FUNA VS.

VILLAR The procedural aspect comes down to the question of whether or not the following
requisites for the exercise of judicial review of an executive act obtain in this petition,
MARCH 28, 2013 ~ VBDIAZ viz:
DENNIS A. B. FUNA, PETITIONER, VS. THE CHAIRMAN, COA, REYNALDO A. VILLAR a. There must be an actual case or justiciable controversy before the court
G.R. No. 192791, April 24, 2012 b. The question before it must be ripe for adjudication;
c. The person challenging the act must be a proper party; and
FACTS: Funa challenges the constitutionality of the appointment of Reynaldo A. Villar d. The issue of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity and must
as Chairman of the COA. be the very litis mota of the case

Following the retirement of Carague on February 2, 2008 and during the fourth year ISSUES:
of Villar as COA Commissioner, Villar was designated as Acting Chairman of COA from
February 4, 2008 to April 14, 2008. Subsequently, on April 18, 2008, Villar was a. WON the petitioner has Locus Standi to bring the case to court
nominated and appointed as Chairman of the COA. Shortly thereafter, on June 11, b. WON Villar’s appointment as COA Chairman, while sitting in that body and after
2008, the Commission on Appointments confirmed his appointment. He was to serve having served for four (4) years of his seven (7) year term as COA commissioner, is
as Chairman of COA, as expressly indicated in the appointment papers, until the valid in light of the term limitations imposed under, and the circumscribing concepts
expiration of the original term of his office as COA Commissioner or on February 2, tucked in, Sec. 1 (2), Art. IX(D) of the Constitution
2011. Challenged in this recourse, Villar, in an obvious bid to lend color of title to his HELD:
hold on the chairmanship, insists that his appointment as COA Chairman accorded
him a fresh term of 7 years which is yet to lapse. He would argue, in fine, that his Issue of Locus Standi: This case before us is of transcendental importance, since it
term of office, as such chairman, is up to February 2, 2015, or 7 years reckoned from obviously has “far-reaching implications,” and there is a need to promulgate rules
February 2, 2008 when he was appointed to that position. that will guide the bench, bar, and the public in future analogous cases. We, thus,
assume a liberal stance and allow petitioner to institute the instant petition.
Before the Court could resolve this petition, Villar, via a letter dated February 22, In David vs Macapagal Arroyo, the Court laid out the bare minimum norm before the
2011 addressed to President Benigno S. Aquino III, signified his intention to step so-called “non-traditional suitors” may be extended standing to sue, thusly:
down from office upon the appointment of his replacement. True to his word, Villar
vacated his position when President Benigno Simeon Aquino III named Ma. Gracia a. For taxpayers, there must be a claim of illegal disbursement of public funds or that
Pulido-Tan (Chairman Tan) COA Chairman. This development has rendered this the tax measure is unconstitutional;
petition and the main issue tendered therein moot and academic. b. For voters, there must be a showing of obvious interest in the validity of the
election law in question
Although deemed moot due to the intervening appointment of Chairman Tan and c. For concerned citizens, there must be a showing that the issues raised are of
the resignation of Villar, We consider the instant case as falling within the transcendental importance which must be settled early; and
requirements for review of a moot and academic case, since it asserts at least four d. For legislators, there must be a claim that the official action complained of
exceptions to the mootness rule discussed in David vs Macapagal Arroyo namely: infringes their prerogatives as legislators.
a. There is a grave violation of the Constitution; On the substantive issue:
b. The case involves a situation of exceptional character and is of paramount public Sec. 1 (2), Art. IX(D) of the Constitution provides that:
interest; (2) The Chairman and Commissioners [on Audit] shall be appointed by the President
c. The constitutional issue raised requires the formulation of controlling principles to with the consent of the Commission on Appointments for a term of seven years
guide the bench, the bar and the public; without reappointment. Of those first appointed, the Chairman shall hold office for
d. The case is capable of repetition yet evading review. seven years, one commissioner for five years, and the other commissioner for three
years, without reappointment. Appointment to any vacancy shall be only for the
unexpired portion of the term of the predecessor. In no case shall any member be
appointed or designated in a temporary or acting capacity.
Petitioner now asseverates the view that Sec. 1(2), Art. IX(D) of the 1987 Constitution
proscribes reappointment of any kind within the commission, the point being that a
second appointment, be it for the same position (commissioner to another position
of commissioner) or upgraded position (commissioner to chairperson) is a prohibited
reappointment and is a nullity ab initio.
The Court finds petitioner’s position bereft of merit. The flaw lies in regarding the
word “reappointment” as, in context, embracing any and all species of appointment.
The rule is that if a statute or constitutional provision is clear, plain and free from
ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted
interpretation.
The first sentence is unequivocal enough. The COA Chairman shall be appointed by
the President for a term of seven years, and if he has served the full term, then he
can no longer be reappointed or extended another appointment. In the same vein,
a Commissioner who was appointed for a term of seven years who likewise served
the full term is barred from being reappointed. In short, once the Chairman or
Commissioner shall have served the full term of seven years, then he can no longer
be reappointed to either the position of Chairman or Commissioner. The obvious
intent of the framers is to prevent the president from “dominating” the Commission
by allowing him to appoint an additional or two more commissioners.
On the other hand, the provision, on its face, does not prohibit a promotional
appointment from commissioner to chairman as long as the commissioner has not
served the full term of seven years, further qualified by the third sentence of Sec.
1(2), Article IX (D) that “the appointment to any vacancy shall be only for the
unexpired portion of the term of the predecessor.” In addition, such promotional
appointment to the position of Chairman must conform to the rotational plan or the
staggering of terms in the commission membership such that the aggregate of the
service of the Commissioner in said position and the term to which he will be
appointed to the position of Chairman must not exceed seven years so as not to
disrupt the rotational system in the commission prescribed by Sec. 1(2), Art. IX(D).
In conclusion, there is nothing in Sec. 1(2), Article IX(D) that explicitly precludes a
promotional appointment from Commissioner to Chairman, provided it is made
under the aforestated circumstances or conditions.
The Court is likewise unable to sustain Villar’s proposition that his promotional
appointment as COA Chairman gave him a completely fresh 7- year term––from
February 2008 to February 2015––given his four (4)-year tenure as COA
commissioner devalues all the past pronouncements made by this Court. While there
had been divergence of opinion as to the import of the word “reappointment,” there
has been unanimity on the dictum that in no case can one be a COA member, either
as chairman or commissioner, or a mix of both positions, for an aggregate term of
more than 7 years. A contrary view would allow a circumvention of the aggregate 7-
year service limitation and would be constitutionally offensive as it would wreak
havoc to the spirit of the rotational system of succession.
In net effect, then President Macapagal-Arroyo could not have had, under any
circumstance, validly appointed Villar as COA Chairman, for a full 7- year
appointment, as the Constitution decrees, was not legally feasible in light of the 7-
year aggregate rule. Villar had already served 4 years of his 7-year term as COA
Commissioner. A shorter term, however, to comply with said rule would also be
invalid as the corresponding appointment would effectively breach the clear purpose
of the Constitution of giving to every appointee so appointed subsequent to the first
set of commissioners, a fixed term of office of 7 years. To recapitulate, a COA
commissioner like respondent Villar who serves for a period less than seven (7) years
cannot be appointed as chairman when such position became vacant as a result of
the expiration of the 7-year term of the predecessor (Carague). Such appointment to
a full term is not valid and constitutional, as the appointee will be allowed to serve
more than seven (7) years under the constitutional ban.
To sum up, the Court restates its ruling on Sec. 1(2), Art. IX(D) of the Constitution,
viz:
1. The appointment of members of any of the three constitutional commissions,
after the expiration of the uneven terms of office of the first set of commissioners,
shall always be for a fixed term of seven (7) years; an appointment for a lesser period
is void and unconstitutional. The appointing authority cannot validly shorten the full
term of seven (7) years in case of the expiration of the term as this will result in the
distortion of the rotational system prescribed by the Constitution.
2. Appointments to vacancies resulting from certain causes (death, resignation,
disability or impeachment) shall only be for the unexpired portion of the term of the
predecessor, but such appointments cannot be less than the unexpired portion as
this will likewise disrupt the staggering of terms laid down under Sec. 1(2), Art. IX(D).
3. Members of the Commission, e.g. COA, COMELEC or CSC, who were appointed for
a full term of seven years and who served the entire period, are barred from
reappointment to any position in the Commission. Corollarily, the first appointees in
the Commission under the Constitution are also covered by the prohibition against
reappointment.

4. A commissioner who resigns after serving in the Commission for less than seven
years is eligible for an appointment to the position of Chairman for the unexpired
portion of the term of the departing chairman. Such appointment is not covered by
the ban on reappointment, provided that the aggregate period of the length of
service as commissioner and the unexpired period of the term of the predecessor
will not exceed seven (7) years and provided further that the vacancy in the position
of Chairman resulted from death, resignation, disability or removal by impeachment.
The Court clarifies that “reappointment” found in Sec. 1(2), Art. IX(D) means a
movement to one and the same office (Commissioner to Commissioner or Chairman
to Chairman). On the other hand, an appointment involving a movement to a
different position or office (Commissioner to Chairman) would constitute a new
appointment and, hence, not, in the strict legal sense, a reappointment barred under
the Constitution.

5. Any member of the Commission cannot be appointed or designated in a

temporary or acting capacity.
GUALBERTO J. DELA LLANA v. THE CHAIRPERSON, COMMISSION ON AUDIT, et al.
G.R. No. 180989, 7 February 2012, EN BANC (Sereno, J.)
There is nothing in the Constitution that requires the Commission on Audit to
conduct a pre-audit of all government transactions and for all government agencies.
Petitioner Gualberto Dela Llana, as a taxpayer, wrote to the Commission on Audit
(COA) regarding the recommendation of the Senate Committee on Agriculture and
Food that the Department of Agriculture set up an internal pre-audit service. The
COA replied to Dela Llana informing him of the prior issuance of Circular No. 89-299
which provides that whenever the circumstances warrant, the COA may reinstitute
pre-audit or adopt such other control measures as necessary and appropriate to
protect the funds and property of an agency.
Dela Llana filed a petition for certiorari alleging that the pre-audit duty on the part
of the COA cannot be lifted by a mere circular, considering that the pre- audit is a
constitutional mandate enshrined in Section 2 of Article IX-D of the 1987
Constitution.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the petition for certiorari filed by Dela Llana is proper
2. Whether or not it is the constitutional duty of COA to conduct a pre-
106 recent jurisprudence audit before the consummation of government
transaction
HELD:
The petition for certiorari filed by Dela Llana is not proper
Dela Llana is correct in that decisions and orders of the COA are reviewable by the
Court via a petition for certiorari. However, these refer to decisions and orders which
were rendered by the COA in its quasi-judicial capacity. Circular No. 89-299 was
promulgated by the COA under its quasi-legislative or rule-making powers. Hence,
Circular No. 89-299 is not reviewable by certiorari.
Nonetheless, the Court has in the past seen fit to step in and resolve petitions despite
their being the subject of an improper remedy, in view of the public importance of
the issues raised therein. In this case, Dela Llana averred that the conduct of pre-
audit by the COA could have prevented the occurrence of the numerous alleged
irregularities in government transactions that involved substantial amounts of public
money. This is a serious allegation of a grave deficiency in observing a constitutional
duty if proven correct. The Court can use its authority to set aside errors of practice
or technicalities of procedure, including the aforementioned technical defects of the
petition, and resolve the merits of a case with such serious allegations of
constitutional breach.
It is not the constitutional duty of the COA to conduct a pre-audit
Dela Llana claimed that the constitutional duty of COA includes the duty to conduct
pre-audit. A pre-audit is an examination of financial transactions before their
consumption or payment. It seeks to determine whether the following conditions
are present: (1) the proposed expenditure complies with an appropriation law or
other specific statutory authority; (2) sufficient funds are available for the purpose;
(3) the proposed expenditure is not unreasonable or extravagant, and the
unexpended balance of appropriations to which it will be charged is sufficient to
cover the entire amount of the expenditure; and (4) the transaction is approved by
the proper authority and the claim is duly supported by authentic underlying
evidence. It could, among others, identify government agency transactions that are
suspicious on their face prior to their implementation and prior to the disbursement
of funds.
Dela Llana’s allegations find no support in the Section 2 of Article IX-D of the 1987
Constitution. There is nothing in the said provision that requires the COA to conduct
a pre-audit of all government transactions and for all government agencies. The only
clear reference to a pre-audit requirement is found in Section 2, paragraph 1, which
provides that a post-audit is mandated for certain government or private entities
with state subsidy or equity and only when the internal control system of an audited
entity is inadequate. In such a situation, the COA may adopt measures, including a
temporary or special pre-audit, to correct the deficiencies.
Hence, the conduct of a pre-audit is not a mandatory duty that this Court may
compel the COA to perform. This discretion on its part is in line with the
constitutional pronouncement that the COA has the exclusive authority to define the
scope of its audit and examination. When the language of the law is clear and explicit,
there is no room for interpretation, only application. Neither can the scope of the
provision be unduly enlarged by this Court.
JENNY M. AGABON v. NLRC, GR No. 158693, 2004-11-17
Facts:
Private respondent Riviera Home Improvements, Inc. is engaged in the business of
selling and installing ornamental and construction materials. It employed petitioners
Virgilio Agabon and Jenny Agabon as gypsum board and cornice installers on January
2, 1992[2] until February 23, 1999 when they were dismissed for abandonment of
work.
Petitioners then filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and payment of money
claims[3] and on December 28, 1999, the Labor Arbiter rendered a decision declaring
the dismissals illegal and ordered private respondent to pay the monetary claims.
On appeal, the NLRC reversed the Labor Arbiter because it found that the petitioners
had abandoned their work, and were not entitled to backwages and separation pay.
Upon denial of their motion for reconsideration, petitioners filed a petition for
certiorari with the Court of Appeals.
The Court of Appeals in turn ruled that the dismissal of the petitioners was not illegal
because they had abandoned their employment but ordered the payment of money
claims.
Petitioners also claim that private respondent did not comply with the twin
requirements of notice and hearing.
Private respondent, on the other hand, maintained that petitioners were not
dismissed but had abandoned their work.
Issues:
whether petitioners were illegally dismissed.
Ruling:
To dismiss an employee, the law requires not only the existence of a just and valid
cause but also enjoins the employer to give the employee the opportunity to be
heard and to defend himself.
Abandonment is the deliberate and unjustified refusal of an employee to resume his
employment.[14] It is a form of neglect of duty, hence, a just cause for termination
of employment by the employer.[15] For a valid finding... of abandonment, these
two factors should be present: (1) the failure to report for work or absence without
valid or justifiable reason; and (2) a clear intention to sever employer-employee
relationship, with the second as the more determinative factor which is manifested
by... overt acts from which it may be deduced that the employees has no more
intention to work. The intent to discontinue the employment must be shown by
clear proof that it was deliberate and unjustified.
an employee who deliberately absented from work without leave or permission from
his employer, for the purpose of looking for a job elsewhere, is considered to have
abandoned his job.
The dismissal should be upheld because it was established that the petitioners
abandoned their jobs to work for another company. Private respondent, however,
did not follow the notice requirements and instead... argued that sending notices to
the last known addresses would have been useless because they did not reside there
anymore. Unfortunately for the private respondent, this is not a valid excuse
because the law mandates the twin notice requirements to the employee's last...
known address.[21] Thus, it should be held liable for non-compliance with the
procedural requirements of due process.
that in cases involving dismissals for cause but without observance of the twin
requirements of notice and hearing, the better rule is to abandon the
Serrano doctrine and to follow Wenphil by holding that the dismissal was for just
cause but imposing sanctions on the employer. Such sanctions, however, must be
stiffer than that imposed in Wenphil.
Where the dismissal is for a just cause, as in the instant case, the lack of statutory
due process should not nullify the dismissal, or render it illegal, or
ineffectual. However, the employer should indemnify the employee for the violation
of his statutory rights
Under the Civil Code, nominal damages is adjudicated in order that a right of the
plaintiff, which has been violated or invaded by the defendant, may be vindicated or
recognized, and not for the purpose of indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss suffered
by him.
The violation of the petitioners' right to statutory due process by the private
respondent warrants the payment of indemnity in the form of nominal damages.
Considering the prevailing circumstances in the case at bar, we deem it proper to fix
it at P30,000.00.
Riviera Home Improvements, Inc. is further ORDERED to pay each of the petitioners embodied therein, and the realization of ideals therein expressed, would be
the amount of P30,000.00 as nominal damages for non-compliance with statutory impractical, if not unrealistic. The espousal of such view presents the dangerous
due process. tendency of being overbroad and exaggerated. The guarantees... of "full protection
to labor" and "security of tenure", when examined in isolation, are facially
Principles: unqualified, and the broadest interpretation possible suggests a blanket shield in
Labor Law favor of labor against any form of removal regardless of circumstance. This
interpretation... implies an unimpeachable right to continued employment-a utopian
Where the dismissal is for a just cause, as in the instant case, the lack of statutory notion, doubtless-but still hardly within the contemplation of the framers.
due process should not nullify the dismissal, or render it illegal, or Subsequent legislation is still needed to define the parameters of these guaranteed
ineffectual. However, the employer should indemnify the employee for the violation rights to ensure the protection and promotion, not... only the rights of the labor
of his statutory rights sector, but of the employers' as well. Without specific and pertinent legislation,
judicial bodies will be at a loss, formulating their own conclusion to approximate at
Political Law... we affirmed the presumption that all constitutional provisions are least the aims of the Constitution.
self-executing.
Ultimately, therefore, Section 3 of Article XIII cannot, on its own, be a source of a
to declare otherwise would result in the pernicious situation wherein by mere positive enforceable right to stave off the dismissal of an employee for just cause
inaction and... disregard by the legislature, constitutional mandates would be owing to the failure to serve proper notice or hearing. As manifested by several
rendered ineffectual. framers of the 1987
In self-executing constitutional provisions, the legislature may still enact legislation Constitution, the provisions on social justice require legislative enactments for their
to facilitate the exercise of powers directly granted by the constitution, further the enforceability.
operation of such a provision, prescribe a practice to be used for its enforcement,
provide... a convenient remedy for the protection of the rights secured or the
determination thereof, or place reasonable safeguards around the exercise of the
right. The mere fact that legislation may supplement and add to or prescribe a
penalty for the violation of a self-executing... constitutional provision does not
render such a provision ineffective in the absence of such legislation. The omission
from a constitution of any express provision for a remedy for enforcing a right or
liability is not necessarily an indication that it was not intended to be... self-
executing. The rule is that a self-executing provision of the constitution does not
necessarily exhaust legislative power on the subject, but any legislation must be in
harmony with the constitution, further the exercise of constitutional right and make
it more available.

Subsequent legislation however does not necessarily mean that the subject
constitutional provision is not, by itself, fully enforceable.

Thus, the constitutional mandates of protection to labor and security of tenure may
be deemed as self-executing in the sense that these are automatically acknowledged
and observed without need for any enabling legislation. However, to declare that the
constitutional provisions... are enough to guarantee the full exercise of the rights
Republic vs. Cagandahan

GR. No. 166676, September 12, 2008

FACTS:

Jennifer Cagandahan was registered as a female in her Certificate of Live

Birth. During her childhood years, she suffered from clitoral hypertrophy and was
later on diagnosed that her ovarian structures had minimized. She likewise has no
breast nor menstruation. Subsequently, she was diagnosed of having Congenital
Adrenal Hyperplasia (CAH), a condition where those afflicted possess secondary
male characteristics because of too much secretion of male hormones,
androgen. According to her, for all interests and appearances as well as in mind and
emotion, she has become a male person. She filed a petition at RTC Laguna for
Correction of Entries in her Birth Certificate such that her gender or sex be changed
to male and her first name be changed to Jeff.

ISSUE: WON correction of entries in her birth certificate should be granted.

HELD:

The Court considered the compassionate calls for recognition of the various degrees
of intersex as variations which should not be subject to outright denial. SC is of the
view that where the person is biologically or naturally intersex the determining factor
in his gender classification would be what the individual, having reached the age of
majority, with good reason thinks of his/her sex. As in this case, respondent, thinks
of himself as a male and considering that his body produces high levels of male
hormones, there is preponderant biological support for considering him as being a
male. Sexual development in cases of intersex persons makes the gender
classification at birth inconclusive. It is at maturity that the gender of such persons,
like respondent, is fixed.
MA. LOURDES C. FERNANDO v. ST. SCHOLASTICA'S COLLEGE, GR No. 161107, 2013-
03-12
Facts:
Respondent SSC is the owner of four (4) parcels of land measuring a total of
56,306.80 square meters, located in Marikina Heights and covered by Transfer
Certificate Title (TCT) No. 91537. Located within the property are SSA-Marikina, the
residence of the sisters of the
Benedictine Order, the formation house of the novices, and the retirement house for
the elderly sisters. The property is enclosed by a tall concrete perimeter fence built
some thirty (30) years ago. Abutting the fence along the West Drive are buildings,
facilities, and other... improvements.[3]
The petitioners are the officials of the City Government of Marikina. On September
30, 1994, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Marikina City enacted Ordinance No.
192,[4] entitled "Regulating the Construction of Fences and Walls in the Municipality
of
Marikina." In 1995 and 1998, Ordinance Nos. 217[5] and 200[6] were enacted to
amend Sections 7 and 5, respectively. Ordinance No. 192, as amended, is reproduced
hereunder, as follows:
Section 3. The standard height of fences or walls allowed under this ordinance are as
follows:
(1)
Fences on the front yard shall be no more than one (1) meter in height. Fences in
excess of one (1) meter shall be of an open fence type, at least eighty percent (80%)
see-thru
Section 5. In no case shall walls and fences be built within the five (5) meter parking
area allowance located between the front monument line and the building line of
commercial and industrial establishments and educational and religious
institutions.[7]
Issues:
The ultimate question before the Court is whether Sections 3.1 and 5 of Ordinance
No. 192 are valid exercises of police power by the City Government of Marikina.
Ruling:
The test of a valid ordinance... substantive requirements: (1) must not contravene
the Constitution or any statute; (2) must not be unfair or oppressive; (3) must not be
partial or discriminatory; (4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade;
(5) must be general and consistent with public policy; and (6) must not be
unreasonable.
The Court joins the CA in finding that the real intent of the setback requirement was
to make the parking space free for use by the public, considering that it would no
longer be for the exclusive use of the respondents as it would also be available for
use by the general... public. Section 9 of Article III of the 1987 Constitution, a
provision on eminent domain, provides that private property shall not be taken for
public use without just compensation.
Section 5 to be unreasonable and oppressive as it will substantially divest the
respondents of the beneficial use of their property solely for aesthetic purposes.
Accordingly, Section 5 of Ordinance No. 192 is... invalid.
The principal purpose of Section 3.1 is "to discourage, suppress or prevent the
concealment of prohibited or unlawful acts." The ultimate goal of this objective is
clearly the prevention of crime to ensure public safety and security. The means
employed by the petitioners,... however, is not reasonably necessary for the
accomplishment of this purpose and is unduly oppressive to private rights.
The petitioners have not adequately shown, and it does not appear obvious to this
Court, that an 80% see-thru fence would provide better protection and a higher level
of security, or serve as a more satisfactory criminal deterrent, than a tall solid
concrete wall. It may even be... argued that such exposed premises could entice and
tempt would-be criminals to the property, and that a see-thru fence would be easier
to bypass and breach. It also appears that the respondents' concrete wall has served
as more than sufficient protection over the last 40 years.
`
As to the beautification purpose of the assailed ordinance, as previously discussed,
the State may not, under the guise of police power, infringe on private rights solely
for the sake of the aesthetic appearance of the community. Similarly, the Court
cannot perceive how a... see-thru fence will foster "neighborliness" between
members of a community.
Compelling the respondents to construct their fence in accordance with the assailed
ordinance is, thus, a clear encroachment on their right to property, which necessarily
includes their right to decide how best to protect their property.

It also appears that requiring the exposure of their property via a see- thru fence is
violative of their right to privacy, considering that the residence of the Benedictine
nuns is also located within the property. The right to privacy has long been
considered a fundamental... right guaranteed by the Constitution that must be
protected from intrusion or constraint. The right to privacy is essentially the right to
be let alone,[37] as governmental powers should stop short of certain intrusions into
the personal life of its... citizens

Considering the invalidity of Sections 3.1 and 5, it is clear that the petitioners were
acting in excess of their jurisdiction in enforcing Ordinance No. 1 92 against the
respondents. The CA was correct in affirming the decision of the RTC in issuing the
writ of prohibition. The... petitioners must permanently desist from enforcing
Sections 3.1 and 5 of the assailed ordinance on the respondents' property in Marikina
City.

Principles:

The test of a valid ordinance... substantive requirements: (1) must not contravene
the Constitution or any statute; (2) must not be unfair or oppressive; (3) must not be
partial or discriminatory; (4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade;

(5) must be general and consistent with public policy; and (6) must not be
unreasonable.

Social Justice Society (SJS) v. Atienza, Jr.:[28]

As with the State, local governments may be considered as having properly exercised
their police power only if the following requisites are met: (1) the interests of the
public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require its exercise
and (2)... the means employed are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of
the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. In short, there must be a
concurrence of a lawful subject and lawful method.

Lacking a concurrence of these two requisites, the police power measure shall be
struck down as an arbitrary intrusion into private rights and a violation of the due
process clause
SERRANO V. GALLANT MARITIME SERVICES,INC.
By way of Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, petitioner assails
the Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA).
FACTS:
Petitioner was hired by Gallant Maritime Services, Inc. and Marlow Navigation Co.,
Ltd. (respondents) under a Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA)-
approved Contract of Employment with the following terms and conditions:
Duration of contract 12 months
Position Chief Officer
Basic monthly salary US$1,400.00
Hours of work 48.0 hours per week
Overtime US$700.00 per month
Vacation leave with pay 7.00 days per month
On March 19, 1998, the date of his departure, petitioner was constrained to accept
a downgraded employment contract for the position of Second Officer with a
monthly salary of US$1,000.00, upon the assurance and representation of
respondents that he would be made Chief Officer by the end of April 1998.
Respondents did not deliver on their promise to make petitioner Chief Officer.
Hence, petitioner refused to stay on as Second Officer and was repatriated to the
Philippines on May 26, 1998.
Petitioner’s employment contract was for a period of 12 months or from March 19,
1998 up to March 19, 1999, but at the time of his repatriation on May 26, 1998, he
had served only two (2) months and seven (7) days of his contract, leaving an
unexpired portion of nine (9) months and twenty-three (23) days.
Petitioner filed with the Labor Arbiter (LA) a Complaint against respondents for
constructive dismissal and for payment of his money claims in the total amount of
US$26,442.73.
The LA rendered a Decision dated July 15, 1999, declaring the dismissal of
petitioner illegal and awarding him monetary benefits, to wit:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered declaring that the
dismissal of the complainant (petitioner) by the respondents in the above-entitled
case was illegal and the respondents are hereby ordered to pay the complainant
[petitioner], jointly and severally, in Philippine Currency, based on the rate of
exchange prevailing at the time of payment, the amount of EIGHT THOUSAND
SEVEN HUNDRED SEVENTY U.S. DOLLARS (US $8,770.00), representing the
complainant’s salary for three (3) months of the unexpired portion of the aforesaid
contract of employment.
The claims of the complainant for moral and exemplary damages are hereby
DISMISSED for lack of merit.
In awarding petitioner a lump-sum salary of US$8,770.00, the LA based his
computation on the salary period of three months only — rather than the entire
unexpired portion of nine months and 23 days of petitioner’s employment contract
– applying the subject clause. However, the LA applied the salary rate of
US$2,590.00, consisting of petitioner’s “[b]asic salary, US$1,400.00/month +
US$700.00/month, fixed overtime pay, + US$490.00/month, vacation leave pay =
US$2,590.00/compensation per month.”
Respondents appealed to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) to
question the finding of the LA that petitioner was illegally dismissed.
The NLRC modified the LA Decision and corrected the LA’s computation of the lump-
sum salary awarded to petitioner by reducing the applicable salary rate from
US$2,590.00 to US$1,400.00 because R.A. No. 8042 “does not provide for the
award of overtime pay, which should be proven to have been actually performed,
and for vacation leave pay.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration, but this time he questioned
the constitutionality of the subject clause. The NLRC denied the motion.
Petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari with the CA, reiterating the constitutional
challenge against the subject clause. After initially dismissing the petition on a
technicality, the CA eventually gave due course to it, as directed by this Court in its
Resolution which granted the petition for certiorari,filed by petitioner.
The CA affirmed the NLRC ruling on the reduction of the applicable salary rate;
however, the CA skirted the constitutional issue raised by petitioner.
His Motion for Reconsideration having been denied by the CA, petitioner brings his
cause to this Court on the following grounds:
The Court of Appeals and the labor tribunals have decided the case in a way not in
accord with applicable decision of the Supreme Court involving similar issue of
granting unto the migrant worker back wages equal to the unexpired portion of his
contract of employment instead of limiting it to three (3) months.
Even without considering the constitutional limitations [of] Sec. 10 of Republic Act
No. 8042, the Court of Appeals gravely erred in law in excluding from petitioner’s
award the overtime pay and vacation pay provided in his contract since under the
contract they form part of his salary.
The Court now takes up the full merit of the petition mindful of the extreme
importance of the constitutional question raised therein.
ISSUES:
 Whether Section 10 (par 5) of RA 8042 is unconstitutional
 Proper computation of the Lump-sum salary to be awarded to petitioner
by reason of his illegal dismissal
 Whether the overtime and leave pay should form part of the salary basis
in the computation of his monetary award
The unanimous finding of the LA, NLRC and CA that the dismissal of petitioner was
illegal is not disputed. Likewise not disputed is the salary differential of US$45.00
awarded to petitioner in all three fora.
Applying the subject clause, the NLRC and the CA computed the lump-sum salary of
petitioner at the monthly rate of US$1,400.00 covering the period of three months
out of the unexpired portion of nine months and 23 days of his employment contract
or a total of US$4,200.00.
Impugning the constitutionality of the subject clause, petitioner contends that, in
addition to the US$4,200.00 awarded by the NLRC and the CA, he is entitled to
US$21,182.23 more or a total of US$25,382.23, equivalent to his salaries for the
entire nine months and 23 days left of his employment contract, computed at the
monthly rate of US$2,590.00.31
Arguments of the Petitioner
For Antonio Serrano (petitioner), a Filipino seafarer, the last clause in the 5th
paragraph of Section 10, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8042, violates the OFWs’
constitutional rights in that it impairs the terms of their contract, deprives them of
equal protection and denies them due process.
The Arguments of Respondents
Respondents contend that the constitutional issue should not be entertained, for
this was belatedly interposed by petitioner in his appeal before the CA, and not at
the earliest opportunity, which was when he filed an appeal before the NLRC.40
The Arguments of the Solicitor General
The Solicitor General (OSG)41 points out that as R.A. No. 8042 took effect on July 15,
1995, its provisions could not have impaired petitioner’s 1998 employment contract.
Rather, R.A. No. 8042 having preceded petitioner’s contract, the provisions thereof
are deemed part of the minimum terms of petitioner’s employment, especially on
the matter of money claims, as this was not stipulated upon by the parties.
The Court’s Ruling:
First Issue
Does the subject clause violate Section 1, Article III of the Constitution, and Section
18, Article II and Section 3, Article XIII on Labor as protected sector?
The answer is in the affirmative.
Section 1, Article III of the Constitution guarantees:
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law
nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the law.
Section 18, Article II and Section 3, Article XIII accord all members of the labor sector,
without distinction as to place of deployment, full protection of their rights and
welfare.
To Filipino workers, the rights guaranteed under the foregoing constitutional
provisions translate to economic security and parity: all monetary benefits should be
equally enjoyed by workers of similar category, while all monetary obligations should
be borne by them in equal degree; none should be denied the protection of the laws
which is enjoyed by, or spared the burden imposed on, others in like circumstances.
Imbued with the same sense of “obligation to afford protection to labor,” the Court
in the present case also employs the standard of strict judicial scrutiny, for it
perceives in the subject clause a suspect classification prejudicial to OFWs.
Upon cursory reading, the subject clause appears facially neutral, for it applies to all
OFWs. However, a closer examination reveals that the subject clause has a
discriminatory intent against, and an invidious impact on OFWs
The subject clause does not state or imply any definitive governmental purpose; and
it is for that precise reason that the clause violates not just petitioner’s right to
equal protection, but also her right to substantive due process under Section 1,
Article III of the Constitution.
Second Issue
It is plain that prior to R.A. No. 8042, all OFWs, regardless of contract periods or the
unexpired portions thereof, were treated alike in terms of the computation of their
monetary benefits in case of illegal dismissal. Their claims were subjected to a
uniform rule of computation: their basic salaries multiplied by the entire unexpired
portion of their employment contracts.
The enactment of the subject clause in R.A. No. 8042 introduced a differentiated
rule of computation of the money claims of illegally dismissed OFWs based on their
employment periods, in the process singling out one category whose contracts have
an unexpired portion of one year or more and subjecting them to the peculiar
disadvantage of having their monetary awards limited to their salaries for 3 months
or for the unexpired portion thereof, whichever is less, but all the while sparing the
other category from such prejudice, simply because the latter’s unexpired contracts
fall short of one year.
Prior to R.A. No. 8042, a uniform system of computation of the monetary awards of
illegally dismissed OFWs was in place. This uniform system was applicable even to
local workers with fixed-term employment.
The subject clause does not state or imply any definitive governmental purpose; and
it is for that precise reason that the clause violates not just petitioner’s right to
equal protection, but also her right to substantive due process under Section 1,
Article III of the Constitution.
The subject clause being unconstitutional, petitioner is entitled to his salaries for
the entire unexpired period of nine months and 23 days of his employment
contract, pursuant to law and jurisprudence prior to the enactment of R.A. No.
8042.
Third Issue
Petitioner contends that his overtime and leave pay should form part of the salary
basis in the computation of his monetary award, because these are fixed benefits
that have been stipulated into his contract.
Petitioner is mistaken.
The word salaries in Section 10(5) does not include overtime and leave pay. For
seafarers like petitioner, DOLE Department Order No. 33, series 1996, provides a
Standard Employment Contract of Seafarers, in which salary is understood as the
basic wage, exclusive of overtime, leave pay and other bonuses; whereas overtime
pay is compensation for all work “performed” in excess of the regular eight hours,
and holiday pay is compensation for any work “performed” on designated rest
days and holidays.
In the same vein, the claim for the day’s leave pay for the unexpired portion of the
contract is unwarranted since the same is given during the actual service of the
seamen.
WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the Petition. The subject clause “or for three
months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less” in the 5th
paragraph of Section 10 of Republic Act No. 8042 is DECLARED
UNCONSTITUTIONAL; and the December 8, 2004 Decision and April 1, 2005
Resolution of the Court of Appeals are MODIFIED to the effect that petitioner is
AWARDED his salaries for the entire unexpired portion of his employment contract
consisting of nine months and 23 days computed at the rate of US$1,400.00 per
month.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ANDRE MARTI (193 SCRA 57) Case Digest with the enforcement of the law. It is not meant to be invoked against acts of private
individuals. It will be recalled that Mr Job Reyes was the one who opened the box in
the presence of the NBI agents in his place of business. The mere presence of the
Facts: NBI agents did not convert the reasonable search effected by Mr. Reyes into a
warrantless search and siezure proscribed by the constitution. Merely to observe
and look at that which is in plain sight is not a search.

On August 14, 1987, the appellant and his common-law wife, Shirley Reyes went to
Manila Packaging and Export Forwarders to send packages to Zurich, Switzerland. It
was received by Anita Reyes and ask if she could inspect the packages. Shirley The judgement of conviction finding appeallant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
refused and eventually convinced Anita to seal the package making it ready for the crime charged was AFFIRMED.
shipment. Before being sent out for delivery, Job Reyes, husband of Anita and
proprietor of the courier company, conducted an inspection of the package as part
of standard operating procedures. Upon opening the package, he noticed a
suspicious odor which made him took sample of the substance he found inside. He
reported this to the NBI and invited agents to his office to inspect the package. In the
presence of the NBI agents, Job Reyes opened the suspicious package and found
dried-marijuana leaves inside. A case was filed against Andre Marti in violation of
R.A. 6425 and was found guilty by the court a quo. Andre filed an appeal in the
Supreme Court claiming that his constitutional right of privacy was violated and that
the evidence acquired from his package was inadmissible as evidence against him.

Issue:

Can the Constitutional Right of Privacy be enforced against private individuals?

Ruling:

The Supreme Court held based on the speech of Commissioner Bernas that the Bill
of Rights governs the relationship between the individual and the state.

The constitutional proscription against unlawful searches and seizures therefore

applies as a restraint directed only against the government and its agencies tasked
AAA v. Carbonell; June 8, 2007; YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
FACTS:
Feb. 28, 2001 to Aug.16, 2001: AAA worked as a secretary at the Arzadon
Automotive and Car Service Center. He Boss Arzadon is the accused.
May 27, 2001 at about 6:30 p.m.: Arzadon asked her to deliver a book to an office
located at another building but when she returned to their office, the lights had been
turned off and the gate was closed. But she still went in to get her handbag.
On her way out, she saw Arzadon standing beside a parked van holding a pipe. He
told her to go near him and upon reaching his side, he threatened her with the pipe
and forced her to lie on the pavement. He removed her pants and underwear, and
inserted his penis into her vagina. She wept and cried out for help but those were
useless since nobody was there. She didn’t report the incident at first because of
Arzadon’s threats but then she found out she’s preggy so she eventually filed the
complaint for rape.
AAA failed to appear for the 4 consecutive orders to take the witness stand in order
to satisfy the judge for the existence of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant
of arrest. Because of this, dismissed the Case for lack of probable cause. He claims
that under Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution, no warrant of arrest shall
issue except upon probable cause “to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce.
Petitioner contends that the judge is not required to personally examine the
complainant and her witnesses in satisfying himself of the existence of probable
cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest as the documentary evidence and
transcript of stenographic notes may sufficiently establish this.
Respondent Judge Carbonell argues in his Comment that the finding of probable
cause by the investigating prosecutor is not binding or obligatory, and that he was
justified in requiring petitioner and her witnesses to take the witness stand in order
to determine probable cause.
ISSUE: WON Judge Carbonell acted with grave abuse of discretion in dismissing
Criminal Case No. 6983 for lack of probable cause
HELD: YES.
Soliven v. Makasiar: The constitutional provision does not mandatorily require the
judge to personally examine the complainant and her witnesses. Instead, he may
opt to: 1)personally evaluate the report and supporting documents submitted by the
prosecutor or 2) he may disregard the prosecutor’s report and require the
submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses. ->
What the law requires as personal determination on the part of the judge is that he
should not rely solely on the report of the investigating prosecutor.
In this case, Judge Carbonell dismissed the case without taking into consideration
the June 11, 2003 Resolution of 2nd Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Georgina Hidalgo,
the October 13, 2003 Resolution of the panel of prosecutors, and the July 1, 2005
Resolution of the Department of Justice, all of which sustain a finding of probable
cause against Arzadon. Moreover, he failed to evaluate the evidence in support
thereof. Respondent judge’s finding of lack of probable cause was premised only
on the complainant’s and her witnesses’ absence during the hearing scheduled by
the respondent judge for the judicial determination of probable cause.
Petitioner narrated in detail the alleged rape incident both in her Sinumpaang
Salaysay. and Complaint-Affidavit. She attended several clarificatory hearings that
were conducted in the instant case. The transcript of stenographic notes of the
hearing held on October 11, 2002 shows that she positively identified Arzadon as her
assailant, and the specific time and place of the incident. She also claimed that she
bore a child as a result of the rape and, in support of her contentions, presented the
child and her birth certificate as evidence. In contrast, Arzadon merely relied on the
defense of alibi which is the weakest of all defenses.

After a careful examination of the records, the SC found that there is sufficient
evidence to establish probable cause.

Thus, respondent Judge committed GAD in the dismissal. for lack of probable cause
on the ground that petitioner and her witnesses failed to take the witness
stand. Considering there is ample evidence and sufficient basis on record to support
a finding of probable cause, it was unnecessary for him to take the further step of
examining the petitioner and her witnesses. Moreover, he erred in holding that
petitioner’s absences in the scheduled hearings were indicative of a lack of interest
in prosecuting the case. In fact, the records show that she has relentlessly pursued
the same.

Needless to say, a full-blown trial is to be preferred to ferret out the truth.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED.

Ruben Del Castillo
vs.
People of the Philippines
Facts:
Pursuant to a confidential information that petitioner Del Castillo was engaged in
selling shabu, police officers headed by SPO3 Bienvenido Masnayon, after
conducting surveillance and test-buy operation at the house of petitioner, secured a
search warrant from the RTC. Upon arrival to the residence of Del Castillo to
implement the search warrant, SPO3 Masnayon claimed that he saw petitioner run
towards a small structure, a nipa hut, in front of his house. Masnayon chased him
but to no avail, because he and his men were not familiar with the entrances and
exits of the place. They all went back to the residence of Del Castillo and requested
his men to get a barangay tanod and a few minutes thereafter, his men returned
with two barangay tanods who searched the house of petitioner including the nipa
hut where the petitioner allegedly ran for cover. His men who searched the
residence of the petitioner found nothing, but one of the barangay tanods was able
to confiscate from the nipa hut several articles, including four (4) plastic packs
containing white crystalline substance.
as well as the CA, merely presumed that petitioner used the said structure due to
the presence of electrical materials, the petitioner being an electrician by profession.
The prosecution must prove that the petitioner had knowledge of the existence and
presence of the drugs in the place under his control and dominion and the character
of the drugs. With the prosecution’s failure to prove that the nipa hut was under
petitioner’s control and dominion, there casts a reasonable doubt as to his guilt. In
considering a criminal case, it is critical to start with the law’s own starting
perspective on the status of the accused — in all criminal prosecutions, he is
presumed innocent of the charge laid unless the contrary is proven beyond
reasonable doubt. Proof beyond reasonable doubt, or that quantum of proof
sufficient to produce a moral certainty that would convince and satisfy the
conscience of those who act in judgment, is indispensable to overcome the
constitutional presumption of innocence.

Thus, an information was filed against Del Castillo for violation of Section 16, Article
III of R.A. 6425 and was found guilty by the RTC and affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
Petitioner filed with the Supreme Court the petition for certiorari contending among
others that CA erred in finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegal
possession of prohibited drugs, because he could not be presumed to be in
possession of the same just because they were found inside the nipa hut.

Issue:
Can petitioner Del Castillo be held liable for violation of Section 16, Article III of R.A.
6425 by mere presumption that the petitioner has dominion and control over the
place where the shabu was found?

Held:

No. While it is not necessary that the property to be searched or seized should be
owned by the person against whom the search warrant is issued, there must be
sufficient showing that the property is under petitioner’s control or possession. The
records are void of any evidence to show that petitioner owns the nipa hut in
question nor was it established that he used the said structure as a shop. The RTC,
FACTS:
The Regional Intelligence Operations Unit of the Capital Command (RIOU-CAPCOM)
received confidential information about a member of the NPA Sparrow Unit being
treated for a gunshot wound at a hospital. Upon verification, it was found that the
wounded person who was listed in the hospital records as Ronnie Javelon is actually
petitioner Rolando Dural, a member of the NPA liquidationsquad responsible for the
killing of two CAPCOM soldiers the day before. He was positively identified by
eyewitnesses as the gunman who went on top of the hood of the CAPCOM mobile
patrol car and fired at the two CAPCOM soldiers seated inside.
ISSUE(S):
Whether or not petitioner’s arrest was lawful.
RULING:
YES. Petitioner Dural was arrested for being a member of the New Peoples Army
(NPA), an outlawed subversive organization. Subversion being a continuing offense,
the arrest of Rolando Dural without a warrant is justified as it can be said that he was
committing an offense when arrested. The crimes of rebellion, subversion,
conspiracy or proposal to commit such crimes, and crimes or offenses committed in
furtherance thereof or in connection therewith constitute direct assaults against the
State and are in the nature of continuing crime.
Petitions are DISMISSED.
Facts: on 1 February 1988, the Regional Intelligence Operations Unit of the Capital
Command (RIOU-CAPCOM) received confidential information about a member of
the NPA Sparrow Unit (liquidation squad) being treated for a gunshot wound at the
St. Agnes Hospital in Roosevelt Avenue, Quezon City. Upon verification, it was found
that the wounded person, who was listed in the hospital records as Ronnie Javelon,
is actually Rolando Dural, a member of the NPA liquidation squad, responsible for
the killing of two (2) CAPCOM soldiers the day before, or on 31 January 1988, in
Macanining Street, Bagong Barrio, Caloocan City. In view of this verification, Rolando
Dural was transferred to the Regional Medical Services of the CAPCOM, for security
reasons. While confined thereat, or on 4 February 1988, Rolando Dural was positively
identified by eyewitnesses as the gunman who went on top of the hood of the
CAPCOM mobile patrol car, and fired at the two (2) CAPCOM soldiers seated inside
the car. As a consequence of this positive identification, Rolando Dural was referred
to the Caloocan City Fiscal who conducted an inquest and thereafter filed with the
Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City an information charging Rolando Dural alias
Ronnie Javelon with the crime of “Double Murder with Assault Upon Agents of
Persons in Authority.” The case was docketed therein as Criminal Case No. C-30112
and no bail was recommended. On 15 February 1988, the information was amended
to include, as defendant, Bernardo Itucal, Jr. who, at the filing of the original
information, was still unidentified. As to Rolando Dural, it clearly appears that he was
not arrested while in the act of shooting the two (2) CAPCOM soldiers
aforementioned. Nor was he arrested just after the commission of the said offense
for his arrest came a day after the said shooting incident. Seemingly, his arrest
without warrant is unjustified. However, Rolando Dural was arrested for being a
member of the New Peoples Army (NPA), an outlawed subversive organization.
Subversion being a continuing offense, the arrest of Rolando Dural without warrant
is justified as it can be said that he was committing an offense when arrested. The
crimes of rebellion, subversion, conspiracy or proposal to commit such crimes, and
crimes or offenses committed in furtherance thereof or in connection therewith
constitute direct assaults against the State and are in the nature of continuing
crimes.
Issue: Whether an arrest and search warrant is required for the crimes of rebellion,
subversion, conspiracy or proposal to commit such crimes, and crimes or offenses
committed in furtherance thereof or in connection therewith constitute direct
assaults against the State.
Held: No, the claim of the petitioners that they were initially arrested illegally is,
therefore, without basis in law and in fact. The crimes of insurrection or rebellion,
subversion, conspiracy or proposal to commit such crimes, and other crimes and
offenses committed in the furtherance, on the occasion thereof, or incident thereto,
or in connection therewith under Presidential Proclamation No. 2045, are all in the
nature of continuing offenses which set them apart from the common offenses,
aside from their essentially involving a massive conspiracy of nationwide magnitude.
Clearly then, the arrest of the herein detainees was well within the bounds of the
law and existing jurisprudence in our jurisdiction. The arrest of persons involved in
the rebellion whether as its fighting armed elements, or for committing non-violent
acts but in furtherance of the rebellion, is more an act of capturing them in the
course of an armed conflict, to quell the rebellion, than for the purpose of
immediately prosecuting them in court for a statutory offense. The arrest, therefore,
need not follow the usual procedure in the prosecution of offenses which requires
the determination by a judge of the existence of probable cause before the issuance
of a judicial warrant of arrest and the granting of bail if the offense is bailable.
Obviously, the absence of a judicial warrant is no legal impediment to arresting or
capturing persons committing overt acts of violence against government forces, or
any other milder acts but equally in pursuance of the rebellious movement. The
arrest or capture is thus impelled by the exigencies of the situation that involves the
very survival of society and its government and duly constituted authorities. If killing
and other acts of violence against the rebels find justification in the exigencies of
armed hostilities which is of the essence of waging a rebellion or insurrection, most
assuredly so in case of invasion, merely seizing their persons and detaining them
while any of these contingencies continues cannot be less justified. In this case,
whatever may be said about the manner of his arrest, the fact remains that the
defendant was actually in court in the custody of the law on March 29, when a
complaint sufficient in form and substance was read to him. To this he pleaded not
guilty. The trial followed, in which, and in the judgment of guilty pronounced by the
court, we find no error. Whether, if there were irregularities in bringing him
personally before the court, he could have been released on a writ of habeas corpus
or now has a civil action for damages against the person who arrested him we need
not inquire. It is enough to say that such irregularities are not sufficient to set aside
a valid judgment rendered upon a sufficient complaint and after a trial free from
error.
Luz v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 197788, 29 February 2012.
18APR
[SERENO, J.]
FACTS: PO3 Alteza flagged down Rodel Luz for violating a municipal ordinance which
requires all motorcycle drivers to wear helmets while driving their motorcyles. PO3
Alteza invited the Luz to come inside their sub-station since the place where he
flagged down the Luz is almost in front of the said sub-station. While issuing a citation
ticket for violation of municipal ordinance, PO3 Alteza noticed that Luz was uneasy
and kept on getting something from his jacket. Alerted and so, he told the Luz to take
out the contents of the pocket of his jacket as the latter may have a weapon inside
it. Luzo bliged and slowly put out the contents of the pocket of his jacket which was
a nickel-like tin or metal container about two (2) to three (3) inches in size, including
two (2) cellphones, one (1) pair of scissors and one (1) Swiss knife. Upon seeing the
said container, he asked Luz to open it. After Luz opened the container, PO3 Alteza
noticed a cartoon cover and something beneath it, and that upon his instruction, the
former spilled out the contents of the container on the table which turned out to be
four (4) plastic sachets, the two (2) of which were empty while the other two (2)
contained suspected shabu. Luz was later charged for illegal possession of dangerous
drugs. Luz claims that there was no lawful search and seizure because there was no
lawful arrest. The RTC found that Luz was lawfully arrested. Upon review, the CA
affirmed the RTCs Decision.
ISSUE #1: Can Luz be considered lawfully arrested based on traffic violation under
the city ordinance, and such arrest lead to a valid search and seizure?
HELD #1: NO, Luz was not lawfully arrested. When he was flagged down for
committing a traffic violation, he was not, ipso facto and solely for this reason,
arrested.
Arrest is the taking of a person into custody in order that he or she may be bound to
answer for the commission of an offense. It is effected by an actual restraint of the
person to be arrested or by that persons voluntary submission to the custody of the
one making the arrest. Neither the application of actual force, manual touching of
the body, or physical restraint, nor a formal declaration of arrest, is required. It is
enough that there be an intention on the part of one of the parties to arrest the
other, and that there be an intent on the part of the other to submit, under the belief
and impression that submission is necessary.
At the time that he was waiting for PO3 Alteza to write his citation ticket, petitioner
could not be said to have been under arrest. There was no intention on the part of
PO3 Alteza to arrest him, deprive him of his liberty, or take him into custody. Prior
to the issuance of the ticket, the period during which petitioner was at the police
station may be characterized merely as waiting time. In fact, as found by the trial
court, PO3 Alteza himself testified that the only reason they went to the police sub-
station was that petitioner had been flagged down almost in front of that place.
Hence, it was only for the sake of convenience that they were waiting there. There
was no intention to take petitioner into custody.
This ruling does not imply that there can be no arrest for a traffic violation. Certainly,
when there is an intent on the part of the police officer to deprive the motorist of
liberty, or to take the latter into custody, the former may be deemed to have
arrested the motorist. In this case, however, the officers issuance (or intent to issue)
a traffic citation ticket negates the possibility of an arrest for the same violation.
ISSUE #2: Assuming that Luz was deemed arrested, was there a valid warrantless
search and seizure that can still produce conviction?
HELD#2: NO. Even if one were to work under the assumption that Luz was deemed
arrested upon being flagged down for a traffic violation and while awaiting the
issuance of his ticket, then the requirements for a valid arrest were not complied
with.
This Court has held that at the time a person is arrested, it shall be the duty of the
arresting officer to inform the latter of the reason for the arrest and must show that
person the warrant of arrest, if any. Persons shall be informed of their constitutional
rights to remain silent and to counsel, and that any statement they might make could
be used against them. It may also be noted that in this case, these constitutional
requirements were complied with by the police officers only after petitioner had
been arrested for illegal possession of dangerous drugs.
[T]here being no valid arrest, the warrantless search that resulted from it was
likewise illegal. The subject items seized during the illegal arrest are
inadmissible. The drugs are the very corpus delicti of the crime of illegal possession
of dangerous drugs. Thus, their inadmissibility precludes conviction and calls for the
acquittal of the accused
JESSE U. LUCAS V. JESUS S. LUCAS
G.R. No. 190710, [June 6, 2011]
FACTS:
Petitioner, Jesse Lucas filed a Petition to Establish Filiation with a Motion for the
Submission of Parties to DNA Testing before the Regional Trial Court (RTC). Jesse
alleged that he is the son of his mother Elsie who got acquainted with respondent,
Jesus S. Lucas in Manila. He also submitted documents which include (a) petitioner’s
certificate of live birth; (b) petitioner’s baptismal certificate; (c) petitioner’s college
diploma, showing that he graduated from Saint Louis University in Baguio City with
a degree in Psychology; (d) his Certificate of Graduation from the same school; (e)
Certificate of Recognition from the University of the Philippines, College of Music;
and (f) clippings of several articles from different newspapers about petitioner, as a
musical prodigy.
Jesus learned of this and he filed a Special Appearance and Comment manifesting
that the petition was adversarial in nature and therefore summons should be served
on him. Meanwhile, Jesse filed a Very Urgent Motion to Try and Hear the Case which
the RTC found to be sufficient in form and hence set the case for hearing. Jesus filed
a Motion for Reconsideration arguing that DNA testing cannot be had on the basis of
a mere allegation pointing to him as Jesse’s father.
Acting on Jesus’ Motion for Reconsideration, the RTC dismissed the case and held
that Jesse failed to establish compliance with the four procedural aspects for a
paternity action enumerated in the case of Herrera v. Alba namely, a prima
faciecase, affirmative defences, presumption of legitimacy, and physical
resemblance between the putative father and the child.
This prompted Jesse to file a Motion for Reconsideration which the RTC granted. A
new hearing was scheduled where the RTC held that ruling on the grounds relied
upon by Jesse for filing the instant petition is premature considering that a full-blown
trial has not yet taken place. Jesus filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was
denied by the RTC. He then filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals
(CA). The CA ruled in favour of Jesus, it noted that Jesse failed to show that the four
significant aspects of a traditional paternity action had been met and held that DNA
testing should not be allowed when the petitioner has failed to establish a prima
facie case.
ISSUE:
Whether aprima facie showing is necessary before a court can issue a DNA testing
order
HELD:
Yes, but it is not yet time to discuss the lack ofa prima facie case vis-à-vis the motion
for DNA testing since no evidence has, as yet, been presented by petitioner.
RATIO:
Misapplication of Herrera v. Alba by the Regional Trial Court and the Court of
Appeals. The statement in Herrera v. Alba that there are four significant procedural
aspects in a traditional paternity case which parties have to face has been widely
misunderstood and misapplied in this case. A party is confronted by these so-called
procedural aspects during trial, when the parties have presented their respective
evidence. They are matters of evidence that cannot be determined at this initial
stage of the proceedings, when only the petition to establish filiation has been filed.
The CA’s observation that petitioner failed to establish a prima facie case is herefore
misplaced. A prima facie case is built by a party’s evidence and not by mere
allegations in the initiatory pleading.
Section 4 of the Rule on DNA Evidence merely provides for conditions that are aimed
to safeguard the accuracy and integrity of the DNA testing. It states that the
appropriate court may, at any time, either motu proprio or on application of any
person, who has a legal interest in the matter in litigation, order a DNA testing. Such
order shall issue after due hearing and notice to the parties upon a showing of the
following: (a) A biological sample exists that is relevant to the case;(b) The biological
sample: (i) was not previously subjected to the type of DNA testing now requested;
or (ii) was previously subjected to DNA testing, but the results may require
confirmation for good reasons; (c) The DNA testing uses a scientifically valid
technique; (d) The DNA testing has the scientific potential to produce new
information that is relevant to the proper resolution of the case; and (e) The
existence of other factors, if any, which the court may consider as potentially
affecting the accuracy or integrity of the DNA testing. This Rule shall not preclude a
DNA testing, without need of a prior court order, at the behest of any party, including
law enforcement agencies, before a suit or proceeding is commenced. This does not
mean, however, that a DNA testing order will be issued as a matter of right if, during
the hearing, the said conditions are established.
In some states, to warrant the issuance of the DNA testing order, there must be a
show cause hearing wherein the applicant must first present sufficient evidence to
establish a prima facie case or a reasonable possibility of paternity or “good cause”
for the holding of the test. In these states, a court order for blood testing is
considered a “search,” which, under their Constitutions (as in ours), must be
preceded by a finding of probable cause in order to be valid. Hence, the requirement
of a prima facie case, or reasonable possibility, was imposed in civil actions as a
counterpart of a finding of probable cause. Courts in various jurisdictions have
differed regarding the kind of procedures which are required, but those jurisdictions
have almost universally found that a preliminary showing must be made before a
court can constitutionally order compulsory blood testing in paternity cases. We
agree, and find that, as a preliminary matter, before the court may issue an order for
compulsory blood testing, the moving party must show that there is a reasonable
possibility of paternity. As explained hereafter, in cases in which paternity is
contested and a party to the action refuses to voluntarily undergo a blood test, a
show cause hearing must be held in which the court can determine whether there is
sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case which warrants issuance of a court
order for blood testing The same condition precedent should be applied in our
jurisdiction to protect the putative father from mere harassment suits. Thus, during
the hearing on the motion for DNA testing, the petitioner must present prima facie
evidence or establish a reasonable possibility of paternity.”
People of the Philippines v. Garry Dela Cruz y De Guzman
G.R. No. 205821; October 1, 2014
Leonen, J.:
FACTS:
Accused-appellant Garry Dela Cruz was arrested and charged for violation of Sections
5 and 11 of RA 9165, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act
of 2002. The RTC and the CA found accused-appellant guilty of the crimes charged,
hence, this appeal.
Dela Cruz was arrested in a buy-bust operation which was allegedly conducted after
a civilian informant tipped the police that a certain “Gary” was selling illegal drugs.
The buy-bust operation team included PO1 Bobon, as poseur-buyer, and SPO1 Roca,
as backup arresting officer. It was agreed that “PO1 Bobon would remove his bull
cap once the sale of illegal drugs was [consummated].” The buy-bust team prepared
a 100.00 bill with serial number KM 776896 as marked money.
The buy-bust operation team, accompanied by the informant, went to the target
area. The informant initially brokered the sale of shabu. It was PO1 Bobon who
handed the marked money to Dela Cruz in exchange for one (1) heat-sealed plastic
sachet of suspected shabu. After which, he removed his bull cap. SPO1 Roca then
arrested Dela Cruz.
Upon frisking Dela Cruz, PO1 Bobon supposedly recovered six (6) more heat-sealed
sachets of suspected shabu. PO1 Bobon placed the sachet he purchased from Dela
Cruz in his right pocket and the six (6) other sachets in his left pocket.
Accused-appellant assails the prosecution’s failure to establish the chain of custody
of the seized sachets of shabu, as well as the validity of the buy-bust operation and
the prosecution’s failure to present the informant in court.
ISSUE:
Was the prosecution able to establish compliance with the chain of custody
requirements under Section 21 of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002
HELD:
NO, the prosecution was not able to establish compliance with the chain of custody
requirements. The significance of complying with Section 21’s requirements cannot
be overemphasized. Non-compliance is tantamount to failure in establishing the
identity of corpus delicti, an essential element of the offenses of illegal sale and
illegal possession of dangerous drugs. By failing to establish an element of these
offenses, non-compliance will, thus, engender the acquittal of an accused.
The mere marking of seized paraphernalia, unsupported by a physical inventory and
taking of photographs, and in the absence of the persons required by Section 21 to
be present, does not suffice. In this case, no physical inventory of the seized items
was conducted. Similarly, there is nothing in the records to show that the seized
items were photographed in the manner required by Section 21. Likewise, none of
the persons required by Section 21 to be present (or their possible substitutes) have
been shown to be present.
The circumstance of PO1 Bobon keeping narcotics in his own pockets precisely
underscores the importance of strictly complying with Section 21. His subsequent
identification in open court of the items coming out of his own pockets is self-serving.
The prosecution effectively admits that from the moment of the supposed buy-bust
operation until the seized items’ turnover for examination, these items had been in
the sole possession of a police officer. In fact, not only had they been in his
possession, they had been in such close proximity to him that they had been
nowhere else but in his own pockets. Keeping one of the seized items in his right
pocket and the rest in his left pocket is a doubtful and suspicious way of ensuring the
integrity of the items.
Even without referring to the strict requirements of Section 21, common sense
dictates that a single police officer’s act of bodily-keeping the item(s) which is at the
crux of offenses penalized under the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002,
is fraught with dangers. Moreover, PO1 Bobon did so without even offering the
slightest justification for dispensing with the requirements of Section 21.
As the integrity of the corpus delicti of the crimes for which Dela Cruz is charged has
not been established, it follows that there is no basis for finding him guilty beyond
reasonable doubt. It is proper that Dela Cruz be acquitted.
G.R. No. 113271. October 16, 1997

Facts: Antonia Melodia Catolico was hired as a pharmacist by Waterous Drug Corp.

YSP Inc., a supplier of medicine, sold to Waterous, thru Catolico, 10 bottles of Voren
Tablets at P384 per unit. However, previews P.O.s issued to YSP, Inc. showed that
the price per bottle is P320.00. Verification was made to YSP, Inc. to determine the
discrepancy and it was found that the cost per bottle was indeed overpriced.

YSP, Inc. Accounting Department (Ms. Estelita Reyes) confirmed that the difference
represents refund of jack-up price of ten bottles of Voren tablets per sales invoice,
which was paid to Ms. Catolico. Said check was sent in an envelope addressed to
Catolico.

Catolico denied receiving the same. However, Saldana, the clerk of Waterous Drug
Corp. confirmed that she saw an open envelope with a check amounting P640
payable to Catolico.

Waterous Drug Corp. ordered the termination of Catolico for acts of dishonesty.

NLRC: Dismissed the Petition. Evidence of respondents (check from YSP) being
rendered inadmissible, by virtue of the constitutional right invoked by complainants.

Petitioners: In the light of the decision in the People v. Marti, the constitutional
protection against unreasonable searches and seizures refers to the immunity of
one’s person from interference by government and cannot be extended to acts
committed by private individuals so as to bring it within the ambit of alleged unlawful
intrusion by the government.

Issue: W/N the check is admissible as evidence

Held: Yes.

Ratio: (People vs. Marti) Marti ruling: The Bill of Rights does not protect citizens
from unreasonable searches and seizures perpetrated by private individuals.

It is not true, as counsel for Catolico claims, that the citizens have no recourse against
such assaults. On the contrary, and as said counsel admits, such an invasion gives rise
to both criminal and civil liabilities. Despite this, the SC ruled that there was
insufficient evidence of cause for the dismissal of Catolico from employment
Suspicion is not among the valid causes provided by the Labor Code for the
termination of Employment.
ZULUETA VS. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 107383, February 20, 1996
Petitioner: Cecilia Zulueta
Respondents: Court of Appeals and Alfredo Martin
Ponente: J. Mendoza
Facts:
This is a petition to review the decision of the Court of Appeals, affirming the decision
of the Regional Trial Court of Manila (Branch X) which ordered petitioner to return
documents and papers taken by her from private respondent's clinic without the
latter's knowledge and consent.
Petitioner Cecilia Zulueta is the wife of private respondent Alfredo Martin. On March
26, 1982, petitioner entered the clinic of her husband, a doctor of medicine, and in
the presence of her mother, a driver and private respondent's secretary, forcibly
opened the drawers and cabinet in her husband's clinic and took 157 documents
consisting of private correspondence between Dr. Martin and his alleged paramours,
greetings cards, cancelled checks, diaries, Dr. Martin's passport, and photographs.
The documents and papers were seized for use in evidence in a case for legal
separation and for disqualification from the practice of medicine which petitioner
had filed against her husband.
Issue:
(1) Whether or not the documents and papers in question are inadmissible in
evidence;
Held:
(1) No. Indeed the documents and papers in question are inadmissible in evidence.
The constitutional injunction declaring "the privacy of communication and
correspondence [to be] inviolable" is no less applicable simply because it is the wife
(who thinks herself aggrieved by her husband's infidelity) who is the party against
whom the constitutional provision is to be enforced. The only exception to the
prohibition in the Constitution is if there is a "lawful order [from a] court or when
public safety or order requires otherwise, as prescribed by law." Any violation of this
provision renders the evidence obtained inadmissible "for any purpose in any
proceeding."
The intimacies between husband and wife do not justify any one of them in breaking
the drawers and cabinets of the other and in ransacking them for any telltale
evidence of marital infidelity. A person, by contracting marriage, does not shed
his/her integrity or his right to privacy as an individual and the constitutional
protection is ever available to him or to her.
The law insures absolute freedom of communication between the spouses by
making it privileged. Neither husband nor wife may testify for or against the other
without the consent of the affected spouse while the marriage subsists. Neither may
be examined without the consent of the other as to any communication received in
confidence by one from the other during the marriage, save for specified
exceptions. But one thing is freedom of communication; quite another is a
compulsion for each one to share what one knows with the other. And this has
nothing to do with the duty of fidelity that each owes to the other.
The review for petition is DENIED for lack of merit.
Salcedo -ortanez vs ca
Facts:
Private respondent Rafael Ortanez filed with the Quezon City RTC a complaint for
annulment of marriage with damages against petitioner Teresita Salcedo-Ortanez,
on grounds of lack of marriage license and/or psychological incapacity of the
petitioner.
Among the exhibits offered by private respondent were three (3) cassette tapes of
alleged telephone conversations between petitioner and unidentified persons.
Teresita submitted her Objection/Comment to Rafael’s oral offer of evidence.
However, the trial court admitted all of private respondent’s offered evidence and
later on denied her motion for reconsideration, prompting petitioner to file a
petition for certiorari with the CA to assail the admission in evidence of the
aforementioned cassette tapes.
These tape recordings were made and obtained when private respondent allowed
his friends from the military to wire tap his home telephone.
CA denied the petition because (1) Tape recordings are not inadmissible per se. They
and any other variant thereof can be admitted in evidence for certain purposes,
depending on how they are presented and offered and on how the trial judge utilizes
them in the interest of truth and fairness and the even handed administration of
justice; and (2) A petition for certiorari is notoriously inappropriate to rectify a
supposed error in admitting evidence adduced during trial. The ruling on
admissibility is interlocutory; neither does it impinge on jurisdiction. If it is erroneous,
the ruling should be questioned in the appeal from the judgment on the merits and
not through the special civil action of certiorari. The error, assuming gratuitously that
it exists, cannot be anymore than an error of law, properly correctible by appeal and
not by certiorari.
Petitioner then filed the present petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court.
Issue:
W/N the recordings of the telephone conversations are admissible in evidence
W/N the remedy of certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court was properly
availed of by the petitioner in the Court of Appeals
Held:
1. No. Rep. Act No. 4200 entitled “An Act to Prohibit and Penalize Wire Tapping and
Other Related Violations of the Privacy of Communication, and for other purposes”
expressly makes such tape recordings inadmissible in evidence thus:
Sec. 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, not being authorized by all the parties to
any private communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or cable, or by using any
other device or arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept, or record such
communication or spoken word by using a device commonly known as a dictaphone
or dictagraph or detectaphone or walkie-talkie or tape-recorder, or however
otherwise described. . . .
Sec. 4. Any communication or spoken word, or the existence, contents, substance,
purport, or meaning of the same or any part thereof, or any information therein
contained, obtained or secured by any person in violation of the preceding sections
of this Act shall not be admissible in evidence in any judicial, quasi-judicial, legislative
or administrative hearing or investigation.
Absent a clear showing that both parties to the telephone conversations allowed the
recording of the same, the inadmissibility of the subject tapes is mandatory under
Rep. Act No. 4200.
2. Yes and no. The extraordinary writ of certiorari is generally not available to
challenge an interlocutory order of a trial court. The proper remedy in such cases is
an ordinary appeal from an adverse judgment, incorporating in said appeal the
grounds for assailing the interlocutory order.
However, where the assailed interlocutory order is patently erroneous and the
remedy of appeal would not afford adequate and expeditious relief, the Court may
allow certiorari as a mode of redress.
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) conducted pursuant to the warrant procedure which is a constitutional precondition
of such electronic surveillance. Pp. 389 U. S. 354-359.
Katz v. United States

No. 35

Argued October 17, 1967

Decided December 18, 1967

389 U.S. 347

Syllabus

Petitioner was convicted under an indictment charging him with transmitting

wagering information by telephone across state lines in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1084.
Evidence of petitioner's end of the conversations, overheard by FBI agents who had
attached an electronic listening and recording device to the outside of the telephone
booth from which the calls were made, was introduced at the trial. The Court of
Appeals affirmed the conviction, finding that there was no Fourth Amendment
violation, since there was "no physical entrance into the area occupied by"
petitioner.

Held:

1. The Government's eavesdropping activities violated the privacy upon which

petitioner justifiably relied while using the telephone booth, and thus constituted a
"search and seizure" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Pp. 389 U. S.
350-353.

(a) The Fourth Amendment governs not only the seizure of tangible items, but
extends as well to the recording of oral statements. Silverman v. United States, 365
U. S. 505, 365 U. S. 511. P. 389 U. S. 353.

(b) Because the Fourth Amendment protects people, rather than places, its reach
cannot turn on the presence or absence of a physical intrusion into any given
enclosure. The "trespass" doctrine of Olmstead v. United States, 277 U. S. 438,
and Goldman v. United States, 316 U. S. 129, is no longer controlling. Pp. 389 U. S.
351, 389 U. S. 353.

2. Although the surveillance in this case may have been so narrowly circumscribed
that it could constitutionally have been authorized in advance, it was not in fact
Pollo v Constantino-David, 659 SCRA 198 (2011)
Facts
Respondent CSC Chair Constantino-David received an anonymous letter complaint
alleging of an anomaly taking place in the Regional Office of the CSC. The respondent
then formed a team and issued a memo directing the team “to back up all the files
in the computers found in the Mamamayan Muna (PALD) and Legal divisions.”
Several diskettes containing the back-up files sourced from the hard disk of PALD and
LSD computers were turned over to Chairperson David. The contents of the diskettes
were examined by the CSC’s Office for Legal Affairs (OLA). It was found that most of
the files in the 17 diskettes containing files copied from the computer assigned to
and being used by the petitioner, numbering about 40 to 42 documents, were draft
pleadings or lettersin connection with administrative cases in the CSC and other
tribunals. On the basis of this finding, Chairperson David issued the Show-Cause
Order, requiring the petitioner, who had gone on extended leave, to submit his
explanation or counter-affidavit within five days from notice.
In his Comment, petitioner denied the accusations against him and accused the CSC
Officials of “fishing expedition” when they unlawfully copied and printed personal
files in his computer.
He was charged of violating R.A. No. 6713 (Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards
for Public Officials and Employees). He assailed the formal charge and filed an
Omnibus Motion ((For Reconsideration, to Dismiss and/or to Defer) assailing the
formal charge as without basis having proceeded from an illegal search which is
beyond the authority of the CSC Chairman, such power pertaining solely to the court.
The CSC denied the omnibus motion and treated the motion as the petitioner’s
answer to the charge. In view of the absence of petitioner and his counsel, and upon
the motion of the prosecution, petitioner was deemed to have waived his right to
the formal investigation which then proceeded ex parte.
The petitioner was dismissed from service. He filed a petition to the CA which was
dismissed by the latter on the ground that it found no grave abuse of discretion on
the part of the respondents. He filed a motion for reconsideration which was further
denied by the appellate court. Hence, this petition.
Issue
WON the search conducted by the CSC on the computer of the petitioner constituted
an illegal search and was a violation of his constitutional right to privacy
Ruling
The search conducted on his office computer and the copying of his personal files
was lawful and did not violate his constitutional right.
Ratio Decidendi
In this case, the Court had the chance to present the cases illustrative of the issue
raised by the petitioner.
Katz v. United States 389 U.S. 437 (1967), the US Supreme Court held that the act of
FBI agents in electronically recording a conversation made by petitioner in an
enclosed public telephone booth violated his right to privacy and constituted a
“search and seizure”. Because the petitioner had a reasonable expectation of
privacy in using the enclosed booth to make a personal telephone call, the protection
of the Fourth Amendment extends to such area. Moreso, the concurring opinion of
Mr. Justice Harlan noted that the existence of privacy right under prior decisions
involved a two-fold requirement: first, that a person has exhibited an actual
(subjective) expectation of privacy; and second, that the expectation be one that
society is prepared to recognize as reasonable (objective).
Mancusi v. DeForte 392 U.S. 364, 88 S.Ct. 2120, 20 L.Ed2d 1154 (1968),thus
“recognized that employees may have a reasonable expectation of privacy against
intrusions by police.”
O’Connor v. Ortega 480 U.S. 709 (1987), the Court categorically declared that
“[i]ndividuals do not lose Fourth Amendment rights merely because they work for
the government instead of a private employer.” In O’Connor the Court recognized
that “special needs” authorize warrantless searches involving public employees for
work-related reasons. The Court thus laid down a balancing test under which
government interests are weighed against the employee’s reasonable expectation
of privacy. This reasonableness test implicates neither probable cause nor the
warrant requirement, which are related to law enforcement.
Social Justice Society (SJS) v. Dangerous Drugs Board G.R. Nos. 157870, 158633 and
161658, November 3, 2008, 570 SCRA 410, 427, (citing Ople v. Torres, G.R. No.
127685, July 23, 1998, 293 SCRA 141, 169),recognized the fact that there may be
such legitimate intrusion of privacy in the workplace.
The Court ruled that the petitioner did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy
in his office and computer files.

As to the second point of inquiry, the Court answered in the affirmative. The search
authorized by the CSC Chair, the copying of the contents of the hard drive on
petitioner’s computer reasonable in its inception and scope.

The Court noted that unlike in the case of Anonymous Letter-Complaint against Atty.
Miguel Morales, Clerk of Court, Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila A.M. Nos. P-08-
2519 and P-08-2520, November 19, 2008, 571 SCRA 361, the case at bar involves the
computer from which the personal files of the petitioner were retrieved is a
government-issued computer, hence government property the use of which the CSC
has absolute right to regulate and monitor.
DISINI v. SECRETARY OF JUSTICE

G.R. No. 203335 Here, the cybercrime law is complete in itself when it directed the CICC to formulate
and implement a national cybersecurity plan. Also, contrary to the position of the
DIGEST BY: Belle Cabal petitioners, the law gave sufficient standards for the CICC to follow when it provided
Submitted: 24 September 2016 a definition of cybersecurity.”

FACTS OF THE CASE IMPORTANT LAWS/STATUTES/PROVISIONS/SECTIONS

These consolidated petitions seek to declare several provisions of R.A. 10175, known
as The Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012 unconstitutional and void. This case holds
a handful of petitions seeking the removal of different sections deemed to be
infringing on privacy rights and more.
For this instance, the focus is the creation of the “Cybercrime Investigation and
Coordinating Center” which, in the same breath, promulgates powers and functions
to the agents of the said center. “Petitioners mainly contend that Congress invalidly
delegated its power when it gave the Cybercrime Investigation and Coordinating
Center (CICC) the power to formulate a national cybersecurity plan without any
sufficient standards or parameters for it to follow.”
“Cybersecurity refers to the collection of tools, policies, risk management
approaches, actions, training, best practices, assurance and technologies that can be
used to protect cyber environment and organization and user’s assets. This definition
serves as the parameters within which CICC should work in formulating the
cybersecurity plan.”
ISSUE
 W/N The CICC is constitutional for it to operate under delegated powers
by Congress
R.A. 10175
Sec. 24. Cybercrime Investigation and Coordinating Center.– There is hereby created,
within thirty (30) days from the effectivity of this Act, an inter-agency body to be
known as the Cybercrime Investigation and Coordinating Center (CICC), under the
administrative supervision of the Office of the President, for policy coordination
among concerned agencies and for the formulation and enforcement of the national
cybersecurity plan.
Sec. 26. Powers and Functions.– The CICC shall have the following powers and
functions:
(a) To formulate a national cybersecurity plan and extend immediate assistance of
real time commission of cybercrime offenses through a computer emergency
response team (CERT); x x x.
 Art. 1, Sec. 6 philippine constitution
Sec 1. The legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which
shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives, except to the extent
reserved to the people by the provision on initiative and referendum.

HELD

 YES. “In order to determine whether there is undue delegation of

legislative power, the Court has adopted two tests: the completeness test
and the sufficient standard test. Under the first test, the law must be
complete in all its terms and conditions when it leaves the legislature such
that when it reaches the delegate, the only thing he will have to do is to
enforce it.1avvphi1 The second test mandates adequate guidelines or
limitations in the law to determine the boundaries of the delegate’s
authority and prevent the delegation from running riot.103
RHONDA AVE S. VIVARES and SPS. MARGARITA and DAVID SUZARA, Petitioners,
vs
ST. THERESA’S COLLEGE, MYLENE RHEZA T. ESCUDERO, and JOHN DOES,
Respondents.
G.R. No. 202666 September 29, 2014
TOPIC: right to informational privacy, writ of habeas data
PONENTE: Velasco, Jr.
PREFATORY:
The individual’s desire for privacy is never absolute, since participation in society is
an equally powerful desire. Thus each individual is continually engaged in a personal
adjustment process in which he balances the desire for privacy with the desire for
disclosure and communication of himself to others, in light of the environmental
conditions and social norms set by the society in which he lives.
– Alan Westin, Privacy and Freedom (1967)
FACTS:
Julia and Julienne, both minors, were graduating high school students at St. Theresa’s
College (STC), Cebu City. Sometime in January 2012, while changing into their
swimsuits for a beach party they were about to attend, Julia and Julienne, along with
several others, took digital pictures of themselves clad only in their undergarments.
These pictures were then uploaded by Angela on her Facebook profile.
At STC, Mylene Escudero, a computer teacher at STC’s high school department,
learned from her students that some seniors at STC posted pictures online, depicting
themselves from the waist up, dressed only in brassieres. Escudero then asked her
students if they knew who the girls in the photos are. In turn, they readily identified
Julia and Julienne, among others.
Using STC’s computers, Escudero’s students logged in to their respective personal
Facebook accounts and showed her photos of the identified students, which include:
(a) Julia and Julienne drinking hard liquor and smoking cigarettes inside a bar; and
(b) Julia and Julienne along the streets of Cebu wearing articles of clothing that show
virtually the entirety of their black brassieres.
Also, Escudero’s students claimed that there were times when access to or
the availability of the identified students’ photos was not confined to the girls’
Facebook friends, but were, in fact, viewable by any Facebook user.
Investigation ensued. Then Julia, Julienne and other students involved were barred
from joining the commencement exercises.
Petitioners, who are the respective parents of the minors, filed a Petition for the
Issuance of a Writ of Habeas Data. RTC dismissed the petition for habeas data on the
following grounds:
1. Petitioners failed to prove the existence of an actual or threatened
violation of the minors’ right to privacy, one of the preconditions for the
issuance of the writ of habeas data.
2. The photos, having been uploaded on Facebook without restrictions as to
who may view them, lost their privacy in some way.
3. STC gathered the photographs through legal means and for a legal
purpose, that is, the implementation of the school’s policies and rules on
discipline.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there was indeed an actual or threatened violation of the right to
privacy in the life, liberty, or security of the minors involved in this case. (Is there a
right to informational privacy in online social network activities of its users?)
HELD: (Note that you can skip the preliminary discussions and check the ruling at the
latter part)
Nature of Writ of Habeas Data
It is a remedy available to any person whose right to privacy in life, liberty or security
is violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or
employee, or of a private individual or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or
storing of data or information regarding the person, family, home and
correspondence of the aggrieved party.
It is an independent and summary remedy designed to protect the image, privacy,
honor, information, and freedom of information of an individual, and to provide a
forum to enforce one’s right to the truth and to informational privacy. It seeks to
protect a person’s right to control information regarding oneself, particularly in
instances in which such information is being collected through unlawful means in
order to achieve unlawful ends.
In developing the writ of habeas data, the Court aimed to protect an individual’s right
to informational privacy, among others. A comparative law scholar has, in fact,
defined habeas data as “a procedure designed to safeguard individual freedom
from abuse in the information age.”
Issuance of writ of habeas data; requirements
1. The existence of a person’s right to informational privacy
2. An actual or threatened violation of the right to privacy in life, liberty or
security of the victim (proven by at least substantial evidence)
Note that the writ will not issue on the basis merely of an alleged
unauthorized access to information about a person.
The writ of habeas data is not only confined to cases of extralegal killings and
enforced disappearances
The writ of habeas data can be availed of as an independent remedy to enforce one’s
right to privacy, more specifically the right to informational privacy. The remedies
against the violation of such right can include the updating, rectification, suppression
or destruction of the database or information or files in possession or in control of
respondents. Clearly then, the privilege of the Writ of Habeas Data may also be
availed of in cases outside of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances.
Meaning of “engaged” in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or information
Habeas data is a protection against unlawful acts or omissions of public officials and
of private individuals or entities engaged in gathering, collecting, or storing data
about the aggrieved party and his or her correspondences, or about his or her family.
Such individual or entity need not be in the business of collecting or storing data.
To “engage” in something is different from undertaking a business endeavour. To
“engage” means “to do or take part in something.” It does not necessarily mean
that the activity must be done in pursuit of a business. What matters is that the
person or entity must be gathering, collecting or storing said data or information
about the aggrieved party or his or her family. Whether such undertaking carries the
element of regularity, as when one pursues a business, and is in the nature of a
personal endeavour, for any other reason or even for no reason at all, is immaterial
and such will not prevent the writ from getting to said person or entity.
As such, the writ of habeas data may be issued against a school like STC.
Right to informational privacy
Right to informational privacy is the right of individuals to control information
about themselves. Several commentators regarding privacy and social networking
sites, however, all agree that given the millions of OSN users, “in this Social
Networking environment, privacy is no longer grounded in reasonable expectations,
but rather in some theoretical protocol better known as wishful thinking.” So the
underlying question now is: Up to what extent is the right to privacy protected in
OSNs?
Facebook Privacy Tools
To address concerns about privacy, but without defeating its purpose, Facebook was
armed with different privacy tools designed to regulate the accessibility of a user’s
profile as well as information uploaded by the user. In H v. W, the South Gauteng
High Court recognized this ability of the users to “customize their privacy settings,”
but did so with this caveat: “Facebook states in its policies that, although it makes
every effort to protect a user’s information, these privacy settings are not foolproof.”
For instance, a Facebook user can regulate the visibility and accessibility of digital
images (photos), posted on his or her personal bulletin or “wall,” except for the
user’s profile picture and ID, by selecting his or her desired privacy setting:
1. Public – the default setting; every Facebook user can view the photo;
2. Friends of Friends – only the user’s Facebook friends and their friends can
view the photo;
3. Friends – only the user’s Facebook friends can view the photo;
4. Custom – the photo is made visible only to particular friends and/or
networks of the Facebook user; and
 5. Only Me – the digital image can be viewed only by the user.
The foregoing are privacy tools, available to Facebook users, designed to set up
barriers to broaden or limit the visibility of his or her specific profile content,
statuses, and photos, among others, from another user’s point of view. In other
words, Facebook extends its users an avenue to make the availability of their
Facebook activities reflect their choice as to “when and to what extent to disclose
facts about themselves – and to put others in the position of receiving such
confidences.”
LONE ISSUE:
NONE. The Supreme Court held that STC did not violate petitioners’ daughters’ right
to privacy as the subject digital photos were viewable either by the minors’ Facebook
friends, or by the public at large.
Without any evidence to corroborate the minors’ statement that the images were
visible only to the five of them, and without their challenging Escudero’s claim that
the other students were able to view the photos, their statements are, at best, self-
serving, thus deserving scant consideration.
It is well to note that not one of petitioners disputed Escudero’s sworn account that
her students, who are the minors’ Facebook “friends,” showed her the photos using
their own Facebook accounts. This only goes to show that no special means to be
able to view the allegedly private posts were ever resorted to by Escudero’s students,
and that it is reasonable to assume, therefore, that the photos were, in reality,
viewable either by (1) their Facebook friends, or (2) by the public at large.
Considering that the default setting for Facebook posts is “Public,” it can be surmised
that the photographs in question were viewable to everyone on Facebook, absent
any proof that petitioners’ children positively limited the disclosure of the
photograph. If such were the case, they cannot invoke the protection attached to
the right to informational privacy.
US v. Gines-Perez: A person who places a photograph on the Internet precisely
intends to forsake and renounce all privacy rights to such imagery, particularly under
circumstances such as here, where the Defendant did not employ protective
measures or devices that would have controlled access to the Web page or the
photograph itself.
United States v. Maxwell: The more open the method of transmission is, the less
privacy one can reasonably expect. Messages sent to the public at large in the chat
room or e-mail that is forwarded from correspondent to correspondent loses any
semblance of privacy.
The Honorable Supreme Court continued and held that setting a post’s or profile
detail’s privacy to “Friends” is no assurance that it can no longer be viewed by
another user who is not Facebook friends with the source of the content. The user’s
own Facebook friend can share said content or tag his or her own Facebook friend
thereto, regardless of whether the user tagged by the latter is Facebook friends or
not with the former. Also, when the post is shared or when a person is tagged, the
respective Facebook friends of the person who shared the post or who was tagged
can view the post, the privacy setting of which was set at “Friends.” Thus, it is
suggested, that a profile, or even a post, with visibility set at “Friends Only” cannot
easily, more so automatically, be said to be “very private,” contrary to petitioners’
argument.
No privacy invasion by STC; fault lies with the friends of minors
Respondent STC can hardly be taken to task for the perceived privacy invasion since
it was the minors’ Facebook friends who showed the pictures to Tigol. Respondents
were mere recipients of what were posted. They did not resort to any unlawful
means of gathering the information as it was voluntarily given to them by persons
who had legitimate access to the said posts. Clearly, the fault, if any, lies with the
friends of the minors. Curiously enough, however, neither the minors nor their
parents imputed any violation of privacy against the students who showed the
images to Escudero.
Different scenario of setting is set on “Me Only” or “Custom”
Had it been proved that the access to the pictures posted were limited to the original
uploader, through the “Me Only” privacy setting, or that the user’s contact list has
been screened to limit access to a select few, through the “Custom” setting, the
result may have been different, for in such instances, the intention to limit access to
the particular post, instead of being broadcasted to the public at large or all the
user’s friends en masse, becomes more manifest and palpable.
FIRST DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 203254, October 08, 2014 ]
DR. JOY MARGATE LEE, PETITIONER, VS. P/SUPT. NERI A. ILAGAN, RESPONDENT.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari[1] assailing the Decision[2] dated
August 30, 2012 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 224 (RTC) in SP
No. 12-71527, which extended the privilege of the writ of habeas data in favor of
respondent Police Superintendent Neri A. Ilagan (Ilagan).
The Facts
In his Petition for Issuance of the Writ of Habeas Data[3] dated June 22, 2012, Ilagan
alleged that he and petitioner Dr. Joy Margate Lee (Lee) were former common law
partners. Sometime in July 2011, he visited Lee at the latter's condominium, rested
for a while and thereafter,proceeded to his office. Upon arrival, Ilagan noticed that
his digital camera was missing.[4] On August 23, 2011, Lee confronted Ilagan at the
latter's office regarding a purported sex video (subject video) she discovered from
the aforesaid camera involving Ilagan and another woman. Ilagan denied the video
and demanded Lee to return the camera, but to no avail.[5] During the confrontation,
Ilagan allegedly slammed Lee's head against a wall inside his office and walked
away.[6] Subsequently, Lee utilized the said video as evidence in filing various
complaints against Ilagan, namely: (a) a criminal complaint for violation of Republic
Act No. 9262,[7] otherwise known as the "Anti-Violence Against Women and Their
Children Act of 2004," before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Makati; and (b) an
administrative complaint for grave misconduct before the National Police
Commission (NAPOLCOM).[8] Ilagan claimed that Lee's acts of reproducing the
subject video and threatening to distribute the same to the upper echelons of the
NAPOLCOM and uploading it to the internet violated not only his right to life, liberty,
security, and privacy but also that of the other woman, and thus, the issuance of a
writ of habeas data in his favor is warranted.[9]
Finding the petition prima facie meritorious, the RTC issued a Writ of Habeas
Data[10] dated June 25, 2012, directing Lee to appear before the court a quo, and to
produce Ilagan's digital camera, as well as the negative and/or original of the subject
video and copies thereof, and to file a verified written return within five (5) working
days from date of receipt thereof.
In her Verified Return[11] dated July 2, 2012, Lee admitted that she indeed kept the
memory card of the digital camera and reproduced the aforesaid video but averred
that she only did so to utilize the same as evidence in the cases she filed against
Ilagan. She also admitted that her relationship with Ilagan started sometime in 2003
and ended under disturbing circumstances in August 2011, and that she only
happened to discover the subject video when Ilagan left his camera in her
condominium. Accordingly, Lee contended that Ilagan's petition for the issuance of
the writ of habeas data should be dismissed because: (a) its filing was only aimed at
suppressing the evidence against Ilagan in the cases she filed; and (b) she is not
engaged in the gathering, collecting, or storing of data regarding the person of
Ilagan.[12]
The RTC Ruling
In a Decision[13] dated August 30, 2012, the RTC granted the privilege of the writ
of habeas data in Ilagan's favor, and accordingly, ordered the implementing officer
to turn-over copies of the subject video to him, and enjoined Lee from further
reproducing the same.[14]
The RTC did not give credence to Lee's defense that she is not engaged in the
gathering, collecting or storing of data regarding the person of Ilagan, finding that
her acts of reproducing the subject video and showing it to other people, i.e., the
NAPOLCOM officers, violated the latter's right to privacy in life and caused him to
suffer humiliation and mental anguish. In this relation, the RTC opined that Lee's use
of the subject video as evidence in the various cases she filed against Ilagan is not
enough justification for its reproduction. Nevertheless, the RTC clarified that it is only
ruling on the return of the aforesaid video and not on its admissibility before other
tribunals.[15]
Dissatisfied, Lee filed this petition.
The Issue Before the Court
The essential issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the RTC correctly
extended the privilege of the writ of habeas data in favor of Ilagan.
The Court's Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
A.M. No. 08-1-16-SC, or the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data (Habeas Data Rule),
was conceived as a response, given the lack of effective and available remedies, to
address the extraordinary rise in the number of killings and enforced
disappearances.[16] It was conceptualized as a judicial remedy enforcing the right to
privacy, most especially the right to informational privacy of individuals,[17] which is
defined as "the right to control the collection, maintenance, use, and dissemination
of data about oneself."[18]
As defined in Section 1 of the Habeas Data Rule, the writ of habeas data now stands
as "a remedy available to any person whose right to privacy in life, liberty or
security is violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a public official
or employee, or of a private individual or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting
or storing of data or information regarding the person, family, home, and
correspondence of the aggrieved party." Thus, in order to support a petition for the
issuance of such writ, Section 6 of the Habeas Data Rule essentially requires that the
petition sufficiently alleges, among others, "[t]he manner the right to privacy is
violated or threatened and how it affects the right to life, liberty or security of the
aggrieved party." In other words, the petition must adequately show that there
exists a nexus between the right to privacy on the one hand, and the right to life,
liberty or security on the other.[19] Corollarily, the allegations in the petition must be
supported by substantial evidence showing an actual or threatened violation of the
right to privacy in life, liberty or security of the victim.[20] In this relation, it bears
pointing out that the writ of habeas data will not issue to protect purely property or
commercial concerns nor when the grounds invoked in support of the petitions
therefor are vague and doubtful.[21]
In this case, the Court finds that Ilagan was not able to sufficiently allege that his
right to privacy in life, liberty or security was or would be violated through the
supposed reproduction and threatened dissemination of the subject sex video. While
Ilagan purports a privacy interest in the suppression of this video which he fears
would somehow find its way to Quiapo or be uploaded in the internet for public
consumption he failed to explain the connection between such interest and any
violation of his right to life, liberty or security. Indeed, courts cannot speculate or
contrive versions of possible transgressions. As the rules and existing jurisprudence
on the matter evoke, alleging and eventually proving the nexus between one's
privacy right to the cogent rights to life, liberty or security are crucial in habeas
data cases, so much so that a failure on either account certainly renders a habeas
data petition dismissible, as in this case.
In fact, even discounting the insufficiency of the allegations, the petition would
equally be dismissible due to the inadequacy of the evidence presented. As the
records show, all that Ilagan submitted in support of his petition was his self-serving
testimony which hardly meets the substantial evidence requirement as prescribed
by the Habeas Data Rule. This is because nothing therein would indicate that Lee
actually proceeded to commit any overt act towards the end of violating Ilagan's
right to privacy in life, liberty or security. Nor would anything on record even lead a
reasonable mind to conclude[22] that Lee was going to use the subject video in order
to achieve unlawful ends say for instance, to spread it to the public so as to ruin
Ilagan's reputation. Contrastingly, Lee even made it clear in her testimony that the
only reason why she reproduced the subject video was to legitimately utilize the
same as evidence in the criminal and administrative cases that she filed against
Ilagan.[23] Hence, due to the insufficiency of the allegations as well as the glaring
absence of substantial evidence, the Court finds it proper to reverse the RTC Decision
and dismiss the habeas data petition.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated August 30, 2012 of the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 224 in SP No. 12-71527is
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the Petition for Issuance of the Writ
of Habeas Data filed by respondent P/Supt. Neri A. Ilagan is DISMISSED for lack of
merit.
SO ORDERED.
OPLE VS TORRES (1998) people to surrender their privacy by giving information about themselves on the
pretext that it will facilitate delivery of basic services.
13 Jan 2018
Petition is granted. A.O. No. 308 is unconstitutional.
[G.R. No. 127685; July 23, 1998] Constitutional Law| Bill of Rights| Right to Privacy

BLAS F. OPLE vs. RUBEN D. TORRES, et.al.

FACTS:

A.O. No. 308 was issued by President Fidel V. Ramos on December 12, 1996 for the
Adoption of a National Computerized Identification Reference System. It was
published in four newspapers of general circulation on January. Petitioner filed the
instant petition against respondents, on the grounds that:

1. it is a usurpation of the power of Congress to legislate,

2. it impermissibly intrudes on our citizenry’s protected zone of privacy.

ISSUE:

Whether there is a violation of the Right to Privacy as enshrined in the Bill of Rights.

HELD:

The essence of privacy is the “right to be left alone.” The right to privacy as such is
accorded recognition independently of its identification with liberty; in itself, it is
fully deserving of constitutional protection.

The Court prescind from the premise that the right to privacy is a fundamental right
guaranteed by the Constitution, hence, it is the burden of government to show that
A.O. No. 308 is justified by some compelling state interest and that it is narrowly
drawn. A.O. No. 308 is predicated on two considerations:

1. the need to provides our citizens and foreigners with the facility to conveniently
transact business with basic service and social security providers and other
government instrumentalities and ;
2. the need to reduce, if not totally eradicate, fraudulent transactions and
misrepresentations by persons seeking basic services.

It is debatable whether the interests are compelling enough to warrant the issuance
of the said order. The broadness, vagueness, and overbreadth of A.O. No. 308 which
if implemented will put our people’s right to privacy in clear and present danger. In
the case at bar, the threat comes from which by issuing A.O. No. 308 pressures the
KMU

This case is consolidated with Consolidated with Bayan Muna vs Ermita

In 2005, Executive Order No. 420 was passed. This law sought to harmonize and
streamline the country’s id system. Kilusang Mayo Uno, Bayan Muna, and other
concerned groups sought to enjoin the Director-General from implementing the EO
because they allege that the said EO is unconstitutional for it infringes upon the right
to privacy of the people and that the same is a usurpation of legislative power by the
president.

ISSUE: Whether or not the said EO is unconstitutional.

HELD: No. Section 1 of EO 420 directs these government entities to “adopt a unified
multi-purpose ID system.” Thus, all government entities that issue IDs as part of their
functions under existing laws are required to adopt a uniform data collection and
format for their IDs.

Section 1 of EO 420 enumerates the purposes of the uniform data collection and
format. The President may by executive or administrative order direct the
government entities under the Executive department to adopt a uniform ID data
collection and format. Sec 17, Article 7 of the 1987 Constitution provides that the
“President shall have control of all executive departments, bureaus and offices.” The
same Section also mandates the President to “ensure that the laws be faithfully
executed.” Certainly, under this constitutional power of control the President can
direct all government entities, in the exercise of their functions under existing laws,
to adopt a uniform ID data collection and ID format to achieve savings, efficiency,
reliability, compatibility, and convenience to the public.

The President’s constitutional power of control is self-executing and does not need
any implementing legislation. Of course, the President’s power of control is limited
to the Executive branch of government and does not extend to the Judiciary or to
the independent constitutional commissions. Thus, EO 420 does not apply to the
Judiciary, or to the COMELEC which under existing laws is also authorized to issue
voter’s ID cards. This only shows that EO 420 does not establish a national ID system
because legislation is needed to establish a single ID system that is compulsory for
all branches of government.
U.S. Supreme Court
United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968)
United States v. O'Brien
No. 232
Argued January 24, 1968
Decided May 27, 1968*
391 U.S. 367
Syllabus
O'Brien burned his Selective Service registration certificate before a sizable crowd in
order to influence others to adopt his anti-war beliefs. He was indicted, tried, and
convicted for violating 50 U.S.C.App. § 462(b), a part of the Universal Military
Training and Service Act, subdivision (3) of which applies to any person "who forges,
alters, knowingly destroys, knowingly mutilates, or in any manner changes any such
certificate . . . ," the words italicized herein having been added by amendment in
1965. The District Court rejected O'Brien's argument that the amendment was
unconstitutional because it was enacted to abridge free speech and served no
legitimate legislative purpose. The Court of Appeals held the 1965 Amendment
unconstitutional under the First Amendment as singling out for special treatment
persons engaged in protests, on the ground that conduct under the 1965
Amendment was already punishable, since a Selective Service System regulation
required registrants to keep their registration certificates in their "personal
possession at all times," 32 CFR § 1617.1, and willful violation of regulations
promulgated under the Act was made criminal by 50 U.S.C.App. § 462(b)(6). The
court, however, upheld O'Brien's conviction under § 462(b)(6), which, in its view,
made violation of the nonpossession regulation a lesser included offense of the
crime defined by the 1965 Amendment.
Held:
1. The 1965 Amendment to 50 U.S.C.App. § 462(b)(3) is constitutional as applied in
this case. Pp. 391 U. S. 375, 391 U. S. 376-382.
(a) The 1965 Amendment plainly does not abridge free speech on its face. P. 391 U.
S. 375.
(b) When "speech" and "nonspeech" elements are combined in the same course of
conduct, a sufficiently important governmental interest in regulating the nonspeech
element can justify incidental limitations on First Amendment freedoms. P. 391 U. S.
376.
(c) A governmental regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within the constitutional
power of the Government and furthers
Page 391 U. S. 368
an important or substantial governmental interest unrelated to the suppression of
free expression, and if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment
freedom is no greater than is essential to that interest. The 1965 Amendment meets
all these requirements. P. 391 U. S. 377.
(d) The 1965 Amendment came within Congress'."broad and sweeping" power to
raise and support armies and make all laws necessary to that end. P. 391 U. S. 377.
(e) The registration certificate serves purposes in addition to initial
notification, e.g., it proves that the described individual has registered for the draft;
facilitates communication between registrants and local boards, and provides a
reminder that the registrant must notify his local board of changes in address or
status. The regulatory scheme involving the certificates includes clearly valid
prohibitions against alteration, forgery, or similar deceptive misuse. Pp. 391 U. S.
378-380.
(f) The preexistence of the nonpossession regulation does not negate Congress' clear
interest in providing alternative statutory avenues of prosecution to assure its
interest in preventing destruction of the Selective Service certificates. P. 391 U. S.
380.
(g) The governmental interests protected by the 1965 Amendment and the
nonpossession regulation, though overlapping, are not identical. Pp. 391 U. S. 380-
381.
(h) The 1965 Amendment is a narrow and precisely drawn provision which
specifically protects the Government's substantial interest in an efficient and easily
administered system for raising armies. Pp. 391 U. S. 381-382.
(i) O'Brien was convicted only for the willful frustration of that governmental
interest. The noncommunicative impact of his conduct for which he was convicted
makes his case readily distinguishable from Stromberg v. California, 283 U. S.
359 (1931). P. 391 U. S. 382.

2. The 1965 Amendment is constitutional as enacted. Pp. 391 U. S. 382-385.

(a) Congress' purpose in enacting the law affords no basis for declaring an otherwise
constitutional statute invalid. McCray v. United States, 195 U. S. 27 (1904). Pp. 391
U. S. 383-384.

(b) Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U. S. 233 (1936) and Gomillion v.
Lightfoot, 364 U. S. 339 (1960), distinguished. Pp. 391 U. S. 384-385.

376 F.2d 538, vacated; judgment and sentence of District Court reinstated.
Osmena vs Comelec
FACTS:
Petitioners argue that RA 7056, in providing for desynchronized elections violates
the Constitution:
1. Republic Act 7056 violates the mandate of the Constitution for the holding of
synchronized national and local elections on the second Monday of May 1992;
2. Republic Act 7056, particularly the 2nd paragraph of Section 3 thereof, providing
that all incumbent provincial, city and municipal officials shall hold over beyond June
30, 1992 and shall serve until their successors shall have been duly elected and
qualified violates Section 2, Article XVIII (Transitory Provision) of the Constitution;
3. The same paragraph of Section 3 of Republic Act 7056, which in effect, shortens
the term or tenure of office of local officials to be elected on the 2nd Monday of
November, 1992 violates Section 8, Article X of the Constitution;
4. Section 8 of Republic Act 7056, providing for the campaign periods for Presidential,
Vice-Presidential and Senatorial elections, violates the provision of Section 9, Article
IX under the title “Commission on Elections” of the Constitution;
5. The so-called many difficult if not insurmountable problems mentioned in
Republic Act 7056 to synchronized national and local elections set by the
Constitution on the second Monday of May, 1992, are not sufficient, much less, valid
justification for postponing the local elections to the second Monday of November
1992, and in the process violating the Constitution itself. If, at all, Congress can devise
ways and means, within the parameters of the Constitution, to eliminate or at least
minimize these problems and if this, still, is not feasible, resort can be made to the
self-correcting mechanism built in the Constitution for its amendment or revision.
On the other hand, the SolGen, counsel for COMELEC, prays for the denial of this
petition arguing that the question is political in nature and that the petitioners lack
legal standing to file the petition and what they are asking for is an advisory opinion
from the court, there being no justiciable controversy to resolve. On the merits, the
SolGen contends that Republic Act 7056 is a valid exercise of legislative power by
Congress and that the regular amending process prescribed by the Constitution does
not apply to its transitory provisions.
PROCEDURAL ISSUE: WON the Court has competence to take cognizance of the
instant petition?
HELD: Yes.
What is involved here is the legality, not the wisdom of RA 7056. Hence, contrary to
SolGen’s contention, the issue in this case is justiciable rather than political. And even
if the question were political in nature, it would still come within the Court’s power
considering the expanded jurisdiction conferred by Article VIII, Section 1 of the 1987
Constitution, which includes the authority to determine whether grave abuse of
discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction has been committed by any
branch or instrumentality of the government. Regarding the challenge to the
petitioner’s standing, the Supreme Court held that even if the petitioners have no
legal standing, the Court has the power to brush aside technicalities considered the
“transcendental importance” of the issue being raised herein.
MAIN ISSUE: WON RA 7056 is unconstitutional?
HELD: Yes. It is unconstitutional.
The Supreme Court held that the law contravenes Article XVIII, Sections 2 and 5 of
the 1987 Constitution which provides for the synchronization of national and local
elections. The said law, on the other hand, provides for the de-synchronization of
election by mandating that there be two separate elections in 1992. The term of
“synchronization” in the mentioned constitutional provision was used synonymously
as the phrase holding simultaneously since this is the precise intent in terminating
their Office Tenure on the same day or occasion. This common termination date will
synchronize future elections to once every three years.
R.A. No. 7056 also violated Sec. 2, Art. XVIII of the 1987 Constitution which provides
that the local official first elected under the Constitution shall serve until noon of
June 30, 1992. But under Sec. 3 of RA 7056, these incumbent local officials shall hold
over beyond June 30, 1992 and shall serve until their successors shall have been duly
elected and qualified. The Supreme Court, quoting Corpus Juris Secundum, states
that “it is not competent for the legislature to extend the term of officers by
providing that they shall hold over until their successors are elected and qualified
where the constitution has in effect or by clear implication prescribed the term and
when the Constitution fixes the day on which the official term shall begin, there is no
legislative authority to continue the office beyond that period, even though the
successors fail to qualify within the time”.
R.A. No. 7056 also violated the clear mandate of Sec. 8, Art. X of 1987 Constitution
which fixed the term of office of all elective local officials, except barangay officials,
to three (3) years. If the local election will be held on the second Monday of
November 1992 under RA 7056, those to be elected will be serving for only two years
and seven months, that is, from November 30, 1992 to June 30, 1995, not three
years.

The law was also held violative of Sec. 9, Article IX of the Constitution by changing
the campaign period. RA 7056 provides for a different campaign period, as follows:

a) For President arid Vice-Presidential elections one hundred thirty (130) days before
the day of election.
b) For Senatorial elections, ninety (90) days before the day of the election, and
c) For the election of Members of the House of Representatives and local elective
provincial, city and municipal officials forty-five (45) days before the day of the
elections.

by Dreams
DIOCESE OF BACOLOD v. COMELEC, GR No. 205728, 2015-01-21
Facts:
This case defines the extent that our people may shape the debates during elections.
We are asked to decide whether the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) has the
competence to limit expressions made by the citizens who are not... candidates
during elections.
special civil action for certiorari and prohibition with application for preliminary
injunction and temporary restraining order... to nullify COMELEC's Notice to Remove
Campaign Materials... petitioners posted two (2) tarpaulins within a private
compound housing the San Sebastian Cathedral of Bacolod.
The first tarpaulin contains the message "IBASURA RH Law" referring to the
Reproductive Health Law of 2012 or Republic Act No. 10354. The second tarpaulin is
the subject of the present case.
This tarpaulin contains the heading "Conscience Vote" and lists candidates as either
"(Anti-RH) Team Buhay" with a check mark, or "(Pro-RH) Team Patay" with an "X"
mark
Those who voted for the passing of the law were classified by petitioners as
comprising "Team Patay," while those who voted against it form "Team Buhay":
During oral arguments, respondents conceded that the tarpaulin was neither
sponsored nor paid for by any candidate
On February 22, 2013, respondent Atty. Mavil V. Majarucon, in her capacity as
Election Officer of Bacolod City, issued a Notice to Remove Campaign Materials[8]
addressed to petitioner Most Rev. Bishop Vicente M. Navarra.
election officer ordered the... tarpaulin's removal within three (3) days from receipt
for being oversized.
On February 27, 2013, COMELEC Law Department issued a letter[12] ordering the
immediate removal of the tarpaulin; otherwise, it will be constrained to file an
election offense against petitioners. The letter of COMELEC Law Department was
silent on the... remedies available to petitioners. The letter provides as follows:...
please order/cause the immediate removal of said election propaganda material,
otherwise, we shall be constrained to file an election offense case against you.
Concerned about the imminent threat of prosecution for their exercise of free
speech, petitioners initiated this case through this petition for certiorari and
prohibition with application for preliminary injunction and temporary restraining
order
They... question respondents' notice dated February 22, 2013 and letter issued on
February 27, 2013.
this court, on March 5, 2013, issued a temporary restraining order enjoining
respondents from enforcing the assailed notice and letter, and set oral arguments
on March 19, 2013
Respondents insist that petitioners should have first brought the matter to the
COMELEC En Banc or any of its divisions.
Issues:
I
PROCEDURAL ISSUES
I.A
This court's jurisdiction over COMELEC cases
I.C
Hierarchy of courts
This brings us to the issue of whether petitioners violated the doctrine of hierarchy
of courts in directly filing their petition before this court.
nvolving as it does the issue of whether the right of suffrage includes the right of
freedom of expression.
I.D
The concept of a political question
I.E
Exhaustion of administrative remedies
Ruling:
Respondents ask that this petition be dismissed on the ground that the notice and
letter are not final orders, decisions, rulings, or judgments of the COMELEC En Banc
issued in the exercise of its adjudicatory powers, reviewable via Rule 64 of the Rules
of Court.[
Ambil, Jr. v. COMELEC
This court declared that it did not have jurisdiction and clarified
This decision must be a final... decision or resolution of the Comelec en banc, not of
a division, certainly not an interlocutory order of a division.
Repol v. COMELEC... this court provided exceptions to this general rule.
This Court, however, has ruled in the past that this procedural requirement [of filing
a motion for reconsideration] may be glossed over to prevent miscarriage of justice,
when the issue involves the principle of social justice or the protection of labor, when
the... decision or resolution sought to be set aside is a nullity, or when the need for
relief is extremely urgent and certiorari is the only adequate and speedy remedy
available.
Ambil, Jr., Repol, Soriano, Jr., Blanco, and Cayetano cited by respondents do not
operate as precedents to oust this court from taking jurisdiction over this case. All
these cases cited involve election protests or disqualification cases filed by the
losing... candidate against the winning candidate.
In the present case, petitioners are not candidates seeking for public office. Their
petition is filed to assert their fundamental right to expression.
Furthermore, all these cases cited by respondents pertained to COMELEC's exercise
of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial power. This case pertains to acts of COMELEC in
the implementation of its regulatory powers.
In this case, the assailed issuances of respondents prejudice not only petitioners'
right to freedom of expression in the present case, but also of others in future similar
cases.
This has become a rare occasion when private citizens actively engage the public in
political discourse.
In the case before this court, there is a clear threat to the paramount right of
freedom of speech and freedom of expression which warrants invocation of relief
from this court. The principles laid down in this decision will likely influence the
discourse of freedom of speech in... the future, especially in the context of elections.
The right to suffrage not only includes the right to vote for one's chosen candidate,
but also the right to vocalize that choice to the public in general, in the hope of
influencing their votes. It may be said that in an... election year, the right to vote
necessarily includes the right to free speech and expression.
This court finds that this is indeed a case of first impression
In this case, it is this court, with its constitutionally enshrined judicial power, that can
rule with finality on whether COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion or
performed acts contrary to the Constitution through the assailed issuances.
case was filed during the 2013 election period. Although the elections have already
been concluded, future cases may be filed that necessitate urgency in its resolution.
this court affords great... respect to the Constitution and the powers and duties
imposed upon COMELEC. Hence, a ruling by this court would be in the best interest
of respondents, in order that their actions may be guided accordingly in the future.
In this case, the repercussions of the assailed issuances on this basic right constitute
an exceptionally compelling reason to justify the direct resort to this court. The lack
of other sufficient remedies in the course of law alone is sufficient ground to allow
direct resort to... this court.
This case also poses a question of similar, if not greater import. Hence, a direct action
to this court is permitted.
While generally, the hierarchy of courts is respected, the present case falls under the
recognized exceptions and, as such, may be resolved by this... court directly.
The argument on exhaustion of administrative remedies is not proper in this case.
Despite the alleged non-exhaustion of administrative remedies, it is clear that the
controversy is already ripe for adjudication.
Petitioners' exercise of their right to speech, given the message and their medium,
had understandable relevance especially during the elections. COMELEC's letter
threatening the filing of the election offense against petitioners is already an
actionable infringement of this... right. The impending threat of criminal litigation is
enough to curtail petitioners' speech.
In the context of this case, exhaustion of their administrative remedies as COMELEC
suggested in their pleadings prolongs the violation of their freedom of speech.
Even assuming that the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies is
applicable... current controversy is within the exceptions to the principle. In Chua v.
Ang,[110] this court held:... e circumstances emphasized are squarely applicable with
the present case.
First, petitioners allege that the assailed issuances violated their right to freedom of
expression and the principle of separation of church and state. This is a purely legal
question. Second, the... circumstances of the present case indicate the urgency of
judicial intervention considering the issue then on the RH Law as well as the
upcoming elections. Thus, to require the exhaustion of administrative remedies in
this case would be unreasonable.
A FINAL NOTE
We maintain sympathies for the COMELEC in attempting to do what it thought was
its duty in this case. However, it was misdirected.
But this caricature, though not agreeable to some, is still protected speech.
Embedded in the tarpaulin, however, are opinions expressed by petitioners.
It is a specie of expression protected by our fundamental law. It is an expression
designed to invite attention, cause debate, and hopefully, persuade.
This is a form of speech hopeful of a quality of democracy that we should all deserve.
It is protected as a fundamental and primordial right by our Constitution. The
expression in the medium chosen by petitioners deserves our protection.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The temporary restraining order
previously issued is hereby made permanent. The act of the COMELEC in issuing the
assailed notice dated February 22, 2013 and letter dated February 27, 2013 is
declared... unconstitutional.
SO ORDERED.
Principles:
Rule 64 is not the exclusive remedy for all acts of the COMELEC. Rule 65 is applicable
especially to raise objections relating to a grave abuse of discretion resulting in the
ouster of jurisdiction.[22] As a special civil action, there must also be a... showing
that there be no plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the
law.
general rule: Sc has no power to review cases decided by COMELEC Division
The Supreme Court has no power to review via certiorari, an interlocutory order or
even a final resolution of a Division of the Commission on
Elections.
Exception to the general rule
Based on ABS-CBN, this court could review orders and decisions of COMELEC in
electoral contests despite not being reviewed by the COMELEC En Banc, if:
1.
It will prevent the miscarriage of justice;
2.
The issue involves a principle of social justice;
3.
The issue involves the protection of labor;
4.
The decision or resolution sought to be set aside is a nullity; or
5.
The need for relief is extremely urgent and certiorari is the only adequate and speedy
remedy available.
In Bañez, Jr. v. Concepcion,[63] we explained the necessity of the application of the
hierarchy of courts:
The Court must enjoin the observance of the policy on the hierarchy of courts, and
now affirms that the policy is not to be ignored without serious consequences. The
strictness of the policy is designed to shield the Court from having to deal with causes
that are... also well within the competence of the lower courts, and thus leave time
to the Court to deal with the more fundamental and more essential tasks that the
Constitution has assigned to it. The Court may act on petitions for the extraordinary
writs of certiorari, prohibition and... mandamus only when absolutely necessary or
when serious and important reasons exist to justify an exception to the policy.[64]
In Bañez, we also elaborated on the reasons why lower courts are allowed to issue
writs of certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus,... The Supreme Court is a court of last
resort, and must so remain if it is to satisfactorily perform the functions assigned to
it by the fundamental charter and immemorial tradition. It cannot and should not be
burdened with the task of dealing with causes in the first... instance. Its original
jurisdiction to issue the so-called extraordinary writs should be exercised only where
absolutely necessary or where serious and important reasons exist therefore
Where the issuance of an extraordinary writ is also within the competence of the
Court of Appeals or a
Regional Trial Court, it is in either of these courts that the specific action for the writ's
procurement must be presented. This is and should continue to be the policy in this
regard, a policy that courts and lawyers must strictly observe
The doctrine that requires respect for the hierarchy of courts was created by this
court to ensure that every level of the judiciary performs its designated roles in an
effective and efficient manner
Trial courts... are likewise competent to determine issues of law which may include
the validity of an ordinance, statute, or even an executive issuance in relation to the
Constitution.
The Court of Appeals is primarily designed as an appellate court that reviews the
determination of facts and law made by the trial courts. It is collegiate in nature. This
nature ensures more standpoints in the review of the actions of the trial court. But
the Court of Appeals... also has original jurisdiction over most special civil actions.
Unlike the trial courts, its writs can have a nationwide scope. It is competent to
determine facts and, ideally, should act on constitutional issues that may not
necessarily be novel unless there are factual... questions to determine.
This court, on the other hand, leads the judiciary by breaking new ground or further
reiterating in the light of new circumstances or in the light of some confusions of
bench or bar existing precedents. Rather than a court of first instance or as a
repetition of the actions of... the Court of Appeals, this court promulgates these
doctrinal devices in order that it truly performs that role.
Supreme Court's role to interpret the Constitution and act in order to protect
constitutional rights when these become exigent should not be emasculated by the
doctrine in respect of the hierarchy of courts. That has never been the purpose of
such... doctrine.
Thus, the doctrine of hierarchy of courts is not an iron-clad rule.[68] This court has
"full discretionary power to take cognizance and assume jurisdiction [over] special
civil actions for certiorari . . . filed directly with it for exceptionally compelling...
reasons[69] or if warranted by the nature of the issues clearly and specifically raised
in the petition."[70] As correctly pointed out by petitioners,[71] we have provided
exceptions to this doctrine:
First... genuine issues of constitutionality that must be addressed at the most
immediate time.
A second exception... when the issues involved are of transcendental importance
In these cases, the imminence and clarity of the threat to fundamental constitutional
rights outweigh the necessity for prudence. The doctrine relating to constitutional...
issues of transcendental importance prevents courts from the paralysis of procedural
niceties when clearly faced with the need for substantial protection.
Third, cases of first impression[75] warrant a direct resort to this court. In cases of
first impression, no jurisprudence yet exists that will guide the lower courts on this
matter
Fourth, the constitutional issues raised are better decided by this court
Fifth, the time element presented in this case cannot be ignored.
Sixth, the filed petition reviews the act of a constitutional organ
Seventh, petitioners rightly claim that they had no other plain, speedy, and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law that could free them from the injurious effects
of respondents' acts in violation of their right to freedom of expression
Eighth, the petition includes questions that are "dictated by public welfare and the
advancement of public policy, or demanded by the broader interest of justice, or the
orders complained of were found to be patent nullities, or the appeal was considered
as clearly an... inappropriate remedy

Ripeness is the "prerequisite that something had by then been accomplished or

performed by either branch [or in this case, organ of government]... before a court
may come into the picture."[106]

Political speech enjoys preferred protection within our constitutional order.

ted expressions, political expression would occupy the... highest rank, and among
different kinds of political expression, the subject of fair and honest elections would
be at the top."

Sovereignty resides in the people.[109] Political speech is a direct exercise of the

sovereignty. The... principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies yields in order
to protect this fundamental right.

On the other hand, prior exhaustion of administrative remedies may be dispensed

with and judicial action may be validly resorted to immediately: (a) when there is a
violation of due process; (b) when the issue involved is purely a legal question; (c)
when the... administrative action is patently illegal amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction; (d) when there is estoppel on the part of the administrative agency
concerned; (e) when there is irreparable injury; (f) when the respondent is a
department secretary whose acts as an alter... ego of the President bear the implied
and assumed approval of the latter; (g) when to require exhaustion of administrative
remedies would be unreasonable; (h) when it would amount to a nullification of a
claim; (i) when the subject matter is a private land in land case... proceedings; (j)
when the rule does not provide a plain, speedy and adequate remedy; or (k) when
there are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial intervention

Time and again, we have held that this court "has the power to relax or suspend the
rules or to except a case from their operation when compelling reasons so warrant,
or when the purpose of justice requires it, [and when] [w]hat constitutes [as] good
and sufficient cause that... will merit suspension of the rules is discretionary upon
the court".[112] Certainly, this case of first impression where COMELEC has
threatened to prosecute private parties who seek to participate in the elections by
calling attention to issues they want... debated by the public in the manner they feel
would be effective is one of those cases.
Pharmaceutical and Health Care Association of the Philippines v Duque III
Facts:
Petition for certiorari seeking to nullify the Revised Implementing Rules and
Regulations (RIRR) of E.O. 51 (Milk Code). Petitioner claims that the RIRR is not valid
as it contains provisions that are not constitutional and go beyond what it is
supposed to implement. Milk Code was issued by President Cory Aquino under the
Freedom Constitution on Oct.1986. One of the preambular clauses of the Milk Code
states that the law seeks to give effect to Art 11 of the Int’l Code of Marketing and
Breastmilk Substitutes(ICBMS), a code adopted by the World Health
Assembly(WHA). From 1982-2006, The WHA also adopted severe resolutions to the
effect that breastfeeding should be supported, hence, it should be ensured that
nutrition and health claims are not permitted for breastmilk substitutes. In 2006, the
DOH issued the assailed RIRR.
Issue:
Sub-Issue: W/N the pertinent int’l agreements entered into by the Phil are part of
the law of the land and may be implemented by DOH through the RIRR. If yes, W/N
the RIRR is in accord with int’l agreements
MAIN: W/N the DOH acted w/o or in excess of their jurisdiction, or with grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack of excess of jurisdiction and in violation of the
Constitution by promulgating the RIRR.
Held:
Sub-issue:
Yes for ICBMS. Under 1987 Consti, int’l law can become domestic law by
transformation (thru constitutional mechanism such as local legislation) or
incorporation (mere constitutional declaration i.e treaties) The ICBMS and WHA
resolutions were not treaties as they have not been concurred by 2/3 of all members
of the Senate as required under Sec, 21, Art 8. However, the ICBMS had been
transformed into domestic law through a local legislation such as the Milk Code. The
Milk Code is almost a verbatim reproduction of ICBMS.
No for WHA Resolutions. The Court ruled that DOH failed to establish that the
provisions pertinent WHA resolutions are customary int’l law that may be deemed
part of the law of the land. For an int’l rule to be considered as customary law, it
must be established that such rule is being followed by states because they consider
it as obligatory to comply with such rules (opinion juris). The WHO resolutions,
although signed by most of the member states, were enforced or practiced by at
least a majority of member states. Unlike the ICBMS whereby legislature enacted
most of the provisions into the law via the Milk Code, the WHA Resolutions
(specifically providing for exclusive breastfeeding from 0-6 months, breastfeeding up
to 24 Months and absolutely prohibiting ads for breastmilk substitutes) have not
been adopted as domestic law nor are they followed in our country as well. The
Filipinos have the option of how to take care of their babies as they see fit. WHA
Resolutions may be classified as SOFT LAW – non-binding norms, principles and
practices that influence state behavior. Soft law is not part of int’l law.
Main issue:
Yes. Some parts of the RIRR were not in consonance with the Milk Code such as Sec.
4(f) ->advertising, promotions of formula are prohibited,
Sec 11 -> prohibitions for advertising breastmilk substitutes intended for infants and
young children uo to 24 months
And Sec 46 -> sanctions for advertising .
These provisions are declared null and void. The DOH and respondents are
prohibited from implementing said provisions.
Pita vs ca
FACTS:
Pursuant to the anti-smut campaign of the City of Manila, elements of the police
force seized and confiscated from dealers, distributors, newsstandowners and
peddlers along Manila sidewalks, magazines, publications and other reading
materials believed to be obscene, pornographic and indecent and later burned the
seized materials in public. Among the publications seized and later burned were
magazines published and co-edited by petitioner.
ISSUE(S):
Whether or not the search and seizure was lawful.
RULING:
NO. Private respondents were not possessed of a lawful court order: (1) finding the
said materials to be pornography, and (2) authorizing them to carry out a search and
seizure, by way of a search warrant.
Petition is GRANTED. Decision of the respondent court is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Pita V CA G.R. No. 80806 October 5, 1989
J. Sarmiento
Facts:
In 1983, elements of the Special Anti-Narcotics Group, and the Manila Police, seized
and confiscated from dealers along Manila sidewalks, magazines believed to be
obscene. These were later burned. One of the publications was Pinoy Playboy
published by Leo Pita.
He filed an injunction case against the mayor of manila to enjoin him from
confiscating more copies of his magazine and claimed that this was a violation of
freedom of speech. The court ordered him to show cause. He then filed an Urgent
Motion for issuance of a temporary restraining order against indiscriminate seizure.
Defendant Mayor Bagatsing admitted the confiscation and burning of obscence
reading materials but admitted that these were surrendered by the stall owners and
the establishments were not raided.
The other defendant, WPD Superintendent, Narcisco Cabrera, filed no answer.
On January 11, 1984, the trial court issued an Order setting the case for hearing on
January 16, 1984 "for the parties to adduce evidence on the question of whether the
publication 'Pinoy Playboy Magazine alleged (sic) seized, confiscated and/or burned
by the defendants, are obscence per se or not".
On February 3, 1984, the trial court promulgated the Order appealed from denying
the motion for a writ of preliminary injunction, and dismissing the case for lack of
merit
The CA also dismissed the appeal due to the argument that freedom of the press is
not without restraint.
In the SC, the petitioner claimed that:
1. The CA erred in holding that the police officers could without any court warrant or
order seize and confiscate petitioner's magazines on the basis simply of their
determination that they are obscene.
2. The Court of Appeals erred in affirming the decision of the trial court and, in effect,
holding that the trial court could dismiss the case on its merits without any hearing
thereon when what was submitted to it for resolution was merely the application of
petitioner for the writ of preliminary injunction.
Issue: Was the seizure constitutional?
Held: No. Petition granted
Ratio:
Test for obscenity: "whether the tendency of the matter charged as obscene, is to
deprave or corrupt those whose minds are open to such immoral influences and into
whose hands a publication or other article charged as being obscene may fall
Also, "whether a picture is obscene or indecent must depend upon the
circumstances of the case, and that ultimately, the question is to be decided by the
"judgment of the aggregate sense of the community reached by it." (Kottinger)
When does a publication have a corrupting tendency, or when can it be said to be
offensive to human sensibilities?
The issue is a complicated one, in which the fine lines have neither been drawn nor
divided.
Katigbak- "Whether to the average person, applying contemporary standards, the
dominant theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to prurient interest."
Kalaw-Katigbak represented a marked departure from Kottinger in the sense that it
measured obscenity in terms of the "dominant theme" of the work, rather than
isolated passages, which were central to Kottinger (although both cases are agreed
that "contemporary community standards" are the final arbiters of what is
"obscene"). Kalaw-Katigbak undertook moreover to make the determination of
obscenity essentially a judicial question and as a consequence, to temper the wide
discretion Kottinger had given unto law enforcers.
The latest say on American jurisprudence was Miller v. California, which
expressly abandoned Massachusettes, and established "basic guidelines," to wit:
"(a) whether 'the average person, applying contemporary standards' would find the
work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest . . .; (b) whether the work
depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined
by the applicable state law; and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious
literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.
The lack of uniformity in American jurisprudence as to what constitutes "obscenity"
has been attributed to the reluctance of the courts to recognize the constitutional
dimension of the problem.
Apparently, the courts have assumed that "obscenity" is not included in the guaranty
of free speech, an assumption that, as we averred, has allowed a climate of opinions
among magistrates predicated upon arbitrary, if vague theories of what is acceptable
to society.
In the case at bar, there is no challenge on the right of the State, in the legitimate
exercise of police power, to suppress smut provided it is smut. For obvious reasons,
smut is not smut simply because one insists it is smut. So is it equally evident that
individual tastes develop, adapt to wide-ranging influences, and keep in step with
the rapid advance of civilization. What shocked our forebears, say, five decades ago,
is not necessarily repulsive to the present generation.
But neither should we say that "obscenity" is a bare (no pun intended) matter of
opinion. As we said earlier, it is the divergent perceptions of men and women that
have probably compounded the problem rather than resolved it.
Undoubtedly, "immoral" lore or literature comes within the ambit of free
expression, although not its protection. In free expression cases, this Court has
consistently been on the side of the exercise of the right, barring a "clear and present
danger" that would warrant State interference and action. But the burden to show
this lies with the authorities.
"There must be objective and convincing, not subjective or conjectural, proof of the
existence of such clear and present danger."
As we so strongly stressed in Bagatsing, a case involving the delivery of a political
speech, the presumption is that the speech may validly be said. The burden is on the
State to demonstrate the existence of a danger, a danger that must not only be: (1)
clear but also, (2) present, to justify State action to stop the speech.
The Court is not convinced that the private respondents have shown the required
proof to justify a ban and to warrant confiscation of the literature for which
mandatory injunction had been sought below. First of all, they were not possessed
of a lawful court order: (1) finding the said materials to be pornography, and (2)
authorizing them to carry out a search and seizure, by way of a search warrant.
Has petitioner been found guilty for publishing obscene works under Presidential
Decrees Nos. 960 and 969? This not answered, one can conclude that the fact that
the former respondent Mayor's act was sanctioned by "police power" is no license
to seize property in disregard of due process. The PD’s don’t give the authorities the
permission to execute high-handed acts.
It is basic that searches and seizures may be done only through a judicial warrant,
otherwise, they become unreasonable and subject to challenge.
There is of course provision for warrantless searches under the Rules of Court but as
the provision itself suggests, the searchmust have been an incident to a lawful arrest
and it must be on account fo a crime committed.
The Court rejected the argument that "[t]here is no constitutional nor legal provision
which would free the accused of all criminal responsibility because there had been
no warrant, and there is no "accused" here to speak of, who ought to be "punished".
Second, to say that the respondent Mayor could have validly ordered the raid (as a
result of an anti-smut campaign) without a lawful search warrant because, in his
opinion, "violation of penal laws" has been committed, is to make the respondent
Mayor judge, jury, and executioner rolled into one.
Soriano v Laguardia
587 SCRA 79 (2009)
Velasco, Jr. J.:
FACTS:
In the evening of 10 Aug 2004, petitioner Eliseo Soriano as hose of the
program Ang Dating Daan, aired on UNTV 37, made the following remarks directed
towards private respondent Michael Sandoval, a minister of the Iglesia ni Cristo and
a host of the program Ang Tamang Daan:
Lehitimong anak ng demonyo; sinungaling. Gago ka talaga Michael, masahol ka pa
sa putang babae o di ba. Yung putang babae ang gumagana lang doon yung ibaba,
[dito] kay Michael ang gumagana ang itaas, o di ba! O, masahol pa sa putang babae
yan. Sabi ng lola ko masahol pa sa putang babae yan. Sobra ang kasinungalingan ng
mga demonyong ito.
Two days after, complaints were lodged by Jessie Galapon and other private
respondents, all members of the Iglesia ni Cristo before the MTRCB. On 16 Aug
2004, the MTRCB issued an order preventively suspending Ang Dating Daan for 20
days in accordance with Sec 3(d) of PD 1986.
Petitioner sought for reconsideration praying that respondent Chairperson
Consoliza Laguardia recuse themselves from hearing the case but later withdrew his
motion followed by the filing for certiorari and prohibition to nullify the preventive
suspension order.
On 27 Sept 2004, the MTRCB issued a decision imposing 3 months suspension
from the program Ang Dating Daan.
ISSUES:
 W/N MTRCB is authorized under PD 1986 to issue preventive suspension.
 W/N petitioner was deprived of due process and equal protection for lack
of due hearing in the case.
 W/N petitioner’s utterance was religious speech protected by religious
freedom.
 W/N petitioner’s utterance was protected by freedom of speech and
expression.
HELD:
1.) Yes. The Court ruled that administrative agencies have powers and
functions which may be administrative, investigatory, regulatory, quasi-legislative,
or quasi-judicial, or a mix of the five, as conferred by the Constitution or the law. The
authority given should be liberally construed. A perusal of the PD 1986 reveal the
possession of authority to issue preventive suspension as found in Sec 3(d), “To
supervise, regulate, and grant, deny or cancel… exhibition, and/or television
broadcast… as are determined by the BOARD to be objectionable…” Any other
construal would render its power to regulate, supervise, or discipline illusory.
Preventive suspension is not a penalty by itself, being merely a preliminary step in
an administrative investigation. And the power to discipline and impose penalties,
if granted, carries with it the power to investigate administrative complaints and,
during such investigation, to preventively suspend the person subject of the
complaint.
Moreover, the assailed Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) issued by MTRCB
in pursuant to PD 1986 merely formalizes the power bestowed by said statute. The
IRR provision on preventive suspension is applicable not only to motion pictures and
publicity materials but only beyond motion pictures. The MTRCB would regretfully
be rendered ineffective should it be subject to the restrictions petitioner envisages.
2.) No. The Court ruled that since MTRCB handed out the assailed order in response
to a written notice after petitioner appeared before that Board for a hearing on
private respondents complaint, no violation of the guarantee was made. Under Sec.
3, Chapter XIII of the IRR of PD 1986, preventive suspension shall issue any time
during the pendency of the case. In this particular case, it was done after MTRCB duly
apprised petitioner of his having possibly violated PD 1986 and of administrative
complaints that had been filed against him for such violation. At any event, that
preventive suspension can validly be meted out even without a hearing
Neither the guarantee of equal protection was denied. Petitioner argues that he
was unable to answer the criticisms coming from the INC ministers. The equal
protection clause demands that all persons subject to legislation should be treated
alike, under like circumstances and conditions both in the privileges conferred and
liabilities imposed. The Court ruled that petitioner cannot, under the premises, place
himself in the same shoes as the INC ministers, who, for one, are not facing
administrative complaints before the MTRCB. For another, he offers no proof to
such allegations.
3.) No. The Court ruled that there is nothing in petitioner’s statements subject of
the complaints expressing any particular religious belief, nothing furthering his
avowed evangelical mission. The fact that he came out with his statements in a
televised bible exposition program does not automatically accord them the character
of a religious discourse. Plain and simple insults directed at another person cannot
be elevated to the status of religious speech. Even petitioners attempts to place his
words in context show that he was moved by anger and the need to seek retribution,
not by any religious conviction.
4.) No. The Court held that be it in the form of prior restraint, e.g., judicial injunction
against publication or threat of cancellation of license/franchise, or subsequent
liability, whether in libel and damage suits, prosecution for sedition, or contempt
proceedings, are anathema to the freedom of expression. Prior restraint means
official government restrictions on the press or other forms of expression in advance
of actual publication or dissemination. The freedom of speech may be regulated to
serve important public interests and it may not be invoked when the expression
touches upon matters of essentially private concern. The freedom to express ones
sentiments and belief does not grant one the license to vilify in public the honor and
integrity of another. Any sentiments must be expressed within the proper forum and
with proper regard for the rights of others. A speech would fall under the
unprotected type if the utterances involved are no essential part of any exposition
of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step of truth that any benefit that
may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and
morality.
The Petitioner’s statement can be treated as obscene, at least with respect to the
average child, and thus his utterances cannot be considered as protected
speech. Citing decisions from the US Supreme Court, the Court said that the analysis
should be context based and found the utterances to be obscene after considering
the use of television broadcasting as a medium, the time of the show, and the “G”
rating of the show, which are all factors that made the utterances susceptible to
children viewers. The Court emphasized on how the uttered words could be easily
understood by a child literally rather than in the context that they were used.
Soriano vs. La Guardia
G.R. No. 164785. April 29, 2009
Facts:
On August 10, 2004, at around 10:00 p.m., petitioner, as host of the program Ang
Dating Daan, aired on UNTV 37, made obscene remarks against INC. Two days after,
before the MTRCB, separate but almost identical affidavit-complaints were lodged
by Jessie L. Galapon and seven other private respondents, all members of the Iglesia
ni Cristo (INC), against petitioner in connection with the above broadcast.
Respondent Michael M. Sandoval, who felt directly alluded to in petitioner’s remark,
was then a minister of INC and a regular host of the TV program Ang Tamang Daan.
Issue:
Whether or not Soriano’s statements during the televised “Ang Dating Daan” part of
the religious discourse and within the protection of Section 5, Art.III.
Held:
No. Under the circumstances obtaining in this case, therefore, and considering the
adverse effect of petitioner’s utterances on the viewers’ fundamental rights as well
as petitioner’s clear violation of his duty as a public trustee, the MTRCB properly
suspended him from appearing in Ang Dating Daan for three months. Furthermore,
it cannot be properly asserted that petitioner’s suspension was an undue curtailment
of his right to free speech either as a prior restraint or as a subsequent punishment.
Aside from the reasons given above (re the paramount of viewers rights, the public
trusteeship character of a broadcaster’s role and the power of the State to regulate
broadcast media), a requirement that indecent language be avoided has its primary
effect on the form, rather than the content, of serious communication. There are
few, if any, thoughts that cannot be expressed by the use of less offensive language.
Social Weather Stations v COMELEC
Facts:
Petitioner, Social Weather Stations, Inc. (SWS) is a private non-stock, non-profit
social research institution conducting surveys in various fields. On the other hand,
petitioner Kamahalan Publishing Corporation publishes the Manila Standard, a
newspaper of general circulation.
Petitioners brought this action for prohibition to enjoin the Commission on Elections
from enforcing Section 5.4 of RA. No.9006 (Fair Election Act), which provides that:
“Surveys affecting national candidates shall not be published fifteen (15) days before
an election and surveys affecting local candidates shall not be published seven (7)
days before an election”.
Petitioners argue that the restriction on the publication of election survey results
constitutes a prior restraint on the exercise of freedom of speech without any clear
and present danger to justify such restraint. They claim that SWS and other pollsters
conducted and published the results of surveys prior to the 1992, 1995, and 1998
elections up to as close as two days before the election day without causing
confusion among the voters and that there is neither empirical nor historical
evidence to support the conclusion that there is an immediate and inevitable danger
to tile voting process posed by election surveys. No similar restriction is imposed on
politicians from explaining their opinion or on newspapers or broadcast media from
writing and publishing articles concerning political issues up to the day of the
election. They contend that there is no reason for ordinary voters to be denied access
to the results of election surveys, which are relatively objective.
surveys, bandwagon effect, and absence of reply; (2) it is narrowly tailored to meet
the "evils" sought to be prevented; and (3) the impairment of freedom of expression
is minimal, the restriction being limited both in duration, i.e., the last 15 days before
the national election and the last 7 days before a local election, and in scope as it
does not prohibit election survey results but only require timeliness.
Issue:
Whether or not Section 5.4 of RA 9006 constitutes an unconstitutional abridgment
of freedom of speech, expression and the press.
Held:
Yes. It constitutes an unconstitutional abridgement of freedom of expression, speech
and the press. To summarize, the Supreme Court held that §5.4 is invalid because (1)
it imposes a prior restraint on the freedom of expression, (2) it is a direct and total
suppression of a category of expression even though such suppression is only for a
limited period, and (3) the governmental interest sought to be promoted can be
achieved by means other than suppression of freedom of expression.
It has been held that mere legislative preferences or beliefs respecting matters of
public convenience may well support regulation directed at other personal activities,
but be insufficient to justify such as diminishes the exercise of rights so vital to the
maintenance of democratic institutions.

Respondent Commission on Elections justifies the restrictions in §5.4 of R.A. No.

9006 as necessary to prevent the manipulation and corruption of the electoral
process by unscrupulous and erroneous surveys just before the election. It contends
that (1) the prohibition on the publication of election survey results during the period
proscribed by law bears a rational connection to the objective of the law, i.e., the
prevention of the debasement of the electoral process resulting from manipulated
GMA NETWORK, INC., Petitioner, YES. The Court held that the assailed rule on “aggregate-
based” airtime limitsis unreasonable and arbitrary as it unduly restricts and
vs. constrains the ability of candidates and political parties to reach out and
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent. communicate with the people. Here, the adverted reason for imposing the
“aggregate-based” airtime limits – leveling the playing field – does not constitute a
G.R. No. 205357 September 2, 2014 compelling state interest which would justify such a substantial restriction on the
freedom of candidates and political parties to communicate their ideas,
philosophies, platforms and programs of government. And, this is specially so in the
absence of a clear-cut basis for the imposition of such a prohibitive measure.

PONENTE: Peralta It is also particularly unreasonable and whimsical to adopt the aggregate-
based time limits on broadcast time when we consider that the Philippines is not
TOPIC: Freedom of expression, of speech and of the press, airtime limits only composed of so many islands. There are also a lot of languages
and dialects spoken among the citizens across the country. Accordingly, for a
national candidate to really reach out to as many of the electorates as possible, then
it might also be necessary that he conveys his message through his advertisements
FACTS:
in languages and dialects that the people may more readily understand and relate
The five (5) petitions before the Court put in issue the alleged to. To add all of these airtimes in different dialects would greatly hamper the ability
unconstitutionality of Section 9 (a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 9615 limiting the of such candidate to express himself – a form of suppression of his political speech.
broadcast and radio advertisements of candidates and political parties for national
election positions to an aggregate total of one hundred twenty (120) minutes and
one hundred eighty (180) minutes, respectively. They contend that such restrictive
regulation on allowable broadcast time violates freedom of the press, impairs the
people’s right to suffrage as well as their right to information relative to the exercise
of their right to choose who to elect during the forth coming elections

Section 9 (a) provides for an “aggregate total” airtime instead of the

previous “per station” airtime for political campaigns or advertisements, and also
required prior COMELEC approval for candidates’ television and radio guestings and
appearances.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Section 9 (a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 9615

on airtimelimits violates freedom of expression, of speech and of the press.

HELD:
1-UNITED TRANSPORT KOALISYON (1-UTAK), Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
G.R. No. 206020, April 14, 2015
PONENTE: Reyes
TOPIC: Election law, prior restraint of free speech, posting of campaign materials on
PUV and public terminals, captive-audience doctrine
DOCTRINE:
The right to participate in electoral processes is a basic and fundamental right in
any democracy. It includes not only the right to vote, but also the right to urge others
to vote for a particular candidate. The right to express one’s preference for a
candidate is likewise part of the fundamental right to free speech. Thus, any
governmental restriction on the right to convince others to vote for a candidate
carries with it a heavy presumption of invalidity.
FACTS:
On January 15, 2013, the COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 9615, which
provided for the rules implementing R.A. No. 9006 in connection with the May 13,
2013 national and local elections and subsequent elections. Section 7 thereof, which
enumerates the prohibited forms of election propaganda, pertinently provides:
SEC. 7. Prohibited Forms of Election Propaganda. – During the campaign period, it
is unlawful:
xxxx
(f) To post, display or exhibit any election campaign or propaganda material outside
of authorized common poster areas, in public places, or in private properties without
the consent of the owner thereof.
(g) Public places referred to in the previous subsection (f) include any of the
following:
xxxx
5. Public utility vehicles such as buses, jeepneys, trains, taxi cabs, ferries, pedicabs
and tricycles, whether motorized or not;
6. Within the premises of public transport terminals, such as bus terminals, airports,
seaports, docks, piers, train stations, and the like.
The violation of items [5 and 6] under subsection (g) shall be a cause for the
revocation of the public utility franchise and will make the owner and/or operator of
the transportation service and/or terminal liable for an election offense under
Section 9 of Republic Act No. 9006 as implemented by Section 18 (n) of these Rules.
Petitioner sought for clarification from COMELEC as regards the application of
REsolution No. 9615 particularly Section 7(g) items (5) and (6), in relation to Section
7(f), vis-à-vis privately owned public utility vehicles (PUVs) and transport terminals.
The petitioner then requested the COMELEC to reconsider the implementation of
the assailed provisions and allow private owners of PUVs and transport terminals to
post election campaign materials on their vehicles and transport terminals.
The COMELEC en banc issued Minute Resolution No. 13-0214, which denied the
petitioner’s request to reconsider the implementation of Section 7(g) items (5) and
(6), in relation to Section 7(f), of Resolution No. 9615.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Section 7(g) items (5) and (6), in relation to Section 7(f), of
Resolution No. 9615 are constitutional.
HELD:
The Supreme Court held that the said provisions of Resolution No. 9615 are null and
void for being repugnant to Sections 1 and 4, Article III of the 1987 Constitution.
Section 7(g) items (5) and (6), in relation to Section 7(f), of Resolution No. 9615 are
prior restraints on speech
Section 7(g) items (5) and (6), in relation to Section 7(f), of Resolution No.
9615 unduly infringe on the fundamental right of the people to freedom of
speech. Central to the prohibition is the freedom of individuals, i.e., the owners of
PUVs and private transport terminals, to express their preference, through the
posting of election campaign material in their property, and convince others to agree
with them.
Pursuant to the assailed provisions of Resolution No. 9615, posting an election
campaign material during an election period in PUVs and transport terminals carries
with it the penalty of revocation of the public utility franchise and shall make the
owner thereof liable for an election offense.
The prohibition constitutes a clear prior restraint on the right to free expression of
the owners of PUVs and transport terminals. As a result of the prohibition, owners
of PUVs and transport terminals are forcefully and effectively inhibited from
expressing their preferences under the pain of indictment for an election offense
and the revocation of their franchise or permit to operate.
The assailed prohibition on posting election campaign materials is an invalid
content-neutral regulation repugnant to the free speech clause.
A content-neutral regulation, i.e., which is merely concerned with the
incidents of the speech, or one that merely controls the time, place or manner, and
under well-defined standards, is constitutionally permissible, even if it restricts the
right to free speech, provided that the following requisites concur:
1. The government regulation is within the constitutional power of the
Government;
2. It furthers an important or substantial governmental interest;
3. The governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free
expression; and
4. The incidental restriction on freedom of expression is no greater than is
essential to the furtherance of that interest.
Section 7(g) items (5) and (6) of Resolution No. 9615 are content-neutral
regulations since they merely control the place where election campaign materials
may be posted. However, the prohibition is still repugnant to the free speech clause
as it fails to satisfy all of the requisites for a valid content-neutral regulation.
Section 7(g) items (5) and (6), in relation to Section 7(f), of Resolution No. 9615, are
not within the constitutionally delegated power of the COMELEC under Section 4,
Article IX-C of the Constitution. Also, there is absolutely no necessity to restrict the
right to free speech of the owners of PUVs and transport terminals.
The COMELEC may only regulate the franchise or permit to operate and not the
ownership per se of PUVs and transport terminals.
In the instant case, the Court further delineates the constitutional grant of
supervisory and regulatory powers to the COMELEC during an election period. As
worded, Section 4, Article IX-C of the Constitution only grants COMELEC supervisory
and regulatory powers over the enjoyment or utilization “of all franchises or permits
for the operation,” inter alia, of transportation and other public utilities. The
COMELEC’s constitutionallydelegated powers of supervision and regulation do not
extend to the ownership per se of PUVs and transport terminals, but only to the
franchise or permit to operate the same.
Section 7(g) items (5) and (6) of Resolution No. 9615 are not within
the constitutionally delegated power of the COMELEC to supervise or regulate the
franchise or permit to operate of transportation utilities. The posting of election
campaign material on vehicles used for public transport or on transport terminals is
not only a form of political expression, but also an act of ownership – it has nothing
to do with the franchise or permit to operate the PUV or transport terminal.
Section 7(g) items (5) and (6) of Resolution No. 9615 are not justified under the
captive-audience doctrine.
The captive-audience doctrine states that when a listener cannot, as a practical
matter, escape from intrusive speech, the speech can be restricted. The “captive-
audience” doctrine recognizes that a listener has a right not to be exposed to an
unwanted message in circumstances in which the communication cannot be
avoided.
A regulation based on the captive-audience doctrine is in the guise of censorship,
which undertakes selectively to shield the public from some kinds of speech on the
ground that they are more offensive than others. Such selective restrictions have
been upheld only when the speaker intrudes on the privacy of the home or the
degree of captivity makes it either impossible or impractical for the unwilling viewer
or auditor to avoid exposure.
Thus, a government regulation based on the captive-audience doctrine may not be
justified if the supposed “captive audience” may avoid exposure to the otherwise
intrusive speech. The prohibition under Section 7(g)
items (5) and (6) of Resolution No. 9615 is not justified under the captive-
audience doctrine; the commuters are not forced or compelled to read the election
campaign materials posted on PUVs and transport terminals. Nor are they incapable
of declining to receive the messages contained in the posted election campaign
materials since they may simply avert their eyes if they find the same unbearably
intrusive.
Lehman’s case not applicable
The COMELEC, in insisting that it has the right to restrict the posting of election
campaign materials on PUVs and transport terminals, cites Lehman v. City of Shaker
Heights, a case decided by the U.S. Supreme Court. In Lehman, a policy of the city
government, which prohibits political advertisements on government-run buses,
was upheld by the U.S. Supreme Court. The U.S. Supreme Court held that the
advertising space on the buses was not a public forum, pointing out that
advertisement space on government-run buses, “although incidental to the
provision of public transportation, is a part of commercial venture.” In the same way
that other commercial ventures need not accept every proffer of advertising from
the general public, the city’s transit system has the discretion on the type of
advertising that may be displayed on its vehicles.
In Lehman, the political advertisement was intended for PUVs owned by the city
government; the city government, as owner of the buses, had the right to decide
which type of advertisements would be placed on its buses.
Lehman actually upholds the freedom of the owner of the utility vehicles, i.e., the
city government, in choosing the types of advertisements that would be placed on
its properties. In stark contrast, Section 7(g) items (5) and (6) of Resolution No. 9615
curtail the choice of the owners of PUVs and transport terminals on the
advertisements that may be posted on their properties.
Also, the city government in Lehman had the right, nay the duty, to refuse political
advertisements on their buses. Considering that what were involved were facilities
owned by the city government, impartiality, or the appearance thereof, was a
necessity. In the instant case, the ownership of PUVs and transport terminals
remains private; there exists no valid reason to suppress their political views by
proscribing the posting of election campaign materials on their properties.
Prohibiting owners of PUVs and transport terminals from posting election
campaign materials violates the equal protection clause.
Section 7(g) items (5) and (6) of Resolution No. 9615 do not only run afoul of the free
speech clause, but also of the equal protection clause. One of the basic principles on
which this government was founded is that of the equality of right, which is
embodied in Section 1, Article III of the 1987 Constitution.
It is conceded that the classification under Section 7(g) items (5) and (6) of Resolution
No. 9615 is not limited to existing conditions and applies equally to the members of
the purported class. However, the classification remains constitutionally
impermissible since it is not based on substantial distinction and is not germane to
the purpose of the law. A distinction exists between PUVs and transport terminals
and private vehicles and other properties in that the former, to be considered as
such, needs to secure from the government either a franchise or a permit to
operate. Nevertheless, as pointed out earlier, the prohibition imposed under
Section 7(g) items (5) and (6) of Resolution No. 9615 regulates the ownership per
se of the PUV and transport terminals; the prohibition does not in any manner
affect the franchise or permit to operate of the PUV and transport terminals.
As regards ownership, there is no substantial distinction between owners of PUVs
and transport terminals and owners of private vehicles and other properties. As
already explained, the ownership of PUVs and transport terminals, though made
available for use by the public, remains private. If owners of private vehicles and
other properties are allowed to express their political ideas and opinion by posting
election campaign materials on their properties, there is no cogent reason to deny
the same preferred right to owners of PUVs and transport terminals. In terms of
ownership, the distinction between owners of PUVs and transport terminals and
owners of private vehicles and properties is merely superficial. Superficial
differences do not make for a valid classification.
The fact that PUVs and transport terminals are made available for use by the public
is likewise not substantial justification to set them apart from private vehicles and
other properties. Admittedly, any election campaign material that would be posted
on PUVs and transport terminals would be seen by many people. However, election
campaign materials posted on private vehicles and other places frequented by the
public, e.g.,commercial establishments, would also be seen by many people. Thus,
there is no reason to single out owners of PUVs and transport terminals in the
prohibition against posting of election campaign materials.

Summary

Section 7(g) items (5) and (6), in relation to Section 7(f), of Resolution No. 9615
violate the free speech clause; they are content-neutral regulations, which are not
within the constitutional power of the COMELEC issue and are not necessary to
further the objective of ensuring equal time, space and opportunity to the
candidates. They are not only repugnant to the free speech clause, but are also
violative of the equal protection clause, as there is no substantial distinction
between owners of PUV s and transport terminals and owners of private vehicles
and other properties.

On a final note, it bears stressing that the freedom to advertise one’s political
candidacy is clearly a significant part of our freedom of expression. A restriction on
this freedom without rhyme or reason is a violation of the most valuable feature of
the democratic way of life.
Ramon bagatsing
International Law
Retired Justice JBL Reyes in behalf of the members of the Anti-Bases Coalition sought
a permit to rally from Luneta Park until the front gate of the US embassy which is less
than two blocks apart. The permit has been denied by then Manila mayor Ramon
Bagatsing. The mayor claimed that there have been intelligence reports that
indicated that the rally would be infiltrated by lawless elements. He also issued City
Ordinance No. 7295 to prohibit the staging of rallies within the 500 feet radius of the
US embassy. Bagatsing pointed out that it was his intention to provide protection to
the US embassy from such lawless elements in pursuant to Art. 22 of the Vienna
Convention on Diplomatic Relations. And that under our constitution we “adhere to
generally accepted principles of international law”.
ISSUE: Whether or not a treaty may supersede provisions of the
Constitution. Whether or not the rallyists should be granted the permit.
HELD:
I. No. Indeed, the receiving state is tasked for the protection of foreign diplomats
from any lawless element. And indeed the Vienna Convention is a restatement of the
generally accepted principles of international law. But the same cannot be invoked
as defense to the primacy of the Philippine Constitution which upholds and
guarantees the rights to free speech and peacable assembly. At the same time, the
City Ordinance issued by respondent mayor cannot be invoked if the application
thereof would collide with a constitutionally guaranteed rights.
II. Yes. The denial of their rally does not pass the clear and present danger test. The
mere assertion that subversives may infiltrate the ranks of the demonstrators does
not suffice. In this case, no less than the police chief assured that they have taken all
the necessary steps to ensure a peaceful rally. Further, the ordinance cannot be
applied yet because there was no showing that indeed the rallyists are within the
500 feet radius (besides, there’s also the question of whether or not the mayor can
prohibit such rally – but, as noted by the SC, that has not been raised an an issue in
this case).
G.R. No. 171396, May 3 2006 [Legislative Department - Power to Declare War and
Delegate Emergency Power]
FACTS:
On February 24, 2006, President Arroyo issued PP No. 1017 declaring a state of
emergency, thus:
NOW, THEREFORE, I, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, President of the Republic of the
Philippines and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, [calling-
out power] by virtue of the powers vested upon me by Section 18, Article 7 of the
Philippine Constitution which states that: “The President. . . whenever it becomes
necessary, . . . may call out (the) armed forces to prevent or suppress. . .rebellion. .
.,― and in my capacity as their Commander-in-Chief, do hereby command the
Armed Forces of the Philippines, to maintain law and order throughout the
Philippines, prevent or suppress all forms of lawless violence as well as any act of
insurrection or rebellion ["take care" power] and to enforce obedience to all the laws
and to all decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my
direction; and [power to take over] as provided in Section 17, Article 12 of the
Constitution do hereby declare a State of National Emergency.
On the same day, PGMA issued G.O. No. 5 implementing PP1017, directing the
members of the AFP and PNP "to immediately carry out the necessary and
appropriate actions and measures to suppress and prevent acts of terrorism and
lawless violence."
David, et al. assailed PP 1017 on the grounds that (1) it encroaches on the emergency
powers of Congress; (2) it is a subterfuge to avoid the constitutional requirements
for the imposition of martial law; and (3) it violates the constitutional guarantees of
freedom of the press, of speech and of assembly. They alleged “direct injury”
resulting from “illegal arrest” and “unlawful search” committed by police
operatives pursuant to PP 1017.
During the hearing, the Solicitor General argued that the issuance of PP 1017 and GO
5 have factual basis, and contended that the intent of the Constitution is to give full
discretionary powers to the President in determining the necessity of calling out the
armed forces. The petitioners did not contend the facts stated b the Solicitor
General.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 is constitutional.
RULING:
The operative portion of PP 1017 may be divided into three important provisions,
thus:
First provision: “by virtue of the power vested upon me by Section 18, Artilce VII …
do hereby command the Armed Forces of the Philippines, to maintain law and order
throughout the Philippines, prevent or suppress all forms of lawless violence as well
any act of insurrection or rebellion”
Second provision: “and to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees,
orders and regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my direction;”
Third provision: “as provided in Section 17, Article XII of the Constitution do hereby
declare a State of National Emergency.”
PP 1017 is partially constitutional insofar as provided by the first provision of the
decree.
First Provision: Calling Out Power.
The only criterion for the exercise of the calling-out power is that “whenever it
becomes necessary,” the President may call the armed forces “to prevent or
suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion.” (Integrated Bar of the Philippines
v. Zamora)
President Arroyo’s declaration of a “state of rebellion” was merely an act declaring
a status or condition of public moment or interest, a declaration allowed under
Section 4, Chap 2, Bk II of the Revised Administration Code. Such declaration, in the
words of Sanlakas, is harmless, without legal significance, and deemed not
written. In these cases, PP 1017 is more than that. In declaring a state of national
emergency, President Arroyo did not only rely on Section 18, Article VII of the
Constitution, a provision calling on the AFP to prevent or suppress lawless violence,
invasion or rebellion. She also relied on Section 17, Article XII, a provision on the
State’s extraordinary power to take over privately-owned public utility and business
affected with public interest. Indeed, PP 1017 calls for the exercise of an awesome
power. Obviously, such Proclamation cannot be deemed harmless.
To clarify, PP 1017 is not a declaration of Martial Law. It is merely an exercise of
President Arroyo’s calling-out power for the armed forces to assist her in preventing
or suppressing lawless violence.
Second Provision: The "Take Care" Power.
The second provision pertains to the power of the President to ensure that the laws
be faithfully executed. This is based on Section 17, Article VII which reads:
SEC. 17. The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus,
and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.
This Court rules that the assailed PP 1017 is unconstitutional insofar as it grants
President Arroyo the authority to promulgate “decrees.” Legislative power is
peculiarly within the province of the Legislature. Section 1, Article VI categorically
states that “[t]he legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the
Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives.” To be
sure, neither Martial Law nor a state of rebellion nor a state of emergency can justify
President Arroyo’s exercise of legislative power by issuing decrees.
Third Provision: The Power to Take Over
Distinction must be drawn between the President’s authority to declare“a state of
national emergency” and to exercise emergency powers. To the first, Section 18,
Article VII grants the President such power, hence, no legitimate constitutional
objection can be raised. But to the second, manifold constitutional issues arise.
Generally, Congress is the repository of emergency powers. This is evident in the
tenor of Section 23 (2), Article VI authorizing it to delegate such powers to the
President. Certainly, a body cannot delegate a power not reposed upon it. However,
knowing that during grave emergencies, it may not be possible or practicable for
Congress to meet and exercise its powers, the Framers of our Constitution deemed
it wise to allow Congress to grant emergency powers to the President, subject to
certain conditions, thus:
(1) There must be a war or other emergency.
(2) The delegation must be for a limited period only.
(3) The delegation must be subject to such restrictions as the Congress may
prescribe.
when such exceptional circumstances have ceased. Likewise, without
legislation, the President has no power to point out the types of businesses affected
with public interest that should be taken over. In short, the President has no
absolute authority to exercise all the powers of the State under Section 17, Article
VII in the absence of an emergency powers act passed by Congress.
As of G.O. No. 5, it is constitutional since it provides a standard by which the AFP and
the PNP should implement PP 1017, i.e. whatever is “necessary and appropriate
actions and measures to suppress and prevent acts of lawless
violence.” Considering that “acts of terrorism” have not yet been defined and made
punishable by the Legislature, such portion of G.O. No. 5 is
declared unconstitutional.

(4) The emergency powers must be exercised to carry out a national policy declared
by Congress.

Section 17, Article XII must be understood as an aspect of the emergency powers
clause. The taking over of private business affected with public interest is just
another facet of the emergency powers generally reposed upon Congress. Thus,
when Section 17 states that the “the State may, during the emergency and under
reasonable terms prescribed by it, temporarily take over or direct the operation of
any privately owned public utility or business affected with public interest,” it refers
to Congress, not the President. Now, whether or not the President may exercise
such power is dependent on whether Congress may delegate it to him pursuant to a
law prescribing the reasonable terms thereof.

Following our interpretation of Section 17, Article XII, invoked by President Arroyo in
issuing PP 1017, this Court rules that such Proclamation does not authorize her
during the emergency to temporarily take over or direct the operation of any
privately owned public utility or business affected with public interest without
authority from Congress.

Let it be emphasized that while the President alone can declare a state of national
emergency, however, without legislation, he has no power to take over privately-
owned public utility or business affected with public interest. Nor can he determine
Bayan, et al., Vs. Eduardo Ermita, et al.,
G.R. No. 169838
April 25, 2006
Facts: The petitioners, Bayan, et al., alleged that they are citizens and taxpayers of
the Philippines and that their right as organizations and individuals were violated
when the rally they participated in on October 6, 2005 was violently dispersed by
policemen implementing Batas Pambansa No. 880.
Petitioners contended that Batas Pambansa No. 880 is clearly a violation of the
Constitution and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and other
human rights treaties of which the Philippines is a signatory. They argue that B.P. No.
880 requires a permit before one can stage a public assembly regardless of the
presence or absence of a clear and present danger. It also curtails the choice of venue
and is thus repugnant to the freedom of expression clause as the time and place of
a public assembly form part of the message which the expression is sought.
Furthermore, it is not content-neutral as it does not apply to mass actions in support
of the government. The words “lawful cause,” “opinion,” “protesting or influencing”
suggest the exposition of some cause not espoused by the government. Also, the
phrase “maximum tolerance” shows that the law applies to assemblies against the
government because they are being tolerated. As a content-based legislation, it
cannot pass the strict scrutiny test. This petition and two other petitions were
ordered to be consolidated on February 14, 2006. During the course of oral
arguments, the petitioners, in the interest of a speedy resolution of the petitions,
withdrew the portions of their petitions raising factual issues, particularly those
raising the issue of whether B.P. No. 880 and/or CPR is void as applied to the rallies
of September 20, October 4, 5 and 6, 2005.
Issue: Whether the Calibrated Pre-emptive response and the Batas Pambansa No.
880, specifically Sections 4, 5, 6, 12, 13(a) and 14(a) violates Art. III Sec. 4 of the
Philippine Constitution as it causes a disturbing effect on the exercise by the people
of the right to peaceably assemble.\
Held: Section 4 of Article III of the Philippine Constitution provides that no law shall
be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of expression, or of the press, or the
right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the government for redress
of grievances. The right to peaceably assemble and petition for redress of grievances,
together with freedom of speech, of expression, and of the press, is a right that
enjoys dominance in the sphere of constitutional protection. For this rights represent
the very basis of a functional democratic polity, without which all the other rights
would be meaningless and unprotected.
However, it must be remembered that the right, while sacrosanct, is not absolute. It
may be regulated that it shall not be injurious to the equal enjoyment of others
having equal rights, nor injurious to the rights of the community or society. The
power to regulate the exercise of such and other constitutional rights is termed the
sovereign “police power,” which is the power to prescribe regulations, to promote
the health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety, and general welfare of
the people.
B.P. No 880 is not an absolute ban of public assemblies but a restriction that simply
regulates the time, place and manner of the assemblies. B.P. No. 880 thus readily
shows that it refers to all kinds of public assemblies that would use public places. The
reference to “lawful cause” does not make it content-based because assemblies
really have to be for lawful causes, otherwise they would not be “peaceable” and
entitled to protection. Neither the words “opinion,” “protesting,” and “influencing”
in of grievances come from the wording of the Constitution, so its use cannot be
avoided. Finally, maximum tolerance is for the protection and benefit of all rallyist
and is independent of the content of the expression in the rally.
Furthermore, the permit can only be denied on the ground of clear and present
danger to public order, public safety, public convenience, public morals or public
health. This is a recognized exception to the exercise of the rights even under the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and The International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights.
Wherefore, the petitions are GRANTED in part, and respondents, more particularly
the Secretary of the Interior and Local Governments, are DIRECTED to take all
necessary steps for the immediate compliance with Section 15 of Batas Pambansa
No. 880 through the establishment or designation of at least one suitable freedom
park or plaza in every city and municipality of the country. After thirty (30) days from
the finality of this Decision, subject to the giving of advance notices, no prior permit
shall be required to exercise the right to peaceably assemble and petition in the
public parks or plaza in every city or municipality that has not yet complied with
section 15 of the law. Furthermore, Calibrated pre-emptive response (CPR), insofar
as it would purport to differ from or be in lieu of maximum tolerance, is NULL and
VOID and respondents are ENJOINED to REFRAIN from using it and to STRICTLY
OBSERVE the requirements of maximum tolerance, The petitions are DISMISSED in
all other respects, and the constitutionality of Batas Pambansa No. 880 is SUSTAINED
U.S. Supreme Court
Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949)
337 U.S. 1
Syllabus
In a meeting which attracted considerable public attention, petitioner addressed a
large audience in an auditorium outside of which was an angry and turbulent crowd
protesting against the meeting. He condemned the conduct of the crowd outside
and vigorously criticized various political and racial groups. Notwithstanding efforts
of a cordon of police to maintain order, there were several disturbances in the
crowd. Petitioner was charged with violation of an ordinance forbidding any "breach
of the peace," and the trial court instructed the jury that any misbehavior which "stirs
the public to anger, invites dispute, brings about a condition of unrest, or creates a
disturbance" violates the ordinance. Petitioner did not except to that instruction, but
he did maintain at all times that, as applied to his conduct, the ordinance violated his
right of free speech under the Federal Constitution. He was convicted on a general
verdict, and his conviction was affirmed by an intermediate appellate court and by
the Supreme Court of the State.
Held:
1. As construed by the trial court and applied to petitioner, the ordinance violates
the right of free speech guaranteed by the First Amendment, made applicable to the
States by the Fourteenth Amendment. Pp. 337 U. S. 4-5.
2. It is immaterial that petitioner took no exception to the instruction, and that,
throughout the appellate proceedings, the state courts assumed that the only
conduct punishable and punished under the ordinance was conduct constituting
"fighting words,"
Page 337 U. S. 2
since the verdict was a general one, and it cannot be said that petitioner's conviction
was not based upon the instruction quoted above. Stromberg v. California, 283 U. S.
359. Pp. 337 U. S. 5-6.
400 Ill. 23, 79 N.E.2d 39, reversed.
Petitioner was convicted in a state court of violating a city ordinance forbidding any
breach of the peace. The Illinois Appellate Court affirmed. 332 Ill.App. 17, 74 N.E.2d
45. The Supreme Court of Illinois affirmed. 400 Ill. 23, 79 N.E.2d 39. This Court
granted certiorari. 335 U.S. 890. Reversed, p. 337 U. S. 6.
CITATION
337 US 1 (1949)
ARGUED
Feb 1, 1949
DECIDED
May 16, 1949
Facts of the case
Father Arthur Terminiello, in an auditorium in Chicago, delivered a vitriolic speech in
which he criticized various political and racial groups and viciously condemned the
protesting crowd that had gathered outside the auditorium. Policemen assigned to
the event were unable to prevent several disturbances by the "angry and turbulent"
crowd. The police arrested Terminiello for "breach of the peace." He was then tried
and convicted for his central role in inciting a riot.
Question
Did the Chicago ordinance violate Terminiello's right of free expression guaranteed
by the First Amendment?
Conclusion
In a 5-to-4 decision, the Court held that the "breach of the peace" ordinance
unconstitutionally infringed upon the freedom of speech. Noting that "[t]he vitality
of civil and political institutions in our society depends on free discussion," the Court
held that speech could be restricted only in the event that it was "likely to produce
a clear and present danger of a serious substantive evil that rises far above public
inconvenience, annoyance, or unrest." Justice Douglas wrote that "a function of free
speech under our system is to invite dispute. It may indeed best serve its high
purpose when it induces a condition of unrest, creates dissatisfaction with conditions
as they are, or even stirs people to anger."