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Nre Case Digest 3
Nre Case Digest 3
FACTS:
This case originated from a petition filed by respondent
[Sulu Resources Development Corporation] for Mines
Production Sharing Agreement (MPSA) No. MPSA-IV-131,
covering certain areas in Antipolo, Rizal. Petitioner
[Armando C. Carpio] filed an opposition/adverse claim
thereto, alleging, inter alia, that his landholdings in
Cupang and Antipolo, Rizal will be covered by
respondent’s claim, thus he enjoys a preferential right
to explore and extract the quarry resources on his
properties. After due proceedings were held, the Panel
of Arbitrators of the Mines and Geo-Sciences Bureau of
the DENR rendered a Resolution upholding petitioner’s
opposition/adverse claim. Respondent appealed the
foregoing Resolution to the Mines Adjudication Board.
Meanwhile, petitioner filed a motion to dismiss appeal
on the ground of respondent’s failure to comply with the
requirements of the New Mining Act’s Implementing Rules
and Regulations. The Mines Adjudication Board rendered
the assailed Order dismissing petitioner’s
opposition/adverse claim. Petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration of said Order which was denied by the
Board. An appeal was filed with the CA but same was
denied.
ISSUE:
Whether or not appeals from the Decision or Final Orders
of the Mines Adjudication Board should be made directly
to the Supreme Court as contended by the respondent and
the Court of Appeals, or such appeals be first made to
the Court of Appeals as contended by herein petitioner.
HELD:
The petition is meritorious. Factual controversies are
usually involved in administrative actions; and the CA
is prepared to handle such issues because, unlike this
Court, it is mandated to rule on questions of fact. In
Metro Construction, we observed that not only did the CA
have appellate jurisdiction over CIAC decisions and
orders, but the review of such decisions included
questions of fact and law. At the very least when factual
findings of the MAB are challenged or alleged to have
been made in grave abuse of discretion as in the present
case, the CA may review them, consistent with the
constitutional duty of the judiciary.
To summarize, there are sufficient legal footings
authorizing a review of the MAB Decision under Rule 43
of the Rules of Court.
First, Section 30 of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution,
mandates that “[n]o law shall be passed increasing the
appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court as provided
in this Constitution without its advice and consent.” On
the other hand, Section 79 of RA No. 7942 provides that
decisions of the MAB may be reviewed by this Court on a
“petition for review by certiorari.” This provision is
obviously an expansion of the Court’s appellate
jurisdiction, an expansion to which this Court has not
consented. Indiscriminate enactment of legislation
enlarging the appellate jurisdiction of this Court would
unnecessarily burden it.
Second, when the Supreme Court, in the exercise of its
rule-making power, transfers to the CA pending cases
involving a review of a quasi-judicial body’s decisions,
such transfer relates only to procedure; hence, it does
not impair the substantive and vested rights of the
parties. The aggrieved party’s right to appeal is
preserved; what is changed is only the procedure by which
the appeal is to be made or decided. The parties still
have a remedy and a competent tribunal to grant this
remedy.
Third, the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure included Rule
43 to provide a uniform rule on appeals from quasi-
judicial agencies. Under the rule, appeals from their
judgments and final orders are now required to be brought
to the CA on a verified petition for review. A quasi-
judicial agency or body has been defined as an organ of
government, other than a court or legislature, which
affects the rights of private parties through either
adjudication or rule-making. MAB falls under this
definition; hence, it is no different from the other
quasi-judicial bodies enumerated under Rule 43. Besides,
the introductory words in Section 1 of Circular No. 1-91
-- “among these agencies are” -- indicate that the
enumeration is not exclusive or conclusive and
acknowledge the existence of other quasi-judicial
agencies which, though not expressly listed, should be
deemed included therein.
Fourth, the Court realizes that under Batas Pambansa (BP)
Blg. 129 as amended by RA No. 7902, factual
controversies are usually involved in decisions of quasi-
judicial bodies; and the CA, which is likewise tasked to
resolve questions of fact, has more elbow room to resolve
them. By including questions of fact among the issues
that may be raised in an appeal from quasi-judicial
agencies to the CA, Section 3 of Revised Administrative
Circular No. 1-95 and Section 3 of Rule 43 explicitly
expanded the list of such issues.
Fifth, the judicial policy of observing the hierarchy of
courts dictates that direct resort from administrative
agencies to this Court will not be entertained, unless
the redress desired cannot be obtained from the
appropriate lower tribunals, or unless exceptional and
compelling circumstances justify availment of a remedy
falling within and calling for the exercise of our
primary jurisdiction.
FACTS:
Lebach did not file any notice of appeal with the required
memorandum of appeal; thus, with respect to Lebach, the
above resolution became final and executory. The MAB made
a decision upholding the Decision of the POA to cancel
the Mining Lode/Lease Contracts of Macroasia. However,
the MAB, subsequently issued a resolution vacating its
previous decision, holding that neither the POA nor the
MAB had the power to revoke a mineral agreement duly
entered into by the DENR Secretary. The MAB further held
that the power to cancel or revoke a mineral agreement
was exclusively lodged with the DENR Secretary.
ISSUE:
HELD:
Facts:
The director of lands filed a criminal case against the
defendants on the ground of misrepresentation and false
data and information. The defendants in the three cases
filed an amended joint answer with counterclaim to the
complaint in intervention. The defendants filed a motion
to dismiss the same on the ground that the accused had
complied with all the legal requirements in the
acquisition of their patents which were duly issued by
the Director of Lands and that they are not guilty of the
alleged falsification of public documents.
Issue:
Whether or not the defendants are entitled to ownership
of the land.
Held:
Yes. The Defendants are entitled to ownership of the land
in question. Section 44 of the Land Act in its second
paragraph states:
A member of the national cultural, minorities who has
continuously occupied and cultivated, either by himself
or through his predecessors-in- interest, a tract or
tracts of land, whether disposable or not since July 4,
1955, shall be entitled to the right granted in the
preceding paragraph of this section: PROVIDED, that at
the time he files his free patent application, he is not
the owner of any real property secured or disposable
under this provision of the Public Land Law.
It is for this reason — that is, to give these national
cultural minorities who were driven from their ancestral
abodes, a fair chance to acquire lands of the public
domain.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Republic Act No. 7942 is unconstitutional.
HELD:
The Court hereby declares unconstitutional and void the
following:
(1) Provisions of Republic Act No. 7942:
(a) The proviso in Section 3 (aq),
(b) Section 23,
(c) Section 33 to 41,
(d) Section 56,
(e) The second and third paragraphs of Section 81
and Section 90.
(2) All provisions of Department of Environment and
Natural Resources Administrative Order 96-40, s. 1996
which are not in conformity with this Decision, and
(3) The Financial and Technical Assistance Agreement
between the Government of the Republic of the
Philippines and WMC Philippines, Inc.
It is undisputed that R.A. No. 7942 and DAO No. 96-40
contain provisions that are more favorable to WMCP,
hence, these laws, to the extent that they are favorable
to WMCP, govern the FTAA. In addition, R.A. No. 7942
explicitly makes certain provisions apply to pre-existing
agreements.
R.A. No. 7942 is invalid insofar as said Act authorizes
service contracts. Although the statute employs the
phrase “financial and technical agreements” in accordance
with the 1987 Constitution, it actually treats these
agreements as service contracts that grant beneficial
ownership to foreign contractors contrary to the
fundamental law.
FACTS:
This resolves the motion for reconsideration dated 12
July 2006, filed by Southeast Mindanao Gold Mining
Corporation (SEM), of this Court’s Decision dated 23 June
2006 (Assailed Decision). The Assailed Decision held
that the assignment of Exploration Permit (EP) 133 in
favor of SEM violated one of the conditions stipulated
in the permit, i.e., that the same shall be for the
exclusive use and benefit of Marcopper Mining Corporation
(MMC) or its duly authorized agents. Since SEM did not
claim or submit evidence that it was a designated agent
of MMC, the latter cannot be considered as an agent of
the former that can use EP 133 and benefit from it. It
also ruled that the transfer of EP 133 violated
Presidential Decree No. 463, which requires that the
assignment of a mining right be made with the prior
approval of the Secretary of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). Moreover, the
Assailed Decision pointed out that EP 133 expired by non-
renewal since it was not renewed before or after its
expiration.
The Assailed Decision likewise upheld the validity of
Proclamation No. 297 absent any question against its
validity. In view of this, and considering that under
Section 5 of Republic Act No. 7942, otherwise known as
the “Mining Act of 1995,” mining operations in mineral
reservations may be undertaken directly by the State or
through a contractor, the Court deemed the issue of
ownership of priority right over the contested Diwalwal
Gold Rush Area as having been overtaken by the said
proclamation. Thus, it was held in the Assailed Decision
that it is now within the prerogative of the Executive
Department to undertake directly the mining operations
of the disputed area or to award the operations to private
entities including petitioners Apex and Balite, subject
to applicable laws, rules and regulations, and provided
that these private entities are qualified.
SEM also filed a Motion for Referral of Case to the Court
En Banc and for Oral Arguments dated 22 August 2006.
Apex, for its part, filed a Motion for Clarification of
the Assailed Decision, praying that the Court elucidate
on the Decision’s pronouncement that “mining operations,
are now, therefore within the full control of the State
through the executive branch.” Moreover, Apex asks this
Court to order the Mines and Geosciences Board (MGB) to
accept its application for an exploration permit.
In its Manifestation and Motion dated 28 July 2006,
Balite echoes the same concern as that of Apex on the
actual takeover by the State of the mining industry in
the disputed area to the exclusion of the private sector.
In addition, Balite prays for this Court to direct MGB
to accept its application for an exploration permit.
Camilo Banad, et al., likewise filed a motion for
reconsideration and prayed that the disputed area be
awarded to them.
ISSUE:
Whether Southeast Mindanao Mining Corp. (SEM) acquired a
vested right over the disputed area, which constitutes a
property right protected by the Constitution.
HELD:
NO. SEM does not aver or prove that its mining rights
had been perfected and completed when the Philippine Bill
of 1902 was still the operative law. Surely, it is
impossible for SEM to successfully assert that it
acquired mining rights over the disputed area in
accordance with the same bill, since it was only in 1984
that MMC, SEM’s predecessor-in-interest, filed its
declaration of locations and its prospecting permit
application in compliance with Presidential Decree No.
463. It was on 1 July 1985 and 10 March 1986 that a
Prospecting Permit and EP 133, respectively, were issued
to MMC. Considering these facts, there is no possibility
that MMC or SEM could have acquired a perfected mining
claim under the auspices of the Philippine Bill of 1902.
Whatever mining rights MMC had that it invalidly
transferred to SEM cannot, by any stretch of imagination,
be considered “mining rights” as contemplated under the
Philippine Bill of 1902 and immortalized in McDaniel and
Gold Creek Mining.
FACTS:
ISSUE:
HELD:
FACTS:
ISSUE:
HELD:
FACTS:
ISSUE:
HELD:
FACTS:
MARCOPPER MINING CORPORATION registered its mining claims
in Pao, Kasibu, Nueva Vizcaya with the DENR from February
02, 1982 to October 12, 1982. Private respondents
Alberto G. Bumolo and others registered their mining
claims in the same area from 28 July 1981 to 22 September
1988, which claims were subsequently converted into
Mineral Production Sharing Agreements (MPSA).
ISSUE:
HELD:
Respondent MAB correctly upheld the ratiocination of
Regional Executive Director Paragas in denying
petitioner's PPA. The disapproval of Marcopper’s PPA
moreover, did not emanate from a single recommendation
of the RTD for Mines. Records would show that as early
as May 31, 1989 x x x the Bumolo group of PD 463 claims
which Marcopper has eventually surrounded by filing its
own PAO 1-30 group of claims x x x x was confirmed by the
Forest Engineering Section of the region to be outside
proclaimed watershed areas, wilderness, national parks
and existing government reforestation projects x x x x
In other words, the circumstance that the area covered
by petitioner's PPA is outside the Magat River Forest
Reservation has been adequately established by the
following evidence: (a) confirmation as early as 31 May
1989 by the Forest Engineering Section of Tuguegarao,
Cagayan; (b) the 8 July 1991 Memorandum Report of
Regional Technical Director Punsal Jr.; and, (c) plotting
provided by the National Mapping and Resources
Information Authority per its 2 June 1995 indorsement of
the maps to the office of the Regional Executive
Director. Petitioner contests the exclusion of the area
subject of its PPA within the Magat River Forest
Reservation based merely on the alleged "typographical
error committed by somebody in the Engineering Section
of the DENR." Aside from the fact that the allegation
does not have anything to support it, the aforementioned
documents which the Regional Executive Directors relied
upon in denying the PPA had already settled the issue.
Furthermore, respondent MAB even fortified the bases for
the rejection of petitioner's PPA. As plotted by the
Lands Management Sector of DENR Region 2 contained in the
sketch plan of 11 November 1996 and as shown in the Land
Use map of the Community Environment and Natural
Resources Office of Dupax, Nueva Vizcaya, the area
covered under the PPA is indeed outside any government
reservation.
SANTA ROSA MINING COMPANY, INC. v. HON. MINISTER OF
NATURAL RESOURCES JOSE J. LEIDO, JR. AND DIRECTOR OF
MINES JUANITO C. FERNANDEZ
FACTS:
Petitioner, Santa Rosa Mining Company, Inc., is a mining
corporation duly organized and existing under the laws
of the Philippines. It alleges that it is the holder of
fifty (50) valid mining claims situated in Jose
Panganiban, Camarines Norte, acquired under the
provisions of the Act of the U.S. Congress dated 1 July
1902 (Philippine Bill of 1902, for short).
ISSUE:
HELD:
FACTS:
The instant case involves a rich tract of mineral land
situated in the Agusan-Davao-Surigao Forest Reserve known
as the “Diwalwal Gold Rush Area.” Located at Mt. Diwata
in the municipalities of Monkayo and Cateel in Davao Del
Norte, the land has been embroiled in controversy since
the mid-80 due to the scramble over gold deposits found
within its bowels.
ISSUE:
Held:
FACTS:
On July 20, 1962, the President of the Philippines
granted mining patents on mineral claims located at Ungay
Malobago, Rapu-Rapu, Albay to herein petitioners and
other private individuals. Way back on October 30, 1959,
John Canson, Jr. and Carlos Stilianopulos assigned their
rights to their mining claims in favor of the
petitioner. The assignment of rights was recorded in the
Office of the Mining Recorder of Albay on December 2,
1959.
ISSUE:
a) Whether or not the lands in question belong to the
public domain;
b) Whether or not the appellate court erred in
dismissing the complaint on the ground that the
petitioner had no personality to institute the same
HELD:
No.
Article XIII, Section 1 of the 1935 Constitution
provides: