G.R. No.

93396 September 30, 1991

PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENT AND GAMING CORPORATION, petitioner,

vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, HON. ELIODORO B. GUINTO, in his capacity as Presiding Judge,
Br. LVIII, RTC of Angeles City and JOEL MONTOYA, respondents.

Ranel L. Trinidad for private respondent.

CRUZ, J.:

On May 3, 1988, the Philippine Amusement & Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) terminated the
services of private respondent Joel Montoya as Table Supervisor at Casino Filipino on the ground of
loss of confidence. He was formally notified of this action on May 5, 1988.

Alleging that he had been dismissed without due process of law, Montoya lodged with the Regional
Trial Court of Angeles City on June 7, 1988, a complaint for damages and attorney's fees against
PAGCOR. PAGCOR filed a motion to dismiss challenging the jurisdiction of the court.

The movant contended that, being a money claim arising from the plaintiffs alleged illegal dismissal,
the complaint was cognizable only by the labor arbiter and the National Labor Relations
Commission. Montoya insisted, however, that PAGCOR was a government-controlled corporation
created under PD 1869 and therefore not covered by the Labor Code.

The trial court denied the motion. In his Order dated November 18, 1988,1 Judge Eliodoro B. Guinto
applied the ruling in the case of National Housing Authority v. Juico2 and held that PAGCOR, being a
government-owned or controlled corporation, belonged to the Civil Service. Nevertheless, he added,
PD 807 did not vest exclusive jurisdiction on the Civil Service Commission over complaints of
government employees, as these could also come under the "broad and encompassing" jurisdiction
of the regional trial courts under BP 129.

The order was affirmed on appeal in the decision of the respondent court dated February 16,
1990.3 It was there held that the issue raised in the lower court did not involve a labor dispute
because the allegations of the plaintiff were "not grounded on the dismissal per se but on the
manner by which he was dismissed." Hence, it did not come under the jurisdiction of the labor
authorities but of the courts of justice.

In the present petition, the Solicitor General argues that the respondent court erred in affirming the
order of the trial court. He does not maintain the original stand of PAGCOR that the complaint should
be resolved by the labor arbiters. Instead, he now asserts that: (a) PAGCOR is a part of the Civil
Service and not a private corporation governed by the Labor Code; (b) the complaint flied by
Montoya is cognizable by the Merit System Protection Board and not the Regional Trial Court; (c)
the plaintiff has not exhausted administrative remedies; and (d) in any case, the termination of the
plaintiff s service was not unlawful.

We gave due course to the petition and required the parties to submit their respective memoranda.
After considering the same and the pertinent laws and jurisprudence, we find that the petition must
be granted.
It must be stated at the outset that the ruling in the Juico Case has since been modified under the
1987 Constitution as applied in the later case of National Services Corporation v. NLRC.4 It is now
settled that, conformably to Article EK-B,Section 2(1), government-owned or controlled corporations
shall be considered part of the Civil Service only if they have original charters, as distinguished from
those created under general law.

PAGCOR belongs to the Civil Service because it was created directly by PD 1869 on July 11, 1983.
Consequently, controversies concerning the relations of the employees with the management of
PAGCOR should come under the jurisdiction of the Merit System Protection Board and the Civil
Service Commission, conformably to the Administrative Code of 1987.

Section 16(2) of the said Code vest in the Merit System Protection Board the power inter alia to:

(a) Hear and decide on appeal administrative cases involving officials and employees of the
Civil Service. Its decision shall be final except those involving dismissal or separation from
the service which may be appealed to the Commission.

Applying this rule, we have upheld the jurisdiction of the Civil Service authorities, as against Chat of
the labor authorities, in controversies involving the terms of employment, and other related issues, of
the Civil Service officials and employees. Thus, in Tanjay Water District v. Gabaton,5 to take only one
example, we held:

Significantly, Article IX(B), Section 2(1) of the 1987 Constitution provides that "(t)he civil service
embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the government, including
government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters." Inasmuch as PD 198, as
amended, is the original charter of the petitioner, Tanjay Water District, and respondent Tarlac Water
District and all water districts in the country, they come under the coverage of the civil service law,
rules and regulations. (Sec. 35, Art, VIII and Sec. 37, Art. EK of PD 807.)

Like most rules, however, Section 16(2) is not without execution. We have held in a number of cases
that labor arbiter exercise original and exclusive jurisdiction over conflicts between employees and
their employers but not when the La Code is not involved. In San Miguel Corporation v.
NLRC,6 observed that "it is not necessary to suppose that the e universe of money claims that might
be asserted by work against their employers has been absorbed into the original a exclusive
jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters. Accordingly, we that the regular courts had jurisdiction over claims not
involving labor disputes in Quisaba v. Sta. Ines-Melale Veneer a Plywood, Inc.;7 Medina v. Castro-
Bartolome;8 Molave Motor Sales Inc. v. Laron;9 Singapore Airlines. Ltd. v. Paño;10 San Miguel
Corporation v. NLRC;11 and, only recently, Pepsi Distributors of the Phils., Inc. v. Gal-lang.12 The
justification this exception was explained by Justice Vicente Abad Santo Medina thus:

It is obvious from the complaint that the plaintiffs have alleged any unfair labor practice.
Theirs is a simple action for d ages for tortious acts allegedly committed by the defendants. S
being the case, the governing statute is the Civil Code and not Labor Code. It results that the
orders under review are based o wrong premise.

A similar exception is applicable to the Civil Service authorities. There are also instances when the
Merit System Protection Board and the Civil Service Commission have to yield juris tion to the civil
courts even if the conflict involves civil servants.

Following the doctrine laid down in the above-mentioned cases, which we here apply by analogy, the
Civil Service authorities will have jurisdiction over a case involving civil servants only if it can be
regarded as equivalent to a labor dispute resoluble under the Labor Code. Conversely, the regular
courts will have jurisdiction if the case can be decided under the general laws, as where the
complaint is, say, for the recovery of private debts, as in Molave; or for damages due to the
slanderous remarks of the employer, as in Medina; or for malicious prosecution of the employees, as
in Pepsi Cola. The mere fact that the parties are members of the Civil Service does not remove such
controversies from the general jurisdiction of the courts of justice and place them under the special
jurisdiction of the Board and the Commission.

It was the exception and not the rule that the respondent court applied in upholding the challenged
order of the trial court denying the petitioner's motion to dismiss the complaint for damages. As
the ponencia explained:

In the case at bar, a scrutiny of the records reveal private respondent's complaint specifically
alleged that he was not claiming for reinstatement nor back wages or any labor-related
benefits but damages arising from the manner by which he was dis by petitioner corporation
which allegedly contravened the due process clause of the constitution. Private respondent
claimed that petitioner never conducted a hearing with regard to his conduct as an employee
of the said corporation but charged him of being dishonest in his work while he was then an
employee of PAGCOR. Because of the gravity of the imputation, PAGCOR dismissed him
from employment without any hearing at all in wanton disregard of his individual rights.

Seemingly, it would appear that the foregoing allegations of private respondent is not
grounded on the dismiss per se but on the manner by which he was dismiss. This it the crux
of private respondent's complaint — being oppressive as to constitute a proper case for civil
action for damages.

After considering the issues and the arguments of the parties in their respective pleadings, we find
we cannot agree with the respondent court.

The record shows that the separation of the private respondent was done in accordance with PD
1869, which provides that the employees of the PAGCOR hold confidential positions. Montoya is not
assailing the validity of that law. The act that he is questioning is what he calls the arbitrary manner
of his dismissal thereunder that he avers entitles him to damages un the Civil Code.

This is not an unfamiliar controversy. The labor cases viewed by us where the employees claimed
they had bee illegally dismissed are numberless. The jurisdiction of the I arbiters and the NLRC was
never in issue because it w conceded that the applicable law was the Labor Code who validity was
assumed. What we are asked to resolve only w whether or not the procedure prescribed therein for
the separation of employees had been observed. We never caned on t civil courts to take over those
cases from the labor authorities for there was no question that the latter had the competence act. To
do so now would be to reverse all those past decision and cause undue trauma on settled
jurisprudence.

A similar situation obtains in the case at bar for what private respondent is asserting is that he has
been illegal dismissed under PD 1869. He admits its validity; in fact, he invoking it to support his
claim for damages. The truth is th although he is claiming damages under the Civil Code, th claim is
based on his submission that his separation was violative of PD 1869.

Shall we apply one rule for workers under the Labor Code an another rule for the herein private
respondent because belongs to the Civil Service?

Even as the labor authorities have original jurisdiction interpret and apply the Labor Code, so too
have the C Service authorities the original jurisdiction to resolve question coming under PD 1869.
The civil courts are excluded from either case because the general civil and criminal laws are n
involved. Obviously, the same rule applied to workers in private sector should also apply to civil
servants, for what sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander.

There is no parity between this case and the case of Medina Castro-Bartolome,13 because what the
employees were protecting in the latter case were the invectives hurled at them by employer when
they were dismissed. They were not questioning their dismissal before the court of justice. What they
we claiming was damages for the slander committed against them when they were dismissed. The
case at bar is different because the real issue here is the validity of the dismissal itself, not only the
alleged lack of due process in the private respondent's separation. In fact, the issue goes deeper, to
the very nature of the position occupied by Montoya.

PD 1869 provides in Section 16 thereof as follows:

Sec. 16. Exemption. — All positions in the Corporation, whether technical, administrative,
professional or managerial are exempt from the provisions of the Civil Service Law, rules and
regulations, and shall be governed only by the personnel management policies set by the
Board of Directors. All employees of the casinos and related services shall be classified as
"Confidential" appointee. (Emphasis supplied.)

The private respondent's services as a confidential appointee were terminated not by virtue of a
dismissal or removal, which imports the separation of the incumbent before the expiration of his
term.14 Montoya did not have a fixed term of office. His tenure was dependent on his retention of the
confidence of his superiors. That confidence was lost because of the disclosure of his involvement in
the Angeles City casino scandal of 1984. He was separated because his term had expired as a
result of the loss of confidence in him.15

Whether such loss of confidence had really been established is a matter that we believe should be
determined in the first instance by the Civil Service authorities. Absent such a determination, the
question of damages cannot be resolved as the two issues are inseparable. The trial court cannot
make an independent finding that the private respondent is entitled to damages unless it is first
ascertained that he was arbitrarily separated. This is a factual question best examined by the Civil
Service authorities. Moreover, even if it be assumed that the Regional Trial Court of Angeles City
has or may eventually exercise jurisdiction over the question of damages, the Solicitor General
would still be correct in pointing out that the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies has
not been served. There would be no cause of action before it at this time.

Our conclusion is that the trial court erred in denying motion to dismiss and that the respondent court
also erred sustaining it. The issue raised by the private respondent, to the correct interpretation and
application of PD 1869, properly comes under the jurisdiction of the Merit System Protection Board,
subject to appeal to the Civil Service Commission, a ultimately to review by this Court.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The appealed decision of the Court of Appeals dated
February 16, 1990, and resolution dated April 30, 1990, are REVERSED. The Regional Trial Court
of Angeles City, Branch 57, is directed to DISMISS Civil Case No. 5412.

SO ORDERED.
CASINO LABOR ASSOCIATION, G.R. No. 141020
Petitioner,
Present:

PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,

CARPIO,
- versus - CORONA,
AZCUNA, and
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, JJ.

COURT OF APPEALS,
PHIL. CASINO OPERATORS Promulgated:
CORPORATION (PCOC) and
PHIL. SPECIAL SERVICES June 12, 2008
CORPORATION (PSSC),
Respondents.

x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

PUNO, C.J.:

This petition for certiorari[1] assails the Decision[2] and Resolution[3] of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 50826. The CA dismissed the petition for
certiorari filed by the petitioner against the First Division of the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC) and denied petitioners motion for reconsideration.
The series of events which ultimately led to the filing of the petition at bar started
with the consolidated cases[4] filed by the petitioner labor union with the Arbitration
Branch of the NLRC. In an Order[5] dated 20 July 1987, the Labor Arbiter dismissed
the consolidated cases for lack of jurisdiction over the respondents therein,
Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) and Philippine Casino
Operators Corporation (PCOC).

On appeal to the NLRC, the Commission en banc issued a Resolution[6] dated 15

November 1988, which dismissed the separate appeals filed by the petitioner on the
ground that the NLRC has no jurisdiction over PAGCOR.
 Petitioner then elevated the case to this Court, via a petition for review on
certiorari,[7] entitled Casino Labor Association v. National Labor Relations
Commission, Philippine Amusement & Gaming Corporation, Philippine
Casino Operators Corporation and Philippine Special Services
Corporation and docketed as G.R. No. 85922.In a Resolution[8] dated 23 January
1989, the Third Division of the Court dismissed the petition for failure of the
petitioner to show grave abuse of discretion on the part of the NLRC.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but the same was denied with
finality in a 15 March 1989 Resolution.[9] The Resolution states, in part:

x x x Any petitions brought against private companies will have to be

brought before the appropriate agency or office of the Department of
Labor and Employment.

Based solely on that statement, petitioner filed a Manifestation/Motion [10] with the
NLRC praying that the records of the consolidated cases be remanded to the
Arbitration Branch for proper prosecution and/or disposition thereof against private
respondents Philippine Casino Operators Corporation (PCOC) and Philippine
Special Services Corporation (PSSC).

Acting on the Manifestation/Motion, the NLRC First Division issued an

Order[11] dated 30 June 1989, which granted the motion and ordered that the records
of the cases be forwarded to the Arbitration Branch for further proceedings.

Respondents PCOC and PSSC filed a motion for reconsideration. In an

Order[12] dated 22 July 1994, the NLRC First Division granted the motion, set aside
the 30 June 1989Order for having been issued without legal basis, and denied with
finality the petitioners Manifestation/Motion. Petitioners motion for reconsideration
was likewise denied in a Resolution[13] dated 28 November 1997.

Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari[14] with this Court asserting that the NLRC
First Division committed grave abuse of discretion in ignoring the mandate of G.R.
No. 85922. Petitioner argued that, with the statement (a)ny petitions brought against
private companies will have to be brought before the appropriate agency or office of
the Department of Labor and Employment, this Court laid down the law of the case
and mandated that petitions against respondents PCOC and PSSC should be brought
before the NLRC. By way of resolution,[15] this Court referred the case to the CA in
accordance with the ruling in St. Martin Funeral Homes v. NLRC.[16]
On 22 June 1999, the CA rendered its Decision dismissing the petition for
certiorari. The CA found no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the NLRC First
Division when it issued: (a) the 22 July 1994 Order, which set aside its 30 June
1989 Order remanding the case to the Arbitration Branch for further proceedings;
and (b) the 28 November 1998 Resolution, which denied petitioners motion for
reconsideration. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, which the CA denied
in its 6 December 1999 Resolution.

Hence, the instant petition for certiorari in which the petitioner raises this sole issue:

CAN THE COURT OF APPEALS IGNORE THE MANDATE OF

THE HONORABLE SUPREME COURTS RESOLUTION IN G.R.
85922, THAT PETITIONS AGAINST PRIVATE RESPONDENTS
PCOC AND PSSC SHOULD BE TRIED BY THE COMMISSION
(NLRC) THRU ITS ARBITRATION BRANCH?

To determine whether the CA acted with grave abuse of discretion correctable by

certiorari, it is necessary to resolve one core issue: whether the Supreme Court, in
G.R. No. 85922, mandated that the NLRC assume jurisdiction over the cases filed
against PCOC and PSSC.
The resolution of the case at bar hinges on the intended meaning of the Third
Division of the Court when it stated in its 15 March 1989 Resolution in G.R. No.
85922, viz:
x x x Any petitions brought against private companies will have to be
brought before the appropriate agency or office of the Department of
Labor and Employment.

Petitioner considers the foregoing statement as a legal mandate warranting the

remand of the consolidated labor cases to the Arbitration Branch of the NLRC for
further proceedings against respondents PCOC and PSSC.

We do not agree.
A court decision must be read as a whole. With regard to interpretation of
judgments, Republic v. De Los Angeles stated:
As a general rule, judgments are to be construed like other written
instruments. The determinative factor is the intention of the court, as
gathered from all parts of the judgment itself. In applying this rule, effect
must be given to that which is unavoidably and necessarily implied in a
judgment, as well as to that which is expressed in the most appropriate
language. Such construction should be given to a judgment as will give
force and effect to every word of it, if possible, and make it as a whole
consistent, effective and reasonable.[17]

Hence, a close scrutiny of the full text of the 23 January and 15 March
1989 Resolutions in G.R. No. 85922 sheds much needed light. In the first
Resolution, the Third Division of this Court dismissed the petitioners case in this
wise:
The issue in this case is whether or not the National Labor Relations
Commission has jurisdiction over employee-employer problems in the
Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR), the
Philippine Casino Operators Corporation (PCOC), and the Philippine
Special Services Corporation (PSSC).

The present Constitution specifically provides in Article IX B, Section

2(1) that the civil service embraces all branches, subdivisions,
instrumentalities, and agencies of the Government, including government-
owned or controlled corporations with original charters. (Emphasis
supplied)

There appears to be no question from the petition and its annexes that the
respondent corporations were created by an original charter, P.D. No.
1869 in relation to P.D. Nos. 1067-A, 1067-C, 1399 and 1632.

In the recent case of National Service Corporation, et al. v. Honorable

Third Division, National Labor Relations Commission, et al. (G.R. No.
69870, November 29, 1988), this Court ruled that subsidiary corporations
owned by government corporations like the Philippine National Bank but
which have been organized under the General Corporation Code are not
governed by Civil Service Law. They fall under the jurisdiction of the
 Department of Labor and Employment and its various
agencies. Conversely, it follows that government corporations created
under an original charter fall under the jurisdiction of the Civil Service
Commission and not the Labor Department.

Moreover, P.D. 1869, Section 18, specifically prohibits formation of

unions among casino employees and exempts them from the coverage of
Labor Code provisions. Under the new Constitution, they may now form
unions but subject to the laws passed to regulate unions in offices and
corporations governed by the Civil Service Law.

CONSIDERING the failure of the petitioner to show grave abuse of

discretion on the part of the public respondent, the COURT RESOLVED
to DISMISS the petition.
Thus, in resolving the issue of whether or not the NLRC has jurisdiction over
employer-employee relations in PAGCOR, PCOC and PSSC, the Third Division
made the definitive ruling that there appears to be no question from the petition and
its annexes that the respondent corporations were created by an original charter. The
Court collectively referred to all respondent corporations, including PCOC and
PSSC, and held that in accordance with the Constitution and jurisprudence,
corporations with original charter fall under the jurisdiction of the Civil Service
Commission and not the Labor Department. The Court stated further that P.D. 1869
exempts casino employees from the coverage of Labor Code provisions and
although the employees are empowered by the Constitution to form unions, these
are subject to the laws passed to regulate unions in offices and corporations governed
by the Civil Service Law. Thus, in dismissing the petition, the ruling of the Third
Division was clear - - - it is the Civil Service Commission, and not the NLRC, that
has jurisdiction over the employer-employee problems in PAGCOR, PCOC and
PSSC.

In its motion for reconsideration, petitioner lamented that its complaint might be
treated as a pingpong ball by the Department of Labor and Employment and the Civil
Service Commission. It argued:
x x x the petitioner will now be in a dilemna (sic) for the reason, that the
charter creating PAGCOR expressly exempts it from the coverage of the
Civil Service Laws and therefore the petitioner, will now be in a quandary
whether it will be allowed to prosecute its case against PAGCOR before
 the Civil Service Commission while its own charter expressly exempts it
from the coverage of the Civil Service Law x x x[18]

The Third Division denied the motion for reconsideration in a Resolution

dated 15 March 1989, which contained the statement upon which the petitioners
whole case relies. The Court stated:
The petitioner states in its motion for reconsideration that the
PAGCOR charter expressly exempts it from the coverage of the Civil
Service Laws and, consequently, even if it has an original charter, its
disputes with management should be brought to the Department of Labor
and Employment. This argument has no merit. Assuming that there may
be some exemptions from the coverage of Civil Service Laws insofar as
eligibility requirements and other rules regarding entry into the service are
concerned, a law or charter cannot supersede a provision of the
Constitution. The fear that the petitioners complaint will be rejected by
the Civil Service Commission is unfounded as the Commission must act
in accordance with its coverage as provided by the Constitution. Any
petitions brought against private companies will have to be brought
before the appropriate agency or office of the Department of Labor
and Employment.

CONSIDERING THE FOREGOING, the COURT RESOLVED to

DENY the motion for reconsideration. This DENIAL is FINAL.
(emphasis added)

Petitioner contends that the private companies referred to therein pertain to

respondents PCOC and PSSC, and consequently, this Court has laid down the law
of the case in G.R. No. 85922 and has directed that the cases against PCOC and
PSSC should be prosecuted before the Department of Labor and Employment or
NLRC.

Petitioners contention is untenable. It is well-settled that to determine the true

intent and meaning of a decision, no specific portion thereof should be resorted to,
but the same must be considered in its entirety.[19] Hence, petitioner cannot merely
view a portion of the 15 March 1989 Resolution in isolation for the purpose of
asserting its position.The 23 January 1989 Resolution already ruled on the NLRCs
lack of jurisdiction over all the respondents in the case PAGCOR, PCOC and
PSSC. The Third Division neither veered away nor reversed such ruling in its 15
March 1989 Resolution to petitioners motion for reconsideration. A reading of the
two aforementioned resolutions clearly shows that the phrase private companies
could not have referred to PCOC and PSSC for that would substantially alter the
Courts ruling that petitioners labor cases against the respondents are cognizable by
the Civil Service Commission, and not by the NLRC. In its assailed decision, the
Court of Appeals ratiocinated:
Evidently, the [March 15] Resolution containing the questioned
pronouncement did not give legal mandate to petitioner to file its Petition
with the Department of Labor and Employment or any of its agencies. On
the contrary, the Resolution decided with finality that petitions brought
against the PAGCOR or similar agencies/instrumentalities of the
government must be filed with the Civil Service Commission which has
jurisdiction on the matter. The questioned pronouncement, to Our mind,
was made only to illustrate the instance when jurisdiction is instead
conferred on the Department of Labor vis--vis the Civil Service
Commission; that is, when the petitions are filed [against] private
companies.

Finally, as pointed out by the Office of the Solicitor General, the

subject matter of the pronouncement in question is any petition not the
petition filed by petitioners. Likewise, the petition must be one which is
brought against private companies not against private
respondents. Apparently, the abovequoted pronouncement is intended to
be a general rule that will govern petitions filed against private
companies. It is not intended to be a specific rule that will apply only to
the petition filed by herein petitioners. Where the law makes no
distinctions, one does not distinguish. A fortiori, where the questioned
pronouncement makes no distinctions, one does not distinguish.

We agree with the CA. The statement that (a)ny petitions brought against private
companies will have to be brought before the appropriate agency or office of the
Department of Labor and Employment, upon which petitioners entire case relies, is
of no consequence. It is obiter dictum.

In its memorandum,[20] petitioner presents a second issue not otherwise raised in its
petition for certiorari, contending that respondents waived their rights to controvert
petitioners valid and just claims when they filed a motion to dismiss the consolidated
cases with the labor arbiter on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. However, in our 20
August 2003 Resolution requiring the parties to submit their respective memoranda,
we specifically stated that no new issues may be raised by a party in his/its
Memorandum. Moreover, petitioner, in support of this additional issue, presents its
arguments on the merits of the consolidated labor cases. This Court is not a trier of
facts. In Santiago v. Vasquez, we reiterated:
We discern in the proceedings in this case a propensity on the part of
petitioner, and, for that matter, the same may be said of a number of
litigants who initiate recourses before us, to disregard the hierarchy of
courts in our judicial system by seeking relief directly from this Court
despite the fact that the same is available in the lower courts in the exercise
of their original or concurrent jurisdiction, or is even mandated by law to
be sought therein. This practice must be stopped, not only because of the
imposition upon the precious time of this Court but also because of the
inevitable and resultant delay, intended or otherwise, in the adjudication
of the case which often has to be remanded or referred to the lower court
as the proper forum under the rules of procedure, or as better equipped to
resolve the issues since this Court is not a trier of facts. We, therefore,
reiterate the judicial policy that this Court will not entertain direct resort
to it unless the redress desired cannot be obtained in the appropriate courts
or where exceptional and compelling circumstances justify availment of a
remedy within and calling for the exercise of our primary jurisdiction.[21]

In this case, the Civil Service Commission is the proper venue for petitioner to
ventilate its claims.

The Court is not oblivious to petitioners plea for justice after waiting numerous years
for relief since it first filed its claims with the labor arbiter in 1986. However,
petitioner is not completely without fault. The 23 January 1989 Resolution in G.R.
No. 85922, declaring the lack of jurisdiction by the NLRC over PAGCOR, PCOC
and PSSC, became final and executory on March 27, 1989. The petitioner did not
file a second motion for reconsideration nor did it file a motion for clarification of
any statement by the Court which petitioner might have thought was
ambiguous. Neither did petitioner take the proper course of action, as laid down in
G.R. No. 85922, to file its claims before the Civil Service Commission. Instead,
petitioner pursued a protracted course of action based solely on its erroneous
understanding of a single sentence in the Courts resolution to a motion for
reconsideration.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the instant petition for certiorari is DISMISSED. The

assailed 22 June 1999 Decision and 6 December 1999 Resolution of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 50826 are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 88167 May 3, 1993

UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES and UP SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS, petitioners,

vs.
THE HON. TEODORO P. REGINO, Presiding Judge, RTC, Br. 84 NATIONAL CAPITAL REGION,
Q.C., ANGEL PAMPLINA, and The CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, respondents.

The Solicitor General for petitioner.

Araullo, Zambrano, Gruba, Chua Law Firm for private respondent.

CRUZ, J.:

Private respondent Angel Pamplina, a mimeograph operator at the University of the Philippines
School of Economics, was dismissed on June 22, 1982, after he was found guilty of dishonesty and
grave misconduct for causing the leakage of final examination questions in Economics 106 under
Prof. Solita Monsod.1

His appeal was denied by the UP Board of Regents, prompting him to seek relief from the Merit
Systems Board (MSB), created under Presidential Decree No. 1409. Under Section 5(l) thereof, the
MSB has the power to "hear and decide administrative cases involving officers and employees of the
civil service."

The University of the Philippines filed a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction on the part of the
MSB. UP relied heavily on the case of University of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals, 2 where it
was held that administrative matters involving the discipline of UP employees properly fall under the
Jurisdiction of the state university and the UP Board of Regents.

The motion was denied. Thereafter, in its decision dated July 5, 1985, the MSB exonerated
Pamplina and ordered his reinstatement with back wages.3 UP, represented by its Office of Legal
Services, moved for reconsideration, but this was denied on January l0, 1986.

UP then appealed to the Civil Service Commission, which on November 4, 1987, issued Resolution
No. 87-428, sustaining the MSB.4 The motion for reconsideration was denied on April 13, 1988.

On June 10, 1988, the petitioners, through their new counsel of record, the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG), filed a second motion for reconsideration. This was also denied on August 31, 1988,
on the basis of Section 39(b) of PD 807, providing in part that "only one petition for reconsideration
shall be entertained" by the Civil Service Commission.

Pamplina filed a "Manifestation and Motion for Execution of Judgment" of the Commission, copy of
which was received by the Office of the Solicitor General on October 4, 1988.5 This was opposed by
the petitioners, but in an order dated November 7, 1988, the Commission granted the motion.
Nevertheless, Pamplina was still not reinstated. UP claimed that the resolutions of the Commission
had not yet become final and executory.

Pamplina's reaction was to file a petition for a writ of mandamus on November 11, 1988. Judge
Teodoro P. Regino of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City granted the petition on April 27, 1989.
The respondents (herein petitioners) were ordered to immediately reinstate Pamplina "to his former
position as mimeograph operator without change of status as permanent employee with back wages
from June 22, 1982, up to his reinstatement, plus salaries for the period of his preventive suspension
covering December 15, 1981 to March 15, 1982."6

On June 19, 1989, the present petition for certiorari was filed with this Court to seek the annulment
of the decision of the trial court and the orders of the Commission directing the reinstatement of
Pamplina. The petitioners also pray that the decision of the UP President and Board of Regents
ordering Pamplina's dismissal be upheld.

UP contends that under its charter, to wit, Act 1870, enacted on June 18, 1906, it enjoys not only
academic freedom but also institutional autonomy. Section 6(e) of the said Act grants the UP Board
of Regents the power "to appoint, on recommendation of the president of the university, professors,
instructors, lecturers, and other employees of the university, to fix their compensation and to remove
them for cause after an investigation and hearing shall have been had." Pamplina was dismissed by
virtue of this provision.

The Civil Service Law (PD 807) expressly vests in the Commission appellate jurisdiction in
administrative disciplinary cases involving members of the Civil Service. Section 9(j) mandates that
the Commission shall have the power to "hear and decide administrative disciplinary cases instituted
directly with it in accordance with Section 37 or brought to it on appeal." And Section 37(a), provides
that, "The Commission shall decide upon appeal all administrative disciplinary cases involving the
imposititon of a penalty of suspension for more than thirty (30) days, or fine in an amount exceeding
thirty days' salary, demotion in rank or salary or transfer, removal or dismissal from office."
(Emphasis supplied)

Under the 1972 Constitution, all government-owned or controlled corporations, regardless of the
manner of their creation, were considered part of the Civil Service.7 Under the 1967 Constitution only
government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters fall within the scope of the Civil
Service pursuant to Article IX-B, Section 2(l), which states:

The Civil Service embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and

agencies of the government, including government-owned or controlled corporations
with original charters.

As a mere government-owned or controlled corporation, UP was clearly a part of the Civil Service
under the 1973 Constitution and now continues to be so because it was created by a special law and
has an original charter. As a component of the Civil Service, UP is therefore governed by PD 607
and administrative cases involving the discipline of its employees come under the appellate
jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission.

Coming now to the petition itself, we note that the petitioners received a copy of the resolution
denying their motion for reconsideration on April 22, 1968.

In Article IX-A, Section 7, of the 1987 Constitution, which was already in effect at that time, it is
provided that:

. . . Unless otherwise provided by this Constitution or by law, any decision, order or

ruling of each Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the
aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof.

This provision was reproduced almost verbatim in Section 28 of the Administrative Code of 1987.
The petitioners therefore had thirty days from April 22, 1988, or until May 22, 1988, within which to
elevate their case to this Court. They did not do so and instead filed a second motion for
reconsideration, which was not allowed under Article IX, Section 39(b) of PD 807. On top of this, the
second motion for reconsideration was filed only on June 10, 1988, or 19 days beyond the 30-day
reglementary period.8

In this connection, it is stressed that where a motion for reconsideration of a decision, order or ruling
of any Constitutional Commission is denied, the 30-day reglementary period does not begin anew.
The petitioner has only the balance of that period (after deducting the time elapsed before the
motion was filed) to come to this Court on certiorari.

The assailed orders having become final and executory, Pamplina had every right to
seek mandamus to compel their execution. Respondent Judge Regino was quite correct when he
issued the questioned writ.

The case cited repeatedly by the petitioners, viz., University of the Philippines vs. Court of
Appeals,9 cannot apply to the present controversy. The reason is that at the time it was promulgated
on January 28, 1971, PD 807 had not yet been enacted. PD 807 took affect only in 1975.

In ruling in that case "that the President and Board of Regents of the University of the Philippines
possess full and final authority in the disciplining, suspension and removal of the civil service
employees of the University, including those of the Philippine General Hospital, independently of the
Commissioner of Civil Service and the Civil Service Board of Appeals," Justice J.B.L. Reyes relied
on the Civil Service Law of 1959, which then empowered the Civil Service Commission:

Except as otherwise provided by law, to have final authority to pass upon the
removal, separation and suspension of all permanent officers and employees in the
competitive or classified service and upon all matters relating to the conduct,
discipline, and efficiency of such officers and employees; and to prebcribe standards,
guidelines and regulations governing the administration of discipline; (Emphasis
supplied)

Article V, Section 9(j), of PD 807 simply gives the Commission the power to "har and decide
administrative disciplinary cases instituted directly with it in accordance with Section 37 or brought to
it on appeal," without the qualifiying phrase appearing in the above-quoted provision. The petitioners
cannot invoke that phrase to justify the special power they claim under Act 1870.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari is DISMISSED and the assailed decision of
respondent Judge Teodoro P. Regino dated April 27, 1989, and the challenged orders of the Civil
Service Commission, are AFIRMED, with costs against the petitioners. It is so ordered.

Narvasa, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Griño-Aquino, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Nocon, Bellosillo, Melo and
Quiason, JJ., concur.

Romero, J., took no part.