I. Classification of Property enjoyment of property is not presumed by
A telephone
Tsai v. CA
As far back as Navarro v. Pineda, 9 SCRA
631 (1963), an immovable may be
considered a personal property if there is a
stipulation as when it is used as security in
the payment of an obligation where a
chattel mortgage is executed over it.
Makati Leasing v. Wearever Textile
If a house of strong materials may be
considered as personal property for
purposes of executing a chattel mortgage
thereon as long as the parties to the
contract so agree and no innocent third
party will be prejudiced thereby, there is
absolutely no reason why a machinery,
which is movable in its nature and becomes
immobilized only by destination or purpose,
may not be likewise treated as such. This is
really because one who has so agreed is
estopped from denying the existence of the
chattel mortgage.
Board of Assessment v. Meralco
The steel towers or supports in question, do
not come within the objects mentioned in
paragraph 1 of NCC Art. 415 because they
do not constitute nor construction
analogous to buildings or constructions
adhered to the soil. As per description,
given by the lower court, they are
removable and merely attached to a square
metal frame by means of bolts, which when
unscrewed could easily be dismantled and
moved from place to place. They cannot be
included under paragraph 3 of same article
as they are not attached to an immovable
in a fixed manner, and they can be
separated without breaking the material or
causing deterioration upon the object to
which they are attached. Each of these
steel towers or supports consists of steel
bars or metal strips, joined together by
means of bolts, which can be disassembled
by unscrewing the bolts and reassembled
by screwing the same. These steel towers
or supports do not also fall under paragraph
5, for they are not machineries,
receptacles, instruments or implements,
and even if they were, they are not intended
for industry or works on the land. Meralco
is not engaged in an industry or works in
the land in which the steel supports or
towers are constructed.
Davao Sawmill v. Castillo
A machinery which is movable in its nature
only becomes immobilized when placed in
a plant by the owner of the property or
plant, but not when so placed by a tenant,
a usufructuary, or any person having only a
temporary right, unless such person acted
as the agent of the owner. The distinction
rests upon the fact that one only having a
temporary right to the possession or
transmitted to the party called.
the law to have applied movable property
belonging to him so as to deprive him of it
by causing it by an act of immobilization to
become the property of another.
People’s Bank v. Dahican Lumber
It is not disputed in the case at bar that the
"after acquired properties" were purchased
by DALCO in connection with, and for use
in the development of its lumber
concession and that they were purchased
in addition to, or in replacement of those
already existing in the premises. In law,
therefore, they must be deemed to have
been immobilized, with the result that the
real estate mortgages involved herein —
which were registered as such — did not
have to be registered a second time as
chattel mortgages in order to bind the "after
acquired properties" and affect third
parties.
Furthermore, both parties had treated the
"after acquired properties" as real
properties by expressly and unequivocally
agreeing that they shall automatically
become subject to the lien of the real estate
mortgages executed by them. There is,
therefore, more reason to hold that such
consensus impresses upon the properties
the character determined by the parties
who must now be held in estoppel to
question it.
Laurel v. Abrogar
The only requirement for a personal
property to be the object of theft under the
penal code is that it be capable of
appropriation. It need not be capable of
asportation, which is defined as carrying
away. Jurisprudence is settled that to take
under the theft provision of the penal code
does not require asportation or carrying
away. To appropriate means to deprive the
lawful owner of the thing.
The business of providing
telecommunication or telephone service is
likewise personal property which can be the
object of theft under Article 308 of the
Revised Penal Code. Interest in business
was not specifically enumerated as
personal property in the Civil Code in force
at the time the above decision was
rendered. Yet, interest in business was
declared to be personal property since it is
capable of appropriation and not included
in the enumeration of real properties.
Business may be appropriated under
Section 2 of the Bulk Sales Law, hence,
could be object of theft.
In making the international phone calls, the
human voice is converted into electrical
impulses or electric current which are
call, therefore, is electrical energy, and an
intangible property such as electrical
energy is capable of appropriation because
it may be taken and carried away.
Electricity is personal property under Article
416 (3) of the Civil Code, which
enumerates forces of nature which are
brought under control by science.
Punzalan v. Vda. De Lacsamana
Buildings are always immovable under the
Code. A building treated separately from
the land on which it stood is immovable
property and the mere fact that the parties
to a contract seem to have dealt with it
separate and apart from the land on which
it stood in no wise changed its character as
immovable property.
Mindanao Bus Co. v. City Assessor
In order for movable equipment to be
immobilized in contemplation of the law,
they must first be “essential and principal
elements” of an industry or works without
which such industry or works would be
“unable to function or carry on the industrial
purpose for which it was established.”
There is, however, distinction from those
which may not be so considered
immobilized because they are merely
incidental, not essential and principal.
Similarly, the tools and equipment in
question in this instant case are, by their
nature, not essential and principle
municipal elements of petitioner’s business
of transporting passengers and cargoes by
motor trucks. They are merely incidentals,
acquired as movables and used only for
expediency to facilitate and/or improve its
service.
BPI v. Franco
The movable property mentioned in Article
559 of the Civil Code pertains to a specific
or determinate thing. A determinate or
specific thing is one that is individualized
and can be identified or distinguished from
others of the same kind.
In this case, the deposit in Franco’s
accounts consists of money which, albeit
characterized as a movable, is generic and
fungible. The quality of being fungible
depends upon the possibility of the
property, because of its nature or the will of
the parties, being substituted by others of
the same kind, not having a distinct
individuality.
It bears emphasizing that money bears no
earmarks of peculiar ownership, and this
characteristic is all the more manifest in the
instant case which involves money in a
banking transaction gone awry. Its primary
function is to pass from hand to hand as a
medium of exchange, without other
evidence of its title. Money, which had
passed through various transactions in the
general course of banking business, even if
of traceable origin, is no exception.
Heirs of Malabanan v. Republic
Pursuant to the Regalian Doctrine, all lands
of the public domain belong to the State
and are inalienable. Lands that are not
clearly under private ownership are also
presumed to belong to the State and,
therefore, may not be alienated or
disposed.
Agricultural lands of the public domain are
rendered alienable and disposable through
any of the exclusive modes enumerated
under Section 11 of the Public Land Act.
If the mode is judicial confirmation of
imperfect title under Section 48(b) of the
Public Land Act, the agricultural land
subject of the application needs only to be
classified as alienable and disposable as of
the time of the application, provided the
applicant’s possession and occupation of
the land dated back to June 12, 1945, or
earlier. Thereby, a conclusive presumption
that the applicant has performed all the
conditions essential to a government grant
arises, and the applicant becomes the
owner of the land by virtue of an imperfect
or incomplete title. By legal fiction, the land
has already ceased to be part of the public
domain and has become private property.
Lands of the public domain subsequently
classified or declared as no longer intended
for public use or for the development of
national wealth are removed from the
sphere of public dominion and are
considered converted into patrimonial
lands or lands of private ownership that
may be alienated or disposed through any
of the modes of acquiring ownership under
the Civil Code.
The prescriptive period for purposes of
acquiring an imperfect title over a property
of the State shall commence to run from the
date an official declaration is issued that
such property is no longer intended for
public service or the development of
national wealth; and prescription will not
run as against the State even if the property
has been previously classified as alienable
and disposable as it is that official
declaration that converts the property to
patrimonial.
MIAA v. CA
MIAA is not a GOCC contemplated under
Sec. 2(B) of the Admin. Code not under
Sec. 16, Art. 12 of the Constitution. MIAA is
a government instrumentality vested with
corporate powers and performing essential
public services. MIAA is not subject to any
kind of tax by local governments under Sec.
133(o) of the Local Government Code.
Furthermore, the airport lands and
buildings of MIAA are properties devoted to
public use and thus, are properties of public
dominion. Under NCC Art. 420, the term
“ports… constructed by the State” includes
airports and seaports. As properties of
public dominion, the subject properties are
owned by the Republic and thus exempt
from real estate tax under Sec. 234 (a) of
the Local Government Code.
Republic v. Cortez
There must be an express declaration by
the State that the public dominion property
is no longer intended for public service or
the development of the national wealth or
that the property has been converted into
patrimonial. Without such express
declaration, the property, even if classified
as alienable or disposable, remains
property of the public dominion, pursuant to
NCC Art. 420(2), and thus incapable of
acquisition by prescription.
Municipality of Antipolo v. Zapanta
Lands that are of public dominion or are
devoted to public use and public service
cannot be subject to private registration.
Villarico v. CA
Forest lands cannot be owned by private
persons. Possession thereof, no matter
how long, does not ripen into a registrable
title. The adverse possession which may be
the basis of a grant of title or confirmation
of an imperfect title refers only to alienable
or disposable portions of the public domain.
Republic v. Metro Index Realty
Properties of the public dominion are not
susceptible to prescription and that only
properties of the State that are no longer
earmarked for public use, otherwise known
as patrimonial, may be acquired by
prescription.
II. Ownership
Caisip v. People
Article 429 is inapplicable to the present
case. Gloria Cabalag did not usurp or
invade the subject lot. She had merely
remained in possession thereof, even
though the hacienda owner may have
become its co-possessor. Petitioners did
not repel or prevent an actual or threatened
unlawful physical invasion or usurpation of
the property. They expelled Gloria from
a property on which she and her husband
were in possession even before the action
for forcible entry was filed against them.
Andamo v. IAC
It must be stressed that the use of one's
property is not without limitations. Article
431 of the Civil Code provides that "the
owner of a thing cannot make use thereof
in such a manner as to injure the rights of a
third person." SIC UTERE TUO UT
ALIENUM NON LAEDAS.
Moreover, adjoining landowners have
mutual and reciprocal duties which require
that each must use his own land in a
reasonable manner so as not to infringe
upon the rights and interests of others.
Although we recognize the right of an
owner to build structures on his land, such
structures must be so constructed and
maintained using all reasonable care so
that they cannot be dangerous to adjoining
landowners and can withstand the usual
and expected forces of nature.
If the structures cause injury or damage to
an adjoining landowner or a third person,
the latter can claim indemnification for the
injury or damage suffered.
Sps. Castro v. Sps Se
Even Article 433 of the Civil Code instructs
that actual possession under claim of
ownership raises disputable presumption
of ownership. The true owner must resort
to judicial process for the recovery of the
property. The contemplated judicial
process is not through an ex-parte petition
as what petitioners availed of, but a
process wherein a third party is given an
opportunity to be heard. Hence, an
enforcement of a writ of possession against
a person who did not take part in the
foreclosure proceedings, would amount to
taking of real property without the benefit of
a proper judicial intervention.
VSD Realty v. Uniwide
The established legal principle in actions
for annulment or reconveyance of title is
that a party seeking it should establish not
merely by a preponderance of evidence but
by clear and convincing evidence that the
land sought to be reconveyed is his.
Article 434 of the Civil Code provides that
to successfully maintain an action to
recover the ownership of a real property,
the person who claims a better right to it
must prove two things: a) the identity of the
land claimed, and; b) his title thereto.
In an action to recover, the property must
be identified, and the plaintiff must rely on
the strength of his title and not on the
weakness of the defendant's claim.
Republic v. Rural Bank of Kabakan
It should be noted that eminent domain
cases involve the expenditure of public
funds. In this kind of proceeding, trial courts
are required to be more circumspect in their
evaluation of the just compensation to be
awarded to the owner of the expropriated
property.
In order for the reconveyance of real
property to be valid, the conveyance must
be embodied in a public document and
registered in the office of the Register of
Deeds where the property is situated
City of Manila v. Te
The term "public use" has acquired a more
comprehensive coverage. To the literal
import of the term signifying strict use or
employment by the public has been added
the broader notion of indirect public benefit
or advantage. Hence, "socialized housing"
falls within the confines of public use.
NPC v. Ibrahim
It is a well-known principle that the owner of
a piece of land has rights not only to its
surface but also to everything underneath
and the airspace above it up to a
reasonable height.
Just compensation has been understood to
be the just and complete equivalent of the
loss and is ordinarily determined by
referring to the value of the land and its
character at the time it was taken by the
expropriating authority. There is a taking
when the owners are actually deprived or
dispossessed of their property, where there
is a practical destruction or a material
impairment of the value of their property, or
when they are deprived of the ordinary use
thereof. There is a taking in this context
when the expropriator enters private
property not only for a momentary period
but for more permanent duration, for the
purpose of devoting the property to a public
use in such a manner as to oust the owner
and deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment
thereof. Moreover, taking of the property for
purposes of eminent domain entails that
the entry into the property must be under
warrant or color of legal authority.
The general rule in determining just
compensation in eminent domain is the
value of the property as of the date of the
filing of the complaint. The exception is
where the Court fixed the value of the
property as of the date it was taken and not
the date of the commencement of the
expropriation proceedings. The exception
finds the application where the owner
would be given undue incremental
advantages arising from the use to which
the government devotes the property
expropriated.
Abad v. Fil-Homes Realty
C.A. No. 538 provides that any action for
ejectment against the tenants occupying
said lands shall be automatically
suspended, for such time as may be
required by the expropriation proceedings
or the necessary negotiations for the
purchase of the lands, in which latter case,
the period of suspension shall not exceed
one year. In order for the tenants to avail of
this suspension, they shall pay to the
landowner the current rents as they
become due or deposit the same with the
court where the action for ejectment has
been instituted.
III. Right of Accession
Republic v. Holy Trinity Realty
The Court in the case of Republic v.
Gingoyon, held that Rule 67 outlines the
procedure under which eminent domain
may be exercised by the State. Yet by no
means does it serve as the only guideline
through which the State may exercise said
power. RA 8974, which provides for a
procedure eminently more favorable to the
property owner than Rule 67, inescapably
applies in instances when the government
expropriates property "for national
government infrastructure projects." Thus,
if expropriation is engaged in by the
national government for purposes other
than national infrastructure projects, the
assessed value standard and the deposit
mode prescribed in Rule 67 continues to
apply.
PNB v. Sps. Maranon
Rent is a civil fruit that belongs to the owner
of the property producing it by right of
accession. Rent, as an accessory follow
the principal. In fact, when the principal
property is mortgaged, the mortgage shall
include all natural or civil fruits and
improvements found thereon when the
secured obligation becomes due as
provided in NCC Art. 2127.
Consequently, in case of non-payment of
the secured debt, foreclosure proceedings
shall cover not only the hypothecated
property but all its accessions and
accessories as well.
However, the rule is not without
qualifications. The Court explained that Art.
2127 is predicated on the presumption that
the ownership of accessions and
accessories also belongs to the mortgagor
as the owner of the principal. After all, it is
an indispensable requisite of a valid REM
that the mortgagor be the absolute owner
of the encumbered property.
Corollary, any evidence sufficiently
overthrowing the presumption that the
mortgagor owns the mortgaged property
precludes the application of Art. 2127.
Otherwise stated, the provision is irrelevant
and inapplicable to mortgages and their
resultant foreclosures if the mortgagor is
later on found or declared to be not the true
owner of the property, as in the instant
case.
Parilla v. Pilar
The right of the lessor upon the termination
of a lease contract with respect to useful
improvements introduced on the leased
property by a lessee is covered by Art.
1678 (If the lessee makes, in good faith,
useful improvements which are suitable to
the use for which the lease is intended,
without altering the form or substance of
the property leased, the lessor upon the
termination of the lease shall pay the
lessee one-half of the value of the
improvements at that time. Should the
lessor refuse to reimburse said amount, the
lessee may remove the improvements,
even though the principal thing may suffer
damage thereby. He shall not, however,
cause any more impairment upon the
property leased than is necessary).
The option under Art. 1678 solely belongs
to the lessor as the law is explicit that
"should the lessor refuse to reimburse said
amount, the lessee may remove the
improvements, even though the principal
thing may suffer damage thereby."
Furthermore, the Court explained that the
lessee’s right to indemnity under Art. 1678
only exists if the lessor opts to appropriate
the improvements. The refusal of the lessor
to pay the lessee one-half of the value of
the useful improvements gives rise to the
right of removal.
Jurisprudence is replete with cases which
categorically declare that Art. 448 covers
only cases in which the builders, sowers or
planters believe themselves to be owners
of the land or, at least, have a claim of title
thereto, but not when the interest is merely
that of a holder, such as a mere tenant,
agent or usufructuary. A tenant cannot be
said to be a builder in good faith as he has
no pretension to be owner.
Bishop v. CA
It is an elementary principle that the owner
of a land registered under the Torrens
system cannot lose it by prescription. In the
case of Legarda v. Saleeby, the Court
explained the purpose of the Torrens
system of land registration is to quite title to
land; to put a stop forever to any question
of the legality of the title, except claims
which were noted at the time of registration
in the certificate, or which may arise
subsequent thereto. That being the
purpose of the law, it would seem that once
the title was registered, the owner may rest
secure, without the necessity of waiting in
the portals of the court, or sitting in the
"mirador de su casa," to avoid the
possibility of losing his land.
A builder in good faith is one who is
unaware of any flaw in his title to the land
at the time he builds on it. This definition
cannot when the builder knew at the very
outset that he had no right at all to occupy
the subject lot.
Heirs of Cabal v. Cabal
Elementary is the rule that there is no co-
ownership where the portion owned is
concretely determined and identifiable,
though not technically described, or that
said portion is still embraced in one and the
same certificate of title does make said
portion less determinable or identifiable, or
distinguishable, one from the other, nor that
dominion over each portion less exclusive,
in their respective owners.
It has been said that good faith is always
presumed, and upon him who alleges bad
faith on the part of the possessor rests the
burden of proof.
Good faith is an intangible and abstract
quality with no technical meaning or
statutory definition, and it encompasses,
among other things, an honest belief, the
absence of malice and the absence of
design to defraud or to seek an
unconscionable advantage.
An individual's personal good faith is a
concept of his own mind and, therefore,
may not conclusively be determined by his
protestations alone.
It implies honesty of intention, and freedom
from knowledge of circumstances which
ought to put the holder upon inquiry. The
essence of good faith lies in an honest
belief in the validity of one's right, ignorance
of a superior claim, and absence of
intention to overreach another. Applied to
possession, one is considered in good faith
if he is not aware that there exists in his title
or mode of acquisition any flaw which
invalidates it.
Briones v. Macabagdal
When a person builds in good faith on the
land of another, Art. 448 governs. It covers
cases in which the builders, sowers or
planters believe themselves to be owners
of the land or, at least, to have a claim of
title thereto.
The builder in good faith can compel the
landowner to make a choice between:
1. appropriating the building by
paying the proper indemnity;
2. obliging the builder to pay the price
of the land.
The choice belongs to the owner of the
land, a rule that accords with the principle
of accession, i.e., that the accessory
follows the principal and not the other way
around.
However, even as the option lies with the
landowner, the grant to him, nevertheless,
is preclusive. He must choose one.
He cannot, for instance, compel the owner
of the building to remove the building from
the land without first exercising either
option. It is only if the owner chooses to sell
his land, and the builder or planter fails to
purchase it where its value is not more than
the value of the improvements, that the
owner may remove the improvements from
the land.
The owner is entitled to such remotion only
when, after having chosen to sell his land,
the other party fails to pay for the same.
Rosales v. Castelltort
A builder in good faith is one who builds
with the belief that the land he is building on
is his, or that by some title one has the right
to build thereon, and is ignorant of any
defect or flaw in his title.
NCC Art. 527 provides that good faith is
always presumed, and upon him who
alleges bad faith on the part of a possessor
rests the burden of proof.
Sps. Aquino v. Sps. Aguilar
In some instances, the Court has allowed
the application of Article 448 to a builder
who has constructed improvements on the
land of another with the consent of the
owner. In those cases, the Court found that
the owners knew and approved of the
construction of improvements on the
property. Hence, the Court ruled therein
that the structures were built in good faith,
even though the builders knew that they
were constructing the improvement on land
owned by another.
Such shall not apply if it to be found that the
landowner explicitly gives his dissent or
prohibits the building of such structure.
De Vera v. CA
Under NCC Arts. 449 and 450, the
landowner has three alternative rights,
either:
1. to appropriate what has been built
without any obligation to pay
indemnity therefor;
2. to demand the builder to remove
what he had built; or
3. to compel the builder to pay the
value of the land.
In any event, landowner is entitled to be
indemnified by the builder in bad faith,
pursuant to Article 451.
Tecnogas Phil. v. CA
The benefit of the builder under Art. 448 is
that, instead of being outrightly ejected
from the land, he can compel the
landowner to make a choice between the
two options: (1) to appropriate the building
by paying the indemnity required by law, or
(2) sell the land to the builder. The
landowner cannot refuse to exercise either
option and compel instead the owner of the
building to remove it from the land.
Removal of the building or improvement
would be available only if and when the
landowner chooses to compel the builder
to buy the land at a reasonable price but the
latter fails to pay such price.
Grande v. CA
An accretion does not automatically
become registered land just because the lot
which receives such accretion is covered
by a Torrens title.
Ownership of a piece of land is one thing;
registration under the Torrens system of
that ownership is another.
Ownership over the accretion received by
the land adjoining a river is governed by the
Civil Code. Imprescriptibility of registered
land is provided in the registration law.
Registration under the Land Registration
and Cadastral Acts does not vest or give
title to the land, but merely confirms and,
thereafter, protects the title already
possessed by the owner, making it
imprescriptible by occupation of third
parties.
But to obtain this protection, the land must
be placed under the operation of the
registration laws, wherein certain judicial
procedures have been provided.
Office of the City Mayor v. Ebio
Properties of public dominion such as
creeks cannot be acquired by prescription.
No matter how long the possession of the
properties has been, there can be no
prescription against the State regarding
property of public domain. Even a city or
municipality cannot acquire them by
prescription as against the State.
Alluvial deposits along the banks of a
creek, however, do not form part of the
public domain as the alluvial property
automatically belongs to the owner of the
estate to which it may have been added.
The only restriction provided for by law is
that the owner of the adjoining property
must register the same under the Torrens
system; otherwise, the alluvial property
may be subject to acquisition through
prescription by third persons.
Sps. Galang v. Sps. Reyes
An ordinary civil action for declaration of
nullity of free patents and certificates of title
is not the same as an action for reversion.
In an action for reversion, the pertinent
allegations in the complaint would admit
State ownership of the disputed land. On
the other hand, a cause of action for
declaration of nullity of free patent and
certificate of title would require allegations
of the plaintiff’s ownership of the contested
lot prior to the issuance of such free patent
and certificate of title as well as the
defendant’s fraud or mistake, as the case
may be, in successfully obtaining these
documents of title over the parcel of land
claimed by plaintiff. The real party in
interest is not the State but the plaintiff who
alleges a pre-existing right of ownership
over the parcel of land in question even
before the grant of title to the defendant.
If indeed a property was the former bed of
a creek that changed its course and passed
through the property of the claimant, then,
pursuant to Article 461, the ownership of
the old bed left to dry by the change of
course was automatically acquired by the
claimant. Before such a conclusion can be
reached, it must first be proven that the
creek indeed changed its course without
artificial or man-made intervention. Thus,
the claimant must prove three key elements
by clear and convincing evidence. These
are: (1) the old course of the creek, (2) the
new course of the creek, and (3) the
change of course of the creek from the old
location to the new location by natural
occurrence.
Gaboya v. Cui
A usufruct on the land may be separate
from the building.
Under the Civil Code (Arts. 445 to 456),
industrial accession by edification on the
principal land is limited either to buildings
erected on the land of another, or buildings
constructed by the owner of the land with
materials owned by someone else.
IV. Quieting of Title
Tandog v. Macapagal
As a general rule, a cloud which may be
removed by suit to quiet title is not created
by mere verbal or parol assertion of
ownership of or an interest in property. This
rule is subject to qualification, where there
is a written or factual basis for the asserted
right. Thus, a claim of right based on
acquisitive prescription or adverse
possession has been held to constitute a
removable cloud on title.
INC v. Ponferrada
A cloud is said to be a semblance of a title,
either legal or equitable, or a cloud of an
interest in land appearing in some legal
form but which is, in fact, unfounded, or
which it would be inequitable to enforce.
An action for quieting of title is
imprescriptible until the claimant is ousted
of his possession.
An accion reinvindicatoria does not
necessarily presuppose that the actual and
material possession of the property is on
defendant and that plaintiff seeks the
recovery of such possession from
defendant. It bears stressing that an accion
reinvindicatoria is a remedy seeking the
recovery of ownership and includes jus
possidendi, jus utendi, and jus fruendi as
well. It is an action whereby a party claims
ownership over a parcel of land and seeks
recovery of its full possession. Thus, the
owner of real property in actual and
material possession thereof may file an
accion reinvindicatoria against another
seeking ownership over a parcel of land
including jus vindicandi, or the right to
exclude defendants from the possession
thereof.
One who is in actual possession of a piece
of land claiming to be the owner thereof
may wait until his possession is disturbed
or his title is attacked before taking steps to
vindicate his right, the reason for the rule
being, that his undisturbed possession
gives him a continuing right to seek the aid
of a court of equity to ascertain and
determine the nature of the adverse claim
of a third party and its effect on his own title,
which right can be claimed only by one who
is in possession.
The verification requirement is deemed
substantially complied with when, as in the
present case, only one of the heirs-
plaintiffs, who has sufficient knowledge and
belief to swear to the truth of the allegations
in the petition (complaint), signed the
verification attached to it. Such verification
is deemed sufficient assurance that the
matters alleged in the petition have been
made in good faith or are true and correct,
not merely speculative.
The rule of substantial compliance may be
availed of with respect to the contents of
the certification against non-forum
shopping. This is because the requirement
of strict compliance with the provisions
merely underscores its mandatory nature in
that the certification cannot be altogether
dispensed with or its requirements
completely disregarded.
Ragasa v. Roa
To make out an action to quiet title under
Article 476, the initiatory pleading has only
to set forth allegations showing that (1) the
plaintiff has "title to real property or any
interest therein" and (2) the defendant
claims an interest therein adverse to the
plaintiff’s arising from an "instrument,
record, claim, encumbrance, or proceeding
which is apparently valid or effective but is
in truth and in fact invalid, ineffective,
voidable, or unenforceable."
Actions to quiet title to property in the
possession of the plaintiff are
imprescriptible. The prevailing rule is that
the right of a plaintiff to have his title to land
quieted, as against one who is asserting
some adverse claim or lien thereon, is not
barred while the plaintiff or his grantors
remain in actual possession of the land,
claiming to be owners thereof, the reason
for this rule being that while the owner in
fee continues liable to an action,
proceeding, or suit upon the adverse claim,
he has a continuing right to the aid of a
court of equity to ascertain and determine
the nature of such claim and its effect on
his title, or to assert any superior equity in
his favor. He may wait until his possession
is disturbed or his title is attacked before
taking steps to vindicate his right. But the
rule that the statute of limitations is not
available as a defense to an action to
remove a cloud from title can only be
invoked by a complainant when he is in
possession. One who claims property
which is in the possession of another must,
it seems, invoke his remedy within the
statutory period.
Mamadsual v. Moson
In an action to quiet title the plaintiff "must"
have legal or equitable title to, or interest in
the real property which is the subject matter
of the action. Legal title means registered
ownership and equitable title means
beneficial ownership.
It is not necessary that the person seeking
to quiet his title is the registered owner of
the property in question. The "title" to
property does not necessarily mean the
original transfer certificate of title. It can
connote acquisitive prescription by
possession in the concept of an owner
thereof. Indeed, one who has an equitable
right or interest in the property may also file
an action to quiet title under the law.
Go v. Looyuko
The sole issue for resolution in an unlawful
detainer case is physical or material
possession of the property involved,
independent of any claim of ownership by
any of the parties. When the defendant,
however, raises the defense of ownership
in his pleadings and the question of
possession cannot be resolved without
deciding the issue of ownership, the issue
of ownership shall be resolved only to
determine the issue of possession.
It is an age-old rule that the person who has
a Torrens Title over a land is entitled to its
possession. It has repeatedly been
emphasized that when the property is
registered under the Torrens system, the
registered owner’s title to the property is
presumed legal and cannot be collaterally
attacked, especially in a mere action for
unlawful detainer. It has even been held
that it does not even matter if the party’s
title to the property is questionable.
V. Ruinous buildings and trees in
danger of falling
-NO CASES-
VI. Co-Ownership
Nufable v. Nufable
Under NCC Art. 493, a co-owner shall have
full ownership of his part and of the fruits
and benefits pertaining thereto. He has the
right to alienate, assign or mortgage it, and
even substitute another person in its
enjoyment. As a mere part owner, he
cannot alienate the shares of the other co-
owners. The prohibition is premised on the
elementary rule that "no one can give what
he does not have." Moreover, a co-owner
does not lose his part ownership of a co-
owned property when his share is
mortgaged by another co-owner without the
former's knowledge and consent. Likewise,
the mortgage of the co-owned property is
not binding against co-owners who never
benefitted.
Pardell v. Bartolome
Each co-owner of realty held pro indiviso
exercises his rights over the whole property
and may use and enjoy the same with no
other limitation than that he shall not injure
the interests of his co-owners, for the
reason that, until a division be made, the
respective part of each holder cannot be
determined and every one of the co-owners
exercises together with his other
coparticipants, joint ownership over the pro
indiviso property, in addition to his use and
enjoyment of the same.
Adlawan v. Adlawan
Under NCC Art. 487, any of the co-owners
may bring an action in ejectment. This
article covers all kinds of actions for the
recovery of possession, including an accion
publiciana and a reinvidicatory action. A co-
owner may bring such an action without the
necessity of joining all the other co-owners
as co-plaintiffs because the suit is deemed
to be instituted for the benefit of all. Any
judgment of the court in favor of the co-
owner will benefit the others but if such
judgment is adverse, the same cannot
prejudice the rights of the unimpleaded co-
owners. If the action is for the benefit of the
plaintiff alone who claims to be the sole
owner and entitled to the possession
thereof, the action will not prosper unless
he impleads the other co-owners who are
indispensable parties.
De Guia v. CA, Abejo
NCC Art. 487 which provides that "any one
of the co-owners may bring an action in
ejectment" covers all kinds of actions for
the recovery of possession. It includes
forcible entry and unlawful detainer (accion
interdictal), recovery of possession (accion
publiciana), and recovery of ownership
(accion de reivindicacion). The summary
actions of forcible entry and unlawful
detainer seek the recovery of physical
possession only. These actions are brought
before municipal trial courts within one year
from dispossession. However, accion
publiciana, which is a plenary action for
recovery of the right to possess, falls under
the jurisdiction of the proper regional trial
court when the dispossession has lasted
for more than one year. Accion de
reivindicacion, which seeks the recovery of
ownership, also falls under the jurisdiction
of the proper regional trial court.
Any co-owner may file an action under Art.
487 not only against a third person, but also
against another co-owner who takes
exclusive possession and asserts
exclusive ownership of the property. In the
latter case, however, the only purpose of
the action is to obtain recognition of the co-
ownership. The plaintiff cannot seek
exclusion of the defendant from the
property because as co-owner he has a
right of possession. The plaintiff cannot
recover any material or determinate part of
the property. Before partition, all that the
co-owner has is an ideal or abstract quota
or proportionate share in the entire
property.
Adille v. Adille
While a vendee a retro, under NCC Art.
1613, "may not be compelled to consent to
a partial redemption," the redemption by
one co-heir or co-owner of the property in
its totality does not vest in him ownership
over it. Failure on the part of all the co-
owners to redeem it entitles the vendee a
retro to retain the property and consolidate
title thereto in his name. But the provision
does not give to the redeeming co-owner
the right to the entire property. It does not
provide for a mode of terminating a co-
ownership.
Cruz v. Catapang
NCC Art. 486 states each co-owner may
use the thing owned in common provided
he does so in accordance with the purpose
for which it is intended and in such a way
as not to injure the interest of the co-
ownership or prevent the other co-owners
from using it according to their rights.
Giving consent to a third person to
construct a house on the co-owned
property will injure the interest of the co-
ownership and prevent other co-owners
from using the property in accordance with
their rights.
NCC Art. 491 states that none of the co-
owners shall, without the consent of the
others, make alterations in the thing owned
in common. It necessarily follows that none
of the co-owners can, without the consent
of the other co-owners, validly consent to
the making of an alteration by another
person in the thing owned in common.
Alterations include any act of strict
dominion or ownership and any
encumbrance or disposition has been held
implicitly to be an act of alteration.
Mercado v. CA
A co-owner has the right to alienate his pro-
indiviso share in the co-owned property
even without the consent of the other co-
owners. Nevertheless, as a mere part
owner, he cannot alienate the shares of the
other co-owners. The prohibition is
premised on the elementary rule that "no
one can give what he does not have"
(Nemo dat guod non habet).
Diversified Credit v. Rosado
No individual co-owner can claim title to
any definite portion of the land or thing
owned in common until the partition
thereof. Prior to that time, all that the co-
owner has is an ideal, or abstract, quota or
proportionate share in the entire thing
owned in common by all the co-owners.
While a co-owner has the right to freely sell
and dispose of his undivided interest, he
has no right to sell a divided part of the real
estate owned in common. "If he is the
owner of an undivided half of a tract of land,
he has the right to sell and convey an
undivided half, but he has no right to divide
the lot into two parts, and convey the whole
of one part by metes and bounds."
Galvez v. CA
Prescription, as a mode of terminating a
relation of co-ownership, must have been
preceded by repudiation (of the co-
ownership). The act of repudiation, in turn,
is subject to certain conditions: (1) a co-
owner repudiates the co-ownership; (2)
such an act of repudiation is clearly made
known to the other co-owners; (3) the
evidence thereon is clear and conclusive;
and (4) he has been in possession through
open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession of the property for the period
required by law.
It is only when such unequivocal notice has
been given that the period of prescription
will begin to run against the other co-
owners and ultimately divest them of their
own title if they do not seasonably defend
it.
Salvador v. CA
Possession of a co-owner is like that of a
trustee and shall not be regarded as
adverse to the other co-owners but in fact
beneficial to all of them.
Article 494 of the Civil Code which provides
that each co-owner may demand at any
time the partition of the common property
implies that an action to demand partition is
imprescriptible or cannot be barred by
laches. The imprescriptibility of the action
cannot, however, be invoked when one of
the co-owners has possessed the property
as exclusive owner and for a period
sufficient to acquire it by prescription.
In Pangan vs. CA, the Court laid down
some specific acts which are considered as
acts of repudiation:
1. Filing by a trustee of an action in
court against the trustor to quiet
title to property, or for recovery of
ownership thereof, held in
possession by the trustee.
2. The issuance of the certificate of
title, and the lapse of more than 20
years, open and adverse
possession as owner would
certainly suffice to vest title by
prescription. An action for the
reconveyance of land based on
implied or constructive trust
prescribes within 10 years. And it
is from the date of the issuance of
such title that the effective
assertion of adverse title for
purposes of the statute of
limitation is counted.
3. When one who is an apparent
administrator of property causes
the cancellation of the title thereto
in the name of the apparent
beneficiaries and gets a new
certificate of title in his own name.
proposed domestic corporation is to deal
and trade in the same goods as those of the
VII. Some Special Properties foreign corporation.
Philips Export v. CA Amigo v. Cluett Peabody
A corporation's right to use its corporate The test of dominancy focuses on the
and trade name is a property right, a right similarity of the prevalent features of the
in rem, which it may assert and protect competing trademarks which might cause
against the world in the same manner as it confusion or deception and thus constitutes
may protect its tangible property, real or infringement. If the competing trademark
personal, against trespass or conversion. It contains the main or essential or dominant
is regarded, to a certain extent, as a features of another, and confusion and
property right and one which cannot be deception is likely to result, infringement
impaired or defeated by subsequent takes place. Duplication or imitation is not
appropriation by another corporation in the necessary; nor is it necessary that the
same field. infringing label should suggest an effort to
imitate. The question at issue in cases of
According to Sec. 18 of the Corporation infringement of trademarks is whether the
Code, no corporate name may be allowed use of the marks involved would be likely to
if the proposed name is identical or cause confusion or mistakes in the mind of
deceptively confusingly similar to that of the public or deceive purchasers. The
any existing corporation or to any other holistic test mandates that the entirety of
name already protected by law or is the marks in question must be considered
patently deceptive, confusing or contrary to in determining confusing similarity.
existing law.
A foreign based trademark owner, whose
For the prohibition to apply, two requisites country of domicile is a party to an
must be present: international convention relating to
1. the complainant corporation must protection of trademarks, is accorded
have acquired a prior right over the protection against infringement or any
use of such corporate name. unfair competition as provided in Section
2. the proposed name is either 37 of Republic Act 166, the Trademark Law
identical or deceptively or which was the law in force at the time this
confusingly similar to that of any case was instituted.
existing corporation or to any other
name already protected by law or
patently deceptive, confusing or
contrary to existing law.
Chua Che v. PPO
While it is no longer necessary to establish
that the goods of the parties possess the
same descriptive properties, as previously
required under the Trade Mark Act of 1905,
registration of a trademark should be
refused in cases where there is a likelihood
of confusion, mistake, or deception, even
though the goods fall into different
categories.
Converse Rubber v. Universal Rubber
A foreign corporation which has never done
any business in the Philippines and which
is unlicensed and unregistered to do
business here, but is widely and favorably
known in the Philippines through the use
therein of its products bearing its corporate
and tradename, has a legal right to
maintain an action in the Philippines to
restrain the residents and inhabitants
thereof from organizing a corporation
therein bearing the same name as the
foreign corporation, when it appears that
they have personal knowledge of the
existence of such a foreign corporation,
and it is apparent that the purpose of the