the privacy and sanctity of the
person himself.117 The purpose of this provision was enunciated by the Court
in People v. CFI of Rizal, Branch IX, Quezon City, viz: 118
The purpose of the constitutional guarantee against unreasonable searches and
seizures is to prevent violations of private security in person and property and
unlawful invasion of the security of the home by officers of the law acting under
legislative or judicial sanction and to give remedy against such usurpation when
attempted. (Adams v. New York, 192 U.S. 858; Alvero v. Dizon, 76 Phil. 637
[1946]). The right to privacy is an essential condition to the dignity and
happiness and to the peace and security of every individual, whether it be of
home or of persons and correspondence. (Tañada and Carreon, Political Law
of the Philippines, Vol. 2, 139 [1962]). The constitutional inviolability of this great
fundamental right against unreasonable searches and seizures must be
deemed absolute as nothing is closer to a man's soul than the serenity of his
privacy and the assurance of his personal security. Any interference allowable
can only be for the best causes and reasons.119 (emphases supplied)
While the right to life under Article III, Section 1120 guarantees essentially the
right to be alive121 - upon which the enjoyment of all other rights is
preconditioned - the right to security of person is a guarantee of the secure
quality of this life, viz: "The life to which each person has a right is not a life lived
in fear that his person and property may be unreasonably violated by a powerful
ruler. Rather, it is a life lived with the assurance that the government he
established and consented to, will protect the security of his person and
property. The ideal of security in life and property... pervades the whole history
of man. It touches every aspect of man's existence."122 In a broad sense, the
right to security of person "emanates in a person's legal and uninterrupted
enjoyment of his life, his limbs, his body, his health, and his reputation. It
includes the right to exist, and the right to enjoyment of life while existing, and it
is invaded not only by a deprivation of life but also of those things which are
necessary to the enjoyment of life according to the nature, temperament, and
lawful desires of the individual."123
A closer look at the right to security of person would yield various permutations
of the exercise of this right.
First, the right to security of person is "freedom from fear." In its "whereas"
clauses, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) enunciates that "a
world in which human beings shall enjoy freedom of speech and belief and
freedom from fear and want has been proclaimed as the highest aspiration of
the common people." (emphasis supplied) Some scholars postulate that
"freedom from fear" is not only an aspirational principle, but essentially an
individual international human right.124 It is the "right to security of person" as
the word "security" itself means "freedom from fear."125 Article 3 of the UDHR
provides, viz:
Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of person.126 (emphasis
supplied)
In furtherance of this right declared in the UDHR, Article 9(1) of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) also provides for the right to
security of person, viz:
1. Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be
subjected to arbitrary arrest or detention. No one shall be deprived of his liberty
except on such grounds and in accordance with such procedure as are
established by law. (emphasis supplied)
The Philippines is a signatory to both the UDHR and the ICCPR.
In the context of Section 1 of the Amparo Rule, "freedom from fear" is the right
and any threat to the rights to life, liberty or security is the actionable wrong.
Fear is a state of mind, a reaction; threat is a stimulus, a cause of action. Fear
caused by the same stimulus can range from being baseless to well-founded as
people react differently. The degree of fear can vary from one person to another
with the variation of the prolificacy of their imagination, strength of character or
past experience with the stimulus. Thus, in the Amparo context, it is more correct
to say that the "right to security" is actually the "freedom from threat." Viewed in
this light, the "threatened with violation" Clause in the latter part of Section 1 of
the Amparo Rule is a form of violation of the right to security mentioned in the
earlier part of the provision.127
Second, the right to security of person is a guarantee of bodily and psychological
integrity or security. Article III, Section II of the 1987 Constitution guarantees
that, as a general rule, one's body cannot be searched or invaded without a
search warrant.128 Physical injuries inflicted in the context of extralegal killings
and enforced disappearances constitute more than a search or invasion of the
body. It may constitute dismemberment, physical disabilities, and painful
physical intrusion. As the degree of physical injury increases, the danger to life
itself escalates. Notably, in criminal law, physical injuries constitute a crime
against persons because they are an affront to the bodily integrity or security of
a person.129
Physical torture, force, and violence are a severe invasion of bodily integrity.
When employed to vitiate the free will such as to force the victim to admit, reveal
or fabricate incriminating information, it constitutes an invasion of both bodily
and psychological integrity as the dignity of the human person includes the
exercise of free will. Article III, Section 12 of the 1987 Constitution more
specifically proscribes bodily and psychological invasion, viz:
(2) No torture, force, violence, threat or intimidation, or any other means which
vitiate the free will shall be used against him (any person under investigation for
the commission of an offense). Secret detention places, solitary,
incommunicado or other similar forms of detention are prohibited.
Page 53 of 99
Parenthetically, under this provision, threat and intimidation that vitiate the free
will - although not involving invasion of bodily integrity - nevertheless constitute
a violation of the right to security in the sense of "freedom from threat" as afore-
discussed.
Article III, Section 12 guarantees freedom from dehumanizing abuses of
persons under investigation for the commission of an offense. Victims of
enforced disappearances who are not even under such investigation should all
the more be protected from these degradations.
An overture to an interpretation of the right to security of person as a right
against torture was made by the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) in
the recent case of Popov v. Russia.130 In this case, the claimant, who was
lawfully detained, alleged that the state authorities had physically abused him in
prison, thereby violating his right to security of person. Article 5(1) of the
European Convention on Human Rights provides, viz: "Everyone has the right
to liberty and security of person. No one shall be deprived of his liberty save in
the following cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law ..."
(emphases supplied) Article 3, on the other hand, provides that "(n)o one shall
be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment."
Although the application failed on the facts as the alleged ill-treatment was found
baseless, the ECHR relied heavily on the concept of security in holding, viz:
...the applicant did not bring his allegations to the attention of domestic
authorities at the time when they could reasonably have been expected to take
measures in order to ensure his security and to investigate the circumstances
in question.
xxx xxx xxx
... the authorities failed to ensure his security in custody or to comply with the
procedural obligation under Art.3 to conduct an effective investigation into his
allegations.131 (emphasis supplied)
The U.N. Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women has
also made a statement that the protection of the bodily integrity of women may
also be related to the right to security and liberty, viz:
...gender-based violence which impairs or nullifies the enjoyment by women of
human rights and fundamental freedoms under general international law or
under specific human rights conventions is discrimination within the meaning of
article 1 of the Convention (on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
Against Women). These rights and freedoms include . . . the right to liberty and
security of person.132
Third, the right to security of person is a guarantee of protection of one's rights
by the government. In the context of the writ of Amparo, this right is built into the
guarantees of the right to life and liberty under Article III, Section 1 of the 1987
Constitution and the right to security of person (as freedom from threat and
guarantee of bodily and psychological integrity) under Article III, Section 2. The
right to security of person in this third sense is a corollary of the policy that the
State "guarantees full respect for human rights" under Article II, Section 11 of
the 1987 Constitution.133 As the government is the chief guarantor of order and
security, the Constitutional guarantee of the rights to life, liberty and security of
person is rendered ineffective if government does not afford protection to these
rights especially when they are under threat. Protection includes conducting
effective investigations, organization of the government apparatus to extend
protection to victims of extralegal killings or enforced disappearances (or threats
thereof) and/or their families, and bringing offenders to the bar of justice. The
Inter-American Court of Human Rights stressed the importance of investigation
in the Velasquez Rodriguez Case,134 viz:
(The duty to investigate) must be undertaken in a serious manner and not as a
mere formality preordained to be ineffective. An investigation must have an
objective and be assumed by the State as its own legal duty, not as a step taken
by private interests that depends upon the initiative of the victim or his family or
upon their offer of proof, without an effective search for the truth by the
government.135
This third sense of the right to security of person as a guarantee of government
protection has been interpreted by the United Nations' Human Rights
Committee136 in not a few cases involving Article 9137 of the ICCPR. While the
right to security of person appears in conjunction with the right to liberty under
Article 9, the Committee has ruled that the right to security of person can exist
independently of the right to liberty. In other words, there need not necessarily
be a deprivation of liberty for the right to security of person to be invoked. In
Delgado Paez v. Colombia,138 a case involving death threats to a religion
teacher at a secondary school in Leticia, Colombia, whose social views differed
from those of the Apostolic Prefect of Leticia, the Committee held, viz:
The first sentence of article 9 does not stand as a separate paragraph. Its
location as a part of paragraph one could lead to the view that the right to
security arises only in the context of arrest and detention. The travaux
préparatoires indicate that the discussions of the first sentence did indeed focus
on matters dealt with in the other provisions of article 9. The Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, in article 3, refers to the right to life, the right to
liberty and the right to security of the person. These elements have been dealt
with in separate clauses in the Covenant. Although in the Covenant the only
reference to the right of security of person is to be found in article 9, there is no
evidence that it was intended to narrow the concept of the right to security only
to situations of formal deprivation of liberty. At the same time, States parties
have undertaken to guarantee the rights enshrined in the Covenant. It cannot
be the case that, as a matter of law, States can ignore known threats to the life
of persons under their jurisdiction, just because that he or she is not arrested or
otherwise detained. States parties are under an obligation to take reasonable
and appropriate measures to protect them. An interpretation of article 9 which
would allow a State party to ignore threats to the personal security of non-
detained persons within its jurisdiction would render totally ineffective the
guarantees of the Covenant.139 (emphasis supplied)
The Paez ruling was reiterated in Bwalya v. Zambia,140 which involved a
political activist and prisoner of conscience who continued to be intimidated,
harassed, and restricted in his movements following his release from detention.
In a catena of cases, the ruling of the Committee was of a similar import:
Bahamonde v. Equatorial Guinea,141 involving discrimination, intimidation and
persecution of opponents of the ruling party in that state; Tshishimbi v. Zaire,142
involving the abduction of the complainant's husband who was a supporter of
democratic reform in Zaire; Dias v. Angola,143 involving the murder of the
complainant's partner and the harassment he (complainant) suffered because
of his investigation of the murder; and Chongwe v. Zambia,144 involving an
assassination attempt on the chairman of an opposition alliance.
Similarly, the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) has interpreted the
"right to security" not only as prohibiting the State from arbitrarily depriving
liberty, but imposing a positive duty on the State to afford protection of the right
to liberty.145 The ECHR interpreted the "right to security of person" under Article
5(1) of the European Convention of Human Rights in the leading case on
disappearance of persons, Kurt v. Turkey.146 In this case, the claimant's son
had been arrested by state authorities and had not been seen since. The
family's requests for information and investigation regarding his whereabouts
proved futile. The claimant suggested that this was a violation of her son's right
to security of person. The ECHR ruled, viz:
... any deprivation of liberty must not only have been effected in conformity with
the substantive and procedural rules of national law but must equally be in
keeping with the very purpose of Article 5, namely to protect the individual from
arbitrariness... Having assumed control over that individual it is incumbent on
the authorities to account for his or her whereabouts. For this reason, Article 5
must be seen as requiring the authorities to take effective measures to
safeguard against the risk of disappearance and to conduct a prompt effective
investigation into an arguable claim that a person has been taken into custody
and has not been seen since.147 (emphasis supplied)
Applying the foregoing concept of the right to security of person to the case at
bar, we now determine whether there is a continuing violation of respondents'
right to security.
First, the violation of the right to security as freedom from threat to respondents'
life, liberty and security.
While respondents were detained, they were threatened that if they escaped,
their families, including them, would be killed. In Raymond's narration, he was
tortured and poured with gasoline after he was caught the first time he attempted
to escape from Fort Magsaysay. A call from a certain "Mam," who wanted to see
him before he was killed, spared him.
This time, respondents have finally escaped. The condition of the threat to be
killed has come to pass. It should be stressed that they are now free from
captivity not because they were released by virtue of a lawful order or voluntarily
freed by their abductors. It ought to be recalled that towards the end of their
ordeal, sometime in June 2007 when respondents were detained in a camp in
Limay, Bataan, respondents' captors even told them that they were still deciding
whether they should be executed. Respondent Raymond Manalo attested in his
affidavit, viz:
Kinaumagahan, naka-kadena pa kami. Tinanggal ang mga kadena mga 3 o 4
na araw pagkalipas. Sinabi sa amin na kaya kami nakakadena ay dahil
pinagdedesisyunan pa ng mga sundalo kung papatayin kami o hindi.148
The possibility of respondents being executed stared them in the eye while they
were in detention. With their escape, this continuing threat to their life is
apparent, moreso now that they have surfaced and implicated specific officers
in the military not only in their own abduction and torture, but also in those of
other persons known to have disappeared such as Sherlyn Cadapan, Karen
Empeño, and Manuel Merino, among others.
Understandably, since their escape, respondents have been under
concealment and protection by private citizens because of the threat to their life,
liberty and security. The threat vitiates their free will as they are forced to limit
their movements or activities.149 Precisely because respondents are being
shielded from the perpetrators of their abduction, they cannot be expected to
show evidence of overt acts of threat such as face-to-face intimidation or written
threats to their life, liberty and security. Nonetheless, the circumstances of
respondents' abduction, detention, torture and escape reasonably support a
conclusion that there is an apparent threat that they will again be abducted,
tortured, and this time, even executed. These constitute threats to their liberty,
security, and life, actionable through a petition for a writ of Amparo.
Next, the violation of the right to security as protection by the government. Apart
from the failure of military elements to provide protection to respondents by
themselves perpetrating the abduction, detention, and torture, they also
miserably failed in conducting an effective investigation of respondents'
abduction as revealed by the testimony and investigation report of petitioners'
own witness, Lt. Col. Ruben Jimenez, Provost Marshall of the 7th Infantry
Division.
Page 54 of 99
The one-day investigation conducted by Jimenez was very limited, superficial,
and one-sided. He merely relied on the Sworn Statements of the six implicated
members of the CAFGU and civilians whom he met in the investigation for the
first time. He was present at the investigation when his subordinate Lingad was
taking the sworn statements, but he did not propound a single question to
ascertain the veracity of their statements or their credibility. He did not call for
other witnesses to test the alibis given by the six implicated persons nor for the
family or neighbors of the respondents.
In his affidavit, petitioner Secretary of National Defense attested that in a
Memorandum Directive dated October 31, 2007, he issued a policy directive
addressed to the AFP Chief of Staff, that the AFP should adopt rules of action
in the event the writ of Amparo is issued by a competent court against any
members of the AFP, which should essentially include verification of the identity
of the aggrieved party; recovery and preservation of relevant evidence;
identification of witnesses and securing statements from them; determination of
the cause, manner, location and time of death or disappearance; identification
and apprehension of the person or persons involved in the death or
disappearance; and bringing of the suspected offenders before a competent
court.150 Petitioner AFP Chief of Staff also submitted his own affidavit attesting
that he received the above directive of respondent Secretary of National
Defense and that acting on this directive, he immediately caused to be issued a
directive to the units of the AFP for the purpose of establishing the
circumstances of the alleged disappearance and the recent reappearance of the
respondents, and undertook to provide results of the investigations to
respondents.151 To this day, however, almost a year after the policy directive
was issued by petitioner Secretary of National Defense on October 31, 2007,
respondents have not been furnished the results of the investigation which they
now seek through the instant petition for a writ of Amparo.
Under these circumstances, there is substantial evidence to warrant the
conclusion that there is a violation of respondents' right to security as a
guarantee of protection by the government.
In sum, we conclude that respondents' right to security as "freedom from threat"
is violated by the apparent threat to their life, liberty and security of person. Their
right to security as a guarantee of protection by the government is likewise
violated by the ineffective investigation and protection on the part of the military.
Finally, we come to the reliefs granted by the Court of Appeals, which petitioners
question.
First, that petitioners furnish respondents all official and unofficial reports of the
investigation undertaken in connection with their case, except those already in
file with the court.
Second, that petitioners confirm in writing the present places of official
assignment of M/Sgt. Hilario aka Rollie Castillo and Donald Caigas.
Third, that petitioners cause to be produced to the Court of Appeals all medical
reports, records and charts, and reports of any treatment given or recommended
and medicines prescribed, if any, to the Manalo brothers, to include a list of
medical personnel (military and civilian) who attended to them from February
14, 2006 until August 12, 2007.
With respect to the first and second reliefs, petitioners argue that the production
order sought by respondents partakes of the characteristics of a search warrant.
Thus, they claim that the requisites for the issuance of a search warrant must
be complied with prior to the grant of the production order, namely: (1) the
application must be under oath or affirmation; (2) the search warrant must
particularly describe the place to be searched and the things to be seized; (3)
there exists probable cause with one specific offense; and (4) the probable
cause must be personally determined by the judge after examination under oath
or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce.152 In the
case at bar, however, petitioners point out that other than the bare, self-serving
and vague allegations made by respondent Raymond Manalo in his unverified
declaration and affidavit, the documents respondents seek to be produced are
only mentioned generally by name, with no other supporting details. They also
argue that the relevancy of the documents to be produced must be apparent,
but this is not true in the present case as the involvement of petitioners in the
abduction has not been shown.
Petitioners' arguments do not hold water. The production order under the
Amparo Rule should not be confused with a search warrant for law enforcement
under Article III, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution. This Constitutional provision
is a protection of the people from the unreasonable intrusion of the government,
not a protection of the government from the demand of the people such as
respondents.
Instead, the Amparo production order may be likened to the production of
documents or things under Section 1, Rule 27 of the Rules of Civil Procedure
which provides in relevant part, viz:
Section 1. Motion for production or inspection order.
Upon motion of any party showing good cause therefor, the court in which an
action is pending may (a) order any party to produce and permit the inspection
and copying or photographing, by or on behalf of the moving party, of any
designated documents, papers, books of accounts, letters, photographs,
objects or tangible things, not privileged, which constitute or contain evidence
material to any matter involved in the action and which are in his possession,
custody or control...
In Material Distributors (Phil.) Inc. v. Judge Natividad,153 the respondent judge,
under authority of Rule 27, issued a subpoena duces tecum for the production
and inspection of among others, the books and papers of Material Distributors
(Phil.) Inc. The company questioned the issuance of the subpoena on the
ground that it violated the search and seizure clause. The Court struck down the
argument and held that the subpoena pertained to a civil procedure that "cannot
be identified or confused with unreasonable searches prohibited by the
Constitution..."
Moreover, in his affidavit, petitioner AFP Chief of Staff himself undertook "to
provide results of the investigations conducted or to be conducted by the
concerned unit relative to the circumstances of the alleged disappearance of the
persons in whose favor the Writ of Amparo has been sought for as soon as the
same has been furnished Higher headquarters."
With respect to the second and third reliefs, petitioners assert that the disclosure
of the present places of assignment of M/Sgt. Hilario aka Rollie Castillo and
Donald Caigas, as well as the submission of a list of medical personnel, is
irrelevant, improper, immaterial, and unnecessary in the resolution of the
petition for a writ of Amparo. They add that it will unnecessarily compromise and
jeopardize the exercise of official functions and duties of military officers and
even unwittingly and unnecessarily expose them to threat of personal injury or
even death.
On the contrary, the disclosure of the present places of assignment of M/Sgt.
Hilario aka Rollie Castillo and Donald Caigas, whom respondents both directly
implicated as perpetrators behind their abduction and detention, is relevant in
ensuring the safety of respondents by avoiding their areas of territorial
jurisdiction. Such disclosure would also help ensure that these military officers
can be served with notices and court processes in relation to any investigation
and action for violation of the respondents' rights. The list of medical personnel
is also relevant in securing information to create the medical history of
respondents and make appropriate medical interventions, when applicable and
necessary.
In blatant violation of our hard-won guarantees to life, liberty and security, these
rights are snuffed out from victims of extralegal killings and enforced
disappearances. The writ of Amparo is a tool that gives voice to preys of silent
guns and prisoners behind secret walls.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DISMISSED. The Decision
of the Court of Appeals dated December 26, 2007 is affirmed.
SO ORDERED.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 182165 November 25, 2009
P/SUPT. FELIXBERTO CASTILLO, POLICE OFFICERS ROMEO BAGTAS,
RUPERTO BORLONGAN, EDMUNDO DIONISIO, RONNIE MORALES,
ARNOLD TRIA, and GILBERTO PUNZALAN, ENGR. RICASOL P. MILLAN,
ENGR. REDENTOR S. DELA CRUZ, MR. ANASTACIO L. BORLONGAN, MR.
ARTEMIO ESGUERRA, "TISOY," and JOHN DOES, Petitioners,
vs.
DR. AMANDA T. CRUZ, NIXON T. CRUZ, and FERDINAND T. CRUZ,
Respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Petitioners, employees and members of the local police force of the City
Government of Malolos, challenge the March 28, 2008 Decision of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos, Branch 10 in a petition for issuance of writs of
amparo and habeas data instituted by respondents.
The factual antecedents.
Respondent Amanda Cruz (Amanda) who, along with her husband Francisco
G. Cruz (Spouses Cruz), leased a parcel of land situated at Barrio Guinhawa,
Malolos (the property), refused to vacate the property, despite demands by the
lessor Provincial Government of Bulacan (the Province) which intended to utilize
it for local projects.
The Province thus filed a complaint for unlawful detainer against the Spouses
Cruz before the then Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Bulacan, Bulacan.
By Decision of September 5, 1997, the MTC rendered judgment against the
Spouses Cruz, which judgment, following its affirmance by the RTC, became
final and executory.
The finality of the decision in the ejectment case notwithstanding, the spouses
Cruz refused to vacate the property. They thereupon filed cases against the
Page 55 of 99
Province2 and the judges who presided over the case.3 Those cases were
dismissed except their petition for annulment of judgment lodged before Branch
18 of the RTC of Malolos, and a civil case for injunction 833-M-2004 lodged
before Branch 10 of the same RTC Malolos.
The Spouses Cruz sought in the case for injunction the issuance of a permanent
writ of injunction to prevent the execution of the final and executory judgment
against them.
By Order of July 19, 2005, the RTC, finding merit in the Spouses Cruzes’
allegation that subsequent events changed the situation of the parties to justify
a suspension of the execution of the final and executory judgment, issued a
permanent writ of injunction, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the foregoing petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration of the
Order dated August 10, 2004 is hereby GRANTED. Order dated August 10,
2004 is hereby RECONSIDERED and SET ASIDE. Further, the verified petition
dated November 05, 2002 are hereby REINSTATED and MADE PERMANENT
until the MTC-Bulacan, Bulacan finally resolves the pending motions of
petitioners with the same determines the metes and bounds of 400 sq. meters
leased premises subject matter of this case with immediate dispatch.
Accordingly, REMAND the determination of the issues raised by the petitioners
on the issued writ of demolition to the MTC of Bulacan, Bulacan.
SO ORDERED.4 (Emphasis in the original; underscoring supplied)
Finding that the fallo of the RTC July 19, 2005 Order treats, as a suspensive
condition for the lifting of the permanent injunction, the determination of the
boundaries of the property, the Province returned the issue for the consideration
of the MTC. In a Geodetic Engineer’s Report submitted to the MTC on August
31, 2007, the metes and bounds of the property were indicated.
The MTC, by Order of January 2, 2008, approved the Report and ruled that the
permanent injunction which the RTC issued is ineffective. On motion of the
Province, the MTC, by Order of January 21, 2008, thus issued a Second Alias
Writ of Demolition.
On receiving notice of the January 2, 2008 MTC Order, the Spouses Cruz filed
a motion before Branch 10 of the RTC for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order (TRO) which it set for hearing on January 25, 2008 on which
date, however, the demolition had, earlier in the day, been implemented. Such
notwithstanding, the RTC issued a TRO.5 The Spouses Cruz, along with their
sons-respondents Nixon and Ferdinand, thereupon entered the property, placed
several container vans and purportedly represented themselves as owners of
the property which was for lease.
On February 21, 2008, petitioners Police Superintendent Felixberto Castillo et
al., who were deployed by the City Mayor in compliance with a memorandum
issued by Governor Joselito R. Mendoza instructing him to "protect, secure and
maintain the possession of the property," entered the property.
Amanda and her co-respondents refused to turn over the property, however.
Insisting that the RTC July 19, 2005 Order of Permanent Injunction enjoined the
Province from repossessing it, they shoved petitioners, forcing the latter to
arrest them and cause their indictment for direct assault, trespassing and other
forms of light threats.
Respondents later filed on March 3, 2008 a "Respectful Motion-Petition for Writ
of Amparo and Habeas Data," docketed as Special Civil Action No. 53-M-2008,
which was coincidentally raffled to Branch 10 of the RTC Malolos.
Respondents averred that despite the Permanent Injunction, petitioners
unlawfully entered the property with the use of heavy equipment, tore down the
barbed wire fences and tents,6 and arrested them when they resisted
petitioners’ entry; and that as early as in the evening of February 20, 2008,
members of the Philippine National Police had already camped in front of the
property.
On the basis of respondents’ allegations in their petition and the supporting
affidavits, the RTC, by Order of March 4, 2008, issued writs of amparo and
habeas data.7
The RTC, crediting respondents’ version in this wise:
Petitioners have shown by preponderant evidence that the facts and
circumstances of the alleged offenses examined into on Writs of Amparo and
Habeas Data that there have been an on-going hearings on the verified Petition
for Contempt, docketed as Special Proceedings No. 306-M-2006, before this
Court for alleged violation by the respondents of the Preliminary Injunction Order
dated July 16, 2005 [sic] in Sp. Civil Action No. 833-M-2002, hearings were held
on January 25, 2008, February 12 and 19, 2008, where the respondents prayed
for an April 22, 2008 continuance, however, in the pitch darkness of February
20, 2008, police officers, some personnel from the Engineering department, and
some civilians proceeded purposely to the Pinoy Compound, converged therein
and with continuing threats of bodily harm and danger and stone-throwing of the
roofs of the homes thereat from voices around its premises, on a pretext of an
ordinary police operation when enterviewed [sic] by the media then present, but
at 8:00 a.m. to late in the afternoon of February 21, 2008, zoomed in on the
petitioners, subjecting them to bodily harm, mental torture, degradation, and the
debasement of a human being, reminiscent of the martial law police brutality,
sending chill in any ordinary citizen, rendered judgment, by Decision of March
28, 2008, in favor of respondents, disposing as follows:
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Commitment Orders and waivers in
Crim. Cases Nos. 08-77 for Direct assault; Crim. Case No. 08-77 for Other
Forms of Trespass; and Crim. Case No. 08-78 for Light Threats are hereby
DECLARED illegal, null and void, as petitioners were deprived of their
substantial rights, induced by duress or a well-founded fear of personal violence.
Accordingly, the commitment orders and waivers are hereby SET ASIDE. The
temporary release of the petitioners is declared ABSOLUTE. Without any
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED."
Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari, pursuant to Section 1910 of
The Rule on the Writ of Amparo (A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC),11 which is essentially
reproduced in the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data (A.M. No. 08-1-16-SC).12
In the main, petitioners fault the RTC for
… giving due course and issuing writs of amparo and habeas data when from
the allegations of the petition, the same ought not to have been issued as (1)
the petition in [sic] insufficient in substance as the same involves property rights;
and (2) criminal cases had already been filed and pending with the Municipal
Trial Court in Cities, Branch 1, City of Malolos. (Underscoring supplied)
The petition is impressed with merit.
The Court is, under the Constitution, empowered to promulgate rules for the
protection and enforcement of constitutional rights. In view of the heightening
prevalence of extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances, the Rule on
the Writ of Amparo was issued and took effect on October 24, 2007 which
coincided with the celebration of United Nations Day and affirmed the Court’s
commitment towards internationalization of human rights. More than three
months later or on February 2, 2008, the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data was
promulgated.
Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo provides:
Section 1. Petition. – The petition for a writ of amparo is a remedy available to
any person whose right to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with
violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a
private individual or entity. The writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced
disappearances or threats thereof.
Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data provides:
Section 1. Habeas Data. – The writ of habeas data is a remedy available to any
person whose right to privacy in life, liberty or security is violated or threatened
by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee or of a private
individual or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or
information regarding the person, family, home and correspondence of the
aggrieved party.
From the above-quoted provisions, the coverage of the writs is limited to the
protection of rights to life, liberty and security. And the writs cover not only actual
but also threats of unlawful acts or omissions.
Secretary of National Defense v. Manalo teaches:
As the Amparo Rule was intended to address the intractable problem of
"extralegal killings" and "enforced disappearances," its coverage, in its present
form, is confined to these two instances or to threats thereof. "Extralegal killings"
are "killings committed without due process of law, i.e., without legal safeguards
or judicial proceedings." On the other hand, "enforced disappearances" are
"attended by the following characteristics: an arrest, detention or abduction of a
person by a government official or organized groups or private individuals acting
with the direct or indirect acquiescence of the government; the refusal of the
State to disclose the fate or whereabouts of the person concerned or a refusal
to acknowledge the deprivation of liberty which places such persons outside the
protection of law.
To thus be covered by the privilege of the writs, respondents must meet the
threshold requirement that their right to life, liberty and security is violated or
threatened with an unlawful act or omission. Evidently, the present controversy
arose out of a property dispute between the Provincial Government and
respondents. Absent any considerable nexus between the acts complained of
and its effect on respondents’ right to life, liberty and security, the Court will not
delve on the propriety of petitioners’ entry into the property.
Apropos is the Court’s ruling in Tapuz v. Del Rosario:
To start off with the basics, the writ of amparo was originally conceived as a
response to the extraordinary rise in the number of killings and enforced
disappearances, and to the perceived lack of available and effective remedies
to address these extraordinary concerns. It is intended to address violations of
or threats to the rights to life, liberty or security, as an extraordinary and
independent remedy beyond those available under the prevailing Rules, or as a
remedy supplemental to these Rules. What it is not, is a writ to protect concerns
that are purely property or commercial. Neither is it a writ that we shall issue on
amorphous and uncertain grounds. Consequently, the Rule on the Writ of
Amparo – in line with the extraordinary character of the writ and the reasonable
certainty that its issuance demands – requires that every petition for the
issuance of the writ must be supported by justifying allegations of fact, to wit:
xxxx
Page 56 of 99
The writ shall issue if the Court is preliminarily satisfied with the prima facie
existence of the ultimate facts determinable from the supporting affidavits that
detail the circumstances of how and to what extent a threat to or violation of the
rights to life, liberty and security of the aggrieved party was or is being
committed.
Tapuz also arose out of a property dispute, albeit between private individuals,
with the petitioners therein branding as "acts of terrorism" the therein
respondents’ alleged entry into the disputed land with armed men in tow. The
Court therein held:
On the whole, what is clear from these statements – both sworn and unsworn –
is the overriding involvement of property issues as the petition traces its roots to
questions of physical possession of the property disputed by the private parties.
If at all, issues relating to the right to life or to liberty can hardly be discerned
except to the extent that the occurrence of past violence has been alleged. The
right to security, on the other hand, is alleged only to the extent of the treats and
harassments implied from the presence of "armed men bare to the waist" and
the alleged pointing and firing of weapons. Notably, none of the supporting
affidavits compellingly show that the threat to the rights to life, liberty and
security of the petitioners is imminent or continuing.
It bears emphasis that respondents’ petition did not show any actual violation,
imminent or continuing threat to their life, liberty and security. Bare allegations
that petitioners "in unison, conspiracy and in contempt of court, there and then
willfully, forcibly and feloniously with the use of force and intimidation entered
and forcibly, physically manhandled the petitioners (respondents) and arrested
the herein petitioners (respondents)"19 will not suffice to prove entitlement to
the remedy of the writ of amparo. No undue confinement or detention was
present. In fact, respondents were even able to post bail for the offenses a day
after their arrest.
Although respondents’ release from confinement does not necessarily hinder
supplication for the writ of amparo, absent any evidence or even an allegation
in the petition that there is undue and continuing restraint on their liberty, and/or
that there exists threat or intimidation that destroys the efficacy of their right to
be secure in their persons, the issuance of the writ cannot be justified.
That respondents are merely seeking the protection of their property rights is
gathered from their Joint Affidavit, viz:
xxxx
11. Kami ay humarang at humiga sa harap ng mga heavy equipment na hawak
hawak ang nasabing kautusan ng RTC Branch 10 (PERMANENT INJUNCTION
at RTC ORDERS DATED February 12, 17 at 19 2008) upang ipaglaban ang
dignidad ng kautusan ng korte, ipaglaban ang prinsipyo ng "SELF-HELP" at
batas ukol sa "PROPERTY RIGHTS", Wala kaming nagawa ipagtanggol ang
aming karapatan sa lupa na 45 years naming "IN POSSESSION."
Oddly, respondents also seek the issuance of a writ of habeas data when it is
not even alleged that petitioners are gathering, collecting or storing data or
information regarding their person, family, home and correspondence.
As for respondents’ assertion of past incidents wherein the Province allegedly
violated the Permanent Injunction order, these incidents were already raised in
the injunction proceedings on account of which respondents filed a case for
criminal contempt against petitioners.
Before the filing of the petition for writs of amparo and habeas data, or on
February 22, 2008, petitioners even instituted a petition for habeas corpus which
was considered moot and academic by Branch 14 of the Malolos RTC and was
accordingly denied by Order of April 8, 2008.
More. Respondent Amanda and one of her sons, Francisco Jr., likewise filed a
petition for writs of amparo and habeas data before the Sandiganbayan, they
alleging the commission of continuing threats by petitioners after the issuance
of the writs by the RTC, which petition was dismissed for insufficiency and forum
shopping.
It thus appears that respondents are not without recourse and have in fact taken
full advantage of the legal system with the filing of civil, criminal and
administrative charges.
It need not be underlined that respondents’ petitions for writs of amparo and
habeas data are extraordinary remedies which cannot be used as tools to stall
the execution of a final and executory decision in a property dispute.
At all events, respondents’ filing of the petitions for writs of amparo and habeas
data should have been barred, for criminal proceedings against them had
commenced after they were arrested in flagrante delicto and proceeded against
in accordance with Section 6, Rule 11224 of the Rules of Court. Validity of the
arrest or the proceedings conducted thereafter is a defense that may be set up
by respondents during trial and not before a petition for writs of amparo and
habeas data. The reliefs afforded by the writs may, however, be made available
to the aggrieved party by motion in the criminal proceedings.25
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The challenged March 4, 2008 Order
of Branch 10 of the Regional Trial Court of Malolos is DECLARED NULL AND
VOID, and its March 28, 2008 Decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Special
Civil Action No. 53-M-2008 is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 182498 December 3, 2009
GEN. AVELINO I. RAZON, JR., Chief, Philippine National Police (PNP);
Police Chief Superintendent RAUL CASTAÑEDA, Chief, Criminal
Investigation and Detection Group (CIDG); Police Senior Superintendent
LEONARDO A. ESPINA, Chief, Police Anti-Crime and Emergency
Response (PACER); and GEN. JOEL R. GOLTIAO, Regional Director of
ARMM, PNP, Petitioners,
vs.
MARY JEAN B. TAGITIS, herein represented by ATTY. FELIPE P. ARCILLA,
JR., Attorney-in-Fact, Respondent.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
We review in this petition for review on certiorari1 the decision dated March 7,
2008 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in C.A-G.R. AMPARO No. 00009.2 This CA
decision confirmed the enforced disappearance of Engineer Morced N. Tagitis
(Tagitis) and granted the Writ of Amparo at the petition of his wife, Mary Jean
B. Tagitis (respondent). The dispositive portion of the CA decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, petition is hereby GRANTED. The Court
hereby FINDS that this is an "enforced disappearance" within the meaning of
the United Nations instruments, as used in the Amparo Rules. The privileges of
the writ of amparo are hereby extended to Engr. Morced Tagitis.
Consequently: (1) respondent GEN. EDGARDO M. DOROMAL, Chief, Criminal
Investigation and Detention Group (CIDG) who should order COL. JOSE
VOLPANE PANTE, CIDG-9 Chief, Zamboanga City, to aid him; (2) respondent
GEN. AVELINO I. RAZON, Chief, PNP, who should order his men, namely: (a)
respondent GEN. JOEL GOLTIAO, Regional Director of ARMM PNP, (b) COL.
AHIRON AJIRIM, both head of TASK FORCE TAGITIS, and (c) respondent SR.
SUPERINTENDENT LEONARDO A. ESPINA, Chief, Police Anti-Crime and
Emergency Response, to aid him as their superior- are hereby DIRECTED to
exert extraordinary diligence and efforts, not only to protect the life, liberty and
security of Engr. Morced Tagitis, but also to extend the privileges of the writ of
amparo to Engr. Morced Tagitis and his family, and to submit a monthly report
of their actions to this Court, as a way of PERIODIC REVIEW to enable this
Court to monitor the action of respondents.
This amparo case is hereby DISMISSED as to respondent LT. GEN.
ALEXANDER YANO, Commanding General, Philippine Army, and as to
respondent GEN. RUBEN RAFAEL, Chief Anti-Terror Task Force Comet,
Zamboanga City, both being with the military, which is a separate and distinct
organization from the police and the CIDG, in terms of operations, chain of
command and budget.
This Decision reflects the nature of the Writ of Amparo – a protective remedy
against violations or threats of violation against the rights to life, liberty and
security.3 It embodies, as a remedy, the court’s directive to police agencies to
undertake specified courses of action to address the disappearance of an
individual, in this case, Engr. Morced N. Tagitis. It does not determine guilt nor
pinpoint criminal culpability for the disappearance; rather, it determines
responsibility, or at least accountability, for the enforced disappearance for
purposes of imposing the appropriate remedies to address the disappearance.
Responsibility refers to the extent the actors have been established by
substantial evidence to have participated in whatever way, by action or
omission, in an enforced disappearance, as a measure of the remedies this
Court shall craft, among them, the directive to file the appropriate criminal and
civil cases against the responsible parties in the proper courts. Accountability,
on the other hand, refers to the measure of remedies that should be addressed
to those who exhibited involvement in the enforced disappearance without
bringing the level of their complicity to the level of responsibility defined above;
or who are imputed with knowledge relating to the enforced disappearance and
who carry the burden of disclosure; or those who carry, but have failed to
discharge, the burden of extraordinary diligence in the investigation of the
enforced disappearance. In all these cases, the issuance of the Writ of Amparo
is justified by our primary goal of addressing the disappearance, so that the life
of the victim is preserved and his liberty and security are restored.
We highlight this nature of a Writ of Amparo case at the outset to stress that the
unique situations that call for the issuance of the writ, as well as the
considerations and measures necessary to address these situations, may not
at all be the same as the standard measures and procedures in ordinary court
actions and proceedings. In this sense, the Rule on the Writ of Amparo4
(Amparo Rule) issued by this Court is unique. The Amparo Rule should be read,
too, as a work in progress, as its directions and finer points remain to evolve
through time and jurisprudence and through the substantive laws that Congress
may promulgate.
THE FACTUAL ANTECEDENTS
The background facts, based on the petition and the records of the case, are
summarized below.
The established facts show that Tagitis, a consultant for the World Bank and the
Senior Honorary Counselor for the Islamic Development Bank (IDB) Scholarship
Page 57 of 99
Programme, was last seen in Jolo, Sulu. Together with Arsimin Kunnong
(Kunnong), an IDB scholar, Tagitis arrived in Jolo by boat in the early morning
of October 31, 2007 from a seminar in Zamboanga City. They immediately
checked-in at ASY Pension House. Tagitis asked Kunnong to buy him a boat
ticket for his return trip the following day to Zamboanga. When Kunnong
returned from this errand, Tagitis was no longer around.5 The receptionist
related that Tagitis went out to buy food at around 12:30 in the afternoon and
even left his room key with the desk.6 Kunnong looked for Tagitis and even sent
a text message to the latter’s Manila-based secretary who did not know of
Tagitis’ whereabouts and activities either; she advised Kunnong to simply wait.7
On November 4, 2007, Kunnong and Muhammad Abdulnazeir N. Matli, a UP
professor of Muslim studies and Tagitis’ fellow student counselor at the IDB,
reported Tagitis’ disappearance to the Jolo Police Station.8 On November 7,
2007, Kunnong executed a sworn affidavit attesting to what he knew of the
circumstances surrounding Tagitis’ disappearance.9
More than a month later (on December 28, 2007), the respondent filed a Petition
for the Writ of Amparo (petition) with the CA through her Attorney-in-Fact, Atty.
Felipe P. Arcilla.10 The petition was directed against Lt. Gen. Alexander Yano,
Commanding General, Philippine Army; Gen. Avelino I. Razon, Chief, Philippine
National Police (PNP); Gen. Edgardo M. Doromal, Chief, Criminal Investigation
and Detention Group (CIDG); Sr. Supt. Leonardo A. Espina, Chief, Police Anti-
Crime and Emergency Response; Gen. Joel Goltiao, Regional Director, ARMM-
PNP; and Gen. Ruben Rafael, Chief, Anti-Terror Task Force Comet [collectively
referred to as petitioners]. After reciting Tagitis’ personal circumstances and the
facts outlined above, the petition went on to state:
xxxx
7. Soon after the student left the room, Engr. Tagitis went out of the pension
house to take his early lunch but while out on the street, a couple of burly men
believed to be police intelligence operatives, forcibly took him and boarded the
latter on a motor vehicle then sped away without the knowledge of his student,
Arsimin Kunnong;
8. As instructed, in the late afternoon of the same day, Kunnong returned to the
pension house, and was surprised to find out that subject Engr. Tagitis cannot
[sic] be contacted by phone and was not also around and his room was closed
and locked;
9. Kunnong requested for the key from the desk of the pension house who [sic]
assisted him to open the room of Engr. Tagitis, where they discovered that the
personal belongings of Engr. Tagitis, including cell phones, documents and
other personal belongings were all intact inside the room;
10. When Kunnong could not locate Engr. Tagitis, the former sought the help of
another IDB scholar and reported the matter to the local police agency;
11. Arsimin Kunnong including his friends and companions in Jolo, exerted
efforts in trying to locate the whereabouts of Engr. Tagitis and when he reported
the matter to the police authorities in Jolo, he was immediately given a ready
answer that Engr. Tagitis could have been abducted by the Abu Sayyaf group
and other groups known to be fighting against the government;
12. Being scared with [sic] these suggestions and insinuations of the police
officers, Kunnong reported the matter to the [respondent, wife of Engr. Tagitis]
by phone and other responsible officers and coordinators of the IDB Scholarship
Programme in the Philippines, who alerted the office of the Governor of ARMM
who was then preparing to attend the OIC meeting in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia;
13. [Respondent], on the other hand, approached some of her co-employees
with the Land Bank in Digos branch, Digos City, Davao del Sur who likewise
sought help from some of their friends in the military who could help them
find/locate the whereabouts of her husband;
14. All of these efforts of the [respondent] did not produce any positive results
except the information from persons in the military who do not want to be
identified that Engr. Tagitis is in the hands of the uniformed men;
15. According to reliable information received by the [respondent], subject Engr.
Tagitis is in the custody of police intelligence operatives, specifically with the
CIDG, PNP Zamboanga City, being held against his will in an earnest attempt
of the police to involve and connect Engr. Tagitis with the different terrorist
groups;
xxxx
17. [Respondent] filed her complaint with the PNP Police Station in the ARMM
in Cotobato and in Jolo, as suggested by her friends, seeking their help to find
her husband, but [respondent’s] request and pleadings failed to produce any
positive results;
18. Instead of helping the [respondent], she [sic] was told of an intriguing tale by
the police that her husband, subject of the petition, was not missing but was with
another woman having good time somewhere, which is a clear indication of the
[petitioners’] refusal to help and provide police assistance in locating her missing
husband;
19. The continued failure and refusal of the [petitioners] to release and/or turn-
over subject Engr. Tagitis to his family or even to provide truthful information to
[the respondent] of the subject’s whereabouts, and/or allow [the respondent] to
visit her husband Engr. Morced Tagitis, caused so much sleepless nights and
serious anxieties;
20. Lately, [the respondent] was again advised by one of the [petitioners] to go
to the ARMM Police Headquarters again in Cotobato City and also to the
different Police Headquarters including [those] in Davao City, in Zamboanga
City, in Jolo, and in Camp Crame, Quezon City, and all these places have been
visited by the [respondent] in search for her husband, which entailed expenses
for her trips to these places thereby resorting her to borrowings and beggings
[sic] for financial help from friends and relatives only to try complying [sic] to the
different suggestions of these police officers, despite of which, her efforts
produced no positive results up to the present time;
21. In fact at times, some police officers, who [sympathized with] the sufferings
undergone by the [respondent], informed her that they are not the proper
persons that she should approach, but assured her not to worry because her
husband is [sic] in good hands;
22. The unexplained uncooperative behavior of the [petitioners] to the
[respondent’s] request for help and failure and refusal of the [petitioners] to
extend the needed help, support and assistance in locating the whereabouts of
Engr. Tagitis who had been declared missing since October 30, 2007 which is
almost two (2) months now, clearly indicates that the [petitioners] are actually in
physical possession and custody of [respondent’s] husband, Engr. Tagitis;
xxxx
25. [The respondent] has exhausted all administrative avenues and remedies
but to no avail, and under the circumstances, [the respondent] has no other
plain, speedy and adequate remedy to protect and get the release of subject
Engr. Morced Tagitis from the illegal clutches of the [petitioners], their
intelligence operatives and the like which are in total violation of the subject’s
human and constitutional rights, except the issuance of a WRIT OF AMPARO.
[Emphasis supplied]
On the same day the petition was filed, the CA immediately issued the Writ of
Amparo, set the case for hearing on January 7, 2008, and directed the
petitioners to file their verified return within seventy-two (72) hours from service
of the writ.11
In their verified Return filed during the hearing of January 27, 2008, the
petitioners denied any involvement in or knowledge of Tagitis’ alleged
abduction. They argued that the allegations of the petition were incomplete and
did not constitute a cause of action against them; were baseless, or at best
speculative; and were merely based on hearsay evidence. 12
The affidavit of PNP Chief Gen. Avelino I. Razon, attached to the Return, stated
that: he did not have any personal knowledge of, or any participation in, the
alleged disappearance; that he had been designated by President Gloria
Macapagal Arroyo as the head of a special body called TASK FORCE USIG, to
address concerns about extralegal killings and enforced disappearances; the
Task Force, inter alia, coordinated with the investigators and local police, held
case conferences, rendered legal advice in connection to these cases; and gave
the following summary:13
xxxx
4.
a) On November 5, 2007, the Regional Director, Police Regional Office ARMM
submitted a report on the alleged disappearance of one Engr. Morced Tagitis.
According to the said report, the victim checked-in at ASY Pension House on
October 30, 2007 at about 6:00 in the morning and then roamed around Jolo,
Sulu with an unidentified companion. It was only after a few days when the said
victim did not return that the matter was reported to Jolo MPS. Afterwards,
elements of Sulu PPO conducted a thorough investigation to trace and locate
the whereabouts of the said missing person, but to no avail. The said PPO is
still conducting investigation that will lead to the immediate findings of the
whereabouts of the person.
b) Likewise, the Regional Chief, 9RCIDU submitted a Progress Report to the
Director, CIDG. The said report stated among others that: subject person
attended an Education Development Seminar set on October 28, 2007
conducted at Ateneo de Zamboanga, Zamboanga City together with a Prof.
Matli. On October 30, 2007, at around 5:00 o’clock in the morning, Engr. Tagitis
reportedly arrived at Jolo Sulu wharf aboard M/V Bounty Cruise, he was then
billeted at ASY Pension House. At about 6:15 o’clock in the morning of the same
date, he instructed his student to purchase a fast craft ticket bound for
Zamboanga City and will depart from Jolo, Sulu on October 31, 2007. That on
or about 10:00 o’clock in the morning, Engr. Tagitis left the premises of ASY
Pension House as stated by the cashier of the said pension house. Later in the
afternoon, the student instructed to purchase the ticket arrived at the pension
house and waited for Engr. Tagitis, but the latter did not return. On its part, the
elements of 9RCIDU is now conducting a continuous case build up and
information gathering to locate the whereabouts of Engr. Tagitis.
c) That the Director, CIDG directed the conduct of the search in all divisions of
the CIDG to find Engr. Tagitis who was allegedly abducted or illegally detained
by covert CIDG-PNP Intelligence Operatives since October 30, 2007, but after
diligent and thorough search, records show that no such person is being
detained in CIDG or any of its department or divisions.
Page 58 of 99
5. On this particular case, the Philippine National Police exhausted all possible
efforts, steps and actions available under the circumstances and continuously
search and investigate [sic] the instant case. This immense mandate, however,
necessitates the indispensable role of the citizenry, as the PNP cannot stand
alone without the cooperation of the victims and witnesses to identify the
perpetrators to bring them before the bar of justice and secure their conviction
in court.
The petitioner PNP-CIDG Chief, Gen. Edgardo M. Doromal, submitted as well
his affidavit, also attached to the Return of the Writ, attesting that upon receipt
of the Writ of Amparo, he caused the following:14
xxxx
That immediately upon receipt on December 29, 2007 of the Resolution of the
Honorable Special Fourth Division of the Court of Appeals, I immediately
directed the Investigation Division of this Group [CIDG] to conduct urgent
investigation on the alleged enforced disappearance of Engineer Morced
Tagitis.
That based on record, Engr. Morced N. Tagitis attended an Education
Development Seminar on October 28, 2007 at Ateneo de Zamboanga at
Zamboanga City together with Prof. Abdulnasser Matli. On October 30, 2007, at
around six o’clock in the morning he arrived at Jolo, Sulu. He was assisted by
his student identified as Arsimin Kunnong of the Islamic Development Bank who
was also one of the participants of the said seminar. He checked in at ASY
pension house located [sic] Kakuyagan, Patikul, Sulu on October 30, 2007 with
[sic] unidentified companion. At around six o’clock in the morning of even date,
Engr. Tagitis instructed his student to purchase a fast craft ticket for Zamboanga
City. In the afternoon of the same date, Kunnong arrived at the pension house
carrying the ticket he purchased for Engr. Tagitis, but the latter was nowhere to
be found anymore. Kunnong immediately informed Prof. Abdulnasser Matli who
reported the incident to the police. The CIDG is not involved in the
disappearance of Engr. Morced Tagitis to make out a case of an enforced
disappearance which presupposes a direct or indirect involvement of the
government.
That herein [petitioner] searched all divisions and departments for a person
named Engr. Morced N. Tagitis, who was allegedly abducted or illegally
detained by covert CIDG-PNP Intelligence Operatives since October 30, 2007
and after a diligent and thorough research records show that no such person is
being detained in CIDG or any of its department or divisions.
That nevertheless, in order to determine the circumstances surrounding Engr.
Morced Tagitis [sic] alleged enforced disappearance, the undersigned had
undertaken immediate investigation and will pursue investigations up to its full
completion in order to aid in the prosecution of the person or persons
responsible therefore.
Likewise attached to the Return of the Writ was PNP-PACER15 Chief PS Supt.
Leonardo A. Espina’s affidavit which alleged that:16
xxxx
That, I and our men and women in PACER vehemently deny any participation
in the alleged abduction or illegally [sic] detention of ENGR. MORCED N.
TAGITS on October 30, 2007. As a matter of fact, nowhere in the writ was
mentioned that the alleged abduction was perpetrated by elements of PACER
nor was there any indication that the alleged abduction or illegal detention of
ENGR. TAGITIS was undertaken jointly by our men and by the alleged covert
CIDG-PNP intelligence operatives alleged to have abducted or illegally detained
ENGR. TAGITIS.
That I was shocked when I learned that I was implicated in the alleged
disappearance of ENGR. MORCED in my capacity as the chief PACER [sic]
considering that our office, the Police Anti-Crime and Emergency Response
(PACER), a special task force created for the purpose of neutralizing or
eradicating kidnap-for-ransom groups which until now continue to be one of the
menace of our society is a respondent in kidnapping or illegal detention case.
Simply put, our task is to go after kidnappers and charge them in court and to
abduct or illegally detain or kidnap anyone is anathema to our mission.
That right after I learned of the receipt of the WRIT OF AMPARO, I directed the
Chief of PACER Mindanao Oriental (PACER-MOR) to conduct pro-active
measures to investigate, locate/search the subject, identify and apprehend the
persons responsible, to recover and preserve evidence related to the
disappearance of ENGR. MORCED TAGITIS, which may aid in the prosecution
of the person or persons responsible, to identify witnesses and obtain
statements from them concerning the disappearance and to determine the
cause, manner, location and time of disappearance as well as any pattern or
practice that may have brought about the disappearance.
That I further directed the chief of PACER-MOR, Police Superintendent JOSE
ARNALDO BRIONES JR., to submit a written report regarding the
disappearance of ENGR. MORCED.
That in compliance with my directive, the chief of PACER-MOR sent through fax
his written report.
That the investigation and measures being undertaken to locate/search the
subject in coordination with Police Regional Office, Autonomous Region of
Muslim Mindanao (PRO-ARMM) and Jolo Police Provincial Office (PPO) and
other AFP and PNP units/agencies in the area are ongoing with the instruction
not to leave any stone unturned so to speak in the investigation until the
perpetrators in the instant case are brought to the bar of justice.
That I have exercised EXTRAORDINARY DILIGENCE in dealing with the WRIT
OF AMPARO just issued.
Finally, the PNP PRO ARMM Regional Director PC Supt. Joel R. Goltiao (Gen.
Goltiao), also submitted his affidavit detailing the actions that he had taken upon
receipt of the report on Tagitis’ disappearance, viz:17
xxxx
3) For the record:
1. I am the Regional Director of Police Regional Office ARMM now and during
the time of the incident;
xxxx
4. It is my duty to look into and take appropriate measures on any cases of
reported enforced disappearances and when they are being alluded to my
office;
5. On November 5, 2007, the Provincial Director of Sulu Police Provincial Office
reported to me through Radio Message Cite No. SPNP3-1105-07-2007 that on
November 4, 2007 at around 3:30 p.m., a certain Abdulnasser Matli, an
employee of Islamic Development Bank, appeared before the Office of the Chief
of Police, Jolo Police Station, and reported the disappearance of Engr. Morced
Tagitis, scholarship coordinator of Islamic Development Bank, Manila;
6. There was no report that Engr. Tagibis was last seen in the company of or
taken by any member of the Philippine National Police but rather he just
disappeared from ASY Pension House situated at Kakuyagan Village, Village,
Patikul, Sulu, on October 30, 2007, without any trace of forcible abduction or
arrest;
7. The last known instance of communication with him was when Arsimin
Kunnong, a student scholar, was requested by him to purchase a vessel ticket
at the Office of Weezam Express, however, when the student returned back to
ASY Pension House, he no longer found Engr. Tagitis there and when he
immediately inquired at the information counter regarding his whereabouts [sic],
the person in charge in the counter informed him that Engr. Tagitis had left the
premises on October 30, 2007 around 1 o’clock p.m. and never returned back
to his room;
8. Immediately after learning the incident, I called and directed the Provincial
Director of Sulu Police Provincial Office and other units through phone call and
text messages to conduct investigation [sic] to determine the whereabouts of
the aggrieved party and the person or persons responsible for the threat, act or
omission, to recover and preserve evidence related to the disappearance of
Engr. Tagitis, to identify witnesses and obtain statements from them concerning
his disappearance, to determine the cause and manner of his disappearance,
to identify and apprehend the person or persons involved in the disappearance
so that they shall be brought before a competent court;
9. Thereafter, through my Chief of the Regional Investigation and Detection
Management Division, I have caused the following directives:
a) Radio Message Cite No. RIDMD-1122-07-358 dated November 22, 2007
directing PD Sulu PPO to conduct joint investigation with CIDG and CIDU
ARMM on the matter;
b) Radio Message Cite No. RIDMD-1128-07-361 dated November 28, 2007
directing PD Sulu PPO to expedite compliance to my previous directive;
c) Memorandum dated December 14, 2007 addressed to PD Sulu PPO
reiterating our series of directives for investigation and directing him to
undertake exhaustive coordination efforts with the owner of ASY Pension House
and student scholars of IDB in order to secure corroborative statements
regarding the disappearance and whereabouts of said personality;
d) Memorandum dated December 24, 2007 addressed to PD Sulu PPO
directing him to maximize efforts to establish clues on the whereabouts of Engr.
Tagitis by seeking the cooperation of Prof. Abdulnasser Matli and Arsimin
Kunnong and/or whenever necessary, for them to voluntarily submit for
polygraph examination with the NBI so as to expunge all clouds of doubt that
they may somehow have knowledge or idea to his disappearance;
e) Memorandum dated December 27, 2007 addressed to the Regional Chief,
Criminal Investigation and Detection Group, Police Regional Office 9,
Zamboanga City, requesting assistance to investigate the cause and unknown
disappearance of Engr. Tagitis considering that it is within their area of
operational jurisdiction;
f) Memorandum from Chief, Intelligence Division, PRO ARMM dated December
30, 2007 addressed to PD Sulu PPO requiring them to submit complete
investigation report regarding the case of Engr. Tagitis;
10. In compliance to our directives, PD Sulu PPO has exerted his [sic] efforts to
conduct investigation [sic] on the matter to determine the whereabouts of Engr.
Tagitis and the circumstances related to his disappearance and submitted the
following:
Page 59 of 99
a) Progress Report dated November 6, 2007 through Radio Message Cite No.
SPNP3-1106-10-2007;
b) Radio Message Cite No. SPIDMS-1205-47-07 informing this office that they
are still monitoring the whereabouts of Engr. Tagitis;
c) Investigation Report dated December 31, 2007 from the Chief of Police, Jolo
Police Station, Sulu PPO;
11. This incident was properly reported to the PNP Higher Headquarters as
shown in the following:
a) Memorandum dated November 6, 2007 addressed to the Chief, PNP
informing him of the facts of the disappearance and the action being taken by
our office;
b) Memorandum dated November 6, 2007 addressed to the Director,
Directorate for Investigation and Detection Management, NHQ PNP;
c) Memorandum dated December 30, 2007 addressed to the Director, DIDM;
4) In spite of our exhaustive efforts, the whereabouts of Engr. Tagitis cannot be
determined but our office is continuously intensifying the conduct of information
gathering, monitoring and coordination for the immediate solution of the case.
Since the disappearance of Tagistis was practically admitted and taking note of
favorable actions so far taken on the disappearance, the CA directed Gen.
Goltiao – as the officer in command of the area of disappearance – to form TASK
FORCE TAGITIS.18
Task Force Tagitis
On January 11, 2008, Gen. Goltiao designated PS Supt. Ahiron Ajirim (PS Supt.
Ajirim) to head TASK FORCE TAGITIS.19 The CA subsequently set three
hearings to monitor whether TASK FORCE TAGITIS was exerting
"extraordinary efforts" in handling the disappearance of Tagitis.20 As planned,
(1) the first hearing would be to mobilize the CIDG, Zamboanga City; (2) the
second hearing would be to mobilize intelligence with Abu Sayyaf and ARMM;
and (3) the third hearing would be to mobilize the Chief of Police of Jolo, Sulu
and the Chief of Police of Zamboanga City and other police operatives.21
In the hearing on January 17, 2008, TASK FORCE TAGITIS submitted to the
CA an intelligence report from PSL Usman S. Pingay, the Chief of Police of the
Jolo Police Station, stating a possible motive for Tagitis’ disappearance.22 The
intelligence report was apparently based on the sworn affidavit dated January
4, 2008 of Muhammad Abdulnazeir N. Matli (Prof. Matli), Professor of Islamic
Studies at the University of the Philippines and an Honorary Student Counselor
of the IDB Scholarship Program in the Philippines, who told the Provincial
Governor of Sulu that:23
[Based] on reliable information from the Office of Muslim Affairs in Manila,
Tagitis has reportedly taken and carried away… more or less Five Million Pesos
(P5,000,000.00) deposited and entrusted to his … [personal] bank accounts by
the Central Office of IDB, Jeddah, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, which [was]
intended for the … IDB Scholarship Fund.
In the same hearing, PS Supt. Ajirim testified that since the CIDG was alleged
to be responsible, he personally went to the CIDG office in Zamboanga City to
conduct an ocular inspection/investigation, particularly of their detention cells.24
PS Supt. Ajirim stated that the CIDG, while helping TASK FORCE TAGITIS
investigate the disappearance of Tagitis, persistently denied any knowledge or
complicity in any abduction.25 He further testified that prior to the hearing, he
had already mobilized and given specific instructions to their supporting units to
perform their respective tasks; that they even talked to, but failed to get any lead
from the respondent in Jolo.26 In his submitted investigation report dated
January 16, 2008, PS Supt. Ajirim concluded:27
9. Gleaned from the undersigned inspection and observation at the
Headquarters 9 RCIDU and the documents at hand, it is my own initial
conclusion that the 9RCIDU and other PNP units in the area had no participation
neither [sic] something to do with [sic] mysterious disappearance of Engr.
Morced Tagitis last October 30, 2007. Since doubt has been raised regarding
the emolument on the Islamic Development Bank Scholar program of IDB that
was reportedly deposited in the personal account of Engr. Tagitis by the IDB
central office in Jeddah, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Secondly, it could might [sic]
be done by resentment or sour grape among students who are applying for the
scholar [sic] and were denied which was allegedly conducted/screened by the
subject being the coordinator of said program.
20. It is also premature to conclude but it does or it may and [sic] presumed that
the motive behind the disappearance of the subject might be due to the funds
he maliciously spent for his personal interest and wanted to elude
responsibilities from the institution where he belong as well as to the Islamic
student scholars should the statement of Prof. Matli be true or there might be a
professional jealousy among them.
xxxx
It is recommended that the Writ of Amparo filed against the respondents be
dropped and dismissed considering on [sic] the police and military actions in the
area particularly the CIDG are exerting their efforts and religiously doing their
tasked [sic] in the conduct of its intelligence monitoring and investigation for the
early resolution of this instant case. But rest assured, our office, in coordination
with other law-enforcement agencies in the area, are continuously and
religiously conducting our investigation for the resolution of this case.
On February 4, 2008, the CA issued an ALARM WARNING that Task Force
Tagitis did not appear to be exerting extraordinary efforts in resolving Tagitis’
disappearance on the following grounds:28
(1) This Court FOUND that it was only as late as January 28, 2008, after the
hearing, that GEN. JOEL GOLTIAO and COL. AHIRON AJIRIM had requested
for clear photographs when it should have been standard operating procedure
in kidnappings or disappearances that the first agenda was for the police to
secure clear pictures of the missing person, Engr. Morced Tagitis, for
dissemination to all parts of the country and to neighboring countries. It had
been three (3) months since GEN. JOEL GOLTIAO admitted having been
informed on November 5, 2007 of the alleged abduction of Engr. Morced Tagitis
by alleged bad elements of the CIDG. It had been more than one (1) month
since the Writ of Amparo had been issued on December 28, 2007. It had been
three (3) weeks when battle formation was ordered through Task Force Tagitis,
on January 17, 2008. It was only on January 28, 2008 when the Task Force
Tagitis requested for clear and recent photographs of the missing person, Engr.
Morced Tagitis, despite the Task Force Tagitis’ claim that they already had an
"all points bulletin", since November 5, 2007, on the missing person, Engr.
Morced Tagitis. How could the police look for someone who disappeared if no
clear photograph had been disseminated?
(2) Furthermore, Task Force Tagitis’ COL. AHIROM AJIRIM informed this Court
that P/Supt KASIM was designated as Col. Ahirom Ajirim’s replacement in the
latter’s official designated post. Yet, P/Supt KASIM’s subpoena was returned to
this Court unserved. Since this Court was made to understand that it was P/Supt
KASIM who was the petitioner’s unofficial source of the military intelligence
information that Engr. Morced Tagitis was abducted by bad elements of the
CIDG (par. 15 of the Petition), the close contact between P/Supt KASIM and
Col. Ahirom Ajirim of TASK FORCE TAGITIS should have ensured the
appearance of Col. KASIM in response to this court’s subpoena and COL.
KASIM could have confirmed the military intelligence information that bad
elements of the CIDG had abducted Engr. Morced Tagitis.
Testimonies for the Respondent
On January 7, 2008, the respondent, Mary Jean B. Tagitis, testified on direct
examination that she went to Jolo and Zamboanga in her efforts to locate her
husband. She said that a friend from Zamboanga holding a high position in the
military (whom she did not then identify) gave her information that allowed her
to "specify" her allegations, "particularly paragraph 15 of the petition."29 This
friend also told her that her husband "[was] in good hands."30 The respondent
also testified that she sought the assistance of her former boss in Davao City,
Land Bank Bajada Branch Manager Rudy Salvador, who told her that "PNP
CIDG is holding [her husband], Engineer Morced Tagitis."31 The respondent
recounted that she went to Camp Katitipan in Davao City where she met Col.
Julasirim Ahadin Kasim (Col. Kasim/Sr. Supt Kasim) who read to her and her
friends (who were then with her) a "highly confidential report" that contained the
"alleged activities of Engineer Tagitis" and informed her that her husband was
abducted because "he is under custodial investigation" for being a liaison for
"J.I. or Jema’ah Islamiah."32
On January 17, 2008, the respondent on cross-examination testified that she is
Tagitis’ second wife, and they have been married for thirteen years; Tagitis was
divorced from his first wife.33 She last communicated with her husband on
October 29, 2007 at around 7:31 p.m. through text messaging; Tagitis was then
on his way to Jolo, Sulu, from Zamboanga City.34
The respondent narrated that she learned of her husband’s disappearance on
October 30, 2007 when her stepdaughter, Zaynah Tagitis (Zaynah), informed
her that she had not heard from her father since the time they arranged to meet
in Manila on October 31, 2007.35 The respondent explained that it took her a
few days (or on November 5, 2007) to personally ask Kunnong to report her
husband’s disappearance to the Jolo Police Station, since she had the
impression that her husband could not communicate with her because his
cellular phone’s battery did not have enough power, and that he would call her
when he had fully-charged his cellular phone’s battery.36
The respondent also identified the high-ranking military friend, who gave her the
information found in paragraph 15 of her petition, as Lt. Col. Pedro L. Ancanan,
Jr (Col. Ancanan). She met him in Camp Karingal, Zamboanga through her
boss.37 She also testified that she was with three other people, namely, Mrs.
Marydel Martin Talbin and her two friends from Mati City, Davao Oriental, when
Col. Kasim read to them the contents of the "highly confidential report" at Camp
Katitipan, Davao City. The respondent further narrated that the report indicated
that her husband met with people belonging to a terrorist group and that he was
under custodial investigation. She then told Col. Kasim that her husband was a
diabetic taking maintenance medication, and asked that the Colonel relay to the
persons holding him the need to give him his medication.38
On February 11, 2008, TASK FORCE TAGITIS submitted two narrative
reports,39 signed by the respondent, detailing her efforts to locate her husband
which led to her meetings with Col. Ancanan of the Philippine Army and Col.
Kasim of the PNP. In her narrative report concerning her meeting with Col.
Ancanan, the respondent recounted, viz:40
On November 11, 2007, we went to Zamboanga City with my friend Mrs.
Marydel Talbin. Our flight from Davao City is 9:00 o’clock in the morning; we
arrived at Zamboanga Airport at around 10:00 o’clock. We [were] fetched by the
Page 60 of 99
two staffs of Col. Ancanan. We immediately proceed [sic] to West Mindanao
Command (WESTMINCOM).
On that same day, we had private conversation with Col. Ancanan. He
interviewed me and got information about the personal background of Engr.
Morced N. Tagitis. After he gathered all information, he revealed to us the
contents of text messages they got from the cellular phone of the subject Engr.
Tagitis. One of the very important text messages of Engr. Tagitis sent to his
daughter Zaynah Tagitis was that she was not allowed to answer any telephone
calls in his condominium unit.
While we were there he did not tell us any information of the whereabouts of
Engr. Tagitis. After the said meeting with Col. Ancanan, he treated us as guests
to the city. His two staffs accompanied us to the mall to purchase our plane
ticket going back to Davao City on November 12, 2007.
When we arrived in Davao City on November 12, 2007 at 9:00 in the morning,
Col. Ancanan and I were discussing some points through phone calls. He
assured me that my husband is alive and he’s last looked [sic] in Talipapao,
Jolo, Sulu. Yet I did not believe his given statements of the whereabouts of my
husband, because I contacted some of my friends who have access to the
groups of MILF, MNLF and ASG. I called up Col. Ancanan several times begging
to tell me the exact location of my husband and who held him but he refused.
While I was in Jolo, Sulu on November 30, 2007, I called him up again because
the PNP, Jolo did not give me any information of the whereabouts of my
husband. Col. Ancanan told me that "Sana ngayon alam mo na kung saan ang
kinalalagyan ng asawa mo." When I was in Zamboanga, I was thinking of
dropping by the office of Col. Ancanan, but I was hesitant to pay him a visit for
the reason that the Chief of Police of Jolo told me not to contact any AFP officials
and he promised me that he can solve the case of my husband (Engr. Tagitis)
within nine days.
I appreciate the effort of Col. Ancanan on trying to solve the case of my husband
Engr. Morced Tagitis, yet failed to do so.
The respondent also narrated her encounter with Col. Kasim, as follows:41
On November 7, 2007, I went to Land Bank of the Philippines, Bajada Branch,
Davao City to meet Mr. Rudy Salvador. I told him that my husband, Engineer
Morced Tagitis was presumed to be abducted in Jolo, Sulu on October 30, 2007.
I asked him a favor to contact his connections in the military in Jolo, Sulu where
the abduction of Engr. Tagitis took place. Mr. Salvador immediately called up
Camp Katitipan located in Davao City looking for high-ranking official who can
help me gather reliable information behind the abduction of subject Engineer
Tagitis.
On that same day, Mr. Salvador and my friend, Anna Mendoza, Executive
Secretary, accompanied me to Camp Katitipan to meet Col. Kasim. Mr.
Salvador introduced me to Col. Kasim and we had a short conversation. And he
assured me that he’ll do the best he can to help me find my husband.
After a few weeks, Mr. Salvador called me up informing me up informing me that
I am to go to Camp Katitipan to meet Col. Kasim for he has an urgent,
confidential information to reveal.
On November 24, 2007, we went back to Camp Katitipan with my three friends.
That was the time that Col. Kasim read to us the confidential report that Engr.
Tagitis was allegedly connected [with] different terrorist [groups], one of which
he mentioned in the report was OMAR PATIK and a certain SANTOS - a Balik
Islam.
It is also said that Engr. Tagitis is carrying boxes of medicines for the injured
terrorists as a supplier. These are the two information that I can still remember.
It was written in a long bond paper with PNP Letterhead. It was not shown to us,
yet Col. Kasim was the one who read it for us.
He asked a favor to me that "Please don’t quote my Name! Because this is a
raw report." He assured me that my husband is alive and he is in the custody of
the military for custodial investigation. I told him to please take care of my
husband because he has aliments and he recently took insulin for he is a
diabetic patient.
In my petition for writ of amparo, I emphasized the information that I got from
Kasim.
On February 11, 2008, the respondent presented Mrs. Marydel Martin Talbin
(Mrs. Talbin) to corroborate her testimony regarding her efforts to locate her
husband, in relation particularly with the information she received from Col.
Kasim. Mrs. Talbin testified that she was with the respondent when she went to
Zamboanga to see Col. Ancanan, and to Davao City at Camp Katitipan to meet
Col. Kasim.42
In Zamboanga, Mrs. Talbin recounted that they met with Col. Ancanan, who told
them that there was a report and that he showed them a series of text messages
from Tagitis’ cellular phone, which showed that Tagitis and his daughter would
meet in Manila on October 30, 2007.43
She further narrated that sometime on November 24, 2007, she went with the
respondent together with two other companions, namely, Salvacion Serrano
and Mini Leong, to Camp Katitipan to talk to Col. Kasim.44 The respondent
asked Col. Kasim if he knew the exact location of Engr. Tagitis. Col. Kasim told
them that Tagitis was in good hands, although he was not certain whether he
was with the PNP or with the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP). She further
recounted that based on the report Col. Kasim read in their presence, Tagitis
was under custodial investigation because he was being charged with terrorism;
Tagitis in fact had been under surveillance since January 2007 up to the time
he was abducted when he was seen talking to Omar Patik and a certain Santos
of Bulacan, a "Balik Islam" charged with terrorism. Col. Kasim also told them
that he could not give a copy of the report because it was a "raw report."45 She
also related that the Col. Kasim did not tell them exactly where Tagitis was being
kept, although he mentioned Talipapao, Sulu.Prof., lalabas din yan."50 Prof.
Matli also emphasized that despite what his January 4, 2008 affidavit
indicated,51 he never told PS Supt. Pingay, or made any accusation, that Tagitis
took away money entrusted to him.52 Prof. Matli confirmed, however, that that
he had received an e-mail report53 from Nuraya Lackian of the Office of Muslim
Affairs in Manila that the IDB was seeking assistance of the office in locating the
funds of IDB scholars deposited in Tagitis’ personal account.54
On cross-examination by the respondent’s counsel, Prof. Matli testified that his
January 4, 2008 affidavit was already prepared when PS Supt. Pingay asked
him to sign it.55 Prof Matli clarified that although he read the affidavit before
signing it, he "was not so much aware of… [its] contents."56
On February 11, 2008, the petitioners presented Col. Kasim to rebut material
portions of the respondent’s testimony, particularly the allegation that he had
stated that Tagitis was in the custody of either the military or the PNP.57 Col.
Kasim categorically denied the statements made by the respondent in her
narrative report, specifically: (1) that Tagitis was seen carrying boxes of
medicines as supplier for the injured terrorists; (2) that Tagitis was under the
custody of the military, since he merely said to the respondent that "your
husband is in good hands" and is "probably taken cared of by his armed
abductors;" and (3) that Tagitis was under custodial investigation by the military,
the PNP or the CIDG Zamboanga City.58 Col. Kasim emphasized that the
"informal letter" he received from his informant in Sulu did not indicate that
Tagitis was in the custody of the CIDG.59 He also stressed that the information
he provided to the respondent was merely a "raw report" sourced from
"barangay intelligence" that still needed confirmation and "follow-up" as to its
veracity.60
On cross-examination, Col. Kasim testified that the information he gave the
respondent was given to him by his informant, who was a "civilian asset,"
through a letter which he considered as "unofficial."61 Col. Kasim stressed that
the letter was only meant for his "consumption" and not for reading by others.62
He testified further that he destroyed the letter right after he read it to the
respondent and her companions because "it was not important to him" and also
because the information it contained had no importance in relation with the
abduction of Tagitis.63 He explained that he did not keep the letter because it
did not contain any information regarding the whereabouts of Tagitis and the
person(s) responsible for his abduction.64
In the same hearing on February 11, 2008, the petitioners also presented Police
Senior Superintendent Jose Volpane Pante (Col. Pante), Chief of the CIDG-9,
to disprove the respondent’s allegation that Tagitis was in the custody of CIDG-
Zamboanga City.65 Col. Pante clarified that the CIDG was the "investigative
arm" of the PNP, and that the CIDG "investigates and prosecutes all cases
involving violations in the Revised Penal Code particularly those considered as
heinous crimes."66 Col. Pante further testified that the allegation that 9 RCIDU
personnel were involved in the disappearance of Tagitis was baseless, since
they did not conduct any operation in Jolo, Sulu before or after Tagitis’ reported
disappearance.67 Col. Pante added that the four (4) personnel assigned to the
Sulu CIDT had no capability to conduct any "operation," since they were only
assigned to investigate matters and to monitor the terrorism situation.68 He
denied that his office conducted any surveillance on Tagitis prior to the latter’s
disappearance.69 Col. Pante further testified that his investigation of Tagitis’
disappearance was unsuccessful; the investigation was "still facing a blank wall"
on the whereabouts of Tagitis.70
THE CA RULING
On March 7, 2008, the CA issued its decision71 confirming that the
disappearance of Tagitis was an "enforced disappearance" under the United
Nations (UN) Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Enforced
Disappearances.72 The CA ruled that when military intelligence pinpointed the
investigative arm of the PNP (CIDG) to be involved in the abduction, the
missing-person case qualified as an enforced disappearance. The conclusion
that the CIDG was involved was based on the respondent’s testimony,
corroborated by her companion, Mrs. Talbin. The CA noted that the information
that the CIDG, as the police intelligence arm, was involved in Tagitis’ abduction
came from no less than the military – an independent agency of government.
The CA thus greatly relied on the "raw report" from Col. Kasim’s asset, pointing
to the CIDG’s involvement in Tagitis’ abduction. The CA held that "raw reports"
from an "asset" carried "great weight" in the intelligence world. It also labeled as
"suspect" Col. Kasim’s subsequent and belated retraction of his statement that
the military, the police, or the CIDG was involved in the abduction of Tagitis.
The CA characterized as "too farfetched and unbelievable" and "a bedlam of
speculation" police theories painting the disappearance as "intentional" on the
part of Tagitis. He had no previous brushes with the law or any record of
overstepping the bounds of any trust regarding money entrusted to him; no
student of the IDB scholarship program ever came forward to complain that he
or she did not get his or her stipend. The CA also found no basis for the police
theory that Tagitis was "trying to escape from the clutches of his second wife,"
on the basis of the respondent’s testimony that Tagitis was a Muslim who could
have many wives under the Muslim faith, and that there was "no issue" at all
when the latter divorced his first wife in order to marry the second. Finally, the
Page 61 of 99
CA also ruled out kidnapping for ransom by the Abu Sayyaf or by the ARMM
paramilitary as the cause for Tagitis’ disappearance, since the respondent, the
police and the military noted that there was no acknowledgement of Tagitis’
abduction or demand for payment of ransom – the usual modus operandi of
these terrorist groups.
Based on these considerations, the CA thus extended the privilege of the writ
to Tagitis and his family, and directed the CIDG Chief, Col. Jose Volpane Pante,
PNP Chief Avelino I. Razon, Task Force Tagitis heads Gen. Joel Goltiao and
Col. Ahiron Ajirim, and PACER Chief Sr. Supt. Leonardo A. Espina to exert
extraordinary diligence and efforts to protect the life, liberty and security of
Tagitis, with the obligation to provide monthly reports of their actions to the CA.
At the same time, the CA dismissed the petition against the then respondents
from the military, Lt. Gen Alexander Yano and Gen. Ruben Rafael, based on
the finding that it was PNP-CIDG, not the military, that was involved.
On March 31, 2008, the petitioners moved to reconsider the CA decision, but
the CA denied the motion in its Resolution of April 9, 2008.73
THE PETITION
In this Rule 45 appeal questioning the CA’s March 7, 2008 decision, the
petitioners mainly dispute the sufficiency in form and substance of the Amparo
petition filed before the CA; the sufficiency of the legal remedies the respondent
took before petitioning for the writ; the finding that the rights to life, liberty and
security of Tagitis had been violated; the sufficiency of evidence supporting the
conclusion that Tagitis was abducted; the conclusion that the CIDG Zamboanga
was responsible for the abduction; and, generally, the ruling that the respondent
discharged the burden of proving the allegations of the petition by substantial
evidence.74
THE COURT’S RULING
We do not find the petition meritorious.
Sufficiency in Form and Substance
In questioning the sufficiency in form and substance of the respondent’s Amparo
petition, the petitioners contend that the petition violated Section 5(c), (d), and
(e) of the Amparo Rule. Specifically, the petitioners allege that the respondent
failed to:
1) allege any act or omission the petitioners committed in violation of Tagitis’
rights to life, liberty and security;
2) allege in a complete manner how Tagitis was abducted, the persons
responsible for his disappearance, and the respondent’s source of information;
3) allege that the abduction was committed at the petitioners’ instructions or with
their consent;
4) implead the members of CIDG regional office in Zamboanga alleged to have
custody over her husband;
5) attach the affidavits of witnesses to support her accusations;
6) allege any action or inaction attributable to the petitioners in the performance
of their duties in the investigation of Tagitis’ disappearance; and
7) specify what legally available efforts she took to determine the fate or
whereabouts of her husband.
A petition for the Writ of Amparo shall be signed and verified and shall allege,
among others (in terms of the portions the petitioners cite):75
(c) The right to life, liberty and security of the aggrieved party violated or
threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of the respondent, and
how such threat or violation is committed with the attendant circumstances
detailed in supporting affidavits;
(d) The investigation conducted, if any, specifying the names, personal
circumstances, and addresses of the investigating authority or individuals, as
well as the manner and conduct of the investigation, together with any report;
(e) The actions and recourses taken by the petitioner to determine the fate or
whereabouts of the aggrieved party and the identity of the person responsible
for the threat, act or omission; and
The framers of the Amparo Rule never intended Section 5(c) to be complete in
every detail in stating the threatened or actual violation of a victim’s rights. As in
any other initiatory pleading, the pleader must of course state the ultimate facts
constituting the cause of action, omitting the evidentiary details.76 In an Amparo
petition, however, this requirement must be read in light of the nature and
purpose of the proceeding, which addresses a situation of uncertainty; the
petitioner may not be able to describe with certainty how the victim exactly
disappeared, or who actually acted to kidnap, abduct or arrest him or her, or
where the victim is detained, because these information may purposely be
hidden or covered up by those who caused the disappearance. In this type of
situation, to require the level of specificity, detail and precision that the
petitioners apparently want to read into the Amparo Rule is to make this Rule a
token gesture of judicial concern for violations of the constitutional rights to life,
liberty and security.
To read the Rules of Court requirement on pleadings while addressing the
unique Amparo situation, the test in reading the petition should be to determine
whether it contains the details available to the petitioner under the
circumstances, while presenting a cause of action showing a violation of the
victim’s rights to life, liberty and security through State or private party action.
The petition should likewise be read in its totality, rather than in terms of its
isolated component parts, to determine if the required elements – namely, of the
disappearance, the State or private action, and the actual or threatened
violations of the rights to life, liberty or security – are present.
In the present case, the petition amply recites in its paragraphs 4 to 11 the
circumstances under which Tagitis suddenly dropped out of sight after engaging
in normal activities, and thereafter was nowhere to be found despite efforts to
locate him. The petition alleged, too, under its paragraph 7, in relation to
paragraphs 15 and 16, that according to reliable information, police operatives
were the perpetrators of the abduction. It also clearly alleged how Tagitis’ rights
to life, liberty and security were violated when he was "forcibly taken and
boarded on a motor vehicle by a couple of burly men believed to be police
intelligence operatives," and then taken "into custody by the respondents’ police
intelligence operatives since October 30, 2007, specifically by the CIDG, PNP
Zamboanga City, x x x held against his will in an earnest attempt of the police
to involve and connect [him] with different terrorist groups."77
These allegations, in our view, properly pleaded ultimate facts within the
pleader’s knowledge about Tagitis’ disappearance, the participation by agents
of the State in this disappearance, the failure of the State to release Tagitis or
to provide sufficient information about his whereabouts, as well as the actual
violation of his right to liberty. Thus, the petition cannot be faulted for any failure
in its statement of a cause of action.
If a defect can at all be attributed to the petition, this defect is its lack of
supporting affidavit, as required by Section 5(c) of the Amparo Rule. Owing to
the summary nature of the proceedings for the writ and to facilitate the resolution
of the petition, the Amparo Rule incorporated the requirement for supporting
affidavits, with the annotation that these can be used as the affiant’s direct
testimony.78 This requirement, however, should not be read as an absolute one
that necessarily leads to the dismissal of the petition if not strictly followed.
Where, as in this case, the petitioner has substantially complied with the
requirement by submitting a verified petition sufficiently detailing the facts relied
upon, the strict need for the sworn statement that an affidavit represents is
essentially fulfilled. We note that the failure to attach the required affidavits was
fully cured when the respondent and her witness (Mrs. Talbin) personally
testified in the CA hearings held on January 7 and 17 and February 18, 2008 to
swear to and flesh out the allegations of the petition. Thus, even on this point,
the petition cannot be faulted.
Section 5(d) of the Amparo Rule requires that prior investigation of an alleged
disappearance must have been made, specifying the manner and results of the
investigation. Effectively, this requirement seeks to establish at the earliest
opportunity the level of diligence the public authorities undertook in relation with
the reported disappearance.79
We reject the petitioners’ argument that the respondent’s petition did not comply
with the Section 5(d) requirements of the Amparo Rule, as the petition specifies
in its paragraph 11 that Kunnong and his companions immediately reported
Tagitis’ disappearance to the police authorities in Jolo, Sulu as soon as they
were relatively certain that he indeed had disappeared. The police, however,
gave them the "ready answer" that Tagitis could have been abducted by the Abu
Sayyaf group or other anti-government groups. The respondent also alleged in
paragraphs 17 and 18 of her petition that she filed a "complaint" with the PNP
Police Station in Cotobato and in Jolo, but she was told of "an intriguing tale" by
the police that her husband was having "a good time with another woman." The
disappearance was alleged to have been reported, too, to no less than the
Governor of the ARMM, followed by the respondent’s personal inquiries that
yielded the factual bases for her petition.80
These allegations, to our mind, sufficiently specify that reports have been made
to the police authorities, and that investigations should have followed. That the
petition did not state the manner and results of the investigation that the Amparo
Rule requires, but rather generally stated the inaction of the police, their failure
to perform their duty to investigate, or at the very least, their reported failed
efforts, should not be a reflection on the completeness of the petition. To require
the respondent to elaborately specify the names, personal circumstances, and
addresses of the investigating authority, as well the manner and conduct of the
investigation is an overly strict interpretation of Section 5(d), given the
respondent’s frustrations in securing an investigation with meaningful results.
Under these circumstances, we are more than satisfied that the allegations of
the petition on the investigations undertaken are sufficiently complete for
purposes of bringing the petition forward.
Section 5(e) is in the Amparo Rule to prevent the use of a petition – that
otherwise is not supported by sufficient allegations to constitute a proper cause
of action – as a means to "fish" for evidence.81 The petitioners contend that the
respondent’s petition did not specify what "legally available efforts were taken
by the respondent," and that there was an "undue haste" in the filing of the
petition when, instead of cooperating with authorities, the respondent
immediately invoked the Court’s intervention.
We do not see the respondent’s petition as the petitioners view it.
Section 5(e) merely requires that the Amparo petitioner (the respondent in the
present case) allege "the actions and recourses taken to determine the fate or
whereabouts of the aggrieved party and the identity of the person responsible
Page 62 of 99
for the threat, act or omission." The following allegations of the respondent’s
petition duly outlined the actions she had taken and the frustrations she
encountered, thus compelling her to file her petition.
xxxx
7. Soon after the student left the room, Engr. Tagitis went out of the pension
house to take his early lunch but while out on the street, a couple of burly men
believed to be police intelligence operatives, forcibly took him and boarded the
latter on a motor vehicle then sped away without the knowledge of his student,
Arsimin Kunnong;
xxxx
10. When Kunnong could not locate Engr. Tagitis, the former sought the help of
another IDB scholar and reported the matter to the local police agency;
11. Arsimin Kunnong, including his friends and companions in Jolo, exerted
efforts in trying to locate the whereabouts of Engr. Tagitis and when he reported
the matter to the police authorities in Jolo, he was immediately given a ready
answer that Engr. Tagitis could [have been] abducted by the Abu Sayyaf group
and other groups known to be fighting against the government;
12. Being scared with these suggestions and insinuations of the police officers,
Kunnong reported the matter to the [respondent](wife of Engr. Tagitis) by phone
and other responsible officers and coordinators of the IDB Scholarship
Programme in the Philippines who alerted the office of the Governor of ARMM
who was then preparing to attend the OIC meeting in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia;
13. [The respondent], on the other hand, approached some of her co-employees
with the Land Bank in Digos branch, Digos City, Davao del Sur, who likewise
sought help from some of their friends in the military who could help them
find/locate the whereabouts of her husband;
xxxx
15. According to reliable information received by the [respondent], subject Engr.
Tagitis is in the custody of police intelligence operatives, specifically with the
CIDG, PNP Zamboanga City, being held against his will in an earnest attempt
of the police to involve and connect Engr. Tagitis with the different terrorist
groups;
xxxx
17. [The respondent] filed her complaint with the PNP Police Station at the
ARMM in Cotobato and in Jolo, as suggested by her friends, seeking their help
to find her husband, but [the respondent’s] request and pleadings failed to
produce any positive results
xxxx
20. Lately, [respondent] was again advised by one of the [petitioners] to go to
the ARMM Police Headquarters again in Cotobato City and also to the different
Police Headquarters including the police headquarters in Davao City, in
Zamboanga City, in Jolo, and in Camp Crame, Quezon City, and all these places
have been visited by the [respondent] in search for her husband, which entailed
expenses for her trips to these places thereby resorting her to borrowings and
beggings [sic] for financial help from friends and relatives only to try complying
to the different suggestions of these police officers, despite of which, her efforts
produced no positive results up to the present time;
xxxx
25. [The respondent] has exhausted all administrative avenues and remedies
but to no avail, and under the circumstances, [respondent] has no other plain,
speedy and adequate remedy to protect and get the release of subject Engr.
Morced Tagitis from the illegal clutches of [the petitioners], their intelligence
operatives and the like which are in total violation of the subject’s human and
constitutional rights, except the issuance of a WRIT OF AMPARO.
Based on these considerations, we rule that the respondent’s petition for the
Writ of Amparo is sufficient in form and substance and that the Court of Appeals
had every reason to proceed with its consideration of the case.
The Desaparecidos
The present case is one of first impression in the use and application of the Rule
on the Writ of Amparo in an enforced disappearance situation. For a deeper
appreciation of the application of this Rule to an enforced disappearance
situation, a brief look at the historical context of the writ and enforced
disappearances would be very helpful.
The phenomenon of enforced disappearance arising from State action first
attracted notice in Adolf Hitler’s Nact und Nebel Erlass or Night and Fog Decree
of December 7, 1941.82 The Third Reich’s Night and Fog Program, a State
policy, was directed at persons in occupied territories "endangering German
security"; they were transported secretly to Germany where they disappeared
without a trace. In order to maximize the desired intimidating effect, the policy
prohibited government officials from providing information about the fate of
these targeted persons.83
In the mid-1970s, the phenomenon of enforced disappearances resurfaced,
shocking and outraging the world when individuals, numbering anywhere from
6,000 to 24,000, were reported to have "disappeared" during the military regime
in Argentina. Enforced disappearances spread in Latin America, and the issue
became an international concern when the world noted its widespread and
systematic use by State security forces in that continent under Operation
Condor84 and during the Dirty War85 in the 1970s and 1980s. The escalation
of the practice saw political activists secretly arrested, tortured, and killed as
part of governments’ counter-insurgency campaigns. As this form of political
brutality became routine elsewhere in the continent, the Latin American media
standardized the term "disappearance" to describe the phenomenon. The
victims of enforced disappearances were called the "desaparecidos,"86 which
literally means the "disappeared ones."87 In general, there are three different
kinds of "disappearance" cases:
1) those of people arrested without witnesses or without positive identification
of the arresting agents and are never found again;
2) those of prisoners who are usually arrested without an appropriate warrant
and held in complete isolation for weeks or months while their families are
unable to discover their whereabouts and the military authorities deny having
them in custody until they eventually reappear in one detention center or
another; and
3) those of victims of "salvaging" who have disappeared until their lifeless bodies
are later discovered.88
In the Philippines, enforced disappearances generally fall within the first two
categories,89 and 855 cases were recorded during the period of martial law
from 1972 until 1986. Of this number, 595 remained missing, 132 surfaced alive
and 127 were found dead. During former President Corazon C. Aquino’s term,
820 people were reported to have disappeared and of these, 612 cases were
documented. Of this number, 407 remain missing, 108 surfaced alive and 97
were found dead. The number of enforced disappearances dropped during
former President Fidel V. Ramos’ term when only 87 cases were reported, while
the three-year term of former President Joseph E. Estrada yielded 58 reported
cases. KARAPATAN, a local non-governmental organization, reports that as of
March 31, 2008, the records show that there were a total of 193 victims of
enforced disappearance under incumbent President Gloria M. Arroyo’s
administration. The Commission on Human Rights’ records show a total of 636
verified cases of enforced disappearances from 1985 to 1993. Of this number,
406 remained missing, 92 surfaced alive, 62 were found dead, and 76 still have
undetermined status.90 Currently, the United Nations Working Group on
Enforced or Involuntary Disappearance91 reports 619 outstanding cases of
enforced or involuntary disappearances covering the period December 1, 2007
to November 30, 2008.92
Enforced Disappearances
Under Philippine Law
The Amparo Rule expressly provides that the "writ shall cover extralegal killings
and enforced disappearances or threats thereof."93 We note that although the
writ specifically covers "enforced disappearances," this concept is neither
defined nor penalized in this jurisdiction. The records of the Supreme Court
Committee on the Revision of Rules (Committee) reveal that the drafters of the
Amparo Rule initially considered providing an elemental definition of the concept
of enforced disappearance:94
JUSTICE MARTINEZ: I believe that first and foremost we should come up or
formulate a specific definition [for] extrajudicial killings and enforced
disappearances. From that definition, then we can proceed to formulate the
rules, definite rules concerning the same.
CHIEF JUSTICE PUNO: … As things stand, there is no law penalizing
extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances… so initially also we have to
[come up with] the nature of these extrajudicial killings and enforced
disappearances [to be covered by the Rule] because our concept of killings and
disappearances will define the jurisdiction of the courts. So we’ll have to agree
among ourselves about the nature of killings and disappearances for instance,
in other jurisdictions, the rules only cover state actors. That is an element
incorporated in their concept of extrajudicial killings and enforced
disappearances. In other jurisdictions, the concept includes acts and omissions
not only of state actors but also of non state actors. Well, more specifically in
the case of the Philippines for instance, should these rules include the killings,
the disappearances which may be authored by let us say, the NPAs or the leftist
organizations and others. So, again we need to define the nature of the
extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances that will be covered by these
rules. [Emphasis supplied] 95
In the end, the Committee took cognizance of several bills filed in the House of
Representatives96 and in the Senate97 on extrajudicial killings and enforced
disappearances, and resolved to do away with a clear textual definition of these
terms in the Rule. The Committee instead focused on the nature and scope of
the concerns within its power to address and provided the appropriate remedy
therefor, mindful that an elemental definition may intrude into the ongoing
legislative efforts.98
As the law now stands, extra-judicial killings and enforced disappearances in
this jurisdiction are not crimes penalized separately from the component criminal
acts undertaken to carry out these killings and enforced disappearances and
are now penalized under the Revised Penal Code and special laws.99 The
simple reason is that the Legislature has not spoken on the matter; the
determination of what acts are criminal and what the corresponding penalty
these criminal acts should carry are matters of substantive law that only the
Page 63 of 99
Legislature has the power to enact under the country’s constitutional scheme
and power structure.
Even without the benefit of directly applicable substantive laws on extra-judicial
killings and enforced disappearances, however, the Supreme Court is not
powerless to act under its own constitutional mandate to promulgate "rules
concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading,
practice and procedure in all courts,"100 since extrajudicial killings and enforced
disappearances, by their nature and purpose, constitute State or private party
violation of the constitutional rights of individuals to life, liberty and security.
Although the Court’s power is strictly procedural and as such does not diminish,
increase or modify substantive rights, the legal protection that the Court can
provide can be very meaningful through the procedures it sets in addressing
extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances. The Court, through its
procedural rules, can set the procedural standards and thereby directly compel
the public authorities to act on actual or threatened violations of constitutional
rights. To state the obvious, judicial intervention can make a difference – even
if only procedurally – in a situation when the very same investigating public
authorities may have had a hand in the threatened or actual violations of
constitutional rights.
Lest this Court intervention be misunderstood, we clarify once again that we do
not rule on any issue of criminal culpability for the extrajudicial killing or enforced
disappearance. This is an issue that requires criminal action before our criminal
courts based on our existing penal laws. Our intervention is in determining
whether an enforced disappearance has taken place and who is responsible or
accountable for this disappearance, and to define and impose the appropriate
remedies to address it. The burden for the public authorities to discharge in
these situations, under the Rule on the Writ of Amparo, is twofold. The first is to
ensure that all efforts at disclosure and investigation are undertaken under pain
of indirect contempt from this Court when governmental efforts are less than
what the individual situations require. The second is to address the
disappearance, so that the life of the victim is preserved and his or her liberty
and security restored. In these senses, our orders and directives relative to the
writ are continuing efforts that are not truly terminated until the extrajudicial
killing or enforced disappearance is fully addressed by the complete
determination of the fate and the whereabouts of the victim, by the production
of the disappeared person and the restoration of his or her liberty and security,
and, in the proper case, by the commencement of criminal action against the
guilty parties.
Enforced Disappearance
Under International Law
From the International Law perspective, involuntary or enforced disappearance
is considered a flagrant violation of human rights.101 It does not only violate the
right to life, liberty and security of the desaparecido; it affects their families as
well through the denial of their right to information regarding the circumstances
of the disappeared family member. Thus, enforced disappearances have been
said to be "a double form of torture," with "doubly paralyzing impact for the
victims," as they "are kept ignorant of their own fates, while family members are
deprived of knowing the whereabouts of their detained loved ones" and suffer
as well the serious economic hardship and poverty that in most cases follow the
disappearance of the household breadwinner.102
The UN General Assembly first considered the issue of "Disappeared Persons"
in December 1978 under Resolution 33/173. The Resolution expressed the
General Assembly’s deep concern arising from "reports from various parts of
the world relating to enforced or involuntary disappearances," and requested
the "UN Commission on Human Rights to consider the issue of enforced
disappearances with a view to making appropriate recommendations."103
In 1992, in response to the reality that the insidious practice of enforced
disappearance had become a global phenomenon, the UN General Assembly
adopted the Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Enforced
Disappearance (Declaration).104 This Declaration, for the first time, provided in
its third preambular clause a working description of enforced disappearance, as
follows:
Deeply concerned that in many countries, often in a persistent manner, enforced
disappearances occur, in the sense that persons are arrested, detained or
abducted against their will or otherwise deprived of their liberty by officials of
different branches or levels of Government, or by organized groups or private
individuals acting on behalf of, or with the support, direct or indirect, consent or
acquiescence of the Government, followed by a refusal to disclose the fate or
whereabouts of the persons concerned or a refusal to acknowledge the
deprivation of their liberty, which places such persons outside the protection of
the law. [Emphasis supplied]
Fourteen years after (or on December 20, 2006), the UN General Assembly
adopted the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from
Enforced Disappearance (Convention).105 The Convention was opened for
signature in Paris, France on February 6, 2007.106 Article 2 of the Convention
defined enforced disappearance as follows:
For the purposes of this Convention, "enforced disappearance" is considered to
be the arrest, detention, abduction or any other form of deprivation of liberty by
agents of the State or by persons or groups of persons acting with the
authorization, support or acquiescence of the State, followed by a refusal to
acknowledge the deprivation of liberty or by concealment of the fate or
whereabouts of the disappeared person, which place such a person outside the
protection of the law. [Emphasis supplied]
The Convention is the first universal human rights instrument to assert that there
is a right not to be subject to enforced disappearance107 and that this right is
non-derogable.108 It provides that no one shall be subjected to enforced
disappearance under any circumstances, be it a state of war, internal political
instability, or any other public emergency. It obliges State Parties to codify
enforced disappearance as an offense punishable with appropriate penalties
under their criminal law.109 It also recognizes the right of relatives of the
disappeared persons and of the society as a whole to know the truth on the fate
and whereabouts of the disappeared and on the progress and results of the
investigation.110 Lastly, it classifies enforced disappearance as a continuing
offense, such that statutes of limitations shall not apply until the fate and
whereabouts of the victim are established.111
Binding Effect of UN Action on the Philippines
To date, the Philippines has neither signed nor ratified the Convention, so that
the country is not yet committed to enact any law penalizing enforced
disappearance as a crime. The absence of a specific penal law, however, is not
a stumbling block for action from this Court, as heretofore mentioned; underlying
every enforced disappearance is a violation of the constitutional rights to life,
liberty and security that the Supreme Court is mandated by the Constitution to
protect through its rule-making powers.
Separately from the Constitution (but still pursuant to its terms), the Court is
guided, in acting on Amparo cases, by the reality that the Philippines is a
member of the UN, bound by its Charter and by the various conventions we
signed and ratified, particularly the conventions touching on humans rights.
Under the UN Charter, the Philippines pledged to "promote universal respect
for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without
distinctions as to race, sex, language or religion."112 Although no universal
agreement has been reached on the precise extent of the "human rights and
fundamental freedoms" guaranteed to all by the Charter,113 it was the UN itself
that issued the Declaration on enforced disappearance, and this Declaration
states:114
Any act of enforced disappearance is an offence to dignity. It is condemned as
a denial of the purposes of the Charter of the United Nations and as a grave and
flagrant violation of human rights and fundamental freedoms proclaimed in the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and reaffirmed and developed in
international instruments in this field. [Emphasis supplied]
As a matter of human right and fundamental freedom and as a policy matter
made in a UN Declaration, the ban on enforced disappearance cannot but have
its effects on the country, given our own adherence to "generally accepted
principles of international law as part of the law of the land."
In the recent case of Pharmaceutical and Health Care Association of the
Philippines v. Duque III, we held that:
Under the 1987 Constitution, international law can become part of the sphere of
domestic law either by transformation or incorporation. The transformation
method requires that an international law be transformed into a domestic law
through a constitutional mechanism such as local legislation. The incorporation
method applies when, by mere constitutional declaration, international law is
deemed to have the force of domestic law. [Emphasis supplied]
We characterized "generally accepted principles of international law" as norms
of general or customary international law that are binding on all states. We held
further:
[G]enerally accepted principles of international law, by virtue of the incorporation
clause of the Constitution, form part of the laws of the land even if they do not
derive from treaty obligations. The classical formulation in international law sees
those customary rules accepted as binding result from the combination [of] two
elements: the established, widespread, and consistent practice on the part of
States; and a psychological element known as the opinion juris sive
necessitates (opinion as to law or necessity). Implicit in the latter element is a
belief that the practice in question is rendered obligatory by the existence of a
rule of law requiring it. [Emphasis in the original]
The most widely accepted statement of sources of international law today is
Article 38(1) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, which provides
that the Court shall apply "international custom, as evidence of a general
practice accepted as law."118 The material sources of custom include State
practice, State legislation, international and national judicial decisions, recitals
in treaties and other international instruments, a pattern of treaties in the same
form, the practice of international organs, and resolutions relating to legal
questions in the UN General Assembly.119 Sometimes referred to as
"evidence" of international law,120 these sources identify the substance and
content of the obligations of States and are indicative of the "State practice" and
"opinio juris" requirements of international law.121 We note the following in
these respects:
First, barely two years from the adoption of the Declaration, the Organization of
American States (OAS) General Assembly adopted the Inter-American
Convention on Enforced Disappearance of Persons in June 1994.122 State
parties undertook under this Convention "not to practice, permit, or tolerate the
forced disappearance of persons, even in states of emergency or suspension of
individual guarantees."123 One of the key provisions includes the States’
obligation to enact the crime of forced disappearance in their respective national
criminal laws and to establish jurisdiction over such cases when the crime was
committed within their jurisdiction, when the victim is a national of that State,
and "when the alleged criminal is within its territory and it does not proceed to
Page 64 of 99
extradite him," which can be interpreted as establishing universal jurisdiction
among the parties to the Inter-American Convention.124 At present, Colombia,
Guatemala, Paraguay, Peru and Venezuela have enacted separate laws in
accordance with the Inter-American Convention and have defined activities
involving enforced disappearance to be criminal.1251avvphi1
Second, in Europe, the European Convention on Human Rights has no explicit
provision dealing with the protection against enforced disappearance. The
European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), however, has applied the
Convention in a way that provides ample protection for the underlying rights
affected by enforced disappearance through the Convention’s Article 2 on the
right to life; Article 3 on the prohibition of torture; Article 5 on the right to liberty
and security; Article 6, paragraph 1 on the right to a fair trial; and Article 13 on
the right to an effective remedy. A leading example demonstrating the protection
afforded by the European Convention is Kurt v. Turkey,126 where the ECHR
found a violation of the right to liberty and security of the disappeared person
when the applicant’s son disappeared after being taken into custody by Turkish
forces in the Kurdish village of Agilli in November 1993. It further found the
applicant (the disappeared person’s mother) to be a victim of a violation of
Article 3, as a result of the silence of the authorities and the inadequate
character of the investigations undertaken. The ECHR also saw the lack of any
meaningful investigation by the State as a violation of Article 13.127
Third, in the United States, the status of the prohibition on enforced
disappearance as part of customary international law is recognized in the most
recent edition of Restatement of the Law: The Third,128 which provides that "[a]
State violates international law if, as a matter of State policy, it practices,
encourages, or condones… (3) the murder or causing the disappearance of
individuals."129 We significantly note that in a related matter that finds close
identification with enforced disappearance – the matter of torture – the United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit Court held in Filartiga v. Pena-
Irala130 that the prohibition on torture had attained the status of customary
international law. The court further elaborated on the significance of UN
declarations, as follows:
These U.N. declarations are significant because they specify with great
precision the obligations of member nations under the Charter. Since their
adoption, "(m)embers can no longer contend that they do not know what human
rights they promised in the Charter to promote." Moreover, a U.N. Declaration
is, according to one authoritative definition, "a formal and solemn instrument,
suitable for rare occasions when principles of great and lasting importance are
being enunciated." Accordingly, it has been observed that the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights "no longer fits into the dichotomy of ‘binding treaty’
against ‘non-binding pronouncement,' but is rather an authoritative statement of
the international community." Thus, a Declaration creates an expectation of
adherence, and "insofar as the expectation is gradually justified by State
practice, a declaration may by custom become recognized as laying down rules
binding upon the States." Indeed, several commentators have concluded that
the Universal Declaration has become, in toto, a part of binding, customary
international law. [Citations omitted]
Fourth, in interpreting Article 2 (right to an effective domestic remedy) of the
International Convention on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), to which the
Philippines is both a signatory and a State Party, the UN Human Rights
Committee, under the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, has
stated that the act of enforced disappearance violates Articles 6 (right to life), 7
(prohibition on torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment)
and 9 (right to liberty and security of the person) of the ICCPR, and the act may
also amount to a crime against humanity.131
Fifth, Article 7, paragraph 1 of the 1998 Rome Statute establishing the
International Criminal Court (ICC) also covers enforced disappearances insofar
as they are defined as crimes against humanity,132 i.e., crimes "committed as
part of a widespread or systematic attack against any civilian population, with
knowledge of the attack." While more than 100 countries have ratified the Rome
Statute,133 the Philippines is still merely a signatory and has not yet ratified it.
We note that Article 7(1) of the Rome Statute has been incorporated in the
statutes of other international and hybrid tribunals, including Sierra Leone
Special Court, the Special Panels for Serious Crimes in Timor-Leste, and the
Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia.134 In addition, the
implementing legislation of State Parties to the Rome Statute of the ICC has
given rise to a number of national criminal provisions also covering enforced
disappearance.135
While the Philippines is not yet formally bound by the terms of the Convention
on enforced disappearance (or by the specific terms of the Rome Statute) and
has not formally declared enforced disappearance as a specific crime, the
above recital shows that enforced disappearance as a State practice has been
repudiated by the international community, so that the ban on it is now a
generally accepted principle of international law, which we should consider a
part of the law of the land, and which we should act upon to the extent already
allowed under our laws and the international conventions that bind us.
The following civil or political rights under the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, the ICCPR and the International Convention on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights (ICESR) may be infringed in the course of a disappearance:136
1) the right to recognition as a person before the law;
2) the right to liberty and security of the person;
3) the right not to be subjected to torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment;

4) the right to life, when the disappeared person is killed;
5) the right to an identity;
6) the right to a fair trial and to judicial guarantees;
7) the right to an effective remedy, including reparation and compensation;
8) the right to know the truth regarding the circumstances of a disappearance.
9) the right to protection and assistance to the family;
10) the right to an adequate standard of living;
11) the right to health; and
12) the right to education [Emphasis supplied]
Article 2 of the ICCPR, which binds the Philippines as a state party, provides:
Article 2
3. Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes:
(a) To ensure that any person whose rights or freedoms as herein recognized
are violated shall have an effective remedy, notwithstanding that the violation
has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity;
(b) To ensure that any person claiming such a remedy shall have his right
thereto determined by competent judicial, administrative or legislative
authorities, or by any other competent authority provided for by the legal system
of the State, and to develop the possibilities of judicial remedy;
(c) To ensure that the competent authorities shall enforce such remedies when
granted. [Emphasis supplied]
In General Comment No. 31, the UN Human Rights Committee opined that the
right to an effective remedy under Article 2 of the ICCPR includes the obligation
of the State to investigate ICCPR violations promptly, thoroughly, and
effectively, viz:137
15. Article 2, paragraph 3, requires that in addition to effective protection of
Covenant rights, States Parties must ensure that individuals also have
accessible and effective remedies to vindicate those rights… The Committee
attaches importance to States Parties' establishing appropriate judicial and
administrative mechanisms for addressing claims of rights violations under
domestic law… Administrative mechanisms are particularly required to give
effect to the general obligation to investigate allegations of violations promptly,
thoroughly and effectively through independent and impartial bodies. A failure
by a State Party to investigate allegations of violations could in and of itself give
rise to a separate breach of the Covenant. Cessation of an ongoing violation is
an essential element of the right to an effective remedy. [Emphasis supplied]
The UN Human Rights Committee further stated in the same General Comment
No. 31 that failure to investigate as well as failure to bring to justice the
perpetrators of ICCPR violations could in and of itself give rise to a separate
breach of the Covenant, thus:138
18. Where the investigations referred to in paragraph 15 reveal violations of
certain Covenant rights, States Parties must ensure that those responsible are
brought to justice. As with failure to investigate, failure to bring to justice
perpetrators of such violations could in and of itself give rise to a separate
breach of the Covenant. These obligations arise notably in respect of those
violations recognized as criminal under either domestic or international law,
such as torture and similar cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment (article 7),
summary and arbitrary killing (article 6) and enforced disappearance (articles 7
and 9 and, frequently, 6). Indeed, the problem of impunity for these violations, a
matter of sustained concern by the Committee, may well be an important
contributing element in the recurrence of the violations. When committed as part
of a widespread or systematic attack on a civilian population, these violations of
the Covenant are crimes against humanity (see Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court, article 7). [Emphasis supplied]
In Secretary of National Defense v. Manalo,139 this Court, in ruling that the right
to security of persons is a guarantee of the protection of one’s right by the
government, held that:
The right to security of person in this third sense is a corollary of the policy that
the State "guarantees full respect for human rights" under Article II, Section 11
of the 1987 Constitution. As the government is the chief guarantor of order and
security, the Constitutional guarantee of the rights to life, liberty and security of
person is rendered ineffective if government does not afford protection to these
rights especially when they are under threat. Protection includes conducting
effective investigations, organization of the government apparatus to extend
protection to victims of extralegal killings or enforced disappearances (or threats
thereof) and/or their families, and bringing offenders to the bar of justice. The
Inter-American Court of Human Rights stressed the importance of investigation
in the Velasquez Rodriguez Case, viz:
(The duty to investigate) must be undertaken in a serious manner and not as a
mere formality preordained to be ineffective. An investigation must have an
objective and be assumed by the State as its own legal duty, not as a step taken
Page 65 of 99
by private interests that depends upon the initiative of the victim or his family or
upon their offer of proof, without an effective search for the truth by the
government. [Emphasis supplied]
Manalo significantly cited Kurt v. Turkey,140 where the ECHR interpreted the
"right to security" not only as a prohibition on the State against arbitrary
deprivation of liberty, but also as the imposition of a positive duty to afford
protection to the right to liberty. The Court notably quoted the following ECHR
ruling:
[A]ny deprivation of liberty must not only have been effected in conformity with
the substantive and procedural rules of national law but must equally be in
keeping with the very purpose of Article 5, namely to protect the individual from
arbitrariness... Having assumed control over that individual, it is incumbent on
the authorities to account for his or her whereabouts. For this reason, Article 5
must be seen as requiring the authorities to take effective measures to
safeguard against the risk of disappearance and to conduct a prompt effective
investigation into an arguable claim that a person has been taken into custody
and has not been seen since. [Emphasis supplied]
These rulings effectively serve as the backdrop for the Rule on the Writ of
Amparo, which the Court made effective on October 24, 2007. Although the
Amparo Rule still has gaps waiting to be filled through substantive law, as
evidenced primarily by the lack of a concrete definition of "enforced
disappearance," the materials cited above, among others, provide ample
guidance and standards on how, through the medium of the Amparo Rule, the
Court can provide remedies and protect the constitutional rights to life, liberty
and security that underlie every enforced disappearance.
Evidentiary Difficulties Posed by the Unique Nature of an Enforced
Disappearance
Before going into the issue of whether the respondent has discharged the
burden of proving the allegations of the petition for the Writ of Amparo by the
degree of proof required by the Amparo Rule, we shall discuss briefly the unique
evidentiary difficulties presented by enforced disappearance cases; these
difficulties form part of the setting that the implementation of the Amparo Rule
shall encounter.
These difficulties largely arise because the State itself – the party whose
involvement is alleged – investigates enforced disappearances. Past
experiences in other jurisdictions show that the evidentiary difficulties are
generally threefold.
First, there may be a deliberate concealment of the identities of the direct
perpetrators.141 Experts note that abductors are well organized, armed and
usually members of the military or police forces, thus:
The victim is generally arrested by the security forces or by persons acting under
some form of governmental authority. In many countries the units that plan,
implement and execute the program are generally specialized, highly-secret
bodies within the armed or security forces. They are generally directed through
a separate, clandestine chain of command, but they have the necessary
credentials to avoid or prevent any interference by the "legal" police forces.
These authorities take their victims to secret detention centers where they
subject them to interrogation and torture without fear of judicial or other
controls.142
In addition, there are usually no witnesses to the crime; if there are, these
witnesses are usually afraid to speak out publicly or to testify on the
disappearance out of fear for their own lives.143 We have had occasion to note
this difficulty in Secretary of Defense v. Manalo144 when we acknowledged that
"where powerful military officers are implicated, the hesitation of witnesses to
surface and testify against them comes as no surprise."
Second, deliberate concealment of pertinent evidence of the disappearance is
a distinct possibility; the central piece of evidence in an enforced disappearance
– i.e., the corpus delicti or the victim’s body – is usually concealed to effectively
thwart the start of any investigation or the progress of one that may have
begun.145 The problem for the victim’s family is the State’s virtual monopoly of
access to pertinent evidence. The Inter-American Court of Human Rights
(IACHR) observed in the landmark case of Velasquez Rodriguez146 that
inherent to the practice of enforced disappearance is the deliberate use of the
State’s power to destroy the pertinent evidence. The IACHR described the
concealment as a clear attempt by the State to commit the perfect crime.147
Third is the element of denial; in many cases, the State authorities deliberately
deny that the enforced disappearance ever occurred.148 "Deniability" is central
to the policy of enforced disappearances, as the absence of any proven
disappearance makes it easier to escape the application of legal standards
ensuring the victim’s human rights.149 Experience shows that government
officials typically respond to requests for information about desaparecidos by
saying that they are not aware of any disappearance, that the missing people
may have fled the country, or that their names have merely been invented.150
These considerations are alive in our minds, as these are the difficulties we
confront, in one form or another, in our consideration of this case.
Evidence and Burden of Proof in Enforced Disappearances Cases
Sections 13, 17 and 18 of the Amparo Rule define the nature of an Amparo
proceeding and the degree and burden of proof the parties to the case carry, as
follows:
Section 13. Summary Hearing. The hearing on the petition shall be summary.
However, the court, justice or judge may call for a preliminary conference to
simplify the issues and determine the possibility of obtaining stipulations and
admissions from the parties.
xxxx
Section 17. Burden of Proof and Standard of Diligence Required. – The parties
shall establish their claims by substantial evidence.
The respondent who is a private individual must prove that ordinary diligence as
required by applicable laws, rules and regulations was observed in the
performance of duty.
The respondent who is a public official or employee must prove that
extraordinary diligence as required by applicable laws, rules and regulations
was observed in the performance of duty.
The respondent public official or employee cannot invoke the presumption that
official duty has been regularly performed or evade responsibility or liability.
Section 18. Judgment. – … If the allegations in the petition are proven by
substantial evidence, the court shall grant the privilege of the writ and such
reliefs as may be proper and appropriate; otherwise, the privilege shall be
denied. [Emphasis supplied]
These characteristics – namely, of being summary and the use of substantial
evidence as the required level of proof (in contrast to the usual preponderance
of evidence or proof beyond reasonable doubt in court proceedings) – reveal
the clear intent of the framers of the Amparo Rule to have the equivalent of an
administrative proceeding, albeit judicially conducted, in addressing Amparo
situations. The standard of diligence required – the duty of public officials and
employees to observe extraordinary diligence – point, too, to the extraordinary
measures expected in the protection of constitutional rights and in the
consequent handling and investigation of extra-judicial killings and enforced
disappearance cases.
Thus, in these proceedings, the Amparo petitioner needs only to properly
comply with the substance and form requirements of a Writ of Amparo petition,
as discussed above, and prove the allegations by substantial evidence. Once a
rebuttable case has been proven, the respondents must then respond and prove
their defenses based on the standard of diligence required. The rebuttable case,
of course, must show that an enforced disappearance took place under
circumstances showing a violation of the victim’s constitutional rights to life,
liberty or security, and the failure on the part of the investigating authorities to
appropriately respond.
The landmark case of Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations151 provided
the Court its first opportunity to define the substantial evidence required to arrive
at a valid decision in administrative proceedings. To directly quote Ang Tibay:
Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion. [citations omitted] The statute provides that ‘the rules of evidence
prevailing in courts of law and equity shall not be controlling.’ The obvious
purpose of this and similar provisions is to free administrative boards from the
compulsion of technical rules so that the mere admission of matter which would
be deemed incompetent in judicial proceedings would not invalidate the
administrative order. [citations omitted] But this assurance of a desirable
flexibility in administrative procedure does not go so far as to justify orders
without a basis in evidence having rational probative force. [Emphasis supplied]
In Secretary of Defense v. Manalo,152 which was the Court’s first petition for a
Writ of Amparo, we recognized that the full and exhaustive proceedings that the
substantial evidence standard regularly requires do not need to apply due to the
summary nature of Amparo proceedings. We said:
The remedy [of the writ of amparo] provides rapid judicial relief as it partakes of
a summary proceeding that requires only substantial evidence to make the
appropriate reliefs available to the petitioner; it is not an action to determine
criminal guilt requiring proof beyond reasonable doubt, or liability for damages
requiring preponderance of evidence, or administrative responsibility requiring
substantial evidence that will require full and exhaustive proceedings.
[Emphasis supplied]
Not to be forgotten in considering the evidentiary aspects of Amparo petitions
are the unique difficulties presented by the nature of enforced disappearances,
heretofore discussed, which difficulties this Court must frontally meet if the
Amparo Rule is to be given a chance to achieve its objectives. These evidentiary
difficulties compel the Court to adopt standards appropriate and responsive to
the circumstances, without transgressing the due process requirements that
underlie every proceeding.
In the seminal case of Velasquez Rodriguez,153 the IACHR – faced with a lack
of direct evidence that the government of Honduras was involved in Velasquez
Rodriguez’ disappearance – adopted a relaxed and informal evidentiary
standard, and established the rule that presumes governmental responsibility
for a disappearance if it can be proven that the government carries out a general
practice of enforced disappearances and the specific case can be linked to that
practice.154 The IACHR took note of the realistic fact that enforced
disappearances could be proven only through circumstantial or indirect
evidence or by logical inference; otherwise, it was impossible to prove that an
individual had been made to disappear. It held:
Page 66 of 99
130. The practice of international and domestic courts shows that direct
evidence, whether testimonial or documentary, is not the only type of evidence
that may be legitimately considered in reaching a decision. Circumstantial
evidence, indicia, and presumptions may be considered, so long as they lead to
conclusions consistent with the facts.
131. Circumstantial or presumptive evidence is especially important in
allegations of disappearances, because this type of repression is characterized
by an attempt to suppress all information about the kidnapping or the
whereabouts and fate of the victim. [Emphasis supplied]
In concluding that the disappearance of Manfredo Velásquez (Manfredo) was
carried out by agents who acted under cover of public authority, the IACHR
relied on circumstantial evidence including the hearsay testimony of Zenaida
Velásquez, the victim’s sister, who described Manfredo’s kidnapping on the
basis of conversations she had with witnesses who saw Manfredo kidnapped
by men in civilian clothes in broad daylight. She also told the Court that a former
Honduran military official had announced that Manfredo was kidnapped by a
special military squadron acting under orders of the Chief of the Armed
Forces.155 The IACHR likewise considered the hearsay testimony of a second
witness who asserted that he had been told by a Honduran military officer about
the disappearance, and a third witness who testified that he had spoken in
prison to a man who identified himself as Manfredo.156
Velasquez stresses the lesson that flexibility is necessary under the unique
circumstances that enforced disappearance cases pose to the courts; to have
an effective remedy, the standard of evidence must be responsive to the
evidentiary difficulties faced. On the one hand, we cannot be arbitrary in the
admission and appreciation of evidence, as arbitrariness entails violation of
rights and cannot be used as an effective counter-measure; we only compound
the problem if a wrong is addressed by the commission of another wrong. On
the other hand, we cannot be very strict in our evidentiary rules and cannot
consider evidence the way we do in the usual criminal and civil cases; precisely,
the proceedings before us are administrative in nature where, as a rule,
technical rules of evidence are not strictly observed. Thus, while we must follow
the substantial evidence rule, we must observe flexibility in considering the
evidence we shall take into account.
The fair and proper rule, to our mind, is to consider all the pieces of evidence
adduced in their totality, and to consider any evidence otherwise inadmissible
under our usual rules to be admissible if it is consistent with the admissible
evidence adduced. In other words, we reduce our rules to the most basic test of
reason – i.e., to the relevance of the evidence to the issue at hand and its
consistency with all other pieces of adduced evidence. Thus, even hearsay
evidence can be admitted if it satisfies this basic minimum test.
We note in this regard that the use of flexibility in the consideration of evidence
is not at all novel in the Philippine legal system. In child abuse cases, Section
28 of the Rule on Examination of a Child Witness157 is expressly recognized
as an exception to the hearsay rule. This Rule allows the admission of the
hearsay testimony of a child describing any act or attempted act of sexual abuse
in any criminal or non-criminal proceeding, subject to certain prerequisites and
the right of cross-examination by the adverse party. The admission of the
statement is determined by the court in light of specified subjective and objective
considerations that provide sufficient indicia of reliability of the child witness.158
These requisites for admission find their counterpart in the present case under
the above-described conditions for the exercise of flexibility in the consideration
of evidence, including hearsay evidence, in extrajudicial killings and enforced
disappearance cases.
Assessment of the Evidence
The threshold question for our resolution is: was there an enforced
disappearance within the meaning of this term under the UN Declaration we
have cited?
The Convention defines enforced disappearance as "the arrest, detention,
abduction or any other form of deprivation of liberty by agents of the State or by
persons or groups of persons acting with the authorization, support or
acquiescence of the State, followed by a refusal to acknowledge the deprivation
of liberty or by concealment of the fate or whereabouts of the disappeared
person, which place such a person outside the protection of the law."159 Under
this definition, the elements that constitute enforced disappearance are
essentially fourfold:160
(a) arrest, detention, abduction or any form of deprivation of liberty;
(b) carried out by agents of the State or persons or groups of persons acting
with the authorization, support or acquiescence of the State;
(c) followed by a refusal to acknowledge the detention, or a concealment of the
fate of the disappeared person; and
(d) placement of the disappeared person outside the protection of the law.
[Emphasis supplied]
We find no direct evidence indicating how the victim actually disappeared. The
direct evidence at hand only shows that Tagitis went out of the ASY Pension
House after depositing his room key with the hotel desk and was never seen
nor heard of again. The undisputed conclusion, however, from all concerned –
the petitioner, Tagitis’ colleagues and even the police authorities – is that
Tagistis disappeared under mysterious circumstances and was never seen
again. The respondent injected the causal element in her petition and testimony,
as we shall discuss below.
We likewise find no direct evidence showing that operatives of PNP CIDG
Zamboanga abducted or arrested Tagitis. If at all, only the respondent’s
allegation that Tagistis was under CIDG Zamboanga custody stands on record,
but it is not supported by any other evidence, direct or circumstantial.
In her direct testimony, the respondent pointed to two sources of information as
her bases for her allegation that Tagistis had been placed under government
custody (in contrast with CIDG Zamboanga custody). The first was an unnamed
friend in Zamboanga (later identified as Col. Ancanan), who occupied a high
position in the military and who allegedly mentioned that Tagitis was in good
hands. Nothing came out of this claim, as both the respondent herself and her
witness, Mrs. Talbin, failed to establish that Col. Ancanan gave them any
information that Tagitis was in government custody. Col. Ancanan, for his part,
admitted the meeting with the respondent but denied giving her any information
about the disappearance.
The more specific and productive source of information was Col. Kasim, whom
the respondent, together with her witness Mrs. Talbin, met in Camp Katitipan in
Davao City. To quote the relevant portions of the respondent’s testimony:
Q: Were you able to speak to other military officials regarding the whereabouts
of your husband particularly those in charge of any records or investigation?
A: I went to Camp Katitipan in Davao City. Then one military officer, Col. Casim,
told me that my husband is being abducted [sic] because he is under custodial
investigation because he is allegedly "parang liason ng J.I.", sir.
Q: What is J.I.?
A: Jema’ah Islamiah, sir.
Q: Was there any information that was read to you during one of those visits of
yours in that Camp?
A: Col. Casim did not furnish me a copy of his report because he said those
reports are highly confidential, sir.
Q: Was it read to you then even though you were not furnished a copy?
A: Yes, sir. In front of us, my friends.
Q: And what was the content of that highly confidential report?
A: Those alleged activities of Engineer Tagitis, sir.161 [Emphasis supplied]
She confirmed this testimony in her cross-examination:
Q: You also mentioned that you went to Camp Katitipan in Davao City?
A: Yes, ma’am.
Q: And a certain Col. Kasim told you that your husband was abducted and under
custodial investigation?
A: Yes, ma’am.
Q: And you mentioned that he showed you a report?
A: Yes, ma’am.
Q: Were you able to read the contents of that report?
A: He did not furnish me a copy of those [sic] report because those [sic] were
highly confidential. That is a military report, ma’am.
Q: But you were able to read the contents?
A: No. But he read it in front of us, my friends, ma’am.
Q: How many were you when you went to see Col. Kasim?
A: There were three of us, ma’am.
Q: Who were your companions?
A: Mrs. Talbin, tapos yung dalawang friends nya from Mati City, Davao Oriental,
ma’am.162
xxxx
Q: When you were told that your husband is in good hands, what was your
reaction and what did you do?
A: May binasa kasi sya that my husband has a parang meeting with other people
na parang mga terorista na mga tao. Tapos at the end of the report is [sic] under
custodial investigation. So I told him "Colonel, my husband is sick. He is diabetic
at nagmemaintain yun ng gamot. Pakisabi lang sa naghohold sa asawa ko na
bigyan siya ng gamot, ma’am."163
xxxx
Page 67 of 99
Q: You mentioned that you received information that Engineer Tagitis is being
held by the CIDG in Zamboanga, did you go to CIDG Zamboanga to verify that
information?
A: I did not go to CIDG Zamboanga. I went to Camp Karingal instead. Enough
na yun na effort ko because I know that they would deny it, ma’am.164
On February 11, 2008, the respondent presented Mrs. Talbin to corroborate her
testimony that her husband was abducted and held under custodial investigation
by the PNP-CIDG Zamboanga City, viz:
Q: You said that you went to Camp Katitipan in Davao City sometime November
24, 2007, who was with you when you went there?
A: Mary Jean Tagitis, sir.
Q: Only the two of you?
A: No. We have some other companions. We were four at that time, sir.
Q: Who were they?
A: Salvacion Serrano, Mini Leong, Mrs. Tagitis and me, sir.
Q: Were you able to talk, see some other officials at Camp Katitipan during that
time?
A: Col. Kasim (PS Supt. Julasirim Ahadin Kasim) only, sir.
Q: Were you able to talk to him?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: The four of you?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What information did you get from Col. Kasim during that time?
A: The first time we met with [him] I asked him if he knew of the exact location,
if he can furnish us the location of Engr. Tagitis. And he was reading this report.
He told us that Engr. Tagitis is in good hands. He is with the military, but he is
not certain whether he is with the AFP or PNP. He has this serious case. He
was charged of terrorism because he was under surveillance from January 2007
up to the time that he was abducted. He told us that he was under custodial
investigation. As I’ve said earlier, he was seen under surveillance from January.
He was seen talking to Omar Patik, a certain Santos of Bulacan who is also a
Balik Islam and charged with terrorism. He was seen carrying boxes of
medicines. Then we asked him how long will he be in custodial investigation.
He said until we can get some information. But he also told us that he cannot
give us that report because it was a raw report. It was not official, sir.
Q: You said that he was reading a report, was that report in document form, in
a piece of paper or was it in the computer or what?
A: As far as I can see it, sir, it is written in white bond paper. I don’t know if it
was computerized but I’m certain that it was typewritten. I’m not sure if it used
computer, fax or what, sir.
Q: When he was reading it to you, was he reading it line by line or he was
reading in a summary form?
A: Sometimes he was glancing to the report and talking to us, sir.165
xxxx
Q: Were you informed as to the place where he was being kept during that time?
A: He did not tell us where he [Tagitis] was being kept. But he mentioned this
Talipapao, Sulu, sir.
Q: After that incident, what did you do if any?
A: We just left and as I’ve mentioned, we just waited because that raw
information that he was reading to us [sic] after the custodial investigation,
Engineer Tagitis will be released. [Emphasis supplied]166
Col. Kasim never denied that he met with the respondent and her friends, and
that he provided them information based on the input of an unnamed asset. He
simply claimed in his testimony that the "informal letter" he received from his
informant in Sulu did not indicate that Tagitis was in the custody of the CIDG.
He also stressed that the information he provided the respondent was merely a
"raw report" from "barangay intelligence" that still needed confirmation and
"follow up" as to its veracity.167
To be sure, the respondent’s and Mrs. Talbin’s testimonies were far from
perfect, as the petitioners pointed out. The respondent mistakenly characterized
Col. Kasim as a "military officer" who told her that "her husband is being
abducted because he is under custodial investigation because he is allegedly
‘parang liason ng J.I.’" The petitioners also noted that "Mrs. Talbin’s testimony
imputing certain statements to Sr. Supt. Kasim that Engr. Tagitis is with the
military, but he is not certain whether it is the PNP or AFP is not worthy of belief,
since Sr. Supt. Kasim is a high ranking police officer who would certainly know
that the PNP is not part of the military."
Upon deeper consideration of these inconsistencies, however, what appears
clear to us is that the petitioners never really steadfastly disputed or presented
evidence to refute the credibility of the respondent and her witness, Mrs. Talbin.
The inconsistencies the petitioners point out relate, more than anything else, to
details that should not affect the credibility of the respondent and Mrs. Talbin;
the inconsistencies are not on material points.168 We note, for example, that
these witnesses are lay people in so far as military and police matters are
concerned, and confusion between the police and the military is not unusual. As
a rule, minor inconsistencies such as these indicate truthfulness rather than
prevarication169and only tend to strengthen their probative value, in contrast to
testimonies from various witnesses dovetailing on every detail; the latter cannot
but generate suspicion that the material circumstances they testified to were
integral parts of a well thought of and prefabricated story.170
Based on these considerations and the unique evidentiary situation in enforced
disappearance cases, we hold it duly established that Col. Kasim informed the
respondent and her friends, based on the informant’s letter, that Tagitis,
reputedly a liaison for the JI and who had been under surveillance since January
2007, was "in good hands" and under custodial investigation for complicity with
the JI after he was seen talking to one Omar Patik and a certain "Santos" of
Bulacan, a "Balik Islam" charged with terrorism. The respondent’s and Mrs.
Talbin’s testimonies cannot simply be defeated by Col. Kasim’s plain denial and
his claim that he had destroyed his informant’s letter, the critical piece of
evidence that supports or negates the parties’ conflicting claims. Col. Kasim’s
admitted destruction of this letter – effectively, a suppression of this evidence –
raises the presumption that the letter, if produced, would be proof of what the
respondent claimed.171 For brevity, we shall call the evidence of what Col.
Kasim reported to the respondent to be the "Kasim evidence."
Given this evidence, our next step is to decide whether we can accept this
evidence, in lieu of direct evidence, as proof that the disappearance of Tagitis
was due to action with government participation, knowledge or consent and that
he was held for custodial investigation. We note in this regard that Col. Kasim
was never quoted to have said that the custodial investigation was by the CIDG
Zamboanga. The Kasim evidence only implies government intervention through
the use of the term "custodial investigation," and does not at all point to CIDG
Zamboanga as Tagitis’ custodian.
Strictly speaking, we are faced here with a classic case of hearsay evidence –
i.e., evidence whose probative value is not based on the personal knowledge of
the witnesses (the respondent, Mrs. Talbin and Col. Kasim himself) but on the
knowledge of some other person not on the witness stand (the informant).172
To say that this piece of evidence is incompetent and inadmissible evidence of
what it substantively states is to acknowledge – as the petitioners effectively
suggest – that in the absence of any direct evidence, we should simply dismiss
the petition. To our mind, an immediate dismissal for this reason is no different
from a statement that the Amparo Rule – despite its terms – is ineffective, as it
cannot allow for the special evidentiary difficulties that are unavoidably present
in Amparo situations, particularly in extrajudicial killings and enforced
disappearances. The Amparo Rule was not promulgated with this intent or with
the intent to make it a token gesture of concern for constitutional rights. It was
promulgated to provide effective and timely remedies, using and profiting from
local and international experiences in extrajudicial killings and enforced
disappearances, as the situation may require. Consequently, we have no choice
but to meet the evidentiary difficulties inherent in enforced disappearances with
the flexibility that these difficulties demand.1avvphi1
To give full meaning to our Constitution and the rights it protects, we hold that,
as in Velasquez, we should at least take a close look at the available evidence
to determine the correct import of every piece of evidence – even of those
usually considered inadmissible under the general rules of evidence – taking
into account the surrounding circumstances and the test of reason that we can
use as basic minimum admissibility requirement. In the present case, we should
at least determine whether the Kasim evidence before us is relevant and
meaningful to the disappearance of Tagistis and reasonably consistent with
other evidence in the case.
The evidence about Tagitis’ personal circumstances surrounded him with an air
of mystery. He was reputedly a consultant of the World Bank and a Senior
Honorary Counselor for the IDB who attended a seminar in Zamboanga and
thereafter proceded to Jolo for an overnight stay, indicated by his request to
Kunnong for the purchase of a return ticket to Zamboanga the day after he
arrived in Jolo. Nothing in the records indicates the purpose of his overnight
sojourn in Jolo. A colleague in the IDB, Prof. Matli, early on informed the Jolo
police that Tagitis may have taken funds given to him in trust for IDB scholars.
Prof Matli later on stated that he never accused Tagitis of taking away money
held in trust, although he confirmed that the IDB was seeking assistance in
locating funds of IDB scholars deposited in Tagitis’ personal account. Other than
these pieces of evidence, no other information exists in the records relating to
the personal circumstances of Tagitis.
The actual disappearance of Tagitis is as murky as his personal circumstances.
While the Amparo petition recited that he was taken away by "burly men
believed to be police intelligence operatives," no evidence whatsoever was
introduced to support this allegation. Thus, the available direct evidence is that
Tagitis was last seen at 12.30 p.m. of October 30, 2007 – the day he arrived in
Jolo – and was never seen again.
Page 68 of 99
The Kasim evidence assumes critical materiality given the dearth of direct
evidence on the above aspects of the case, as it supplies the gaps that were
never looked into and clarified by police investigation. It is the evidence, too,
that colors a simple missing person report into an enforced disappearance case,
as it injects the element of participation by agents of the State and thus brings
into question how the State reacted to the disappearance.
Denials on the part of the police authorities, and frustration on the part of the
respondent, characterize the attempts to locate Tagitis. Initially in Jolo, the
police informed Kunnong that Tagitis could have been taken by the Abu Sayyaf
or other groups fighting the government. No evidence was ever offered on
whether there was active Jolo police investigation and how and why the Jolo
police arrived at this conclusion. The respondent’s own inquiry in Jolo yielded
the answer that he was not missing but was with another woman somewhere.
Again, no evidence exists that this explanation was arrived at based on an
investigation. As already related above, the inquiry with Col. Ancanan in
Zamboanga yielded ambivalent results not useful for evidentiary purposes.
Thus, it was only the inquiry from Col. Kasim that yielded positive results. Col.
Kasim’s story, however, confirmed only the fact of his custodial investigation
(and, impliedly, his arrest or abduction), without identifying his abductor/s or the
party holding him in custody. The more significant part of Col. Kasim’s story is
that the abduction came after Tagitis was seen talking with Omar Patik and a
certain Santos of Bulacan, a "Balik Islam" charged with terrorism. Mrs. Talbin
mentioned, too, that Tagitis was being held at Talipapao, Sulu. None of the
police agencies participating in the investigation ever pursued these leads.
Notably, Task Force Tagitis to which this information was relayed did not appear
to have lifted a finger to pursue these aspects of the case.
More denials were manifested in the Returns on the writ to the CA made by the
petitioners. Then PNP Chief Gen. Avelino I. Razon merely reported the
directives he sent to the ARMM Regional Director and the Regional Chief of the
CIDG on Tagitis, and these reports merely reiterated the open-ended initial
report of the disappearance. The CIDG directed a search in all of its divisions
with negative results. These, to the PNP Chief, constituted the exhaustion "of
all possible efforts." PNP-CIDG Chief General Edgardo M. Doromal, for his part,
also reported negative results after searching "all divisions and departments [of
the CIDG] for a person named Engr. Morced N. Tagitis . . . and after a diligent
and thorough research, records show that no such person is being detained in
the CIDG or any of its department or divisions." PNP-PACER Chief PS Supt.
Leonardo A. Espina and PNP PRO ARMM Regional Director PC
Superintendent Joel R. Goltiao did no better in their affidavits-returns, as they
essentially reported the results of their directives to their units to search for
Tagitis.
The extent to which the police authorities acted was fully tested when the CA
constituted Task Force Tagitis, with specific directives on what to do. The
negative results reflected in the Returns on the writ were again replicated during
the three hearings the CA scheduled. Aside from the previously mentioned
"retraction" that Prof. Matli made to correct his accusation that Tagitis took
money held in trust for students, PS Supt. Ajirim reiterated in his testimony that
the CIDG consistently denied any knowledge or complicity in any abduction and
said that there was no basis to conclude that the CIDG or any police unit had
anything to do with the disappearance of Tagitis; he likewise considered it
premature to conclude that Tagitis simply ran away with the money in his
custody. As already noted above, the Task Force notably did not pursue any
investigation about the personal circumstances of Tagitis, his background in
relation to the IDB and the background and activities of this Bank itself, and the
reported sighting of Tagistis with terrorists and his alleged custody in Talipapao,
Sulu. No attempt appears to have ever been made to look into the alleged IDB
funds that Tagitis held in trust, or to tap any of the "assets" who are
indispensable in investigations of this nature. These omissions and negative
results were aggravated by the CA findings that it was only as late as January
28, 2008 or three months after the disappearance that the police authorities
requested for clear pictures of Tagitis. Col. Kasim could not attend the trial
because his subpoena was not served, despite the fact that he was designated
as Ajirim’s replacement in the latter’s last post. Thus, Col. Kasim was not then
questioned. No investigation – even an internal one – appeared to have been
made to inquire into the identity of Col. Kasim’s "asset" and what he indeed
wrote.
We glean from all these pieces of evidence and developments a consistency in
the government’s denial of any complicity in the disappearance of Tagitis,
disrupted only by the report made by Col. Kasim to the respondent at Camp
Katitipan. Even Col. Kasim, however, eventually denied that he ever made the
disclosure that Tagitis was under custodial investigation for complicity in
terrorism. Another distinctive trait that runs through these developments is the
government’s dismissive approach to the disappearance, starting from the initial
response by the Jolo police to Kunnong’s initial reports of the disappearance, to
the responses made to the respondent when she herself reported and inquired
about her husband’s disappearance, and even at Task Force Tagitis itself.
As the CA found through Task Force Tagitis, the investigation was at best
haphazard since the authorities were looking for a man whose picture they
initially did not even secure. The returns and reports made to the CA fared no
better, as the CIDG efforts themselves were confined to searching for custodial
records of Tagitis in their various departments and divisions. To point out the
obvious, if the abduction of Tagitis was a "black" operation because it was
unrecorded or officially unauthorized, no record of custody would ever appear
in the CIDG records; Tagitis, too, would not be detained in the usual police or
CIDG detention places. In sum, none of the reports on record contains any
meaningful results or details on the depth and extent of the investigation made.
To be sure, reports of top police officials indicating the personnel and units they
directed to investigate can never constitute exhaustive and meaningful
investigation, or equal detailed investigative reports of the activities undertaken
to search for Tagitis. Indisputably, the police authorities from the very beginning
failed to come up to the extraordinary diligence that the Amparo Rule requires.
CONCLUSIONS AND THE AMPARO REMEDY
Based on these considerations, we conclude that Col. Kasim’s disclosure, made
in an unguarded moment, unequivocally point to some government complicity
in the disappearance. The consistent but unfounded denials and the haphazard
investigations cannot but point to this conclusion. For why would the
government and its officials engage in their chorus of concealment if the intent
had not been to deny what they already knew of the disappearance? Would not
an in-depth and thorough investigation that at least credibly determined the fate
of Tagitis be a feather in the government’s cap under the circumstances of the
disappearance? From this perspective, the evidence and developments,
particularly the Kasim evidence, already establish a concrete case of enforced
disappearance that the Amparo Rule covers. From the prism of the UN
Declaration, heretofore cited and quoted,173 the evidence at hand and the
developments in this case confirm the fact of the enforced disappearance and
government complicity, under a background of consistent and unfounded
government denials and haphazard handling. The disappearance as well
effectively placed Tagitis outside the protection of the law – a situation that will
subsist unless this Court acts.
This kind of fact situation and the conclusion reached are not without precedent
in international enforced disappearance rulings. While the facts are not exactly
the same, the facts of this case run very close to those of Timurtas v. Turkey,174
a case decided by ECHR. The European tribunal in that case acted on the basis
of the photocopy of a "post-operation report" in finding that Abdulvahap Timurtas
(Abdulvahap) was abducted and later detained by agents (gendarmes) of the
government of Turkey. The victim's father in this case brought a claim against
Turkey for numerous violations of the European Convention, including the right
to life (Article 2) and the rights to liberty and security of a person (Article 5). The
applicant contended that on August 14, 1993, gendarmes apprehended his son,
Abdulvahap for being a leader of the Kurdish Workers’ Party (PKK) in the Silopi
region. The petition was filed in southeast Turkey nearly six and one half years
after the apprehension. According to the father, gendarmes first detained
Abdulvahap and then transferred him to another detainment facility. Although
there was no eyewitness evidence of the apprehension or subsequent
detainment, the applicant presented evidence corroborating his version of
events, including a photocopy of a post-operation report signed by the
commander of gendarme operations in Silopi, Turkey. The report included a
description of Abdulvahap's arrest and the result of a subsequent interrogation
during detention where he was accused of being a leader of the PKK in the
Silopi region. On this basis, Turkey was held responsible for Abdulvahap’s
enforced disappearance.
Following the lead of this Turkish experience - adjusted to the Philippine legal
setting and the Amparo remedy this Court has established, as applied to the
unique facts and developments of this case – we believe and so hold that the
government in general, through the PNP and the PNP-CIDG, and in particular,
the Chiefs of these organizations together with Col. Kasim, should be held fully
accountable for the enforced disappearance of Tagitis.
The PNP and CIDG are accountable because Section 24 of Republic Act No.
6975, otherwise known as the "PNP Law,"175 specifies the PNP as the
governmental office with the mandate "to investigate and prevent crimes, effect
the arrest of criminal offenders, bring offenders to justice and assist in their
prosecution." The PNP-CIDG, as Col. Jose Volpane Pante (then Chief of CIDG
Region 9) testified, is the "investigative arm" of the PNP and is mandated to
"investigate and prosecute all cases involving violations of the Revised Penal
Code, particularly those considered as heinous crimes."176 Under the PNP
organizational structure, the PNP-CIDG is tasked to investigate all major crimes
involving violations of the Revised Penal Code and operates against organized
crime groups, unless the President assigns the case exclusively to the National
Bureau of Investigation (NBI).177 No indication exists in this case showing that
the President ever directly intervened by assigning the investigation of Tagitis’
disappearance exclusively to the NBI.
Given their mandates, the PNP and PNP-CIDG officials and members were the
ones who were remiss in their duties when the government completely failed to
exercise the extral'>To fully enforce the Amparo remedy, we refer this case back
to the CA for appropriate proceedings directed at the monitoring of the PNP and
the PNP-CIDG investigations and actions, and the validation of their results
through hearings the CA may deem appropriate to conduct. For purposes of
these investigations, the PNP/PNP-CIDG shall initially present to the CA a plan
of action for further investigation, periodically reporting the detailed results of its
investigation to the CA for its consideration and action. On behalf of this Court,
the CA shall pass upon: the need for the PNP and the PNP-CIDG to make
disclosures of matters known to them as indicated in this Decision and as further
CA hearings may indicate; the petitioners’ submissions; the sufficiency of their
investigative efforts; and submit to this Court a quarterly report containing its
actions and recommendations, copy furnished the petitioners and the
respondent, with the first report due at the end of the first quarter counted from
the finality of this Decision. The PNP and the PNP-CIDG shall have one (1) full
year to undertake their investigation. The CA shall submit its full report for the
consideration of this Court at the end of the 4th quarter counted from the finality
of this Decision.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DENY the petitioners’ petition for
review on certiorari for lack of merit, and AFFIRM the decision of the Court of
Appeals dated March 7, 2008 under the following terms:
Page 69 of 99
a. Recognition that the disappearance of Engineer Morced N. Tagitis is an
enforced disappearance covered by the Rule on the Writ of Amparo;
b. Without any specific pronouncement on exact authorship and responsibility,
declaring the government (through the PNP and the PNP-CIDG) and Colonel
Julasirim Ahadin Kasim accountable for the enforced disappearance of
Engineer Morced N. Tagitis;
c. Confirmation of the validity of the Writ of Amparo the Court of Appeals issued;
d. Holding the PNP, through the PNP Chief, and the PNP-CIDG, through its
Chief, directly responsible for the disclosure of material facts known to the
government and to their offices regarding the disappearance of Engineer
Morced N. Tagitis, and for the conduct of proper investigations using
extraordinary diligence, with the obligation to show investigation results
acceptable to this Court;
e. Ordering Colonel Julasirim Ahadin Kasim impleaded in this case and holding
him accountable with the obligation to disclose information known to him and to
his "assets" in relation with the enforced disappearance of Engineer Morced N.
Tagitis;
f. Referring this case back to the Court of Appeals for appropriate proceedings
directed at the monitoring of the PNP and PNP-CIDG investigations, actions and
the validation of their results; the PNP and the PNP-CIDG shall initially present
to the Court of Appeals a plan of action for further investigation, periodically
reporting their results to the Court of Appeals for consideration and action;
g. Requiring the Court of Appeals to submit to this Court a quarterly report with
its recommendations, copy furnished the incumbent PNP and PNP-CIDG Chiefs
as petitioners and the respondent, with the first report due at the end of the first
quarter counted from the finality of this Decision;
h. The PNP and the PNP-CIDG shall have one (1) full year to undertake their
investigations; the Court of Appeals shall submit its full report for the
consideration of this Court at the end of the 4th quarter counted from the finality
of this Decision;
These directives and those of the Court of Appeals’ made pursuant to this
Decision shall be given to, and shall be directly enforceable against, whoever
may be the incumbent Chiefs of the Philippine National Police and its Criminal
Investigation and Detection Group, under pain of contempt from this Court when
the initiatives and efforts at disclosure and investigation constitute less than the
extraordinary diligence that the Rule on the Writ of Amparo and the
circumstances of this case demand. Given the unique nature of Amparo cases
and their varying attendant circumstances, these directives – particularly, the
referral back to and monitoring by the CA – are specific to this case and are not
standard remedies that can be applied to every Amparo situation.
The dismissal of the Amparo petition with respect to General Alexander Yano,
Commanding General, Philippine Army, and General Ruben Rafael, Chief, Anti-
Terrorism Task Force Comet, Zamboanga City, is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 186640 February 11, 2010
GEN. ALEXANDER B. YANO, Chief of Staff, Armed Forces of the
Philippines, LT. GEN. VICTOR S. IBRADO, Commanding General,
Philippine Army, and MAJ. GEN. RALPH A. VILLANUEVA, Commander, 7th
Infantry Division, Philippine Army, Petitioners,
vs.
CLEOFAS SANCHEZ and MARCIANA MEDINA, Respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
On December 28, 2007, respondent Cleofas Sanchez (Cleofas) filed before this
Court a petition docketed as G.R. No. 180839 for issuance of a Writ of Amparo
with Motion for Production and Inspection directed against Gen. Hermogenes
Esperon (Gen. Esperon), the then Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines (AFP).
On January 2, 2008, the Court1 resolved to issue a Writ of Amparo and ordered
Gen. Esperon to make a verified return of the writ before Court of Appeals
Justice Edgardo Sundiam, who was ordered to hear and decide the case which
was eventually redocketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 00010 WR/A.
Cleofas amended her petition2 on January 14, 2008 to include herein co-
respondent Marciana Medina (Marciana) as therein additional petitioner, and to
implead other military officers3 including Lt. Ali Sumangil (Lt. Sumangil) and Sgt.
Gil Villalobos4 (Sgt. Villalobos) as therein additional respondents.
In the Amended Petition, Cleofas and Marciana (respondents) alleged that on
September 17, 2006 at around 8:00 p.m., their respective sons Nicolas Sanchez
and Heherson Medina were catching frogs outside their home in Sitio Dalin,
Barangay Bueno, Capas, Tarlac; that at around 1:00 a.m. of the next day,
September 18, 2006, Nicolas’ "wives" Lourdez and Rosalie Sanchez, who were
then at home, heard gunshots and saw armed men in soldiers’ uniforms passing
by; that at around 4:00 a.m. of the same day, Lourdez and Rosalie went out to
check on Nicolas and Heherson but only saw their caps, slippers, pana and
airgun for catching frogs, as well as bloodstains; and that they immediately
reported the matter to the barangay officials.
Respondents narrated that they, together with other family members, proceeded
on September 19, 2006 to the Capas Station of the Philippine National Police
(PNP). Accompanied by officials of the National Commission on Indigenous
Peoples (NCIP),5 they also tried to search for Nicolas and Heherson at the
Camp Detachment of the 71st Infantry Batallion of the Philippine Army (Army)
in Barangay Burgos, San Jose, Tarlac, and at the Camp of the Bravo Company
of the Army’s 71st Infantry Batallion inside Hacienda Luisita, Tarlac City, but to
no avail.
Furthermore, respondents alleged that Josephine Galang Victoria, also known
as Antonina Galang (Josephine), niece of a neighbor, later informed them that
she had seen two men inside Camp Servillano Aquino of the Northern Luzon
Command (Nolcom) in San Miguel, Tarlac City on September 21, 2006, whom
Josephine later identified as Nicolas and Heherson (the victims) after
respondents had shown her their photographs; and that Josephine informed
them that she saw the victims again on September 24, 2006 and November 1,
2006,6 this time at the Camp of the Bravo Company of the Army’s 71st Infantry
Batallion inside Hacienda Luisita, where she had occasion to talk to Lt. Sumangil
and Sgt. Villalobos. Respondents filed a case on December 21, 2006 before the
Commission on Human Rights (CHR), which endorsed7 the same to the
Ombudsman for appropriate action.
Contending that the victims’ life, liberty and security had been and continued to
be violated on account of their forced disappearance, respondents prayed for
the issuance of a writ of Amparo, the production of the victims’ bodies during
the hearing on the Writ, the inspection of certain military camps,8 the issuance
of temporary and permanent protection orders, and the rendition of judgment
under Section 18 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo.9
Meanwhile, a consolidated Return of the Writ,10 verified by Gen. Esperon, Lt.
Sumangil, Sgt. Villalobos, Maj. Gen. Juanito Gomez (Maj. Gen. Gomez) as
Commander of the Army’s 7th Infantry Division, and Lt. Col. Victor Bayani (Lt.
Col. Bayani) as Camp Commander of Camp Servillano Aquino of the Nolcom in
Tarlac City, was filed with the appellate court on January 24, 2008. Lt. Gen.
Alexander Yano (Lt. Gen. Yano), Commanding General of the Army, filed a
Return of the Writ upon his return from an official trip abroad.
In their Return, the military officers denied having custody of the victims. They
posited that the proper remedy of respondents was to file a petition for the
issuance of a Writ of Habeas Corpus, since the petition’s ultimate objective was
the production of the bodies of the victims, as they were allegedly abducted and
illegally detained by military personnel;11 that the petition failed to indicate the
matters required by paragraphs (c), (d) and (e), Section 5 of the Rule on the
Writ of Amparo, such that the allegations were incomplete to constitute a cause
of action, aside from being based on mere hearsay evidence, and are, at best,
speculative; that respondents failed to present the affidavits of some other
competent persons which would clearly validate their claim that the military
violated the victims’ right to life, liberty or security by abducting or detaining
them; and that the petition did not allege any specific action or inaction
attributable to the military officers with respect to their duties; or allege that
respondents took any action by filing a formal complaint or visiting the military
camps adverted to in order to verify Josephine’s claim that she saw the victims
on two different occasions inside the camps, or that they took efforts to follow
up on the PNP Capas Station’s further action on their complaint.12
Denying he violated the victims’ right to life, liberty and security, Gen. Esperon
specifically asserted that, in compliance with the Defense Secretary’s directive
in relation to cases of Writ of Amparo against the AFP, he issued directives to
the Nolcom Commander and the Army’s Commanding General to investigate
and establish the circumstances surrounding reported disappearances of
victims insofar as the claim on the possible involvement of the military units was
concerned; and undertook to bring any military personnel involved, when
warranted by the evidence, to the bar of justice.13
Maj. Gen. Gomez likewise denied having custody or knowledge of the
whereabouts of the victims, stating that it was not army policy to abduct civilians
in his area of responsibility,14 and that he was away on official business at the
time of the alleged disappearance of the victims.15
Lt. Col. Bayani attested that he was designated Camp Commander only on
September 1, 2007 and thus had no personal knowledge about the victims’
alleged disappearance or abduction on September 18, 2006; that he was
informed by his immediate predecessor that no individuals were detained in the
camp as it did not even have detention facilities; and that in compliance with
Gen. Esperon’s directive, their command was conducting further investigation
to verify the allegations in the petition.16
Lt. Sumangil denied having spoken to Josephine inside the camp on September
24, 2006, on which date civilians were not allowed to enter except on official
missions or when duly authorized to conduct transactions inside the camp. He
thus concluded that Josephine lied in claiming to have seen the two victims
inside the Camp of the Bravo Company of the 71st Infantry Batallion inside
Page 70 of 99
Hacienda Luisita on September 24, 2006 or at any time thereafter. He instead
recounted that on September 24, 2006, he spoke for the first and only time, but
only at the gate of the camp, with a person who identified herself as "Antonina
Galang," who informed him about the disappearance of the victims since
September 18, 2006. Warning him that these men were members of the New
People’s Army (NPA), she advised him not to entertain any queries or
complaints relative to their alleged disappearance.17
Sgt. Villalobos echoed Sumangil’s disclaimer about having any of the victims in
his custody or meeting anyone named Josephine Victoria, or about the latter
having entered the camp’s kitchen to drink water.
Lt. Gen. Yano stated that upon his return from his official functions overseas, he
immediately inquired on the actions taken on the case. He averred that he had
never participated directly or indirectly; or consented, permitted or sanctioned
any illegal or illegitimate military operations. He declared that it had always been
his policy to respect human rights and uphold the rule of law, and to bring those
who violated the law before the court of justice.
In opposing the request for issuance of inspection and production orders, the
military officers posited that apart from compromising national security should
entry into these military camps/bases be allowed, these orders partook of the
nature of a search warrant, such that the requisites for the issuance thereof must
be complied with prior to their issuance. They went on to argue that such request
relied solely on bare, self-serving and vague allegations contained in
Josephine’s affidavit, for aside from merely mentioning that she saw Nicolas and
Heherson on board an army truck near the Nolcom gate and, days later, inside
the kitchen of the 71st Infantry Battalion Camp inside Hacienda Luisita and while
logging outside said camp, Josephine had stated nothing more to ascertain the
veracity of the places where she allegedly saw Nicolas and Heherson.18
On whether the impleaded military officers were either directly or indirectly
connected with the disappearance of the victims, the appellate court, after
hearing, absolved, by the assailed Decision of September 17, 2008,19 Gen.
Esperon, Lt. Gen. Yano, Maj. Gen. Gomez, and Lt. Col. Bayani for lack of
evidence linking them to the disappearances, and further ruled as follows:
All said, this Court is convinced that petitioners have not adequately and
convincingly established any direct or indirect link between respondents
individual military officers and the disappearances of Nicolas and Heherson.
Neither did the concerned Philippine Army Units have exerted fully their efforts
to investigate and unearth the truth and bring the culprits before the bar of
justice.
The concerned Philippine Army units (such as the Northern Command and the
7th Infantry Division, which had jurisdiction over the place of disappearance of
Nicolas and Heherson, should exert extraordinary diligence to follow all possible
leads to solve the disappearances of Nicolas and Heherson. The Philippine
Army should be reminded of its constitutional mandate as the protector of the
people and the State.
RELIEFS
While as We stated hereinbefore that We could not find any link between
respondents individual military officers to the disappearance of Nicolas and
Heherson, nonetheless, the fact remains that the two men are still missing.
Hence, We find it equitable to grant petitioners some reliefs in the interest of
human rights and justice as follows:
1. Inspections of the following camps: Camp Servillano Aquino, San Miguel,
Tarlac City, any military camp of the 7th Infantry Division located in Aqua Farm,
Hacienda Luisita, Tarlac City, within reasonable working hours of any day
except when the military camp is on red alert status.
2. Thorough and Impartial Investigation – for the appropriate Investigating Unit
of the Philippine Army at Camp Servillano Aquino and the Philippine Army, 7th
Infantry Division in Fort Magsaysay to conduct their respective investigation of
all angles pertaining to the disappearances of Nicolas and Heherson and to
immediately file charges against those found guilty and submit their written
report to this Court within three (3) months from notice.
SO ORDERED.20 (underscoring supplied)
The military officers filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration (Motion), arguing
in the main that since respondents failed to prove the allegations in their petition
by substantial evidence, the appellate court should not have granted those
reliefs.21
The appellate court denied the Motion by the assailed Resolution of March 3,
2009.22
Taking up the cudgels for the military, Gen. Alexander Yano,23 Lt. Gen. Victor
Ibrado,24 and Maj. Gen. Ralph Villanueva25 (petitioners) filed the present
petition for review of the appellate court’s assailed issuances, faulting it for
. . . NOT CATEGORICALLY DENYING THE PRIVILEGE OF THE WRIT OF
AMPARO PURSUANT TO SECTION 18 OF THE RULE ON THE WRIT OF
AMPARO DESPITE ITS FINDING THAT RESPONDENTS FAILED TO PROVE
THEIR ALLEGATIONS IN THEIR PETITION FOR AMPARO BY SUBSTANTIAL
EVIDENCE. . . . [AND] . . . DIRECTING PETITIONERS TO:
(A) ALLOW RESPONDENTS TO INSPECT CAMP SERVILLANO AQUINO,
NORTH LUZON COMMAND, PHILIPPINE ARMY, SAN MIGUEL, TARLAC
CITY AND ANY MILITARY CAMP OF THE 7th INFANTRY DIVISION
LOCATED IN AQUA FARM, HACIENDA LUISITA, TARLAC CITY; AND.
(B) CONDUCT THOROUGH AND IMPARTIAL INVESTIGATION OF THE
DISAPPEARANCE OF THE AGGRIEVED PARTIES, FILE CHARGES
AGAINST THOSE FOUND GUILTY AND SUBMIT WRITTEN REPORT WITHIN
THREE MONTHS FROM NOTICE.26 (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The Court finds merit in the petition.
In ruling in favor of Lt. Sumangil and Sgt. Villalobos, the appellate court resolved
the case on the basis of the credibility of Josephine as a witness. It arrived at
the following findings:
To prove that these two military officers took or have custody of Nicolas and
Heherson, petitioners presented Josephine Galang Victoria, also known as
Antonina Galang, a niece of petitioner Cleofas Sanchez’ neighbor, who
allegedly saw Nicolas and Heherson inside Camp Servillano Aquino on
September 21, 2006 when she visited her uncle, a certain Major Henry Galang,
who is allegedly living inside the camp; that a few days later, she again saw
Nicolas and Heherson at Aqua Farm at Hacienda Luisita, where the camp of
Bravo Company of the 71st Infantry Battalion is located and where Heherson
was seen sweeping the floor and Nicolas was seen cooking, having wounds in
their legs near the feet as if sustained from a gunshot wound; that on November
1, 2006, she went back upon advice of Lt. Sumangil to give her a cellfone which
Tech. Sgt. Villalobos handed to her for her to know where Nicolas and Heherson
will be brought; that they [sic] saw the two outside getting some woods under
the watchful eye of a soldier when Sumangil kicked Nicolas for being slow and
thereafter, she did not see the two anymore.
While Josephine Galang Victoria’s story of how she saw the subject two missing
persons (Nicolas and Heherson) appeared initially as plausible, however, her
credibility as a witness had been successfully destroyed by the following
witnesses presented by the respondents.
1) Barangay Captain Rodolfo P. Supan of Cut-Cut II, Tarlac City, attested that
she knows a certain woman named Josephine Galang Victoria who introduces
herself as Antonina Galang, niece through the cousin of his wife and a long-time
resident of Cut-Cut II since birth until she lived with her partner – Philip Victoria
and they still visit and goes to her auntie or sibling’s house; that he knows the
reputation of Josephine Victoria as bad regarding her telling the truth, her
truthfulness and integrity, known to fool others and invents stories for money
reasons, that she cannot be trusted even if she is under oath before God and
the State.
2) As if that is not yet enough, Gloria Galang Mansalay testified that she is a
resident of Cut-Cut II since birth in 1964 and she knows Josephine Galang
Victoria because she is her niece being the daughter of her older brother; that
she even took care of Antonina as a child but her general reputation in telling
the truth, her fidelity and integrity is bad, known to fool others, a liar and invent
[sic] stories for reason of money.
3) Clarita Galang Ricafrente saying that she is a resident of Cut-cut II and
Antonina Galang is a niece and attested the same negative reputations against
Antonina.
It appears that said negative testimonies of Josephine Galang Victoria’s
relatives were never successfully rebutted by her and the Court gives credence
to them. No ill motive [sic] were established against the said witnesses to testify
against Antonina Galang.
Furthermore, Antonina Galang stated that she was in Camp Servillano Aquino
when she first saw Nicolas and Heherson riding in an army truck because she
was visiting her uncle, Major Henry Galang, allegedly living in the camp.
Parenthetically, this story of Antonina Galang was put to doubt. TSG Edgard
Reyes who attested that as a meter reader in the camp, Major Galang was no
longer residing there in September 2006. This testimony and revelation of TSG
Reyes only bolstered the testimonies of the other witnesses on Antonina
Galang’s penchant to invent stories or tell a lie.
In sum, We are not inclined to give credence to the claims of Antonina Galang
that the two missing person [sic] she saw first in Camp Servillano Aquino and
later, in Aqua Farm, were Nicolas and Heherson. Notably, Antonina Galang
never did see the faces of the two but were known to her through photographs.
Certainly, there may be a difference between photographs and the faces in
person.
To be noted also is that even the two wives of Nicolas did not make an express
attestation that they saw Nicolas and Heherson in the company of those armed
men who passed their place in the early morning of September 18, 2006.27
(underscoring supplied)
NOTABLY, respondents neither moved for reconsideration nor appealed the
appellate court’s September 17, 2008 Decision.
The entrenched procedural rule in this jurisdiction is that a party who did not
appeal cannot assign such errors as are designed to have the judgment
modified. All that said appellee can do is to make a counter-assignment of errors
or to argue on issues raised at the trial only for the purpose of sustaining the
judgment in his favor, even on grounds not included in the decision of the court
a quo or raised in the appellant’s assignment of errors or arguments.28
Page 71 of 99
This tenet is enshrined as one of the basic principles in our rules of procedure,
specifically to avoid ambiguity in the presentation of issues, facilitate the setting
forth of arguments by the parties, and aid the court in making its determinations.
A party who fails to acquire complete relief from a decision of the court has
various remedies to correct an omission by the court. He may move for a
correction or clarification of judgment, or even seek its modification through
ordinary appeal. There is thus no basis for the Court to skip the rule and excuse
herein respondents for failure to properly avail themselves of the remedies in
the face of the parties’ contentions that have remained disputed.29
What is thus left for the Court to resolve is the issue of whether the grant of the
RELIEFS30 by the appellate court after finding want of substantial evidence are
valid and proper.
Sections 17 and 18 of the Amparo Rule lay down the requisite standard of proof
necessary to prove either party’s claim, viz:
SEC. 17. Burden of Proof and Standard of Diligence Required. - The parties
shall establish their claim by substantial evidence.
The respondent who is a private individual or entity must prove that ordinary
diligence as required by applicable laws, rules and regulations was observed in
the performance of duty.
The respondent who is a public official or employee must prove that
extraordinary diligence as required by applicable laws, rules and regulations
was observed in the performance of duty.
The respondent public official or employee cannot invoke the presumption that
official duty has been regularly performed to evade responsibility or liability.
SEC. 18. Judgment. - The Court shall render judgment within ten (10) days from
the time the petition is submitted for decision. If the allegations in the petition
are proven by substantial evidence, the court shall grant the privilege of the writ
and such reliefs as may be proper and appropriate; otherwise, the privilege shall
be denied. (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The requisite standard of proof – substantial evidence - speaks of the clear
intent of the Rule to have the equivalent of an administrative proceeding, albeit
judicially conducted, in resolving amparo petitions.
To the appellate court, the evidence adduced in the present case failed to
measure up to that standard– substantial evidence which a reasonable mind
might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Since respondents did not
avail of any remedy against the adverse judgment, the appellate court’s decision
is, insofar as it concerns them, now beyond the ambit of review.
Meanwhile, the requirement for a government official or employee to observe
extraordinary diligence in the performance of duty stresses the extraordinary
measures expected to be taken in safeguarding every citizen’s constitutional
rights as well as in the investigation of cases of extra-judicial killings and
enforced disappearances.31
The failure to establish that the public official observed extraordinary diligence
in the performance of duty does not result in the automatic grant of the privilege
of the amparo writ. It does not relieve the petitioner from establishing his or her
claim by substantial evidence. The omission or inaction on the part of the public
official provides, however, some basis for the petitioner to move and for the
court to grant certain interim reliefs.
In line with this, Section 14 of the Amparo Rule provides for interim or provisional
reliefs that the courts may grant in order to, inter alia, protect the witnesses and
the rights of the parties, and preserve all relevant evidence, viz:
SEC. 14. Interim Reliefs. — Upon filing of the petition or at anytime before final
judgment, the court, justice or judge may grant any of the following reliefs:
(a) Temporary Protection Order. — The court, justice or judge, upon motion or
motu proprio, may order that the petitioner or the aggrieved party and any
member of the immediate family be protected in a government agency or by an
accredited person or private institution capable of keeping and securing their
safety. If the petitioner is an organization, association or institution referred to in
Section 3 (c) of this Rule, the protection may be extended to the officers
involved.
The Supreme Court shall accredit the persons and private institutions that shall
extend temporary protection to the petitioner or the aggrieved party and any
member of the immediate family, in accordance with guidelines which it shall
issue.
The accredited persons and private institutions shall comply with the rules and
conditions that may be imposed by the court, justice or judge.
(b) Inspection Order. — The court, justice or judge, upon verified motion and
after due hearing, may order any person in possession or control of a designated
land or other property, to permit entry for the purpose of inspecting, measuring,
surveying, or photographing the property or any relevant object or operation
thereon.
The motion shall state in detail the place or places to be inspected. It shall be
supported by affidavits or testimonies of witnesses having personal knowledge
of the enforced disappearance or whereabouts of the aggrieved party.
If the motion is opposed on the ground of national security or of the privileged
nature of the information, the court, justice or judge may conduct a hearing in
chambers to determine the merit of the opposition.
The movant must show that the inspection order is necessary to establish the
right of the aggrieved party alleged to be threatened or violated.
The inspection order shall specify the person or persons authorized to make the
inspection and the date, time, place and manner of making the inspection and
may prescribe other conditions to protect the constitutional rights of all parties.
The order shall expire five (5) days after the date of its issuance, unless
extended for justifiable reasons.
(c) Production Order. — The court, justice, or judge, upon verified motion and
after due hearing, may order any person in possession, custody or control of
any designated documents, papers, books, accounts, letters, photographs,
objects or tangible things, or objects in digitized or electronic form, which
constitute or contain evidence relevant to the petition or the return, to produce
and permit their inspection, copying or photographing by or on behalf of the
movant.
The motion may be opposed on the ground of national security or of the
privileged nature of the information, in which case the court, justice or judge may
conduct a hearing in chambers to determine the merit of the opposition.
The court, justice or judge shall prescribe other conditions to protect the
constitutional rights of all the parties. (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
These provisional reliefs are intended to assist the court before it arrives at a
judicious determination of the amparo petition. For the appellate court to, in the
present case, still order the inspection of the military camps and order the army
units to conduct an investigation into the disappearance of Nicolas and
Heherson after it absolved petitioners is thus not in order. The reliefs granted by
the appellate court to respondents are not in sync with a finding that petitioners
could not be held accountable for the disappearance of the victims.
Respondents posit that there appears to be some shared confusion as to
whether the reliefs granted by the appellate court are final or interlocutory. They
thus implore this Court to modify the appellate court’s judgment by considering
the reliefs as temporary or interlocutory and by adding thereto an order for the
production of logbooks and reports.32
At this late stage, respondents can no longer avail themselves of their stale
remedies in the guise of praying for affirmative reliefs in their Comment. No
modification of judgment could be granted to a party who did not appeal.33
If respondents believed that the September 17, 2008 Decision of the appellate
court was merely interlocutory, they had every opportunity to question the
conclusion of said court, but they did not. They could have opposed petitioners’
motion for reconsideration filed with the appellate court, it being a prohibited
pleading34 under the Amparo Rule, but they did not.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed September 17, 2008
Decision and March 3, 2009 Resolution of the Court of Appeals, insofar as it
grants the assailed earlier-quoted reliefs are SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 183871 February 18, 2010
LOURDES D. RUBRICO, JEAN RUBRICO APRUEBO, and MARY JOY
RUBRICO CARBONEL, Petitioners,
vs.
GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, GEN. HERMOGENES ESPERON, P/DIR.
GEN. AVELINO RAZON, MAJ. DARWIN SY a.k.a. DARWIN REYES, JIMMY
SANTANA, RUBEN ALFARO, CAPT. ANGELO CUARESMA, a certain
JONATHAN, P/SUPT. EDGAR B. ROQUERO, ARSENIO C. GOMEZ, and
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, Respondents.
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
In this petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court in relation to
Section 191 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo2 (Amparo Rule), Lourdes D.
Rubrico, Jean Rubrico Apruebo, and Mary Joy Rubrico Carbonel assail and
seek to set aside the Decision3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated July 31, 2008
in CA-G.R. SP No. 00003, a petition commenced under the Amparo Rule.
The petition for the writ of amparo dated October 25, 2007 was originally filed
before this Court. After issuing the desired writ and directing the respondents to
file a verified written return, the Court referred the petition to the CA for summary
Page 72 of 99
hearing and appropriate action. The petition and its attachments contained, in
substance, the following allegations:
1. On April 3, 2007, armed men belonging to the 301st Air Intelligence and
Security Squadron (AISS, for short) based in Fernando Air Base in Lipa City
abducted Lourdes D. Rubrico (Lourdes), then attending a Lenten pabasa in
Bagong Bayan, Dasmariñas, Cavite, and brought to, and detained at, the air
base without charges. Following a week of relentless interrogation - conducted
alternately by hooded individuals - and what amounts to verbal abuse and
mental harassment, Lourdes, chair of the Ugnayan ng Maralita para sa Gawa
Adhikan, was released at Dasmariñas, Cavite, her hometown, but only after
being made to sign a statement that she would be a military asset.
After Lourdes’ release, the harassment, coming in the form of being tailed on at
least two occasions at different places, i.e., Dasmariñas, Cavite and Baclaran
in Pasay City, by motorcycle-riding men in bonnets, continued;
2. During the time Lourdes was missing, P/Sr. Insp. Arsenio Gomez (P/Insp.
Gomez), then sub-station commander of Bagong Bayan, Dasmariñas, Cavite,
kept sending text messages to Lourdes’ daughter, Mary Joy R. Carbonel (Mary
Joy), bringing her to beaches and asking her questions about Karapatan, an
alliance of human rights organizations. He, however, failed to make an
investigation even after Lourdes’ disappearance had been made known to him;
3. A week after Lourdes’ release, another daughter, Jean R. Apruebo (Jean),
was constrained to leave their house because of the presence of men watching
them;
4. Lourdes has filed with the Office of the Ombudsman a criminal complaint for
kidnapping and arbitrary detention and administrative complaint for gross abuse
of authority and grave misconduct against Capt. Angelo Cuaresma (Cuaresma),
Ruben Alfaro (Alfaro), Jimmy Santana (Santana) and a certain Jonathan, c/o
Headquarters 301st AISS, Fernando Air Base and Maj. Sy/Reyes with address
at No. 09 Amsterdam Ext., Merville Subd., Parañaque City, but nothing has
happened; and the threats and harassment incidents have been reported to the
Dasmariñas municipal and Cavite provincial police stations, but nothing eventful
resulted from their respective investigations.
Two of the four witnesses to Lourdes’ abduction went into hiding after being
visited by government agents in civilian clothes; and
5. Karapatan conducted an investigation on the incidents. The investigation
would indicate that men belonging to the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP),
namely Capt. Cuaresma of the Philippine Air Force (PAF), Alfaro, Santana,
Jonathan and Maj. Darwin Sy/Reyes, led the abduction of Lourdes; that
unknown to the abductors, Lourdes was able to pilfer a "mission order" which
was addressed to CA Ruben Alfaro and signed by Capt. Cuaresma of the PAF.
The petition prayed that a writ of amparo issue, ordering the individual
respondents to desist from performing any threatening act against the security
of the petitioners and for the Office of the Ombudsman (OMB) to immediately
file an information for kidnapping qualified with the aggravating circumstance of
gender of the offended party. It also prayed for damages and for respondents
to produce documents submitted to any of them on the case of Lourdes.
Before the CA, respondents President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, Gen.
Hermogenes Esperon, then Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) Chief of
Staff, Police Director-General (P/Dir. Gen.) Avelino Razon, then Philippine
National Police (PNP) Chief, Police Superintendent (P/Supt.) Roquero of the
Cavite Police Provincial Office, Police Inspector (P/Insp.) Gomez, now retired,
and the OMB (answering respondents, collectively) filed, through the Office of
the Solicitor General (OSG), a joint return on the writ specifically denying the
material inculpatory averments against them. The OSG also denied the
allegations against the following impleaded persons, namely: Cuaresma, Alfaro,
Santana, Jonathan, and Sy/Reyes, for lack of knowledge or information
sufficient to form a belief as to the allegations’ truth. And by way of general
affirmative defenses, answering respondents interposed the following defenses:
(1) the President may not be sued during her incumbency; and (2) the petition
is incomplete, as it fails to indicate the matters required by Sec. 5(d) and (e) of
the Amparo Rule.4
Attached to the return were the affidavits of the following, among other public
officials, containing their respective affirmative defenses and/or statements of
what they had undertaken or committed to undertake regarding the claimed
disappearance of Lourdes and the harassments made to bear on her and her
daughters:
1. Gen. Esperon – attested that, pursuant to a directive of then Secretary of
National Defense (SND) Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr., he ordered the Commanding
General of the PAF, with information to all concerned units, to conduct an
investigation to establish the circumstances behind the disappearance and the
reappearance of Lourdes insofar as the involvement of alleged personnel/unit
is concerned. The Provost Marshall General and the Office of the Judge
Advocate General (JAGO), AFP, also undertook a parallel action.
Gen. Esperon manifested his resolve to provide the CA with material results of
the investigation; to continue with the probe on the alleged abduction of Lourdes
and to bring those responsible, including military personnel, to the bar of justice
when warranted by the findings and the competent evidence that may be
gathered in the investigation process by those mandated to look into the
matter;5
2. P/Dir. Gen. Razon - stated that an investigation he immediately ordered upon
receiving a copy of the petition is on-going vis-à-vis Lourdes’ abduction, and that
a background verification with the PNP Personnel Accounting and Information
System disclosed that the names Santana, Alfaro, Cuaresma and one Jonathan
do not appear in the police personnel records, although the PNP files carry the
name of Darwin Reyes Y. Muga.
Per the initial investigation report of the Dasmariñas municipal police station,
P/Dir. Gen. Razon disclosed, Lourdes was abducted by six armed men in the
afternoon of April 3, 2007 and dragged aboard a Toyota Revo with plate number
XRR 428, which plate was issued for a Mitsubishi van to AK Cottage Industry
with address at 9 Amsterdam St., Merville Subd., Parañaque City. The person
residing in the apartment on that given address is one Darius/Erwin See @
Darius Reyes allegedly working, per the latter’s house helper, in Camp
Aguinaldo.
P/Dir. Gen. Razon, however, bemoaned the fact that Mrs. Rubrico never
contacted nor coordinated with the local police or other investigating units of the
PNP after her release, although she is in the best position to establish the
identity of her abductors and/or provide positive description through composite
sketching. Nonetheless, he manifested that the PNP is ready to assist and
protect the petitioners and the key witnesses from threats, harassments and
intimidation from whatever source and, at the same time, to assist the Court in
the implementation of its orders.61avvphi1
3. P/Supt. Roquero – stated conducting, upon receipt of Lourdes’ complaint, an
investigation and submitting the corresponding report to the PNP Calabarzon,
observing that neither Lourdes nor her relatives provided the police with relevant
information;
4. P/Insp. Gomez – alleged that Lourdes, her kin and witnesses refused to
cooperate with the investigating Cavite PNP; and
5. Overall Deputy Ombudsman Orlando Casimiro - alleged that cases for
violation of Articles 267 and 124, or kidnapping and arbitrary detention,
respectively, have been filed with, and are under preliminary investigation by
the OMB against those believed to be involved in Lourdes’ kidnapping; that upon
receipt of the petition for a writ of amparo, proper coordination was made with
the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for the Military and other Law Enforcement
Offices (MOLEO) where the subject criminal and administrative complaints were
filed.
Commenting on the return, petitioners pointed out that the return was no more
than a general denial of averments in the petition. They, thus, pleaded to be
allowed to present evidence ex parte against the President, Santana, Alfaro,
Capt. Cuaresma, Darwin Sy, and Jonathan. And with leave of court, they also
asked to serve notice of the petition through publication, owing to their failure to
secure the current address of the latter five and thus submit, as the CA required,
proof of service of the petition on them.
The hearing started on November 13, 2007.7 In that setting, petitioners’ counsel
prayed for the issuance of a temporary protection order (TPO) against the
answering respondents on the basis of the allegations in the petition. At the
hearing of November 20, 2007, the CA granted petitioners’ motion that the
petition and writ be served by the court’s process server on Darwin Sy/Reyes,
Santana, Alfaro, Capt. Cuaresma, and Jonathan.
The legal skirmishes that followed over the propriety of excluding President
Arroyo from the petition, petitioners’ motions for service by publication, and the
issuance of a TPO are not of decisive pertinence in this recital. The bottom line
is that, by separate resolutions, the CA dropped the President as respondent in
the case; denied the motion for a TPO for the court’s want of authority to issue
it in the tenor sought by petitioners; and effectively denied the motion for notice
by publication owing to petitioners’ failure to submit the affidavit required under
Sec. 17, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court.8
After due proceedings, the CA rendered, on July 31, 2008, its partial judgment,
subject of this review, disposing of the petition but only insofar as the answering
respondents were concerned. The fallo of the CA decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, partial judgment is hereby rendered
DISMISSING the instant petition with respect to respondent Gen. Hermogenes
Esperon, P/Dir. Gen. Avelino Razon, Supt. Edgar B. Roquero, P/Sr. Insp.
Arsenio C. Gomez (ret.) and the Office of the Ombudsman.
Nevertheless, in order that petitioners’ complaint will not end up as another
unsolved case, the heads of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the
Philippine National Police are directed to ensure that the investigations already
commenced are diligently pursued to bring the perpetrators to justice. The Chief
of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and P/Dir. Gen. Avelino Razon
are directed to regularly update petitioners and this Court on the status of their
investigation.
SO ORDERED.
In this recourse, petitioners formulate the issue for resolution in the following
wise:
WHETHER OR NOT the [CA] committed reversible error in dismissing [their]
Petition and dropping President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo as party respondent.
Petitioners first take issue on the President’s purported lack of immunity from
suit during her term of office. The 1987 Constitution, so they claim, has removed
Page 73 of 99
such immunity heretofore enjoyed by the chief executive under the 1935 and
1973 Constitutions.
Petitioners are mistaken. The presidential immunity from suit remains preserved
under our system of government, albeit not expressly reserved in the present
constitution. Addressing a concern of his co-members in the 1986 Constitutional
Commission on the absence of an express provision on the matter, Fr. Joaquin
Bernas, S.J. observed that it was already understood in jurisprudence that the
President may not be sued during his or her tenure.9 The Court subsequently
made it abundantly clear in David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, a case likewise
resolved under the umbrella of the 1987 Constitution, that indeed the President
enjoys immunity during her incumbency, and why this must be so:
Settled is the doctrine that the President, during his tenure of office or actual
incumbency, may not be sued in any civil or criminal case, and there is no need
to provide for it in the Constitution or law. It will degrade the dignity of the high
office of the President, the Head of State, if he can be dragged into court
litigations while serving as such. Furthermore, it is important that he be freed
from any form of harassment, hindrance or distraction to enable him to fully
attend to the performance of his official duties and functions. Unlike the
legislative and judicial branch, only one constitutes the executive branch and
anything which impairs his usefulness in the discharge of the many great and
important duties imposed upon him by the Constitution necessarily impairs the
operation of the Government.10 x x x
And lest it be overlooked, the petition is simply bereft of any allegation as to
what specific presidential act or omission violated or threatened to violate
petitioners’ protected rights.
This brings us to the correctness of the assailed dismissal of the petition with
respect to Gen. Esperon, P/Dir. Gen. Razon, P/Supt. Roquero, P/Insp. Gomez,
and the OMB.
None of the four individual respondents immediately referred to above has been
implicated as being connected to, let alone as being behind, the alleged
abduction and harassment of petitioner Lourdes. Their names were not even
mentioned in Lourdes’ Sinumpaang Salaysay11 of April 2007. The same goes
for the respective Sinumpaang Salaysay and/or Karagdagang Sinumpaang
Salaysay of Jean12 and Mary Joy.13
As explained by the CA, Gen. Esperon and P/Dir. Gen. Razon were included in
the case on the theory that they, as commanders, were responsible for the
unlawful acts allegedly committed by their subordinates against petitioners. To
the appellate court, "the privilege of the writ of amparo must be denied as
against Gen. Esperon and P/Dir. Gen. Razon for the simple reason that
petitioners have not presented evidence showing that those who allegedly
abducted and illegally detained Lourdes and later threatened her and her family
were, in fact, members of the military or the police force." The two generals, the
CA’s holding broadly hinted, would have been accountable for the abduction
and threats if the actual malefactors were members of the AFP or PNP.
As regards the three other answering respondents, they were impleaded
because they allegedly had not exerted the required extraordinary diligence in
investigating and satisfactorily resolving Lourdes’ disappearance or bringing to
justice the actual perpetrators of what amounted to a criminal act, albeit there
were allegations against P/Insp. Gomez of acts constituting threats against Mary
Joy.
While in a qualified sense tenable, the dismissal by the CA of the case as
against Gen. Esperon and P/Dir. Gen. Razon is incorrect if viewed against the
backdrop of the stated rationale underpinning the assailed decision vis-à-vis the
two generals, i.e., command responsibility. The Court assumes the latter stance
owing to the fact that command responsibility, as a concept defined, developed,
and applied under international law, has little, if at all, bearing in amparo
proceedings.
The evolution of the command responsibility doctrine finds its context in the
development of laws of war and armed combats. According to Fr. Bernas,
"command responsibility," in its simplest terms, means the "responsibility of
commanders for crimes committed by subordinate members of the armed forces
or other persons subject to their control in international wars or domestic
conflict."14 In this sense, command responsibility is properly a form of criminal
complicity. The Hague Conventions of 1907 adopted the doctrine of command
responsibility,15 foreshadowing the present-day precept of holding a superior
accountable for the atrocities committed by his subordinates should he be
remiss in his duty of control over them. As then formulated, command
responsibility is "an omission mode of individual criminal liability," whereby the
superior is made responsible for crimes committed by his subordinates for failing
to prevent or punish the perpetrators16 (as opposed to crimes he ordered).
The doctrine has recently been codified in the Rome Statute17 of the
International Criminal Court (ICC) to which the Philippines is signatory. Sec. 28
of the Statute imposes individual responsibility on military commanders for
crimes committed by forces under their control. The country is, however, not yet
formally bound by the terms and provisions embodied in this treaty-statute,
since the Senate has yet to extend concurrence in its ratification.18
While there are several pending bills on command responsibility,19 there is still
no Philippine law that provides for criminal liability under that doctrine.20
It may plausibly be contended that command responsibility, as legal basis to
hold military/police commanders liable for extra-legal killings, enforced
disappearances, or threats, may be made applicable to this jurisdiction on the
theory that the command responsibility doctrine now constitutes a principle of
international law or customary international law in accordance with the
incorporation clause of the Constitution.21 Still, it would be inappropriate to
apply to these proceedings the doctrine of command responsibility, as the CA
seemed to have done, as a form of criminal complicity through omission, for
individual respondents’ criminal liability, if there be any, is beyond the reach of
amparo. In other words, the Court does not rule in such proceedings on any
issue of criminal culpability, even if incidentally a crime or an infraction of an
administrative rule may have been committed. As the Court stressed in
Secretary of National Defense v. Manalo (Manalo),22 the writ of amparo was
conceived to provide expeditious and effective procedural relief against
violations or threats of violation of the basic rights to life, liberty, and security of
persons; the corresponding amparo suit, however, "is not an action to determine
criminal guilt requiring proof beyond reasonable doubt x x x or administrative
liability requiring substantial evidence that will require full and exhaustive
proceedings."23 Of the same tenor, and by way of expounding on the nature
and role of amparo, is what the Court said in Razon v. Tagitis:
It does not determine guilt nor pinpoint criminal culpability for the disappearance
[threats thereof or extra-judicial killings]; it determines responsibility, or at least
accountability, for the enforced disappearance [threats thereof or extra-judicial
killings] for purposes of imposing the appropriate remedies to address the
disappearance [or extra-judicial killings].
xxxx
As the law now stands, extra-judicial killings and enforced disappearances in
this jurisdiction are not crimes penalized separately from the component criminal
acts undertaken to carry out these killings and enforced disappearances and
are now penalized under the Revised Penal Code and special laws. The simple
reason is that the Legislature has not spoken on the matter; the determination
of what acts are criminal x x x are matters of substantive law that only the
Legislature has the power to enact.24 x x x
If command responsibility were to be invoked and applied to these proceedings,
it should, at most, be only to determine the author who, at the first instance, is
accountable for, and has the duty to address, the disappearance and
harassments complained of, so as to enable the Court to devise remedial
measures that may be appropriate under the premises to protect rights covered
by the writ of amparo. As intimated earlier, however, the determination should
not be pursued to fix criminal liability on respondents preparatory to criminal
prosecution, or as a prelude to administrative disciplinary proceedings under
existing administrative issuances, if there be any.
Petitioners, as the CA has declared, have not adduced substantial evidence
pointing to government involvement in the disappearance of Lourdes. To a
concrete point, petitioners have not shown that the actual perpetrators of the
abduction and the harassments that followed formally or informally formed part
of either the military or the police chain of command. A preliminary police
investigation report, however, would tend to show a link, however hazy, between
the license plate (XRR 428) of the vehicle allegedly used in the abduction of
Lourdes and the address of Darwin Reyes/Sy, who was alleged to be working
in Camp Aguinaldo.25 Then, too, there were affidavits and testimonies on
events that transpired which, if taken together, logically point to military
involvement in the alleged disappearance of Lourdes, such as, but not limited
to, her abduction in broad daylight, her being forcibly dragged to a vehicle
blindfolded and then being brought to a place where the sounds of planes taking
off and landing could be heard. Mention may also be made of the fact that
Lourdes was asked about her membership in the Communist Party and of being
released when she agreed to become an "asset."
Still and all, the identities and links to the AFP or the PNP of the alleged
abductors, namely Cuaresma, Alfaro, Santana, Jonathan, and Sy/Reyes, have
yet to be established.
Based on the separate sworn statements of Maj. Paul Ciano26 and Technical
Sergeant John N. Romano,27 officer-in-charge and a staff of the 301st AISS,
respectively, none of the alleged abductors of Lourdes belonged to the 301st
AISS based in San Fernando Air Base. Neither were they members of any unit
of the Philippine Air Force, per the certification28 of Col. Raul Dimatactac, Air
Force Adjutant. And as stated in the challenged CA decision, a verification with
the Personnel Accounting and Information System of the PNP yielded the
information that, except for a certain Darwin Reyes y Muga, the other alleged
abductors, i.e., Cuaresma, Alfaro, Santana and Jonathan, were not members of
the PNP. Petitioners, when given the opportunity to identify Police Officer 1
Darwin Reyes y Muga, made no effort to confirm if he was the same Maj. Darwin
Reyes a.k.a. Darwin Sy they were implicating in Lourdes’ abduction.
Petitioners, to be sure, have not successfully controverted answering
respondents’ documentary evidence, adduced to debunk the former’s
allegations directly linking Lourdes’ abductors and tormentors to the military or
the police establishment. We note, in fact, that Lourdes, when queried on cross-
examination, expressed the belief that Sy/Reyes was an NBI agent.29 The
Court is, of course, aware of what was referred to in Razon30 as the "evidentiary
difficulties" presented by the nature of, and encountered by petitioners in,
enforced disappearance cases. But it is precisely for this reason that the Court
should take care too that no wrong message is sent, lest one conclude that any
kind or degree of evidence, even the outlandish, would suffice to secure amparo
remedies and protection.
Sec. 17, as complemented by Sec. 18 of the Amparo Rule, expressly prescribes
the minimum evidentiary substantiation requirement and norm to support a
cause of action under the Rule, thus:
Page 74 of 99
Sec. 17. Burden of Proof and Standard of Diligence Required.—The parties
shall establish their claims by substantial evidence.
xxxx
Sec. 18. Judgment.—x x x If the allegations in the petition are proven by
substantial evidence, the court shall grant the privilege of the writ and such
reliefs as may be proper and appropriate; otherwise, the privilege shall be
denied. (Emphasis added.)
Substantial evidence is more than a mere imputation of wrongdoing or violation
that would warrant a finding of liability against the person charged;31 it is more
than a scintilla of evidence. It means such amount of relevant evidence which a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, even if
other equally reasonable minds might opine otherwise.32 Per the CA’s
evaluation of their evidence, consisting of the testimonies and affidavits of the
three Rubrico women and five other individuals, petitioners have not
satisfactorily hurdled the evidentiary bar required of and assigned to them under
the Amparo Rule. In a very real sense, the burden of evidence never even
shifted to answering respondents. The Court finds no compelling reason to
disturb the appellate court’s determination of the answering respondents’ role in
the alleged enforced disappearance of petitioner Lourdes and the threats to her
family’s security.
Notwithstanding the foregoing findings, the Court notes that both Gen. Esperon
and P/Dir. Gen. Razon, per their separate affidavits, lost no time, upon their
receipt of the order to make a return on the writ, in issuing directives to the
concerned units in their respective commands for a thorough probe of the case
and in providing the investigators the necessary support. As of this date,
however, the investigations have yet to be concluded with some definite findings
and recommendation.
As regards P/Supt. Romero and P/Insp. Gomez, the Court is more than satisfied
that they have no direct or indirect hand in the alleged enforced disappearance
of Lourdes and the threats against her daughters. As police officers, though,
theirs was the duty to thoroughly investigate the abduction of Lourdes, a duty
that would include looking into the cause, manner, and like details of the
disappearance; identifying witnesses and obtaining statements from them; and
following evidentiary leads, such as the Toyota Revo vehicle with plate number
XRR 428, and securing and preserving evidence related to the abduction and
the threats that may aid in the prosecution of the person/s responsible. As we
said in Manalo,33 the right to security, as a guarantee of protection by the
government, is breached by the superficial and one-sided––hence, ineffective–
–investigation by the military or the police of reported cases under their
jurisdiction. As found by the CA, the local police stations concerned, including
P/Supt. Roquero and P/Insp. Gomez, did conduct a preliminary fact-finding on
petitioners’ complaint. They could not, however, make any headway, owing to
what was perceived to be the refusal of Lourdes, her family, and her witnesses
to cooperate. Petitioners’ counsel, Atty. Rex J.M.A. Fernandez, provided a
plausible explanation for his clients and their witnesses’ attitude, "[They] do not
trust the government agencies to protect them."34 The difficulty arising from a
situation where the party whose complicity in extra-judicial killing or enforced
disappearance, as the case may be, is alleged to be the same party who
investigates it is understandable, though.
The seeming reluctance on the part of the Rubricos or their witnesses to
cooperate ought not to pose a hindrance to the police in pursuing, on its own
initiative, the investigation in question to its natural end. To repeat what the
Court said in Manalo, the right to security of persons is a guarantee of the
protection of one’s right by the government. And this protection includes
conducting effective investigations of extra-legal killings, enforced
disappearances, or threats of the same kind. The nature and importance of an
investigation are captured in the Velasquez Rodriguez case,35 in which the
Inter-American Court of Human Rights pronounced:
[The duty to investigate] must be undertaken in a serious manner and not as a
mere formality preordained to be ineffective. An investigation must have an
objective and be assumed by the State as its own legal duty, not a step taken
by private interests that depends upon the initiative of the victim or his family or
upon offer of proof, without an effective search for the truth by the government.
(Emphasis added.)
This brings us to Mary Joy’s charge of having been harassed by respondent
P/Insp. Gomez. With the view we take of this incident, there is nothing concrete
to support the charge, save for Mary Joy’s bare allegations of harassment. We
cite with approval the following self-explanatory excerpt from the appealed CA
decision:
In fact, during her cross-examination, when asked what specific act or threat
P/Sr. Gomez (ret) committed against her or her mother and sister, Mary Joy
replied "None …"36
Similarly, there appears to be no basis for petitioners’ allegations about the OMB
failing to act on their complaint against those who allegedly abducted and
illegally detained Lourdes. Contrary to petitioners’ contention, the OMB has
taken the necessary appropriate action on said complaint. As culled from the
affidavit37 of the Deputy Overall Ombudsman and the joint affidavits38 of the
designated investigators, all dated November 7, 2007, the OMB had, on the
basis of said complaint, commenced criminal39 and administrative40
proceedings, docketed as OMB-P-C-07-0602-E and OMB-P-A 07-567-E,
respectively, against Cuaresma, Alfaro, Santana, Jonathan, and Sy/Reyes. The
requisite orders for the submission of counter-affidavits and verified position
papers had been sent out.
The privilege of the writ of amparo, to reiterate, is a remedy available to victims
of extra-judicial killings and enforced disappearances or threats of similar
nature, regardless of whether the perpetrator of the unlawful act or omission is
a public official or employee or a private individual.
At this juncture, it bears to state that petitioners have not provided the CA with
the correct addresses of respondents Cuaresma, Alfaro, Santana, Jonathan,
and Sy/Reyes. The mailed envelopes containing the petition for a writ of amparo
individually addressed to each of them have all been returned unopened. And
petitioners’ motion interposed before the appellate court for notice or service via
publication has not been accompanied by supporting affidavits as required by
the Rules of Court. Accordingly, the appealed CA partial judgment––disposing
of the underlying petition for a writ of amparo without (1) pronouncement as to
the accountability, or lack of it, of the four non-answering respondents or (2)
outright dismissal of the same petition as to them––hews to the prescription of
Sec. 20 of the Amparo Rule on archiving and reviving cases.41 Parenthetically,
petitioners have also not furnished this Court with sufficient data as to where the
afore-named respondents may be served a copy of their petition for review.
Apart from the foregoing considerations, the petition did not allege ultimate facts
as would link the OMB in any manner to the violation or threat of violation of the
petitioners’ rights to life, liberty, or personal security.
The privilege of the writ of amparo is envisioned basically to protect and
guarantee the rights to life, liberty, and security of persons, free from fears and
threats that vitiate the quality of this life.42 It is an extraordinary writ
conceptualized and adopted in light of and in response to the prevalence of
extra-legal killings and enforced disappearances.43 Accordingly, the remedy
ought to be resorted to and granted judiciously, lest the ideal sought by the
Amparo Rule be diluted and undermined by the indiscriminate filing of amparo
petitions for purposes less than the desire to secure amparo reliefs and
protection and/or on the basis of unsubstantiated allegations.
In their petition for a writ of amparo, petitioners asked, as their main prayer, that
the Court order the impleaded respondents "to immediately desist from doing
any acts that would threaten or seem to threaten the security of the Petitioners
and to desist from approaching Petitioners, x x x their residences and offices
where they are working under pain of contempt of [this] Court." Petitioners,
however, failed to adduce the threshold substantive evidence to establish the
predicate facts to support their cause of action, i.e., the adverted harassments
and threats to their life, liberty, or security, against responding respondents, as
responsible for the disappearance and harassments complained of. This is not
to say, however, that petitioners’ allegation on the fact of the abduction incident
or harassment is necessarily contrived. The reality on the ground, however, is
that the military or police connection has not been adequately proved either by
identifying the malefactors as components of the AFP or PNP; or in case
identification is not possible, by showing that they acted with the direct or indirect
acquiescence of the government. For this reason, the Court is unable to ascribe
the authorship of and responsibility for the alleged enforced disappearance of
Lourdes and the harassment and threats on her daughters to individual
respondents. To this extent, the dismissal of the case against them is correct
and must, accordingly, be sustained.
Prescinding from the above considerations, the Court distinctly notes that the
appealed decision veritably extended the privilege of the writ of amparo to
petitioners when it granted what to us are amparo reliefs. Consider: the
appellate court decreed, and rightly so, that the police and the military take
specific measures for the protection of petitioners’ right or threatened right to
liberty or security. The protection came in the form of directives specifically to
Gen. Esperon and P/Dir. Gen. Razon, requiring each of them (1) to ensure that
the investigations already commenced by the AFP and PNP units, respectively,
under them on the complaints of Lourdes and her daughters are being pursued
with urgency to bring to justice the perpetrators of the acts complained of; and
(2) to submit to the CA, copy furnished the petitioners, a regular report on the
progress and status of the investigations. The directives obviously go to Gen.
Esperon in his capacity as head of the AFP and, in a sense, chief guarantor of
order and security in the country. On the other hand, P/Dir. Gen. Razon is called
upon to perform a duty pertaining to the PNP, a crime-preventing, investigatory,
and arresting institution.
As the CA, however, formulated its directives, no definitive time frame was set
in its decision for the completion of the investigation and the reportorial
requirements. It also failed to consider Gen. Esperon and P/Dir. Gen. Razon’s
imminent compulsory retirement from the military and police services,
respectively. Accordingly, the CA directives, as hereinafter redefined and
amplified to fully enforce the amparo remedies, are hereby given to, and shall
be directly enforceable against, whoever sits as the commanding general of the
AFP and the PNP.
At this stage, two postulates and their implications need highlighting for a proper
disposition of this case.
First, a criminal complaint for kidnapping and, alternatively, for arbitrary
detention rooted in the same acts and incidents leading to the filing of the subject
amparo petition has been instituted with the OMB, docketed as OMB-P-C-O7-
0602-E. The usual initial steps to determine the existence of a prima facie case
against the five (5) impleaded individuals suspected to be actually involved in
the detention of Lourdes have been set in motion. It must be pointed out, though,
that the filing44 of the OMB complaint came before the effectivity of the Amparo
Rule on October 24, 2007.
Second, Sec. 2245 of the Amparo Rule proscribes the filing of an amparo
petition should a criminal action have, in the meanwhile, been commenced. The
Page 75 of 99
succeeding Sec. 23,46 on the other hand, provides that when the criminal suit
is filed subsequent to a petition for amparo, the petition shall be consolidated
with the criminal action where the Amparo Rule shall nonetheless govern the
disposition of the relief under the Rule. Under the terms of said Sec. 22, the
present petition ought to have been dismissed at the outset. But as things stand,
the outright dismissal of the petition by force of that section is no longer
technically feasible in light of the interplay of the following factual mix: (1) the
Court has, pursuant to Sec. 647 of the Rule, already issued ex parte the writ of
amparo; (2) the CA, after a summary hearing, has dismissed the petition, but
not on the basis of Sec. 22; and (3) the complaint in OMB-P-C-O7-0602-E
named as respondents only those believed to be the actual abductors of
Lourdes, while the instant petition impleaded, in addition, those tasked to
investigate the kidnapping and detention incidents and their superiors at the top.
Yet, the acts and/or omissions subject of the criminal complaint and the amparo
petition are so linked as to call for the consolidation of both proceedings to
obviate the mischief inherent in a multiplicity-of-suits situation.
Given the above perspective and to fully apply the beneficial nature of the writ
of amparo as an inexpensive and effective tool to protect certain rights violated
or threatened to be violated, the Court hereby adjusts to a degree the literal
application of Secs. 22 and 23 of the Amparo Rule to fittingly address the
situation obtaining under the premises. 48 Towards this end, two things are at
once indicated: (1) the consolidation of the probe and fact-finding aspects of the
instant petition with the investigation of the criminal complaint before the OMB;
and (2) the incorporation in the same criminal complaint of the allegations in this
petition bearing on the threats to the right to security. Withal, the OMB should
be furnished copies of the investigation reports to aid that body in its own
investigation and eventual resolution of OMB-P-C-O7-0602-E. Then, too, the
OMB shall be given easy access to all pertinent documents and evidence, if
any, adduced before the CA. Necessarily, Lourdes, as complainant in OMB-P-
C-O7-0602-E, should be allowed, if so minded, to amend her basic criminal
complaint if the consolidation of cases is to be fully effective.
WHEREFORE, the Court PARTIALLY GRANTS this petition for review and
makes a decision:
(1) Affirming the dropping of President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo from the
petition for a writ of amparo;
(2) Affirming the dismissal of the amparo case as against Gen. Hermogenes
Esperon, and P/Dir. Gen. Avelino Razon, insofar as it tended, under the
command responsibility principle, to attach accountability and responsibility to
them, as then AFP Chief of Staff and then PNP Chief, for the alleged enforced
disappearance of Lourdes and the ensuing harassments allegedly committed
against petitioners. The dismissal of the petition with respect to the OMB is also
affirmed for failure of the petition to allege ultimate facts as to make out a case
against that body for the enforced disappearance of Lourdes and the threats
and harassment that followed; and
(3) Directing the incumbent Chief of Staff, AFP, or his successor, and the
incumbent Director-General of the PNP, or his successor, to ensure that the
investigations already commenced by their respective units on the alleged
abduction of Lourdes Rubrico and the alleged harassments and threats she and
her daughters were made to endure are pursued with extraordinary diligence as
required by Sec. 1749 of the Amparo Rule. They shall order their subordinate
officials, in particular, to do the following:
(a) Determine based on records, past and present, the identities and locations
of respondents Maj. Darwin Sy, a.k.a. Darwin Reyes, Jimmy Santana, Ruben
Alfaro, Capt. Angelo Cuaresma, and one Jonathan; and submit certifications of
this determination to the OMB with copy furnished to petitioners, the CA, and
this Court;
(b) Pursue with extraordinary diligence the evidentiary leads relating to Maj.
Darwin Sy and the Toyota Revo vehicle with Plate No. XRR 428; and
(c) Prepare, with the assistance of petitioners and/or witnesses, cartographic
sketches of respondents Maj. Sy/Reyes, Jimmy Santana, Ruben Alfaro, Capt.
Angelo Cuaresma, and a certain Jonathan to aid in positively identifying and
locating them.
The investigations shall be completed not later than six (6) months from receipt
of this Decision; and within thirty (30) days after completion of the investigations,
the Chief of Staff of the AFP and the Director-General of the PNP shall submit
a full report of the results of the investigations to the Court, the CA, the OMB,
and petitioners.
This case is accordingly referred back to the CA for the purpose of monitoring
the investigations and the actions of the AFP and the PNP.
Subject to the foregoing modifications, the Court AFFIRMS the partial judgment
dated July 31, 2008 of the CA.
SO ORDERED.
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 189155 September 7, 2010
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR THE WRIT OF AMPARO AND THE
WRIT OF HABEAS DATA IN FAVOR OF MELISSA C. ROXAS, MELISSA C.
ROXAS, Petitioner,
vs.
GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, GILBERT TEODORO, GEN. VICTOR S.
IBRADO, P/DIR. GEN. JESUS AME VERZOSA, LT. GEN. DELFIN N.
BANGIT, PC/SUPT. LEON NILO A. DELA CRUZ, MAJ. GEN. RALPH
VILLANUEVA, PS/SUPT. RUDY GAMIDO LACADIN, AND CERTAIN
PERSONS WHO GO BY THE NAME[S] DEX, RC AND ROSE, Respondents.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
At bench is a Petition For Review on Certiorari1 assailing the Decision2 dated
26 August 2009 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 00036-WRA — a
petition that was commenced jointly under the Rules on the Writ of Amparo
(Amparo Rule) and Habeas Data (Habeas Data Rule). In its decision, the Court
of Appeals extended to the petitioner, Melissa C. Roxas, the privilege of the
writs of amparo and habeas data but denied the latter’s prayers for an inspection
order, production order and return of specified personal belongings. The fallo of
the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the Petition is PARTIALLY MERITORIOUS. This Court hereby
grants Petitioner the privilege of the Writ of Amparo and Habeas Data.
Accordingly, Respondents are enjoined to refrain from distributing or causing
the distribution to the public of any records in whatever form, reports, documents
or similar papers relative to Petitioner’s Melissa C. Roxas, and/or Melissa
Roxas; alleged ties to the CPP-NPA or pertinently related to the complained
incident. Petitioner’s prayers for an inspection order, production order and for
the return of the specified personal belongings are denied for lack of merit.
Although there is no evidence that Respondents are responsible for the
abduction, detention or torture of the Petitioner, said Respondents pursuant to
their legally mandated duties are, nonetheless, ordered to continue/complete
the investigation of this incident with the end in view of prosecuting those who
are responsible. Respondents are also ordered to provide protection to the
Petitioner and her family while in the Philippines against any and all forms of
harassment, intimidation and coercion as may be relevant to the grant of these
reliefs.3
We begin with the petitioner’s allegations.
Petitioner is an American citizen of Filipino descent.4 While in the United States,
petitioner enrolled in an exposure program to the Philippines with the group
Bagong Alyansang Makabayan-United States of America (BAYAN-USA) of
which she is a member.5 During the course of her immersion, petitioner toured
various provinces and towns of Central Luzon and, in April of 2009, she
volunteered to join members of BAYAN-Tarlac6 in conducting an initial health
survey in La Paz, Tarlac for a future medical mission.7
In pursuit of her volunteer work, petitioner brought her passport, wallet with
Fifteen Thousand Pesos (₱15,000.00) in cash, journal, digital camera with
memory card, laptop computer, external hard disk, IPOD,8 wristwatch,
sphygmomanometer, stethoscope and medicines.9
After doing survey work on 19 May 2009, petitioner and her companions,
Juanito Carabeo (Carabeo) and John Edward Jandoc (Jandoc), decided to rest
in the house of one Mr. Jesus Paolo (Mr. Paolo) in Sitio Bagong Sikat, Barangay
Kapanikian, La Paz, Tarlac.10 At around 1:30 in the afternoon, however,
petitioner, her companions and Mr. Paolo were startled by the loud sounds of
someone banging at the front door and a voice demanding that they open up.11
Suddenly, fifteen (15) heavily armed men forcibly opened the door, barged
inside and ordered petitioner and her companions to lie on the ground face
down.12 The armed men were all in civilian clothes and, with the exception of
their leader, were also wearing bonnets to conceal their faces.13
Petitioner tried to protest the intrusion, but five (5) of the armed men ganged up
on her and tied her hands.14 At this juncture, petitioner saw the other armed
men herding Carabeo and Jandoc, already blindfolded and taped at their
mouths, to a nearby blue van. Petitioner started to shout her name.15 Against
her vigorous resistance, the armed men dragged petitioner towards the van—
bruising her arms, legs and knees.16 Once inside the van, but before she can
be blindfolded, petitioner was able to see the face of one of the armed men
sitting beside her.17 The van then sped away.
After about an hour of traveling, the van stopped.18 Petitioner, Carabeo and
Jandoc were ordered to alight.19 After she was informed that she is being
detained for being a member of the Communist Party of the Philippines-New
People’s Army (CPP-NPA), petitioner was separated from her companions and
was escorted to a room that she believed was a jail cell from the sound of its
metal doors.20 From there, she could hear the sounds of gunfire, the noise of
planes taking off and landing and some construction bustle.21 She inferred that
she was taken to the military camp of Fort Magsaysay in Laur, Nueva Ecija.22
Page 76 of 99
What followed was five (5) straight days of interrogation coupled with torture.23
The thrust of the interrogations was to convince petitioner to abandon her
communist beliefs in favor of returning to "the fold."24 The torture, on the other
hand, consisted of taunting, choking, boxing and suffocating the petitioner.25
Throughout the entirety of her ordeal, petitioner was made to suffer in blindfolds
even in her sleep.26 Petitioner was only relieved of her blindfolds when she was
allowed to take a bath, during which she became acquainted with a woman
named "Rose" who bathed her.27 There were also a few times when she
cheated her blindfold and was able to peek at her surroundings.28
Despite being deprived of sight, however, petitioner was still able to learn the
names of three of her interrogators who introduced themselves to her as "Dex,"
"James" and "RC."29 "RC" even told petitioner that those who tortured her came
from the "Special Operations Group," and that she was abducted because her
name is included in the "Order of Battle."30
On 25 May 2009, petitioner was finally released and returned to her uncle’s
house in Quezon City.31 Before being released, however, the abductors gave
petitioner a cellular phone with a SIM32 card, a slip of paper containing an e-
mail address with password,33 a plastic bag containing biscuits and books,34
the handcuffs used on her, a blouse and a pair of shoes.35 Petitioner was also
sternly warned not to report the incident to the group Karapatan or something
untoward will happen to her and her family.36
Sometime after her release, petitioner continued to receive calls from RC via
the cellular phone given to her.37 Out of apprehension that she was being
monitored and also fearing for the safety of her family, petitioner threw away the
cellular phone with a SIM card.
Seeking sanctuary against the threat of future harm as well as the suppression
of any existing government files or records linking her to the communist
movement, petitioner filed a Petition for the Writs of Amparo and Habeas Data
before this Court on 1 June 2009.38 Petitioner impleaded public officials
occupying the uppermost echelons of the military and police hierarchy as
respondents, on the belief that it was government agents who were behind her
abduction and torture. Petitioner likewise included in her suit "Rose," "Dex" and
"RC."39
The Amparo and Habeas Data petition prays that: (1) respondents be enjoined
from harming or even approaching petitioner and her family; (2) an order be
issued allowing the inspection of detention areas in the 7th Infantry Division,
Fort Magsaysay, Laur, Nueva Ecija; (3) respondents be ordered to produce
documents relating to any report on the case of petitioner including, but not
limited to, intelligence report and operation reports of the 7th Infantry Division,
the Special Operations Group of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and
its subsidiaries or branch/es prior to, during and subsequent to 19 May 2009;
(4) respondents be ordered to expunge from the records of the respondents any
document pertinent or connected to Melissa C. Roxas, Melissa Roxas or any
name which sounds the same; and (5) respondents be ordered to return to
petitioner her journal, digital camera with memory card, laptop computer,
external hard disk, IPOD, wristwatch, sphygmomanometer, stethoscope,
medicines and her ₱15,000.00 cash.40
In a Resolution dated 9 June 2009, this Court issued the desired writs and
referred the case to the Court of Appeals for hearing, reception of evidence and
appropriate action.41 The Resolution also directed the respondents to file their
verified written return.42
On 18 June 2009, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a Return of the
Writs43 on behalf of the public officials impleaded as respondents.
We now turn to the defenses interposed by the public respondents.
The public respondents label petitioner’s alleged abduction and torture as
"stage managed."44 In support of their accusation, the public respondents
principally rely on the statement of Mr. Paolo, as contained in the Special
Report45 of the La Paz Police Station. In the Special Report, Mr. Paolo
disclosed that, prior to the purported abduction, petitioner and her companions
instructed him and his two sons to avoid leaving the house.46 From this
statement, the public respondents drew the distinct possibility that, except for
those already inside Mr. Paolo’s house, nobody else has any way of knowing
where petitioner and her companions were at the time they were supposedly
abducted.47 This can only mean, the public respondents concluded, that if ever
there was any "abduction" it must necessarily have been planned by, or done
with the consent of, the petitioner and her companions themselves.48
Public respondents also cited the Medical Certificate49 of the petitioner, as
actually belying her claims that she was subjected to serious torture for five (5)
days. The public respondents noted that while the petitioner alleges that she
was choked and boxed by her abductors—inflictions that could have easily
produced remarkable bruises—her Medical Certificate only shows abrasions in
her wrists and knee caps.50
For the public respondents, the above anomalies put in question the very
authenticity of petitioner’s alleged abduction and torture, more so any military or
police involvement therein. Hence, public respondents conclude that the claims
of abduction and torture was no more than a charade fabricated by the petitioner
to put the government in bad light, and at the same time, bring great media
mileage to her and the group that she represents.51
Nevertheless, even assuming the abduction and torture to be genuine, the
public respondents insist on the dismissal of the Amparo and Habeas Data
petition based on the following grounds: (a) as against respondent President
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, in particular, because of her immunity from suit,52
and (b) as against all of the public respondents, in general, in view of the
absence of any specific allegation in the petition that they had participated in, or
at least authorized, the commission of such atrocities.53
Finally, the public respondents posit that they had not been remiss in their duty
to ascertain the truth behind the allegations of the petitioner.54 In both the police
and military arms of the government machinery, inquiries were set-up in the
following manner:
Police Action
Police authorities first learned of the purported abduction around 4:30 o’clock in
the afternoon of 19 May 2009, when Barangay Captain Michael M. Manuel
came to the La Paz Municipal Police Station to report the presence of heavily
armed men somewhere in Barangay Kapanikian.55 Acting on the report, the
police station launched an initial investigation.56
The initial investigation revolved around the statement of Mr. Paolo, who
informed the investigators of an abduction incident involving three (3) persons—
later identified as petitioner Melissa Roxas, Juanito Carabeo and John Edward
Jandoc—who were all staying in his house.57 Mr. Paolo disclosed that the
abduction occurred around 1:30 o’clock in the afternoon, and was perpetrated
by about eight (8) heavily armed men who forced their way inside his house.58
Other witnesses to the abduction also confirmed that the armed men used a
dark blue van with an unknown plate number and two (2) Honda XRM
motorcycles with no plate numbers.59
At 5:00 o’clock in the afternoon of 19 May 2009, the investigators sent a Flash
Message to the different police stations surrounding La Paz, Tarlac, in an effort
to track and locate the van and motorcycles of the suspects. Unfortunately, the
effort yielded negative results.60
On 20 May 2009, the results of the initial investigation were included in a Special
Report61 that was transmitted to the Tarlac Police Provincial Office, headed by
public respondent P/S Supt. Rudy Lacadin (Supt. Lacadin). Public respondent
Supt. Lacadin, in turn, informed the Regional Police Office of Region 3 about
the abduction.62 Follow-up investigations were, at the same time, pursued.63
On 26 May 2009, public respondent PC/Supt. Leon Nilo Dela Cruz, as Director
of the Regional Police Office for Region 3, caused the creation of Special
Investigation Task Group—CAROJAN (Task Group CAROJAN) to conduct an
in-depth investigation on the abduction of the petitioner, Carabeo and Jandoc.64
Task Group CAROJAN started its inquiry by making a series of background
examinations on the victims of the purported abduction, in order to reveal the
motive behind the abduction and, ultimately, the identity of the perpetrators.65
Task Group CAROJAN also maintained liaisons with Karapatan and the Alliance
for Advancement of People’s Rights—organizations trusted by petitioner—in the
hopes of obtaining the latter’s participation in the ongoing investigations.66
Unfortunately, the letters sent by the investigators requesting for the availability
of the petitioner for inquiries were left unheeded.67
The progress of the investigations conducted by Task Group CAROJAN had
been detailed in the reports68 that it submitted to public respondent General
Jesus Ame Verzosa, the Chief of the Philippine National Police. However, as of
their latest report dated 29 June 2009, Task Group CAROJAN is still unable to
make a definitive finding as to the true identity and affiliation of the abductors—
a fact that task group CAROJAN attributes to the refusal of the petitioner, or any
of her fellow victims, to cooperate in their investigative efforts.69
Military Action
Public respondent Gilbert Teodoro, the Secretary of National Defense, first
came to know about the alleged abduction and torture of the petitioner upon
receipt of the Resolution of this Court directing him and the other respondents
to file their return.70 Immediately thereafter, he issued a Memorandum
Directive71 addressed to the Chief of Staff of the AFP, ordering the latter,
among others, to conduct an inquiry to determine the validity of the accusation
of military involvement in the abduction.72
Acting pursuant to the Memorandum Directive, public respondent General Victor
S. Ibrado, the AFP Chief of Staff, sent an AFP Radio Message73 addressed to
public respondent Lieutenant General Delfin N. Bangit (Lt. Gen. Bangit), the
Commanding General of the Army, relaying the order to cause an investigation
on the abduction of the petitioner.74
For his part, and taking cue from the allegations in the amparo petition, public
respondent Lt. Gen. Bangit instructed public respondent Major General Ralph
A. Villanueva (Maj. Gen. Villanueva), the Commander of the 7th Infantry Division
of the Army based in Fort Magsaysay, to set in motion an investigation regarding
the possible involvement of any personnel assigned at the camp in the
purported abduction of the petitioner.75 In turn, public respondent Maj. Gen.
Villanueva tapped the Office of the Provost Marshal (OPV) of the 7th Infantry
Division, to conduct the investigation.76
On 23 June 2009, the OPV of the 7th Infantry Division released an Investigation
Report77 detailing the results of its inquiry. In substance, the report described
petitioner’s allegations as "opinionated" and thereby cleared the military from
any involvement in her alleged abduction and torture.78
The Decision of the Court of Appeals
Page 77 of 99
In its Decision,79 the Court of Appeals gave due weight and consideration to
the petitioner’s version that she was indeed abducted and then subjected to
torture for five (5) straight days. The appellate court noted the sincerity and
resolve by which the petitioner affirmed the contents of her affidavits in open
court, and was thereby convinced that the latter was telling the truth.80
On the other hand, the Court of Appeals disregarded the argument of the public
respondents that the abduction of the petitioner was "stage managed," as it is
merely based on an unfounded speculation that only the latter and her
companions knew where they were staying at the time they were forcibly
taken.81 The Court of Appeals further stressed that the Medical Certificate of
the petitioner can only affirm the existence of a true abduction, as its findings
are reflective of the very injuries the latter claims to have sustained during her
harrowing ordeal, particularly when she was handcuffed and then dragged by
her abductors onto their van.82
The Court of Appeals also recognized the existence of an ongoing threat against
the security of the petitioner, as manifested in the attempts of "RC" to contact
and monitor her, even after she was released.83 This threat, according to the
Court of Appeals, is all the more compounded by the failure of the police
authorities to identify the material perpetrators who are still at large.84 Thus, the
appellate court extended to the petitioner the privilege of the writ of amparo by
directing the public respondents to afford protection to the former, as well as
continuing, under the norm of extraordinary diligence, their existing
investigations involving the abduction.85
The Court of Appeals likewise observed a transgression of the right to
informational privacy of the petitioner, noting the existence of "records of
investigations" that concerns the petitioner as a suspected member of the CPP-
NPA.86 The appellate court derived the existence of such records from a
photograph and video file presented in a press conference by party-list
representatives Jovito Palparan (Palparan) and Pastor Alcover (Alcover), which
allegedly show the petitioner participating in rebel exercises. Representative
Alcover also revealed that the photograph and video came from a female CPP-
NPA member who wanted out of the organization. According to the Court of
Appeals, the proliferation of the photograph and video, as well as any form of
media, insinuating that petitioner is part of the CPP-NPA does not only
constitute a violation of the right to privacy of the petitioner but also puts further
strain on her already volatile security.87 To this end, the appellate court granted
the privilege of the writ of habeas data mandating the public respondents to
refrain from distributing to the public any records, in whatever form, relative to
petitioner’s alleged ties with the CPP-NPA or pertinently related to her abduction
and torture.88
The foregoing notwithstanding, however, the Court of Appeals was not
convinced that the military or any other person acting under the acquiescence
of the government, were responsible for the abduction and torture of the
petitioner.89 The appellate court stressed that, judging by her own statements,
the petitioner merely "believed" that the military was behind her abduction.90
Thus, the Court of Appeals absolved the public respondents from any complicity
in the abduction and torture of petitioner.91 The petition was likewise dismissed
as against public respondent President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, in view of her
immunity from suit.92
Accordingly, the petitioner’s prayers for the return of her personal belongings
were denied.93 Petitioner’s prayers for an inspection order and production order
also met the same fate.94
Hence, this appeal by the petitioner.
AMPARO
A.
Petitioner first contends that the Court of Appeals erred in absolving the public
respondents from any responsibility in her abduction and torture.95 Corollary to
this, petitioner also finds fault on the part of Court of Appeals in denying her
prayer for the return of her personal belongings.96
Petitioner insists that the manner by which her abduction and torture was carried
out, as well as the sounds of construction, gun-fire and airplanes that she heard
while in detention, as these were detailed in her two affidavits and affirmed by
her in open court, are already sufficient evidence to prove government
involvement.97
Proceeding from such assumption, petitioner invokes the doctrine of command
responsibility to implicate the high-ranking civilian and military authorities she
impleaded as respondents in her amparo petition.98 Thus, petitioner seeks from
this Court a pronouncement holding the respondents as complicit in her
abduction and torture, as well as liable for the return of her belongings.99
Command Responsibility in Amparo Proceedings
It must be stated at the outset that the use by the petitioner of the doctrine of
command responsibility as the justification in impleading the public respondents
in her amparo petition, is legally inaccurate, if not incorrect. The doctrine of
command responsibility is a rule of substantive law that establishes liability and,
by this account, cannot be a proper legal basis to implead a party-respondent
in an amparo petition.100
The case of Rubrico v. Arroyo,101 which was the first to examine command
responsibility in the context of an amparo proceeding, observed that the doctrine
is used to pinpoint liability. Rubrico notes that:102
The evolution of the command responsibility doctrine finds its context in the
development of laws of war and armed combats. According to Fr. Bernas,
"command responsibility," in its simplest terms, means the "responsibility of
commanders for crimes committed by subordinate members of the armed forces
or other persons subject to their control in international wars or domestic
conflict."103 In this sense, command responsibility is properly a form of criminal
complicity. The Hague Conventions of 1907 adopted the doctrine of command
responsibility,104 foreshadowing the present-day precept of holding a superior
accountable for the atrocities committed by his subordinates should he be
remiss in his duty of control over them. As then formulated, command
responsibility is "an omission mode of individual criminal liability," whereby the
superior is made responsible for crimes committed by his subordinates for failing
to prevent or punish the perpetrators105 (as opposed to crimes he ordered).
(Emphasis in the orginal, underscoring supplied)
Since the application of command responsibility presupposes an imputation of
individual liability, it is more aptly invoked in a full-blown criminal or
administrative case rather than in a summary amparo proceeding. The obvious
reason lies in the nature of the writ itself:
The writ of amparo is a protective remedy aimed at providing judicial relief
consisting of the appropriate remedial measures and directives that may be
crafted by the court, in order to address specific violations or threats of violation
of the constitutional rights to life, liberty or security.106 While the principal
objective of its proceedings is the initial determination of whether an enforced
disappearance, extralegal killing or threats thereof had transpired—the writ does
not, by so doing, fix liability for such disappearance, killing or threats, whether
that may be criminal, civil or administrative under the applicable substantive
law.107 The rationale underpinning this peculiar nature of an amparo writ has
been, in turn, clearly set forth in the landmark case of The Secretary of National
Defense v. Manalo:108
x x x The remedy provides rapid judicial relief as it partakes of a summary
proceeding that requires only substantial evidence to make the appropriate
reliefs available to the petitioner; it is not an action to determine criminal guilt
requiring proof beyond reasonable doubt, or liability for damages requiring
preponderance of evidence, or administrative responsibility requiring substantial
evidence that will require full and exhaustive proceedings.109(Emphasis
supplied)
It must be clarified, however, that the inapplicability of the doctrine of command
responsibility in an amparo proceeding does not, by any measure, preclude
impleading military or police commanders on the ground that the complained
acts in the petition were committed with their direct or indirect acquiescence. In
which case, commanders may be impleaded—not actually on the basis of
command responsibility—but rather on the ground of their responsibility, or at
least accountability. In Razon v. Tagitis,110 the distinct, but interrelated
concepts of responsibility and accountability were given special and unique
significations in relation to an amparo proceeding, to wit:
x x x Responsibility refers to the extent the actors have been established by
substantial evidence to have participated in whatever way, by action or
omission, in an enforced disappearance, as a measure of the remedies this
Court shall craft, among them, the directive to file the appropriate criminal and
civil cases against the responsible parties in the proper courts. Accountability,
on the other hand, refers to the measure of remedies that should be addressed
to those who exhibited involvement in the enforced disappearance without
bringing the level of their complicity to the level of responsibility defined above;
or who are imputed with knowledge relating to the enforced disappearance and
who carry the burden of disclosure; or those who carry, but have failed to
discharge, the burden of extraordinary diligence in the investigation of the
enforced disappearance.
Responsibility of Public Respondents
At any rate, it is clear from the records of the case that the intent of the petitioner
in impleading the public respondents is to ascribe some form of responsibility
on their part, based on her assumption that they, in one way or the other, had
condoned her abduction and torture.111
To establish such assumption, petitioner attempted to show that it was
government agents who were behind her ordeal. Thus, the petitioner calls
attention to the circumstances surrounding her abduction and torture—i.e., the
forcible taking in broad daylight; use of vehicles with no license plates; utilization
of blindfolds; conducting interrogations to elicit communist inclinations; and the
infliction of physical abuse—which, according to her, is consistent with the way
enforced disappearances are being practiced by the military or other state
forces.112
Moreover, petitioner also claims that she was held inside the military camp Fort
Magsaysay—a conclusion that she was able to infer from the travel time
required to reach the place where she was actually detained, and also from the
sounds of construction, gun-fire and airplanes she heard while thereat.113
We are not impressed. The totality of the evidence presented by the petitioner
does not inspire reasonable conclusion that her abductors were military or police
personnel and that she was detained at Fort Magsaysay.
First. The similarity between the circumstances attending a particular case of
abduction with those surrounding previous instances of enforced
disappearances does not, necessarily, carry sufficient weight to prove that the
government orchestrated such abduction. We opine that insofar as the present
Page 78 of 99
case is concerned, the perceived similarity cannot stand as substantial evidence
of the involvement of the government.
In amparo proceedings, the weight that may be accorded to parallel
circumstances as evidence of military involvement depends largely on the
availability or non-availability of other pieces of evidence that has the potential
of directly proving the identity and affiliation of the perpetrators. Direct evidence
of identity, when obtainable, must be preferred over mere circumstantial
evidence based on patterns and similarity, because the former indubitably offers
greater certainty as to the true identity and affiliation of the perpetrators. An
amparo court cannot simply leave to remote and hazy inference what it could
otherwise clearly and directly ascertain.
In the case at bench, petitioner was, in fact, able to include in her Offer of
Exhibits,114 the cartographic sketches115 of several of her abductors whose
faces she managed to see. To the mind of this Court, these cartographic
sketches have the undeniable potential of giving the greatest certainty as to the
true identity and affiliation of petitioner’s abductors. Unfortunately for the
petitioner, this potential has not been realized in view of the fact that the faces
described in such sketches remain unidentified, much less have been shown to
be that of any military or police personnel. Bluntly stated, the abductors were
not proven to be part of either the military or the police chain of command.
Second. The claim of the petitioner that she was taken to Fort Magsaysay was
not adequately established by her mere estimate of the time it took to reach the
place where she was detained and by the sounds that she heard while thereat.
Like the Court of Appeals, We are not inclined to take the estimate and
observations of the petitioner as accurate on its face—not only because they
were made mostly while she was in blindfolds, but also in view of the fact that
she was a mere sojourner in the Philippines, whose familiarity with Fort
Magsaysay and the travel time required to reach it is in itself doubtful.116 With
nothing else but obscure observations to support it, petitioner’s claim that she
was taken to Fort Magsaysay remains a mere speculation.
In sum, the petitioner was not able to establish to a concrete point that her
abductors were actually affiliated, whether formally or informally, with the
military or the police organizations. Neither does the evidence at hand prove
that petitioner was indeed taken to the military camp Fort Magsaysay to the
exclusion of other places. These evidentiary gaps, in turn, make it virtually
impossible to determine whether the abduction and torture of the petitioner was
in fact committed with the acquiescence of the public respondents. On account
of this insufficiency in evidence, a pronouncement of responsibility on the part
of the public respondents, therefore, cannot be made.
Prayer for the Return of Personal Belongings
This brings Us to the prayer of the petitioner for the return of her personal
belongings.
In its decision, the Court of Appeals denied the above prayer of the petitioner by
reason of the failure of the latter to prove that the public respondents were
involved in her abduction and torture.117 We agree with the conclusion of the
Court of Appeals, but not entirely with the reason used to support it. To the mind
of this Court, the prayer of the petitioner for the return of her belongings is
doomed to fail regardless of whether there is sufficient evidence to hold public
respondents responsible for the abduction of the petitioner.
In the first place, an order directing the public respondents to return the personal
belongings of the petitioner is already equivalent to a conclusive pronouncement
of liability. The order itself is a substantial relief that can only be granted once
the liability of the public respondents has been fixed in a full and exhaustive
proceeding. As already discussed above, matters of liability are not
determinable in a mere summary amparo proceeding.118
But perhaps the more fundamental reason in denying the prayer of the
petitioner, lies with the fact that a person’s right to be restituted of his property
is already subsumed under the general rubric of property rights—which are no
longer protected by the writ of amparo.119 Section 1 of the Amparo Rule,120
which defines the scope and extent of the writ, clearly excludes the protection
of property rights.
B.
The next error raised by the petitioner is the denial by the Court of Appeals of
her prayer for an inspection of the detention areas of Fort Magsaysay.121
Considering the dearth of evidence concretely pointing to any military
involvement in petitioner’s ordeal, this Court finds no error on the part of the
Court of Appeals in denying an inspection of the military camp at Fort
Magsaysay. We agree with the appellate court that a contrary stance would be
equivalent to sanctioning a "fishing expedition," which was never intended by
the Amparo Rule in providing for the interim relief of inspection order.122
Contrary to the explicit position123 espoused by the petitioner, the Amparo Rule
does not allow a "fishing expedition" for evidence.
An inspection order is an interim relief designed to give support or strengthen
the claim of a petitioner in an amparo petition, in order to aid the court before
making a decision.124 A basic requirement before an amparo court may grant
an inspection order is that the place to be inspected is reasonably determinable
from the allegations of the party seeking the order. While the Amparo Rule does
not require that the place to be inspected be identified with clarity and precision,
it is, nevertheless, a minimum for the issuance of an inspection order that the
supporting allegations of a party be sufficient in itself, so as to make a prima
facie case. This, as was shown above, petitioner failed to do.
Since the very estimates and observations of the petitioner are not strong
enough to make out a prima facie case that she was detained in Fort
Magsaysay, an inspection of the military camp cannot be ordered. An inspection
order cannot issue on the basis of allegations that are, in themselves, unreliable
and doubtful.
HABEAS DATA
As earlier intimated, the Court of Appeals granted to the petitioner the privilege
of the writ of habeas data, by enjoining the public respondents from "distributing
or causing the distribution to the public any records in whatever form, reports,
documents or similar papers" relative to the petitioner’s "alleged ties with the
CPP-NPA or pertinently related to her abduction and torture." Though not raised
as an issue in this appeal, this Court is constrained to pass upon and review this
particular ruling of the Court of Appeals in order to rectify, what appears to Us,
an error infecting the grant.
For the proper appreciation of the rationale used by the Court of Appeals in
granting the privilege of the writ of habeas data, We quote hereunder the
relevant portion125 of its decision:
Under these premises, Petitioner prayed that all the records, intelligence reports
and reports on the investigations conducted on Melissa C. Roxas or Melissa
Roxas be produced and eventually expunged from the records. Petitioner
claimed to be included in the Government’s Order of Battle under Oplan Bantay
Laya which listed political opponents against whom false criminal charges were
filed based on made up and perjured information.
Pending resolution of this petition and before Petitioner could testify before Us,
Ex-army general Jovito Palaparan, Bantay party-list, and Pastor Alcover of the
Alliance for Nationalism and Democracy party-list held a press conference
where they revealed that they received an information from a female NPA rebel
who wanted out of the organization, that Petitioner was a communist rebel.
Alcover claimed that said information reached them thru a letter with photo of
Petitioner holding firearms at an NPA training camp and a video CD of the
training exercises.
Clearly, and notwithstanding Petitioner’s denial that she was the person in said
video, there were records of other investigations on Melissa C. Roxas or Melissa
Roxas which violate her right to privacy. Without a doubt, reports of such nature
have reasonable connections, one way or another, to petitioner’s abduction
where she claimed she had been subjected to cruelties and dehumanizing acts
which nearly caused her life precisely due to allegation of her alleged
membership in the CPP-NPA. And if said report or similar reports are to be
continuously made available to the public, Petitioner’s security and privacy will
certainly be in danger of being violated or transgressed by persons who have
strong sentiments or aversion against members of this group. The unregulated
dissemination of said unverified video CD or reports of Petitioner’s alleged ties
with the CPP-NPA indiscriminately made available for public consumption
without evidence of its authenticity or veracity certainly violates Petitioner’s right
to privacy which must be protected by this Court. We, thus, deem it necessary
to grant Petitioner the privilege of the Writ of Habeas Data. (Emphasis supplied).
The writ of habeas data was conceptualized as a judicial remedy enforcing the
right to privacy, most especially the right to informational privacy of
individuals.126 The writ operates to protect a person’s right to control
information regarding himself, particularly in the instances where such
information is being collected through unlawful means in order to achieve
unlawful ends.
Needless to state, an indispensable requirement before the privilege of the writ
may be extended is the showing, at least by substantial evidence, of an actual
or threatened violation of the right to privacy in life, liberty or security of the
victim.127 This, in the case at bench, the petitioner failed to do.
The main problem behind the ruling of the Court of Appeals is that there is
actually no evidence on record that shows that any of the public respondents
had violated or threatened the right to privacy of the petitioner. The act ascribed
by the Court of Appeals to the public respondents that would have violated or
threatened the right to privacy of the petitioner, i.e., keeping records of
investigations and other reports about the petitioner’s ties with the CPP-NPA,
was not adequately proven—considering that the origin of such records were
virtually unexplained and its existence, clearly, only inferred by the appellate
court from the video and photograph released by Representatives Palparan and
Alcover in their press conference. No evidence on record even shows that any
of the public respondents had access to such video or photograph.
In view of the above considerations, the directive by the Court of Appeals
enjoining the public respondents from "distributing or causing the distribution to
the public any records in whatever form, reports, documents or similar papers"
relative to the petitioner’s "alleged ties with the CPP-NPA," appears to be devoid
of any legal basis. The public respondents cannot be ordered to refrain from
distributing something that, in the first place, it was not proven to have.
Verily, until such time that any of the public respondents were found to be
actually responsible for the abduction and torture of the petitioner, any inference
regarding the existence of reports being kept in violation of the petitioner’s right
to privacy becomes farfetched, and premature.
For these reasons, this Court must, at least in the meantime, strike down the
grant of the privilege of the writ of habeas data.
Page 79 of 99
DISPOSITION OF THE CASE
Our review of the evidence of the petitioner, while telling of its innate
insufficiency to impute any form of responsibility on the part of the public
respondents, revealed two important things that can guide Us to a proper
disposition of this case. One, that further investigation with the use of
extraordinary diligence must be made in order to identify the perpetrators behind
the abduction and torture of the petitioner; and two, that the Commission on
Human Rights (CHR), pursuant to its Constitutional mandate to "investigate all
forms of human rights violations involving civil and political rights and to provide
appropriate legal measures for the protection of human rights,"128 must be
tapped in order to fill certain investigative and remedial voids.
Further Investigation Must Be Undertaken
Ironic as it seems, but part and parcel of the reason why the petitioner was not
able to adduce substantial evidence proving her allegations of government
complicity in her abduction and torture, may be attributed to the incomplete and
one-sided investigations conducted by the government itself. This "awkward"
situation, wherein the very persons alleged to be involved in an enforced
disappearance or extralegal killing are, at the same time, the very ones tasked
by law to investigate the matter, is a unique characteristic of these proceedings
and is the main source of the "evidentiary difficulties" faced by any petitioner in
any amparo case.129
Cognizant of this situation, however, the Amparo Rule placed a potent
safeguard—requiring the "respondent who is a public official or employee" to
prove that no less than "extraordinary diligence as required by applicable laws,
rules and regulations was observed in the performance of duty."130 Thus,
unless and until any of the public respondents is able to show to the satisfaction
of the amparo court that extraordinary diligence has been observed in their
investigations, they cannot shed the allegations of responsibility despite the
prevailing scarcity of evidence to that effect.
With this in mind, We note that extraordinary diligence, as required by the
Amparo Rule, was not fully observed in the conduct of the police and military
investigations in the case at bar.
A perusal of the investigation reports submitted by Task Group CAROJAN
shows modest effort on the part of the police investigators to identify the
perpetrators of the abduction. To be sure, said reports are replete with
background checks on the victims of the abduction, but are, at the same time,
comparatively silent as to other concrete steps the investigators have been
taking to ascertain the authors of the crime. Although conducting a background
investigation on the victims is a logical first step in exposing the motive behind
the abduction—its necessity is clearly outweighed by the need to identify the
perpetrators, especially in light of the fact that the petitioner, who was no longer
in captivity, already came up with allegations about the motive of her captors.
Instead, Task Group CAROJAN placed the fate of their investigations solely on
the cooperation or non-cooperation of the petitioner—who, they claim, was less
than enthusiastic in participating in their investigative efforts.131 While it may
be conceded that the participation of the petitioner would have facilitated the
progress of Task Group CAROJAN’s investigation, this Court believes that the
former’s reticence to cooperate is hardly an excuse for Task Group CAROJAN
not to explore other means or avenues from which they could obtain relevant
leads.132 Indeed, while the allegations of government complicity by the
petitioner cannot, by themselves, hold up as adequate evidence before a court
of law—they are, nonetheless, a vital source of valuable investigative leads that
must be pursued and verified, if only to comply with the high standard of
diligence required by the Amparo Rule in the conduct of investigations.
Assuming the non-cooperation of the petitioner, Task Group CAROJAN’s
reports still failed to explain why it never considered seeking the assistance of
Mr. Jesus Paolo—who, along with the victims, is a central witness to the
abduction. The reports of Task Group CAROJAN is silent in any attempt to
obtain from Mr. Paolo, a cartographic sketch of the abductors or, at the very
least, of the one who, by petitioner’s account, was not wearing any
mask.1avvphi1
The recollection of Mr. Paolo could have served as a comparative material to
the sketches included in petitioner’s offer of exhibits that, it may be pointed out,
were prepared under the direction of, and first submitted to, the CHR pursuant
to the latter’s independent investigation on the abduction and torture of the
petitioner.133 But as mentioned earlier, the CHR sketches remain to be
unidentified as of this date.
In light of these considerations, We agree with the Court of Appeals that further
investigation under the norm of extraordinary diligence should be undertaken.
This Court simply cannot write finis to this case, on the basis of an incomplete
investigation conducted by the police and the military. In a very real sense, the
right to security of the petitioner is continuously put in jeopardy because of the
deficient investigation that directly contributes to the delay in bringing the real
perpetrators before the bar of justice.
To add teeth to the appellate court’s directive, however, We find it fitting, nay,
necessary to shift the primary task of conducting further investigations on the
abduction and torture of the petitioner upon the CHR.134 We note that the CHR,
unlike the police or the military, seems to enjoy the trust and confidence of the
petitioner—as evidenced by her attendance and participation in the hearings
already conducted by the commission.135 Certainly, it would be reasonable to
assume from such cooperation that the investigations of the CHR have
advanced, or at the very least, bears the most promise of advancing farther, in
terms of locating the perpetrators of the abduction, and is thus, vital for a final
resolution of this petition. From this perspective, We also deem it just and
appropriate to relegate the task of affording interim protection to the petitioner,
also to the CHR.
Hence, We modify the directive of the Court of the Appeals for further
investigation, as follows—
1.) Appointing the CHR as the lead agency tasked with conducting further
investigation regarding the abduction and torture of the petitioner. Accordingly,
the CHR shall, under the norm of extraordinary diligence, take or continue to
take the necessary steps: (a) to identify the persons described in the
cartographic sketches submitted by the petitioner, as well as their whereabouts;
and (b) to pursue any other leads relevant to petitioner’s abduction and torture.
2.) Directing the incumbent Chief of the Philippine National Police (PNP), or his
successor, and the incumbent Chief of Staff of the AFP, or his successor, to
extend assistance to the ongoing investigation of the CHR, including but not
limited to furnishing the latter a copy of its personnel records circa the time of
the petitioner’s abduction and torture, subject to reasonable regulations
consistent with the Constitution and existing laws.
3.) Further directing the incumbent Chief of the PNP, or his successor, to furnish
to this Court, the Court of Appeals, and the petitioner or her representative, a
copy of the reports of its investigations and their recommendations, other than
those that are already part of the records of this case, within ninety (90) days
from receipt of this decision.
4.) Further directing the CHR to (a) furnish to the Court of Appeals within ninety
(90) days from receipt of this decision, a copy of the reports on its investigation
and its corresponding recommendations; and to (b) provide or continue to
provide protection to the petitioner during her stay or visit to the Philippines, until
such time as may hereinafter be determined by this Court.
Accordingly, this case must be referred back to the Court of Appeals, for the
purposes of monitoring compliance with the above directives and determining
whether, in light of any recent reports or recommendations, there would already
be sufficient evidence to hold any of the public respondents responsible or, at
least, accountable. After making such determination, the Court of Appeals shall
submit its own report with recommendation to this Court for final action. The
Court of Appeals will continue to have jurisdiction over this case in order to
accomplish its tasks under this decision.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is PARTIALLY MERITORIOUS. We hereby
render a decision:
1.) AFFIRMING the denial of the petitioner’s prayer for the return of her personal
belongings;
2.) AFFIRMING the denial of the petitioner’s prayer for an inspection of the
detention areas of Fort Magsaysay.
3.) REVERSING the grant of the privilege of habeas data, without prejudice,
however, to any modification that this Court may make on the basis of the
investigation reports and recommendations submitted to it under this decision.
4.) MODIFYING the directive that further investigation must be undertaken, as
follows—
a. APPOINTING the Commission on Human Rights as the lead agency tasked
with conducting further investigation regarding the abduction and torture of the
petitioner. Accordingly, the Commission on Human Rights shall, under the norm
of extraordinary diligence, take or continue to take the necessary steps: (a) to
identify the persons described in the cartographic sketches submitted by the
petitioner, as well as their whereabouts; and (b) to pursue any other leads
relevant to petitioner’s abduction and torture.
b. DIRECTING the incumbent Chief of the Philippine National Police, or his
successor, and the incumbent Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, or his successor, to extend assistance to the ongoing investigation
of the Commission on Human Rights, including but not limited to furnishing the
latter a copy of its personnel records circa the time of the petitioner’s abduction
and torture, subject to reasonable regulations consistent with the Constitution
and existing laws.
c. Further DIRECTING the incumbent Chief of the Philippine National Police, or
his successor, to furnish to this Court, the Court of Appeals, and the petitioner
or her representative, a copy of the reports of its investigations and their
recommendations, other than those that are already part of the records of this
case, within ninety (90) days from receipt of this decision.
d. Further DIRECTING the Commission on Human Rights (a) to furnish to the
Court of Appeals within ninety (90) days from receipt of this decision, a copy of
the reports on its investigation and its corresponding recommendations; and (b)
to provide or continue to provide protection to the petitioner during her stay or
visit to the Philippines, until such time as may hereinafter be determined by this
Court.
5.) REFERRING BACK the instant case to the Court of Appeals for the following
purposes:
a. To MONITOR the investigations and actions taken by the PNP, AFP, and the
CHR;
Page 80 of 99
b. To DETERMINE whether, in light of the reports and recommendations of the
CHR, the abduction and torture of the petitioner was committed by persons
acting under any of the public respondents; and on the basis of this
determination—
c. To SUBMIT to this Court within ten (10) days from receipt of the report and
recommendation of the Commission on Human Rights—its own report, which
shall include a recommendation either for the DISMISSAL of the petition as
against the public respondents who were found not responsible and/or
accountable, or for the APPROPRIATE REMEDIAL MEASURES, AS MAY BE
ALLOWED BY THE AMPARO AND HABEAS DATA RULES, TO BE
UNDERTAKEN as against those found responsible and/or accountable.
Accordingly, the public respondents shall remain personally impleaded in this
petition to answer for any responsibilities and/or accountabilities they may have
incurred during their incumbencies.
Other findings of the Court of Appeals in its Decision dated 26 August 2009 in
CA-G.R. SP No. 00036-WRA that are not contrary to this decision are
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ
Associate Justice
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. Nos. 184461-62 May 31, 2011
LT. COL. ROGELIO BOAC, LT. COL. FELIPE ANOTADO AND LT. FRANCIS
MIRABELLE SAMSON, Petitioners,
vs.
ERLINDA T. CADAPAN AND CONCEPCION E. EMPEñO, Respondents.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 184495
ERLINDA T. CADAPAN AND CONCEPCION E. EMPEñO, Petitioners,
vs.
GEN. HERMOGENES ESPERON, P/DIR.GEN. AVELINO RAZON, (RET.)
GEN. ROMEO TOLENTINO, (RET.) GEN. JOVITO PALPARAN, LT. COL.
ROGELIO BOAC, LT. COL. FELIPE ANOTADO, ET AL., Respondents.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 187109
ERLINDA T. CADAPAN AND CONCEPCION E. EMPEñO, Petitioners,
vs.
GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, GEN. HERMOGENES ESPERON,
P/DIR.GEN. AVELINO RAZON, (RET.) GEN. ROMEO TOLENTINO, (RET.)
GEN. JOVITO PALPARAN, LT. COL. ROGELIO BOAC, LT. COL. FELIPE
ANOTADO, DONALD CAIGAS, A.K.A. ALAN OR ALVIN, ARNEL ENRIQUEZ
AND LT. FRANCIS MIRABELLE SAMSON, Respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
At 2:00 a.m. of June 26, 2006, armed men abducted Sherlyn Cadapan
(Sherlyn), Karen Empeño (Karen) and Manuel Merino (Merino) from a house in
San Miguel, Hagonoy, Bulacan. The three were herded onto a jeep bearing
license plate RTF 597 that sped towards an undisclosed location.
Having thereafter heard nothing from Sherlyn, Karen and Merino, their
respective families scoured nearby police precincts and military camps in the
hope of finding them but the same yielded nothing.
On July 17, 2006, spouses Asher and Erlinda Cadapan and Concepcion
Empeño filed a petition for habeas corpus1 before the Court, docketed as G.R.
No. 173228, impleading then Generals Romeo Tolentino and Jovito Palparan
(Gen. Palparan), Lt. Col. Rogelio Boac (Lt. Col. Boac), Arnel Enriquez and Lt.
Francis Mirabelle Samson (Lt. Mirabelle) as respondents. By Resolution of July
19, 2006,2 the Court issued a writ of habeas corpus, returnable to the Presiding
Justice of the Court of Appeals.
The habeas corpus petition was docketed at the appellate court as CA-G.R. SP
No. 95303.
By Return of the Writ dated July 21, 2006,3 the respondents in the habeas
corpus petition denied that Sherlyn, Karen and Merino are in the custody of the
military. To the Return were attached affidavits from the respondents, except
Enriquez, who all attested that they do not know Sherlyn, Karen and Merino;
that they had inquired from their subordinates about the reported abduction and
disappearance of the three but their inquiry yielded nothing; and that the military
does not own nor possess a stainless steel jeep with plate number RTF 597.
Also appended to the Return was a certification from the Land Transportation
Office (LTO) that plate number RTF 597 had not yet been manufactured as of
July 26, 2006.
Trial thereupon ensued at the appellate court.
Witness Wilfredo Ramos, owner of the house where the three were abducted,
recounted that on June 26, 2006, while he was inside his house in Hagonoy, he
witnessed armed men wearing bonnets abduct Sherlyn and Karen from his
house and also abduct Merino on their way out; and that tied and blindfolded,
the three were boarded on a jeep and taken towards Iba in Hagonoy.4
Witness Alberto Ramirez (Ramirez) recalled that on June 28, 2006, while he
was sleeping in his house, he was awakened by Merino who, in the company of
a group of unidentified armed men, repaired to his house; that onboard a
stainless jeep bearing plate number RTF 597, he (Ramirez) was taken to a place
in Mercado, Hagonoy and was asked by one Enriquez if he knew "Sierra,"
"Tanya," "Vincent" and "Lisa"; and that Enriquez described the appearance of
two ladies which matched those of Sherlyn and Karen, whom he was familiar
with as the two had previously slept in his house.5
Another witness, Oscar Leuterio, who was himself previously abducted by
armed men and detained for five months, testified that when he was detained in
Fort Magsaysay in Nueva Ecija, he saw two women fitting the descriptions of
Sherlyn and Karen, and also saw Merino, his kumpare.6
Lt. Col. Boac, the then commander of Task Force Malolos, a special operations
team tasked to neutralize the intelligence network of communists and other
armed groups, declared that he conducted an inquiry on the abduction of
Sherlyn, Karen and Merino but his subordinates denied knowledge thereof.7
While he denied having received any order from Gen. Palparan to investigate
the disappearance of Sherlyn, Karen and Merino, his assistance in locating the
missing persons was sought by the mayor of Hagonoy.
Major Dominador Dingle, the then division adjutant of the Philippine Army’s 7th
Infantry Division in Fort Magsaysay, denied that a certain Arnel Enriquez is a
member of his infantry as in fact his name did not appear in the roster of troops.8
Roberto Se, a supervisor of the Equipment, Plate Number and Supply Units of
the LTO, denied that his office manufactured and issued a plate number bearing
number RTF 597.9
On rebuttal, Lt. Mirabelle, Lt. Col. Boac and Gen. Palparan took the witness
stand as hostile witnesses.
Lt. Mirabelle testified that she did not receive any report on the abduction of
Sherlyn, Karen and Merino nor any order to investigate the matter. And she
denied knowing anything about the abduction of Ramirez nor who were Ka
Tanya or Ka Lisa.10
Gen. Palparan testified that during a debate in a televised program, he
mentioned the names of Ka Lisa and Ka Tanya as the ones involved in
revolutionary tax activities; and that he ordered Lt. Col. Boac to conduct an
investigation on the disappearance of Sherlyn, Karen and Merino.11 When
pressed to elaborate, he stated: "I said that I got the report that it stated that it
was Ka Tanya and Ka Lisa that, I mean, that incident happened in Hagonoy,
Bulacan was the abduction of Ka Lisa and Ka Tanya, Your Honor, and another
one. That was the report coming from the people in the area."12
By Decision of March 29, 2007,13 the Court of Appeals dismissed the habeas
corpus petition in this wise:
As Sherlyn Cadapan, Karen Empeño and Manuel Merino are indeed missing,
the present petition for habeas corpus is not the appropriate remedy since the
main office or function of the habeas corpus is to inquire into the legality of one’s
detention which presupposes that respondents have actual custody of the
persons subject of the petition. The reason therefor is that the courts have
limited powers, means and resources to conduct an investigation. x x x.
It being the situation, the proper remedy is not a habeas corpus proceeding but
criminal proceedings by initiating criminal suit for abduction or kidnapping as a
crime punishable by law. In the case of Martinez v. Mendoza, supra, the
Supreme Court restated the doctrine that habeas corpus may not be used as a
means of obtaining evidence on the whereabouts of a person, or as a means of
finding out who has specifically abducted or caused the disappearance of a
certain person. (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Thus the appellate court disposed:
WHEREFORE, the petition for habeas corpus is hereby DISMISSED, there
being no strong evidence that the missing persons are in the custody of the
respondents.
The Court, however, further resolves to refer the case to the Commission on
Human Rights, the National Bureau of Investigation and the Philippine National
Police for separate investigations and appropriate actions as may be warranted
by their findings and to furnish the Court with their separate reports on the
outcome of their investigations and the actions taken thereon.
Let copies of this decision be furnished the Commission on Human Rights, the
National Bureau of Investigation and the Philippine National Police for their
appropriate actions.
Page 81 of 99
SO ORDERED. (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Petitioners in CA-G.R. SP No. 95303 moved for a reconsideration of the
appellate court’s decision. They also moved to present newly discovered
evidence consisting of the testimonies of Adoracion Paulino, Sherlyn’s mother-
in-law who was allegedly threatened by soldiers; and Raymond Manalo who
allegedly met Sherlyn, Karen and Merino in the course of his detention at a
military camp.
During the pendency of the motion for reconsideration in CA-G.R. SP No.
95303, Erlinda Cadapan and Concepcion Empeño filed before this Court a
Petition for Writ of Amparo14 With Prayers for Inspection of Place and
Production of Documents dated October 24, 2007, docketed as G.R. No.
179994. The petition impleaded the same respondents in the habeas corpus
petition, with the addition of then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, then
Armed Forces of the Phil. (AFP) Chief of Staff Hermogenes Esperon Jr., then
Phil. National Police (PNP) Chief Gen. Avelino Razon (Gen. Razon), Lt. Col.
Felipe Anotado (Lt. Col. Anotado) and Donald Caigas.
Then President Arroyo was eventually dropped as respondent in light of her
immunity from suit while in office.
Petitioners in G.R. No. 179994 also prayed that they be allowed to inspect the
detention areas of the following places:
1. 7th Infantry Division at Fort Magsaysay, Laur, Nueva Ecija
2. 24th Infantry Batallion at Limay, Bataan
3. Army Detachment inside Valmocina Farm, Pinaod, San Ildefonso, Bulacan
4. Camp Tecson, San Miguel, Bulacan
5. The Resthouse of Donald Caigas alias Allan or Alvin of the 24th Infantry
Batallion at Barangay Banog, Bolinao, Pangasinan
6. 56th Infantry Batallion Headquarters at Iba, Hagonoy, Bulacan
7. Army Detachment at Barangay Mercado, Hagonoy, Bulacan
8. Beach House [at] Iba, Zambales used as a safehouse with a retired military
personnel as a caretaker;
By Resolution of October 25, 2007, the Court issued in G.R. No. 179994 a writ
of amparo returnable to the Special Former Eleventh Division of the appellate
court, and ordered the consolidation of the amparo petition with the pending
habeas corpus petition.
Docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 002, respondents in the amparo case, through
the Solicitor General, filed their Return of the Writ on November 6, 2007.15 In
the Return, Gen. Palparan, Lt. Col. Boac and Lt. Mirabelle reiterated their earlier
narrations in the habeas corpus case.
Gen. Hermogenes Esperon Jr. stated in the Return that he immediately caused
to investigate and verify the identities of the missing persons and was aware of
the earlier decision of the appellate court ordering the police, the Commission
on Human Rights and the National Bureau of Investigation to take further action
on the matter.16
Lt. Col. Felipe Anotado, the then battalion commander of the 24th Infantry
Battalion based in Balanga City, Bataan, denied any involvement in the
abduction. While the 24th Infantry Battalion detachment was reported to be a
detention site of the missing persons, Lt. Col. Anotado claimed that he found no
untoward incident when he visited said detachment. He also claimed that there
was no report of the death of Merino per his inquiry with the local police.17
Police Director General Avelino Razon narrated that he ordered the compilation
of pertinent records, papers and other documents of the PNP on the abduction
of the three, and that the police exhausted all possible actions available under
the circumstances.18
In addition to the witnesses already presented in the habeas corpus case,
petitioners called on Adoracion Paulino and Raymond Manalo to testify during
the trial.
Adoracion Paulino recalled that her daughter-in-law Sherlyn showed up at home
on April 11, 2007, accompanied by two men and three women whom she
believed were soldiers. She averred that she did not report the incident to the
police nor inform Sherlyn’s mother about the visit.19
Raymond Manalo (Manalo) claimed that he met the three abducted persons
when he was illegally detained by military men in Camp Tecson in San Miguel,
Bulacan. His group was later taken to a camp in Limay, Bataan. He recalled that
Lt. Col. Anotado was the one who interrogated him while in detention.20
In his Sinumpaang Salaysay,21 Manalo recounted:
xxxx
59. Saan ka dinala mula sa Sapang?
Pagkalipas ng humigit kumulang 3 buwan sa Sapang, dinala ako sa Camp
Tecson sa ilalim ng 24th IB.
xxxx
Sa loob ng barracks ko nakilala si Sherlyn Cadapan, isang estudyante ng UP.
Ipinapalinis din sa akin ang loob ng barracks. Sa isang kwarto sa loob ng
barracks, may nakita akong babae na nakakadena[.] Noong una, pinagbawalan
akong makipag-usap sa kanya. Sa ikatlo o ikaapat na araw, nakausap ko yung
babaeng nagngangalang Sherlyn. Binigyan ko siya ng pagkain. Sinabi niya sa
akin na dinukot si[ya] sa Hagonoy, Bulacan at matindi ang tortyur na dinaranas
niya. Sabi niya gusto niyang umuwi at makasama ang kanyang magulang.
Umiiyak siya. Sabi niya sa akin ang buong pangalan niya ay Sherlyn Cadapan,
mula sa Laguna. Sa araw tinatanggal ang kanyang kadena at inuutusan si
Sherlyn na maglaba.
x x x x.
61. Sino ang mga nakilala mo sa Camp Tecson?
Dito sa Camp Tecson naming nakilala si ‘Allan Alvin’ (maya-maya nalaman
naming na siya pala si Donald Caigas), ng 24th IB, na tinatawag na ‘master’ o
‘commander’ ng kanyang mga tauhan.
Pagkalipas ng 2 araw matapos dalhin si Reynaldo sa Camp Tecson dumating
sina Karen Empeño at Manuel Merino na mga bihag din. Inilagay si Karen at
Manuel sa kwarto ni ‘Allan[.]’ Kami naman ni Reynaldo ay nasa katabing kwarto,
kasama si Sherlyn.
xxxx
62. x x x x
Kaming mga lalake (ako, si Reynaldo at si Manuel) ay ginawang utusan, habang
sina Sherlyn at Karen ay ginawang labandera.
Si Sherlyn ang pinahirapan nina Mickey, Donald at Billy. Sabi ni Sherlyn sa akin
na siya’y ginahasa.
xxxx
63. x x x x
xxxx
Kaming lima (ako, si Reynaldo, si Sherlyn, si Karen at si [Merino]) ang dinala sa
Limay. Sinakay ako, si Reynaldo, si Sherlyn at si [Merino] sa isang stainless na
jeep. Si Karen ay isinakay sa itim na sasakyan ni Donald Caigas. x x x x
xxxx
66. Saan pa kayo dinala mula sa Limay, Bataan?
Mula sa Limay, kaming 5 (ako, si Reynaldo, si Sherlyn, Si Karen at si Manuel)
ay dinala sa isang safehouse sa Zambales, tabi ng dagat. x x x x (underscoring
supplied; italics and emphasis in the original)
On rebuttal, Lt. Col. Anotado and Col. Eduardo Boyles Davalan were called to
the witness stand.
Lt. Col. Anotado denied seeing or meeting Manalo. He posited that Manalo
recognized him because he was very active in conducting lectures in Bataan
and even appeared on television regarding an incident involving the 24th
Infantry Batallion. He contended that it was impossible for Manalo, Sherlyn,
Karen and Merino to be detained in the Limay detachment which had no
detention area.
Col. Eduardo Boyles Davalan, the then chief of staff of the First Scout Ranger
Regiment in Camp Tecson, testified that the camp is not a detention facility, nor
does it conduct military operations as it only serves as a training facility for scout
rangers. He averred that his regiment does not have any command relation with
either the 7th Infantry Division or the 24th Infantry Battalion.22
By Decision of September 17, 2008,23 the appellate court granted the Motion
for Reconsideration in CA-G.R. SP No. 95303 (the habeas corpus case) and
ordered the immediate release of Sherlyn, Karen and Merino in CA-G.R. SP No.
00002 (the amparo case). Thus it disposed:
WHEREFORE, in CA-G.R. SP NO. 95303 (Habeas Corpus case), the Motion
for Reconsideration is GRANTED.
Accordingly, in both CA-G.R. SP NO. 95303 (Habeas Corpus case) and in CA-
G.R. SP NO. 00002 (Amparo case), the respondents are thereby ordered to
immediately RELEASE, or cause the release, from detention the persons of
Sher[lyn] Cadapan, Karen Empeño and Manuel Merino.
Respondent Director General Avelino Razon is hereby ordered to resume [the]
PNP’s unfinished investigation so that the truth will be fully ascertained and
appropriate charges filed against those truly responsible.
SO ORDERED.
In reconsidering its earlier Decision in the habeas corpus case, the appellate
court relied heavily on the testimony of Manalo in this wise:
Page 82 of 99
With the additional testimony of Raymond Manalo, the petitioners have been
able to convincingly prove the fact of their detention by some elements in the
military. His testimony is a first hand account that military and civilian personnel
under the 7th Infantry Division were responsible for the abduction of Sherlyn
Cadapan, Karen Empeño and Manuel Merino. He also confirmed the claim of
Oscar Leuterio that the latter was detained in Fort Magsaysay. It was there
where he (Leuterio) saw Manuel Merino.
His testimony that Leuterio saw Manuel Merino in Fort Magsaysay may be
hearsay but not with respect to his meeting with, and talking to, the three
desaparecidos. His testimony on those points was no hearsay. Raymond
Manalo saw the three with his very own eyes as they were detained and tortured
together. In fact, he claimed to be a witness to the burning of Manuel Merino. In
the absence of confirmatory proof, however, the Court will presume that he is
still alive.
The testimony of Raymond Manalo can no longer be ignored and brushed aside.
His narration and those of the earlier witnesses, taken together, constitute more
than substantial evidence warranting an order that the three be released from
detention if they are not being held for a lawful cause. They may be moved from
place to place but still they are considered under detention and custody of the
respondents.
His testimony was clear, consistent and convincing. x x x.
xxxx
The additional testimonies of Lt. Col. Felipe Anotado and Col. Eduardo Boyles
Davalan were of no help either. Again, their averments were the same negative
ones which cannot prevail over those of Raymond Manalo. Indeed, Camp
Tecson has been utilized as a training camp for army scout rangers. Even
Raymond Manalo noticed it but the camp’s use for purposes other than training
cannot be discounted.
xxxx
In view of the foregoing, there is now a clear and credible evidence that the
three missing persons, [Sherlyn, Karen and Merino], are being detained in
military camps and bases under the 7th Infantry Division. Being not held for a
lawful cause, they should be immediately released from detention. (italic in the
original; emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Meanwhile, in the amparo case, the appellate court deemed it a superfluity to
issue any inspection order or production order in light of the release order. As it
earlier ruled in the habeas corpus case, it found that the three detainees’ right
to life, liberty and security was being violated, hence, the need to immediately
release them, or cause their release. The appellate court went on to direct the
PNP to proceed further with its investigation since there were enough leads as
indicated in the records to ascertain the truth and file the appropriate charges
against those responsible for the abduction and detention of the three.
Lt. Col. Rogelio Boac, et al. challenged before this Court, via petition for review,
the September 17, 2008 Decision of the appellate court. This was docketed as
G.R. Nos. 184461-62, the first above-captioned case- subject of the present
Decision.
Erlinda Cadapan and Concepcion Empeño, on the other hand, filed their own
petition for review also challenging the same September 17, 2008 Decision of
the appellate court only insofar as the amparo aspect is concerned. Their
petition, docketed as G.R. No. 179994, was redocketed as G.R. No. 184495,
the second above-captioned case.
By Resolution of June 15, 2010, the Court ordered the consolidation of G.R. No.
184495 with G.R. Nos. 1844461-62.24
Meanwhile, Erlinda Cadapan and Concepcion Empeño filed before the
appellate court a Motion to Cite Respondents in Contempt of Court for failure of
the respondents in the amparo and habeas corpus cases to comply with the
directive of the appellate court to immediately release the three missing
persons. By Resolution of March 5, 2009,25 the appellate court denied the
motion, ratiocinating thus:
While the Court, in the dispositive portion, ordered the respondents "to
immediately RELEASE, or cause the release, from detention the persons of
Sherlyn Cadapan, Karen Empeño and Manuel Merino," the decision is not ipso
facto executory. The use of the term "immediately" does not mean that that it is
automatically executory. There is nothing in the Rule on the Writ of Amparo
which states that a decision rendered is immediately executory. x x x.
Neither did the decision become final and executory considering that both
parties questioned the Decision/Resolution before the Supreme Court. x x x.
Besides, the Court has no basis. The petitioners did not file a motion for
execution pending appeal under Section 2 of Rule 39. There being no motion,
the Court could not have issued, and did not issue, a writ of execution. x x x.
(underscoring supplied)
Via a petition for certiorari filed on March 30, 2009 before this Court, Erlinda
Cadapan and Concepcion Empeño challenged the appellate court’s March 5,
2009 Resolution denying their motion to cite respondents in contempt. The
petition was docketed as G.R. No. 187109, the last above-captioned case
subject of the present Decision.
Only Lt. Col. Anotado and Lt. Mirabelle remained of the original respondents in
the amparo and habeas corpus cases as the other respondents had retired from
government service.26 The AFP has denied that Arnel Enriquez was a member
of the Philippine Army.27 The whereabouts of Donald Caigas remain
unknown.28
In G.R. Nos. 184461-62, petitioners posit as follows:
I while on detention. Thus it held:
…THE COURT OF APPEALS GROSSLY MISAPPRECIATED THE VALUE OF
THE TESTIMONY OF RAYMOND MANALO.
II
THE PETITION[S] FOR HABEAS CORPUS AND WRIT OF AMPARO SHOULD
BE DISMISSED BECAUSE RESPONDENTS FAILED TO PROVE BY THE
REQUIRED QUANTUM OF EVIDENCE THAT PETITIONERS HAVE
SHERLYN CADAPAN, KAREN EMPEñO AND MANUEL MERINO ARE IN
THEIR CUSTODY.
III
PETITIONERS’ DENIALS PER SE SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN TAKEN
AGAINST THEM BECAUSE THEY DID NOT REALLY HAVE ANY
INVOLVEMENT IN THE ALLEGED ABDUCTION; MOREOVER, THE
SUPPOSED INCONSISTENCIES IN THEIR TESTIMONIES ARE ON POINTS
IRRELEVANT TO THE PETITION.
IV
THE DISPOSITIVE PORTION OF THE ASSAILED DECISION IS VAGUE AND
INCONGRUENT WITH THE FINDINGS OF THE COURT OF APPEALS.
V also ordered to clean inside the barracks. In one of the rooms therein, he met
THE COURT OF APPEALS IGNORED AND FAILED TO RULE UPON THE
FATAL PROCEDURAL INFIRMITIES IN THE PETITION FOR WRIT OF
AMPARO.29
In G.R. No. 184495, petitioners posit as follows:
5. The Court of Appeals erred in not granting the Interim Relief for Inspection of
Places;
6. The Court of Appeals erred in not granting the Interim Relief for Production
of Documents;
7. The Court of Appeals erred in not finding that the Police Director Gen. Avelino
Razon did not make extraordinary diligence in investigating the enforced
disappearance of the aggrieved parties…
8. The Court of Appeals erred in not finding that this was not the command
coming from the highest echelon of powers of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, Philippine Army and the Seventh Infantry Division of the Philippine
Army to enforcibly disappear [sic] the aggrieved parties…
9. The Court of Appeals erred in dropping President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo
as party respondent in this case;
10. The Court of Appeals erred in not finding that President Gloria Macapagal
Arroyo had command responsibility in the enforced disappearance and
continued detention of the three aggrieved parties…
11. The Court of Appeals erred in not finding that the Armed Forces Chief of
Staff then Hermogenes Esperon and the Present Chief of Staff as having
command responsibility in the enforced disappearance and continued detention
of the three aggrieved parties…30
In G.R. No. 187109, petitioners raise the following issues:
[1] Whether… the decision in the Court of Appeals has become final and
executory[.]
[2] Whether…there is a need to file a motion for execution in a Habeas Corpus
decision or in an Amparo decision[.]
[3] Whether…an appeal can stay the decision of a Habeas Corpus [case] [or]
an Amparo case[.]31
Essentially, the consolidated petitions present three primary issues, viz: a)
whether the testimony of Raymond Manalo is credible; b) whether the chief of
the AFP, the commanding general of the Philippine Army, as well as the heads
of the concerned units had command responsibility over the abduction and
detention of Sherlyn, Karen and Merino; and c) whether there is a need to file a
motion for execution to cause the release of the aggrieved parties.
G.R. Nos. 184461-62
Petitioners Lt. Col. Boac, et al. contend that the appellate court erred in giving
full credence to the testimony of Manalo who could not even accurately describe
the structures of Camp Tecson where he claimed to have been detained along
with Sherlyn, Karen and Merino. They underscore that Camp Tecson is not
Page 83 of 99
under the jurisdiction of the 24th Infantry Batallion and that Manalo’s testimony
is incredible and full of inconsistencies.32
In Secretary of National Defense v. Manalo,33 an original petition for Prohibition,
Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order which was treated as a petition
under the Amparo Rule, said Rule having taken effect during the pendency of
the petition, the Court ruled on the truthfulness and veracity of the personal
account of Manalo which included his encounter with Sherlyn, Kara and Merino
We affirm the factual findings of the appellate court, largely based on
respondent Raymond Manalo’s affidavit and testimony, viz:
x x x x.
We reject the claim of petitioners that respondent Raymond Manalo’s
statements were not corroborated by other independent and credible pieces of
evidence. Raymond’s affidavit and testimony were corroborated by the affidavit
of respondent Reynaldo Manalo. The testimony and medical reports prepared
by forensic specialist Dr. Molino, and the pictures of the scars left by the physical
injuries inflicted on respondents, also corroborate respondents’ accounts of the
torture they endured while in detention. Respondent Raymond Manalo’s
familiarity with the facilities in Fort Magsaysay such as the "DTU," as shown in
his testimony and confirmed by Lt. Col. Jimenez to be the "Division Training
Unit," firms up respondents’ story that they were detained for some time in said
military facility. (citations omitted; emphasis and underscoring supplied)
On Manalo’s having allegedly encountered Sherlyn, Karen and Merino while on
detention, the Court in the immediately cited case synthesized his tale as
follows:
The next day, Raymond’s chains were removed and he was ordered to clean
outside the barracks. It was then he learned that he was in a detachment of the
Rangers. There were many soldiers, hundreds of them were training. He was
Sherlyn Cadapan from Laguna. She told him that she was a student of the
University of the Philippines and was abducted in Hagonoy, Bulacan. She
confided that she had been subjected to severe torture and raped. She was
crying and longing to go home and be with her parents. During the day, her
chains were removed and she was made to do the laundry.
After a week, Reynaldo was also brought to Camp Tecson. Two days from his
arrival, two other captives, Karen Empeño and Manuel Merino, arrived. Karen
and Manuel were put in the room with "Allan" whose name they later came to
know as Donald Caigas, called "master" or "commander" by his men in the 24th
Infantry Battalion. Raymond and Reynaldo were put in the adjoining room. At
times, Raymond and Reynaldo were threatened, and Reynaldo was beaten up.
In the daytime, their chains were removed, but were put back on at night. They
were threatened that if they escaped, their families would all be killed.
On or about October 6, 2006, Hilario arrived in Camp Tecson. He told the
detainees that they should be thankful they were still alive and should continue
along their "renewed life." Before the hearing of November 6 or 8, 2006,
respondents were brought to their parents to instruct them not to attend the
hearing. However, their parents had already left for Manila. Respondents were
brought back to Camp Tecson. They stayed in that camp from September 2006
to November 2006, and Raymond was instructed to continue using the name
"Oscar" and holding himself out as a military trainee. He got acquainted with
soldiers of the 24th Infantry Battalion whose names and descriptions he stated
in his affidavit.
On November 22, 2006, respondents, along with Sherlyn, Karen, and Manuel,
were transferred to a camp of the 24th Infantry Battalion in Limay, Bataan. There
were many huts in the camp. They stayed in that camp until May 8, 2007. Some
soldiers of the battalion stayed with them. While there, battalion soldiers whom
Raymond knew as "Mar" and "Billy" beat him up and hit him in the stomach with
their guns. Sherlyn and Karen also suffered enormous torture in the camp. They
were all made to clean, cook, and help in raising livestock.
Raymond recalled that when "Operation Lubog" was launched, Caigas and
some other soldiers brought him and Manuel with them to take and kill all
sympathizers of the NPA. They were brought to Barangay Bayan-bayanan,
Bataan where he witnessed the killing of an old man doing kaingin. The soldiers
said he was killed because he had a son who was a member of the NPA and
he coddled NPA members in his house. Another time, in another "Operation
Lubog," Raymond was brought to Barangay Orion in a house where NPA men
stayed. When they arrived, only the old man of the house who was sick was
there. They spared him and killed only his son right before Raymond’s eyes.
From Limay, Raymond, Reynaldo, Sherlyn, Karen, and Manuel were transferred
to Zambales, in a safehouse near the sea. Caigas and some of his men stayed
with them. A retired army soldier was in charge of the house. Like in Limay, the
five detainees were made to do errands and chores. They stayed in Zambales
from May 8 or 9, 2007 until June 2007.
In June 2007, Caigas brought the five back to the camp in Limay. Raymond,
Reynaldo, and Manuel were tasked to bring food to detainees brought to the
camp. Raymond narrated what he witnessed and experienced in the camp, viz:
x x x x.34 (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The Court takes judicial notice of its Decision in the just cited Secretary of
National Defense v. Manalo35 which assessed the account of Manalo to be a
candid and forthright narrative of his and his brother Reynaldo’s abduction by
the military in 2006; and of the corroborative testimonies, in the same case, of
Manalo’s brother Reynaldo and a forensic specialist, as well as Manalo’s
graphic description of the detention area. There is thus no compelling reason
for the Court, in the present case, to disturb its appreciation in Manalo’s
testimony. The outright denial of petitioners Lt. Col. Boac, et al. thus crumbles.
Petitioners go on to point out that the assailed Decision of the appellate court is
"vague and incongruent with [its] findings" for, so they contend, while the
appellate court referred to the perpetrators as "misguided and self-righteous
civilian and military elements of the 7th Infantry Division," it failed to identify who
these perpetrators are. Moreover, petitioners assert that Donald Caigas and
Arnel Enriquez are not members of the AFP. They furthermore point out that
their co-petitioners Generals Esperon, Tolentino and Palparan have already
retired from the service and thus have no more control of any military camp or
base in the country.36
There is nothing vague and/or incongruent about the categorical order of the
appellate court for petitioners to release Sherlyn, Karen and Merino. In its
discourse, the appellate court merely referred to "a few misguided self-righteous
people who resort to the extrajudicial process of neutralizing those who disagree
with the country’s democratic system of government." Nowhere did it specifically
refer to the members of the 7th Infantry Division as the "misguided self-
righteous" ones.
Petitioners finally point out that the parents of Sherlyn and Karen do not have
the requisite standing to file the amparo petition on behalf of Merino. They call
attention to the fact that in the amparo petition, the parents of Sherlyn and Karen
merely indicated that they were "concerned with Manuel Merino" as basis for
filing the petition on his behalf.37
Section 2 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo38 provides:
The petition may be filed by the aggrieved party or by any qualified person or
entity in the following order:
(a) Any member of the immediate family, namely: the spouse, children and
parents of the aggrieved party;
(b) Any ascendant, descendant or collateral relative of the aggrieved party within
the fourth civil degree of consanguinity or affinity, in default of those mentioned
in the preceding paragraph; or
(c) Any concerned citizen, organization, association or institution, if there is no
known member of the immediate family or relative of the aggrieved party.
Indeed, the parents of Sherlyn and Karen failed to allege that there were no
known members of the immediate family or relatives of Merino. The exclusive
and successive order mandated by the above-quoted provision must be
followed. The order of priority is not without reason—"to prevent the
indiscriminate and groundless filing of petitions for amparo which may even
prejudice the right to life, liberty or security of the aggrieved party."39
The Court notes that the parents of Sherlyn and Karen also filed the petition for
habeas corpus on Merino’s behalf. No objection was raised therein for, in a
habeas corpus proceeding, any person may apply for the writ on behalf of the
aggrieved party.40
It is thus only with respect to the amparo petition that the parents of Sherlyn and
Karen are precluded from filing the application on Merino’s behalf as they are
not authorized parties under the Rule.
G.R. No. 184495
Preliminarily, the Court finds the appellate court’s dismissal of the petitions
against then President Arroyo well-taken, owing to her immunity from suit at the
time the habeas corpus and amparo petitions were filed.41
Settled is the doctrine that the President, during his tenure of office or actual
incumbency, may not be sued in any civil or criminal case, and there is no need
to provide for it in the Constitution or law. It will degrade the dignity of the high
office of the President, the Head of State, if he can be dragged into court
litigations while serving as such. Furthermore, it is important that he be freed
from any form of harassment, hindrance or distraction to enable him to fully
attend to the performance of his official duties and functions. Unlike the
legislative and judicial branch, only one constitutes the executive branch and
anything which impairs his usefulness in the discharge of the many great and
important duties imposed upon him by the Constitution necessarily impairs the
operation of the Government. x x x 42
Parenthetically, the petitions are bereft of any allegation that then President
Arroyo permitted, condoned or performed any wrongdoing against the three
missing persons.
On the issue of whether a military commander may be held liable for the acts of
his subordinates in an amparo proceeding, a brief discussion of the concept of
command responsibility and its application insofar as amparo cases already
decided by the Court is in order.
Rubrico v. Macapagal Arroyo43 expounded on the concept of command
responsibility as follows:
The evolution of the command responsibility doctrine finds its context in the
development of laws of war and armed combats. According to Fr. Bernas,
"command responsibility," in its simplest terms, means the "responsibility of
Page 84 of 99
commanders for crimes committed by subordinate members of the armed forces
or other persons subject to their control in international wars or domestic
conflict." In this sense, command responsibility is properly a form of criminal
complicity. The Hague Conventions of 1907 adopted the doctrine of command
responsibility, foreshadowing the present-day precept of holding a superior
accountable for the atrocities committed by his subordinates should he be
remiss in his duty of control over them. As then formulated, command
responsibility is "an omission mode of individual criminal liability," whereby the
superior is made responsible for crimes committed by his subordinates for failing
to prevent or punish the perpetrators (as opposed to crimes he ordered).
(citations omitted; emphasis in the original; underscoring supplied)44
It bears stressing that command responsibility is properly a form of criminal
complicity,45 and thus a substantive rule that points to criminal or administrative
liability.
An amparo proceeding is not criminal in nature nor does it ascertain the criminal
liability of individuals or entities involved. Neither does it partake of a civil or
administrative suit.46 Rather, it is a remedial measure designed to direct
specified courses of action to government agencies to safeguard the
constitutional right to life, liberty and security of aggrieved individuals.47
Thus Razon Jr. v. Tagitis 48 enlightens:
[An amparo proceeding] does nor determine guilt nor pinpoint criminal
culpability for the disappearance [threats thereof or extrajudicial killings]; it
determines responsibility, or at least accountability, for the enforced
disappearance…for purposes of imposing the appropriate remedies to address
the disappearance…49 (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Further, Tagitis defines what constitutes "responsibility" and "accountability,"
viz:
x x x. Responsibility refers to the extent the actors have been established by
substantial evidence to have participated in whatever way, by action or
omission, in an enforced disappearance, as a measure of the remedies this
Court shall craft, among them, the directive to file the appropriate criminal and
civil cases against the responsible parties in the proper courts. Accountability,
on the other hand, refers to the measure of remedies that should be addressed
to those who exhibited involvement in the enforced disappearance without
bringing the level of their complicity to the level of responsibility defined above;
or who are imputed with knowledge relating to the enforced disappearance and
who carry the burden of disclosure; or those who carry, but have failed to
discharge, the burden of extraordinary diligence in the investigation of the
enforced disappearance. In all these cases, the issuance of the Writ of Amparo
is justified by our primary goal of addressing the disappearance, so that the life
of the victim is preserved and his liberty and security are restored.50 (emphasis
in the original; underscoring supplied)
Rubrico categorically denies the application of command responsibility in
amparo cases to determine criminal liability.51 The Court maintains its
adherence to this pronouncement as far as amparo cases are concerned.
Rubrico, however, recognizes a preliminary yet limited application of command
responsibility in amparo cases to instances of determining the responsible or
accountable individuals or entities that are duty-bound to abate any
transgression on the life, liberty or security of the aggrieved party.
If command responsibility were to be invoked and applied to these proceedings,
it should, at most, be only to determine the author who, at the first instance, is
accountable for, and has the duty to address, the disappearance and
harassments complained of, so as to enable the Court to devise remedial
measures that may be appropriate under the premises to protect rights covered
by the writ of amparo. As intimated earlier, however, the determination should
not be pursued to fix criminal liability on respondents preparatory to criminal
prosecution, or as a prelude to administrative disciplinary proceedings under
existing administrative issuances, if there be any.52 (emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
In other words, command responsibility may be loosely applied in amparo cases
in order to identify those accountable individuals that have the power to
effectively implement whatever processes an amparo court would issue.53 In
such application, the amparo court does not impute criminal responsibility but
merely pinpoint the superiors it considers to be in the best position to protect the
rights of the aggrieved party.
Such identification of the responsible and accountable superiors may well be a
preliminary determination of criminal liability which, of course, is still subject to
further investigation by the appropriate government agency.
Relatedly, the legislature came up with Republic Act No. 985154 (RA 9851) to
include command responsibility as a form of criminal complicity in crimes
against international humanitarian law, genocide and other crimes.55 RA 9851
is thus the substantive law that definitively imputes criminal liability to those
superiors who, despite their position, still fail to take all necessary and
reasonable measures within their power to prevent or repress the commission
of illegal acts or to submit these matters to the competent authorities for
investigation and prosecution.
The Court finds that the appellate court erred when it did not specifically name
the respondents that it found to be responsible for the abduction and continued
detention of Sherlyn, Karen and Merino. For, from the records, it appears that
the responsible and accountable individuals are Lt. Col. Anotado, Lt. Mirabelle,
Gen. Palparan, Lt. Col. Boac, Arnel Enriquez and Donald Caigas. They should
thus be made to comply with the September 17, 2008 Decision of the appellate
court to IMMEDIATELY RELEASE Sherlyn, Karen and Merino.
The petitions against Generals Esperon, Razon and Tolentino should be
dismissed for lack of merit as there is no showing that they were even remotely
accountable and responsible for the abduction and continued detention of
Sherlyn, Karen and Merino.
G.R. No. 187109.
Contrary to the ruling of the appellate court, there is no need to file a motion for
execution for an amparo or habeas corpus decision. Since the right to life, liberty
and security of a person is at stake, the proceedings should not be delayed and
execution of any decision thereon must be expedited as soon as possible since
any form of delay, even for a day, may jeopardize the very rights that these writs
seek to immediately protect.
The Solicitor General’s argument that the Rules of Court supplement the Rule
on the Writ of Amparo is misplaced. The Rules of Court only find suppletory
application in an amparo proceeding if the Rules strengthen, rather than
weaken, the procedural efficacy of the writ. As it is, the Rule dispenses with
dilatory motions in view of the urgency in securing the life, liberty or security of
the aggrieved party. Suffice it to state that a motion for execution is inconsistent
with the extraordinary and expeditious remedy being offered by an amparo
proceeding.
In fine, the appellate court erred in ruling that its directive to immediately release
Sherlyn, Karen and Merino was not automatically executory. For that would
defeat the very purpose of having summary proceedings56 in amparo petitions.
Summary proceedings, it bears emphasis, are immediately executory without
prejudice to further appeals that may be taken therefrom.57
WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing discussions, the Court renders the
following judgment:
1. The Petitions in G.R. Nos. 184461-62 and G.R. No. 184495 are DISMISSED.
The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated September 17, 2008 is AFFIRMED
with modification in that respondents in G.R. No. 184495, namely Lt. Col. Felipe
Anotado, Lt. Francis Mirabelle Samson, Gen. Jovito Palparan, Lt. Col. Rogelio
Boac, Arnel Enriquez and Donald Caigas are ordered to immediately release
Sherlyn Cadapan, Karen Empeño and Manuel Merino from detention.
The petitions against Generals Esperon, Razon and Tolentino are DISMISSED.
2. The petition in G.R. No. 187109 is GRANTED. The named respondents are
directed to forthwith comply with the September 17, 2008 Decision of the
appellate court. Owing to the retirement and/or reassignment to other places of
assignment of some of the respondents herein and in G.R. No. 184495, the
incumbent commanding general of the 7th Infantry Division and the incumbent
battalion commander of the 24th Infantry Battalion, both of the Philippine Army,
are enjoined to fully ensure the release of Sherlyn Cadapan, Karen Empeño and
Manuel Merino from detention.1awphi1
Respondents Lt. Col. Felipe Anotado, Lt. Francis Mirabelle Samson, Gen. Jovito
Palparan, Lt. Col. Rogelio Boac, Arnel Enriquez and Donald Caigas shall remain
personally impleaded in the petitions to answer for any responsibilities and/or
accountabilities they may have incurred during their incumbencies.
Let copies of this Decision and the records of these cases be furnished the
Department of Justice (DOJ), the Philippine National Police (PNP) and the
Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) for further investigation to determine the
respective criminal and administrative liabilities of respondents.
All the present petitions are REMANDED to the Court of Appeals for appropriate
action, directed at monitoring of the DOJ, PNP and AFP investigations and the
validation of their results.
SO ORDERED.
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Baguio City
EN BANC
G.R. No. 191805 April 16, 2013
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR THE WRIT OF AMPARO AND
HABEAS DATA IN FAVOR OF NORIEL RODRIGUEZ, NORIEL RODRIGUEZ,
Petitioner,
vs.
GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, GEN. VICTOR S. IBRADO, PDG JESUS
AME VERSOZA, LT. GEN. DELFIN BANGIT, MAJ. GEN. NESTOR Z.
OCHOA, P/CSUPT. AMETO G. TOLENTINO, P/SSUPT. JUDE W. SANTOS,
COL. REMIGIO M. DE VERA, an officer named MATUTINA, LT. COL. MINA,
CALOG, GEORGE PALACPAC under the name "HARRY," ANTONIO CRUZ,
ALDWIN "BONG" PASICOLAN and VINCENT CALLAGAN, Respondents.
Page 85 of 99
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 193160
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR THE WRIT OF AMPARO AND
HABEAS DATA IN FAVOR OF NORIEL RODRIGUEZ, POLICE DIR. GEN.
JESUS A. VERSOZA, P/SSUPT. JUDE W. SANTOS, BGEN. REMEGIO M. DE
VERA, 1ST LT. RYAN S. MATUTINA, LT. COL. LAURENCE E. MINA,
ANTONIO C. CRUZ, ALDWIN C. PASICOLAN and VICENTE A. CALLAGAN,
Petitioners,
vs.
NORIEL H. RODRIGUEZ, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
SERENO, CJ.:
On 15 November 2011, the Court promulgated its Decision in the present case,
the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, we resolve to GRANT the Petition for Partial Review in G.R. No.
191805 and DENY the Petition for Review in G.R. No. 193160. The Decision of
the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION.
The case is dismissed with respect to respondents former President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo, P/CSupt. Ameto G. Tolentino, and P/SSupt. Jude W.
Santos, Calog, George Palacpac, Antonio Cruz, Aldwin Pasicolan and Vincent
Callagan for lack of merit.
This Court directs the Office of the Ombudsman (Ombudsman) and the
Department of Justice (DOJ) to take the appropriate action with respect to any
possible liability or liabilities, within their respective legal competence, that may
have been incurred by respondents Gen. Victor lbrado, PDG. Jesus Verzosa,
Lt. Gen. Delfin Bangit, Maj. Gen. Nestor Ochoa, Brig. Gen. Remegio De Vera,
1st Lt. Ryan Matutina, and Lt. Col. Laurence Mina. The Ombudsman and the
DOJ are ordered to submit to this Court the results of their action within a period
of six months from receipt of this Decision.
In the event that herein respondents no longer occupy their respective posts,
the directives mandated in this Decision and in the Court of Appeals are
enforceable against the incumbent officials holding the relevant positions.
Failure to comply with the foregoing shall constitute contempt of court.
SO ORDERED.
After a careful examination of the records, the Court was convinced that the
Court of Appeals correctly found sufficient evidence proving that the soldiers of
the 17th Infantry Battalion, 5th Infantry Division of the military abducted
petitioner Rodriguez on 6 September 2009, and detained and tortured him until
17 September 2009.
Pursuant to the Decision ordering the Office of the Ombudsman to take further
action, Ombudsman Conchita Carpio Morales sent this Court a letter dated 23
May 2012, requesting an additional two-month period, or until 24 July 2012,
within which to submit a report. The Ombudsman stated that Noriel Rodriguez
(Rodriguez) and his family refused to cooperate with the investigation for
security reasons.
On 6 January 2012, respondents filed their Motion for Reconsideration,1
arguing that the soldiers belonging to the 17th Infantry Battalion, 5th Infantry
Division of the military cannot be held accountable for authoring the abduction
and torture of petitioner. Their arguments revolve solely on the claim that
respondents were never specifically mentioned by name as having performed,
permitted, condoned, authorized, or allowed the commission of any act or
incurrence omission which would violate or threaten with violation the rights to
life, liberty, and security of petitioner-respondent and his family.2
On 18 January 2013, the Ombudsman submitted the Investigation Report, as
compliance with the Court’s directive to take appropriate action with respect to
possible liabilities respondents may have incurred. The exhaustive report
detailed the steps taken by the Field Investigation Office (FIO) of the Office of
the Ombudsman, concluding that no criminal, civil, or administrative liabilities
may be imputed to the respondents. It was reflected therein that the lawyers for
the Rodriguezes had manifested to the FIO that the latter are hesitant to appear
before them for security reasons, viz:
Karapatan (a non-governmental organization that provides legal assistance to
victims of human rights violations and their families) could not locate Noriel and
Rodel. As of this writing, the Rodriguezes refused to participate in the present
fact-finding investigation ‘for security reasons.’ Atty. Yambot disclosed (through
a Manifestation dated March 30, 2012 that despite efforts to convince Noriel to
participate in the present proceedings, the latter ‘remains unconvinced and
unwilling to this date.’
Recent information, however, revealed that Noriel and his family are no longer
interested in participating in the present case.
Instead of appearing before this Office for a conference under oath, SPO1
Robert B. Molina submitted an Affidavit dated June 13, 2012 stating that on
September 15, 2009, at around 11:00 o’clock in the morning, Wilma H.
Rodriguez appeared before the Gonzaga Police Station and requested to enter
into the blotter that her son, Noriel, was allegedly missing in Sitio Comunal,
Gonzaga, Cagayan. Thereupon, he gathered information relative to Wilma’s
report "but the community residence failed to reveal anything".3
The other accounts – specifically that of respondent Antonino C. Cruz, Special
Investigator II of the Commission on Human Rights (CHR), as well as the claims
of respondents Mina and De Vera that they had disclosed to the CHR that Noriel
had become an agent ("asset") of the 17th Infantry Battalion – have been
thoroughly evaluated and ruled upon in our Decision. The OMB further laments,
"If only he (Noriel) could be asked to verify the circumstances under which he
executed these subsequent affidavits, his inconsistent claims will finally be
settled," and that "(I)f there is one person who can attest on whether detention
and torture were indeed committed by any of the Subjects herein, it is Noriel
Rodriguez himself, the supposed victim."4
The purported unwillingness of the petitioner to appear or participate at this
stage of the proceedings due to security reasons does not affect the rationale
of the writ granted by the CA, as affirmed by this Court. In any case, the issue
of the existence of criminal, civil, or administrative liability which may be imputed
to the respondents is not the province of amparo proceedings -- rather, the writ
serves both preventive and curative roles in addressing the problem of
extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances. It is preventive in that it
breaks the expectation of impunity in the commission of these offenses, and it
is curative in that it facilitates the subsequent punishment of perpetrators by
inevitably leading to subsequent investigation and action.5 In this case then, the
thrust of ensuring that investigations are conducted and the rights to life, liberty,
and security of the petitioner, remains.
We deny the motion for reconsideration.
The writ of amparo partakes of a summary proceeding that requires only
substantial evidence to make the appropriate interim and permanent reliefs
available to the petitioner. As explained in the Decision, it is not an action to
determine criminal guilt requiring proof beyond reasonable doubt, or liability for
damages requiring preponderance of evidence, or even administrative
responsibility requiring substantial evidence. The totality of evidence as a
standard for the grant of the writ was correctly applied by this Court, as first laid
down in Razon v. Tagitis:
The fair and proper rule, to our mind, is to consider all the pieces of evidence
adduced in their totality, and to consider any evidence otherwise inadmissible
under our usual rules to be admissible if it is consistent with the admissible
evidence adduced. In other words, we reduce our rules to the most basic test of
reason – i.e., to the relevance of the evidence to the issue at hand and its
consistency with all other pieces of adduced evidence. Thus, even hearsay
evidence can be admitted if it satisfies this basic minimum test.6 (Emphasis
supplied.)
No reversible error may be attributed to the grant of the privilege of the writ by
the CA, and the present motion for reconsideration raises no new issues that
would convince us otherwise.
Respondents’ claim that they were not competently identified as the soldiers
who abducted and detained the petitioner, or that there was no mention of their
names in the documentary evidence, is baseless. The CA rightly considered
Rodriguez’s Sinumpaang Salaysay7 as a meticulous and straightforward
account of his horrific ordeal with the military, detailing the manner in which he
was captured and maltreated on account of his suspected membership in the
NPA.8
Petitioner narrated that at dawn on 9 September 2009, he noticed a soldier with
the name tag "Matutina," who appeared to be an official because the other
soldiers addressed him as "sir."9 He saw Matutina again at 11:00 p.m. on 15
September 2009, when his abductors took him to a military operation in the
mountains. His narration of his suffering included an exhaustive description of
his physical surroundings, personal circumstances, and perceived
observations. He likewise positively identified respondents 1st Lt. Matutina and
Lt. Col. Mina to be present during his abduction, detention and torture.10 These
facts were further corroborated by Hermie Antonio Carlos in his Sinumpaang
Salaysay dated 16 September 2009,11 wherein he recounted in detail the
circumstances surrounding the victim’s capture.
Respondents’ main contention in their Return of the Writ was correctly deemed
illogical and contradictory by the CA. They claim that Rodriguez had complained
of physical ailments due to activities in the CPP-NPA, yet nevertheless signified
his desire to become a double-agent for the military. The CA stated:
In the Return of the Writ, respondent AFP members alleged that petitioner
confided to his military handler, Cpl. Navarro, that petitioner could no longer
stand the hardships he experienced in the wilderness, and that he wanted to
become an ordinary citizen again because of the empty promises of the CPP-
NPA. However, in the same Return, respondents state that petitioner agreed to
become a double agent for the military and wanted to re-enter the CPP-NPA,
so that he could get information regarding the movement directly from the
source. If petitioner was tired of life in the wilderness and desired to become an
ordinary citizen again, it defies logic that he would agree to become an
undercover agent and work alongside soldiers in the mountains – or the
wilderness he dreads – to locate the hideout of his alleged NPA comrades.12
(Emphasis supplied.)
Respondents conveniently neglect to address the findings of both the CA and
this Court that aside from the abduction of Rodriguez, respondents, specifically
1st Lt. Matutina, had violated and threatened the former’s right to security when
they made a visual recording of his house, as well as the photos of his relatives.
Page 86 of 99
The CA found that the soldiers even went as far as taking videos of the photos
of petitioner’s relatives hung on the wall of the house, and the innermost portions
of the house.13 There is no reasonable justification for this violation of the right
to privacy and security of petitioner’s abode, which strikes at the very heart and
rationale of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo. More importantly, respondents also
neglect to address our ruling that the failure to conduct a fair and effective
investigation similarly amounted to a violation of, or threat to Rodriguez’s rights
to life, liberty, and security.14
The writ’s curative role is an acknowledgment that the violation of the right to
life, liberty, and security may be caused not only by a public official’s act, but
also by his omission. Accountability may attach to respondents who are imputed
with knowledge relating to the enforced disappearance and who carry the
burden of disclosure; or those who carry, but have failed to discharge, the
burden of extraordinary diligence in the investigation of the enforced
disappearance.15 The duty to investigate must be undertaken in a serious
manner and not as a mere formality preordained to be ineffective.16
The CA found that respondents Gen. Ibrado, PDG Verzosa, LT. Gen. Bangit,
Maj. Gen. Ochoa, Col. De Vera, and Lt. Col. Mina conducted a perfunctory
investigation which relied solely on the accounts of the military. Thus, the CA
correctly held that the investigation was superficial, one-sided, and depended
entirely on the report prepared by 1st Lt. Johnny Calub. No efforts were
undertaken to solicit petitioner’s version of the incident, and no witnesses were
questioned regarding it.17 The CA also took into account the palpable lack of
effort from respondent Versoza, as the chief of the Philippine National Police.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Motion for Reconsideration is
hereby DENIED with FINALITY. Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished the
Ombudsman for whatever appropriate action she may still take under
circumstances.
SO ORDERED.
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Chief Justice
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 184467 June 19, 2012
EDGARDO NAVIA,1 RUBEN DIO,2 and ANDREW BUISING, Petitioners,
vs.
VIRGINIA PARDICO, for and in behalf and in representation of BENHUR V.
PARDICO Respondent.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
For the protective writ of amparo to issue in enforced disappearance cases,
allegation and proof that the persons subject thereof are missing are not
enough. It must also be shown by the required quantum of proof that their
disappearance was carried out by, "or with the authorization, support or
acquiescence of, [the government] or a political organization, followed by a
refusal to acknowledge [the same or] give information on the fate or
whereabouts of [said missing] persons."3
This petition for review on certiorari4 filed in relation to Section 19 of A.M. No.
07-9-12-SC5 challenges the July 24, 2008 Decision6 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 20, Malolos City which granted the Petition for Writ of Amparo7
filed by herein respondent against the petitioners.
Factual Antecedents
On March 31, 2008, at around 8:30 p.m., a vehicle of Asian Land Strategies
Corporation8 (Asian Land) arrived at the house of Lolita M. Lapore (Lolita)
located at 7A Lot 9, Block 54, Grand Royale Subdivision, Barangay Lugam,
Malolos City. The arrival of the vehicle awakened Lolita’s son, Enrique Lapore
(Bong), and Benhur Pardico (Ben), who were then both staying in her house.
When Lolita went out to investigate, she saw two uniformed guards
disembarking from the vehicle. One of them immediately asked Lolita where
they could find her son Bong. Before Lolita could answer, the guard saw Bong
and told him that he and Ben should go with them to the security office of Asian
Land because a complaint was lodged against them for theft of electric wires
and lamps in the subdivision.9
Shortly thereafter, Bong, Lolita and Ben were in the office of the security
department of Asian Land also located in Grand Royale Subdivision.10 The
supervisor of the security guards, petitioner Edgardo Navia (Navia), also arrived
thereat.
As to what transpired next, the parties’ respective versions diverge.
Version of the Petitioners
Petitioners alleged that they invited Bong and Ben to their office because they
received a report from a certain Mrs. Emphasis, a resident of Grand Royale
Subdivision, that she saw Bong and Ben removing a lamp from a post in said
subdivision.11 The reported unauthorized taking of the lamp was relayed thru
radio to petitioners Ruben Dio (Dio) and Andrew Buising (Buising), who both
work as security guards at the Asian Land security department. Following their
department’s standard operating procedure, Dio and Buising entered the report
in their logbook and proceeded to the house of Mrs. Emphasis. It was there
where Dio and Buising were able to confirm who the suspects were. They thus
repaired to the house of Lolita where Bong and Ben were staying to invite the
two suspects to their office. Bong and Ben voluntarily went with them.
At the security office, Dio and Buising interviewed Bong and Ben. The suspects
admitted that they took the lamp but clarified that they were only transferring it
to a post nearer to the house of Lolita.12 Soon, Navia arrived and Buising
informed him that the complainant was not keen in participating in the
investigation. Since there was no complainant, Navia ordered the release of
Bong and Ben. Bong then signed a statement to the effect that the guards
released him without inflicting any harm or injury to him.13 His mother Lolita
also signed the logbook below an entry which states that she will never again
harbor or entertain Ben in her house. Thereafter, Lolita and Bong left the security
office.
Ben was left behind as Navia was still talking to him about those who might be
involved in the reported loss of electric wires and lamps within the subdivision.
After a brief discussion though, Navia allowed Ben to leave. Ben also affixed his
signature on the logbook to affirm the statements entered by the guards that he
was released unharmed and without any injury.14
Upon Navia’s instructions, Dio and Buising went back to the house of Lolita to
make her sign the logbook as witness that they indeed released Ben from their
custody. Lolita asked Buising to read aloud that entry in the logbook where she
was being asked to sign, to which Buising obliged. Not contented, Lolita put on
her reading glasses and read the entry in the logbook herself before affixing her
signature therein. After which, the guards left.
Subsequently, petitioners received an invitation15 from the Malolos City Police
Station requesting them to appear thereat on April 17, 2008 relative to the
complaint of Virginia Pardico (Virginia) about her missing husband Ben. In
compliance with the invitation, all three petitioners appeared at the Malolos City
Police Station. However, since Virginia was not present despite having received
the same invitation, the meeting was reset to April 22, 2008.16
On April 22, 2008, Virginia attended the investigation. Petitioners informed her
that they released Ben and that they have no information as to his present
whereabouts.17 They assured Virginia though that they will cooperate and help
in the investigation of her missing husband.18
Version of the Respondent
According to respondent, Bong and Ben were not merely invited. They were
unlawfully arrested, shoved into the Asian Land vehicle and brought to the
security office for investigation. Upon seeing Ben at the security office, Navia
lividly grumbled "Ikaw na naman?"19 and slapped him while he was still seated.
Ben begged for mercy, but his pleas were met with a flurry of punches coming
from Navia hitting him on different parts of his body.20 Navia then took hold of
his gun, looked at Bong, and said, "Wala kang nakita at wala kang narinig,
papatayin ko na si Ben."21
Bong admitted that he and Ben attempted to take the lamp. He explained that
the area where their house is located is very dark and his father had long been
asking the administrator of Grand Royale Subdivision to install a lamp to illumine
their area. But since nothing happened, he took it upon himself to take a lamp
from one of the posts in the subdivision and transfer it to a post near their house.
However, the lamp Bong got was no longer working. Thus, he reinstalled it on
the post from which he took it and no longer pursued his plan. 22
Later on, Lolita was instructed to sign an entry in the guard’s logbook where she
undertook not to allow Ben to stay in her house anymore.23 Thereafter, Navia
again asked Lolita to sign the logbook. Upon Lolita’s inquiry as to why she had
to sign again, Navia explained that they needed proof that they released her son
Bong unharmed but that Ben had to stay as the latter’s case will be forwarded
to the barangay. Since she has poor eyesight, Lolita obligingly signed the
logbook without reading it and then left with Bong.24 At that juncture, Ben
grabbed Bong and pleaded not to be left alone. However, since they were afraid
of Navia, Lolita and Bong left the security office at once leaving Ben behind.25
Moments after Lolita and Bong reached their house, Buising arrived and asked
Lolita to sign the logbook again. Lolita asked Buising why she had to sign again
when she already twice signed the logbook at the headquarters. Buising
assured her that what she was about to sign only pertains to Bong’s release.
Since it was dark and she has poor eyesight, Lolita took Buising’s word and
signed the logbook without, again, reading what was written in it. 26
The following morning, Virginia went to the Asian Land security office to visit her
husband Ben, but only to be told that petitioners had already released him
together with Bong the night before. She then looked for Ben, asked around,
and went to the barangay. Since she could not still find her husband, Virginia
reported the matter to the police.
In the course of the investigation on Ben’s disappearance, it dawned upon Lolita
that petitioners took advantage of her poor eyesight and naivete. They made
her sign the logbook as a witness that they already released Ben when in truth
Page 87 of 99
and in fact she never witnessed his actual release. The last time she saw Ben
was when she left him in petitioners’ custody at the security office.27
Exasperated with the mysterious disappearance of her husband, Virginia filed a
Petition for Writ of Amparo28 before the RTC of Malolos City. Finding the
petition sufficient in form and substance, the amparo court issued an Order29
dated June 26, 2008 directing, among others, the issuance of a writ of amparo
and the production of the body of Ben before it on June 30, 2008. Thus:
WHEREFORE, conformably with Section 6 of the Supreme Court Resolution
[in] A.M. No. 07-[9]-12-SC, also known as "The Rule On The Writ Of Amparo",
let a writ of amparo be issued, as follows:
(1) ORDERING [petitioners] Edgardo Navia, Ruben Dio and Andrew Buising of
the Asian Land Security Agency to produce before the Court the body of
aggrieved party Benhur Pardico, on Monday, June 30, 2008, at 10:30 a.m.;
(2) ORDERING the holding of a summary hearing of the petition on the
aforementioned date and time, and DIRECTING the [petitioners] to personally
appear thereat;
(3) COMMANDING [petitioners] Edgardo Navia, Ruben Dio and Andrew Buising
to file, within a non-extendible period of seventy-two (72) hours from service of
the writ, a verified written return with supporting affidavits which shall, among
other things, contain the following:
a) The lawful defenses to show that the [petitioners] did not violate or threaten
with violation the right to life, liberty and security of the aggrieved party, through
any act or omission;
b) The steps or actions taken by the [petitioners] to determine the fate or
whereabouts of the aggrieved party and the person or persons responsible for
the threat, act or omission; and
c) All relevant information in the possession of the [petitioners] pertaining to the
threat, act or omission against the aggrieved party.
(4) GRANTING, motu proprio, a Temporary Protection Order prohibiting the
[petitioners], or any persons acting for and in their behalf, under pain of
contempt, from threatening, harassing or inflicting any harm to [respondent], his
immediate family and any [member] of his household.
The Branch Sheriff is directed to immediately serve personally on the
[petitioners], at their address indicated in the petition, copies of the writ as well
as this order, together with copies of the petition and its annexes.30
A Writ of Amparo31 was accordingly issued and served on the petitioners on
June 27, 2008.32 On June 30, 2008, petitioners filed their Compliance33
praying for the denial of the petition for lack of merit.
A summary hearing was thereafter conducted. Petitioners presented the
testimony of Buising, while Virginia submitted the sworn statements34 of Lolita
and Enrique which the two affirmed on the witness stand.
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
On July 24, 2008, the trial court issued the challenged Decision35 granting the
petition. It disposed as follows:
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby grants the privilege of the writ of amparo, and
deems it proper and appropriate, as follows:
(a) To hereby direct the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) to immediately
conduct a deep and thorough investigation of the [petitioners] Edgardo Navia,
Ruben Dio and Andrew Buising in connection with the circumstances
surrounding the disappearance of [Benhur] Pardico, utilizing in the process, as
part of the investigation, the documents forming part of the records of this case;
(b) To hereby direct the NBI to extend to the family of [Benhur] Pardico and the
witnesses who testified in this case protection as it may deem necessary to
secure their safety and security; and
(c) To hereby direct the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Bulacan to
investigate the circumstances concerning the legality of the arrest of [Benhur]
Pardico by the [petitioners] in this case, utilizing in the process, as part of said
investigation, the pertinent documents and admissions forming part of the
record of this case, and take whatever course/s of action as may be warranted.
Furnish immediately copies of this decision to the NBI, through the Office of
Director Nestor Mantaring, and to the Provincial Prosecutor of Bulacan.
SO ORDERED.36
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration37 which was denied by the trial
court in an Order38 dated August 29, 2008.
Hence, this petition raising the following issues for our consideration:
4.1. WHETHER X X X THE HONORABLE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED
IN RULING THAT RESPONDENT IS ENTITLED TO THE PRIVILEGE OF THE
WRIT OF AMPARO.
4.1.1. WHETHER X X X RESPONDENT WAS ABLE TO ESTABLISH THAT
PETITIONERS HAVE COMMITTED OR ARE COMMITTING ACTS IN
VIOLATION OF HER HUSBAND’S RIGHT TO LIFE, LIBERTY, OR SECURITY.
4.1.2. WHETHER X X X RESPONDENT SUFFICIENTLY ESTABLISHED THE
FACT OF THE DISAPPEARANCE OF BENHUR PARDICO.
4.1.3. WHETHER X X X RESPONDENT WAS ABLE TO ESTABLISH THAT
THE ALLEGED DISAPPEARANCE OF BENHUR PARDICO WAS AT THE
INSTANCE OF HEREIN PETITIONERS.39
Petitioners’ Arguments
Petitioners essentially assail the sufficiency of the amparo petition. They
contend that the writ of amparo is available only in cases where the factual and
legal bases of the violation or threatened violation of the aggrieved party’s right
to life, liberty and security are clear. Petitioners assert that in the case at bench,
Virginia miserably failed to establish all these. First, the petition is wanting on its
face as it failed to state with some degree of specificity the alleged unlawful act
or omission of the petitioners constituting a violation of or a threat to Ben’s right
to life, liberty and security. And second, it cannot be deduced from the evidence
Virginia adduced that Ben is missing; or that petitioners had a hand in his alleged
disappearance. On the other hand, the entries in the logbook which bear the
signatures of Ben and Lolita are eloquent proof that petitioners released Ben on
March 31, 2008 at around 10:30 p.m. Petitioners thus posit that the trial court
erred in issuing the writ and in holding them responsible for Ben’s
disappearance.
Our Ruling
Virginia’s Petition for Writ of Amparo is fatally defective and must perforce be
dismissed, but not for the reasons adverted to by the petitioners.
A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC or The Rule on the Writ of Amparo was promulgated to
arrest the rampant extralegal killings and enforced disappearances in the
country. Its purpose is to provide an expeditious and effective relief "to any
person whose right to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with
violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a
private individual or entity." 40
Here, Ben’s right to life, liberty and security is firmly settled as the parties do not
dispute his identity as the same person summoned and questioned at
petitioners’ security office on the night of March 31, 2008. Such uncontroverted
fact ipso facto established Ben’s inherent and constitutionally enshrined right to
life, liberty and security. Article 641 of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights42 recognizes every human being’s inherent right to life, while
Article 943 thereof ordains that everyone has the right to liberty and security.
The right to life must be protected by law while the right to liberty and security
cannot be impaired except on grounds provided by and in accordance with law.
This overarching command against deprivation of life, liberty and security
without due process of law is also embodied in our fundamental law.44
The pivotal question now that confronts us is whether Ben’s disappearance as
alleged in Virginia’s petition and proved during the summary proceedings
conducted before the court a quo, falls within the ambit of A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC
and relevant laws.
It does not. Section 1 of A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC provides:
SECTION 1. Petition. – The petition for a writ of amparo is a remedy available
to any person whose right to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened
with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or
of a private individual or entity.
The writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats
thereof. (Emphasis ours.)
While Section 1 provides A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC’s coverage, said Rules does not,
however, define extralegal killings and enforced disappearances. This omission
was intentional as the Committee on Revision of the Rules of Court which
drafted A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC chose to allow it to evolve through time and
jurisprudence and through substantive laws as may be promulgated by
Congress.45 Then, the budding jurisprudence on amparo blossomed in Razon,
Jr. v. Tagitis46 when this Court defined enforced disappearances. The Court in
that case applied the generally accepted principles of international law and
adopted the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from
Enforced Disappearance’s definition of enforced disappearances, as "the arrest,
detention, abduction or any other form of deprivation of liberty by agents of the
State or by persons or groups of persons acting with the authorization, support
or acquiescence of the State, followed by a refusal to acknowledge the
deprivation of liberty or by concealment of the fate or whereabouts of the
disappeared person, which place such a person outside the protection of the
law."47
Not long thereafter, another significant development affecting A.M. No. 07-9-12-
SC came about after Congress enacted Republic Act (RA) No. 985148 on
December 11, 2009. Section 3(g) thereof defines enforced or involuntary
disappearances as follows:
(g) "Enforced or involuntary disappearance of persons" means the arrest,
detention, or abduction of persons by, or with the authorization, support or
acquiescence of, a State or a political organization followed by a refusal to
acknowledge that deprivation of freedom or to give information on the fate or
Page 88 of 99
whereabouts of those persons, with the intention of removing from the protection
of the law for a prolonged period of time.
Then came Rubrico v. Macapagal-Arroyo49 where Justice Arturo D. Brion wrote
in his Separate Opinion that with the enactment of RA No. 9851, "the Rule on
the Writ of Amparo is now a procedural law anchored, not only on the
constitutional rights to the rights to life, liberty and security, but on a concrete
statutory definition as well of what an ‘enforced or involuntary disappearance’
is."50 Therefore, A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC’s reference to enforced disappearances
should be construed to mean the enforced or involuntary disappearance of
persons contemplated in Section 3(g) of RA No. 9851. Meaning, in probing
enforced disappearance cases, courts should read A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC in
relation to RA No. 9851.
From the statutory definition of enforced disappearance, thus, we can derive the
following elements that constitute it:
(a) that there be an arrest, detention, abduction or any form of deprivation of
liberty;
(b) that it be carried out by, or with the authorization, support or acquiescence
of, the State or a political organization;
(c) that it be followed by the State or political organization’s refusal to
acknowledge or give information on the fate or whereabouts of the person
subject of the amparo petition; and,
(d) that the intention for such refusal is to remove subject person from the
protection of the law for a prolonged period of time.
As thus dissected, it is now clear that for the protective writ of amparo to issue,
allegation and proof that the persons subject thereof are missing are not
enough. It must also be shown and proved by substantial evidence that the
disappearance was carried out by, or with the authorization, support or
acquiescence of, the State or a political organization, followed by a refusal to
acknowledge the same or give information on the fate or whereabouts of said
missing persons, with the intention of removing them from the protection of the
law for a prolonged period of time. Simply put, the petitioner in an amparo case
has the burden of proving by substantial evidence the indispensable element of
government participation.
In the present case, we do not doubt Bong’s testimony that Navia had a
menacing attitude towards Ben and that he slapped and inflicted fistic blows
upon him. Given the circumstances and the pugnacious character of Navia at
that time, his threatening statement, "Wala kang nakita at wala kang narinig,
papatayin ko na si Ben," cannot be taken lightly. It unambiguously showed his
predisposition at that time. In addition, there is nothing on record which would
support petitioners’ assertion that they released Ben on the night of March 31,
2008 unscathed from their wrath. Lolita sufficiently explained how she was
prodded into affixing her signatures in the logbook without reading the entries
therein. And so far, the information petitioners volunteered are sketchy at best,
like the alleged complaint of Mrs. Emphasis who was never identified or
presented in court and whose complaint was never reduced in writing.1âwphi1
But lest it be overlooked, in an amparo petition, proof of disappearance alone is
not enough. It is likewise essential to establish that such disappearance was
carried out with the direct or indirect authorization, support or acquiescence of
the government. This indispensable element of State participation is not present
in this case. The petition does not contain any allegation of State complicity, and
none of the evidence presented tend to show that the government or any of its
agents orchestrated Ben’s disappearance. In fact, none of its agents, officials,
or employees were impleaded or implicated in Virginia’s amparo petition
whether as responsible or accountable persons.51 Thus, in the absence of an
allegation or proof that the government or its agents had a hand in Ben’s
disappearance or that they failed to exercise extraordinary diligence in
investigating his case, the Court will definitely not hold the government or its
agents either as responsible or accountable persons.
We are aware that under Section 1 of A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC a writ of amparo
may lie against a private individual or entity. But even if the person sought to be
held accountable or responsible in an amparo petition is a private individual or
entity, still, government involvement in the disappearance remains an
indispensable element. Here, petitioners are mere security guards at Grand
Royale Subdivision in Brgy. Lugam, Malolos City and their principal, the Asian
Land, is a private entity. They do not work for the government and nothing has
been presented that would link or connect them to some covert police, military
or governmental operation. As discussed above, to fall within the ambit of A.M.
No. 07-9-12-SC in relation to RA No. 9851, the disappearance must be attended
by some governmental involvement. This hallmark of State participation
differentiates an enforced disappearance case from an ordinary case of a
missing person.
WHEREFORE, the July 24, 2008 Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
20, Malolos City, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Petition for Writ of
Amparo filed by Virginia Pardico is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO
Associate Justice
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 204528 February 19, 2013
SECRETARY LEILA M. DE LIMA, DIRECTOR NONNATUS R. ROJAS and
DEPUTY DIRECTOR REYNALDO 0. ESMERALDA, Petitioners,
vs.
MAGTANGGOL B. GATDULA, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
LEONEN, J.:
Submitted for our resolution is a prayer for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin "the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 26, in Manila from implementing its Decision x x x in Civil Case
No. 12-127405 granting respondent's application for the issuance of inspection
and production orders x x x."1 This is raised through a Petition for Review on
Certiorari under Rule 45 from the "Decision" rendered by the Regional Trial
Court dated 20 March 2012.
From the records, it appears that on 27 February 2012, respondent Magtanggol
B. Gatdula filed a Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Amparo in the Regional
Trial Court of Manila. This case was docketed as In the Matter of the Petition for
Issuance of Writ of Amparo of Atty. Magtanggol B. Gatdula, SP No. 12-127405.
It was raffled to the sala of Judge Silvino T. Pampilo, Jr. on the same day.
The Amparo was directed against petitioners Justice Secretary Leila M. De
Lima, Director Nonnatus R. Rojas and Deputy Director Reynaldo O. Esmeralda
of the National Bureau of Investigation (DE LIMA, ET AL. for brevity). Gatdula
wanted De Lima, et al. "to cease and desist from framing up Petitioner [Gatdula]
for the fake ambush incident by filing bogus charges of Frustrated Murder
against Petitioner [Gatdula] in relation to the alleged ambush incident."3
Instead of deciding on whether to issue a Writ of Amparo, the judge issued
summons and ordered De Lima, et al. to file an Answer.4 He also set the case
for hearing on 1 March 2012. The hearing was held allegedly for determining
whether a temporary protection order may be issued. During that hearing,
counsel for De Lima, et al. manifested that a Return, not an Answer, is
appropriate for Amparo cases.5
In an Order dated 2 March 2012, Judge Pampilo insisted that "[s]ince no writ
has been issued, return is not the required pleading but answer". The judge
noted that the Rules of Court apply suppletorily in Amparo cases. He opined
that the Revised Rules of Summary Procedure applied and thus required an
Answer.
Judge Pampilo proceeded to conduct a hearing on the main case on 7 March
2012.10 Even without a Return nor an Answer, he ordered the parties to file
their respective memoranda within five (5) working days after that hearing. Since
the period to file an Answer had not yet lapsed by then, the judge also decided
that the memorandum of De Lima, et al. would be filed in lieu of their Answer.11
On 20 March 2012, the RTC rendered a "Decision" granting the issuance of the
Writ of Amparo. The RTC also granted the interim reliefs prayed for, namely:
temporary protection, production and inspection orders. The production and
inspection orders were in relation to the evidence and reports involving an on-
going investigation of the attempted assassination of Deputy Director
Esmeralda. It is not clear from the records how these pieces of evidence may
be related to the alleged threat to the life, liberty or security of the respondent
Gatdula.
In an Order dated 8 October 2012, the RTC denied the Motion for
Reconsideration dated 23 March 2012 filed by De Lima, et al.
Petitioners Sec. De Lima, et al. thus came to this Court assailing the RTC
"Decision" dated 20 March 2012 through a Petition for Review on Certiorari
(With Very Urgent Application for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining
Order/Writ of Preliminary Injunction) via Rule 45, as enunciated in Section 19 of
the Rule on the Writ of Amparo (A.M. No. 07-9- 12-SC, 25 September 2007),
viz:
SEC. 19. Appeal. – Any party may appeal from the final judgment or order to
the Supreme Court under Rule 45. The appeal may raise questions of fact or
law or both. x x x (Emphasis supplied).
It is the Court’s view that the "Decision" dated 20 March 2012 granting the writ
of Amparo is not the judgment or final order contemplated under this rule.
Hence, a Petition for Review under Rule 45 may not yet be the proper remedy
at this time.
The RTC and the Parties must understand the nature of the remedy of Amparo
to put its procedures in the proper context.
The remedy of the Writ of Amparo is an equitable and extraordinary remedy to
safeguard the right of the people to life, liberty12 and security13 as enshrined
in the 1987 Constitution.14 The Rule on the Writ of Amparo was issued as an
exercise of the Supreme Court's power to promulgate rules concerning the
protection and enforcement of constitutional rights.15 It aims to address
Page 89 of 99
concerns such as, among others, extrajudicial killings and enforced
disappearances.
Due to the delicate and urgent nature of these controversies, the procedure was
devised to afford swift but decisive relief. It is initiated through a petition18 to be
filed in a Regional Trial Court, Sandiganbayan, the Court of Appeals, or the
Supreme Court. The judge or justice then makes an "immediate" evaluation20
of the facts as alleged in the petition and the affidavits submitted "with the
attendant circumstances detailed".21 After evaluation, the judge has the option
to issue the Writ of Amparo22 or immediately dismiss the case. Dismissal is
proper if the petition and the supporting affidavits do not show that the
petitioner's right to life, liberty or security is under threat or the acts complained
of are not unlawful. On the other hand, the issuance of the writ itself sets in
motion presumptive judicial protection for the petitioner. The court compels the
respondents to appear before a court of law to show whether the grounds for
more permanent protection and interim reliefs are necessary.
The respondents are required to file a Return23 after the issuance of the writ
through the clerk of court. The Return serves as the responsive pleading to the
petition. Unlike an Answer, the Return has other purposes aside from identifying
the issues in the case. Respondents are also required to detail the actions they
had taken to determine the fate or whereabouts of the aggrieved party.
If the respondents are public officials or employees, they are also required to
state the actions they had taken to: (i) verify the identity of the aggrieved party;
(ii) recover and preserve evidence related to the death or disappearance of the
person identified in the petition; (iii) identify witnesses and obtain statements
concerning the death or disappearance; (iv) determine the cause, manner,
location, and time of death or disappearance as well as any pattern or practice
that may have brought about the death or disappearance; and (vi) bring the
suspected offenders before a competent court.25 Clearly these matters are
important to the judge so that s/he can calibrate the means and methods that
will be required to further the protections, if any, that will be due to the petitioner.
There will be a summary hearing only after the Return is filed to determine the
merits of the petition and whether interim reliefs are warranted. If the Return is
not filed, the hearing will be done ex parte. After the hearing, the court will render
the judgment within ten (10) days from the time the petition is submitted for
decision.
If the allegations are proven with substantial evidence, the court shall grant the
privilege of the writ and such reliefs as may be proper and appropriate.29 The
judgment should contain measures which the judge views as essential for the
continued protection of the petitioner in the Amparo case. These measures must
be detailed enough so that the judge may be able to verify and monitor the
actions taken by the respondents. It is this judgment that could be subject to
appeal to the Supreme Court via Rule 45. After the measures have served their
purpose, the judgment will be satisfied. In Amparo cases, this is when the
threats to the petitioner’s life, liberty and security cease to exist as evaluated by
the court that renders the judgment. Parenthetically, the case may also be
terminated through consolidation should a subsequent case be filed – either
criminal or civil. Until the full satisfaction of the judgment, the extraordinary
remedy of Amparo allows vigilant judicial monitoring to ensure the protection of
constitutional rights.
The "Decision" dated 20 March 2012 assailed by the petitioners could not be
the judgment or final order that is appealable under Section 19 of the Rule on
the Writ of Amparo. This is clear from the tenor of the dispositive portion of the
"Decision", to wit:
The Branch Clerk of Court of Court [sic] is hereby DIRECTED to issue the Writ
of Amparo.
Likewise, the Branch Clerk of Court is hereby DIRECTED to effect the service
of the Writ of Amparo in an expeditious manner upon all concerned, and for this
purpose may call upon the assistance of any military or civilian agency of the
government.
This "Decision" pertained to the issuance of the writ under Section 6 of the Rule
on the Writ of Amparo, not the judgment under Section 18. The "Decision" is
thus an interlocutory order, as suggested by the fact that temporary protection,
production and inspection orders were given together with the decision. The
temporary protection, production and inspection orders are interim reliefs that
may be granted by the court upon filing of the petition but before final judgment
is rendered.
The confusion of the parties arose due to the procedural irregularities in the
RTC.
First, the insistence on filing of an Answer was inappropriate. It is the Return
that serves as the responsive pleading for petitions for the issuance of Writs of
Amparo. The requirement to file an Answer is contrary to the intention of the
Court to provide a speedy remedy to those whose right to life, liberty and
security are violated or are threatened to be violated. In utter disregard of the
Rule on the Writ of Amparo, Judge Pampilo insisted on issuing summons and
requiring an Answer.
Judge Pampilo’s basis for requiring an Answer was mentioned in his Order
dated 2 March 2012:
Under Section 25 of the same rule [on the Writ of Amparo], the Rules of Court
shall apply suppletorily insofar as it is not inconsistent with the said rule.
Considering the summary nature of the petition, Section 5 of the Revised Rules
of Summary Procedure shall apply.
Section 5. Answer – Within ten (10) days from service of summons, the
defendant shall file his Answer to the complaint and serve a copy thereof on the
plaintiff. x x x
WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing, the respondents are required to file their
Answer ten (days) from receipt of this Order.33
The 1991 Revised Rules of Summary Procedure is a special rule that the Court
has devised for the following circumstances:
SECTION 1. Scope. – This rule shall govern the summary procedure in the
Metropolitan Trial Courts, the Municipal Trial Courts in Cities, the Municipal Trial
Courts, and the Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in the following cases falling within
their jurisdiction:
A. Civil Cases:
(1) All cases of forcible entry and unlawful detainer, x x x.
(2) All other cases, except probate proceedings, where the total amount of the
plaintiff’s claim does not exceed x x x.
B. Criminal Cases:
(1) Violations of traffic laws, rules and regulations;
(2) Violations of the rental law;
(3) Violations of municipal or city ordinances;
(4) All other criminal cases where the penalty prescribed by law for the offense
charged is imprisonment not exceeding six months, or a fine not exceeding one
thousand pesos (P1,000.00), or both, x x x.
xxxx
It is clear from this rule that this type of summary procedure only applies to
MTC/MTCC/MCTCs. It is mind-boggling how this rule could possibly apply to
proceedings in an RTC. Aside from that, this Court limited the application of
summary procedure to certain civil and criminal cases. A writ of Amparo is a
special proceeding. It is a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status,
a right or particular fact.34 It is not a civil nor a criminal action, hence, the
application of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure is seriously misplaced.
The second irregularity was the holding of a hearing on the main case prior to
the issuance of the writ and the filing of a Return. Without a Return, the issues
could not have been properly joined.
Worse, is the trial court’s third irregularity: it required a memorandum in lieu of
a responsive pleading (Answer) of De Lima, et al.
The Return in Amparo cases allows the respondents to frame the issues subject
to a hearing. Hence, it should be done prior to the hearing, not after. A
memorandum, on the other hand, is a synthesis of the claims of the party
litigants and is a final pleading usually required before the case is submitted for
decision. One cannot substitute for the other since these submissions have
different functions in facilitating the suit.
More importantly, a memorandum is a prohibited pleading under the Rule on
the Writ of Amparo.35
The fourth irregularity was in the "Decision" dated 20 March 2012 itself. In the
body of its decision, the RTC stated:
"Accordingly this court GRANTS the privilege of the writ and the interim reliefs
prayed for by the petitioner." (Emphasis supplied).
This gives the impression that the decision was the judgment since the
phraseology is similar to Section 18 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo:
"SEC. 18. Judgment. — The court shall render judgment within ten (10) days
from the time the petition is submitted for decision. If the allegations in the
petition are proven by substantial evidence, the court shall grant the privilege of
the writ and such reliefs as may be proper and appropriate; otherwise, the
privilege shall be denied." (Emphasis supplied).
The privilege of the Writ of Amparo should be distinguished from the actual order
called the Writ of Amparo. The privilege includes availment of the entire
procedure outlined in A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC, the Rule on the Writ of Amparo.
After examining the petition and its attached affidavits, the Return and the
evidence presented in the summary hearing, the judgment should detail the
required acts from the respondents that will mitigate, if not totally eradicate, the
violation of or the threat to the petitioner's life, liberty or security.
A judgment which simply grants "the privilege of the writ" cannot be
executed.1âwphi1 It is tantamount to a failure of the judge to intervene and grant
judicial succor to the petitioner. Petitions filed to avail of the privilege of the Writ
of Amparo arise out of very real and concrete circumstances. Judicial responses
cannot be as tragically symbolic or ritualistic as "granting the privilege of the Writ
of Amparo."
Page 90 of 99
The procedural irregularities in the RTC affected the mode of appeal that
petitioners used in elevating the matter to this Court.
It is the responsibility of counsels for the parties to raise issues using the proper
procedure at the right time. Procedural rules are meant to assist the parties and
courts efficiently deal with the substantive issues pertaining to a case. When it
is the judge himself who disregards the rules of procedure, delay and confusion
result.
The Petition for Review is not the proper remedy to assail the interlocutory order
denominated as "Decision" dated 20 March 2012. A Petition for Certiorari, on
the other hand, is prohibited.36 Simply dismissing the present petition, however,
will cause grave injustice to the parties involved. It undermines the salutary
purposes for which the Rule on the Writ of Amparo were promulgated.
In many instances, the Court adopted a policy of liberally construing its rules in
order to promote a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action and
proceeding.37 The rules can be suspended on the following grounds: (1)
matters of life, liberty, honor or property, (2) the existence of special or
compelling circumstances, (3) the merits of the case, (4) a cause not entirely
attributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored by the suspension of
the rules, (5) a lack of any showing that the review sought is merely frivolous
and dilatory, and (6) the other party will not be unjustly prejudiced thereby.38
WHEREFORE, in the interest of justice, as a prophylactic to the irregularities
committed by the trial court judge, and by virtue of its powers under Article VIII,
Section 5 (5) of the Constitution, the Court RESOLVES to:
(1) NULLIFY all orders that are subject of this Resolution issued by Judge
Silvino T. Pampilo, Jr. after respondent Gatdula filed the Petition for the
Issuance of a Writ of Amparo;
(2) DIRECT Judge Pampilo to determine within forty-eight (48) hours from his
receipt of this Resolution whether the issuance of the Writ of Amparo is proper
on the basis of the petition and its attached affidavits.
The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to cause the personal service of this
Resolution on Judge Silvino T. Pampilo, Jr. of Branch 26 of the Regional Trial
Court of Manila for his proper guidance together with a WARNING that further
deviation or improvisation from the procedure set in A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC shall
be meted with severe consequences.
SO ORDERED.
MARVIC MARIO VICTOR F. LEONEN
Associate Justice
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 193652 August 5, 2014
Infant JULIAN YUSA Y CARAM, represented by his mother, MA.
CHRISTINA YUSAY CARAM, Petitioner,
vs.
Atty. MARIJOY D. SEGUI, Atty. SALLY D. ESCUTIN, VILMA B. CABRERA,
and CELIA C. YANGCO, Respondents.
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure, as amended, and Section 191 of the Rule on the Writ of
Amparo2 seeking to set aside the August 17, 20103 and September 6, 20104
Orders of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 106 of Quezon City, in Sp.
Proc. Case No. Q-10-67604. The RTC had dismissed petitioner’s petition for the
issuance ofa writ of amparo which petitioner filed in order for her to regain
parental authority and custody of Julian Yusay Caram (Baby Julian), her
biological child, from the respondent officers of the Department of Social
Welfare and Development (DSWD). The factual antecedents as gleaned from
the records follow:
Petitioner Ma. Christina Yusay Caram(Christina) had an amorous relationship
with Marcelino Gicano Constantino III (Marcelino) and eventually became
pregnant with the latter’s child without the benefit of marriage. After getting
pregnant, Christina mislead Marcelino into believing that she had an abortion
when in fact she proceeded to complete the term of her pregnancy. During this
time, she intended to have the child adopted through Sun and Moon Home for
Children (Sun and Moon) in Parañaque City to avoid placing her family ina
potentially embarrassing situation for having a second illegitimate son.5
On July 26, 2009, Christina gavebirth to Baby Julian at Amang Rodriguez
Memorial MedicalCenter, Marikina City.6 Sun and Moon shouldered all the
hospital and medical expenses. On August 13, 2009, Christina voluntarily
surrendered Baby Julian by way of a Deed of Voluntary Commitment7 to the
DSWD.
On November 26, 2009, Marcelino suffered a heart attack and died8 without
knowing about the birth of his son. Thereafter, during the wake, Christina
disclosed to Marcelino’s family that she and the deceased had a son that she
gave up for adoption due to financial distress and initial embarrassment.
Marcelino’s family was taken aback by the revelation and sympathized with
Christina. After the emotional revelation, they vowed to help her recover and
raise the baby.9 On November 27, 2009, the DSWD, through Secretary
Esperanza I. Cabral issued a certificate10 declaring Baby Julian as "Legally
Available for Adoption." A local matching conference was held on January 27,
2010 and on February 5, 2010, Baby Julian was "matched" with the spouses
Vergel and Filomina Medina (Medina Spouses) of the Kaisahang Bahay
Foundation. Supervised trial custody then commenced.11
On May 5, 2010, Christina who had changed her mind about the adoption, wrote
a letter to the DSWDasking for the suspension of Baby Julian’s adoption
proceedings. She alsosaid she wanted her family back together.12
On May 28, 2010, the DSWD, through respondent Atty. Marijoy D. Segui, sent
a Memorandum13 to DSWD Assistant Secretary Vilma B. Cabrera informing her
that the certificate declaring Baby Julian legally available for adoption had
attained finality on November 13, 2009, or three months after Christina signed
the Deed of Voluntary Commitment which terminated her parental authority and
effectively made Baby Julian a ward of the State. The said Memorandum was
noted by respondent Atty. Sally D. Escutin, Director IV of the Legal Service,
DSWD.
On July 12, 2010, Noel Gicano Constantino, Marcelino’s brother, sent a letter to
Atty. Escutin informing her that a DNA testing was scheduled on July 16, 2010
at the DNA Analysis Laboratory at the University of the Philippines.14
On July 16, 2010, Assistant Secretary Cabrera sent a letter15 to Noel
Constantino stating that it would not allow Baby Julian to undergo DNA testing.
Assistant Secretary Cabrera informed Noel Constantino that the procedures
followed relative to the certification on the availability of the child for adoption
and the child’s subsequent placement to prospective adoptive parents were
proper, and that the DSWD was no longer in the position to stop the adoption
process. Assistant Secretary Cabrera further stated that should Christina wish
to reacquire her parental authority over Baby Julian or halt the adoption process,
she may bring the matter to the regular courts as the reglementary period for
her to regain her parental rights had already lapsed under Section 7 of Republic
Act (R.A.) No. 9523.16
On July 27, 2010, Christina filed a petition17 for the issuance of a writ of amparo
before the RTC of Quezon City seeking to obtain custody of Baby Julian from
Atty. Segui, Atty. Escutin, Assistant Secretary Cabrera and Acting Secretary
Celia C. Yangco, all of the DSWD.
In her petition, Christina accused respondents of "blackmailing" her into
surrendering custody of her childto the DSWD utilizing what she claims to be an
invalid certificate of availability for adoption which respondents allegedly used
as basis to misrepresent that all legal requisites for adoption of the minor child
had been complied with.
Christina argued that by making these misrepresentations, the respondents had
acted beyond the scope of their legal authority thereby causing the enforced
disappearance of the said child and depriving her of her custodial rights and
parental authority over him.
On the basis of the said petition,the RTC, Branch 106 of Quezon City, through
its Presiding Judge, the Honorable Angelene Mary W. Quimpo-Sale, issued a
Writ of Amparo18 on July 28, 2010 commanding the four respondents to
produce the body of Baby Julian at a hearing scheduled on August 4, 2010.
Respondents were alsorequired to file their verified written return to the writ
pursuant to Section 919 of the Amparo Rule, within five working days from the
service of the writ.
The respondents complied with the writ and filed their Return20 on August 2,
2010 praying that the petition be denied for being the improper remedy to avail
of in a case relating toa biological parent’s custodial rights over her child.
On August 4, 2010, respondents appeared before the RTC but respondents did
not bring the child, stating that threats of kidnapping were made on the child and
his caregivers. To give respondents another chance, the RTC reset the hearing
to August 5, 2010.
At the August 5, 2010 hearing, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) entered
its appearance as representative of the State and prayed that its lawyers be
given time to file their memorandum or position paper in this case. In turn, the
RTC acknowledged the appearance of the OSG and allowed its representatives
to actively participate in the arguments raised during the said hearing. Relative
to the matter of the parties submitting additional pleadings, Judge Sale
narrowed the issues to be discussed by providing for the following guidelines,
thus:
To abbreviate the proceedings, in view of all the manifestations and counter-
manifestations made by the counsels, the court enjoined the parties to file their
respective position papers on the following issues:
1. Whether or not this court has jurisdiction over the instant case;
2. Whether or not this petition isthe proper remedy based on the facts of the
case and prayer in the petition; and
Page 91 of 99
3. Whether or not the prayer in the petition should be granted and custody of
the child be given to his biological mother.
The parties were given five (5) days from today to file their respective position
papers based on these three main issues. They may include other related
issues they deem essential for the resolution of this case. Set this case for
further hearing, if necessary, on August 18, 2010 at 9:00 a.m.21
In the same order, Judge Sale alsoacknowledged that the child subject of the
case was brought before the court and the petitioner was allowed to see him
and take photographs of him.
On August 17, 2010, the RTC dismissed the petition for issuance of a writ of
amparo without prejudice to the filing of the appropriate action in court. The RTC
held that Christina availed of the wrong remedy to regain custody of her child
Baby Julian.22 The RTC further stated that Christina should have filed a civil
case for custody of her child as laid down in the Family Code and the Rule on
Custody of Minors and Writ of Habeas Corpus in Relation to Custody of Minors.
If there is extreme urgency to secure custody of a minor who has been
illegallydetained by another, a petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas
corpus may be availed of, either as a principal or ancillary remedy, pursuant to
the Rule on Custody of Minors and Writ of Habeas Corpus inRelation to Custody
of Minors.23
On August 20, 2010, Christina filed a motion for reconsideration24 arguing that
since the RTC assumed jurisdiction of the petition for the issuance of a writ of
amparo, the latter is duty-bound to dispose the case on the merits.25 The RTC,
however, deniedChristina’s motion for reconsideration on September 6, 2010
maintaining that the latter availed of the wrong remedy and that the Supreme
Court intended the writ of amparo to address the problem of extrajudicial killings
and enforced disappearances.26
On September 28, 2010, Christina directly elevated the case before this Court,
via a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, as amended, in relation to Section 19 of the Rule on the Writ of
Amparo. In her petition, Christina prayed that the Court (1) set aside the August
17, 2010 and September 6, 2010 Orders of the RTC, (2) declare R.A. No. 9523
unconstitutional for being contrary to A.M. No. 02-6-02-SC,27 which was
promulgated by the Supreme Court, and for violating the doctrine of separation
of powers, (3) declare the "enforced separation" between her and Baby Julian
as violative of her rights to life, liberty and security, and (4) grant her the privilege
of availing the benefits of a writ of amparo so she could be reunited with her
son.28
The only relevant issue presented before the Court worthy of attention is
whether a petition for a writ of amparo is the proper recourse for obtaining
parental authority and custody of a minor child. This Court will not belabor to
discuss Christina’s argumentsrelating to the supposedunconstitutionality or R.A.
No. 9523 as Congress has the plenary power to repeal, alter and modify existing
laws29 and A.M. No. 02-6-02-SC functions only as a means to enforce the
provisions of all adoption and adoption-related statutes before the courts.
Now, in her petition, Christina argues that the life, liberty and security of Baby
Julian is being violated or threatened by the respondent DSWD officers’
enforcement of an illegal Deed of Voluntary Commitment between her and Sun
and Moon. She claims thatshe had been "blackmailed" through the said Deed
by the DSWD officers and Sun and Moon’s representatives into surrendering
her child thereby causing the "forced separation" of the said infant from his
mother. Furthermore, she also reiterates that the respondent DSWD officers
acted beyond the scope of their authority when they deprived her of Baby
Julian’s custody.30
The Court rejects petitioner’s contentions and denies the petition.
Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo provides as follows:
SECTION 1. Petition. – The petition for a writ of amparois a remedy available to
any person whose right to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with
violation by an unlawful actor omission of a public official or employee, or of a
private individual or entity.
The writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats
thereof.
In the landmark case of Secretary of National Defense, et al. v. Manalo, et al.,31
this Court held:
[T]he AmparoRule was intended to address the intractable problem of
"extralegal killings" and "enforced disappearances," its coverage, in its present
form, is confined to these two instances or to threats thereof. "Extralegal killings"
are "killings committed without due process of law, i.e., without legal safeguards
or judicial proceedings." On the other hand, "enforced disappearances" are
"attended by the following characteristics: an arrest, detention or abduction of a
person by a government official or organized groupsor private individuals acting
with the direct or indirect acquiescence of the government; the refusal of the
State to disclose the fate or whereabouts of the person concerned or a refusal
to acknowledge the deprivation of liberty which places such persons outside the
protection of law.
This pronouncement on the coverage of the writ was further cemented in the
latter case of Lozada, Jr. v. Macapagal-Arroyo32 where this Court explicitly
declared that as it stands, the writ of amparo is confined only to cases of
extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances, or to threats thereof. As to
what constitutes "enforced disappearance," the Court in Navia v. Pardico33
enumerated the elementsconstituting "enforced disappearances" as the term is
statutorily defined in Section 3(g) of R.A. No. 985134 to wit:
(a) that there be an arrest, detention, abduction or any form of deprivation of
liberty;
(b) that it be carried out by, or with the authorization, support or acquiescence
of, the State ora political organization;
(c) that it be followed by the State or political organization’s refusal to
acknowledge or give information on the fate or whereabouts of the person
subject of the amparopetition; and,
(d) that the intention for such refusal isto remove subject person from the
protection of the law for a prolonged period of time.1âwphi1
In this case, Christina alleged that the respondent DSWD officers caused her
"enforced separation" from Baby Julian and that their action amounted to an
"enforced disappearance" within the context of the Amparo rule. Contrary to her
position, however, the respondent DSWD officers never concealed Baby
Julian's whereabouts. In fact, Christina obtained a copy of the DSWD's May 28,
2010 Memorandum35 explicitly stating that Baby Julian was in the custody of
the Medina Spouses when she filed her petition before the RTC. Besides, she
even admitted in her petition for review on certiorari that the respondent DSWD
officers presented Baby Julian before the RTC during the hearing held in the
afternoon of August 5, 2010.36 There is therefore, no "enforced disappearance"
as used in the context of the Amparo rule as the third and fourth elements are
missing.
Christina's directly accusing the respondents of forcibly separating her from her
child and placing the latter up for adoption, supposedly without complying with
the necessary legal requisites to qualify the child for adoption, clearly indicates
that she is not searching for a lost child but asserting her parental authority over
the child and contesting custody over him.37 Since it is extant from the
pleadings filed that what is involved is the issue of child custody and the exercise
of parental rights over a child, who, for all intents and purposes, has been legally
considered a ward of the State, the Amparo rule cannot be properly applied.
To reiterate, the privilege of the writ of amparo is a remedy available to victims
of extra-judicial killings and enforced disappearances or threats of a similar
nature, regardless of whether the perpetrator of the unlawful act or omission is
a public official or employee or a private individual. It is envisioned basically to
protect and guarantee the right to life, liberty and security of persons, free from
fears and threats that vitiate the quality of life.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The August 17, 2010 and September 6,
2010 Orders of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 106, Quezon City in Sp. Proc.
Case No. Q-10-67604 are AFFIRMED without prejudice to petitioner's right to
avail of proper legal remedies afforded to her by law and related rules. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.
Associate Justice
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 191416 February 7, 2017
MAYOR WILLIAM N. MAMBA, ATTY. FRANCISCO N. MAMBA, JR., ARIEL
MALANA, NARDING AGGANGAN, JOMARI SAGALON, JUN CINABRE,
FREDERICK BALIGOD, ROMMEL ENCOLLADO, JOSEPH TUMALIUAN,
and RANDY DAYAG, Petitioners
vs.
LEOMAR BUENO, Respondent
DECISION
REYES, J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 filed in relation to Section 19 of A.M.
No. 07-9-12-SC,2 seeking to annul and set aside the Decision3 dated January
18, 2010 and Resolution4 dated March 2, 2010 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-G.R. SP. No. 00038, which granted the petition for the issuance of a writ of
amparo filed by Leomar Bueno (respondent) against Mayor William N. Mamba
(Mayor Mamba), Atty. Francisco N. Mamba, Jr. (Atty. Mamba), Ariel Malana
(Malana), Narding Aggangan (Aggangan), Jomari Sagalon (Sagalon), Jun
Cinabre (Cinabre), Frederick Baligod (Baligod), Rommel Encollado (Encollado
), Joseph Tumaliuan (Tumaliuan), and Randy Dayag (Dayag) (collectively, the
petitioners).
The Facts
On June 13, 2009, the canteen owned by Emelita N. Mamba (Emelita) in Tuao,
Cagayan was robbed. Emelita is the mother of Mayor Mamba, then Mayor of
the Municipality of Tuao, Cagayan and Atty. Mamba, then a Malacafiang
official.5 The Task Force Lingkod Bayan (Task Force), an agency created by
Page 92 of 99
the Sangguniang Bayan of Tuao to help the local police force in maintaining
peace and order in the municipality, undertook an investigation on the robbery.6
On June 14, 2009, several members of the Task Force, Malana, Aggangan and
Sagalon, together with barangay officials Cinabre and Encollado, went to the.
house of the respondent, then still a minor, to invite him for questioning on his
supposed involvement in the robbery. The respondent and his mother, Maritess
Bueno (Maritess ), acceded to the invitation. Thereupon, the respondent was
brought to the Tuao police station.7
The parties gave different accounts of what happened after the respondent was
brought to the Tuao police station.
The petitioners claim that:
When they reached the Tuao police station, there were no police investigators
or any representative from the local Social Welfare and Development (SWD)
office and, hence, the investigation could not proceed. At that time, Raymund
Rodriguez (Raymund), allegedly an eyewitness to the robbery, was at the police
station. Raymund pointed to the respondent as among those who robbed the
store; the respondent then told Raymund that he would kill him for ratting him
out.8 The petitioners allege that prior to the robbery of the canteen, the
respondent approached Raymund and his brother Robin and proposed to them
that they rob the canteen. The latter, however, declined the offer. Later that
night, Raymund saw the respondent and Lorenzo Haber (Haber) robbing the
canteen. Thereafter, Robin reported the incident to the Task Force.9
The petitioners further claim that at the time of the robbery, Mayor Mamba and
Atty. Mamba were not around since they previously left Tuao, Cagayan for
Manila on June 10, 2009. Mayor Mamba was on official leave for 10 days, from
June 10, 2009 until June 20, 2009, while Atty. Mamba had to report for work in
Malacañang.10
The respondent's custody was then referred to the Task Force. Haber was later
invited to the police station for questioning regarding his involvement in the
robbery. However, his custody was likewise referred to the Task Force since
there were still no police investigators.11
On June 17, 2009, Atty. Mamba arrived in Tuao, Cagayan. While going out of
his residence, Maritess approached Atty. Mamba and asked him about her son.
Atty. Mamba told her that he does not know her son and that if the respondent
indeed committed a crime, she should not tolerate what her son was doing.12
On June 18, 2009, while the members of the Task Force were on their way to
bring the respondent and Haber to the police station, they were met by Police
Superintendent Joselito Buenaobra (P/Supt. Buenaobra) of the Philippine
National Police (PNP) Cagayan Regional Office. Thereafter, the respondent's
custody was transferred to the PNP Cagayan Regional Office.13
Maritess then went to the office of Mayor Mamba, but she was told to come back
at later date since Mayor Mamba was still on official leave. When Mayor Mamba
arrived in Tuao on June 20, 2009, a conference was immediately held. Maritess
requested that the members of the Task Force be brought to Mayor Mamba's
office. Almost all of the members of the Task Force arrived. However, Maritess
was unable to pinpoint who among them took custody of his son. Mayor Mamba
then advised her to file a complaint in court should she be able to identify the
responsible persons.14
On the other hand, the respondent alleges that:
At around 3:00 p.m. of June 14, 2009, Tumaliuan and Dayag, both members of
the Task Force, upon the order of Baligod, then Municipal Administrator of Tuao,
fetched the respondent from the police station and brought him to Mayor
Mamba's house.15 Sometime in the evening of even date, the respondent was
made to board a white van driven by Aggangan. Inside the van, he was beaten
with a gun by Malana, who later threatened him that he would be killed.
Thereafter, he was brought back to Mayor Mamba's house.16
That same evening, Haber, likewise a minor, was invited by the barangay
captain in his place, accompanied by about 10 barangay tanods and two police
officers, for questioning as regards the robbery of the canteen. Haber was
brought to the police station where he spent the night.17
On June 15, 2009, Haber was brought to Mayor Mamba's house. The
respondent and Haber were then tortured to force them to admit to their
involvement in the robbery. They were made to roll on the grass while being
kicked and beaten with a cue stick by Malana; hot wax was poured over their
bodies to force them to admit to the robbery, but they denied any involvement
therein. Thereafter, they were blindfolded and were questioned by Atty. Mamba
regarding the robbery of the canteen. When his blindfold was taken off, the
respondent saw Atty. Mamba sitting nearby.18 On June 16, 2009, Malana
brought the respondent and Haber, together with Robin and Raymund, to the
office of the Task Force, where they all spent the night.19
Meanwhile, Maritess went to the Tuao police station to look for her son; she was
told that the respondent was brought to Mayor Mamba's house. However, when
Maritess went to Mayor Mamba's house, she was not permitted to see her son.
Maritess was able to talk to Mayor Mamba who told her that she should not
condone the acts of her son. Maritess then sought the assistance of P/Supt.
Buenaobra regarding the respondent's disappearance from the police station.
The PNP Cagayan Regional Office was then preparing a case for habeas
corpus when the respondent was released on June 18, 2009 to the local SWD
office.20
Maritess then sought the assistance of the Regional Office of the Commission
on Human Rights (CHR) in Cagayan as regards the case of the respondent.21
On August 25, 2009, the respondent, assisted by the CHR, filed a Petition for
the Issuance of a Writ of Amparo with the CA.22
On September 14, 2009, the CA, gave due course to the petition and directed
the issuance of the writ of amparo. On September 23, 2009, the petitioners filed
their verified return.23
A summary hearing was thereafter conducted by the CA. The respondent
presented in evidence his own testimony and the testimonies of Dr. Odessa B.
Tiangco (Dr. Tiangco) of the Cagayan Valley Medical Center, provindal social
welfare officer Elvira Layus (Layus), and Maritess.24 The petitioners, on the
other hand, presented the testimony of Cinabre, Encollado, Baligod, and
Robin.25
The CA further issued subpoena duces tecum ad testificandum to and heard
the testimony of P/Supt. Buenaobra.26
On January 18, 2010, the CA rendered the herein assailed Decision,27 the
decretal portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the Petition for a Writ of Amparo filed by [the respondent] is
hereby GRANTED. Accordingly:
1. [The petitioners] are hereby enjoined from doing any act of physical or
psychological violence that would harm or threaten [the respondent] and his
family, including those who assisted him in the preparation of this present
petition, especially the [CHR], Regional Office No. 02, Cagayan and his
witnesses;
2. The Head of the PNP Regional Office of Cagayan, whoever is the incumbent,
is hereby ordered to continue the investigation on the violation done against [the
respondent], and using extraordinary diligence, to furnish this Court with a report
regarding the said investigation. The investigation must be commenced as soon
as possible but not more than 30 days from the receipt of this Decision.
3. [Mayor Mamba] is hereby ordered to provide assistance to the above PNP
investigation including but not limited to the act of furnishing and/or providing
the latter a list of the members of the Task Force who had direct involvement in
the violation of [the respondent's] rights to life, liberty and security, including
their identities and whereabouts, and to allow the investigation to run its course
unhindered or influenced. He is further ordered to update and furnish this Court
of the actions he has done or will be doing regarding this directive.
4. The Head of the PNP Regional Office of Cagayan and [Mayor Mamba] are
ordered to update this Court regarding their reportorial duty under this Decision
within ten (10) days from the commencement of the investigation, and
thereafter, to make a quarterly report regarding the said investigation. The
investigation should be completed within one year from the receipt of this
Decision;
5. All findings resulting from the said investigation should be made available to
[the respondent] and his counsel should they consider the same necessary to
aid them in the filing of appropriate actions, criminal or otherwise, against those
who are responsible for the violation of the former's rights.
Failure to comply with the above will render the Head of the PNP Regional Office
of Cagayan and [Mayor Mamba] liable for contempt of this Court.
The Clerk of Court is hereby ordered to also furnish the Head of the PNP
Regional Office of Cagayan a copy of this Decision.
SO ORDERED.28
The CA opined that the respondent's rights to liberty and security were
undeniably undermined when he was invited by the members of the Task Force
for investigation and was brought to Mayor Mamba's house from the Tuao police
station.29 It further pointed out that notwithstanding that Mayor Mamba was not
in Tuao when the incident happened, he is still accountable since he· failed to
show sufficient action to protect the respondent's rights; that Mayor Mamba
failed to acknowledge the irregularity of the acts of the members of the Task
Force or to identify those who were responsible for the violation of the
respondent's rights. The CA further ruled that it was incumbent upon Atty.
Mamba, being a public servant, to ensure that the respondent's constitutional
rights are not violated.30
The CA pointed out that the "invitation" extended to the respondent by the
members of the Task Force was in the nature of an arrest as the real purpose
of the same was to make him answer to the heist committed the night before.
The CA ruled that the same amounted to an invalid warrantless arrest since the
circumstances of the case do not fall within the purview of Section 5 of Rule 113
of the Rules of Court.31
Further, the CA ruled that although the respondent was subsequently released
and that he failed to establish that there is an impending danger of physical harm
to him or his family, the refusal of the respondent officials of the local
government of Tuao, especially Mayor Mamba, to admit and address the
irregularities committed by the members of the Task Force is tantamount to a
continuing violation of the respondent's right to security.32
The petitioners sought a reconsideration33 of the Decision dated January 18,
2010, but it was denied by the CA in its Resolution34 dated March 2, 2010.
Page 93 of 99
Hence, this petition.
The petitioners claim that the CA erred in issuing the writ of amparo in favor of
the respondent. They insist that the respondent, who was then the suspect in
the robbery of the canteen, was not illegally detained or tortured; that the
members of the Task Force merely invited him for questioning as to his
involvement in the robbery.35 They allege that the petition for the issuance of a
writ of amparo is not the proper remedy available to the respondent since the
present laws provide ample recourse to him for the alleged threats to his life,
liberty and security. They also maintain that the respondent's rights to life, liberty
and security are not under threat since he and his mother stated that they are
not afraid of the petitioners.36
The petitioners further aver that it was improper for the CA to direct the PNP
Cagayan Regional Office to conduct further investigation on the incident since
P/Supt. Buenaobra had already testified for the respondent during the summary
hearing conducted by the CA.37 They also maintain that Mayor Mamba and
Atty. Mamba had nothing to do with the alleged violation of the rights of the
respondent since they were not in Tuao at the time of the incident. That when
Mayor Mamba returned to Tuao, he immediately met Maritess to discuss the
incident, but the latter failed to identify the persons involved in the incident.38
On the other hand, the respondent claims that this petition was filed beyond the
reglementary period. He claims that under Section 19 of A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC,
an appeal from the final judgment or order must be filed with this Court within
five working days from notice of the adverse judgment. The respondent avers
that the petitioners, instead of immediately filing a petition for review on certiorari
with this Court, opted to file a motion for reconsideration with the CA, which is a
prohibited pleading since it is dilatory.39
The respondent further maintains that the CA did not err when it directed the
issuance of a writ of amparo in his favor. He claims that the writ of amparo is an
appropriate remedy in his case since it covers enforced disappearances; that
his illegal warrantless arrest is covered by the term "enforced
disappearances."40
Issues
Essentially, the issues for the Court's consideration are the following: first,
whether the petition for review on certiorari before the Court was filed within the
reglementary period; and second, whether the CA erred in granting the petition
for the issuance of a writ of amparo.
Ruling of the Court
The petition is devoid of merit.
First Issue: Timeliness of the petition
The petition for review on certiorari before the Court, which assails the CA's
grant of the writ of amparo, contrary to the respondent's assertion, was filed on
time. Section 19 of A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC provides that:
Sec. 19. Appeal. - Any party may appeal from the final judgment or order to the
Supreme Court under Rule 45. The appeal may raise question of fact or law or
both.
The period of appeal shall be five (5) working days from the date of notice of the
adverse judgment.1âwphi1
The appeal shall be given the same priority as in habeas corpus cases.
There is nothing in A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC which proscribes the filing of a motion
for reconsideration of the final judgment or order that grants or denies a writ of
amparo. Section 11 of A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC only prohibits the following
pleadings and motions:
Sec. 11. Prohibited Pleadings and Motions. - The following pleadings and
motions are prohibited:
a. Motion to dismiss;
b. Motion for extension of time to file return, opposition, affidavit, position paper
and other pleadings;
c. Dilatory motion for postponement;
d. Motion for a bill of particulars;
e. Counterclaim or cross-claim;
f. Third-party complaint;
g. Reply;
h. Motion to declare respondent in default;
i. Intervention;
j. Memorandum;
k. Motion for reconsideration of interlocutory orders or interim relief orders; and
l. Petition for certiorari, mandamus, or prohibition against any interlocutory
order.
What is prohibited under Section 11 of A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC are motions for
reconsideration directed against interlocutory orders or interim relief orders, not
those assailing the final judgment or order. The pleadings and motions
enumerated in Section 11 of A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC would unnecessarily cause
delays in the proceedings; they are, thus, proscribed since they would run
counter to the summary nature of the rule on the writ of amparo. A motion
seeking a reconsideration of a final judgment or order in such case, obviously,
no longer affects the proceedings.
Moreover, the Rules of Court applies suppletorily to A.M. No. 07-9-12- SC
insofar as it is not inconsistent with the latter.41 Accordingly, there being no
express prohibition to the contrary, the rules on motions for reconsideration
under the Rules of Court apply suppletorily to the Rule on the Writ of Amparo.
Nevertheless, considering that under Section 19 of A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC a party
is only given five working days from the date of notice of the adverse judgment
within which to appeal to this Court through a petition· for review on certiorari, a
motion for reconsideration of a final judgment or order must likewise be filed
within the same period. Thereafter, from the order denying or granting the
motion for reconsideration, the party concerned may file an appeal to the Court
via a Rule 45 petition within five working days from notice of the order pursuant
to the fresh period rule.42
The petitioners received a copy of the CA's Decision dated January 18, 2010 on
January 20, 2010.43 They, thus, have until January 27, 2010 to either file a
motion for reconsideration with the CA or an appeal to this Court through a Rule
45 petition.44 On January 25, 2010, the petitioners filed a motion for
reconsideration with the CA.45 The CA denied the petitioners' motion for
reconsideration in its Resolution dated March 2, 2010, a copy of which was
received by the petitioners' counsel on March 8, 2010.46 Thus, the petitioners
had until March 15, 2010 within which to appeal to this Court.47 The petitioners
filed this petition for review on certiorari on March 12, 2010.48 Thus, contrary to
the respondent's claim, this petition was filed within the reglementary period.
Second Issue: Propriety of the grant of the writ of amparo
The writ of amparo is a protective remedy aimed at providing judicial relief
consisting of the appropriate remedial measures and directives that may be
crafted by the court, in order to address specific violations or threats of violation
of the constitutional rights to life, liberty or security.49 Section 1 of A.M. No. 07-
9-12-SC specifically delimits the coverage of the writ of amparo to extralegal
killings and enforced disappearances, viz.:
Sec. 1. Petition. - The petition for a writ of amparo is a remedy available to any
person whose rights to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with
violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a
private individual or entity.
The writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats
thereof.
Extralegal killings are killings committed without due process of law, i.e., without
legal safeguards or judicial proceedings.50 On the other hand, enforced
disappearance has been defined by the Court as the arrest, detention,
abduction or any other form of deprivation of liberty by agents of the State or by
persons or groups of persons acting with the authorization, support or
acquiescence of the State, followed by a refusal to acknowledge the deprivation
of liberty or by concealment of the fate or whereabouts of the disappeared
person, which place such a person outside the protection of the law.51
In an amparo action, the parties must establish their respective claims by
substantial evidence.52 Substantial evidence is that amount of evidence which
a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. It is more
than a mere imputation of wrongdoing or violation that would warrant a finding
of liability against the person charged.53
After a thorough review of the records of this case, the Court affirms the factual
findings of the CA, which is largely based on the respondent's evidence. Verily,
the totality of the evidence presented by the respondent meets the requisite
evidentiary threshold. To corroborate his allegations, the respondent presented
the testimony of Haber who, during the hearing conducted by the CA on October
6, 2009, averred that on June 15, 2009, he was brought to Mayor Mamba's
house where he and the respondent were tortured. Haber testified that hot wax
was dripped onto their bodies while they were handcuffed; that they were kicked
and beaten with a cue stick and an alcohol container. Thereafter, Haber testified
that he and the respondent were brought to the guardhouse where they were
suffocated by placing plastic bags on their heads. He also testified that a wire
was inserted inside their penises.54
The respondent's claim was further corroborated by Dr. Tiangco who testified
that on June 18, 2009, she examined the respondent and found that he suffered
several injuries and multiple second degree bums. Layus also attested that she
saw the scars incurred by the respondent on his head, arms, and back when
she interviewed him on July 26, 2009.55
In contrast, the respective testimonies of the witnesses for the petitioners merely
consisted in denial and the allegation that the respondent was indeed the one
who robbed the canteen.56 Clearly, against the positive testimony of the
respondent, which was corroborated by his witnesses, the petitioners'
allegations must fail.
Page 94 of 99
It is settled that denial is inherently a weak defense. To be believed, it must be
buttressed by a strong evidence of non-culpability; otherwise, such denial is
purely self-serving and without evidentiary value.57 Further, even if the
respondent was indeed guilty of a crime, assuming it to be true, it does not justify
his immediate apprehension, in the guise of an invitation, and the subsequent
acts of torture inflicted on him.
What is clear is that the respondent was able to prove by substantial evidence
that he was apprehended by the members of the Task Force, illegally detained,
and tortured. It was further established that Maritess would not have seen his
son if not for the timely intercession of P/Supt. Buenaobra of the PNP Cagayan
Regional Office. The members of the Task Force apprehended and detained
the respondent to make him admit to his complicity in the heist the night before
sans the benefit of legal and judicial processes.
Nevertheless, it is undisputed that the respondent, after four days of detention,
had been released by the members of the Task Force on June 18, 2009. This
fact alone, however, does not negate the propriety of the grant of a writ of
amparo.
In the seminal case of Secretary of National Defense, et al. v. Manalo, et al.,58
the Court emphasized that the writ of amparo serves both preventive and
curative roles in addressing the problem of extralegal killings and enforced
disappearances. It is preventive in that it breaks the expectation of impunity in
the commission of these offenses; it is curative in that it facilitates the
subsequent punishment of perpetrators as it will inevitably yield leads to
subsequent investigation and action.59
Accordingly, a writ of amparo may still issue in the respondent's favor
notwithstanding that he has already been released from detention. In such case,
the writ of amparo is issued to facilitate the punishment of those behind the
illegal detention through subsequent investigation and action.
More importantly, the writ of amparo likewise covers violations of the right to
security.1âwphi1 At the core of the guarantee of the right to security, as
embodied in Section 2, Article III of the Constitution,60 is the immunity of one's
person, including the extensions of his/her person, i.e., houses, papers and
effects, against unwarranted government intrusion. Section 2, Article III of the
Constitution not only limits the State's power over a person's home and
possession, but more importantly, protects the privacy and sanctity of the
person himself.61
The right to security is separate and distinct from the right to life. The right to life
guarantees essentially the right to be alive - upon which the enjoyment of all
other rights is preconditioned. On the other hand, the right to security is a
guarantee of the secure quality of life, i.e., the life, to which each person has a
right, is not a life lived in fear that his person and property may be unreasonably
violated by a powerful ruler.62
In Manalo, the Court further opined that the right to security of person yields
various permutations of the exercise of the right, such as freedom from fear or,
in the arnparo context, freedom from threat; a guarantee of bodily and
psychological integrity or security; and a guarantee of protection of one's rights
by the government.63 As regards the right to security, in the sense of the
guarantee of protection of one's rights by the government, the Court explained:
In the context of the writ of amparo, this right is built into the guarantees of the
rights to life and liberty under Article III, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution and
the right to security of person (as freedom from threat and guarantee of bodily
and psychological integrity) under Article III, Section 2. The right to security of
person in this third sense is a corollary of the policy that the State "guarantees
full respect for human rights" under Article II, Section 11 of the 1987
Constitution. As the government is the chief guarantor of order and security, the
Constitutional guarantee of the rights to life, liberty and security of person is
rendered ineffective if government does not afford protection to these rights
especially when they are under threat. Protection includes conducting effective
investigations, organization of the government apparatus to extend protection
to victims of extralegal killings or enforced disappearances (or threats thereof)
and/or their families, and bringing offenders to the bar of justice. x x x.64
(Citation omitted and emphasis in the original)
In this case, it is incumbent upon the petitioners, who all hold positions in the
local government of Tuao, to conduct, at the very least, an investigation on the
alleged illegal arrest, illegal detention and torture of the respondent. The
petitioners, nevertheless, claim that the Office of the Mayor and the police
station of Tuao, unknown to the respondent, are conducting an investigation on
the incident. However, other than their bare assertion, they failed to present any
evidence that would prove the supposed investigation. Mere allegation is not a
fact. Absent any evidence that would corroborate the said claim, it is a mere
allegation that does not have any probative value.
Verily, the petitioners failed to point to any specific measures undertaken by
them to effectively investigate the irregularities alleged by the respondent and
to prosecute those who are responsible therefor. Worse, the illegal detention
and torture suffered by the respondent were perpetrated by the members of the
Task Force themselves.
Instead of effectively addressing the irregularities committed against the
respondent, the petitioners seemingly justify the illegal arrest and detention and
infliction of bodily harm upon the respondent by stating that the latter is a
habitual delinquent and was the one responsible for the robbery of the canteen.
As stated earlier, even if the respondent committed a crime, the petitioners, as
local government officials, are not at liberty to disregard the respondent's
constitutionally guaranteed rights to life, liberty and security. It is quite HABEAS DATA
unfortunate that the petitioners, all local government officials, are the very ones
who are infringing on the respondent's fundamental rights to life, liberty and
security. Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Clearly, there is substantial evidence in this case that would warrant the Manila
conclusion that the respondent's right to security, as a guarantee of protection
by the government, was violated. Accordingly, the CA correctly issued the writ THIRD DIVISION
of amparo in favor of the respondent.
G.R. No. 202666 September 29, 2014
The petitioners' claim that it was improper for the CA to direct the PNP Cagayan
Regional Office to conduct further investigation on the respondent's allegations RHONDA AVE S. VIVARES and SPS. MARGARITA and DAVID SUZARA,
deserves scant consideration. There is simply no basis to the petitioners' claim Petitioners,
that the PNP Cagayan Regional Office would not be expected to be objective in vs.
their investigation since representatives therefrom testified during the summary ST. THERESA'S COLLEGE, MYLENE RHEZA T. ESCUDERO, and JOHN
hearing. It bears stressing that P/Supt. Buenaobra was not a witness for the DOES, Respondents.
respondent; he testified pursuant to the subpoena duces tecum ad testificandum
issued by the CA. Further, as aptly pointed out by the CA, it would be more
DECISION
reasonable for the PNP Cagayan Regional Office to conduct the said
investigation since it has already commenced an initial investigation on the VELASCO, JR., J.:
incident.
The individual's desire for privacy is never absolute, since participation in society
Nevertheless, there is a need to modify the reliefs granted by the CA in favor of is an equally powerful desire. Thus each individual is continually engaged in a
the respondent. The CA's Decision was promulgated in 2010.1âwphi1 Since
personal adjustment process in which he balances the desire for privacy with
then, Mayor Mamba's term of office as Mayor of Tuao had ended and,
the desire for disclosure and communication of himself to others, in light of the
presumably, a new individual is now occupying the position of Mayor of Tuao.
environmental conditions and social norms set by the society in which he lives.
Accordingly, the incumbent Mayor of Tuao should be directed to likewise
provide assistance to the investigation to be conducted by the PNP Cagayan
- Alan Westin, Privacy and Freedom (1967)
Regional Office. Further, it has not been manifested in this case that the PNP
Cagayan Regional Office had commenced the investigation on the incident that
The Case
was ordered by the CA.
Before Us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing disquisitions, the petition is
Court, in relation to Section 19 of A.M. No. 08-1-16-SC,1 otherwise known as
DENIED. The Decision dated January 18, 2010 and Resolution dated March 2, the "Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data." Petitioners herein assail the July 27,
2010 issued by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP. No. 00038 are hereby 2012 Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 14 in Cebu City (RTC) in
AFFIRMED subject to the following terms: SP. Proc. No. 19251-CEB, which dismissed their habeas data petition.
1. Petitioners Mayor William N. Mamba, Atty. Francisco N. Mamba, Jr., Ariel
The Facts
Malana, Narding Aggangan, Jomari Sagalon, Jun Cinabre, Frederick Baligod,
Rommel Encollado, Joseph Tumaliuan, and Randy Dayag and the incumbent Nenita Julia V. Daluz (Julia) and Julienne Vida Suzara (Julienne), both minors,
local government officials of Tuao, Cagayan are hereby enjoined from doing any
were, during the period material, graduating high school students at St.
act of physical or psychological violence on respondent Leomar Bueno and his
Theresa's College (STC), Cebu City. Sometime in January 2012, while changing
family including those who assisted him in the filing of the petition for the
into their swimsuits for a beach party they were about to attend, Julia and
issuance of a writ of amparo with the Court of Appeals; Julienne, along with several others, took digital pictures of themselves clad only
in their undergarments. These pictures were then uploaded by Angela Lindsay
2. The Regional Director of the Philippine National Police – Cagayan Regional
Tan (Angela) on her Facebook3 profile.
Office, whoever is the incumbent, is hereby directed to conduct an investigation,
using extraordinary diligence, on the violation of the rights to life, liberty and Back at the school, Mylene Rheza T. Escudero (Escudero), a computer teacher
security of the respondent when he was supposedly arrested on June 14, 2009 at STC’s high school department, learned from her students that some seniors
by the members of the Task Force Lingkod Bayan until he was released on June
at STC posted pictures online, depicting themselves from the waist up, dressed
18, 2009;
only in brassieres. Escudero then asked her students if they knew who the girls
in the photos are. In turn, they readily identified Julia, Julienne, and Chloe
3. The petitioners and the incumbent officials of the local government of Tuao Lourdes Taboada (Chloe), among others.
are hereby ordered to provide genuine and effective assistance to the
investigation to be conducted by the Philippine National Police - Cagayan
Using STC’s computers, Escudero’s students logged in to their respective
Regional Office, including but not limited to furnishing and/or providing the latter
personal Facebook accounts and showed her photos of the identified students,
a list of the members of the Task Force Lingkod Bayan and all those who had a
which include: (a) Julia and Julienne drinking hard liquor and smoking cigarettes
direct involvement in the violation of the respondent's rights to life, liberty and inside a bar; and (b) Julia and Julienne along the streets of Cebu wearing
security, including their whereabouts, and to allow the investigation to run its articles of clothing that show virtually the entirety of their black brassieres. What
course unhindered; is more, Escudero’s students claimed that there were times when access to or
the availability of the identified students’ photos was not confined to the girls’
4. The investigation shall be completed not later than six (6) months from receipt Facebook friends,4 but were, in fact, viewable by any Facebook user.5
of this Decision; and within thirty (30) days after completion of the investigation,
the Regional Director of the Philippine National Police - Cagayan Regional
Upon discovery, Escudero reported the matter and, through one of her student’s
Office shall submit a full report on the results of the investigation to the Court of Facebook page, showed the photosto Kristine Rose Tigol (Tigol), STC’s
Appeals;
Discipline-in-Charge, for appropriate action. Thereafter, following an
investigation, STC found the identified students to have deported themselves in
5. The Court of Appeals, within thirty (30) days from the submission by the
a manner proscribed by the school’s Student Handbook, to wit:
Regional Director of the Philippine National Police - Cagayan Regional Office of
his full report, is directed to submit to this Court its own report and
1. Possession of alcoholic drinks outside the school campus;
recommendations on the investigation and furnish a copy thereof to the
incumbent Regional Director of the Philippine National Police - Cagayan 2. Engaging in immoral, indecent, obscene or lewd acts;
Regional Office, the petitioners, and the respondent; and
3. Smoking and drinking alcoholicbeverages in public places;
6. This case is referred back to the Court of Appeals for appropriate proceedings
directed at the monitoring of (a) the investigation to be conducted by the
4. Apparel that exposes the underwear;
Philippine National Police - Cagayan Regional Office, (b) the actions to be
undertaken in pursuance of the said investigation, and (c) the validation of the 5. Clothing that advocates unhealthy behaviour; depicts obscenity; contains
results.
sexually suggestive messages, language or symbols; and 6. Posing and
uploading pictures on the Internet that entail ample body exposure.
SO ORDERED.
On March 1, 2012, Julia, Julienne, Angela, and the other students in the pictures
BIENVENIDO L. REYES
in question, reported, as required, to the office of Sr. Celeste Ma. Purisima Pe
Associate Justice
(Sr. Purisima), STC’s high school principal and ICM6 Directress. They claimed
that during the meeting, they were castigated and verbally abused by the STC
officials present in the conference, including Assistant Principal Mussolini S.
Yap (Yap), Roswinda Jumiller, and Tigol. What is more, Sr. Purisima informed
their parents the following day that, as part of their penalty, they are barred from
joining the commencement exercises scheduled on March 30, 2012.

A week before graduation, or on March 23, 2012, Angela’s mother, Dr. Armenia
M. Tan (Tan), filed a Petition for Injunction and Damages before the RTC of
Page 95 of 99
Cebu City against STC, et al., docketed as Civil Case No. CEB-38594.7 In it,
Tan prayed that defendants therein be enjoined from implementing the sanction
that precluded Angela from joining the commencement exercises.
On March 25, 2012,petitioner Rhonda Ave Vivares (Vivares), the mother of
Julia, joined the fray as an intervenor. On March 28, 2012, defendants inCivil
Case No. CEB-38594 filed their memorandum, containing printed copies of the
photographs in issue as annexes. That same day, the RTC issued a temporary
restraining order (TRO) allowing the students to attend the graduation
ceremony, to which STC filed a motion for reconsideration.
Despite the issuance of the TRO,STC, nevertheless, barred the sanctioned
students from participating in the graduation rites, arguing that, on the date of
the commencement exercises, its adverted motion for reconsideration on the
issuance ofthe TRO remained unresolved.
Thereafter, petitioners filed before the RTC a Petition for the Issuance of a Writ
of Habeas Data, docketed as SP. Proc. No. 19251-CEB8 on the basis of the
following considerations:
1. The photos of their children in their undergarments (e.g., bra) were taken for
posterity before they changed into their swimsuits on the occasion of a birthday
beach party;
2. The privacy setting of their children’s Facebook accounts was set at "Friends
Only." They, thus, have a reasonable expectation of privacy which must be
respected.
3. Respondents, being involved in the field of education, knew or ought to have
known of laws that safeguard the right to privacy. Corollarily, respondents knew
or ought to have known that the girls, whose privacy has been invaded, are the
victims in this case, and not the offenders. Worse, after viewing the photos, the
minors were called "immoral" and were punished outright;
4. The photos accessed belong to the girls and, thus, cannot be used and
reproduced without their consent. Escudero, however, violated their rights by
saving digital copies of the photos and by subsequently showing them to STC’s
officials. Thus, the Facebook accounts of petitioners’ children were intruded
upon;
5. The intrusion into the Facebook accounts, as well as the copying of
information, data, and digital images happened at STC’s Computer Laboratory;
and
6. All the data and digital images that were extracted were boldly broadcasted
by respondents through their memorandum submitted to the RTC in connection
with Civil Case No. CEB-38594. To petitioners, the interplay of the foregoing
constitutes an invasion of their children’s privacy and, thus, prayed that: (a) a
writ of habeas databe issued; (b) respondents be ordered to surrender and
deposit with the court all soft and printed copies of the subjectdata before or at
the preliminary hearing; and (c) after trial, judgment be rendered declaring all
information, data, and digital images accessed, saved or stored, reproduced,
spread and used, to have been illegally obtained inviolation of the children’s
right to privacy.
Finding the petition sufficient in form and substance, the RTC, through an Order
dated July 5, 2012, issued the writ of habeas data. Through the same Order,
herein respondents were directed to file their verified written return, together
with the supporting affidavits, within five (5) working days from service of the
writ.
In time, respondents complied with the RTC’s directive and filed their verified
written return, laying down the following grounds for the denial of the petition,
viz: (a) petitioners are not the proper parties to file the petition; (b) petitioners
are engaging in forum shopping; (c) the instant case is not one where a writ of
habeas data may issue; and (d) there can be no violation of their right to privacy
as there is no reasonable expectation of privacy on Facebook.
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
On July 27, 2012, the RTC rendered a Decision dismissing the petition for
habeas data. The dispositive portion of the Decision pertinently states:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, the Petition is hereby
DISMISSED.
The parties and media must observe the aforestated confidentiality.
xxxx
SO ORDERED.9
To the trial court, petitioners failed to prove the existence of an actual or
threatened violation of the minors’ right to privacy, one of the preconditions for
the issuance of the writ of habeas data. Moreover, the court a quoheld that the
photos, having been uploaded on Facebook without restrictions as to who may
view them, lost their privacy in some way. Besides, the RTC noted, STC
gathered the photographs through legal means and for a legal purpose, that is,
the implementation of the school’s policies and rules on discipline.
Not satisfied with the outcome, petitioners now come before this Court pursuant
to Section 19 of the Rule on Habeas Data.10
Page 96 of 99
The Issues
The main issue to be threshed out inthis case is whether or not a writ of habeas
datashould be issued given the factual milieu. Crucial in resolving the
controversy, however, is the pivotal point of whether or not there was indeed an
actual or threatened violation of the right to privacy in the life, liberty, or security
of the minors involved in this case.
Our Ruling
We find no merit in the petition.
Procedural issues concerning the availability of the Writ of Habeas Data
The writ of habeas datais a remedy available to any person whose right to
privacy in life, liberty or security is violated or threatened by an unlawful act or
omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity
engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or information regarding
the person, family, home and correspondence of the aggrieved party.11 It is an
independent and summary remedy designed to protect the image, privacy,
honor, information, and freedom of information of an individual, and to provide
a forum to enforce one’s right to the truth and to informational privacy. It seeks
to protect a person’s right to control information regarding oneself, particularly
in instances in which such information is being collected through unlawful
means in order to achieve unlawful ends.12
In developing the writ of habeas data, the Court aimed to protect an individual’s
right to informational privacy, among others. A comparative law scholar has, in
fact, defined habeas dataas "a procedure designed to safeguard individual
freedom from abuse in the information age."13 The writ, however, will not issue
on the basis merely of an alleged unauthorized access to information about a
person.Availment of the writ requires the existence of a nexus between the right
to privacy on the one hand, and the right to life, liberty or security on the other.14
Thus, the existence of a person’s right to informational privacy and a showing,
at least by substantial evidence, of an actual or threatened violation of the right
to privacy in life, liberty or security of the victim are indispensable before the
privilege of the writ may be extended.15
Without an actionable entitlement in the first place to the right to informational
privacy, a habeas datapetition will not prosper. Viewed from the perspective of
the case at bar,this requisite begs this question: given the nature of an online
social network (OSN)––(1) that it facilitates and promotes real-time interaction
among millions, if not billions, of users, sans the spatial barriers,16 bridging the
gap created by physical space; and (2) that any information uploaded in OSNs
leavesan indelible trace in the provider’s databases, which are outside the
control of the end-users––is there a right to informational privacy in OSN
activities of its users? Before addressing this point, We must first resolve the
procedural issues in this case.
a. The writ of habeas data is not only confined to cases of extralegal killings and
enforced disappearances
Contrary to respondents’ submission, the Writ of Habeas Datawas not enacted
solely for the purpose of complementing the Writ of Amparoin cases of
extralegal killings and enforced disappearances.
Section 2 of the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data provides:
Sec. 2. Who May File. – Any aggrieved party may file a petition for the writ of
habeas data. However, in cases of extralegal killings and enforced
disappearances, the petition may be filed by:
(a) Any member of the immediate family of the aggrieved party, namely: the
spouse, children and parents; or
(b) Any ascendant, descendant or collateral relative of the aggrieved party within
the fourth civil degreeof consanguinity or affinity, in default of those mentioned
in the preceding paragraph. (emphasis supplied)
Had the framers of the Rule intended to narrow the operation of the writ only to
cases of extralegal killings or enforced disappearances, the above underscored
portion of Section 2, reflecting a variance of habeas data situations, would not
have been made.
Habeas data, to stress, was designed "to safeguard individual freedom from
abuse in the information age."17 As such, it is erroneous to limit its applicability
to extralegal killings and enforced disappearances only. In fact, the annotations
to the Rule preparedby the Committee on the Revision of the Rules of Court,
after explaining that the Writ of Habeas Data complements the Writ of Amparo,
pointed out that:
The writ of habeas data, however, can be availed of as an independent remedy
to enforce one’s right to privacy, more specifically the right to informational
privacy. The remedies against the violation of such right can include the
updating, rectification, suppression or destruction of the database or information
or files in possession or in control of respondents.18 (emphasis Ours) Clearly
then, the privilege of the Writ of Habeas Datamay also be availed of in cases
outside of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances.
b. Meaning of "engaged" in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or
information
Respondents’ contention that the habeas data writ may not issue against STC,
it not being an entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or
information regarding the person, family, home and correspondence of the
aggrieved party, while valid to a point, is, nonetheless, erroneous.
To be sure, nothing in the Rule would suggest that the habeas data protection
shall be available only against abuses of a person or entity engaged in the
businessof gathering, storing, and collecting of data. As provided under Section
1 of the Rule:
Section 1. Habeas Data. – The writ of habeas datais a remedy available to any
person whose right to privacy in life, liberty or security is violated or threatened
by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private
individual or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or
information regarding the person, family, home and correspondence of the
aggrieved party. (emphasis Ours)
The provision, when taken in its proper context, as a whole, irresistibly conveys
the idea that habeas data is a protection against unlawful acts or omissions of
public officials and of private individuals or entities engaged in gathering,
collecting, or storing data about the aggrieved party and his or her
correspondences, or about his or her family. Such individual or entity need not
be in the business of collecting or storing data.
To "engage" in something is different from undertaking a business endeavour.
To "engage" means "to do or take part in something."19 It does not necessarily
mean that the activity must be done in pursuit of a business. What matters is
that the person or entity must be gathering, collecting or storing said data or
information about the aggrieved party or his or her family. Whether such
undertaking carries the element of regularity, as when one pursues a business,
and is in the nature of a personal endeavour, for any other reason or even for
no reason at all, is immaterial and such will not prevent the writ from getting to
said person or entity.
To agree with respondents’ above argument, would mean unduly limiting the
reach of the writ to a very small group, i.e., private persons and entities whose
business is data gathering and storage, and in the process decreasing the
effectiveness of the writ asan instrument designed to protect a right which is
easily violated in view of rapid advancements in the information and
communications technology––a right which a great majority of the users of
technology themselves are not capable of protecting.
Having resolved the procedural aspect of the case, We now proceed to the core
of the controversy.
The right to informational privacy on Facebook
a. The Right to Informational Privacy
The concept of privacyhas, through time, greatly evolved, with technological
advancements having an influential part therein. This evolution was briefly
recounted in former Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno’s speech, The Common
Right to Privacy,20 where he explained the three strands of the right to privacy,
viz: (1) locational or situational privacy;21 (2) informational privacy; and (3)
decisional privacy.22 Of the three, what is relevant to the case at bar is the right
to informational privacy––usually defined as the right of individuals to control
information about themselves.23
With the availability of numerous avenues for information gathering and data
sharing nowadays, not to mention each system’s inherent vulnerability to
attacks and intrusions, there is more reason that every individual’s right to
control said flow of information should be protected and that each individual
should have at least a reasonable expectation of privacy in cyberspace. Several
commentators regarding privacy and social networking sites, however, all agree
that given the millions of OSN users, "[i]n this [Social Networking] environment,
privacy is no longer grounded in reasonable expectations, but rather in some
theoretical protocol better known as wishful thinking."24
It is due to this notion that the Court saw the pressing need to provide for judicial
remedies that would allow a summary hearing of the unlawful use of data or
information and to remedy possible violations of the right to privacy.25 In the
same vein, the South African High Court, in its Decision in the landmark case,
H v. W,26 promulgated on January30, 2013, recognized that "[t]he law has to
take into account the changing realities not only technologically but also socially
or else it will lose credibility in the eyes of the people. x x x It is imperative that
the courts respond appropriately to changing times, acting cautiously and with
wisdom." Consistent with this, the Court, by developing what may be viewed as
the Philippine model of the writ of habeas data, in effect, recognized that,
generally speaking, having an expectation of informational privacy is not
necessarily incompatible with engaging in cyberspace activities, including those
that occur in OSNs.
The question now though is up to whatextent is the right to privacy protected in
OSNs? Bear in mind that informational privacy involves personal information. At
the same time, the very purpose of OSNs is socializing––sharing a myriad of
information,27 some of which would have otherwise remained personal.
b. Facebook’s Privacy Tools: a response to the clamor for privacy in OSN
activities
Briefly, the purpose of an OSN is precisely to give users the ability to interact
and to stay connected to other members of the same or different social media
platform through the sharing of statuses, photos, videos, among others,
Page 97 of 99
depending on the services provided by the site. It is akin to having a room filled
with millions of personal bulletin boards or "walls," the contents of which are
under the control of each and every user. In his or her bulletin board, a
user/owner can post anything––from text, to pictures, to music and videos––
access to which would depend on whether he or she allows one, some or all of
the other users to see his or her posts. Since gaining popularity, the OSN
phenomenon has paved the way to the creation of various social networking
sites, includingthe one involved in the case at bar, www.facebook.com
(Facebook), which, according to its developers, people use "to stay connected
with friends and family, to discover what’s going on in the world, and to share
and express what matters to them."28
Facebook connections are established through the process of "friending"
another user. By sending a "friend request," the user invites another to connect
their accounts so that they can view any and all "Public" and "Friends Only"
posts of the other. Once the request is accepted, the link is established and both
users are permitted to view the other user’s "Public" or "Friends Only" posts,
among others. "Friending," therefore, allows the user to form or maintain one-
to-one relationships with other users, whereby the user gives his or her
"Facebook friend" access to his or her profile and shares certain information to
the latter.29
To address concerns about privacy,30 but without defeating its purpose,
Facebook was armed with different privacy tools designed to regulate the
accessibility of a user’s profile31 as well as information uploaded by the user. In
H v. W,32 the South Gauteng High Court recognized this ability of the users to
"customize their privacy settings," but did so with this caveat: "Facebook states
in its policies that, although it makes every effort to protect a user’s information,
these privacy settings are not foolproof."33
For instance, a Facebook user canregulate the visibility and accessibility of
digital images(photos), posted on his or her personal bulletin or "wall," except
for the user’sprofile picture and ID, by selecting his or her desired privacy
setting:
(a) Public - the default setting; every Facebook user can view the photo;
(b) Friends of Friends - only the user’s Facebook friends and their friends can
view the photo;
(b) Friends - only the user’s Facebook friends can view the photo;
(c) Custom - the photo is made visible only to particular friends and/or networks
of the Facebook user; and
(d) Only Me - the digital image can be viewed only by the user.
The foregoing are privacy tools, available to Facebook users, designed to set
up barriers to broaden or limit the visibility of his or her specific profile content,
statuses, and photos, among others, from another user’s point of view. In other
words, Facebook extends its users an avenue to make the availability of their
Facebook activities reflect their choice as to "when and to what extent to
disclose facts about [themselves] – and to put others in the position of receiving
such confidences."34 Ideally, the selected setting will be based on one’s desire
to interact with others, coupled with the opposing need to withhold certain
information as well as to regulate the spreading of his or her personal
information. Needless to say, as the privacy setting becomes more limiting,
fewer Facebook users can view that user’s particular post.
STC did not violate petitioners’ daughters’ right to privacy
Without these privacy settings, respondents’ contention that there is no
reasonable expectation of privacy in Facebook would, in context, be correct.
However, such is not the case. It is through the availability of said privacy tools
that many OSN users are said to have a subjective expectation that only those
to whomthey grant access to their profile will view the information they post or
upload thereto.35
This, however, does not mean thatany Facebook user automatically has a
protected expectation of privacy inall of his or her Facebook activities. Before
one can have an expectation of privacy in his or her OSN activity, it is first
necessary that said user, in this case the children of petitioners manifest the
intention to keepcertain posts private, through the employment of measures to
prevent access thereto or to limit its visibility.36 And this intention can
materialize in cyberspace through the utilization of the OSN’s privacy tools. In
other words, utilization of these privacy tools is the manifestation,in cyber world,
of the user’s invocation of his or her right to informational privacy.37
Therefore, a Facebook user who opts to make use of a privacy tool to grant or
deny access to his or her post orprofile detail should not be denied the
informational privacy right which necessarily accompanies said choice.38
Otherwise, using these privacy tools would be a feckless exercise, such that if,
for instance, a user uploads a photo or any personal information to his or her
Facebook page and sets its privacy level at "Only Me" or a custom list so that
only the user or a chosen few can view it, said photo would still be deemed
public by the courts as if the user never chose to limit the photo’s visibility and
accessibility. Such position, if adopted, will not only strip these privacy tools of
their function but it would also disregard the very intention of the user to keep
said photo or information within the confines of his or her private space.
We must now determine the extent that the images in question were visible to
other Facebook users and whether the disclosure was confidential in nature. In
other words, did the minors limit the disclosure of the photos such that the
images were kept within their zones of privacy? This determination is necessary
in resolving the issue of whether the minors carved out a zone of privacy when
the photos were uploaded to Facebook so that the images will be protected
against unauthorized access and disclosure.
Petitioners, in support of their thesis about their children’s privacy right being
violated, insist that Escudero intruded upon their children’s Facebook accounts,
downloaded copies ofthe pictures and showed said photos to Tigol. To them,
this was a breach of the minors’ privacy since their Facebook accounts,
allegedly, were under "very private" or "Only Friends" setting safeguarded with
a password.39 Ultimately, they posit that their children’s disclosure was only
limited since their profiles were not open to public viewing. Therefore, according
to them, people who are not their Facebook friends, including respondents, are
barred from accessing said post without their knowledge and consent.
Aspetitioner’s children testified, it was Angelawho uploaded the subjectphotos
which were only viewable by the five of them,40 although who these five are do
not appear on the records.
Escudero, on the other hand, stated in her affidavit41 that "my students showed
me some pictures of girls cladin brassieres. This student [sic] of mine informed
me that these are senior high school [students] of STC, who are their friends in
[F]acebook. x x x They then said [that] there are still many other photos posted
on the Facebook accounts of these girls. At the computer lab, these students
then logged into their Facebook account [sic], and accessed from there the
various photographs x x x. They even told me that there had been times when
these photos were ‘public’ i.e., not confined to their friends in Facebook."
In this regard, We cannot give muchweight to the minors’ testimonies for one
key reason: failure to question the students’ act of showing the photos to Tigol
disproves their allegation that the photos were viewable only by the five of them.
Without any evidence to corroborate their statement that the images were visible
only to the five of them, and without their challenging Escudero’s claim that the
other students were able to view the photos, their statements are, at best, self-
serving, thus deserving scant consideration.42
It is well to note that not one of petitioners disputed Escudero’s sworn account
that her students, who are the minors’ Facebook "friends," showed her the
photos using their own Facebook accounts. This only goes to show that no
special means to be able to viewthe allegedly private posts were ever resorted
to by Escudero’s students,43 and that it is reasonable to assume, therefore, that
the photos were, in reality, viewable either by (1) their Facebook friends, or (2)
by the public at large.
Considering that the default setting for Facebook posts is"Public," it can be
surmised that the photographs in question were viewable to everyone on
Facebook, absent any proof that petitioners’ children positively limited the
disclosure of the photograph. If suchwere the case, they cannot invoke the
protection attached to the right to informational privacy. The ensuing
pronouncement in US v. Gines-Perez44 is most instructive:
[A] person who places a photograph on the Internet precisely intends to forsake
and renounce all privacy rights to such imagery, particularly under
circumstances suchas here, where the Defendant did not employ protective
measures or devices that would have controlled access to the Web page or the
photograph itself.45
Also, United States v. Maxwell46 held that "[t]he more open the method of
transmission is, the less privacy one can reasonably expect. Messages sent to
the public at large inthe chat room or e-mail that is forwarded from
correspondent to correspondent loses any semblance of privacy."
That the photos are viewable by "friends only" does not necessarily bolster the
petitioners’ contention. In this regard, the cyber community is agreed that the
digital images under this setting still remain to be outside the confines of the
zones of privacy in view of the following:
(1) Facebook "allows the world to be more open and connected by giving its
users the tools to interact and share in any conceivable way;"47
(2) A good number of Facebook users "befriend" other users who are total
strangers;48
(3) The sheer number of "Friends" one user has, usually by the hundreds; and
(4) A user’s Facebook friend can "share"49 the former’s post, or "tag"50 others
who are not Facebook friends with the former, despite its being visible only tohis
or her own Facebook friends.
It is well to emphasize at this point that setting a post’s or profile detail’s privacy
to "Friends" is no assurance that it can no longer be viewed by another user
who is not Facebook friends with the source of the content. The user’s own
Facebook friend can share said content or tag his or her own Facebook friend
thereto, regardless of whether the user tagged by the latter is Facebook friends
or not with the former. Also, when the post is shared or when a person is tagged,
the respective Facebook friends of the person who shared the post or who was
tagged can view the post, the privacy setting of which was set at "Friends."
To illustrate, suppose A has 100 Facebook friends and B has 200. A and B are
not Facebook friends. If C, A’s Facebook friend, tags B in A’s post, which is set
at "Friends," the initial audience of 100 (A’s own Facebook friends) is
dramatically increased to 300 (A’s 100 friends plus B’s 200 friends or the public,
depending upon B’s privacy setting). As a result, the audience who can view the
post is effectively expanded––and to a very large extent.
Page 98 of 99
This, along with its other features and uses, is confirmation of Facebook’s
proclivity towards user interaction and socialization rather than seclusion or
privacy, as it encourages broadcasting of individual user posts. In fact, it has
been said that OSNs have facilitated their users’ self-tribute, thereby resulting
into the "democratization of fame."51 Thus, it is suggested, that a profile, or
even a post, with visibility set at "Friends Only" cannot easily, more so
automatically, be said to be "very private," contrary to petitioners’ argument.
As applied, even assuming that the photos in issue are visible only to the
sanctioned students’ Facebook friends, respondent STC can hardly be taken to
task for the perceived privacy invasion since it was the minors’ Facebook friends
who showed the pictures to Tigol. Respondents were mere recipients of what
were posted. They did not resort to any unlawful means of gathering the
information as it was voluntarily given to them by persons who had legitimate
access to the said posts. Clearly, the fault, if any, lies with the friends of the
minors. Curiously enough, however, neither the minors nor their parents
imputed any violation of privacy against the students who showed the images
to Escudero.
Furthermore, petitioners failed to prove their contention that respondents
reproduced and broadcasted the photographs. In fact, what petitioners
attributed to respondents as an act of offensive disclosure was no more than
the actuality that respondents appended said photographs in their memorandum
submitted to the trial court in connection with Civil Case No. CEB-38594.52
These are not tantamount to a violation of the minor’s informational privacy
rights, contrary to petitioners’ assertion.
In sum, there can be no quibbling that the images in question, or to be more
precise, the photos of minor students scantily clad, are personal in nature, likely
to affect, if indiscriminately circulated, the reputation of the minors enrolled in a
conservative institution. However, the records are bereft of any evidence, other
than bare assertions that they utilized Facebook’s privacy settings to make the
photos visible only to them or to a select few. Without proof that they placed the
photographs subject of this case within the ambit of their protected zone of
privacy, they cannot now insist that they have an expectation of privacy with
respect to the photographs in question.
Had it been proved that the access tothe pictures posted were limited to the
original uploader, through the "Me Only" privacy setting, or that the user’s
contact list has been screened to limit access to a select few, through the
"Custom" setting, the result may have been different, for in such instances, the
intention to limit access to the particular post, instead of being broadcasted to
the public at large or all the user’s friends en masse, becomes more manifest
and palpable.
On Cyber Responsibility
It has been said that "the best filter is the one between your children’s ears."53
This means that self-regulation on the part of OSN users and internet
consumers ingeneral is the best means of avoiding privacy rights violations.54
As a cyberspace communitymember, one has to be proactive in protecting his
or her own privacy.55 It is in this regard that many OSN users, especially minors,
fail.Responsible social networking or observance of the "netiquettes"56 on the
part of teenagers has been the concern of many due to the widespreadnotion
that teenagers can sometimes go too far since they generally lack the people
skills or general wisdom to conduct themselves sensibly in a public forum.57
Respondent STC is clearly aware of this and incorporating lessons on good
cyber citizenship in its curriculum to educate its students on proper online
conduct may be mosttimely. Too, it is not only STC but a number of schools and
organizations have already deemed it important to include digital literacy and
good cyber citizenshipin their respective programs and curricula in view of the
risks that the children are exposed to every time they participate in online
activities.58 Furthermore, considering the complexity of the cyber world and its
pervasiveness,as well as the dangers that these children are wittingly or
unwittingly exposed to in view of their unsupervised activities in cyberspace, the
participation of the parents in disciplining and educating their children about
being a good digital citizen is encouraged by these institutions and
organizations. In fact, it is believed that "to limit such risks, there’s no substitute
for parental involvement and supervision."59
As such, STC cannot be faulted for being steadfast in its duty of teaching its
students to beresponsible in their dealings and activities in cyberspace,
particularly in OSNs, whenit enforced the disciplinary actions specified in the
Student Handbook, absenta showing that, in the process, it violated the
students’ rights.
OSN users should be aware of the risks that they expose themselves to
whenever they engage incyberspace activities.1âwphi1 Accordingly, they
should be cautious enough to control their privacy and to exercise sound
discretion regarding how much information about themselves they are willing to
give up. Internet consumers ought to be aware that, by entering or uploading
any kind of data or information online, they are automatically and inevitably
making it permanently available online, the perpetuation of which is outside the
ambit of their control. Furthermore, and more importantly, information, otherwise
private, voluntarily surrendered by them can be opened, read, or copied by third
parties who may or may not be allowed access to such.
It is, thus, incumbent upon internet users to exercise due diligence in their online
dealings and activities and must not be negligent in protecting their rights. Equity
serves the vigilant. Demanding relief from the courts, as here, requires that
claimants themselves take utmost care in safeguarding a right which they allege
to have been violated. These are indispensable. We cannot afford protection to
persons if they themselves did nothing to place the matter within the confines of
their private zone. OSN users must be mindful enough to learn the use of privacy
tools, to use them if they desire to keep the information private, and to keep
track of changes in the available privacy settings, such as those of Facebook,
especially because Facebook is notorious for changing these settings and the
site's layout often.
In finding that respondent STC and its officials did not violate the minors' privacy
rights, We find no cogent reason to disturb the findings and case disposition of
the court a quo.
In light of the foregoing, the Court need not belabor the other assigned errors.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DENIED. The
Decision dated July 27, 2012 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 14 in Cebu
City in SP. Proc. No. 19251-CEB is hereby AFFIRMED.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 203254, October 08, 2014
DR. JOY MARGATE LEE, Petitioner, v. P/SUPT. NERI A. ILAGAN,
Respondent.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari1 assailing the Decision2
dated August 30, 2012 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 224
(RTC) in SP No. 12-71527, which extended the privilege of the writ of habeas
data in favor of respondent Police Superintendent Neri A. Ilagan (Ilagan).
The Facts
In his Petition for Issuance of the Writ of Habeas Data3 dated June 22, 2012,
Ilagan alleged that he and petitioner Dr. Joy Margate Lee (Lee) were former
common law partners. Sometime in July 2011, he visited Lee at the latter’s
condominium, rested for a while and thereafter, proceeded to his office. Upon
arrival, Ilagan noticed that his digital camera was missing.4 On August 23, 2011,
Lee confronted Ilagan at the latter’s office regarding a purported sex video
(subject video) she discovered from the aforesaid camera involving Ilagan and
another woman. Ilagan denied the video and demanded Lee to return the
camera, but to no avail.5 During the confrontation, Ilagan allegedly slammed
Lee’s head against a wall inside his office and walked away.6Subsequently, Lee
utilized the said video as evidence in filing various complaints against Ilagan,
namely: (a) a criminal complaint for violation of Republic Act No.
9262,7otherwise known as the “Anti-Violence Against Women and Their
Children Act of 2004,” before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Makati; and (b)
an administrative complaint for grave misconduct before the National Police
Commission (NAPOLCOM).8 Ilagan claimed that Lee’s acts of reproducing the
subject video and threatening to distribute the same to the upper echelons of
the NAPOLCOM and uploading it to the internet violated not only his right to life,
liberty, security, and privacy but also that of the other woman, and thus, the
issuance of a writ of habeas data in his favor is warranted.9
Finding the petition prima facie meritorious, the RTC issued a Writ of Habeas
Data10 dated June 25, 2012, directing Lee to appear before the court a quo,
and to produce Ilagan’s digital camera, as well as the negative and/or original
of the subject video and copies thereof, and to file a verified written return within
five (5) working days from date of receipt thereof.
In her Verified Return11 dated July 2, 2012, Lee admitted that she indeed kept
the memory card of the digital camera and reproduced the aforesaid video but
averred that she only did so to utilize the same as evidence in the cases she
filed against Ilagan. She also admitted that her relationship with Ilagan started
sometime in 2003 and ended under disturbing circumstances in August 2011,
and that she only happened to discover the subject video when Ilagan left his
camera in her condominium. Accordingly, Lee contended that Ilagan’s petition
for the issuance of the writ of habeas data should be dismissed because: (a) its
filing was only aimed at suppressing the evidence against Ilagan in the cases
she filed; and (b) she is not engaged in the gathering, collecting, or storing of
data regarding the person of Ilagan.12
The RTC Ruling
In a Decision13 dated August 30, 2012, the RTC granted the privilege of the writ
of habeas data in Ilagan’s favor, and accordingly, ordered the implementing
officer to turn-over copies of the subject video to him, and enjoined Lee from
further reproducing the same.14
Page 99 of 99
The RTC did not give credence to Lee’s defense that she is not engaged in the
gathering, collecting or storing of data regarding the person of Ilagan, finding
that her acts of reproducing the subject video and showing it to other people,
i.e., the NAPOLCOM officers, violated the latter’s right to privacy in life and
caused him to suffer humiliation and mental anguish. In this relation, the RTC
opined that Lee’s use of the subject video as evidence in the various cases she
filed against Ilagan is not enough justification for its reproduction. Nevertheless,
the RTC clarified that it is only ruling on the return of the aforesaid video and not
on its admissibility before other tribunals.15
Dissatisfied, Lee filed this petition.
The Issue Before the Court
The essential issue for the Court’s resolution is whether or not the RTC correctly
extended the privilege of the writ of habeas data in favor of Ilagan.
The Court’s Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
A.M. No. 08-1-16-SC, or the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data (Habeas Data
Rule), was conceived as a response, given the lack of effective and available
remedies, to address the extraordinary rise in the number of killings and
enforced disappearances.16 It was conceptualized as a judicial remedy
enforcing the right to privacy, most especially the right to informational privacy
of individuals,17 which is defined as “the right to control the collection,
maintenance, use, and dissemination of data about oneself.”18
As defined in Section 1 of the Habeas Data Rule, the writ of habeas data now
stands as “a remedy available to any person whose right to privacy in life, liberty
or security is violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a public
official or employee, or of a private individual or entity engaged in the gathering,
collecting or storing of data or information regarding the person, family, home,
and correspondence of the aggrieved party.” Thus, in order to support a petition
for the issuance of such writ, Section 6 of the Habeas Data Rule essentially
requires that the petition sufficiently alleges, among others, “[t]he manner the
right to privacy is violated or threatened and how it affects the right to life, liberty
or security of the aggrieved party.” In other words, the petition must adequately
show that there exists a nexus between the right to privacy on the one hand,
and the right to life, liberty or security on the other .19 Corollarily, the allegations
in the petition must be supported by substantial evidence showing an actual or
threatened violation of the right to privacy in life, liberty or security of the
victim.20 In this relation, it bears pointing out that the writ of habeas data will not
issue to protect purely property or commercial concerns nor when the grounds
invoked in support of the petitions therefor are vague and doubtful.21
In this case, the Court finds that Ilagan was not able to sufficiently allege that
his right to privacy in life, liberty or security was or would be violated through the
supposed reproduction and threatened dissemination of the subject sex video.
While Ilagan purports a privacy interest in the suppression of this video – which
he fears would somehow find its way to Quiapo or be uploaded in the internet
for public consumption – he failed to explain the connection between such
interest and any violation of his right to life, liberty or security. Indeed, courts
cannot speculate or contrive versions of possible transgressions. As the rules
and existing jurisprudence on the matter evoke, alleging and eventually proving
the nexus between one’s privacy right to the cogent rights to life, liberty or
security are crucial in habeas data cases, so much so that a failure on either
account certainly renders a habeas data petition dismissible, as in this case.
In fact, even discounting the insufficiency of the allegations, the petition would
equally be dismissible due to the inadequacy of the evidence presented. As the
records show, all that Ilagan submitted in support of his petition was his self-
serving testimony which hardly meets the substantial evidence requirement as
prescribed by the Habeas Data Rule. This is because nothing therein would
indicate that Lee actually proceeded to commit any overt act towards the end of
violating Ilagan’s right to privacy in life, liberty or security. Nor would anything
on record even lead a reasonable mind to conclude22 that Lee was going to
use the subject video in order to achieve unlawful ends – say for instance, to
spread it to the public so as to ruin Ilagan’s reputation. Contrastingly, Lee even
made it clear in her testimony that the only reason why she reproduced the
subject video was to legitimately utilize the same as evidence in the criminal and
administrative cases that she filed against Ilagan.23 Hence, due to the
insufficiency of the allegations as well as the glaring absence of substantial
evidence, the Court finds it proper to reverse the RTC Decision and dismiss the
habeas data petition.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated August 30, 2012
of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 224 in SP No. 12-71527is
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the Petition for Issuance of
the Writ of Habeas Data filed by respondent P/Supt. Neri A. Ilagan is
DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Sereno, C.J., (Chairperson), Leonardo-De Castro, Bersamin, and Perez, JJ.,
concur.