G.R. No. 141284. August 15, 2000.
* IBP has failed to present a specific and substantial interest in the
INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES,
petitioner, vs. HON. RONALDO B. ZAMORA, GEN.
PANFILO M. LACSON, GEN. EDGAR B. AGLIPAY, and
GEN. ANGELO REYES, respondents.
Judicial Review; Requisites.—When questions of constitutional
significance are raised, the Court can exercise its power of judicial
review only if the following requisites are complied with, namely: (1)
the existence of an actual and appropriate case; (2) a personal and
substantial interest of the party raising the constitutional question;
(3) the exercise of judicial review is pleaded at the earliest
opportunity; and (4) the constitutional question is the lis mota of the
case.
Same; Same; Parties; “Locus Standi”; Words and
Phrases; “Legal Standing” or “Locus Standi,” “Interest,”
Explained.—“Legal standing” or locus standi has been defined as a
personal and substantial interest in the case such that the party has
sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the
governmental act that is being challenged. The term “interest”
means a material interest, an interest in issue affected by the
decree, as distinguished from mere interest in the question involved,
or a mere incidental interest. The gist of the question of standing is
whether a party alleges “such personal stake in the outcome of the
controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens
the presentation of issues upon which the court depends for
illumination of difficult constitutional questions.”
Same; Same; Same; Integrated Bar of the Philippines; The
mere invocation by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines of its duty
to preserve the rule of law and nothing more, while undoubtedly true,
is not sufficient to clothe it with standing in this case—this is too
general an interest which is shared by other groups and the whole
citizenry.—The IBP primarily anchors its standing on its alleged
responsibility to uphold the rule of law and the Constitution. Apart
from this declaration, however, the IBP asserts no other basis in
support of its locus standi. The mere invocation by the IBP of its
duty to preserve the rule of law and nothing more, while
undoubtedly true, is not sufficient to clothe it with standing in this
case. This is too general an interest which is shared by other groups
and the whole citizenry. Based on the standards above-stated; the
resolution of the case.
_____________
*EN BANC.
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Integrated Bar of the Philippines vs. Zamora
Its fundamental purpose which, under Section 2, Rule 139-A of
the Rules of Court, is to elevate the standards of the law profession
and to improve the administration of justice is alien to, and cannot
be affected by the deployment of the Marines.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The interest of the National
President of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines who signed the
petition, is his alone, absent a formal board resolution authorizing
him to file the present action.—It should also be noted that the
interest of the National President of the IBP who signed the
petition, is his alone, absent a formal board resolution authorizing
him to file the present action. To be sure, members of the BAR, those
in the judiciary included, have varying opinions on the issue.
Moreover, the IBP, assuming that it has duly authorized the
National President to file the petition, has not shown any specific
injury which it has suffered or may suffer by virtue of the questioned
governmental act. Indeed, none of its members, whom the IBP
purportedly represents, has sustained any form of injury as a result
of the operation of the joint visibility patrols. Neither is it alleged
that any of its members has been arrested or that their civil liberties
have been violated by the deployment of the Marines. What the IBP
projects as injurious is the supposed “militarization” of law
enforcement which might threaten Philippine democratic
institutions and may cause more harm than good in the long run.
Not only is the presumed “injury” not personal in character, it is
likewise too vague, highly speculative and uncertain to satisfy the
requirement of standing.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The Supreme Court, however, does
not categorically rule that the Integrated Bar of the Philippines has
absolutely no standing to raise constitutional issues how or in the
future, but the Integrated Bar of the Philippines must, by way of
allegations and proof, satisfy the Court that it has sufficient stake to
obtain judicial resolution of the controversy.—Since petitioner has
not successfully established a direct and personal injury as a
consequence of the questioned act, it does not possess the
personality to assail the validity of the deployment of the Marines.
This Court, however, does not categorically rule that the IBP has
absolutely no standing to raise constitutional issues now or in the
future. The IBP must, by way of allegations and proof, satisfy this
Court that it has sufficient stake to obtain judicial resolution of the
controversy.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The Supreme Court has the
discretion to take cognizance of a suit which does not satisfy the
requirement of legal standing when paramount interest is involved;
In this case, a reading of the petition shows that the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines has advanced
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Integrated Bar of the Philippines vs. Zamora
constitutional issues which deserve the attention of the Supreme
Court in view of their seriousness, novelty and weight as
precedents.—Having stated the foregoing, it must be emphasized
that this Court has the discretion to take cognizance of a suit which
does not satisfy the requirement of legal standing when paramount
interest is involved. In not a few cases, the Court has adopted a
liberal attitude on the locus standi of a petitioner where the
petitioner is able to craft an issue of transcendental significance to
the people. Thus, when the issues raised are of paramount
importance to the public, the Court may brush aside technicalities
of procedure. In this case, a reading of the petition shows that the
IBP has advanced constitutional issues which deserve the attention
of this Court in view of their seriousness, novelty and weight as
precedents. Moreover, because peace and order are under constant
threat and lawless violence occurs in increasing tempo, undoubtedly
aggravated by the Mindanao insurgency problem, the legal
controversy raised in the petition almost certainly will not go away.
It will stare us in the face again. It, therefore, behooves the Court to
relax the rules on standing and to resolve the issue now, rather than
later.
Same; Presidency; Commander-in-Chief Clause; “Calling Out”
Power; While the Supreme Court gives considerable weight to the
parties’ formulation of the issues, the resolution of the controversy
may warrant a creative approach that goes beyond the narrow
confines of the issues raised; Even as the parties are in agreement
that the power exercised by the President is the power to call out the
armed forces, the Court is of the view that the power involved may be
no more than the maintenance of peace and order and promotion of
the general welfare.—As framed by the parties, the underlying
issues are the scope of presidential powers and limits, and the extent
of judicial review. But, while this Court gives considerable weight to
the parties’ formulation of the issues, the resolution of the
controversy may warrant a creative approach that goes beyond the
narrow confines of the issues raised. Thus, while the parties are in
agreement that the power exercised by the President is the power to
call out the armed forces, the Court is of the view that the power
involved may be no more than the maintenance of peace and order
and promotion of the general welfare. For one, the realities on the
ground do not show that there exist a state of warfare, widespread
civil unrest or anarchy. Secondly, the full brunt of the military is not
brought upon the citizenry, a point discussed in the latter part of
this decision.
Same; Same; Political Questions; Separation of Powers; As a
general proposition, a controversy is justiciable if it refers to a matter
which is appropriate for court review; One class of cases wherein the
Court hesitates
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84 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Integrated Bar of the Philippines vs. Zamora
to rule on are “political questions”; The political question being
a function of the separation of powers, the courts will not normally
interfere with the workings of another co-equal branch unless the
case shows a clear need for the courts to step in to uphold the law and
the Constitution.—As a general proposition, a controversy is
justiciable if it refers to a matter which is appropriate for court
review. It pertains to issues which are inherently susceptible of
being decided on grounds recognized by law. Nevertheless, the
Court does not automatically assume jurisdiction over actual
constitutional cases brought before it even in instances that are ripe
for resolution. One class of cases wherein the Court hesitates to rule
on are “political questions.” The reason is that political questions
are concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not the
legality, of a particular act or measure being assailed. Moreover, the
political question being a function of the separation of powers, the
courts will not normally interfere with the workings of another co-
equal branch unless the case shows a clear need for the courts to
step in to uphold the law and the Constitution.
Same; Same; Same; Same; When the grant of power is
qualified, conditional or subject to limitations, the issue of whether
the prescribed qualifications or conditions have been met or the
limitations respected, is justiciable—the problem being one of
legality or validity, not its wisdom.—The 1987 Constitution expands
the concept of judicial review by providing that “(T)he Judicial
power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts
as may be established by law. Judicial power includes the duty of
the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government.” Under this definition, the
Court cannot agree with the Solicitor General that the issue
involved is a political question beyond the jurisdiction of this Court
to review. When the grant of power is qualified, conditional or
subject to limitations, the issue of whether the prescribed
qualifications or conditions have been met or the limitations
respected, is justiciable—the problem being one of legality or
validity, not its wisdom. Moreover, the jurisdiction to delimit
constitutional boundaries has been given to this Court. When
political questions are involved, the Constitution limits the
determination as to whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of
the official whose action is being questioned.
Same; Same; Same; Words and Phrases; By grave abuse of
discretion is meant simply capricious or whimsical exercise of
judgment that is patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of
positive duty or a virtual refusal to
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Integrated Bar of the Philippines vs. Zamora
perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation
of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic
manner by reason of passion or hostility; A showing that plenary
power is granted either department of government, may not be an
obstacle to judicial inquiry, for the improvident exercise or abuse
thereof may give rise to justiciable controversy.—By grave abuse of
discretion is meant simply capricious or whimsical exercise of
judgment that is patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of
positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law,
or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is
exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion
or hostility. Under this definition, a court is without power to
directly decide matters over which full discretionary authority has
been delegated. But while this Court has no power to substitute its
judgment for that of Congress or of the President, it may look into
the question of whether such exercise has been made in grave abuse
of discretion. A showing that plenary power is granted either
department of government, may not be an obstacle to judicial
inquiry, for the improvident exercise or abuse thereof may give rise
to justiciable controversy.
Same; Same; Commander-in-Chief Clause; “Calling Out”
Power; In view of the constitutional intent to give the President full
discretionary power to determine the necessity of calling out the
armed forces, it is incumbent upon the petitioner to show that the
President’s decision is totally bereft of factual basis; In the
performance of the Supreme Court’s duty of “purposeful hesitation”
before declaring an act of another branch as unconstitutional, only
where such grave abuse of discretion is clearly shown shall the Court
interfere with the President’s judgment—to doubt is to sustain.—
When the President calls the armed forces to prevent or suppress
lawless violence, invasion or rebellion, he necessarily exercises a
discretionary power solely vested in his wisdom. This is clear from
the intent of the framers and from the text of the Constitution itself.
The Court, thus, cannot be called upon to overrule the President’s
wisdom or substitute its own. However, this does not prevent an
examination of whether such power was exercised within
permissible constitutional limits or whether it was exercised in a
manner constituting grave abuse of discretion. In view of the
constitutional intent to give the President full discretionary power
to determine the necessity of calling out the armed forces, it is
incumbent upon the petitioner to show that the President’s decision
is totally bereft of factual basis. The present petition fails to
discharge such heavy burden as there is no evidence to support the
assertion that there exist no justification for calling out the armed
forces. There is, likewise, no evidence to support the proposition that
grave abuse was committed because the power to call was exercised
in such a manner as to violate the constitu-
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Integrated Bar of the Philippines vs. Zamora
tional provision on civilian supremacy over the military. In the
performance of this Court’s duty of “purposeful hesitation” before
declaring an act of another branch as unconstitutional, only where
such grave abuse of discretion is clearly shown shall the Court
interfere with the President’s judgment. To doubt is to sustain.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Statutory Construction; Unlike in
the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or the
power to proclaim martial law in relation to which the Constitution
has empowered Congress to revoke such suspension or proclamation
and the Supreme Court to review the sufficiency of the factual basis
thereof there is no such equivalent provision dealing with the
revocation or review of the President’s action to call out the armed
forces, a distinction which places the calling out power in a different
category from the power to declare martial law and the power to
suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.—Under the
foregoing provisions, Congress may revoke such proclamation or
suspension and the Court may review the sufficiency of the factual
basis thereof. However, there is no such equivalent provision
dealing with the revocation or review of the President’s action to call
out the armed forces. The distinction places the calling out power in
a different category from the power to declare martial law and the
power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus,
otherwise, the framers of the Constitution would have simply
lumped together the three powers and provided for their revocation
and review without any qualification. Expressio unius est exclusio
alterius. Where the terms are expressly limited to certain matters,
it may not, by interpretation or construction, be extended to other
matters. That the intent of the Constitution is exactly what its letter
says, i.e., that the power to call is fully discretionary to the
President, is extant in the deliberation of the Constitutional
Commission.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The reason for the difference in the
treatment of the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus, the power to declare martial law and the power to call out
the armed forces highlights the intent to grant the President the
widest leeway and broadest discretion in using the power to call out
because it is considered as the lesser and more benign power
compared to the two other powers.---The reason for the difference in
the treatment of the aforementioned powers highlights the intent to
grant the President the widest leeway and broadest discretion in
using the power to call out because it is considered as the lesser and
more benign power compared to the power to suspend the privilege
of the writ of habeas corpus and the power to impose martial law,
both of which involve the curtailment and suppression of certain
basic civil rights and individual freedoms, and thus necessitating
safeguards by
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Integrated Bar of the Philippines vs. Zamora
Congress and review by this Court. Moreover, under Section 18,
Article VII of the Constitution, in the exercise of the power to
suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or to impose
martial law, two conditions must concur: (1) there must be an actual
invasion or rebellion and, (2) public safety must require it. These
conditions are not required in the case of the power to call out the
armed forces. The only criterion is that “whenever it becomes
necessary,” the President may call the armed forces “to prevent or
suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion.” The implication is
that the President is given full discretion and wide latitude in the
exercise of the power to call as compared to the two other powers.
Same; Same; Same; Same; If the petitioner fails, by way of proof
to support the assertion that the President acted without factual
basis, then the Supreme Court cannot undertake an independent
investigation beyond the pleadings.—If the petitioner fails, by way
of proof, to support the assertion that the President acted without
factual basis, then this Court cannot undertake an independent
investigation beyond the pleadings. The factual necessity of calling
out the armed forces is not easily quantifiable and cannot be
objectively established since matters considered for satisfying the
same is a combination of several factors which are not always
accessible to the courts. Besides the absence of textual standards
that the court may use to judge necessity, information necessary to
arrive at such judgment might also prove unmanageable for the
courts. Certain pertinent information might be difficult to verify, or
wholly unavailable to the courts. In many instances, the evidence
upon which the President might decide that there is a need to call
out the armed forces may be of a nature not constituting technical
proof.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Judicial Notice; The Court takes
judicial notice of the recent bombings perpetrated by lawless
elements in shopping malls, public utilities, and other public
places.—The President has already determined the necessity and
factual basis for calling the armed forces. In his Memorandum, he
categorically asserted that, “[V]iolent crimes like bank/store
robberies, holdups, kidnappings and carnappings continue to occur
in Metro Manila . . .” We do not doubt the veracity of the President’s
assessment of the situation, especially in the light of present
developments. The Court takes judicial notice of the recent
bombings perpetrated by lawless elements in the shopping malls,
public utilities, and other public places. These are among the areas
of deployment described in the LOI 2000. Considering all these
facts, we hold that the President has sufficient factual basis to call
for military aid in law enforcement and in the exercise of this
constitutional power.
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Integrated Bar of the Philippines vs. Zamora
Same; Same; Same; Same; Civilian Supremacy Clause; The
deployment of the Marines in the metropolis for civilian law
enforcement does not constitute a breach of the civilian supremacy
clause.—The deployment of the Marines does not constitute a
breach of the civilian supremacy clause. The calling of the Marines
in this case constitutes permissible use of military assets for civilian
law enforcement. The participation of the Marines in the conduct of
joint visibility patrols is appropriately circumscribed. The limited
participation of the Marines is evident in the provisions of the LOI
itself, which sufficiently provides the metes and bounds of the
Marines’ authority. It is noteworthy that the local police forces are
the ones in charge of the visibility patrols at all times, the real
authority belonging to the PNP. In fact, the Metro Manila Police
Chief is the overall leader of the PNP-Philippine Marines joint
visibility patrols. Under the LOI, the police forces are tasked to brief
or orient the soldiers on police patrol procedures. It is their
responsibility to direct and manage the deployment of the Marines.
It is, likewise, their duty to provide the necessary equipment to the
Marines and render logistical support to these soldiers. In view of
the foregoing, it cannot be properly argued that military authority
is supreme over civilian authority. Moreover, the deployment of the
Marines to assist the PNP does not unmake the civilian character of
the police force. Neither does it amount to an “insidious incursion”
of the military in the task of law enforcement in violation of Section
5(4), Article XVI of the Constitution.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Philippine National Police
(PNP);Where none of the Marines was incorporated or enlisted as
members of the Philippine National Police, there can be no
appointment to a civilian position to speak of—the deployment of the
Marines in the joint visibility patrols does not destroy the civilian
character of the Philippine National Police.—In this regard, it is not
correct to say that General Angelo Reyes, Chief of Staff of the AFP,
by his alleged involvement in civilian law enforcement, has been
virtually appointed to a civilian post in derogation of the aforecited
provision. The real authority in these operations, as stated in the
LOI, is lodged with the head of a civilian institution, the PNP, and
not with the military. Such being the case, it does not matter
whether the APP Chief actually participates in the Task
Force Tulungan since he does not exercise any authority or control
over the same. Since none of the Marines was incorporated or
enlisted as members of the PNP, there can be no appointment to a
civilian position to speak of. Hence, the deployment of the Marines
in the joint visibility patrols does not destroy the civilian character
of the PNP.
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Integrated Bar of the Philippines vs. Zamora
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Words and
Phrases; “Regulatory Power” “Proscriptive Power,” and “Compulsory
Power,” Distinguished.—A power regulatory in nature is one which
controls or directs. It is proscriptive if it prohibits or condemns
and compulsory if it exerts some coercive force. See US v. Yunis, 681
F.Supp 891 (D.D.C., 1988). See also FOURTH AMENDMENT AND
POSSE COMITATUS ACT RESTRICTIONS ON MILITARY
INVOLVEMENT IN CIVIL LAW ENFORCEMENT, 54 George
Washington Law Review, pp. 404-433 (1986), which discusses the
four divergent standards for assessing acceptable involvement of
military personnel in civil law enforcement. See likewise
HONORED IN THE BREECH: PRESIDENTIAL AUTHORITY TO
EXECUTE THE LAWS WITH MILITARY FORCE, 83 Yale Law
Journal, pp. 130-152, 1973.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Even if the Court were to
apply the rigid standards to determine whether there is permissible
use of the military in civilian law enforcement, the conclusion is
inevitable that no violation of the civilian supremacy clause in the
Constitution is committed.—Even if the Court were to apply the
above rigid standards to the present case to determine whether
there is permissible use of the military in civilian law enforcement,
the conclusion is inevitable that no violation of the civilian
supremacy clause in the Constitution is committed. On this point,
the Court agrees with the observation of the Solicitor General: 3.
The designation of tasks in Annex A does not constitute the exercise
of regulatory, proscriptive, or compulsory military power. First, the
soldiers do not control or direct the operation. This is evident from
Nos. 6, 8(k) and 9(a) of Annex A. These soldiers, second, also have
no power to prohibit or condemn. In No. 9(d) of Annex A, all arrested
persons are brought to the nearest police stations for proper
disposition. And last, these soldiers apply no coercive force. The
materials or equipment issued to them, as shown in No. 8(c) of
Annex A, are all low impact and defensive in character. The
conclusion is that there being no exercise of regulatory, proscriptive
or compulsory military power, the deployment of a handful of
Philippine Marines constitutes no impermissible use of military
power for civilian law enforcement.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Unless the petitioner can show that
in the deployment of the Marines, the President has violated the
fundamental law, exceeded his authority or jeopardized the civil
liberties of the people, the Supreme Court is not inclined to overrule
the President’s determination of the factual basis for the calling of
the Marines to prevent or suppress lawless violence.—It appears that
the present petition is anchored on fear that once the armed forces
are deployed, the military will gain ascendancy, and thus place in
peril our cherished liberties. Such apprehensions,
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Integrated Bar of the Philippines vs. Zamora
however, are unfounded. The power to call the armed forces is
just that—calling out the armed forces. Unless, petitioner IBP can
show, which it has not, that in the deployment of the Marines, the
President has violated the fundamental law, exceeded his authority
or jeopardized the civil liberties of the people, this Court is not
inclined to overrule the President’s determination of the factual
basis for the calling of the Marines to prevent or suppress lawless
violence.
Freedom; Civil Liberties; Freedom and democracy will be in full
bloom only when people feel secure in their homes and in the streets,
not when the shadows of violence and anarchy constantly lurk in
their midst.—Since the institution of the joint visibility patrol in
January, 2000, not a single citizen has complained that his political
or civil rights have been violated as a result of the deployment of the
Marines. It was precisely to safeguard peace, tranquility and the
civil liberties of the people that the joint visibility patrol was
conceived. Freedom and democracy will be in full bloom only when
people feel secure in their homes and in the streets, not when the
shadows of violence and anarchy constantly lurk in their midst.
PUNO, J., Separate Opinion:
Judicial Review; Political Questions; Commander-in-Chief
Clause;“Calling Out” Power; If the government attempt in the instant
case to foist the political question doctrine to shield an executive act
done in the exercise of the commander-in-chief powers from judicial
scrutiny succeeded, it would have diminished the power of judicial
review and weakened the checking authority of the Supreme Court
over the Chief Executive when he exercises such powers.—If the case
at bar is significant, it is because of the government attempt to foist
the political question doctrine to shield an executive act done in the
exercise of the commander-in-chief powers from judicial scrutiny. If
the attempt succeeded, it would have diminished the power of
judicial review and weakened the checking authority of this Court
over the Chief Executive when he exercises his commander-in-chief
powers. The attempt should remind us of the tragedy that befell the
country when this Court sought refuge in the political question
doctrine and forfeited its most important role as protector of the civil
and political rights of our people. The ongoing conflict in Mindanao
may worsen and can force the Chief Executive to resort to the use of
his greater commander-in-chief powers, hence, this Court should be
extra cautious in assaying similar attempts. A laid back posture may
not sit well with our people considering that the 1987 Constitution
strengthened the checking powers of this Court and expanded its
jurisdiction precisely to stop any act constituting “x x x
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Integrated Bar of the Philippines vs. Zamora
grave abuse of discretion x x x on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government.”
Same; Same; Same; Same; Constitutional Law; Two lessons
were not lost to the members of the Constitutional Commission that
drafted the 1987 Constitution—the first was the need to grant the
Supreme Court the express power to review the exercise of the powers
as Commander-in-chief by the President and deny it of any discretion
to decline its exercise, and the second was the need to compel the
Court to be proactive by expanding its jurisdiction and, thus, reject
its laid back stance against acts constituting grave abuse of
discretion on the part of any branch or instrumentality of
government.—Two lessons were not lost, to the members of the
Constitutional Commission that drafted the 1987 Constitution.
The first was the need to grant this Court the express power to
review the exercise of the powers as commander-in-chief by the
President and deny it of any discretion to decline its exercise.
The second was the need to compel the Court to be pro-active by
expanding its jurisdiction and, thus, reject its laid back stance
against acts constituting grave abuse of discretion on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of government. Then Chief Justice
Roberto Concepcion, a member of the Constitutional Commission,
worked for the insertion of the second paragraph of Section 1, Article
VIII in the draft Constitution.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Statutory Construction; The
proceedings of the Constitutional Convention are less conclusive on
the proper construction of the fundamental law than are legislative
proceedings of the proper construction of a statute—the conventional
wisdom is that the Constitution does not derive its force from the
convention which framed it, but from the people who ratified it, the
intent to be arrived at is that of the people.—It must be borne in
mind, however, that while a member’s opinion expressed on the floor
of the Constitutional Convention is valuable, it is not necessarily
expressive of the people’s intent. The proceedings of the Convention
are less conclusive on the proper construction of the fundamental
law than are legislative proceedings of the proper construction of a
statute, for in the latter case it is the intent of the legislature the
courts seek, while in the former, courts seek to arrive at the intent
of the people through the discussions and deliberations of their
representatives. The conventional wisdom is that the Constitution
does not derive its force from the convention which framed it, but
from the people who ratified it, the intent to be arrived at is that of
the people.
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Integrated Bar of the Philippines vs. Zamora
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Given the light of our
constitutional history, the express grant of power to the Supreme
Court to review the sufficiency of the factual bases used by the
President in the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus and the declaration of martial law merely means that the
Court cannot decline the exercise of its power because of the political
question doctrine as it did in the past—It is true that the third
paragraph of Section 18, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution
expressly gives the Court the power to review the sufficiency of the
factual bases used by the President in the suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and the declaration of martial
law. It does not follow, however, that just because the same
provision did not grant to this Court the power to review the exercise
of the calling out power by the President, ergo, this Court cannot
pass upon the validity of its exercise. Given the light of our
constitutional history, this express grant of power merely means
that the Court cannot decline the exercise of its power because of
the political question doctrine as it did in the past. In fine, the
express grant simply stresses the mandatory duty of this Court to
check the exercise of the commander-in-chief powers of the
President. It eliminated the discretion of the Court not to wield its
power of review thru the use of the political question doctrine.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Even as it may be
conceded that the calling out power may be a “lesser power”
compared to the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus and the power to declare martial law, its exercise cannot be
left to the absolute discretion of the Chief Executive as Commander-
in-Chief of the armed forces, as its impact on the rights of our people
protected by the Constitution cannot be downgraded.—It may be
conceded that the calling out power may be a “lesser power”
compared to the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus and the power to declare martial law. Even then, its exercise
cannot be left to the absolute discretion of the Chief Executive as
Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces, as its impact on the rights
of our people protected by the Constitution cannot be downgraded.
We cannot hold that acts of the commander-in-chief cannot be
reviewed on the ground that they have lesser impact on the civil and
political rights of our people. The exercise of the calling out power
may be “benign” in the case at bar but may not be so in future cases.
Same; Same; When private justiciable rights are involved in a
suit, the Court must not refuse to assume jurisdiction even though
questions of extreme political importance are necessarily involved.—
We should not water down the ruling that deciding whether a
matter has been committed by the Constitution to another branch
of government, or whether the
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VOL. 338, AUGUST 15, 2000 93
Integrated Bar of the Philippines vs. Zamora
action of that branch exceeds whatever authority has been
committed, is a delicate exercise in constitutional interpretation,
and is a responsibility of the Court as ultimate interpreter of the
fundamental law. When private justiciable rights are involved in a
suit, the Court must not refuse to assume jurisdiction even though
questions of extreme political importance are necessarily involved.
Every officer under a constitutional government must act according
to law and subject to the controlling power of the people, acting
through the courts, as well as through the executive and legislative.
One department is just as representative of the other, and the
judiciary is the department which is charged with the special duty
of determining the limitations which the law places upon all official
action. This historic role of the Court is the foundation stone of a
government of laws and not of men.
VITUG, J., Separate Opinion:
Presidency; Commander-in-Chief Clause; Calling-Out
Power; The act of the President in simply calling on the Armed Forces
of the Philippines, an executive prerogative, to assist the Philippine
National Police in “joint visibility patrols” in the Metropolis does not
constitute grave abuse of discretion that would warrant an exercise
by the Supreme Court of its extraordinary power as so envisioned by
the fundamental law.—The term grave abuse of discretion is long
understood in our jurisprudence as being, and confined to, a
capricious and whimsical or despotic exercise of judgment
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Minus the not-so-
unusual exaggerations often invoked by litigants in the duel of
views, the act of the President in simply calling on the Armed Forces
of the Philippines, an executive prerogative, to assist the Philippine
National Police in “joint visibility patrols” in the metropolis does
not, I believe, constitute grave abuse of discretion that would now
warrant an exercise by the Supreme Court of its extraordinary
power as so envisioned by the fundamental law.
MENDOZA, J., Concurring and Dissenting Opinion:
Judicial Review; Judgment on the substantive constitutional
issues raised must await an actual case involving real parties with
“injuries” to show as a result of the operation of the challenged
executive action.—I concur in the opinion of the Court insofar as it
holds petitioner to be without standing to question the validity of
LOI 02/2000 which mandates the Philippine Marines to conduct
“joint visibility” patrols with the police in Metro Manila. But I
dissent insofar as the opinion dismisses the petition in this case on
other grounds. I submit that judgment on the substantive
constitutional issues raised by petitioner must await an actual case
in-
94
94 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Integrated Bar of the Philippines vs. Zamora
volving real parties with “injuries” to show as a result of the
operation of the challenged executive action. While as an
organization for the advancement of the rule of law petitioner has
an interest in upholding the Constitution, its interest is
indistinguishable from the interest of the rest of the citizenry and
falls short of that which is necessary to give petitioner standing.
Same; Parties; Locus Standi; “Injury in Fact” Test; The “injury
in fact” test requires more than injury to a cognizable interest—As I
have indicated elsewhere, a citizens’ suit challenging the
constitutionality of governmental action requires that (1) the
petitioner must have suffered an “injury in fact” of an actual or
imminent nature; (2) there must be a causal connection between the
injury and the conduct complained of; and (3) the injury is likely to
be redressed by a favorable action by this Court. The “injury in fact”
test requires more than injury to a cognizable interest. It requires
that the party seeking review be himself among those injured.
Same; The lack of a real, earnest and vital controversy can only
impoverish the judicial process.—We are likely to err in dismissing
the suit brought in this case on the ground that the calling out of
the military does not violate the Constitution, just as we are likely
to do so if we grant the petition and invalidate the executive
issuance in question. For indeed, the lack of a real, earnest and vital
controversy can only impoverish the judicial process. That is why,
as Justice Laurel emphasized in the Angara case, “this power of
judicial review is limited to actual cases and controversies to be
exercised after full opportunity of argument by the parties, and
limited further to the constitutional question raised or the very lis
mota presented.”
SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Certiorari
and Prohibition.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
The Solicitor General for respondents.
KAPUNAN, J.:
At bar is a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition
with prayer for issuance of a temporary restraining order
seeking to nullify on constitutional grounds the order of
President Joseph Ejercito Estrada commanding the
deployment of the Philippine
95
VOL. 338, AUGUST 15, 2000 95
Integrated Bar of the Philippines vs. Zamora
Marines (the “Marines”) to join the Philippine National Police
(the “PNP”) in visibility patrols around the metropolis.
In view of the alarming increase in violent crimes in Metro
Manila, like robberies, kidnappings and carnappings, the
President, in a verbal directive, ordered the PNP and the
Marines to conduct joint visibility patrols for the purpose of
crime prevention and suppression. The Secretary of National
Defense, the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines (the “AFP”), the Chief of the PNP and the
Secretary of the Interior and Local Government were tasked
to execute and implement the said order. In compliance with
the presidential mandate, the PNP Chief, through Police Chief
Superintendent Edgar B. Aglipay, formulated Letter of
Instruction 02/2000 (the “LOI”) which detailed the manner by
1
which the joint visibility patrols, called Task
Force Tulungan, would be conducted. Task
2
Force Tulungan was placed under the leadership of the Police
Chief of Metro Manila.
Subsequently, the President confirmed his previous
directive on the deployment of the Marines in a Memorandum,
dated 24 January 2000, addressed to the Chief of Staff of the
AFP and the PNP Chief. In the Memorandum, the President
3
expressed his desire to improve the peace and order situation
in Metro Manila through a more effective crime prevention
program including increased police patrols. The President
4
further stated that to heighten police visibility in the
metropolis, augmentation from the AFP is necessary. Invoking
5
his powers as Commander-in-Chief under Section 18, Article
VII of the Constitution, the President directed the AFP Chief
of Staff and PNP Chief to coordinate with each other for the
proper deployment and utilization of the Marines to assist the
PNP in preventing or suppressing criminal or lawless
violence. Finally, the President declared that the services of
6
the Marines in the anti-crime campaign are merely temporary
in nature and for a reasonable period only, until such time
when the situation shall have improved. 7
The LOI explains the concept of the PNP-Philippine
Marines joint visibility patrols as follows:
xxx
2. PURPOSE:
 The Joint Implementing Police Visibility Patrols between the
PNP NCRPO and the Philippine Marines partnership in the conduct
of visibility patrols in Metro Manila for the suppression of crime
prevention and other serious threats to national security.
3. SITUATION:
Criminal incidents in Metro Manila have been perpetrated not
only by ordinary criminals but also by organized syndicates whose
members include active and former police/military personnel—
whose training, skill, discipline and firepower prove well-above the
present capability of the local police alone to handle. The
deployment of a joint PNP NCRPO-Philippine Marines in the
conduct of police visibility patrol in urban areas will reduce the
incidence of crimes specially those perpetrated by active or former
police/military personnel.
4. MISSION:
The PNP NCRPO will organize a provisional Task Force to
conduct joint NCRPO-PM visibility patrols to keep Metro Manila
streets crime-free, through a sustained street patrolling to minimize
or eradicate all forms of high-profile crimes especially those
perpetrated by organized crime syndicates whose members include
those that are well-trained, disciplined and well-armed active or
former PNP/Military personnel.
______________
6 Id.
7 Rollo, p. 75.
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VOL. 338, AUGUST 15, 2000 97
Integrated Bar of the Philippines vs. Zamora
5. CONCEPT IN JOINT VISIBILITY PATROL OPERATIONS:
a.The visibility patrols shall be conducted jointly by the
NCRPO [National Capital Regional Police Office] and the
Philippine Marines to curb criminality in Metro Manila and to
preserve the internal security of the state against insurgents
and other serious threat to national security, although the
primary responsibility over Internal Security Operations still
rests upon the AFP.
b.The principle of integration of efforts shall be applied to
eradicate all forms of high-profile crimes perpetrated by
organized crime syndicates operating in Metro Manila. This
concept requires the military and police to work cohesively and
unify efforts to ensure a focused, effective and holistic approach
in addressing crime prevention. Along this line, the role of the
military and police aside from neutralizing crime syndicates is
to bring a wholesome atmosphere wherein delivery of basic
services to the people and development is achieved. Hand-in-
hand with this joint NCRPO-Philippine Marines visibility
patrols, local Police Units are responsible for the maintenance
of peace and order in their locality.
c.To ensure the effective implementation of this project, a
provisional Task Force “TULUNGAN” shall be organized to
provide the mechanism, structure, and procedures for the
integrated planning, coordinating, monitoring and assessing
the security situation.
x x x. 8
The selected areas of deployment under the LOI are:
Monumento Circle, North Edsa (SM City), Araneta Shopping
Center, Greenhills, SM Megamall, Makati Commercial
Center, LRT/MRT Stations and the NAIA and Domestic
Airport. 9
On 17 January 2000, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(the “IBP”) filed the instant petition to annul LOI 02/2000 and
to declare the deployment of the Philippine Marines, null and
void and unconstitutional, arguing that:
I
THE DEPLOYMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE MARINES IN METRO
MANILA IS VIOLATIVE OF THE CONSTITUTION, IN THAT:
_____________
8Id., at 17-18.
9Id.
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98 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Integrated Bar of the Philippines vs. Zamora
 A)NO EMERGENCY SITUATION OBTAINS IN METRO
MANILA AS WOULD JUSTIFY, EVEN ONLY
REMOTELY, THE DEPLOYMENT OF SOLDIERS FOR
LAW ENFORCEMENT WORK; HENCE, SAID
DEPLOYMENT IS IN DEROGATION OF ARTICLE II,
SECTION 3 OF THE CONSTITUTION;
B)SAID DEPLOYMENT CONSTITUTES AN
INSIDIOUS INCURSION BY THE MILITARY IN A
CIVILIAN FUNCTION OF GOVERNMENT (LAW
ENFORCEMENT) IN DEROGATION OF ARTICLE XVI,
SECTION 5 (4), OF THE CONSTITUTION;
C)SAID DEPLOYMENT CREATES A DANGEROUS
TENDENCY TO RELY ON THE MILITARY TO
PERFORM THE CIVILIAN FUNCTIONS OF THE
GOVERNMENT.
II
IN MILITARIZING LAW ENFORCEMENT IN METRO MANILA,
THE ADMINISTRATION IS UNWITTINGLY MAKING THE
MILITARY MORE POWERFUL THAN WHAT IT SHOULD
REALLY BE UNDER THE CONSTITUTION. 10
Asserting itself as the official organization of Filipino lawyers
tasked with the bounden duty to uphold the rule of law and
the Constitution, the IBP questions the validity of the
deployment and utilization of the Marines to assist the PNP
in law enforcement.
Without granting due course to the petition, the Court in a
Resolution, dated 25 January 2000, required the Solicitor
11
General to file his Comment on the petition. On 8 February
2000, the Solicitor General submitted his Comment.
The Solicitor General vigorously defends the
constitutionality of the act of the President in deploying the
Marines, contending, among others, that petitioner has no
legal standing; that the question of deployment of the Marines
is not proper for judicial scrutiny since the same involves a
political question; that the organization and conduct of police
visibility patrols, which feature the team-up of one police
officer and one Philippine Marine soldier, does not violate the
civilian supremacy clause in the Constitution.
_______________
Rollo, p. 7.
10
Id., at 24.
11
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VOL. 338, AUGUST 15, 2000 99
Integrated Bar of the Philippines vs. Zamora
The issues raised in the present petition are: (1) Whether or
not petitioner has legal standing; (2) Whether or not the
President’s factual determination of the necessity of calling
the armed forces is subject to judicial review; and, (3) Whether
or not the calling of the armed forces to assist the PNP in joint
visibility patrols violates the constitutional provisions on
civilian supremacy, over the military and the civilian
character of the PNP.
The petition has no merit.
First, petitioner failed to sufficiently show that it is in
possession of the requisites of standing to raise the issues in
the petition. Second, the President did not commit grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction nor did
he commit a violation of the civilian supremacy clause of the
Constitution.
The power of judicial review is set forth in Section 1, Article
VIII of the Constitution, to wit:
Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court
and in such lower courts as may be established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle
actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable
and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
When questions of constitutional significance are raised, the
Court can exercise its power of judicial review only if the
following requisites are complied with, namely: (1) the
existence of an actual and appropriate case; (2) a personal and
substantial interest of the party raising the constitutional
question; (3) the exercise of judicial review is pleaded at the
earliest opportunity; and (4) the constitutional question is
the lis mota of the case. 12
The IBP has not sufficiently complied with the requisites of
standing in this case.
_______________
12 Philippine
Constitution Association v. Enriquez, 235 SCRA
506 (1994) citing Luz Farms v. Secretary of the Department of Agrarian
Reform, 192 SCRA 51 (1990); Dumlao v. Commission on Elections, 95 SCRA
392 (1980); and, People v. Vera, 65 Phil. 56 (1937).
100
100 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Integrated Bar of the Philippines vs. Zamora
“Legal standing” or locus standi has been defined as a
personal and substantial interest in the case such that the
party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of
the governmental act that is being challenged. The term 13
“interest” means a material interest, an interest in issue
affected by the decree, as distinguished from mere interest in
the question involved, or a mere incidental interest. The gist 14
of the question of standing is whether a party alleges “such
personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure
that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of
issues upon which the court depends for illumination of
difficult constitutional questions.” 15
In the case at bar, the IBP primarily anchors its standing
on its alleged responsibility to uphold the rule of law and the
Constitution. Apart from this declaration, however, the IBP
asserts no other basis in support of its locus standi. The mere
invocation by the IBP of its duty to preserve the rule of law
and nothing more, while undoubtedly true, is not sufficient to
clothe it with standing in this case. This is too general an
interest which is shared by other groups and the whole
citizenry. Based on the standards above-stated, the IBP has
failed to present a specific and substantial interest in the
resolution of the case. Its fundamental purpose which, under
Section 2, Rule 139-A of the Rules of Court, is to elevate the
standards of the law profession and to improve the
administration of justice is alien to, and cannot be affected by
the deployment of the Marines. It should also be noted that
the interest of the National President of the IBP who signed
the petition, is his alone, absent a formal board resolution
authorizing him to file the present action. To be sure, members
of the BAR, those in the judiciary included, have varying
opinions on the issue. Moreover, the IBP, assuming that it has
duly authorized the National President to file the petition, has
not shown any specific injury which it
_______________
13 Joya v. Presidential Commission on Good Government, 225 SCRA 568,
576 (1993).
14 Ibid., citing House International Building Tenants Association, Inc. v.
Intermediate Appellate Court, 151 SCRA 703 (1987).
15 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 82 S. Ct. 691, 7L. Ed. 2d 663, 678 (1962).
101
VOL. 338, AUGUST 15, 2000 101
Integrated Bar of the Philippines vs. Zamora
has suffered or may suffer by virtue of the questioned
governmental act. Indeed, none of its members, whom the IBP
purportedly represents, has sustained any form of injury as a
result of the operation of the joint visibility patrols. Neither is
it alleged that any of its members has been arrested or that
their civil liberties have been violated by the deployment of the
Marines. What the IBP projects as injurious is the supposed
“militarization” of law enforcement which might threaten
Philippine democratic institutions and may cause more harm
than good in the long run. Not only is the presumed “injury”
not personal in character, it is likewise too vague, highly
speculative and uncertain to satisfy the requirement of
standing. Since petitioner has not successfully established a
direct and personal injury as a consequence of the questioned
act, it does not possess the personality to assail the validity of
the deployment of the Marines. This Court, however, does not
categorically rule that the IBP has absolutely no standing to
raise constitutional issues now or in the future. The IBP must,
by way of allegations and proof, satisfy this Court that it has
sufficient stake to obtain judicial resolution of the controversy.
Having stated the foregoing, it must be emphasized that
this Court has the discretion to take cognizance of a suit which
does not satisfy the requirement of legal standing when
paramount interest is involved. In not a few cases, the Court
16
has adopted a liberal attitude on the locus standi of a
petitioner where the petitioner is able to craft an issue of
transcendental significance to the people. Thus, when the
17
issues raised are of paramount importance to the public, the
Court may brush aside technicalities of procedure. In this
18
case, a reading of the petition shows that the IBP has
advanced constitutional issues which deserve the attention of
this Court in view of their seriousness, novelty and weight as
precedents. Moreover, because peace and order are under
constant threat and lawless violence occurs in increasing
tempo, undoubtedly aggravated by the Mindanao insurgency
problem, the legal controversy raised in the petition almost
certainly will not go away. It will stare us in the face again. It,
therefore, behooves the Court to relax the rules on standing
and to resolve the issue now, rather than later.
The President did not commit grave abuse of discretion
in calling out the Marines.
In the case at bar, the bone of contention concerns the factual
determination of the President of the necessity of calling the
armed forces, particularly the Marines, to aid the PNP in
visibility patrols. In this regard, the IBP admits that the
deployment of the military personnel falls under the
Commander-in-Chief powers of the President as stated in
Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, specifically, the
power to call out the armed forces to prevent or suppress
lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. What the IBP
questions, however, is the basis for the calling of the Marines
under the aforestated provision. According to the IBP, no
emergency exists that would justify the need for the calling of
the military to assist the police force. It contends that no
lawless violence, invasion or rebellion exist to warrant the
calling of the Marines. Thus, the IBP prays that this Court
“review the sufficiency of the factual basis for said troop
[Marine] deployment.” 19
The Solicitor General, on the other hand, contends that the
issue pertaining to the necessity of calling the armed forces is
not proper for judicial scrutiny since it involves a political
question and the resolution of factual issues which are beyond
the review powers of this Court.
As framed by the parties, the underlying issues are the
scope of presidential powers and limits, and the extent of
judicial review. But, while this Court gives considerable
weight to the parties’ formulation of the issues, the resolution
of the controversy may warrant a creative approach that goes
beyond the narrow confines of the issues raised. Thus, while
the parties are in agreement that the power exercised by the
President is the power to call out the armed forces, the Court
is of the view that the power involved may be no more than the
maintenance of peace and order and promotion of the general
welfare. For one, the realities on the ground do not show that
20
there exist a state of warfare, widespread civil unrest or
anarchy. Secondly, the full brunt of the military is not brought
upon the citizenry, a point discussed in the latter part of this
decision. In the words of the late Justice Irene Cortes
in Marcos v. Manglapus:
More particularly, this case calls for the exercise of the President’s
powers as protector of the peace. [Rossiter, The American
Presidency]. The power of the President to keep the peace is not
limited merely to exercising the commander-in-chief powers in
times of emergency or to leading the State against external and
internal threats to its existence. The President is not only clothed
with extraordinary powers in times of emergency, but is also tasked
with attending to the day-to-day problems of maintaining peace and
order and ensuring domestic tranquility in times when no foreign
foe appears on the horizon. Wide discretion, within the bounds of
law, in fulfilling presidential duties in times of peace is not in any
way diminished by the relative want of an emergency specified in
the commander-in-chief provision. For in making the President As Tañada v. Cuenco puts it, political questions refer “to
23

commander-in-chief the enumeration of powers that follow cannot
be said to exclude the President’s exercising as Commander-in-Chief
powers short of the calling of the armed forces, or suspending the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or declaring martial law, in
order to keep the peace, and maintain public order and security.
xxx 21
those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be
decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard
to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the
legislative or executive branch of government.” Thus, if an
issue is clearly identified by the text of the Constitution as

matters for discretionary action by a particular branch of

Nonetheless, even if it is conceded that the power involved is
government or to the people themselves then it is held to be a
the President’s power to call out the armed forces to prevent
political question. In the classic formulation of Justice
or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion, the
Brennan in Baker v. Carr “[p]rominent on the surface of any
resolution of the controversy will reach a similar result.
24

case held to involve a political question is found a textually

We now address the Solicitor General’s argument that the
demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a
issue involved is not susceptible to review by the judiciary
coordinate political department; or a lack of judicially
because it involves a political question, and thus, not
discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; or the
justiciable.
impossibility of deciding without an initial policy
As a general proposition, a controversy is justiciable if it
determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or
refers to a matter which is appropriate for court review. It 22

the impossibility of a court’s undertaking independent

pertains to issues which are inherently susceptible of being
resolution without expressing lack of the respect due
decided on grounds recognized by law. Nevertheless, the Court
coordinate branches of government; or an unusual need for
does not automatically assume jurisdiction over actual
unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made;
constitutional cases brought before it even in instances that
or the potentiality of embarassment from multifarious
are ripe for resolution. One class of cases wherein the Court
pronouncements by various departments on the one question.”
hesitates to rule on are “political questions.” The reason is that
The 1987 Constitution expands the concept of judicial
political questions are concerned with issues dependent upon
review by providing that “(T)he Judicial power shall be vested
the wisdom, not the legality, of a particular act or measure
in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be
being assailed. Moreover, the political question being a
established by law. Judicial power includes the duty of the
function of the separation of powers, the courts will not
courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights
normally interfere with the workings of another co-equal
which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to
branch unless the
_______________ determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the
21177 SCRA 668, 694 (1989). part of any branch or instrumentality of the
WEST’S LEGAL THESAURUS/DICTIONARY (Special Deluxe Edition)
Government.” Under this definition, the Court cannot agree
22
25

p. 440 (1986).
105 with the Solicitor General that the issue involved is a political
VOL. 338, AUGUST 15, 2000 105 question beyond the jurisdiction of this Court to review. When
Integrated Bar of the Philippines vs. Zamora the grant of power is qualified, conditional or subject to
case shows a clear need for the courts to step in to uphold the limitations, the issue of
_______________
law and the Constitution.
 23 103 Phil. 1051 (1957).
369 U.S. 186, 82 S ct. 691, 7 L. Ed. 2d 663, 678 (1962).
24
25 Article VIII, Sec. 1 of the 1987 CONSTITUTION.
106
106 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Integrated Bar of the Philippines vs. Zamora
whether the prescribed qualifications or conditions have been
met or the limitations respected, is justiciable—the problem
being one of legality or validity, not its wisdom. Moreover, the
26
jurisdiction to delimit constitutional boundaries has been
given to this Court. When political questions are involved, the
27
Constitution limits the determination as to whether or not
there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the official whose action
is being questioned. 28
By grave abuse of discretion is meant simply capricious or
whimsical exercise of judgment that is patent and gross as to
amount to an evasion of positive duty or a virtual refusal to
perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in
contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an
arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or
hostility. Under this definition, a court is without power to
29
directly decide matters over which full discretionary authority
has been delegated. But while this Court has no power to
substitute its judgment for that of Congress or of the
President, it may look into the question of whether such
exercise has been made in grave abuse of discretion. A
showing that plenary power is granted either department of
government, may not be an obstacle to judicial inquiry, for the
improvident exercise or abuse thereof may give rise to
justiciable controversy. 31
When the President calls the armed forces to prevent or
suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion, he necessarily
exercises a discretionary power solely vested in his wisdom.
This is clear from the intent of the framers and from the text
of the Constitution itself. The Court, thus, cannot be called
upon to overrule the President’s wisdom or substitute its own.
However, this does not prevent an examination of whether
such power was exercised within permissible constitutional
limits or whether it was exercised in a manner constituting
grave abuse of discretion. In view of the constitutional intent
to give the President full discretionary power to determine the
necessity of calling out the armed forces, it is incumbent upon
the petitioner to show that the President’s decision is totally
bereft of factual basis. The present petition fails to discharge
such heavy burden as there is no evidence to support the
assertion that there exist no justification for calling out the
armed forces. There is, likewise, no evidence to support the
proposition that grave abuse was committed because the
power to call was exercised in such a manner as to violate the
constitutional provision on civilian supremacy over the
military. In the performance of this Court’s duty of “purposeful
hesitation” before declaring an act of another branch as
32
unconstitutional, only where such grave abuse of discretion is
clearly shown shall the Court interfere with the President’s
judgment. To doubt is to sustain.
There is a clear textual commitment under the Constitution
to bestow on the President full discretionary power to call out
the armed forces and to determine the necessity for the
exercise of such power. Section 18, Article VII of the
Constitution, which embodies the powers of the President as
Commander-in-Chief, provides in part:
The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces
of the Philippines and whenever it becomes necessary, he may call
30
out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence,
invasion or rebellion. In case of invasion or rebellion, when the
public safety requires it, he may, for a period not exceeding sixty
days, suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, or place the
Philippines or any part thereof under martial Law.
xxx
The full discretionary power of the President to determine the
factual basis for the exercise of the calling out power is also
implied
_______________
32 Drilon v. Lim, 235 SCRA 135 (1994).
 108
108 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Integrated Bar of the Philippines vs. Zamora
and further reinforced in the rest of Section 18, Article VII
which reads, thus:
xxx
Within forty-eight hours from the proclamation of martial law or
the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, the
President shall submit a report in person or in writing to the
Congress. The Congress, voting jointly, by a vote of at least a
majority of all its Members in regular or special session, may revoke
such proclamation or suspension, which revocation shall not be set
aside by the President. Upon the initiative of the President, the
Congress may, in the same manner, extend such proclamation or
suspension for a period to be determined by the Congress, if the
invasion or rebellion shall persist and public safety requires it.
The Congress, if not in session, shall within twenty-four hours
following such proclamation or suspension, convene in accordance
with its rules without need of a call.
The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding
filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of the factual basis of the
proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the
writ or the extension thereof, and must promulgate its decision
thereon within thirty days from its filing.
A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the
Constitution, nor supplant the functioning of the civil courts or
legislative assemblies, nor authorize the conferment of jurisdiction
on military courts and agencies over civilians where civil courts are
able to function, nor automatically suspend the privilege of the writ.
The suspension of the privilege of the writ shall apply only to
persons judicially charged for rebellion or offenses inherent in or
directly connected with invasion.
During the suspension of the privilege of the writ, any person
thus arrested or detained shall be judicially charged within three
days, otherwise he shall be released.
Under the foregoing provisions, Congress may revoke such
proclamation or suspension and the Court may review the
sufficiency of the factual basis thereof. However, there is no
such equivalent provision dealing with the revocation or
review of the President’s action to call out the armed forces.
The distinction places the calling out power in a different
category from the power to declare martial law and the power
to suspend the privilege of
109
VOL. 338, AUGUST 15, 2000 109
Integrated Bar of the Philippines vs. Zamora
the writ of habeas corpus, otherwise, the framers of the
Constitution would have simply lumped together the three
powers and provided for their revocation and review without
any qualification. Expressio unius est exclusio alterius. Where
the terms are expressly limited to certain matters, it may not,
by interpretation or construction, be extended to other
matters. That the intent of the Constitution is exactly what
33
its letter says, i.e., that the power to call is fully discretionary
to the President, is extant in the deliberation of the
Constitutional Commission, to wit:
FR. BERNAS. It will not make any difference. I may add that
there is a graduated power of the President as Commander-
in-Chief. First, he can call out such Armed Forces as may
be necessary to suppress lawless violence; then he can
suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, then he
can impose martial law. This is a graduated sequence.
When he judges that it is necessary to impose martial law
or suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, his
judgment is subject to review. We are making it subject to
review by the Supreme Court and subject to concurrence by
the National Assembly. But when he exercises this lesser
power of calling on the Armed Forces, when he says it is
necessary, it is my opinion that his judgment cannot be
reviewed by anybody.
xxx
FR. BERNAS. Let me just add that when we only have
imminent danger, the matter can be handled by the first
sentence: “The President . . . may call out such armed forces
to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or
 rebellion.” So we feel that that is sufficient for handling
imminent danger.
MR. DE LOS REYES. So actually, if a President feels that
there is imminent danger, the matter can be handled by the
First Sentence: “The President . . . . may call out such
Armed Forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence,
invasion or rebellion.” So we feel that that is sufficient for
handling imminent danger, of invasion or rebellion, instead
of imposing martial law or suspending the writ of habeas
corpus, he must necessarily have to call the Armed Forces
of the Philippines as their Commander-in-Chief. Is that the
idea?
_______________
Sarmiento v. Mison, 156 SCRA 549 (1987).
33
110
110 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Integrated Bar of the Philippines vs. Zamora
MR. REGALADO. That does not require any concurrence by
the legislature nor is it subject to judicial review.
34
The reason for the difference in the treatment of the
aforementioned powers highlights the intent to grant the
President the widest leeway and broadest discretion in using
the power to call out because it is considered as the lesser and
more benign power compared to the power to suspend the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and the power to impose
martial law, both of which involve the curtailment and
suppression of certain basic civil rights and individual
freedoms, and thus necessitating safeguards by Congress and
review by this Court.
Moreover, under Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution,
in the exercise of the power to suspend the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus or to impose martial law, two conditions must
concur: (1) there must be an actual invasion or rebellion and,
(2) public safety must require it. These conditions are not
required in the case of the power to call out the armed forces.
The only criterion is that “whenever it becomes necessary,” the
President may call the armed forces “to prevent or suppress
lawless violence, invasion or rebellion.” The implication is that
the President is given full discretion and wide latitude in the
exercise of the power to call as compared to the two other
powers.
If the petitioner fails, by way of proof, to support the
assertion that the President acted without factual basis, then
this Court cannot undertake an independent investigation
beyond the pleadings. The factual necessity of calling out the
armed forces is not easily quantifiable and cannot be
objectively established since matters considered for satisfying
the same is a combination of several factors which are not
always accessible to the courts. Besides the absence of textual
standards that the court may use to judge necessity,
information necessary to arrive at such judgment might also
prove unmanageable for the courts. Certain pertinent
information might be difficult to verify, or wholly unavailable
to the courts. In many instances, the evidence upon which the
Presi-
_______________
34 II RECORD OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION:
PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES, pp. 409, 412 (1986).
111
VOL. 338, AUGUST 15, 2000 111
Integrated Bar of the Philippines vs. Zamora
dent might decide that there is a need to call out the armed
forces may be of a nature not constituting technical proof.
On the other hand, the President as Commander-in-Chief
has a vast intelligence network to gather information, some of
which may be classified as highly confidential or affecting the
security of the state. In the exercise of the power to call, on-
the-spot decisions may be imperatively necessary in
emergency situations to avert great loss of human lives and
mass destruction of property. Indeed, the decision to call out
the military to prevent or suppress lawless violence must be
done swiftly and decisively if it were to have any effect at all.
Such a scenario is not farfetched when we consider the present
situation in Mindanao, where the insurgency problem could
spill over the other parts of the country. The determination of
the necessity for the calling out power if subjected to
unfettered judicial scrutiny could be a veritable prescription
for disaster, as such power may be unduly straitjacketed by an
injunction or a temporary restraining order every time it is
exercised.
Thus, it is the unclouded intent of the Constitution to vest
upon the President, as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed
Forces, full discretion to call forth the military when in his
judgment it is necessary to do so in order to prevent or
suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. Unless the
petitioner can show that the exercise of such discretion was
gravely abused, the President’s exercise of judgment deserves
to be accorded respect from this Court.
The President has already determined the necessity and
factual basis for calling the armed forces. In his Memorandum,
he categorically asserted that, “[V]iolent crimes like
bank/store robberies, holdups, kidnappings and carnappings
continue to occur in Metro Manila . . .” We do not doubt the
35
veracity of the President’s assessment of the situation,
especially in the light of present developments. The Court
takes judicial notice of the recent bombings perpetrated by
lawless elements in the shopping malls, public utilities, and
other public places. These are among the areas of deployment
described in the LOI 2000. Considering all these facts, we hold
that the President has sufficient factual basis to call for
military aid in law enforcement and in the exercise of this
constitutional power.
The deployment of the Marines does not violate the
civilian supremacy clause nor does it infringe the
civilian character of the police force.
Prescinding from its argument that no emergency situation
exists to justify the calling of the Marines, the IBP asserts that
by the deployment of the Marines, the civilian task of law
enforcement is “militarized” in violation of Section 3, Article
II of the Constitution.
36
We disagree. The deployment of the Marines does not
constitute a breach of the civilian supremacy clause. The
calling of the Marines in this case constitutes permissible use
of military assets for civilian law enforcement. The
participation of the Marines in the conduct of joint visibility
patrols is appropriately circumscribed. The limited
participation of the Marines is evident in the provisions of the
LOI itself, which sufficiently provides the metes and bounds of
the Marines’ authority. It is noteworthy that the local police
forces are the ones in charge of the visibility patrols at all
times, the real authority belonging to the PNP. In fact, the
Metro Manila Police Chief is the overall leader of the PNP-
Philippine Marines joint visibility patrols. Under the LOI, the
37
police forces are tasked to brief or orient the soldiers on police
patrol procedures. It is their responsibility to direct and
38
manage the deployment of the Marines. It is, likewise, their
39
duty to provide the necessary equipment to the Marines and
render logistical support to these soldiers. In view of the
40
foregoing, it cannot be properly argued that military authority
is supreme over civilian authority. Moreover, the deployment
of the Marines to assist the PNP does not unmake the civilian
character of the police force. Neither does it amount to an
“insidious incursion” of the military in the task of law
enforcement in violation of Section 5(4), Article XVI of the
Constitution. 41
In this regard, it is not correct to say that General Angelo
Reyes, Chief of Staff of the AFP, by his alleged involvement in
civilian law enforcement, has been virtually appointed to a
civilian post in derogation of the aforecited provision. The real
authority in these operations, as stated in the LOI, is lodged
with the head of a civilian institution, the PNP, and not with
the military. Such being the case, it does not matter whether
the AFP Chief actually participates in the Task
Force Tulungan since he does not exercise any authority or
control over the same. Since none of the Marines was
incorporated or enlisted as members of the PNP, there can be
no appointment to a civilian position to speak of. Hence, the
deployment of the Marines in the joint visibility patrols does
not destroy the civilian character of the PNP.
Considering the above circumstances, the Marines render
nothing more than assistance required in conducting the
patrols. As such, there can be no “insidious incursion” of the
military in civilian affairs nor can there be a violation of the
civilian supremacy clause in the Constitution.
It is worth mentioning that military assistance to civilian
authorities in various forms persists in Philippine jurisdiction.
The Philippine experience reveals that it is not averse to
requesting the assistance of the military in the
implementation and execution of certain traditionally “civil”
functions. As correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General,
some of the multifarious activities wherein military aid has
been rendered, exemplifying the activities that bring both the
civilian and the military together in a relationship of
cooperation, are:
1.Elections; 42
2.Administration of the Philippine National Red Cross; 43
3.Relief and rescue operations during calamities and
disasters;44
4.Amateur sports promotion and development; 45
5.Development of the culture and the arts; 46
6.Conservation of natural resources; 47
7.Implementation of the agrarian reform program; 48
8.Enforcement of customs laws; 49
9.Composite civilian-military law enforcement activities;
10.Conduct of licensure examinations; 51
11.Conduct of nationwide tests for elementary and high
school students; 52
12.Anti-drug enforcement activities; 53
13.Sanitary inspections; 54
14.Conduct of census work; 55
15.Administration of the Civil Aeronautics Board; 56
16.Assistance in installation of weather forecasting
devices; 57
17.Peace and order policy formulation in local government
units.58
This unquestionably constitutes a gloss on executive power
resulting from a systematic, unbroken, executive practice,
long pursued to the knowledge of Congress and, yet, never
before questioned. What we have here is mutual support and
59
cooperation between the military and civilian authorities, not
derogation of civilian supremacy.
In the United States, where a long tradition of suspicion
and hostility towards the use of military force for domestic
purposes has persisted, and whose Constitution, unlike ours,
60
does not expressly provide for the power to call, the use of
military personnel by civilian law enforcement officers is
allowed under circumstances similar to those surrounding the
present deployment of the Philippine Marines. Under
the Posse Comitatus Act of the US, the use of the military in
61
civilian law enforcement is generally prohibited, except in
certain allowable circumstances. A provision of the Act states:
50 § 1385. Use of Army and Air Force as posse comitatus
 Whoever, except in cases and under circumstances expressly deployment of a handful of Philippine Marines constitutes no
authorized by the Constitution or Act of Congress, willfully uses any impermissible use of military power for civilian law enforcement.
71

part of the Army or the Air Force as posse comitatus or otherwise to It appears that the present petition is anchored on fear that
execute the laws shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned once the armed forces are deployed, the military will gain
not more than two years, or both. 62
ascendancy, and thus place in peril our cherished liberties.
To determine whether there is a violation of the Posse Such apprehensions, however, are unfounded. The power to
Comitatus Act in the use of military personnel, the US call the armed forces is just that—calling out the armed forces.
courts apply the following standards, to wit:
63
Unless, petitioner IBP can show, which it has not, that in the
Were Army or Air Force personnel used by the civilian law deployment of the Marines, the President has violated the
enforcement officers at Wounded Knee in such a manner that the
fundamental law, exceeded his authority or jeopardized the
military personnel subjected the citizens to the exercise of military
civil liberties of the people, this Court is not inclined to
power which was regulatory, proscriptive, or compulsory in nature,
64

either presently or prospectively?
xxx
When this concept is transplanted into the present legal context,
we take it to mean that military involvement, even when not
expressly authorized by the Constitution or a statute, does not
violate the Posse Comitatus Act unless it actually regulates, forbids
or compels some conduct on the part of those claiming relief. A mere
threat of some future injury would be insufficient.(emphasis
supplied)
Even if the Court were to apply the above rigid standards to
the present case to determine whether there is permissible use
of the military in civilian law enforcement, the conclusion is
inevitable that no violation of the civilian supremacy clause in
the Constitution is committed. On this point, the Court agrees
with the observation of the Solicitor General:
3. The designation of tasks in Annex A does not constitute the
65
overrule the President’s determination of the factual basis for
the calling of the Marines to prevent or suppress lawless
violence.
One last point. Since the institution of the joint visibility
patrol in January, 2000, not a single citizen has complained
that his political or civil rights have been violated as a result
of the deployment of the Marines. It was precisely to safeguard
peace, tranquility and the civil liberties of the people that the
joint visibility patrol was conceived. Freedom and democracy
will be in full bloom only when people feel secure in their
homes and in the streets, not when the shadows of violence
and anarchy constantly lurk in their midst.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby
DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.

exercise of regulatory, proscriptive, or compulsory military power.

First, the soldiers do not control or direct the operation. This is
evident from Nos. 6, 8(k) and 9(a) of Annex A. These soldiers,
66 67 68

second, also have no power to prohibit or condemn. In No. 9(d) of69

Annex A, all arrested persons are brought to the nearest police

stations for proper disposition. And last, these soldiers apply no
coercive force. The materials or equipment issued to them, as shown
in No. 8(c) of Annex A, are all low impact and defensive in
70

character. The conclusion is that there being no exercise of

regulatory, proscriptive or compulsory military power, the
 G.R. No. 159085. February 3, 2004. * 658
SANLAKAS, represented by REP. J.V. BAUTISTA, and 658 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
PARTIDO NG MANGGAGAWA, represented by REP. Sanlakas vs. Executive Secretary
RENATO MAGTUBO, petitioners, vs. EXECUTIVE Same; Same; Same; That petitioners SJS officers/members are
SECRETARY, SECRETARY ANGELO REYES, GENERAL taxpayers and citizens does not necessarily endow them with
NARCISO ABAYA, DIR. GEN. HERMOGENES EBDANE, standing; A taxpayer may bring suit where the act complained of
respondents. directly involves the illegal disbursement of public funds derived
from taxation.—That petitioner SJS officers/members are taxpayers
and citizens does not necessarily endow them with standing. A
Remedial Law; Actions; As a rule, courts do not adjudicate moot
taxpayer may bring suit where the act complained of directly
cases, judicial power being limited to the determination of actual
involves the illegal disbursement of public funds derived from
controversies; Courts will decide a question, otherwise moot, if it is
taxation. No such illegal disbursement is alleged.
“capable of repetition yet evading review.”—As a rule, courts do not
Same; Same; Same; A citizen will be allowed to raise a
adjudicate moot cases, judicial power being limited to the
constitutional question only when he can show that he has personally
determination of “actual controversies.” Nevertheless, courts will
suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of the allegedly
decide a question, otherwise moot, if it is “capable of repetition yet
illegal conduct of the government.—On the other hand, a citizen will
evading review.”
be allowed to raise a constitutional question only when he can show
Same; Same; Parties; An act of the Executive which injures the
that he has personally suffered some actual or threatened injury as
institution of Congress causes a derivative but nonetheless
a result of the allegedly illegal conduct of the government; the injury
substantial injury which can be questioned by a member of
is fairly traceable to the challenged action; and the injury is likely
Congress.—To the extent the powers of Congress are impaired, so is
to be redressed by a favorable action.
the power of each member thereof, since his office confers a right to
Constitutional Law; Executive Department; Section 18, Article
participate in the exercise of the powers of that institution. An act
VII does not expressly prohibit the President from declaring a state
of the Executive which injures the institution of Congress causes a
of rebellion.—Nevertheless, it is equally true that Section 18, Article
derivative but nonetheless substantial injury, which can be
VII does notexpressly prohibit the President from declaring a state
questioned by a member of Congress. In such a case, any member of
of rebellion. Note that the Constitution vests the President not only
Congress can have a resort to the courts.
with Commander-in-Chiefpowers but, first and foremost,
Same; Same; Same; Petitioners Sanlakas and Partido ng
with Executive powers.
Manggagawa (PM) and Social Justice Society (SJS)
Same; Same; The President’s authority to declare a state of
Officers/Members have no legal standing or locus standi to bring
rebellion springs in the main from her powers as chief executive and,
suit; Definition of Legal Standing or Locus Standi.—Petitioners
at the same time, draws strength from her Commander-in-Chief
Sanlakas and PM, and SJS Officers/Members, have no legal
powers.—The President’s authority to declare a state of rebellion
standing or locus standi to bring suit. “Legal standing” or locus
springs in the main from her powers as chief executive and, at the
standihas been defined as a personal and substantial interest in the
same time, draws strength from her Commander-in-Chief powers.
case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury
Indeed, as the Solicitor General accurately points out, statutory
as a result of the governmental act that is being challenged. . . . The
authority for such a declaration may be found in Section 4, Chapter
gist of the question of standing is whether a party alleges “such
2 (Ordinance Power), Book III (Office of the President) of the
personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that
Revised Administrative Code of 1987.
concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues
upon which the court depends for illumination of difficult
PANGANIBAN, J., Separate Opinion:
constitutional questions.”
 Remedial Law; Action; The judicial power to declare a law or
an executive order unconstitutional is limited to actual cases and
controversies to be exercised after full opportunity of argument by the
parties and limited further to the constitutional question raised or
the very lis mota presented; Fourfold Requisites in deciding
constitutional law issues.—The judicial power to declare a law or an
executive order unconstitutional, according to Justice Jose P.
Laurel, is “limited to actual cases and controversies to be exercised
after full opportunity of argument by the parties, and limited
further to the constitutional question raised or the very lis mota pre-
659
VOL. 421, FEBRUARY 3, 2004 659
Sanlakas vs. Executive Secretary
sented.” Following this long-held principle, the Court has thus
always been guided by these fourfold requisites in deciding
constitutional law issues: 1) there must be an actual case or
controversy involving a conflict of rights susceptible of judicial
determination; 2) the constitutional question must be raised by a
proper party; 3) the constitutional question must be raised at the
earliest opportunity; and 4) adjudication of the constitutional
question must be indispensable to the resolution of the case.
Same; Same; A justiciable controversy involves a definite and
concrete dispute touching on the legal relations of parties having
adverse legal interests.—The first requirement, the existence of
a live case or controversy, means that an existing litigation is ripe
for resolution and susceptible of judicial determination; as opposed
to one that is conjectural or anticipatory, hypothetical or feigned. A
justiciable controversy involves a definite and concrete dispute
touching on the legal relations of parties having adverse legal
interests. Hence, it admits of specific relief through a decree that is
conclusive in character, in contrast to an opinion which only advises
what the law would be upon a hypothetical state of facts.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J., Separate Opinion:
Constitutional Law; Executive Department; The declaration of
a “state of rebellion” does not have any legal meaning or
consequence.—The majority made it clear that exercise of the
President’s Commander-in-Chief powers does not require the
declaration of a “state of rebellion” or a declaration of a “state of
lawless violence” or a “state of invasion.” When any of these
conditions exist, the President may call out the armed forces to
suppress the danger. Thus, the declaration of a “state of rebellion”
does not have any legal meaning or consequence. This declaration
does not give the President any extra powers. It does not have any
good purpose.
SANDOVAL-GUTTIEREZ, J., Dissenting Opinion:
Same; Same; There is no provision in our Constitution
authorizing the President to declare a state of rebellion.—The powers
of the President are not as particularized as are those of Congress.
Enumerated powers do not include undefined powers, as what the
majority would want to point out. I state once more that there is no
provision in our Constitution authorizing the President to declare “a
state of rebellion.” Not even the constitutional powers vested upon
her include such power.
PETITION to declare unconstitutional Proclamation No. 427
and General Order No. 4.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Roberto Guevarra for petitioners in G.R. No. 159085.
660
660 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Sanlakas vs. Executive Secretary
Gana & Manlangit Law Office for Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr.
Samson S. Alcantara, Ed Vincent S. Albano, Rene B.
Gorospe,Edwin R. Sandoval and Rodolfo D. Mapile for
petitioners in G.R. No. 159103.
Cornelio P. Panes for petitioners in G.R. No. 159185.
Demaree J.B. Raval collaborating counsel for petitioners
in G.R. No. 159185.
TINGA, J.:
They came in the middle of the night. Armed with high-
powered ammunitions and explosives, some three hundred
junior officers and enlisted men of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines (AFP) stormed into the Oakwood Premiere
apartments in Makati City in the wee hours of July 27, 2003.
Bewailing the corruption in the AFP, the soldiers demanded,
among other things, the resignation of the President, the
Secretary of Defense and the Chief of the Philippine National
Police (PNP). 1
In the wake of the Oakwood occupation, the President
issued later in the day Proclamation No. 427 and General
Order No. 4, both declaring “a state of rebellion” and calling
out the Armed Forces to suppress the rebellion. Proclamation
No. 427 reads in full:
PROCLAMATION NO. 427
DECLARING A STATE OF REBELLION
WHEREAS, certain elements of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, armed with high-powered firearms and explosives,
acting upon the instigation and command and direction of known
and unknown leaders, have seized a building in Makati City, put
bombs in the area, publicly declared withdrawal of support for, and
took arms against the duly constituted Government, and continue
to rise publicly and show open hostility, for the purpose of removing
allegiance to the Government certain bodies of the Armed Forces of
the Philippines and the Philippine National Police, and depriving
the President of the Republic of the Philippines, wholly or partially,
of her powers and prerogatives which constitute the crime of
rebellion punishable under Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code,
as amended;
_______________
1 Rollo, G.R. No. 159085, p. 7; Rollo, G.R. No. 159103, pp. 4-5; Rollo, G.R. No.
159185, pp. 4-5; Rollo, G.R. No. 159186, p. 9.
661
VOL. 421, FEBRUARY 3, 2004
Sanlakas vs. Executive Secretary
WHEREAS, these misguided elements of the Armed Forces of
the Philippines are being supported, abetted and aided by known
and unknown leaders, conspirators and plotters in the government
service and outside the government;
WHEREAS, under Section 18, Article VII of the present
Constitution, whenever it becomes necessary, the President, as the
Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, may
call out such Armed Forces to suppress the rebellion;
NOW, THEREFORE, I, GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, by
virtue of the powers vested in me by law, hereby confirm the
existence of an actual and on-going rebellion, compelling me to
declare a state of rebellion.
In view of the foregoing, I am issuing General Order No. 4 in
accordance with Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, calling
out the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National
Police to immediately carry out the necessary actions and measures
to suppress and quell the rebellion with due regard to constitutional
rights.
General Order No. 4 is similarly worded:
GENERAL ORDER NO. 4
DIRECTING THE ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES
AND THE
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE TO
SUPPRESS REBELLION
WHEREAS, certain elements of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, armed with high-powered firearms and explosives,
acting upon the instigation and command and direction of known
and unknown leaders, have seized a building in Makati City, put
bombs in the area, publicly declared withdrawal of support for, and
took arms against the duly constituted Government, and continue
to rise publicly and show open hostility, for the purpose of removing
allegiance to the Government certain bodies of the Armed Forces of
the Philippines and the Philippine National Police, and depriving
the President of the Republic of the Philippines, wholly or partially,
of her powers and prerogatives which constitute the crime of
661 rebellion punishable under Article 134 et seq. of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended;
WHEREAS, these misguided elements of the Armed Forces of
the Philippines are being supported, abetted and aided by known
and unknown leaders, conspirators and plotters in the government
service and outside the government;
 WHEREAS, under Section 18, Article VII of the present
Constitution, whenever it becomes necessary, the President, as the
Commander-in-Chief of all Armed Forces of the Philippines, may
call out such Armed Forces to suppress the rebellion;
662
662 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Sanlakas vs. Executive Secretary
NOW, THEREFORE, I, GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, by
virtue of the powers vested in me by the Constitution as President
of the Republic of the Philippines and Commander-in-Chief of all
the armed forces of the Philippines and pursuant to Proclamation
No. 427 dated July 27, 2003, do hereby call upon the Armed Forces
of the Philippines and the Philippine National Police to suppress
and quell the rebellion.
I hereby direct the Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines
and the Chief of the Philippine National Police and the officers and
men of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine
National Police to immediately carry out the necessary and
appropriate actions and measures to suppress and quell the
rebellion with due regard to constitutional rights.
By the evening of July 27, 2003, the Oakwood occupation had
ended. After hours-long negotiations, the soldiers agreed to
return to barracks. The President, however, did not
immediately lift the declaration of a state of rebellion and did
so only on August 1, 2003, through Proclamation No. 435:
DECLARING THAT THE STATE OF REBELLION
HAS CEASED TO EXIST
WHEREAS, by virtue of Proclamation No. 427 dated July 27, 2003,
a state of rebellion was declared;
WHEREAS, by virtue of General Order No. 4 dated July 27,
2003, which was issued on the basis of Proclamation No. 427 dated
July 27, 2003, and pursuant to Article VII, Section 18 of the
Constitution, the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the
Philippine National Police were directed to suppress and quell the
rebellion;
WHEREAS, the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the
Philippine National Police have effectively suppressed and quelled
the rebellion.
NOW, THEREFORE, I, GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO,
President of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me by
law, hereby declare that the state of rebellion has ceased to exist.
In the interim, several petitions were filed before this Court
challenging the validity of Proclamation No. 427 and General
Order No. 4.
In G.R. No. 159085 (Sanlakas and PM v. Executive
Secretary, et al.), party-list organizations Sanlakas and
2
Partido ng Mangga-
_______________
2 The Court in a Resolution dated August 5, 2003 (Rollo, G.R. No. 159086,
p. 18) previously dismissed the Sanlakas petition for failure to
663
VOL. 421, FEBRUARY 3, 2004 663
Sanlakas vs. Executive Secretary
gawa (PM), contend that Section 18, Article VII of the
Constitution does not require the declaration of a state of
rebellion to call out the armed forces. They further submit
3
that, because of the cessation of the Oakwood occupation,
there exists no sufficient factual basis for the proclamation by
the President of a state of rebellion for an indefinite period. 4
Petitioners in G.R. No. 159103 (SJS Officers/Members v.
Hon. Executive Secretary, et al.) are officers/members of the
Social Justice Society (SJS), “Filipino citizens, taxpayers, law
professors and bar reviewers.” Like Sanlakas and PM, they
5
claim that Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution does not
authorize the declaration of a state of rebellion. They contend
6
that the declaration is a “constitutional anomaly” that
“confuses, confounds and misleads” because “[o]verzealous
public officers, acting pursuant to such proclamation or
general order, are liable to violate the constitutional right of
private citizens.” Petitioners also submit that the
7
proclamation is a circumvention of the report requirement
under the same Section 18, Article VII, commanding the
President to submit a report to Congress within 48 hours from
the proclamation of martial law. Finally, they contend that
8
the presidential issuances cannot be construed as an exercise
of emergency powers as Congress has not delegated any such
power to the President. 9 other deadly weapons’ assaulted and attempted to break into
In G.R. No. 159185 (Rep. Suplico, et al. v. President
Macapagal-Arroyo and Executive Secretary Romulo),
petitioners brought suit as citizens and as Members of the
House of Representatives whose rights, powers and functions
were allegedly affected by the declaration of a state of
rebellion. Petitioners do not challenge the power of the
10
President to call out the Armed Forces. They argue, however,
11
that the declaration of a state of rebellion is a “superfluity,”
and is actually an exercise of emergency powers. Such 12
exercise, it is contended, amounts to a usurpation of the power
of Congress granted by Section 23 (2), Article VI of the
Constitution. 13
In G.R. No. 159196 (Pimentel v. Romulo, et al.), petitioner
Senator assails the subject presidential issuances as “an
unwarranted, illegal and abusive exercise of a martial law
power that has no basis under the Constitution.” In the main,
14
petitioner fears that the declaration of a state of rebellion
“opens the door to the unconstitutional implementation of
warrantless arrests” for the crime of rebellion. 15
Required to comment, the Solicitor General argues that the
petitions have been rendered moot by the lifting of the
declaration. In addition, the Solicitor General questions the
16
standing of the petitioners to bring suit.
17
The Court agrees with the Solicitor General that the
issuance of Proclamation No. 435, declaring that the state of
rebellion has ceased to exist, has rendered the case moot. As a
rule, courts do not adjudicate moot cases, judicial power being
limited to the determination of
“actual controversies.” Nevertheless, courts will decide a
18
question, otherwise moot, if it is “capable of repetition yet
evading review.” The case at bar is one such case.
19
Once before, the President on May 1, 2001 declared a state
of rebellion and called upon the AFP and the PNP to suppress
the rebellion through Proclamation No. 38 and General Order
No. 1. On that occasion, “ ‘an angry and violent mob armed
with explosives, firearms, bladed weapons, clubs, stones and
Malacañang.” Petitions were filed before this Court assailing
20
the validity of the President’s declaration. Five days after such
declaration, however, the President lifted the same. The
mootness of the petitions in Lacson v. Perez and accompanying
cases precluded
21 this Court from addressing the
constitutionality of the declaration.
To prevent similar questions from reemerging, we seize this
opportunity to finally lay to rest the validity of the declaration
of a state of rebellion in the exercise of the President’s calling
out power, the mootness of the petitions notwithstanding.
Only petitioners Rep. Suplico, et al. and Sen. Pimentel, as
Members of Congress, have standing to challenge the subject
issuances. In Philippine Constitution Association v.
Enriquez, this Court recognized that:
22
To the extent the powers of Congress are impaired, so is the power
of each member thereof, since his office confers a right to participate
in the exercise of the powers of that institution.
An act of the Executive which injures the institution of Congress
causes a derivative but nonetheless substantial injury, which can be
questioned by a member of Congress. In such a case, any member of
Congress can have a resort to the courts.
Petitioner Members of Congress claim that the declaration of
a state of rebellion by the President is tantamount to an
exercise of Congress’ emergency powers, thus impairing the
lawmakers’ legislative powers. Petitioners also maintain that
the declaration is a subterfuge to avoid congressional scrutiny
into the President’s exercise of martial law powers.
Petitioners Sanlakas and PM, and SJS Officers/Members,
have no legal standing or locus standi to bring suit. “Legal
standing” or locus standi has been defined as a personal and
substantial interest in the case such that the party has
sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the
governmental act that is being challenged. . . . The gist of the
question of standing is whether a party alleges “such personal
stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that
concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of
issues upon which the court depends for illumination of
difficult constitutional questions.” 23
Petitioners Sanlakas and PM assert that:
2. As a basic principle of the organizations and as an important
plank in their programs, petitioners are committed to assert,
defend, protect, uphold, and promote the rights, interests, and
welfare of the people, especially the poor and marginalized classes
and sectors of Philippine society. Petitioners are committed to
defend and assert human rights, including political and civil rights,
of the citizens.
3. Members of the petitioner organizations resort to mass actions
and mobilizations in the exercise of their Constitutional rights to
peaceably assemble and their freedom of speech and of expression
under Section 4, Article III of the 1987 Constitution, as a vehicle to
publicly ventilate their grievances and legitimate demands and to
mobilize public opinion to support the same. [Emphasis in the
24
original.]
Petitioner party-list organizations claim no better right than
the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino, whose standing this
Court rejected in Lacson v. Perez.
. . . petitioner has not demonstrated any injury to itself which would
justify the resort to the Court. Petitioner is a juridical person not
subject to arrest. Thus, it cannot claim to be threatened by a
warrantless arrest. Nor is it alleged that its leaders, members, and
supporters are being threatened with warrantless arrest and
detention for the crime of rebellion. Every action must be brought in
the name of the party whose legal rights has been invaded or
infringed, or whose legal right is under imminent threat of invasion
or infringement.
At best, the instant petition may be considered as an action for
declaratory relief, petitioner claiming that it[’]s right to freedom of
expression and freedom of assembly is affected by the declaration of
a “state of rebellion” and that said proclamation is invalid for being
contrary to the Constitution.
However, to consider the petition as one for declaratory relief
affords little comfort to petitioner, this Court not having jurisdiction
in the first instance over such a petition. Section 5 [1], Article VIII
of the Constitution limits the original jurisdiction of the court to
cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls,
and over petitions for certiorari,prohibition, mandamus, quo
warranto, and habeas corpus. 25
Even assuming that petitioners are “people’s organizations,”
this status would not vest them with the requisite personality
to question the validity of the presidential issuances, as this
Court made clear in Kilosbayan v. Morato: 26
The Constitution provides that “the State shall respect the role of
independent people’s organizations to enable the people to pursue
and protect, within the democratic framework, their legitimate and
collective interests and aspirations through peaceful and lawful
means,” that their right to “effective and reasonable participation at
all levels of social, political, and economic decision-making shall not
be abridged.” (Art. XIII, §§15-16)
These provisions have not changed the traditional rule that
only real parties in interest or those with standing, as the case may
be, may invoke the judicial power. The jurisdiction of this Court,
even in cases involving constitutional questions, is limited by the
“case and controversy” requirement of Art. VIII, §5. This
requirement lies at the very heart of the judicial function. It is what
differentiates decision-making in the courts from decision making
in the political departments of the government and bars the
bringing of suits by just any party.27
That petitioner SJS officers/members are taxpayers and
citizens does not necessarily endow them with standing. A
taxpayer may bring suit where the actcomplained of directly
involves the illegal disbursement of public funds derived from
taxation. No such illegal disbursement is alleged.
28
On the other hand, a citizen will be allowed to raise a
constitutional question only when he can show that he has
personally suffered some actual or threatened injury as a
result of the allegedly illegal conduct of the government; the
injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action; and the
injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable action. Again,
29
no such injury is alleged in this case.
Even granting these petitioners have standing on the
ground that the issues they raise are of transcendental
importance, the petitions must fail.
 It is true that for the purpose of exercising the calling out
power the Constitution does not require the President to make
a declaration of a state of rebellion. Section 18, Article VII
provides:
Sec. 18. The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all
armed forces of the Philippines and whenever it becomes necessary,
he may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless
violence, invasion or rebellion. In case of invasion or rebellion, when
the public safety requires it, he may, for a period not exceeding sixty
days, suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or place the
Philippines or any part thereof under martial law. Within forty-
eight hours from the proclamation of martial law or the suspension
of the writ of habeas corpus, the President shall submit a report in
person or in writing to the Congress. The Congress, voting jointly,
by a vote of at least a majority of all its Members in regular or special
session, may revoke such proclamation or suspension, which
revocation shall not be set aside by the President. Upon the
initiative of the President, the Congress may, in the same manner,
extend such proclamation or suspension for a period to be
determined by the Congress, if the invasion or rebellion shall persist
and public safety requires it.
The Congress, if not in session, shall, within twenty-four hours
following such proclamation or suspension, convene in accordance
with its rules without need of a call.
The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding
filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of the factual basis for the
proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus or the extension thereof, and must promulgate
its decision thereon within thirty days from its filing.
A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the
Constitution, nor supplant the functioning of the civil courts or
legislative assemblies, nor authorize the conferment of the
jurisdiction on military courts and agencies over civilians where
civil courts are able to function, nor automatically suspend the
privilege of the writ.
The suspension of the privilege of the writ shall apply only to
persons judicially charged for rebellion or offenses inherent in or
directly connected with invasion.
During the suspension of the privilege of the writ, any person
thus arrested or detained shall be judicially charged within three
days, otherwise he shall be released. [Emphasis supplied.]
The above provision grants the President, as Commander-in-
Chief, a “sequence” of “graduated power[s].” From the most to
30
the least benign, these are: the calling out power, the power to
suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, and the
power to declare martial law. In the exercise of the latter two
powers, the Constitution requires the concurrence of two
conditions, namely, an actual invasion or rebellion, and that
public safety requires the exercise of such power. However, as
31
we observed in Integrated Bar of the Philippines v.
Zamora, “[t]hese conditions are not required in the exercise
32
of the calling out power. The only criterion is that ‘whenever it
becomes necessary,’ the President may call the armed forces
‘to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion.’
”
Nevertheless, it is equally true that Section 18, Article VII
does not expressly prohibit the President from declaring a
state of rebellion. Note that the Constitution vests the
President not only with Commander-in-Chief powers but, first
and foremost, with Executive powers.
Section 1, Article VII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution
states: “The executive power shall be vested in the President .
. . .” As if by exposition, Section 17 of the same Article provides:
“He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.” The
provisions trace their history to the Constitution of the United
States.
The specific provisions of the U.S. Constitution granting the
U.S. President executive and commander-in-chief powers have
remained in their original simple form since the Philadelphia
Constitution of 1776, Article II of which states in part:
Section 1. 1. The Executive Power shall be vested in a President of
the United States of America . . . .
Section 2. 1. The President shall be Commander in Chief of the
Army and Navy of the United States . . . .
....
 Section 3. . . . he shall take care that the laws be faithfully
executed . . . . [Article II—Executive Power]
Recalling in historical vignettes the use by the U.S. President
of the above-quoted provisions, as juxtaposed against the
corresponding action of the U.S. Supreme Court, is instructive.
Clad with the prerogatives of the office and endowed with
sovereign powers, which are drawn chiefly from the Executive
Power and Commander-in-Chief provisions, as well as the
presidential oath of office, the President serves as Chief of
State or Chief of Government, Commander-in-Chief, Chief of
Foreign Relations and Chief of Public Opinion. 33
First to find definitive new piers for the authority of the
Chief of State, as the protector of the people, was President
Andrew Jackson. Coming to office by virtue of a political
revolution, Jackson, as President not only kept faith with the
people by driving the patricians from power. Old Hickory, as
he was fondly called, was the first President to champion the
indissolubility of the Union by defeating South Carolina’s
nullification effort. 34
The Federal Tariff Acts of 1828 and 1832 that Congress
enacted did not pacify the hotspurs from South Carolina. Its
State Legislature ordered an election for a convention, whose
members quickly passed an Ordinance of Nullification. The
Ordinance declared the Tariff Acts unconstitutional,
prohibited South Carolina citizens from obeying them after a
certain date in 1833, and threatened secession if the Federal
Government sought to oppose the tariff laws. The Legislature
then implemented the Ordinance with bristling punitive laws
aimed at any who sought to pay or collect customs duties.
Jackson bided his time. His task of enforcement would not
be easy. Technically, the President might send troops into a
State only if the Governor called for help to suppress an
insurrection, which would not occur in the instance. The
President could also
_______________
33 In the Philippines, the President is called the Chief Executive.
34 Milton, The Use of Presidential Power, 1789-1943, pp. 73, 86-90.
Id., at p. 91.
35
671
VOL. 421, FEBRUARY 3, 2004 671
Sanlakas vs. Executive Secretary
send troops to see to it that the laws enacted by Congress were
faithfully executed. But these laws were aimed at individual
citizens, and provided no enforcement machinery against
violation by a State. Jackson prepared to ask Congress for a
force bill. 36
In a letter to a friend, the President gave the essence of his
position. He wrote: “. . . when a faction in a State attempts to
nullify a constitutional law of Congress, or to destroy the
Union, the balance of the people composing this Union have a
perfect right to coerce them to obedience.” Then in a
Proclamation he issued on December 10, 1832, he called upon
South Carolinians to realize that there could be no peaceable
interference with the execution of the laws, and dared them,
“disunion by armed force is treason. Are you ready to incur its
guilt?”37
The Proclamation frightened nullifiers, non-nullifiers and
tight-rope walkers. Soon, State Legislatures began to adopt
resolutions of agreement, and the President announced that
the national voice from Maine on the north to Louisiana on the
south had declared nullification and accession “confined to
contempt and infamy.” 38
No other President entered office faced with problems so
formidable, and enfeebled by personal and political handicaps
so daunting, as Abraham Lincoln.
35 Lincoln believed the President’s power broad and that of
Congress explicit and restricted, and sought some source of
executive power not failed by misuse or wrecked by sabotage.
He seized upon the President’s designation by the
Constitution as Commander-in-Chief, coupled it to the
executive power provision—and joined them as “the war
power” which authorized him to do many things beyond the
competence of Congress. 39
 Lincoln embraced the Jackson concept of the President’s
independent power and duty under his oath directly to
represent and protect the people. In his Message of July 4,
1861, Lincoln declared that “the Executive found the duty of
employing the war power in defense of the government forced
upon him. He could not but perform the duty or surrender the
existence of the Government . . . .” This concept began as a
transition device, to be validated by Con-
_______________
36 Id., at p. 92.
37 Ibid.
38 Milton, at pp. 91-92.
39 Id., at p. 109.
672
672 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Sanlakas vs. Executive Secretary
gress when it assembled. In less than two-years, it grew into
an independent power under which he felt authorized to
suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, issue the
Emancipation Proclamation, and restore reoccupied States. 40
Lincoln’s Proclamation of April 15, 1861, called for 75,000
troops. Their first service, according to the proclamation,
would be to recapture forts, places and property, taking care
“to avoid any devastation, any destruction of or interference
with property, or any disturbance of peaceful citizens.”
41
Early in 1863, the U.S. Supreme Court approved President
Lincoln’s report to use the war powers without the benefit of
Congress. The decision was handed in the celebrated Prize
Cases which involved suits attacking the President’s right to
42
legally institute a blockade. Although his Proclamation was
subsequently validated by Congress, the claimants contended
that under international law, a blockade could be instituted
only as a measure of war under the sovereign power of the
State. Since under the Constitution only Congress is
exclusively empowered to declare war, it is only that body that
could impose a blockade and all prizes seized before the
legislative declaration were illegal. By a 5 to 4 vote, the
Supreme Court upheld Lincoln’s right to act as he had. 43
In the course of time, the U.S. President’s power to call out
armed forces and suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpuswithout prior legislative approval, in case of invasion,
insurrection, or rebellion came to be recognized and accepted.
The United States introduced the expanded presidential
powers in the Philippines through the Philippine Bill of
1902. The use of the power was put to judicial test and this
44
Court held that the case raised a political question and said
that it is beyond its province to inquire into the exercise of the
power. Later, the grant of the power was incorporated in the
45
1935 Constitution. 46
Elected in 1884, Grover Cleveland took his ascent to the
presidency to mean that it made him the trustee of all the
people. Guided by the maxim that “Public office is a public
trust,” which he practiced during his incumbency, Cleveland
sent federal troops to Illinois to quell striking railway workers
who defied a court injunction. The injunction banned all
picketing and distribution of handbills. For leading the strikes
and violating the injunction, Debs, who was the union
president, was convicted of contempt of court. Brought to the
Supreme Court, the principal issue was by what authority of
the Constitution or statute had the President to send troops
without the request of the Governor of the State. 47
In In Re: Eugene Debs, et al., the Supreme Court upheld
48
the contempt conviction. It ruled that it is not the
government’s province to mix in merely individual present
controversies. Still, so it went on, “whenever wrongs
complained of are such as affect the public at large, and are in
respect of matters which by the Constitution are entrusted to
the care of the Nation and concerning which the Nation owes
the duty to all citizens of securing to them their common
rights, then the mere fact that the Government has no
pecuniary interest in the controversy is not sufficient to
exclude it from the Courts, or prevent it from taking measures
therein to fully discharge those constitutional duties.” Thus,
49
Cleveland’s course had the Court’s attest.
Taking off from President Cleveland, President Theodore
Roosevelt launched what political scientists dub the
“stewardship theory.” Calling himself “the steward of the
people,” he felt that the executive power “was limited only by
the specific restrictions and prohibitions appearing in the
Constitution, or impleaded by Congress under its
constitutional powers.” 50
The most far-reaching extension of presidential power
“T.R.” ever undertook to employ was his plan to occupy and
operate Pennsylvania’s coal mines under his authority as
Commander-in-Chief. In the issue, he found means other than
force to end the 1902 hard-coal strike, but he had made
detailed plans to use his power as Commander-in-Chief to
wrest the mines from the stubborn operators, so that coal
production would begin again. 51
Eventually, the power of the State to intervene in and even
take over the operation of vital utilities in the public interest
was accepted. In the Philippines, this led to the incorporation
of Section 6, Article XIII of the 1935 Constitution, which was
52
later carried over with modifications in Section 7, Article XIV
53
of the 1973 Constitution, and thereafter in Section 18, Article
54
XII of the 1987 Constitution.
The lesson to be learned from the U.S. constitutional
history is that the Commander-in-Chief powers are broad
enough as it is and become more so when taken together with
the provision on executive power and the presidential oath of
office. Thus, the plenitude of the powers of the presidency
equips the occupant with the means to address exigencies or
threats which undermine the very existence of government or
the integrity of the State.
In The Philippine Presidency A Study of Executive
Power,the late Mme. Justice Irene R. Cortes, proposed that the
Philippine President was vested with residual power and that
this is even greater than that of the U.S. President. She
attributed this distinction to the “unitary and highly
centralized” nature of the Philippine government. She noted
that, “There is no counterpart of the several states of the
American union which have reserved powers under the United
States constitution.” Elaborating on the constitutional basis
for her argument, she wrote:
. . . . The [1935] Philippine [C]onstitution establishes the three
departments of the government in this manner: “The legislative
power shall be vested in a Congress of the Philippines which shall
consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives.” “The executive
power shall be vested in a President of the Philippines.” The judicial
powers shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such inferior
courts as may be provided by law.” These provisions not only
establish a separation of powers by actual division but also confer
plenary legislative, executive, and judicial powers. For as the
Supreme Court of the Philippines pointed out in Ocampo v.
Cabangis, “a grant of legislative power means a grant of all the
legislative power; and a grant of the judicial power means a grant of
all the judicial power which may be exercised under the
government.” If this is true of the legislative power which is
exercised by two chambers with a combined membership [at that
time] of more than 120 and of the judicial power which is vested in
a hierarchy of courts, it can equally if not more appropriately apply
to the executive power which is vested in one official—the president.
He personifies the executive branch. There is a unity in the
executive branch absent from the two other branches of government.
The president is not the chief of many executives. He
is the executive. His direction of the executive branch can be more
immediate and direct than the United States president because he
is given by express provision of the constitution control over all
executive departments, bureaus and offices. 55
The esteemed Justice conducted her study against the
backdrop of the 1935 Constitution, the framers of which, early
on, arrived at a general opinion in favor of a strong Executive
in the Philip-pines.” Since then, reeling from the aftermath of
56
martial law, our most recent Charter has restricted the
President’s powers as Commander-in-Chief. The same,
however, cannot be said of the President’s powers as Chief
Executive.
 In her ponencia in Marcos v. Manglapus, Justice Cortes put
her thesis into jurisprudence. There, the Court, by a slim 8-7
margin, upheld the President’s power to forbid the return of
her exiled predecessor. The rationale for the majority’s ruling
rested on the President’s
. . . unstated residual powers which are implied from the grant of
executive power and which are necessary for her to comply with her
duties under the Constitution. The powers of the President are not
limited to what are expressly enumerated in the article on the
Executive Department and in scattered provisions of the
Constitution. This is so, notwithstanding the avowed intent of the
members of the Constitutional Commission of 1986 to limit the
powers of the President as a reaction to the abuses under the regime
of Mr. Marcos, for the result was a limitation of specific powers of
the President, particularly those relating to the commander-in-chief
clause, but not a diminution of the general grant of
executive power. [Boldface supplied. Italics in the original.]
57
Thus, the President’s authority to declare a state of rebellion
springs in the main from her powers as chief executive and, at
the same time, draws strength from her Commander-in-Chief
powers. Indeed, as the Solicitor General accurately points out,
statutory authority for such a declaration may be found in
Section 4, Chapter 2 (Ordinance Power), Book III (Office of the
President) of the Revised Administrative Code of 1987, which
states:
SEC. 4. Proclamations.—Acts of the President fixing a date or
declaring a status or condition of public moment or interest, upon
the existence of which the operation of a specific law or regulation is
made to depend, shall be promulgated in proclamations which shall
have the force of an executive order. [Emphasis supplied.]
The foregoing discussion notwithstanding, in calling out the
armed forces, a declaration of a state of rebellion is an utter
super-fluity. At most, it only gives notice to the nation that
58
such a state exists and that the armed forces may be called to
prevent or suppress it. Perhaps the declaration may wreak
59
emotional effects upon the perceived enemies of the State,
even on the entire nation. But this Court’s mandate is to probe
only into the legal consequences of the declaration. This Court
finds that such a declaration is devoid of any legal significance.
For all legal intents, the declaration is deemed not written.
Should there be any “confusion” generate by the issuance of
Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4, we clarify
that, as the dissenters in Lacson correctly pointed out, the
mere declaration of a state of rebellion cannot diminish or
violate constitutionally protected rights. Indeed, if a state of
60
martial law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution
or automatically suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus? then it is with more reason that a simple declaration
61
of a state of rebellion could not bring about these
conditions. At any rate, the presidential issuances
62
themselves call for the suppression of the rebellion “with due
regard to constitutional rights.”
For the same reasons, apprehensions that the military and
police authorities may resort to warrantless arrests are
likewise unfounded. In Lacson vs. Perez, supra, majority of the
Court held that “[i]n quelling or suppressing the rebellion, the
authorities may only resort to warrantless arrests of persons
suspected of rebellion, as provided under Section 5, Rule 113
of the Rules of Court, if the circumstances so warrant. The
63
warrantless arrest feared by petitioners is, thus, not based on
the declaration of a ‘state of rebellion.’ ” In other words, a
64
person may be subjected to a warrantless arrest for the crime
of rebellion whether or not the president has declared a state
of rebellion, so long as the requisites for a valid warrantless
arrest are present.
It is not disputed that the President has full discretionary
power to call out the armed forces and to determine the
necessity the exercise of such power. While the Court may
examine whether the power was exercised within
constitutional limits or in a manner constituting grave abuse
of discretion, none of the petitioners here have, by way of proof,
supported their assertion that the President acted without
factual basis. 65
The argument that the declaration of a state of rebellion
amounts to a declaration of martial law and, therefore, is a
circumvention of the report requirement, is a leap of logic.
There is no indication that military tribunals have replaced
civil courts in the “theater of war” or that military authorities
have taken over the functions of civil government. There is no
allegation of curtailment of civil or political rights. There is no
indication that the President has exercised judicial and
legislative powers. In short, there is no illustration that the
President has attempted to exercise or has exercised martial
law powers.
Nor by any stretch of the imagination can the declaration
constitute an indirect exercise of emergency powers, which
exercise depends upon a grant of Congress pursuant to Section
23 (2), Article VI of the Constitution:
Sec. 23. (1) . . .
(2) In times of war or other national emergencies, the Congress
may, by law, authorize the President, for a limited period and
subject to such restrictions as it may prescribe, to exercise powers
necessary and proper to carry out a declared national policy. Unless
sooner withdrawn by resolution of the Congress, such powers shall
cease upon the next adjournment thereof.
The petitions do not cite a specific instance where the
President has attempted to or has exercised powers beyond
her powers as Chief Executive or as Commander-in-Chief. The
President, in declaring a state of rebellion and in calling out
the armed forces, was merely exercising a wedding of her Chief
Executive and Commander-in-Chief powers. These are purely
executive powers, vested on the President by Sections 1 and 18,
Article VII, as opposed to the delegated legislative powers
contemplated by Section 23 (2), Article VI.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.