MUÑOZ VS.

DEL BARRIO

FACTS
● September 24, 1942 - Felicidad P. Muñoz and Jose del Barrio were married civilly in
Municipal Court of Manila
● October 24, 1942 - both were married canonically
● Out of this union were born Felix Luis del Barrio and Maria Teresa del Barrio who must
be actually 11 and 9 years
● Couple had frequent quarrels, on which occasions the husband maltreated his wife by
deed, and latter was unable to bear, in 1947 they unceremoniously separated (wife -
Meycawayan, husband - house of his father at 2110 Rizal Avenue, Manila)
● Felicidad claims that in December, 1950, or January, 1951, and in September of the
latter year she was again maltreated by Jose
● October 26, 1951 - Felicidad filed a petition in the Court of First Instance of Bulacan
alleging that respondent has made several attempts on the life of the herein petitioner
which compelled her to live separately and apart from the respondent since 1947; and
that respondent has not provided support for petitioner and their children. Hence she
prays the court:

(a) that a decree of legal separation be granted

(b) that petitioner be awarded the custody of their minor children Felix del Barrio and
Maria Teresa del Barrio
(c) that respondent be directed to contribute to the support of said children
(d) that petitioner be allowed costs, plus attorney’s fees in the sum of P200 in this
instance, to be charged against the conjugal partnership property referred to in
paragraph 4 above, pursuant to Article 293 of the Civil Code of the Philippines
(e) that whatever shall remain of said conjugal partnership property after deduction
of the expenses mentioned in the next preceding paragraph, be divided and adjudicated
in equal parts to herein petitioner and respondent and the conjugal partnership dissolved
and liquidated
(f) that petitioner be granted such further and complete relief as may be just and
equitable in the premises
● November 12, 1951 - respondent filed his answer. He denied his wife’s allegations and
prayed that petition be denied and dismissed for lack of merit, it being contrary to moral
and good customs and not authorized or sanctioned by statute, praying further for such
other relief as provided by law, with costs de oficio
● Court took every feasible step towards the reconciliation of the spouses (Art 98), but His
Honor failed in his purpose by reason of the determined refusal of the wife to yield to the
efforts of the Judge to that end.

LOWER COURT RULING

● Petition dismissed for lack of merits; without costs.

FINAL RULING

The alleged maltreatments to the wife by the husband occurred before their separation a mensa
et thoro in 1947 must NOT have amounted to said husband’s attempts on the life of his wife
since the latter did not institute any action for the legal separation from him upon the effectivity
of the Civil Code on August 30, 1950, and this case was only brought to court on October 26,
1951, after the alleged maltreatment of September 1951 had taken place. The appellant
suffered at the hands of the respondent after their separation of dwelling, which allegedly
occurred in December, 1950, or January, 1951, and September of the latter year, furnish ground
for the legal separation applied for under paragraph 2 of Article 97 of the Civil Code.

Petitioners evidence/testimonies

● Jovita Faustino, a tenant of apartment No. 2068 Ipil St., Manila, owned by appellant’s
father, referring to the quarrel that the spouses had in March of 1950;
● Faustino Mallari, patrolman in the Manila Police Department, referring to the spouses’
encounter in December, 1950, or January, 1951; did not witness the maltreatment on
which he testified, the thing he noticed was that she was crying and that there were
certain scratches on her brow and cheeks and on certain points of the neck which were
blackened (ecchymosis).
● Attorney Macias declared that appelle boxed his wife on the abdomen, pulled her hair
and had also twisted her neck when said attorney, Leoncio Santos and Jose Enriquez
separated petitioner and respondent.

An attempt on the life of a person implies that the actor in the attempt is moved by an intention
to kill the person against whom the attempt is made, and after a careful examination of the
evidence produced by appellant. We share the opinion of the trial judge who declared that said
maltreatments cannot constitute attempts on the life of appellant as provided in Article 97, No.2,
of the Civil Code of the Philippines.

From the second edition of the Revised Penal Code by Dean Vicente J. Francisco – Book II,it is
absolutely necessary that the homicidal intent be evidenced by adequate acts which at the time
of their execution were unmistakably calculated to produce the death of the victim

In the case of U.S. vs. Reyes et al., 30 Phil., 551, the Highest Tribunal of the land said the
following:

“Homicide; Criminal intent. – A personal assault must be punished according to its

consequences and the harm done to the victim, for the penal law in this class of crimes is only
concerned with the material results produced by the transgression, unless the perverse intention
of taking the victim’s life be clearly manifested.”

In the maltreatments complained of in this case, the respondent only used at most his bare
fists or hands and desisted from giving further chastisement after the first blows were given
at the spur of the impulse. In the case at bar intent to kill has not been proved by such
evidence. Petitioner-appellant herself should not have been so sure of her evidence when
instead of the present action she dared not cause the prosecution of her husband for attempted
parricide as a means of establishing her right to secure the legal separation she applies for in
this case.

Judgment affirmed.

Estrella de la Cruz vs. Severino de la Cruz

G.R. No. L-19565 January 30, 1968

FACTS:

On 01 February 1938, Estrella and Severino married in Bacolod City. During their union, six (6)
children were born, and seven (7) parcels of land from Bacolod Cadastre and three (3) parcels of
land from Silay Cadastre were acquired. These lands were assessed at P45,429 and P43,580,
respectively. The hacienda in Silay had a net profit of P3,309.49 in 1957. Aside from these
properties, the spouses also owned a number of varied businesses and subdivisions.

On 22 July 1958, Estrella de la Cruz filed a complaint alleging that her husband had not only
abandoned her, but also mismanaged their conjugal partnership properties. According to Estrella,
since 1955, Severino had not lived in their conjugal home, but instead had lived in his office and
thereafter had been living in Manila with his concubine, Nenita Hernandez. This was supported
by notes and letters written by Nenita which Estrella found hidden in the pocket of her husband’s
polo shirt and then in his iron safe thereafter. When confronted, Severino denied of abandoning
his wife and children. He reasoned that he was only living in his office to teach a lesson to his
quarrelsome and extremely jealous wife. He further averred that he never failed to give his family
financial support as evidenced by the allowance drawings of the wife in the amounts ranging from
P1000 to P1500 from the office, which was corroborated by Marcos Ganaban, the assistant
general manager of Philippine Textboard Factory.

Furthermore, Estrella insists that her husband refused and failed to inform her of the status of
their various business concerns. She further claims that such actuations are tantamount to an
abuse of administrative powers over the conjugal partnership properties. However, no evidence
from the plaintiff was presented.

ISSUES:

Whether or not the separation of the defendant from the plaintiff constitute abandonment in law
and would justify a separation of the conjugal partnership properties?
Whether the defendant’s failure and/or refusal to inform the plaintiff of the state of their business
enterprises such an abuse of his powers of administration of the conjugal partnership as to
warrant a division of matrimonial assets?
HELD:

NO, THE DEFENDANT IS NOT GUILTY OF ABANDONMENT.

The Court held that the plaintiff’s prayer that her plea for separation of conjugal partnership
properties under Articles 167 and 178 of the new Civil Code requires a presentment of real
abandonment and not mere separation. The abandonment must not only be physical
estrangement but also amount to financial and moral desertion. Physical separation alone is
not the full meaning of the term “abandonment”, if the husband, despite his voluntary departure
from the society of his spouse, neither neglects the management of the conjugal partnership nor
ceases to give support to his wife. The Court further believed that the defendant did not intend
to leave his wife and children permanently despite his absence from the conjugal home, as
shown by the evidence on record that he continued to give support to his family. Furthermore,
the evidence on record fails to preponderate in favour as to whether Severino kept Nenita as a
concubine. Credible evidence is needed, which the plaintiff failed to show and is negatived by
her testimony that she had not seen Nenita’s handwriting before.

NO, THE DEFENDANT IS NOT GUILTY OF ABUSING HIS POWERS OF ADMINISTRATION

OVER THE CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP PROPERTIES.
There is no evidence on the record to show that he has squandered the conjugal assets. The
refusal or failure of the husband as administrator of the conjugal partnership to inform the wife of
the progress of the family businesses does not constitute in abuse.

Brown vs. Yambao

G.R. No. L-10699, 18 October 1957

FACTS:

On July 14, 1955, William H. Brown filed suit in the Court of First Instance of Manila to obtain
legal separation from his lawful wife Juanita Yambao. He alleged under oath that while interned
by the Japanese invaders, from 1942 to 1945, at the University of Sto. Tomas internment camp,
his wife engaged in adulterous relations with one Carlos Field of whom she begot a baby girl
that Brown learned of his wife’s misconduct only in 1945, upon his release from internment and
that they have lived separately thereafter.

Brown prayed for confirmation of the liquidation agreement; for custody of the children issued of
the marriage; that the defendant be declared disqualified to succeed the plaintiff; and for their
remedy as might be just and equitable.

The court subsequently declared Juanita Yambao in default, for failure to answer in due time,
despite service of summons and directed the City Fiscal or his representatives to investigate, in
accordance with Article 101 of the Civil Code, if collusion exists between the parties.
During the cross-examination of the plaintiff by Assistant City Fiscal Rafael Jose, it was found
out that after the liberation,Brown had lived maritally with another woman and had begotten
children by her. Thereafter, the court rendered judgment denying the legal separation asked, on
the ground that, while the wife’s adultery was established, Brown had incurred in a misconduct
of similar nature that barred his right of action under Article 100 of the new Civil Code.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petition for legal separation should be granted?

RULING:

No.The court below correctly held that the appellant’s action was already barred, because
Brown did not petition for legal separation proceedings until ten years after he learned of his
wife’s adultery, which was upon his release from internment in 1945.Appellant’s brief does not
even contest the correctness of such findings and conclusion.

Article 100 of the Civil Code provides that:“The legal separation may be claimed only by the
innocent spouse, provided there has been no condonation of or consent to the adultery or
concubinage. Where both spouses are offenders, a legal separation cannot be claimed by either
of them. Collusion between the parties to obtain legal separation shall cause the dismissal of
the petition.”

In the case at bar, it is pursuant to the second sentence of the aforementioned law, wherein
Brown and Yumbao are both offenders, hence, a legal separation cannot be granted.

Article 102 of the Civil Code provides that:“An action for legal separation cannot be filed except
within one year from and after the date on which the plaintiff became cognizant of the cause and
within five years from and after the date when such cause occurred.”

In the case at bar, Brown did not petition for legal separation proceedings until ten years after
he learned of his wife’s adultery.

It is true that the wife has not interposed prescription as a defense. Nevertheless, the courts can
take cognizance thereof, because actions seeking a decree of legal separation, or annulment of
marriage, involve public interest and it is the policy of our law that no such decree be issued if
any legal obstacles thereto appear upon the record.

Hence, there being at least two well established statutory grounds for denying the remedy
sought (commission of similar offense by petitioner and prescription of the action), it becomes
unnecessary to delve further into the case and ascertain if Brown’s inaction for ten years also
evidences condonation or connivance on his part. Even if it did not, his situation would not be
improved. It is thus needless to discuss the second assignment of error.
The third assignment of error being a mere consequence of the others must necessarily fail with
them.

Cervantes v Fajardo

Facts: This is a petition for a writ of Habeas Corpus over the person of the minor Angelie Anne Cervantes.
Angelie Ann Cervantes was born on 14 February 1987 to Conrado Fajardo and Gina Carreon, who
are common-law husband and wife. They offered the child for adoption to Gina Carreon's sister and
brother-in-law, Zenaida Carreon-Cervantes and Nelson Cervantes, spouses, who took care and custody of
the child when she was barely two weeks old. An Affidavit of Consent to the adoption of the child was
executed by respondent Gina Carreon. The petition for adoption was filed by petitioners before the RTC
of Rizal, which granted the petition.
Sometime in 1987, the adoptive parents, Nelson and Zenaida Cervantes, received a letter from
the respondents demanding to be paid the amount of P150,000.00, otherwise, they would get back their
child. Petitioners refused. As a result, while petitioners were out at work, the Gina Carreon took the child
from her "yaya" at the petitioners' residence, on the pretext that she was instructed to do so by her
mother. Gina Carreon brought the child to her house. Petitioners demanded the return of the child, but
Gina Carreon refused, saying that she had no desire to give up her child for adoption and that the affidavit
of consent to the adoption she had executed was not fully explained to her.

Issue: Whether or not the natural parents or the adoptive parents have custody over Angelie Ann
Cervantes.

Held: The custody and care of the minor Angelie Anne Cervantes are granted to petitioners, Zenaida and
Nelson Cervantes, to whom they properly belong.

Ratio: In all cases involving the custody, care, education and property of children, the latter's welfare is
paramount. The provision that no mother shall be separated from a child under five (5) years of age, will
not apply where the Court finds compelling reasons to rule otherwise. In all controversies regarding the
custody of minors, the foremost consideration is the moral, physical and social welfare of the child
concerned, taking into account the resources and moral as well as social standing of the contending
parents.
Conrado Fajardo's relationship with the Gina Carreon is a common-law husband and wife
relationship. His open cohabitation with Gina will not accord the minor that desirable atmosphere where
she can grow and develop into an upright and moral-minded person. Gina Carreon had also previously
given birth to another child by another married man with whom she lived for almost three (3) years but
who eventually left her and vanished. For a minor to grow up with a sister whose "father" is not her true
father, could also affect the moral outlook and values of said minor. Upon the other hand, petitioners who
are legally married appear to be morally, physically, financially, and socially capable of supporting the
minor and giving her a future better than what the natural mother, who is not only jobless but also
maintains an illicit relation with a married man, can most likely give her.
Minor has been legally adopted by petitioners with the full knowledge and consent of
respondents. A decree of adoption has the effect of dissolving the authority vested in natural parents over
the adopted child. The adopting parents have the right to the care and custody of the adopted child and
exercise parental authority and responsibility over him.
Herald Black Dacasin, versus Sharon Del Mundo Dacasin

FACTS:
On April 1994, petitioner and respondent got married in the Philippines. The following year,
respondent got pregnant and gave birth to a baby girl whom they named Stephanie. In June of
1999 respondent sought and obtained from the Illinois Court a divorce
decree against petitioner. In its ruling, the Illinois court dissolved the marriage of petitioner and
respondent, awarded to respondent sole custody of Stephanie and retained jurisdiction over the
case for enforcement purposes.

On 28th of January 2002, petitioner and respondent executed in Manila a contract for the joint
custody of Stephanie. Two years after, petitioner sued respondent in the Regional Trial Court of
Makati City. 7. Petitioner claimed that respondent exercised sole custody over Stephanie.
Respondent sought the dismissal of the complaint due to lack of jurisdiction, since Illinois Court
hold the jurisdiction in enforcing the divorce decree.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the Trial Court have the jurisdiction over the case
2. Whether the agreement or contract is valid
HELD:

1. No. It is precluded from taking cognizance over suit considering the Illinois Court’s retention
of jurisdiction to enforce its divorce decree, including its order awarding sole custody of
Stephanie to respondent.

2.No. The divorce decree is binding on petitioner following the “nationality rule” prevailing in this
jurisdiction, thus, agreement is void for contravening Article 2035 paragraph 5 of the Civil Code
prohibiting compromise agreements on jurisdiction.

FACTS:
Petitioner sought reconsideration his new argument is that the divorce decree obtained by
respondent is void The divorce is no bar to the trial court’s exercise of jurisdiction over the case.

In its order on June 23, 2005, the trial court denied reconsideration because petitioner is under
the laws of his nationality, which is American. Hence, the petitioner filed alternative theories for
the validity of the agreement:the agreement noted the valid divorce decree, modifying the terms
of child custody from the sole to joint and the agreement is independent of the divorce decree
obtained by respondents

ISSUE
Whether the trial court has jurisdiction to take cognizance of petitioner’s suit if so, whether the
trial court can enforce the Agreement on joint custody
II. HELD

Agreement is still void but the court calls for the remand of the case to settle Stephanie’s
custody. (Article 213 of the Family Code lost its coverage over Stephanie. Stephanie was
already almost 15 during this time thus, she is entitled to choose to whom she want to be)

Instead of dismissing the case, court chose to remand the case in order to settle Stephanie’s
custody. Court decided to REVERSE the orders dated March 1, 2005 and June 23, 2005. The
case is REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with its ruling.

Estrada vs. Escritor

492 SCRA 1

FACTS:
Escritor is a court interpreter since 1999 in the RTC of Las Pinas City. She has been living with
Quilapio, a man who is not her husband, for more than twenty five years and had a son with him
as well. Respondent’s husband died a year before she entered into the judiciary while Quilapio
is still legally married to another woman.

Complainant Estrada requested the Judge of said RTC to investigate respondent. According to
complainant, respondent should not be allowed to remain employed therein for it will appear as
if the court allows such act.

Respondent claims that their conjugal arrangement is permitted by her religion—the Jehovah’s
Witnesses and the Watch Tower and the Bible Trace Society. They allegedly have a
‘Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness’ under the approval of their congregation. Such a
declaration is effective when legal impediments render it impossible for a couple to legalize their
union.

ISSUE: Whether or Not the State could penalize respondent for such conjugal arrangement.

RULING: No. The State could not penalize respondent for she is exercising her right to freedom
of religion. The free exercise of religion is specifically articulated as one of the fundamental
rights in our Constitution. As Jefferson put it, it is the most inalienable and sacred of human
rights. The State’s interest in enforcing its prohibition cannot be merely abstract or symbolic in
order to be sufficiently compelling to outweigh a free exercise claim. In the case at bar, the State
has not evinced any concrete interest in enforcing the concubinage or bigamy charges against
respondent or her partner. Thus the State’s interest only amounts to the symbolic preservation
of an unenforced prohibition.

Furthermore, a distinction between public and secular morality and religious morality should be
kept in mind. The jurisdiction of the Court extends only to public and secular morality.

The Court further states that our Constitution adheres the benevolent neutrality approach that
gives room for accommodation of religious exercises as required by the Free Exercise Clause.
This benevolent neutrality could allow for accommodation of morality based on religion,
provided it does not offend compelling state interests. Assuming arguendo that the OSG has
proved a compelling state interest, it has to further demonstrate that the state has used the least
intrusive means possible so that the free exercise is not infringed any more than necessary to
achieve the legitimate goal of the state. Thus the conjugal arrangement cannot be penalized for
it constitutes an exemption to the law based on her right to freedom of religion.

G.R. No. L-48219 February 28, 1979

MANUEL J. C. REYES, petitioner,

vs.
HON. LEONOR INES-LUCIANO, as Judge of the Juvenile & Domestic Relations Court, Quezon
City, COURT OF APPEALS and CELIA ILUSTRE-REYES, respondents.

Facts:

The plaintiff asked for support pendente lite for her and her three children. The defendant, petitioner
herein, opposed the application for support pendente lite on the ground that his wife had committed
adultery with her physician.

The application for support pendente lite was set for hearing and submitted for resolution on the
basis of the pleadings and the documents attached thereto by the parties.

The respondent Judge issued an order dated March 15, 1977 granting plaintiff's prayer for
alimony pendente lite in the amount of P5,000.00 a month commencing from June 1976.3

Issue:
WON, the plaintiff's prayer for alimony pendente lite in the amount of P5,000.00 will be granted.

Rule:

The amount of support pendente lite was reduced to P4,000.00 inasmuch as the children are in the
custody of the petitioner and are being supported by him.It is thus seen that the respondent judge
acted with due deliberation before fixing the amount of support pendente lite in the amount of
P4,000.00 a month. In determining the amount to be awarded as support pendente lite it is not
necessary to go fully into the merits of the case, it being sufficient that the court ascertain the kind
and amount of evidence which it may deem sufficient to enable it to justly resolve the application,
one way or the other, in view of the merely provisional character of the resolution to be entered.
Mere affidavits may satisfy the court to pass upon the application for support pendente lite. 13 It is
enough the the facts be established by affidavits or other documentary evidence appearing in the
record