Can I Know “That I Am Not Dreaming? LTEAN EER BLUMENELD RB Ix Mroreatio 1 Descartes oles an argument to show that he annot Senow that i ot deuming. This argument has occupied a ental place in the history of modern philowph: it forcefully risen the problem of the estenal world, and, at the sme ime, leads Considerations tha Descartes wes in his proof of dualism. Yeti has ‘Seemed co many philosophers that some more or ls simple maneuver Foal tha is needed to ete the argument Ic will be our contention that this mot so, Some of he eins miss the mark entirely; ‘thers show that the argument needs to be reformulated in certain Says But noue, in our vew, disposes of the fundamental skeptical ‘Corry that lesa isnt Our atm sn this paper, however, i201 ‘Seablsh any form of shepiciom about the senses, What we do hope {O show is that Descarters argument isa great deal more dieu ‘elate than has been commonty thought. Descartes begin by considering the posiility that his seme deceive him A line of argument which he fds compelling is ontained in thi ‘welLknown panage How often tas it happened to ne tat he night I eam that 1 our ‘Byuitn pparclr plc, tat I wes dard aa satel near the Be {Tht in ely Two ig wend in be! At his moment des de (Tem tome the is th je sake that Tam ooking at paper hat Cx NOM "AT £ AM NOT OaRANNG? 230 (his ead which 1 move stot ep, tn i is dlibetely and of pur ett Teatend ony hand and perce what happen ia sep dow aot [ppear v0 car nor so disnc at doe ll ix Rati tinking tin vert ‘ind melt that on many ocasions T have in lep been eed by ‘Ser ilusann and dwelling cvtaly on thi tein Tae my mam {erly aba there sve no cerain adm by which we try deny die tinqih wakctulcet Gea deep Gat T tm bt atest. And ay ‘conihment so gre hati alimow capble of prmading me hat 1 sow deem [HR T8548) |Arwe shall we, che argument stated above is subject to some interesting Variations. But asi stands its basic ust is dear. Desares thatthe fet that his curren experience fas sch and such {features i never scent to show that he is awake The fact that he has had dreams whose qualitative character was fniningshable from that of waking experience convines him that there canbe no exper. fatal eriterion whereby he an determine that he Is wot dreaming. He oer not pause o consider along it of posible criteria, for he thinks ‘tat any qualitative ature ofa waking experience could be feature ‘ot dream at wel, Hence the preence of such a feature will never provide an answer to the quertion: Am I awake? One plausible way af feting oot Descarer'argument ie hi: Argument (D) (0) have had dreams which were qualitatively indistinguishable om vesking experience. (@) Therefore the qualiaive character of my experience does not ruarante that Lam not now dreaming Ie should be ponte out thatthe notion ofthe “qualitative character ‘of my experience” which we use here to capture the intent of Desartess argument ito be construcd quite Ureuly. I includes, for cxample, my current recollections (memory impressions) of how things Ive ben ih the past. Given this broad sense of the pase, one item thar would count as an spect of the qualitative characer of my experience i ts apparent coherence with my pat, But ft would be Descartes (Meditation 1) view thatthe satisfaction of this exiterion Ss ot suficient to diatinguih dreaming from waking Since i could be that Tam only dreaming that my present experience Is coberent sth ony put experince, thi erterion fala to provide» way of ‘Suablishing that Tam awake, Dexartes dos not ultimately conclude fom that he cannot know hat he isnot dreaming. For although he thinks that he cannot know ths snply on the bane the quae charac of hi nperene te bles tht he can go on to RONEN SNCS, Reade ewe os a Fn245 oAvD ALAMGNTELD AND JEAN AEEX aLAMUENELD uit one who isin pneaion of his know can know that he ioe ding. Now, his spy nto bo and tas Tee sched byw any ctntht we props tiga i Clary, Becanatscaatinton tote ope of niog le more in he ‘Sepa todos he aed han inthe memer in whh he Drop fo combat tem.) can be conver in fly sepa pune: by te ston of he flowing (oman ep 2) she quae character of my enprenee does wot gunanee that Sn oc now reaming cen Tot koow tat Tn not tow doing (o Theron 1 Emm tnow hat Cam not nw deni {8 Icom taow ut Tom notnow dreaming then Teanot know thacTam nt avas teaming \o There amotio ta Tam no away dreaming [Art exnoeKaow tha I am not sony reing he Xcnnot row to tn ny tlt whch bed on my experience ley Thetre1 cannot know tobe wen Delt whieh bd on ay enprenc, “Two qulfentins with rapect to () and @) ate stemay. Many ‘icp wou alow tae hee spa oof belt which mit be tobe “sed on my expres Dut whose eran) Thyumned bythe petty tat Tm dram. “Te ae bel welch tone the charer of my caren one ella Thich can't exprenel by fentene of te fot sums me Stats Since fe do not wihw dic the eof wheter mach betes do inde ave «pec stan we watt alte hat @) nd et be ander yeti te bate Secondly t ‘kept intend by Descartes might hoi that my bt tha ene Resi on my eperene of thisking tte te crany of ‘hisbel is animpogie bythe oy hat am desing. Ap treo ot wit o dicate es enneted ih the cp we want ips hu () and) are be rend sv ang a2 ‘epton ony bel ht eis Fly ae our ima oer itwth the problne that Dor let, ne sal Siete thn othe fly skp anu whch nls ep (toh (Grit ist tha etal eer tous argent (D) fence Wl L 3) pie pnt hh tn © Nee ie addeth renin 1) of angmet (0) apparently dee by} An in ACH rms soe Re atl has to intrnac dilerence in kind betwee thowe of our perceptions that (201 KNOW TAT 1 AN ROT oazastne? en ‘He vera in hei presentation of material Using ah delusive'" Austin says, * — ee 4. he ene aa eapet wm pte Fc a he pay i ft ant st os nace ar ae SESE pm of n'a ace esas, tid i aa pec tin Pes Sepia tom uly being preted tothe Pape Que ny ‘But this is jow the wort of thing Dearest wet suggesting. Om bis view ic pombe to hae a deam which qultareeyobase sushable om acunlly being presented tothe Pope. To'rne ae 2 suggestion, one would neo an srgunent and Alin do oe aes inthe psage that ined flows Neto ‘Ale a we hve the phe des the quality; ome waking execs Sipura fume eb Hetie 6 eerying. Hf dream were Sot ual ees fee ‘ang experienc, ten every waking experince would be Ihe det Alot clearly has Descartes (mong others) in nd ‘ers in mind here, ashe ads in a footnoc, “This spat, 0 dou ony 2 : mL ont part, of dhe abrurdity in Descartes coving with the notion that the whole of our experience fight be» dream.” Now, while sem that the second pang cad kom Aun cotsns an argument rected agai something ke out premise (1), itis not altogether clear what the conclusion of this rgument 8 meant to be, Neverthees, we believe that there ae only Katy Every dream is quality GIG Tom waking Experience) (AZ) Mout dreams are qualitatively diferent rom waking coperiene. |) soe danse alta aiten oa sanng eee | Zach ofthe three interpretations of Austin's meaning tenders Hs argument problematic, however. (A2) and (AS) may be paul in Shove ut each a thee i content Se Pee Gt me {) syed some same re qualacey beter hig pene ad cher (A oe) ony smh ahr ds cnt jr) Rt lhe is dubious, Ain ean wea (a a argument for it is apparently this: ee (At) Fi is woe the cate that every desta is qualitatively diferent ‘rom waking experience, chen every waking experience is dren,Kuvy 258 pam aLUMTELD AND JEAN AHEM BLLAEENTELD like, and hence the pirate “s dreamlike quality” meaningles becase applicable wo everything But ic seems perlecly pouible that the following situation should ‘obtain, Some dreame are vague and unclear, and in vrtoe ofthis fet fre said to poses a dreamlike quality. Other dreams are lear and ‘vid, and thor do not poses dreamlike quality. Most waking ‘experiences are clear and ivi, although some lew are vague amd funy In sucha situation, ic might be tat the cleat and vivid dreams {re qualitatively indistinguishable (fon the clear and vivid waking txperiences, (e, the antecedent of (AS) would be tr. Bu ie certainly ‘woul not follow thatthe cleat and vivid waking experiences pone 2 deamlke quality, nor thatthe phrase "a dresalike quality” Tneaningles. Hence (A)—the support for (AL) fale, sod Aosta Inasnot ceeded in undermining argument (D) Anthony Kenny attempts to show that premise () fale. According 0 8) ean know that Lam amake only {the qualitative character of ty experience guarantees tht this eo. In her words, can know that am not now dteaming only Hf there ix ame feature of 2) txperience Lom which I cam infer that Lamn awake. Ie is Kenny's view, fn the other hand hat Ian know that Iam awake without appealing to the characer of ay experience. In fet, on Kennys view T know that T am awake without appealing to any citerion at all With fespect to the question “Am I awaker” Kenny sayy "there it 2 Wu Ammer tothe ston namely, "Tam awake” Moreover, 1 know this psn. When Is ‘am avake/ T do so without grounds, but ‘ot without justiseation."« This jstieation isthe alleged fact that inorder to make a judgment or entertain + belie, oe must be awake Kenny agrees with Norman Mateolm that one cannot make judgment daring dreams Hence, any ume that I judge or believe that Tm ‘vate wll be ve that lam awake For, any te that I make any jinn whatuoever, it wll be rue that Iam awake. Kenny’ lait {The jadgment ‘Tam take’ cannot be mistaken... The question “Amn Fawkes pointes tothe extent tha if man isin 2 position o atk the question, hei aso in a poston to answer ie" This {rgumeat to show that one can know that he ix not dreaming can be summarize fallow —— AKT) TE judge that Tam awake, know that Tam awake (Cp tae Rae ai / (9) Todos now know ha Tamawate, | Ce LANOW AE 1 AMC NO amsaneNG? 20 Ie might be objected that people do inded make judgments during Seep, including some true onen For example, during 4 dream one sometimes makes a comect mathematical judgment. And, itis quite fommon for 4 sleeping person to make the judgment that he “reaming, So, itis noe abviour thatthe support which Kenny gives for (Et) is sustactory But suppose that we grant (KI) for We sake of Argument Tes neverteles deal to se what etblshes that (K2) {is rue. One might be incined to think that iis evident to me when Tam judging, But in thinking this over I smat remind spyslé that on many ocasions in sleep i has seemed to me tat Twas judging, That jit has semed evident cha 1 was judging when I was realy only reaming that 1 judged. Sf dhe face that T seem tO judge is not sulicient to show that I do judge. nor co exis that (K2) is crc. TE we gant tha judgments cannot occur in sleep, the queton for Kenny i How do you know that you are now judging that you are awake? Perhaps you are only dreaming spd so merely seems to You ‘a you are jg. (OF coure, many pilorophers—Dexartesincluded—have held that it it seems tome that I judg, then I do judge. To adhere o thi thesis consistently, however, one mas sho Hold tht in dream, when "sein to judge, I do judge Kenny clearly cannot enjoy the beets of this view, for according o (KI) judgments are not made during ‘zeams. Thus, for Kenny, nectar condition of making judgment ‘shat one be awake, and iis impouible to Know that one is judging Simply on the basi ofthe fact that i scems to one that he judging ‘Kenny’ clnim that (KI) re forces hi to justify his claim that (K3) ‘ales he were to maintain that in dreams we donot seem to judge only one reply i available to Kenny. This ie that one cam know that he judges: he need only judge that he judges. To this the Cartesian ‘question wil be: How does one know that he jugs that he judges? Perhaps he is only dreaming that he judges that he judges. Kenny, of ‘nurse can make his move again, as can Descartes, ad infinitum. But the regtes is dearly fatal to Keanys position, not Descartes. For Kenny has claimed to beable to disposé ofthe Cartesian question. In fact what he har done is ony to put back to another level At level the emerges, and, for this reaon, Kenny jistifably claim to have answered it Another intresting erigue of argument (D) is oflred by G. B. Moore in his paper “Certainty.” In trying to set out the reasoning n Moo Re, |