Republic of the Philippines Armed with the search warrants, the NBI accompanied by the petitioner's
SUPREME COURT agents, raided the video outlets and seized the items described therein. An
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. Nos. 76649-51 August 19, 1988
20TH CENTURY FOX FILM CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, EDUARDO M. BARRETO, RAUL SAGULLO and
FORTUNE LEDESMA, respondents.
Siguion Reyna, Montecillo & Ongsiako Law Office for petitioner.
B.C. Salazar & Associates for respondents.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
The petitioner questions the application of the constitutional provision against
illegal searches and seizures to raids conducted in connection with the
government's anti-film piracy campaign. The main issue hinges on whether
or not the judge properly lifted the search warrants he issued earlier upon the
application of the National Bureau of Investigation on the basis of the
complaint filed by the petitioner.
In a letter-complaint dated August 26, 1985, petitioner 20th Century Fox Film
Corporation through counsel sought the National Bureau of Investigation's
(NBI) assistance in the conduct of searches and seizures in connection with
the latter's anti-film piracy campaign. Specifically, the letter-complaint alleged
that certain videotape outlets all over Metro Manila are engaged in the
unauthorized sale and renting out of copyrighted films in videotape form
which constitute a flagrant violation of Presidential Decree No. 49 (otherwise
known as the Decree on the Protection of Intellectual Property).
Acting on the letter-complaint, the NBI conducted surveillance and
investigation of the outlets pinpointed by the petitioner and subsequently filed
three (3) applications for search warrants against the video outlets owned by
the private respondents. The applications were consolidated and heard by
the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 132.
On September 4, 1985, the lower court issued the desired search warrants.
inventory of the items seized was made and left with the private respondents.
Acting on a motion to lift search warrants and release seized properties filed
by the private respondents, the lower court issued an order dated October 8,
1985, lifting the three (3) search warrants issued earlier against the private
respondents by the court. The dispositive portion of the order reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby orders that Search
Warrants Nos. SW- 85-024; issued against Eduardo M.
Barreto of the Junction Video, etc., Paranaque, Metro
Manila; SW No. 85-025, issued against Raul M. Sagullo of
South Video Bug Center, Inc., etc., also of No. 5355 Pres.
Avenue BF Homes, Parañaque, Metro Manila; and SW No.
85-026, issued against Fortune A. Ledesma of Sonix Video
Services of San Antonio Plaza, Forbes Park, Makati, Metro
Manila, be lifted.
Consequently, the articles listed in the returns of the three
search warrants which could not be a basis of any criminal
prosecution, now in the possession of the National Bureau of
Investigation which under the law must be delivered to this
Court, but which the NBI failed to do, are hereby ordered to
be returned to their owners through their lawyer, Atty. Benito
Salazar or his agents or representatives, against proper
receipt, to be forwarded to this Court for record purposes, as
proof that said properties have been returned to the
possession of the rightful owners." (p. 34, Rollo)
The lower court denied a motion for reconsideration filed by the petitioner in
its order dated January 2, 1986.
The petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals to annul
the October 8, 1985 and January 2, 1986 orders of the lower court. The
petition was dismissed.
Hence, this petition.
The main issue hinges on the meaning of "probable cause" within the context
of the constitutional provision against illegal searches and seizures (Section
3, Article IV, 1973 Constitution, now, Section 2, Article Ill, 1987 Constitution.
The petitioner maintains that the lower court issued the questioned search
warrants after finding the existence of a probable cause justifying their
issuance. According to the petitioner, the lower court arrived at this
conclusion on the basis of the depositions of applicant NBI's two witnesses
which were taken through searching questions and answers by the lower
court.
Section 2, Article III of the present Constitution which substantially
reproduces Section 3, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution on illegal searches
and seizures provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be
inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall
issue except upon probable cause to be determined
personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched
and the persons or things to be seized.
This constitutional right protects a citizen against wanton and unreasonable
invasion of his privacy and liberty as to his person, papers and effects. We
have explained in the case of People v. Burgos (144 SCRA 1)
citing Villanueva v. Querubin (48 SCRA 345) why the right is so important:
It is deference to one's personality that lies at the core of this
right, but it could be also looked upon as a recognition of a
constitutionally protected area, primarily one's home, but not
necessarily thereto confined. (Cf. Hoffa v. United States, 385
US 293 119661) What is sought to be guarded is a man's
prerogative to choose who is allowed entry to his residence.
In that haven of refuge, his individuality can assert itself not
only in the choice of who shall be welcome but likewise in
the kind of objects he wants around him. There the state,
however powerful, does not as such have access except
under the circumstances above noted, for in the traditional
formulation, his house, however humble, is his castle. Thus
is outlawed any unwarranted intrusion by government, which
is called upon to refrain from any invasion of his dwelling and
to respect the privacies of his life. (Cf Schmerber v.
California, 384 US 757 [1966], Brennan, J. and Boyd v.
United States, 116 630 [1886]). In the same vein, Landynski
in his authoritative work (Search and Seizure and the
Supreme Court [1966]), could fitly characterize constitutional
right as the embodiment of a "spiritual concept: the belief
that to value the privacy of home and person and to afford its
constitutional protection against the long reach of
government is no less than to value human dignity, and that
his privacy must not be disturbed except in case of
overriding social need, and then only under stringent
procedural safeguards."(ibid, p. 74).
The government's right to issue search warrants against a citizen's papers
and effects is circumscribed by the requirements mandated in the searches
and seizures provision of the Constitution.
In the case of Burgos, Sr. v. Chief of Staff, AFP (133 SCRA 800), we defined
probable cause for a valid search "as such facts and circumstances which
would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense
has been committed and that the objects sought in connection with the
offense are in the place sought to be searched." This constitutional provision
also demands "no less than personal knowledge by the complainant or his
witnesses of the facts upon which the issuance of a search warrant may be
justified" in order to convince the judge, not the individual making the affidavit
and seeking the issuance of the warrant, of the existence of a probable
cause. (Alvarez v. Court of First Instance, 64 Phil. 33; Burgos, Sr. v. Chief of
Staff, AFP, supra).
In the instant case, the lower court lifted the three questioned search
warrants against the private respondents on the ground that it acted on the
application for the issuance of the said search warrants and granted it on the
misrepresentations of applicant NBI and its witnesses that infringement of
copyright or a piracy of a particular film have been committed. Thus the lower
court stated in its questioned order dated January 2,1986:
According to the movant, all three witnesses during the
proceedings in the application for the three search warrants
testified of their own personal knowledge. Yet, Atty. Albino
Reyes of the NBI stated that the counsel or representative of
the Twentieth Century Fox Corporation will testify on the
video cassettes that were pirated, so that he did not have
personal knowledge of the alleged piracy. The witness
Bacani also said that the video cassettes were pirated
without stating the manner it was pirated and that it was Atty.
Domingo that has knowledge of that fact.
On the part of Atty. Domingo, he said that the re-taping of
the allegedly pirated tapes was from master tapes allegedly
belonging to the Twentieth Century Fox, because, according
to him, it is of his personal knowledge.
At the hearing of the Motion for Reconsideration, Senior NBI
Agent Atty. Albino Reyes testified that when the complaint
for infringement was brought to the NBI, the master tapes of
the allegedly pirated tapes were shown to him and he made
comparisons of the tapes with those purchased by their man
Bacani. Why the master tapes or at least the film reels of the
allegedly pirated tapes were not shown to the Court during
the application gives some misgivings as to the truth of that
bare statement of the NBI agent on the witness stand. "
Again as the application and search proceedings is a prelude
to the filing of criminal cases under PD 49, the copyright
infringement law, and although what is required for the
issuance thereof is merely the presence of probable cause,
that probable cause must be satisfactory to the Court, for it is
a time- honored precept that proceedings to put a man to
task as an offender under our laws should be interpreted
in strictissimi juris against the government and liberally in
favor of the alleged offender.
xxx xxx xxx
This doctrine has never been overturned, and as a matter of
fact it had been enshrined in the Bill of Rights in our 1973
Constitution.
So that lacking in persuasive effect, the allegation that
master tapes were viewed by the NBI and were compared to
the purchased and seized video tapes from the respondents'
establishments, it should be dismissed as not supported by
competent evidence and for that matter the probable cause
hovers in that grey debatable twilight zone between black
and white resolvable in favor of respondents herein.
But the glaring fact is that 'Cocoon,' the first video tape
mentioned in the search warrant, was not even duly
registered or copyrighted in the Philippines. (Annex C of
Opposition p. 152 record). So, that lacking in the requisite
presentation to the Court of an alleged master tape for
purposes of comparison with the purchased evidence of the
video tapes allegedly pirated and those seized from
respondents, there was no way to determine whether there
really was piracy, or copying of the film of the complainant
Twentieth Century Fox." (pp. 37-39, Rollo)
xxx xxx xxx
The lower court, therefore, lifted the three (3) questioned search warrants in
the absence of probable cause that the private respondents violated P.D. 49.
As found out by the court, the NBI agents who acted as witnesses did not
have personal knowledge of the subject matter of their testimony which was
the alleged commission of the offense by the private respondents. Only the
petitioner's counsel who was also a witness during the application for the
issuance of the search warrants stated that he had personal knowledge that
the confiscated tapes owned by the private respondents were pirated tapes
taken from master tapes belonging to the petitioner. However, the lower court
did not give much credence to his testimony in view of the fact that the
master tapes of the allegedly pirated tapes were not shown to the court
during the application.
All these factors were taken into consideration by the lower court when it
lifted the three questioned search warrants. There is no truth, therefore, to
the petitioner's allegation that the lower court based its January 2, 1986 order
only "on the fact that the original or master copies of the copyrighted films
were not presented during the application for search warrants, thus leading it
to conclude that it had been "misled by the applicant and his witnesses." (p.
17, Rollo)
The presentation of the master tapes of the copyrighted films from which the
pirated films were allegedly copied, was necessary for the validity of search
warrants against those who have in their possession the pirated films. The
petitioner's argument to the effect that the presentation of the master tapes at
the time of application may not be necessary as these would be merely
evidentiary in nature and not determinative of whether or not a probable
cause exists to justify the issuance of the search warrants is not meritorious.
The court cannot presume that duplicate or copied tapes were necessarily
reproduced from master tapes that it owns.
The application for search warrants was directed against video tape outlets
which allegedly were engaged in the unauthorized sale and renting out of
copyrighted films belonging to the petitioner pursuant to P.D. 49.
The essence of a copyright infringement is the similarity or at least
substantial similarity of the purported pirated works to the copyrighted work.
Hence, the applicant must present to the court the copyrighted films to
compare them with the purchased evidence of the video tapes allegedly
pirated to determine whether the latter is an unauthorized reproduction of the
former. This linkage of the copyrighted films to the pirated films must be
established to satisfy the requirements of probable cause. Mere allegations
as to the existence of the copyrighted films cannot serve as basis for the
issuance of a search warrant.
Furthermore, we note that the search warrants described the articles sought
to be seized as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
xxx xxx xxx
c) Television sets, Video Cassettes
Recorders, rewinders, tape head cleaners,
accessories, equipments and other
machines used or intended to be used in the
unlawful reproduction, sale, rental/lease
distribution of the above-mentioned video
tapes which she is keeping and concealing
in the premises above-described." (p. 26,
Rollo)
In the case of Burgos v. Chief of Staff, AFP supra, we stated:
xxx xxx xxx
Another factor which makes the search warrants under
consideration constitutionally objectionable is that they are in
the nature of general warrants. The search warrants
describe the articles sought to be seized in this wise:
l] All printing equipment, paraphernalia, paper, ink, photo
equipment, typewriters, cabinets, tables
communications/recording equipment, tape recorders,
dictaphone and the like used and/or connected in the printing
of the 'WE FORUM' newspaper and any and all
document/communications, letters and facsimile of prints
related to "WE FORUM" newspaper.
2] Subversive documents, pamphlets, leaflets, books, and
other publications to promote the objectives and purposes of
the subversive organizations known as Movement for Free
Philippines, Light-a-Fire Movement and April 6 Movement;
and
3] Motor vehicles used in the distribution/circulation of the
'WE FORUM and other subversive materials and
propaganda, more particularly,
1] Toyota-Corolla, colored yellow with Plate
No. NKA 892;
2] DATSUN pick-up colored white with Plate
No. NKV 969;
3] A delivery truck with Plate No. NBS 542;
4] TOYOTA-TAMARAW, colored white with
Plate No. PBP 665;and,
5] TOYOTA Hi-Lux, pick-up truck with Plate
No. NGV 472 with marking "Bagong Silang."
In Stanford v. State of Texas (379 U.S. 476,13 L ed 2nd
431), the search warrant which authorized the search for
'books, records, pamphlets, cards, receipts, lists,
memoranda, pictures, recordings and other written
instruments concerning the Communist Parties of Texas,
and the operations of the Community Party in Texas," was
declared void by the U.S. Supreme Court for being too
general. In like manner, directions to "seize any evidence in
connection with the violation of SDC 13-3703 or otherwise'
have been held too general, and that portion of a search
warrant which authorized the seizure of any "paraphernalia
which could be used to violate Sec. 54-197 of the
Connecticut General Statutes [the statute dealing with the
crime of conspiracy]"' was held to be a general warrant, and
therefore invalid (68 Am. Jur. 2d., pp. 736-737). The
description of the articles sought to be seized under the
search warrants in question cannot be characterized
differently. (at pp. 814-815)
Undoubtedly, a similar conclusion can be deduced from the description of the
articles sought to be confiscated under the questioned search warrants.
Television sets, video cassette recorders, reminders and tape cleaners are
articles which can be found in a video tape store engaged in the legitimate
business of lending or renting out betamax tapes. In short, these articles and
appliances are generally connected with, or related to a legitimate business
not necessarily involving piracy of intellectual property or infringement of
copyright laws. Hence, including these articles without specification and/or
particularity that they were really instruments in violating an Anti-Piracy law
makes The search warrant too general which could result in the confiscation
of all items found in any video store. In fact, this actually happened in the
instant case. Thus, the lower court, in its questioned order dated October 8,
1985 said:
Although the applications and warrants themselves covered
certain articles of property usually found in a video store, the
Court believes that the search party should have confined
themselves to articles that are according to them, evidence
constitutive of infringement of copyright laws or the piracy of
intellectual property, but not to other articles that are usually
connected with, or related to, a legitimate business, not
involving piracy of intellectual property, or infringement of
copyright laws. So that a television set, a rewinder, and a
whiteboard listing Betamax tapes, video cassette cleaners
video cassette recorders as reflected in the Returns of
Search Warrants, are items of legitimate business engaged
in the video tape industry, and which could not be the subject
of seizure, The applicant and his agents therefore exceeded
their authority in seizing perfectly legitimate personal
property usually found in a video cassette store or business
establishment." (p. 33, Rollo)
All in all, we find no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the lower court
when it lifted the search warrants it earlier issued against the private
respondents. We agree with the appellate court's findings to the effect that:
An assiduous examination of the assailed orders reveal that
the main ground upon which the respondent Court anchored
said orders was its subsequent findings that it was misled by
the applicant (NBI) and its witnesses 'that infringement of
copyright or a piracy of a particular film have been committed
when it issued the questioned warrants.' Stated differently,
the respondent Court merely corrected its erroneous findings
as to the existence of probable cause and declared the
search and seizure to be unreasonable. Certainly, such
action is within the power and authority of the respondent
Court to perform, provided that it is not exercised in an
oppressive or arbitrary manner. Indeed, the order of the
respondent Court declaring the existence of probable cause
is not final and does not constitute res judicata.
A careful review of the record of the case shows that the
respondent Court did not commit a grave abuse of discretion
when it issued the questioned orders. Grave abuse of
discretion' implies such capricious and whimsical exercise of
judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, or, in other
words, where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or
despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility,
and it must be so patent and gross as to amount to an
evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the
duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law.' But far
from being despotic or arbitrary, the assailed orders were
motivated by a noble desire of rectifying an error, much so
when the erroneous findings collided with the constitutional
rights of the private respondents. In fact, the petitioner did
not even contest the righteousness and legality of the
questioned orders but instead concentrated on the alleged
denial of due process of law." (pp. 44-45, Rollo)
The proliferation of pirated tapes of films not only deprives the government of
much needed revenues but is also an indication of the widespread
breakdown of national order and discipline. Courts should not impose any
unnecessary roadblocks in the way of the anti-film piracy campaign.
However, the campaign cannot ignore or violate constitutional safeguards.
To say that the problem of pirated films can be solved only by the use of
unconstitutional shortcuts is to denigrate the long history and experience
behind the searches and seizures clause of the Bill of Rights. The trial court
did not commit reversible error.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED. The questioned decision
and resolution of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J., Feliciano, Bidin and Cortes, JJ., concur
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 76193 November 9, 1989
UNITED FEATURE SYNDICATE, INC., petitioner,
vs.
MUNSINGWEAR CREATION MANUFACTURING COMPANY, respondent.
Quasha, Asperilla, Ancheta, Pena and Nolasco for petitioner.
Jaime G. Manzano for private respondent.
PARAS, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari filed by United Feature Syndicate
Inc., seeking to set aside the Resolution of the Seventh Division of the Court
of Appeals * dated September 16, 1986 dismissing the appeal of petitioner-
appellant for having been filed out of time and denying its Motion for
Reconsideration for lack of merit in its Resolution dated October 14, 1986.
The Resolution dismissing the appeal, reads as follows:
We agree with the Philippine Patent Office and respondent
appellee that the decision of the aforementioned office dated
October 2, 1984 had already become final and executory at
the time the Notice of Appeal was filed.
Our reasons for this conclusions are borne out by the
following facts:
a) On October 2, 1984, the decision sought
to be appealed was rendered by the
Philippine Patent Office and a copy thereof
was received by counsel for petitioner-
appellant on October 3, 1984 — not October
9, 1984 as stated in the Notice of Appeal.
There can be no doubt about the decision
having been received by petitioner-
appellant's counsel on October 3, 1984 for
this is clearly written in the Notice of
Decision (p. 61, Original Record), and in
point of fact the date of receipt cannot be
October 9, 1984, as declared in the Notice
of Appeal (p. 1, Rollo), because in the
motion for reconsideration subsequently
filed by petitioner-appellant it was stated that
a copy of the decision was received
on October 4, 1984 (p. 80, Original Record).
b) On October 18, 1984 — as shown in the
stamp mark of the Philippine Patent Office
(p. 80, Original Record) or on the 15th and
last day either for appealing or for moving
for reconsideration, petitioner-appellant filed
a motion for reconsideration.
Sadly and unexplainably for a veteran law office, said motion
did not contain or incorporate a notice of hearing.
c) Possibly realizing the fatal defect in its
motion for reconsideration, petitioner-
appellant subsequently filed a motion to set
for hearing its motion for reconsideration.
This was done, however, only on October
31, 1984 (p. 162, Original Record).
The motion for reconsideration filed on the last day, fatally
failing as it did to contain a notice of hearing, said pleading
did not interrupt the period for appealing, for the motion was
nothing but a piece of scrap paper (Agricultural and Industrial
Marketing, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 118 SCRA [1982]
492; Republic Planters Bank v. Intermediate Appellate Court,
13 SCRA [1984] 631).
This deadly and moral deficiency in the motion for
reconsideration, therefore, resulted in the decision of the
Philippine Patent Office being final and executory on October
19, 1984, the day after the motion for reconsideration was
filed, said motion having been filed on the 15th and last day
for appealing.
WHEREFORE, the motion of respondent appellee is hereby
granted and the appeal dismissed.
 SO ORDERED. (Rollo 42-43) I

This case arose from petition filed by petitioner for the cancellation of the WHETHER THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS
registration of trademark CHARLIE BROWN (Registration No. SR. 4224) in ACTED IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION AND/OR
the name of respondent MUNSINGWEAR in Inter Partes Case No. 1350 COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN IT
entitled "United Feature Syndicate, Inc. v. Munsingwear Creation Mfg. Co.", BASED ITS RESOLUTION IN DISMISSING ITS APPEAL
with the Philippine Patent Office alleging that petitioner is damaged by the ON STRICT TECHNICAL RULES OF PROCEDURE AS
registration of the trademark CHARLIE BROWN of T-Shirts under Class 25 ENUNCIATED IN RULE 15 OF THE RULES OF COURT
with the Registration No. SR-4224 dated September 12, 1979 in the name of INSTEAD OF RELYING ON THE POLICY OF THE
Munsingwear Creation Manufacturing Co., Inc., on the following grounds: (1) PHILIPPINE PATENT OFFICE AS STRESSED IN RULE
that respondent was not entitled to the registration of the mark CHARLIE 169, AS AMENDED, OF THE RULES OF PRACTICE IN
BROWN, & DEVICE at the time of application for registration; (2) that TRADEMARK CASES.
CHARLIE BROWN is a character creation or a pictorial illustration, the
copyright to which is exclusively owned worldwide by the petitioner; (3) that II
as the owner of the pictorial illustration CHARLIE BROWN, petitioner has
since 1950 and continuously up to the present, used and reproduced the
WHETHER THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS
same to the exclusion of others; (4) that the respondent-registrant has no
COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
bona fide use of the trademark in commerce in the Philippines prior to its
AMOUNTING TO EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN BY
application for registration. (Petition, p. 2, Rollo, p. 8) DISMISSING THE APPEAL TO IT FROM THE DECISION
OF THE DIRECTOR OF PATENTS, IT KNOWINGLY
On October 2, 1984 the Director of the Philippine Patent Office rendered a DISREGARDED ITS OWN DECISION IN AC-GR. SP. NO.
decision in this case holding that a copyright registration like that of the name 0342, WHICH WAS AFFIRMED BY THIS HONORABLE
and likeness of CHARLIE BROWN may not provide a cause of action for the SUPREME COURT TO THE EFFECT THAT A
cancellation of a trademark registration, (Petition, p. 4; Rollo, p. 10 ) COPYRIGHTED CHARACTER MAY NOT BE
APPROPRIATED AS A TRADEMARK BY ANOTHER
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision rendered by the UNDER PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 49.
Philippine Patent Office which was denied by the Director of said office on
the ground that the Decision No. 84-83 was already final and executory III
(Petition, Rollo, pp. 11-12).
WHETHER, ASSUMING ARGUENDO, BUT ONLY
From this decision, petitioner-appellant appealed to the Court of Appeals and ASSUMING, THAT THE DECISION OF THE DIRECTOR OF
respondent court in its resolution dated September 16, 1986 denied the PATENTS IN THE CASE AT BAR HAD ALREADY BECOME
appeal. While the Motion for Reconsideration was filed on time, that is, on FINAL WHEN IT WAS APPEALED TO THE COURT OF
the last day within which to appeal, still it is a mere scrap of paper because APPEALS, THE LATTER, BY REASON OF THE
there was no, date, of hearing stated therein. SUPERVENING FACTS AFTER THE DECISION
APPEALED FROM WAS RENDERED, SHOULD HAVE
Subsequently, petitioner-appellant filed a motion for reconsideration which HARMONIZED THE DECISION WITH LAW, THE
public respondent denied for lack of merit( Annex "B", Rollo p. 45).. DEMANDS OF JUSTICE AND EQUITY.

Hence this petition for review on certiorari. The petitioner is impressed with merit.

In the resolution of April 6, 1987, the petition was given due course. Petitioner's contention that the purpose of a notice of hearing to the adverse
party is to afford him an opportunity to resist the motion, more particularly the
In its petition (Rollo, p. 10) and in its memorandum (Rollo, p. 97), petitioner- motion for reconsideration filed by its company is well taken. Said purpose
appellant raised the following legal issues: was served when Munsingwear filed its opposition thereto on November 20,
1984 and cured the technical defect of lack of notice of hearing complained
of (Rollo, p. 52). Otherwise stated such shortcomings of petitioner as to
compliance with procedural requirements in taking its appeal cannot be
deemed sufficient to deprive it of a chance to secure a review by this court in
order to obtain substantial justice; more so where liverality accorded to the
petitioner becomes compelling because of the ostensible merit of petitioner's
case (Olango v. Court of First Instance of Misamis Oriental, 121 SCRA 338
[1983]).
Moreover, in Siguenza v. Court of Appeals, (137 SCRA 570 [1985]) the Court
stressed that the right to appeal should not be lightly disregarded by a
stringent application of rules of procedure especially where the appeal is on
its face meritorious and the interest of substantial justice would be served by
permitting the appeal.
As enunciated in the case of Castro v. Court of Appeals (123 SCRA 782,
[1983]) the importance and real purpose of the remedy of appeal was
stressed as follows:
An appeal is an essential part of oar judicial system. We
have advised the courts to proceed with caution so as not to
deprive a party of the right to appeal. (National Waterworks
and Sewerage Authority v. Municipality of Libmanan, 97
SCRA 138) and instructed that every party-litigant should
beafforded the amplest opportunity for the proper and just
disposition of his cause, freed from the constraints of
technicalities. (A-One Feeds, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 100
SCRA 590).
The rules of procedure are not to be applied in a very rigid
and technical sense. The rules of procedure are used only to
help secure not override substantial justice. (Gregorio v.
Court of Appeals, 72 SCRA 120), therefore, we ruled in
Republic v. Court of Appeals (83 SCRA 453) that a six day
delay in the perfection of the appeal does not warrant its
dismissal. And again in Ramos v. Bagaso, 96 SCRA 395,
this Court held that the delay of four (4) days in filing a notice
of appeal and a motion for extension of time to file a record
on appeal can be excused on the basis of equity.
It was further emphasized that we allowed the filing of an appeal in some
cases where a stringent application of the rules would have denied it, or
when to do so would serve the demands of substantial justice and in the
exercise of our equity jurisdiction (Serrano v. Court of Appeals, 139 SCRA
179 [1085].)
In the case at bar, the petitioner's delay in filing their record on appeal should
not be strictly construed as to deprive them of the right to appeal especially
since on its face the appeal appears to be impressed with merit. (Emphasis
supplied). All aforementioned cases are cited in G.R. No. 76595, Pacific Asia
Overseas Shipping Corporation v. NLRC, et al., May 6, 1988.
Procedural technicality should not prevail over substantive rights of a party to
appeal (NEA v. CA, 126 SCRA 394).
Moreover, a judgment of the Court of Appeals that become final by reason of
the mistake of the herein petitioner's lawyer may still be reviewed on appeal
by the Supreme Court particularly where the Supreme Court already gave
due course to the petition for review (Ernesto v. Court of Appeals, 116 SCRA
755 [1982]).
Where strong considerations of substantial justice are manifest in the
petition, this Court may relax the stringent application of technical rules in the
exercise of equity jurisdiction. In addition to the basic merits of the main
case, such petition usually embodies justifying circumstances which warrant
our heeding the petitioner's cry for justice, inspite of the earlier negligence of
counsel (Serrano v. Court of Appeals et al., 139 SCRA 179 [1985]).
In a number of cases, this Court in the exercise of equity jurisdiction decided
to disregard technicalities in order to resolve the case on its merits based on
the evidence (St. Peter Memorial Park, Inc. et al. v. Cleofas, 121 SCRA 287,
[1983]; Helmuth, Jr. v. People of the Philippines, 112 SCRA 573 [1983]).
This case was brought before this Court for the resolution of the dismissal of
the appeal filed by petitioner-appellant from the decision of the Director of the
Philippines Patent Office for being filed out of time. The normal action to take
thereafter, would be to remand this case to the Court of Appeals for further
proceedings. However, in line with jurisprudence, such time consuming
procedure may be properly dispensed with to resolve the issue (Quisumbing
v. Court of Appeals, 122 SCRA 709 [1983]) where there is enough basis to
end the basic controversy between the parties here and now. In the case at
bar dispensing with such procedural steps would not anyway affect
substantially the merits of their respective claims as held in Velasco v. Court
of Appeals, (95 SCRA 621 [1980] cited in Ortigas & Co. Ltd. v. Ruiz, 148
SCRA [1987] hence the need for this Court to broaden its inquiry in this case
land decide the same on the merits rather than merely resolve the procedural
question raised (Dorado v. Court of Appeals, 153 SCRA 420 [1987]; De Lima
v. Laguna Tayabas Co., 160 SCRA 70 [1988]).
Petitioner contends that it will be damaged by the registration of the
trademark CHARLIE BROWN & DEVICE in favor of private respondent and
that it has a better right to CHARLIE BROWN & DEVICE since the likeness
of CHARLIE BROWN appeared in periodicals having worldwide distribution
and covered by copyright registration in its name which antedates the
certificate of registration of respondent issued only on September 12, 1979.
(Petition, Rollo, p. 21).
Petitioner further stresses that Decision No. 84-83 (TM) promulgated by the
Philippine Patent Office on October 2, 1984 which held that "the name
likeness of CHARLIE BROWN may not provide a cause of action for the
cancellation of a trademark registration," was based in the conclusion made
in the case of "Children's Television Workshop v. touch of Class" earlier
decided by the Director of Patent Office on May 10, 1984. However, when
the latter case was appealed to the then Intermediate Appellate Court,
docketed as A.C. G.R. SP No. 03432, the appellate court reversed the
decision of the Director holding said appealed decision as illegal and contrary
to law. this reversal was affirmed by this Court on August 7, 1985 in G.R. No.
71210 by denying the petition of respondent Touch of Class.
The Court of Appeals in reversing the Director of Patent's decision in Touch
of Class, Inc. succintly said:
The Patents Office ruled that a trademark, unlike a label,
cannot be copyrighted. The "Cookie Monster" is not,
however, a trademark. It is a character in a TV series entitled
"Sesame Street." It was respondent which appropriated the
"Cookie Monster" as a trademark, after it has been
copyrighted. We hold that the exclusive right secured by PD
49 to the petitioner precludes the appropriation of the
"Cookie Monster" by the respondent.
Pertinently, Section 2 of Presidential Decree No. 49, otherwise known as the
"Decree on Intellectual Property", provides:
Section 2. The rights granted by this Decree shall, from the
moment of creation, subsist with respect to any of the
following classes of works:
xxx xxx xxx
(O) Prints, pictorial illustrations, advertising copies, labels,
tags and box wraps. ...
Therefore, since the name "CHARLIE BROWN" and its pictorial
representation were covered by a copyright registration way back in 1950 the
same are entitled to protection under PD No. 49.
Aside from its copyright registration, petitioner is also the owner of several
trademark registrations and application for the name and likeness of
"CHARLIE BROWN" which is the duly registered trademark and copyright of
petitioner United Feature Syndicate Inc. as early as 1957 and additionally
also as TV SPECIALS featuring the "PEANUTS" characters "CHARLIE
BROWN" (Memorandum, Rollo p. 97 [211]).
An examination of the records show that the only appreciable defense of
respondent-registrant is embodied in its answer, which reads:
It uses, the trademark "CHARLIE BROWN" & "DEVICE" on
children's wear such as T-shirts, undershirts, sweaters, brief
and sandos, in class 25; whereas "CHARLIE BROWN" is
used only by petitioner as character, in a pictorial illustration
used in a comic strip appearing in newspapers and
magazines. It has no trademark significance and therefore
respondent-registrant's use of "CHARLIE BROWN" &
"DEVICE" is not in conflict with the petitioner's use of
"CHARLIE BROWN" (Rollo, p. 97 [21]).
It is undeniable from the records that petitioner is the actual owner of said
trademark due to its prior registration with the Patent's Office.
Finally, in La Chemise Lacoste S.A. v. Hon. Oscar Fernandez &
Gobindram Hemandas Sujanani v. Hon. Roberto V. Ongpin, et al. 129 SCRA
373 [1984]), the Court declared.
In upholding the right of the petitioner to maintain the present
suit before our courts for unfair competition or infringement
of trademarks of a foreign corporation, we are moreover
recognizing our duties and the rights of foregoing states
under the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial
Property to which the Philippines and (France) U.S. are
parties. We are simply interpreting a solemn international
commitment of the Philippines embodied in a multilateral
treaty to which we are a party and which we entered into
because it is in our national interest to do so.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Resolutions of the Court of Appeals dated
September 16, 1985 and October 14, 1986 dismissing petitioner's appeal are
hereby SET ASIDE and Certificate of Registration no. SR-424 issued to
private respondent dated September 12, 1979 is hereby CANCELLED.
SO ORDERED.