G.R. No. 109404. January 22, 1996.
* the complaint where the supporting documents submitted substantiating the claim of non-
FLORENCIO EUGENIO, doing business under the name E & S Delta Village,
petitioner, vs. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY FRANKLIN M. DRILON, HOUSING AND LAND USE
REGULATORY BOARD (HLURB) AND PROSPERO PALMIANO, respondents.
Actions; Appeals; Jurisdiction; Administrative Law; Pleadings and Practice; Under
Revised Administrative Circular No. 1-95, appeals from judgments or final orders of the Office
of the President may be taken to the Court of Appeals.—Under Revised Administrative Circular
No. 1-95, “appeals from judgments or final orders of the x x x Office of the President x x x may
be taken to the Court of Appeals x x x.” However, in order to hasten the resolution of this case,
which was deemed submitted for decision one and a half years ago, the Court resolved to make
an exception to the said Circular in the interest of speedy justice.
Statutes; P.D. 957; Subdivisions; Contracts; Statutory Construction; P.D. 957 is to be
given retroactive effect so as to cover even those contracts executed prior to its enactment in
1976.—In his Petition before this Court, petitioner avers that the Executive Secretary erred in
applying P.D. 957 and in concluding that the nondevelopment of the E & S Delta Village justified
private respondent’s non-payment of his amortizations. Petitioner avers that inasmuch as the
land purchase agreements were entered into in 1972, prior to the effectivity of P.D. 957 in
1976, said law cannot govern the transaction. We hold otherwise, and herewith rule that
respondent Executive Secretary did not abuse his discretion, and that P.D. 957 is to be given
retroactive effect so as to cover even those contracts executed prior to its enactment in 1976.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The intent of the law, as culled from its preamble and
from the situation, circumstances and conditions it sought to remedy, must be enforced.—P.D.
957 did not expressly provide for retroactivity in its entirety, but such can be plainly inferred
from the unmistakable intent of the law. The intent of the law, as culled from its preamble and
from the situation, circumstances and conditions it sought to remedy, must be enforced.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Social Justice; P.D. 957 was enacted with no other end
in view than to provide a protective mantle over helpless citizens who may fall prey to the
manipulations and machinations of unscrupulous subdivision and condominium sellers.—It
goes without saying that, as an instrument of social justice, the law must favor the weak and
the disadvantaged, including, in this instance, small lot buyers and aspiring homeowners. P.D.
957 was enacted with no other end in view than to provide a protective mantle over helpless
citizens who may fall prey to the manipulations and machinations of ‘unscrupulous subdivision
and condominium sellers,’ and such intent is nowhere expressed more clearly than in its
preamble.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Section 23 of P.D. 957 correctly invoked to justify non-
payment of amortizations for failure of the subdivision owner to develop the subdivision project
according to the approved plans and within the time limit for complying with the same.—
Moreover, as P.D. 957 is undeniably applicable to the contracts in question, it follows that
Section 23 thereof had been properly invoked by private respondent when he desisted from
making further payment to petitioner due to petitioner’s failure to develop the subdivision
project according to the approved plans and within the time limit for complying with the same.
(Such incomplete development of the subdivision and non-performance of specific contractual
and statutory obligations on the part of the subdivision-owner had been established in the
findings of the HLURB which in turn were confirmed by the respondent Executive Secretary in
his assailed Decision.)
Pleadings and Practice; The Executive Secretary did not exceed his jurisdiction in ordering
the refund of private respondent’s payments on Lot 12 although only Lot 13 was the subject of
development justified such order inasmuch as such claim was also the basis for non-payment
of amortizations on Lot 12.—Likewise, there is no merit in petitioner’s contention that
respondent Secretary exceeded his jurisdiction in ordering the refund of private respondent’s
payments on Lot 12 although (according to petitioner) only Lot 13 was the subject of the
complaint. Respondent Secretary duly noted that the supporting documents submitted
substantiating the claim of non-development justified such order inasmuch as such claim was
also the basis for non-payment of amortizations on said Lot 12.
Administrative Law; Decisions, resolutions and orders of the Office of the President shall,
except as otherwise provided for by special laws, become final after the lapse of fifteen (15)
days from receipt of a copy thereof, unless a motion for reconsideration thereof is filed within
such period.—Finally, since petitioner’s motion for reconsideration of the (Executive
Secretary’s) Decision dated March 10, 1992 was filed only on the 21st day from receipt thereof,
said decision had become final and executory, pursuant to Section 7 of Administrative Order
No. 18 dated February 12, 1987, which provides that “(d)ecisions/resolutions/orders of the
Office of the President shall, except as otherwise provided for by special laws, become final
after the lapse of fifteen (15) days from receipt of a copy thereof x x x, unless a motion for
reconsideration thereof is filed within such period.”
PETITION for review of a decision of the Executive Secretary.
The facts are stated in the resolution of the Court.
Edwin Y. Chua for petitioner.
RESOLUTION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Did the failure to develop a subdivision constitute legal justification for the non-payment of
amortizations by a buyer on installment under land purchase agreements entered into prior
to the enactment of P.D. 957, “The Subdivision and Condominium Buyers’ Protective Decree”?
This is the major question raised in the instant Petition seeking to set aside the Decision of the
respondent Executive Secretary dated March 10, 1992 in O.P. Case No. 3761, which affirmed
the order of the respondent HLURB dated September 1, 1987.
On May 10, 1972, private respondent purchased on installment basis from petitioner and
his co-owner/developer Fermin Salazar, two lots in the E & S Delta Village in Quezon City.
Acting on complaints for non-development docketed as NHA Cases Nos. 2619 and 2620
filed by the Delta Village Homeowners’ Association, Inc., the National Housing Authority
rendered a resolution on January 17, 1979 inter aliaordering petitioner to cease and desist
from making further sales of lots in said village or in any project owned by him.
While NHA Cases Nos. 2619 and 2620 were still pending, private respondent filed with the
Office of Appeals, Adjudication and Legal Affairs (OAALA) of the Human Settlements
Regulatory Commission (HSRC), a complaint (Case No. 80-589) against petitioner and spouses
Rodolfo and Adelina Relevo alleging that, in view of the above NHA resolution, he suspended
payment of his amortizations, but that petitioner resold one of the two lots to the said spouses
Relevo, in whose favor title to the said property was registered. Private respondent further
alleged that he suspended his payments because of petitioner’s failure to develop the village.
Private respondent prayed for the annulment of the sale to the Relevo spouses and for
reconveyance of the lot to him.
 On October 11, 1983, the OAALA rendered a decision upholding the right of petitioner to
cancel the contract with private respondent and dismissed private respondent’s complaint.
On appeal, the Commission Proper of the HSRC reversed the OAALA and, applying P.D.
957, ordered petitioner to complete the subdivision development and to reinstate private
respondent’s purchase contract over one lot, and as to the other, “it appearing that Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 269546 has been issued to x x x spouses Rodolfo and Ad(e)lina Relevo x
x x, the management of E & S Delta Village is hereby ordered to immediately refund to the
complainant-appellant (herein private respondent) all payments made thereon, plus interests
computed at legal rates from date of receipt hereof until fully paid.”
The respondent Executive Secretary, on appeal, affirmed the decision of the HSRC and
denied the subsequent Motion for Reconsideration for lack of merit and for having been filed
out of time. Petitioner has now filed this Petition for review before the Supreme Court.
Under Revised Administrative Circular No. 1-95, “appeals from judgments or final orders
of the x x x Office of the President x x x may be taken to the Court of Appeals x x x.” However,
in order to hasten the resolution of this case, which was deemed submitted for decision one
and a half years ago, the Court resolved to make an exception to the said Circular in the interest
of speedy justice.
In his Petition before this Court, petitioner avers that the Executive Secretary erred in
applying P.D. 957 and in concluding that the non-development of the E & S Delta Village
justified private respondent’s non-payment of his amortizations. Petitioner avers that
inasmuch as the land purchase agreements were entered into in 1972, prior to the effectivity
of P.D. 957 in 1976, said law cannot govern the transaction.
We hold otherwise, and herewith rule that respondent Executive Secretary did not abuse
his discretion, and that P.D. 957 is to be given retroactive effect so as to cover even those
contracts executed prior to its enactment in 1976.
P.D. 957 did not expressly provide for retroactivity in its entirety, but such can be plainly
inferred from the unmistakable intent of the law.
The intent of the law, as culled from its preamble and from the situation, circumstances
and conditions it sought to remedy, must be enforced. On this point, a leading authority on
statutory construction stressed:
‘The intent of a statute is the law. x x x. The intent is the vital part, the essence of the law, and
the primary rule of construction is to ascertain and give effect to the intent. The intention of
the legislature in enacting a law is the law itself, and must be enforced when ascertained,
although it may not be consistent with the strict letter of the statute. Courts will not follow the
letter of a statute when it leads away from the true intent and purpose of the legislature and
to conclusions inconsistent with the general purpose of the act. x x x. In construing statutes the
proper course is to start out and follow the true intent of the legislature and to adopt that
sense which harmonizes best with the context and promotes in the fullest manner the
apparent policy and objects of the legislature.’1 (italics supplied.)
It goes without saying that, as an instrument of social justice, the law must favor the weak and
the disadvantaged, including, in this instance, small lot buyers and aspiring homeowners. P.D.
957 was enacted with no other end in view than to provide a protective mantle over helpless
citizens who may fall prey to the manipulations and machinations of ‘unscrupulous subdivision
and condominium sellers,’ and such intent is nowhere expressed more clearly than in its
preamble, pertinent portions of which read as follows:
“WHEREAS, it is the policy of the State to afford its inhabitants the requirements of decent
human settlement and to provide them with ample opportunities for improving their quality
of life;
“WHEREAS, numerous reports reveal that many real estate subdivision owners,
developers, operators, and/or sellers have reneged on their representations and obligations to
provide and maintain properly subdivision roads, drainage, sewerage, water systems, lighting
systems, and other similar basic requirements, thus endangering the health and safety of home
and lot buyers;
“WHEREAS, reports of alarming magnitude also show cases of swindling and fraudulent
manipulations perpetrated by unscrupulous subdivision and condominium sellers and
operators, such as failure to deliver titles to the buyers or titles free from liens and
encumbrances, and to pay real estate taxes, and fraudulent sales of the same subdivision lots
to different innocent purchasers for value”2; (italics supplied.)
From a dedicated reading of the preamble, it is manifest and unarguable that the legislative
intent must have been to remedy the alarming situation by having P.D. 957 operate
retrospectively even upon contracts already in existence at the time of its enactment. Indeed,
a strictly prospective application of the statute will effectively emasculate it, for then the State
will not be able to exercise its regulatory functions and curb fraudulent schemes and practices
perpetrated under or in connection with those contracts and transactions which happen to
have been entered into prior to P.D. 957, despite obvious prejudice to the very subdivision lot
buyers sought to be protected by said law. It is hardly conceivable that the legislative authority
intended to permit such a loophole to remain and continue to be a source of misery for
subdivision lot buyers well into the future.
Adding force to the arguments for the retroactivity of P.D. 957 as a whole are certain of its
provisions, viz., Sections 20, 21 and 23 thereof, which by their very terms have retroactive
effect and will impact upon even those contracts and transactions entered into prior to P.D.
957’s enactment:
“SEC. 20. Time of Completion.—Every owner or developer shall construct and provide the
facilities, improvements, infrastructures and other forms of development, including water
supply and lighting facilities, which are offered and indicated in the approved subdivision or
condominium plans, brochures, prospectus, printed matters, letters or in any form of
advertisement, within one year from the date of the issuance of the license for the subdivision
or condominium project or such other period of time as may be fixed by the Authority.
“SEC. 21. Sales Prior to Decree.—In cases of subdivision lots or condominium units sold or
disposed of prior to the effectivity of this Decree, it shall be incumbent upon the owner or
developer of the subdivision or condominium project to complete compliance with his or its
obligations as provided in the preceding section within two years from the date of this
Decree unless otherwise extended by the
Authority or unless an adequate performance bond is filed in accordance with Section 6
hereof.
“Failure of the owner or developer to comply with the obligations under this and the
preceding provisions shall constitute a violation punishable under Sections 38 and 39 of this
Decree.
“SEC. 23. Non-Forfeiture of Payments.—No installment payment made by a buyer in a
subdivision or condominium project for the lot or unit he contracted to buy shall be forfeited
in favor of the owner or developer when the buyer, after due notice to the owner or developer,
desists from further payment due to the failure of the owner or developer to develop the
subdivision or condominium project according to the approved plans and within the time limit
for complying with the same. Such buyer may, at his option, be reimbursed the total amount
paid including amortization interests but excluding delinquency interests, with interest
thereon at the legal rate.” (italics supplied)
On the other hand, as argued by the respondent Executive Secretary, the application of P.D.
957 to the contracts in question will be consistent with paragraph 4 of the contracts
themselves, which expressly provides:
“(4) The party of the First Part hereby binds himself to subdivide, develop and improve the
entire area covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 168119 of which the parcels of lands
subject of this contract is a part in accordance with the provisions of Quezon City Ordinance
No. 6561, S-66 and the Party of the First Part further binds himself to comply with and abide
by all laws, rules and regulations respecting the subdivision and development of lots for
residential purposes as may be presently in force or may hereafter be required by laws passed
by the Congress of the Philippines or required by regulations of the Bureau of Lands, the General
Registration Office and other government agencies.” (italics supplied)
Moreover, as P.D. 957 is undeniably applicable to the contracts in question, it follows that
Section 23 thereof had been properly invoked by private respondent when he desisted from
making further payment to petitioner due to petitioner’s failure to develop the subdivision
project according to the approved plans and within the time limit for complying with the same.
(Such incomplete development of the subdivision and non-performance of specific contractual
and statutory obligations on the part of the subdivision-owner had been established in the
findings of the HLURB which in turn were confirmed by the respondent Executive Secretary in
his assailed Decision.) Furthermore, respondent Executive Secretary also gave due weight to
the following matters: although private respondent started to default on amortization
payments beginning May 1975, so that by the end of July 1975 he had already incurred three
consecutive arrearages in payments, nevertheless, the petitioner, who had the cancellation
option available to him under the contract, did not exercise or utilize the same in timely fashion
but delayed until May 1979 when he finally made up his mind to cancel the contracts. But by
that time the land purchase agreements had already been overtaken by the provisions of P.D.
957, promulgated on July 12, 1976. (In any event, as pointed out by respondent HLURB and
seconded by the Solicitor General, the defaults in amortization payments incurred by private
respondent had been effectively condoned by the petitioner, by reason of the latter’s
tolerance of the defaults for a long period of time.)
Likewise, there is no merit in petitioner’s contention that respondent Secretary exceeded
his jurisdiction in ordering the refund of private respondent’s payments on Lot 12 although
(according to petitioner) only Lot 13 was the subject of the complaint. Respondent Secretary
duly noted that the supporting documents submitted substantiating the claim of
nondevelopment justified such order inasmuch as such claim was also the basis for non-
payment of amortizations on said Lot 12.
Finally, since petitioner’s motion for reconsideration of the (Executive Secretary’s)
Decision dated March 10, 1992 was filed only on the 21st day from receipt thereof, said
decision had become final and executory, pursuant to Section 7 of Administrative Order No.
18 dated February 12, 1987, which provides that “(d)ecisions/resolutions/orders of the Office
of the President shall, except as otherwise provided for by special laws, become final after the
lapse of fifteen (15) days from receipt of a copy thereof x x x, unless a motion for
reconsideration thereof is filed within such period.”
WHEREFORE, there being no showing of grave abuse of discretion, the petition is DENIED
due course and is hereby DISMISSED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-47757-61 January 28, 1980
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, ABUNDIO R. ELLO, As 4th Assistant of Provincial Bohol
VICENTE DE LA SERNA. JR., as complainant all private prosecutor, petitioners,
vs.
HON. VICENTE B. ECHAVES, JR., as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Bohol Branch II,
ANO DACULLO, GERONIMO OROYAN, MARIO APARICI, RUPERTO CAJES and MODESTO S
SUELLO, respondents.
AQUINO, J.:p
The legal issue in this case is whether Presidential Decree No. 772, which penalizes squatting
and similar acts, applies to agricultural lands. The decree (which took effect on August 20,
1975) provides:
SECTION 1. Any person who, with the use of force, intimidation or threat,
or taking advantage of the absence or tolerance of the landowner,
succeeds in occupying or possessing the property of the latter against his
will for residential, commercial or any other purposes, shall be punished
by an imprisonment ranging from six months to one year or a fine of not
less than one thousand nor more than five thousand pesos at the
discretion of the court, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
(2nd paragraph is omitted.)
The record shows that on October 25, 1977 Fiscal Abundio R. Ello filed with the lower court
separate informations against sixteen persons charging them with squatting as penalized by
Presidential Decree No. 772. The information against Mario Aparici which is similar to the other
fifteen informations, reads:
That sometime in the year 1974 continuously up to the present at
barangay Magsaysay, municipality of Talibon, province of Bohol,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, with stealth and strategy, enter into, occupy and cultivate
a portion of a grazing land physically occupied, possessed and claimed by
Atty. Vicente de la Serna, Jr. as successor to the pasture applicant Celestino
de la Serna of Pasture Lease Application No. 8919, accused's entrance into
the area has been and is still against the win of the offended party; did then
and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously squat and cultivate a
portion of the said grazing land; said cultivating has rendered a nuisance
to and has deprived the pasture applicant from the full use thereof for
which the land applied for has been intended, that is preventing applicant's
cattle from grazing the whole area, thereby causing damage and prejudice
to the said applicant-possessor-occupant, Atty. Vicente de la Serna, Jr. (sic)
Five of the informations, wherein Ano Dacullo, Geronimo Oroyan, Mario Aparici, Ruperto Cajes
and Modesto Suello were the accused, were raffled to Judge Vicente B. Echaves, Jr. of Branch
II (Criminal Cases Nos. 1824, 1828, 1832, 1833 and 1839, respectively).
Before the accused could be arraigned, Judge Echaves motu proprio issued an omnibus order
dated December 9, 1977 dismissing the five informations on the grounds (1) that it was alleged
that the accused entered the land through "stealth and strategy", whereas under the decree
the entry should be effected "with the use of force, intimidation or threat, or taking advantage
of the absence or tolerance of the landowner", and (2) that under the rule of ejusdem
generis the decree does not apply to the cultivation of a grazing land.
Because of that order, the fiscal amended the informations by using in lieu of "stealth and
strategy" the expression "with threat, and taking advantage of the absence of the ranchowner
and/or tolerance of the said ranchowner". The fiscal asked that the dismissal order be
reconsidered and that the amended informations be admitted.
The lower court denied the motion. It insisted that the phrase "and for other purposes" in the
decree does not include agricultural purposes because its preamble does not mention the
Secretary of Agriculture and makes reference to the affluent class.
From the order of dismissal, the fiscal appealed to this Court under Republic Act No. 5440. The
appeal is devoid of merit.
We hold that the lower court correctly ruled that the decree does not apply to pasture lands
because its preamble shows that it was intended to apply to squatting in urban communities or
more particularly to illegal constructions in squatter areas made by well-to-do individuals. The
squating complained of involves pasture lands in rural areas.
The preamble of the decree is quoted below:
WHEREAS, it came to my knowledge that despite the issuance of Letter of
Instruction No. 19 dated October 2, 1972, directing the Secretaries of
National Defense, Public Work. 9 and communications, Social Welfare and
the Director of Public Works, the PHHC General Manager, the Presidential
Assistant on Housing and Rehabilitation Agency, Governors, City and
Municipal Mayors, and City and District Engineers, "to remove an illegal
constructions including buildings on and along esteros and river banks,
those along railroad tracks and those built without permits on public and
private property." squatting is still a major problem in urban
communities all over the country;
WHEREAS, many persons or entities found to have been unlawfully
occupying public and private lands belong to the affluent class;
WHEREAS, there is a need to further intensify the government's drive
against this illegal and nefarious practice.
It should be stressed that Letter of Instruction No. 19 refers to illegal constructions on public
and private property. It is complemented by Letter of Instruction No. 19-A which provides for
the relocation of squatters in the interest of public health, safety and peace and order.

On the other hand, it should be noted that squatting on public agricultural lands, like the
grazing lands involved in this case, is punished by Republic Act No. 947 which makes it unlawful
for any person, corporation or association to forcibly enter or occupy public agricultural lands.
That law provides:

SECTION 1. It shall be unlawful for any person corporation or association

to enter or occupy, through force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth,
any public agriculture land including such public lands as are granted to
private individuals under the provision of the Public Land Act or any other
laws providing for the of public agriculture lands in the Philippines and are
duly covered by the corresponding applications for the notwithstanding
standing the fact that title thereto still remains in the Government or for
any person, natural or judicial to investigate induce or force another to
commit such acts.

Violations of the law are punished by a fine of not exceeding one thousand or imprisonment
for not more than one year, or both such fine and imprisonment in the discretion of the court,
with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. (See People vs. Lapasaran 100 Phil. 40.)

The rule of ejusdem generis (of the same kind or species) invoked by the trial court does not
apply to this case. Here, the intent of the decree is unmistakable. It is intended to apply only
to urban communities, particularly to illegal constructions. The rule of ejusdem generis is
merely a tool of statutory construction which is resorted to when the legislative intent is
uncertain (Genato Commercial Corp. vs. Court of Tax Appeals, 104 Phil. 615,618; 28 C.J.S. 1049-
50).

WHEREFORE, the trial court's order of dismissal is affirmed. No costs.

SO ORDERED.
 No. L-28329. August 7, 1975.*
COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS, petitioner, vs. ESSO STANDARD EASTERN, INC., (Formerly:
Standard-Vacuum Refining Corp. (Phil.), respondent.
Taxation; Special import tax; Exemption from payment of customs duties under Republic
Act No. 387 includes exemption from payment of special import tax; Reasons.—Considering
the manner in which extrinsic aids, the history of the enactment of the statute and purpose of
the legislature in employing a clause or provision in the law had been applied in determining
the true intent of the lawmaking body, R.A. No. 387, The Petroleum Act of 1949, was intended
to encourage the exploitation, exploration and development of the petroleum resources of the
country by giving it the necessary incentive in the form of tax exemptions. This is the raison d
etre for the generous grant of tax exemptions to those who would invest their financial
resources towards the achievement of this national economic goal.
Statutes; Interpretation of; Use of aids in interpretation of ambiguous statute.—It is a
well accepted principle that where a statute is ambiguous, courts may examine both the
printed pages of the published Act as well as those extrinsic matters that may aid in construing
the meaning of the statute, such as the history of its enactment, the reasons for the passage
of the bill and purposes to be accomplished by the measure.
Same; Same; Determination of legislative intent; Examination of origin and history of
statute.—Courts may take judicial notice of the origin and history of the statutes which they
are called upon to construe and administer, and of facts which affect their derivation, validity
and operation.
Same; Same; Same; Consideration of whole and every part of the law.—In order to
determine the true intent of the legislature, the particular clauses and phrases of the statute
should not be taken as detached and isolated expressions, but the whole and every part
thereof must be considered in fixing the maning of any of its parts.
Same; Same; Same; Adoption of construction that will harmonize law in question with
other laws.—In fact every statute should receive such construction as will make it harmonize
with the pre-existing body of laws. Antagonism between the Act to be interpreted and existing
or previous laws is to be avoided, unless it was clearly the intention of the legislature that such
antagonism should arise and one amends or repeals the other, either expressly or by
implication.
Same; Same; Repeal by implication not favored.—Repeal by implication is not favored
unless it is manifested that the legislature so intended. As laws are presumed to be passed
with deliberation and with full knowledge of all existing ones on the subject, it is logical to
conclude that in passing a statute it was not intended to interfere with or abrogate any former
law relating to the same matter, unless the repugnancy between the two is not only
irreconcilable but also clear and convincing as a result of the language used, or unless the latter
actfully embraces the subject matter of the earlier.
Same; Petroleum Act of 1949; Intent of legislature.—The title of Republic Act No. 387
and the provisions of its three articles give a clue to the intent of the Philippine Legislature,
which is to encourage the exploitation and development of the petroleum resources of the
country. Through the instrumentality of said law, it declared in no uncertain terms that the
intensification of the exploration for petroleum must be carried on unflinchingly even if, for
the time being, no taxes, both national and local, may be collected from the industry. This is
the unequivocal intention of the Philippine Congress when the language of the Petroleum Act
is examined. Until this law or any substantial portion thereof is clearly amended or repealed
by subsequent statutes, the intention of the legislature must be upheld.
Same; Special Import Tax Law; Special Import Tax Law repealed six prior statutes.—
Republic Act No. 1394 repealed and revoked six earlier statutes which had something to do
with the imposition of special levies and/or exemption of certain importations from the burden
of the special import taxes or levies. On the other hand, it is apparent that R.A. No. 387, the
Petroleum Act, had been spared from the pruning knife of Congress, although this latter law
had granted more concessions and tax-exemption privileges than any of the statutes that were
amended, repealed or revoked by R.A. No. 1394. The answer must be that the Congress of the
Philippines saw fit to preserve the privileges granted under the Petroleum Law of 1949 in order
to keep the door open to the exploitation and such development of the petroleum resources
of the country with such incentives as are given under that law.
APPEAL from a decision of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Solicitor General Antonio P. Barredo, Assistant Solicitor General Antonio A.
Torres and Solicitor Antonio M. Martinez for petitioner.
Carlos J. Valdez & Associates for respondent.
ESGUERRA, J.:
Appeal from the decision of the Court of Tax Appeals reversing the Commissioner of Customs’
decision holding respondent ESSO Standard Eastern, Inc., (formerly the Standard-Vacuum
Refining Corporation (Phil.) and hereinafter referred to as ESSO) liable in the total sum of
P775.62 as special import tax on certain articles imported by the latter under Republic Act No.
387, otherwise known as the Petroleum Act of 1949.
Respondent ESSO is the holder of Refining Concession No. 2, issued by the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources on December 9, 1957, and operates a petroleum refining
plant in Limay, Bataan. Under Article 103 of Republic Act No. 387 which provides: “During the
five years following the granting of any concession, the concessionaire may import free of
customs duty, all equipment, machinery, material, instruments, supplies and accessories,”
respondent imported and was assessed the special import tax (which it paid under protest) on
the following separate importations:
1)One carton, scientific instruments with C & F value of $163.59; assessed a special
import tax in the amount of P31.98 (Airport Protest No. 10);
2)One carton of recorder parts with C & F value of $221.56; assessed special import tax
in the amount of P43.82 (Airport Protest No. 11);
3)One carton of valves with C & F value of $310.58; assessed special import tax in the
amount of P60.72 (Airport Protest No. 12);
4)One box of parts for Conversion boilers and Auxiliary Equipment with C & F value of
$2,389.69; assessed special import tax in the amount of P467.00 (Airport Protest No.
15);
 5)One carton of X-ray films with C & F value of $132.80; assessed special import tax in THE COURT OF TAX APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT EXEMPTION FROM PAYMENT OF
the amount of P26.00 (Airport ProtestNo. 16); and CUSTOMS DUTIES UNDER REPUBLIC ACT NO. 387 INCLUDES EXEMPTION FROM PAYMENT OF
THE SPECIAL IMPORT TAX.
6)One carton of recorder parts with C & F value of $750.39; assessed special import tax On the other hand, the Court of Tax Appeals retionalized the ground for its ruling thus:
in the amount of P147.00 (Airport Protest No. 17).1 “If we are to adhere, as we should, to the plain and obvious meaning of words in consonance
with settled rules of interpretation, it seems clear that the special import tax is an impost or a
charge on the importation or bringing into the Philippines of all goods, articles or products
The Collector of Customs on February 16, 1962, held that respondent ESSO was subject to the
subject thereto, for the phrase “import tax on all goods, articles or products imported or
payment of the special import tax provided in Republic Act No. 1394, as amended by R.A. No.
brought into the Philippines” in explicit and unambiguous terms simply means customs duties.
2352, and dismissed the protests.2
It is hardly necessary to add that “customs duties” are simply taxes assessed on merchandise
On March 1, 1962, respondent appealed the ruling of the Collector of Customs to the
imported from, or exported to a foreign country.
Commissioner of Customs who, on March 19, 1965, affirmed the decision of said Collector of
“And being a charge upon importation, the special import tax is essentially a customs duty,
Customs.3
or at least partakes of the character thereof.”
On July 2, 1965, respondent ESSO filed a petition with the Court of Tax Appeals for review
Citing numerous American decisions and definitions of terms “customs duties,” “duties,”
of the decision of the Commissioner of Customs.
“imposts,” “levies,” “tax,” and “tolls,” and their distinctions, including some pronouncements
The Court of Tax Appeals, on September 30, 1967, reversed the decision of herein
of this Court on the subject, the Court of Tax Appeals in its decision, went to great lengths to
petitioner Commissioner of Customs and ordered refund of the amount of P775.62 to
show that the term “special import tax” as used in R.A. No. 1394 includes customs duties. It
respondent ESSO which the latter had paid under protest. 4
sees the special import tax as nothing but an impost or a charge on the importation or bringing
This decision of the Court of Tax Appeals is now before this Court for review.
into the Philippines of goods, articles or products. 7
Petitioner contends that the special import tax under Republic Act No. 1394 is separate
To clinch its theory the Court of Tax Appeals cited the similarity in the basis of computation
and distinct from the customs duty prescribed by the Tariff and Customs Code, and that the
of the customs duty as well as the similarity in the phraseology of Section 3 of Republic Act No.
exemption enjoyed by respondent ESSO from the payment of customs duties under the
1394 (which establishes the special import tax) and Section 201 of the Tariff & Customs Code
Petroleum Act of 1949 does not include exemption from the payment of the special import tax
(the basic law providing for and regulating the imposition of customs duties and imposts on
provided in R.A. No. 1394.5
importations).8
For its stand petitioner puts forward this rationale:
For its part, private respondent, ESSO, in its answer to the petition, leaned heavily on the
“A perusal of the provisions of R.A. No. 1394 will show that the legislature considered the
same arguments as those given by the Tax Court, the burden of which is that the special import
special import tax as a tax distinct from customs duties as witness the fact that Section 2(a) of
tax law is a customs law.9
the said law made separate mention of customs duties and special import tax when it provided
It is clear that the only issue involved in this case is whether or not the exemption enjoyed
that x x x if as a result of the application of the schedule therein, the total revenue derived
by herein private respondent ESSO Standard Eastern, Inc. from customs duties granted by
from the customs duties and from the special import tax on goods, x x x imported from the
Republic Act No. 387, or the Petroleum Act of 1949, should embrace or include the special
United States is less in any calendar year than the proceeds from the exchange tax imposed
import tax imposed by R.A. No. 1394, or the Special Import Tax Law.
under Repbulic Act Numbered Six Hundred and One, as amended, on such goods, articles or
We have examined the records of this case thoroughly and carefully considered the
products during the calendar year 1955, the President may, by proclamation, suspend the
arguments presented by both parties and We are convinced that the only thing left to this
reduction of the special import tax for the next succeeding calendar year x x x x.
Court to do is to determine the intention of the legislature through interpretation of the two
“If it were the intention of Congress to exempt the holders of petroleum refinery
statutes involved, i.e., Republic Act No. 1394 and Republic Act No. 387.
concessions like the protestant (respondent herein), such exemption should have been clearly
It is a well accepted principle that where a statute is ambiguous, as Republic Act No. 1394
stated in the statute. Exemptions are never presumed. They must be expressed in the clearest
appears to be, courts may examine both the printed pages of the published Act as well as those
and most unambiguous language and not left to mere implication.”6
extrinsic matters that may aid in construing the meaning of the statute, such as the history of
Specifically, petitioner in his brief submitted two assignments of errors allegedly committed by
its enactment, the reasons for the passage of the bill and purposes to be accomplished by the
the Court of Tax Appeals in the controverted decision, to wit:
measure.10
1st assignment of error:
Petitioner in the first assignment of error took exception to the finding of the Court of Tax
Appeals that “The language of Republic Act No. 1394 seems to leave no room for doubt that
THE COURT OF TAX APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE TERM “CUSTOMS DUTY” IN the law intends that the phrase ‘Special import tax’ is taken to include customs duties” and
ARTICLE 103 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 387 INCLUDES THE SPECIAL IMPORT TAX IMPOSED BY countered with the argument that “An examination of the provisions of Republic Act No. 1394
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 1394; will indubitably reveal that Congress considered the special import tax as a tax different from
customs duties, as may be seen from the fact that Section 2(a) of said law made separate
2nd assignment of error: mention of customs duties and special import tax . . .” Thus:
“x x x if as a result of the application of the schedule therein the total revenue derived from
the customs duties and from the special import tax on goods, x x x imported from the United
States is less in any calendar year than the proceeds from the exchange tax imposed under
Republic Act Numbered Six Hundred and One, as amended, on such goods, articles or products
during the calendar year 1955, the President may, by proclamation, suspend the reduction of
the special import tax for the next succeeding calendar year x x x”
Petitioner further argues:
“Customs duties are prescribed by the Tariff and Customs Code, while the special import tax is
provided for by Republic Act No. 1394. If our legislature had intended to classify the special
import tax as customs duty, the said Act would not have expressly exempted from payment of
the special import tax importations of machinery, equipment, accessories, and spare parts for
use of industries, without distinguishing whether the industries referred to are the industries
exempt from the payment of customs duties or the non-exempt ones (Sec. 6). It is sufficient
that the imported machinery, etc., is for the use of any industry.”11
A study of petitioner’s two assignments of errors shows that one is anchored on practically the
same ground as the other: both involve the interpretation of R.A. No. 387 (The Petroleum Act
of 1949) in relation with R.A. No. 1394 (The Special Import Tax Law).
While the petitioner harps on particular clauses and phrases found in the two cited laws,
which in a way was likewise resorted to by the respondent ESSO, it would do Us well to restate
the fundamental rule in the construction of a statute.
In order to determine the true intent of the legislature, the particular clauses and phrases
of the statute should not be taken as detached and isolated expressions, but the whole and
every part thereof must be considered in fixing the meaning of any of its parts. In fact every
statute should receive such construction as will make it harmonize with the pre-existing body
of laws. Antagonism between the Act to be interpreted and existing or previous laws is to be
avoided, unless it was clearly the intention of the legislature that such antagonism should arise
and one amends or repeals the other, either expressly or by implication.
Another rule applied by this Court is that the courts may take judicial notice of the origin
and history of the statutes which they are called upon to construe and administer, and of facts
which affect their derivation, validity and operation.12
Applying the above stated rules and principles, let us consider the history, the purpose and
objectives of Republic Act No. 387 as it relates to Republic Act No. 1394 and other laws passed
by the Congress of the Philippines insofar as they relate to each other.
Republic Act No. 387, the Petroleum Act of 1949, has this for its title, to wit:
AN ACT TO PROMOTE THE EXPLORATION, DEVELOPMENT, EXPLOITATION, AND UTILIZATION
OF THE PETROLEUM RESOURCES OF THE PHILIPPINES; TO ENCOURAGE THE CONSERVATION
OF SUCH PETROLEUM RESOURCES; TO AUTHORIZE THE SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE AND
NATURAL RESOURCES TO CREATE AN ADMINISTRATION UNIT AND A TECHNICAL BOARD IN THE
BUREAU OF MINES; TO APPROPRIATE FUNDS THEREFOR; AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.
Art. 103 of said Act reads:
“ART. 103. Customs duties.—During the five years following the granting of any concessions,
the concessionaire may import free of customs duty, all equipment, machinery, material,
instruments, supplies and accessories.
“x x x x”
Art. 102 of the Same law insofar as pertinent, provides:
“ART. 102. Work obligations, taxes, royalties not to be charged.—x x x; nor shall any other
special taxes or levies be applied to such concessions, nor shall concessionaires under this Act
be subjected to any provincial, municipal, or other local taxes or levies; nor shall any sales tax
be charged on any petroleum produced from the concession or portion thereof, manufactured
by the concessionaire and used in the working of his concession. x x x.”
Art. 104, still of the same Act, reads:
“ART. 104. No export tax to be imposed.—No export tax shall be levied upon petroleum
produced from concessions granted under this Act.”
The title of Republic Act No. 387 and the provisions of its three articles just cited give a clue to
the intent of the Philippine legislature, which is to encourage the exploitation and
development of the petroleum resources of the country. Through the instrumentality of said
law, it declared in no uncertain terms that the intensification of the exploration for petroleum
must be carried on unflinchingly even if, for the time being, no taxes, both national and local,
may be collected from the industry. This is the unequivocal intention of the Philippine Congress
when the language of the Petroleum Act is examined. Until this law or any substantial portion
thereof is clearly amended or repealed by subsequent statutes, the intention of the legislature
must be upheld.
Against this unambiguous language of R.A. No. 387, there is the subsequent legislation,
R.A. No. 1394, the Special Import Tax Law, which, according to the herein petitioner, shows
that the legislature considered the special import tax as a tax distinct from customs duties.
Republic Act No. 1394, otherwise known as the Special Import Tax Law, is entitled as
follows:
AN ACT TO IMPOSE A SPECIAL IMPORT TAX ON ALL GOODS, ARTICLES OR PRODUCTS
IMPORTED OR BROUGHT INTO THE PHILIPPINES, AND TO REPEAL REPUBLIC ACTS NUMBERED
SIX HUNDRED AND ONE, EIGHT HUNDRED AND FOURTEEN, EIGHT HUNDRED AND SEVENTY-
ONE, ELEVEN HUNDRED AND SEVENTY-FIVE, ELEVEN HUNDRED AND NINETY-SEVEN AND
THIRTEEN HUNDRED AND SEVENTY-FIVE.
The title indicates unmistakably that it is repealing six prior statutes. As will be seen later,
all these laws dealt with the imposition of a special excise tax on foreign exchange or other
form of levy on importation of goods into the country.
Section 1 of Republic Act No. 1394 reads as follows:
“SECTION 1. Except as herein otherwise provided, there shall be levied, collected and paid as
special import tax on all goods, articles or products imported or brought into the Philippines,
irrespective of source, during the period and in accordance with the rates provided for in the
following schedule:
x x x x x x x x x x”
It would appear that by the provision of Section 1 of this Act, the pertinent provision of the
Petroleum Law, for which there appears to be no proviso to the contrary, has been modified
or altered.
Section 6 of Republic Act No. 1394 declares that the tax provided for in its Section 1 shall
not be imposed against importation into the Philippines of machinery and/or raw materials to
be used by new and necessary industries as determined in accordance with R.A. No. 901 and a
long list of other goods, articles, machinery, equipment, accessories and others.
We shall now examine the six statutes repealed by R. A. No 1394, namely:
R.A. No. 601 is an Act imposing a special excise tax of 17% on foreign exchange sold by the
Central Bank or its agents. This is known as the Exchange Tax Law;
R.A. No. 814 amended Sections one, two and five and repealed Sections three and four of
R.A. No. 601;
R.A. No. 871 amended Sections one and two of R.A. No. 601, as amended earlier by R.A.
No. 814;
R.A. No. 1175 amended further Sections one and two of R.A. No. 601, as amended;
R.A. No. 1197 amended furthermore R.A. No. 601 as amended previously by R.A. No. 1175;
R.A. No. 1375 amended Sections one and two of R.A. No. 601 as amended by R.A. Nos.
1175 and 1197.
As can be seen from the foregoing, in one fell swoop, Republic Act No. 1394 repealed and It is not amiss to mention herein passing that contrary to the theory of the herein
revoked six earlier statutes which had something to do with the impostion of special levies petitioner, R.A. No. 387 had not been repealed by R.A. No. 2352 which expressly abrogated
and/or exemption of certain importations from the burden of the special import taxes or Section 6 of R.A. No. 1394 but did not repeal any part of R.A. No. 387. Therefore, the exemption
levies. On the other hand, it is apparent that R.A. No. 387, the Petroleum Act, had been spared granted by Republic Act No. 387 still stands.
from the pruning knife of Congress, although this latter law had granted more concessions and WHEREFORE, taking into consideration the weight given by this Court to the findings and
tax-exemption privileges than any of the statutes that were amended, repealed or revoked by conclusions of the Court of Tax Appeals on a matter it is well-equipped to handle, which
R.A. No. 1394. The answer must be that the Congress of the Philippine saw fit to preserve the findings and conclusions We find no reason to overturn, the petition of the Commissioner of
privileges granted under the Petroleum Law of 1949 in order to keep the door open to the Customs to reverse the decision of the Court of Tax Appeals should be, as it is hereby, denied.
exploitation and development of the petroleum resources of the country with such incentives No costs.
as are given under that law. SO ORDERED.
This ascertained will and intention of the legislature finds a parallelism in a case brought
earlier before this Court.
A fishpond owner was slapped with taxes as a “merchant” by the Collector of Internal
Revenue. He paid under protest and filed an action to recover the taxes paid, claiming that he
was an agriculturist and not a merchant. When this Court was called upon to interpret the
provisions of the Internal Revenue Law on whether fish is an agricultural product which falls
under the exemption provisions of said law, it inquired into the purpose of the legislature in
establishing the exemption for agricultural products. We held:
“The first inquiry, therefore, must relate to the purpose the legislature had in mind in
establishing the exemption contained in the clause now under consideration. It seems
reasonable to assume that it was due to the belief on the part of the law-making body that by
exempting agricultural products from this tax the farming industry
124
124 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Commissioner of Customs vs. Esso Standard Eastern, Inc.
would be favored and the development of the resources of the country encouraged. . . . .”13
Having this in mind, particularly the manner in which extrinsic aids, the history of the
enactment of the statute and purpose of the legislature in employing a clause or provision in
the law had been applied in determining the true intent of the lawmaking body, We are
convinced that R.A. No. 387, The Petroleum Act of 1949, was intended to encourage the
exploitation, exploration and development of the petroleum resources of the country by giving
it the necessary incentive in the form of tax exemptions. This is the raison d etre for the
generous grant of tax exemptions to those who would invest their financial resources towards
the achievement of this national economic goal.
On the contention of herein petitioner that the exemptions enjoyed by respondent ESSO
under R.A. No. 387 have been abrogated by R.A. No. 1394, We hold that repeal by implication
is not favored unless it is manifest that the legislature so intended. As laws are presumed to
be passed with deliberation and with full knowledge of all existing ones on the subject, it is
logical to conclude that in passing a statute it was not intended to interfere with or abrogate
any former law relating to the same matter, unless the repugnancy between the two is not
only irreconcilable but also clear and convincing as a result of the language used, or unless the
latter act fully embraces the subject matter of the earlier.14
As observed earlier, Congress lined up for revocation by Republic Act No. 1394 six statutes
dealing with the imposition of special imposts or levies or the granting of exemptions from
special import taxes. Yet, considering the tremendous amount of revenues it was losing under
the Petroleum Law of 1949, it failed to include the latter statute among those it chose to bury
by the Special Import Taw Law. The reason for this is very clear: The legislature wanted to
continue the incentives for the continuing development of the petroleum industry.
G.R. No. L-33693-94 May 31, 1979
MISAEL P. VERA, as Commissioner of Internal Revenue, and THE FAIR TRADE
BOARD, petitioner,
vs.
HON. SERAFIN R. CUEVAS, as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch IV,
INSTITUTE OF EVAPORATED FILLED MILK MANUFACTURERS OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC.,
CONSOLIDATED MILK COMPANY (PHIL.) INC., and MILK INDUSTRIES, INC., respondents.
DE CASTRO, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction to review the decision rendered by
respondent judge, in Civil Case No. 52276 and in Special Civil Action No. 52383 both of the
Court of First Instance of Manila.
Plaintiffs, in Civil Case No. 52276 private respondents herein, are engaged in the manufacture,
sale and distribution of filled milk products throughout the Philippines. The products of private
respondent, Consolidated Philippines Inc. are marketed and sold under the brand Darigold
whereas those of private respondent, General Milk Company (Phil.), Inc., under the brand
"Liberty;" and those of private respondent, Milk Industries Inc., under the brand "Dutch Baby."
Private respondent, Institute of Evaporated Filled Milk Manufacturers of the Philippines, is a
corporation organized for the principal purpose of upholding and maintaining at its highest the
standards of local filled milk industry, of which all the other private respondents are members.
Civil Case No. 52276 is an action for declaratory relief with ex-parte petition for preliminary
injunction wherein plaintiffs pray for an adjudication of their respective rights and obligations
in relation to the enforcement of Section 169 of the Tax Code against their filled milk products.
The controversy arose from the order of defendant, Commissioner of Internal Revenue now
petitioner herein, requiring plaintiffs- private respondents to withdraw from the market all of
their filled milk products which do not bear the inscription required by Section 169 of the Tax
Code within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the order with the explicit warning that failure of
plaintiffs' private respondents to comply with said order will result in the institution of the
necessary action against any violation of the aforesaid order. Section 169 of the Tax Code reads
as follows:
Section 169. Inscription to be placed on skimmed milk. — All condensed
skimmed milk and all milk in whatever form, from which the fatty part has
been removed totally or in part, sold or put on sale in the Philippines shall
be clearly and legibly marked on its immediate containers, and in all the
language in which such containers are marked, with the words, "This milk
is not suitable for nourishment for infants less than one year of age," or
with other equivalent words.
The Court issued a writ of preliminary injunction dated February 16, 1963 restraining the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue from requiring plaintiffs' private respondents to print on
the labels of their rifled milk products the words, "This milk is not suitable for nourishment for
infants less than one year of age or words of similar import, " as directed by the above quoted
provision of Law, and from taking any action to enforce the above legal provision against the
plaintiffs' private respondents in connection with their rifled milk products, pending the final
determination of the case, Civil Case No. 52276, on the merits.
On July 25, 1969, however, the Office of the Solicitor General brought an appeal from the said
order by way of certiorari to the Supreme Court. 1 In view thereof, the respondent court in the
meantime suspended disposition of these cases but in view of the absence of any injunction
or restraining order from the Supreme Court, it resumed action on them until their final
disposition therein.
Special Civil Action No. 52383, on the other hand, is an action for prohibition and injunction
with a petition for preliminary injunction. Petitioners therein pray that the respondent Fair
Trade Board desist from further proceeding with FTB I.S. No. I . entitled "Antonio R. de Joya vs.
Institute of Evaporated Milk Manufacturers of the Philippines, etc." pending final
determination of Civil Case No. 52276. The facts of this special civil action show that on
December 7, 1962, Antonio R. de Joya and Sufronio Carrasco, both in their individual capacities
and in their capacities as Public Relations Counsel and President of the Philippine Association
of Nutrition, respectively, filed FTB I.S. No. 1 with Fair Trade Board for misleading
advertisement, mislabeling and/or misbranding. Among other things, the complaint filed
include the charge of omitting to state in their labels any statement sufficient to Identify their
filled milk products as "imitation milk" or as an imitation of genuine cows milk. and omitting
to mark the immediate containers of their filled milk products with the words: "This milk is not
suitable for nourishment for infants less than one year of age or with other equivalent words
as required under Section 169 of the Tax Code. The Board proceeded to hear the complaint
until it received the writ of preliminary injunction issued by the Court of First Instance on
March 19, 1963.
Upon agreement of the parties, Civil Case No. 52276 and Special Civil Action No. 52383 were
heard jointly being intimately related with each other, with common facts and issues being
also involved therein. On April 16, 1971, the respondent court issued its decision, the
dispositive part of which reads as follows:
Wherefore, judgment is hereby rendered:
In Civil Case No. 52276:
(a) Perpetually restraining the defendant, Commissioner of Internal
Revenue, his agents, or employees from requiring plaintiffs to print on the
labels of their filled milk products the words: "This milk is not suitable for
nourishment for infants less than one year of age" or words with
equivalent import and declaring as nun and void and without authority in
law, the order of said defendant dated September 28, 1961, Annex A of
the complaint, and the Ruling of the Secretary of Finance, dated November
12, 1962, Annex G of the complaint; and
In Special Civil Action No. 52383:
(b) Restraining perpetually the respondent Fair Trade Board, its agents or
employees from continuing in the investigation of the complaints against
petitioners docketed as FTB I.S. No. 2, or any charges related to the
manufacture or sale by the petitioners of their filled milk products and
declaring as null the proceedings so far undertaken by the respondent
Board on said complaints. (pp. 20- 21, Rollo).
From the above decision of the respondent court, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue and
the Fair Trade Board joined together to file the present petition for certiorari with preliminary
injunction, assigning the following errors:
I. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT SEC. TION 169 OF THE TAX
CODE HAS BEEN REPEALED BY IMPLICATION.
II. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT SECTION 169 OF THE TAX
CODE HAS LOST ITS TAX PURPOSE, AND THAT COMMISSIONER
NECESSARILY LOST HIS AUTHORITY TO ENFORCE THE SAME AND THAT THE
PROPER AUTHORITY TO PROMOTE THE HEALTH OF INFANTS IS THE FOOD
AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION, THE SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND THE
SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, AS PROVIDED FOR IN RA 3720, NOT THE
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE.
III. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT THE POWER TO
INVESTIGATE AND TO PROSECUTE VIOLATIONS OF FOOD LAWS IS
ENTRUSTED TO THE FOOD AND DRUG INSPECTION, THE FOOD AND DRUG
ADMINISTRATION, THE SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND THE SECRETARY OF
JUSTICE, AND THAT THE FAIR TRADE BOARD IS WITHOUT JURISDICTION TO
INVESTIGATE AND PROSECUTE ALLEGED MISBRANDING, MISLABELLING
AND/OR MISLEADING ADVERTISEMENT OF FILLED MILK PRODUCTS. (pp, 4-
5, Rollo).
The lower court did not err in ruling that Section 169 of the Tax Code has been repealed by
implication. Section 169 was enacted in 1939, together with Section 141 (which imposed a
Specific tax on skimmed milk) and Section 177 (which penalized the sale of skimmed milk
without payment of the specific tax and without the legend required by Section 169). However,
Section 141 was expressly repealed by Section 1 of Republic Act No. 344, and Section 177, by
Section 1 of Republic Act No. 463. By the express repeal of Sections 141 and 177, Section 169
became a merely declaratory provision, without a tax purpose, or a penal sanction.
Moreover, it seems apparent that Section 169 of the Tax Code does not apply to filled milk.
The use of the specific and qualifying terms "skimmed milk" in the headnote and "condensed
skimmed milk" in the text of the cited section, would restrict the scope of the general clause
"all milk, in whatever form, from which the fatty pat has been removed totally or in part." In
other words, the general clause is restricted by the specific term "skimmed milk" under the
familiar rule of ejusdem generis that general and unlimited terms are restrained and limited by
the particular terms they follow in the statute.
Skimmed milk is different from filled milk. According to the "Definitions, Standards of Purity,
Rules and Regulations of the Board of Food Inspection," skimmed milk is milk in whatever form
from which the fatty part has been removed. Filled milk, on the other hand, is any milk,
whether or not condensed, evaporated concentrated, powdered, dried, dessicated, to which
has been added or which has been blended or compounded with any fat or oil other than milk
fat so that the resulting product is an imitation or semblance of milk cream or skim milk." The
difference, therefore, between skimmed milk and filled milk is that in the former, the fatty part
has been removed while in the latter, the fatty part is likewise removed but is substituted with
refined coconut oil or corn oil or both. It cannot then be readily or safely assumed that Section
169 applies both to skimmed milk and filled milk.
The Board of Food Inspection way back in 1961 rendered an opinion that filled milk does not
come within the purview of Section 169, it being a product distinct from those specified in the
said Section since the removed fat portion of the milk has been replaced with coconut oil and
Vitamins A and D as fortifying substances (p. 58, Rollo). This opinion bolsters the Court's stand
as to its interpretation of the scope of Section 169. Opinions and rulings of officials of the
government called upon to execute or implement administrative laws command much respect
and weight. (Asturias Sugar Central Inc. vs. Commissioner of Customs, G. R. No. L-19337,
September 30, 1969, 29 SCRA 617; Tan, et. al. vs. The Municipality of Pagbilao et. al., L-14264,
April 30, 1963, 7 SCRA 887; Grapilon vs. Municipal Council of Carigara L-12347, May 30, 1961,
2 SCRA 103).
This Court is, likewise, induced to the belief that filled milk is suitable for nourishment for
infants of all ages. The Petitioners themselves admitted that: "the filled milk products of the
petitioners (now private respondents) are safe, nutritious, wholesome and suitable for feeding
infants of all ages" (p. 44, Rollo) and that "up to the present, Filipino infants fed since birth with
filled milk have not suffered any defects, illness or disease attributable to their having been
fed with filled milk." (p. 45, Rollo).
There would seem, therefore, to be no dispute that filled milk is suitable for feeding infants of
all ages. Being so, the declaration required by Section 169 of the Tax Code that filled milk is not
suitable for nourishment for infants less than one year of age would, in effect, constitute a
deprivation of property without due. process of law.
Section 169 is being enforced only against respondent manufacturers of filled milk product and
not as against manufacturers, distributors or sellers of condensed skimmed milk such as
SIMILAC, SMA, BREMIL, ENFAMIL, OLAC, in which, as admitted by the petitioner, the fatty part
has been removed and substituted with vegetable or corn oil. The enforcement of Section 169
against the private respondents only but not against other persons similarly situated as the
private respondents amounts to an unconstitutional denial of the equal pro petition of the
laws, for the law, equally enforced, would similarly offend against the Constitution. Yick Wo
vs. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356,30 L. ed. 220).
As stated in the early part of this decision, with the repeal of Sections 141 and 177 of the Tax
Code, Section 169 has lost its tax purpose. Since Section 169 is devoid of any tax purpose,
petitioner Commissioner necessarily lost his authority to enforce the same. This was so held
by his predecessor immediately after Sections 141 and 177 were repealed in General Circular
No. V-85 as stated in paragraph IX of the Partial Stipulation of facts entered into by the parties,
to wit:
... As the act of sewing skimmed milk without first paying the specific tax
thereon is no longer unlawful and the enforcement of the requirement in
regard to the placing of the proper legend on its immediate containers is a
subject which does not come within the jurisdiction of the Bureau of
Internal Revenue, the penal provisions of Section 177 of the said Code
having been repealed by Republic Act No. 463. (p. 102, Rollo).
Petitioner's contention that he still has jurisdiction to enforce Section 169 by virtue of Section
3 of the Tax Code which provides that the Bureau of Internal Revenue shall also "give effect to
and administer the supervisory and police power conferred to it by this Code or other laws" is
untenable. The Bureau of Internal Revenue may claim police power only when necessary in
the enforcement of its principal powers and duties consisting of the "collection of all national
internal revenue taxes, fees and charges, and the enforcement of all forfeitures, penalties and
fines connected therewith." The enforcement of Section 169 entails the promotion of the
health of the nation and is thus unconnected with any tax purpose. This is the exclusive
function of the Food and Drug Administration of the Department of Health as provided for in
Republic Act No. 3720. In particular, Republic Act No. 3720 provides:
Section 9. ... It shall be the duty of the Board (Food and Drug Inspection),
conformably with the rules and regulations, to hold hearings and conduct
investigations relative to matters touching the Administration of this Act,
to investigate processes of food, drug and cosmetic manufacture and to
subject reports to the Food and Drug Administrator, recommending food
and drug standards for adoption. Said Board shall also perform such
additional functions, properly within the scope of the administration
thereof, as maybe assigned to it by the Food and Drug Administrator. The
decisions of the Board shall be advisory to the Food and Drug
Administrator.
branded he shall cause notice thereof to be given to the person or persons
concerned and such person or persons shall be given an opportunity to
subject evidence impeaching the correctness of the finding or charge in
question.
(e) When a violation of any provisions of this Act comes to the knowledge
of the Food and Drug Administrator of such character that a criminal
prosecution ought to be instituted against the offender, he shall certify the
facts to the Secretary of Justice through the Secretary of Health, together
with the chemists' report, the findings of the Board of Food and Drug
Inspection, or other documentary evidence on which the charge is based.
(f) Nothing in this Act shall be construed as requiring the Food and Drug
Administrator to certify for prosecution pursuant to subparagraph (e)
hereof, minor violations of this Act whenever he believes that public
interest will be adequately served by a suitable written notice or warning.
The aforequoted provisions of law clearly show that petitioners, Commissioner of Internal
Revenue and the Fair Trade Board, are without jurisdiction to investigate and to prosecute
alleged misbranding, mislabeling and/or misleading advertisements of filled milk. The
jurisdiction on the matters cited is vested upon the Board of Food and Drug inspection and the
Food and Drug Administrator, with the Secretary of Health and the Secretary of Justice, also
intervening in case criminal prosecution has to be instituted. To hold that the petitioners have
also jurisdiction as would be the result were their instant petition granted, would only cause
overlapping of powers and functions likely to produce confusion and conflict of official action
which is neither practical nor desirable.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed en toto. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

Section 26. ...

xxx xxx xxx

(c) Hearing authorized or required by this Act shall be conducted by the

Board of Food and Drug Inspection which shall submit recommendation to
the Food and Drug Administrator.

(d) When it appears to the Food and Drug Administrator from the reports
of the Food and Drug Laboratory that any article of food or any drug or
cosmetic secured pursuant to Section 28 of this Act is adulterated or
G.R. No. L-43760 August 21, 1976
PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF FREE LABOR UNIONS (PAFLU), petitioner
vs.
BUREAU OF LABOR RELATIONS, HONORABLE CARMELO C. NORIEL, NATIONAL FEDERATION
OF FREE LABOR UNIONS (NAFLU), and PHILIPPINE BLOOMING MILLS CO., INC., respondents.
FERNANDO, Acting C.J.:
A certification by respondent Director of Labor Relations, Carmelo C. Noriel, that respondent
National Federation of Free Labor Unions (NAFLU) as the exclusive bargaining agent of all the
employees in the Philippine Blooming Mills, Company, Inc. disregarding the objection raised
by petitioner, the Philippine Association of Free Labor Unions (PAFLU), is assailed in this
certiorari proceeding. Admittedly, in the certification election held on February 27, 1976,
respondent Union obtained 429 votes as against 414 of petitioner Union. Again, admittedly,
under the Rules and Regulations implementing the present Labor Code, a majority of the valid
votes cast suffices for certification of the victorious labor union as the sole and exclusive
bargaining agent.1 There were four votes cast by employees who did not want any union. 2 On
its face therefore, respondent Union ought to have been certified in accordance with the above
applicable rule. Petitioner, undeterred, would seize upon the doctrine announced in the case
of Allied Workers Association of the Philippines v. Court of Industrial Relations3 that spoiled
ballots should be counted in determining the valid votes cast. Considering there were
seventeen spoiled ballots, it is the submission that there was a grave abuse of discretion on
the part of respondent Director. Implicit in the comment of respondent Director of Labor
Relations, 4 considered as an answer, is the controlling weight to be accorded the
implementing rule above-cited, no inconsistency being shown between such rule and the
present Labor Code. Under such a view, the ruling in the Allied Workers Association case that
arose during the period when it was the Industrial Peace Act 5, that was in effect and not the
present law, no longer possesses relevance. It cannot and should not be applied. It is not
controlling. There was no abuse of discretion then, much less a grave one.
This Court is in agreement. The law is on the side of respondent Director, not to mention the
decisive fact appearing in the Petition itself that at most, only ten of the spoiled ballots "were
intended for the petitioner Union,"6 thus rendering clear that it would on its own showing
obtain only 424 votes as against 429 for respondent Union. certiorari does not lie.
1. What is of the essence of the certification process, as noted in Lakas Ng Manggagawang
Pilipino v. Benguet Consolidated, Inc.7 "is that every labor organization be given the
opportunity in a free and honest election to make good its claim that it should be the exclusive
collective bargaining representative."8 Petitioner cannot complain. It was given that
opportunity. It lost in a fair election. It came out second best. The implementing rule favors, as
it should, respondent Union, It obtained a majority of the valid votes cast. So our law
Prescribes. It is equally the case in the United States as this excerpt from the work of Cox and
Bok makes clear: "It is a well-settled rule that a representative will he certified even though
less than a majority of all the employees in the unit cast ballots in favor of the union. It is
enough that the union be designated by a majority of the valid ballots, and this is so even
though only a small proportion of the eligible voters participates. Following the analogy of
political elections, the courts have approved this practice of the Board."9
2. There is this policy consideration. The country is at present embarked on a wide-scale
industrialization project. As a matter of fact, respondent firm is engaged in such activity.
Industrialization, as noted by Professor Smith, Merrifield and Rothschild, "can thrive only as
there is developed a. stable structure of law and order in the productive sector."10That
objective is best attained in a collective bargaining regime, which is a manifestation of
industrial democracy at work, if there be no undue obstacles placed in the way of the choice
of a bargaining representative. To insist on the absolute majority where there are various
unions and where the possibility of invalid ballots may not be ruled out, would be to frustrate
that goal. For the probability of a long drawn-out, protracted process is not easy to dismiss.
That is not unlikely given the intensity of rivalry among unions capable of enlisting the
allegiance of a group of workers. It is to avoid such a contingency that there is this explicit
pronouncement in the implementing rule. It speaks categorically. It must be obeyed. That was
what respondent Director did.
3. Nor can fault of a grave and serious character be imputed to respondent Director
presumably because of failure to abide by the doctrine or pronouncement of this Court in the
aforesaid Allied Workers Association case. The reliance is on this excerpt from the opinion:
"However, spoiled ballots, i.e., those which are defaced, torn or marked (Rules for Certification
Elections, Rule II, sec. 2[j]) should be counted in determining the majority since they are
nevertheless votes cast by those who are qualified to do so." 11 Nothing can be clearer than
that its basis is a paragraph in a section of the then applicable rules for certification
elections. 12 They were promulgated under the authority of the then prevailing Industrial
Peace Act. 13 That Legislation is no longer in force, having been superseded by the present
Labor Code which took effect on November 1, 1974. This certification election is governed
therefore, as was made clear, by the present Labor Code and the Rules issued thereunder.
Absent a showing that such rules and regulations -are violative of the Code, this Court cannot
ignore their existence. When, as should be the case, a public official acts in accordance with a
norm therein contained, no infraction of the law is committed. Respondent Director did, as he
ought to, comply with its terms. He took into consideration only the "valid votes" as was
required by the Rules. He had no choice as long as they remain in force. In a proper showing,
the judiciary can nullify any rule it found in conflict with the governing statute. 14 That was not
even attempted here. All that petitioner did was to set forth in two separate paragraphs the
applicable rule followed by respondent Director 15and the governing article. 16 It did not even
bother to discuss why such rule was in conflict with the present Labor Code. It failed to point
out any repugnancy. Such being the case, respondent Director must be upheld.
4. The conclusion reached by us derives further support from the deservedly high repute
attached to the construction placed by the executive officials entrusted with the responsibility
of applying a statute. The Rules and Regulations implementing the present Labor Code were
issued by Secretary Blas Ople of the Department of Labor and took effect on February 3, 1975,
the present Labor Code having been made known to the public as far back as May 1, 1974,
although its date of effectivity was postponed to November 1, 1974, although its date of
effectivity was postponed to November 1, 1974. It would appear then that there was more
than enough time for a really serious and careful study of such suppletory rules and regulations
to avoid any inconsistency with the Code. This Court certainly cannot ignore the interpretation
thereafter embodied in the Rules. As far back as In re Allen," 17 a 1903 decision, Justice
McDonough, as ponente, cited this excerpt from the leading American case of Pennoyer v.
McConnaughy, decided in 1891: "The principle that the contemporaneous construction of a
statute by the executive officers of the government, whose duty it is to execute it, is entitled
to great respect, and should ordinarily control the construction of the statute by the courts, is
so firmly embedded in our jurisprudence that no authorities need be cited to support
it." 18 There was a paraphrase by Justice Malcolm of such a pronouncement in Molina v.
Rafferty," 19 a 1918 decision: "Courts will and should respect the contemporaneous
construction placed upon a statute by the executive officers whose duty it is to enforce it, and
unless such interpretation is clearly erroneous will ordinarily be controlled thereby." 20 Since
then, such a doctrine has been reiterated in numerous decisions . 21 As was emphasized by
Chief Justice Castro, "the construction placed by the office charged with implementing and
enforcing the provisions of a Code should he given controlling weight. " 22

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is dismissed. Costs against petitioner Philippine
Association of Free Labor Unions (PAFLU).
 G.R. No. 135992. January 31, 2006.*
EASTERN TELECOMMUNICATIONS PHILIPPINES, INC. and TELECOMMUNICATIONS
TECHNOLOGIES, INC., petitioners, vs. INTERNATIONAL COMMUNICATION CORPORATION,
respondent.
Administrative Law; National Telecommunications Commission; Statutory
Construction; The National Telecommunications Commission, being the government agency
entrusted with the regulation of activities coming under its special and technical forte, and
possessing the necessary rule-making power to implement is objectives, is in the best position
to interpret its own rules, regulations and guidelines.—The NTC, being the government agency
entrusted with the regulation of activities coming under its special and technical forte, and
possessing the necessary rule-making power to implement its objectives, is in the best position
to interpret its own rules, regu-lations and guidelines. The Court has consistently yielded and
accorded great respect to the interpretation by administrative agencies of their own rules
unless there is an error of law, abuse of power, lack of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion
clearly conflicting with the letter and spirit of the law.
MOTION FOR PARTIAL RECONSIDERATION of a decision of the Supreme Court.
The facts are stated in the amended opinion of the Court.
Fetalvero, Dalmacio & Alinsunurin Law Office for petitioners.
Maria Pia Altea-Urgello for petitioners Eastern Telecom, Phil., Inc., et al.
Quiason, Makalintal, Barot, Torres and Ibarra for private respondent.
AMENDED DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
On July 23, 2004, the Court promulgated its Decision in the above-captioned case with the
following dispositive portion:
“WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The Order of the
National Telecommunications Commissions dated November 10, 1997 in NTC Case No. 96-195
is AFFIRMED with the following modifications:
Respondent International Communication Corporation, in accordance with Section 27 of
NTC MC No. 11-9-93, is required to:
(1)Deposit in escrow in a reputable bank 20% of the investment required for the first
two years of the implementation of the proposed project; and
(2)Post a performance bond equivalent to 10% of the investment required for the first
two years of the approved project but not to exceed P500 Million.
within such period to be determined by the National Telecommunications Commission.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.”1
Respondent now seeks a partial reconsideration of the portion of the Court’s decision requiring
it to make a 20% escrow deposit and to post a 10% performance bond. Respondent claims that
Section 27 of NTC MC No. 11-9-93, which required the foregoing amounts, pertains only to
applications filed under Executive Order No. 109 (E.O. No. 109) and not to applications
voluntarily filed. In its Manifestation in support of the motion for partial reconsideration,
respondent attached a letter from Deputy Commissioner and Officer-in-Charge (OIC), Kathleen
G. Heceta, of the National Telecommunications Commission (NTC), stating thus:
xxx
Please be informed that the escrow deposit and performance bond were required to
public telecommunications entities to ensure that the mandated installation of local exchange
lines are installed within three (3) years pursuant to EO 109 and RA 7925. Since your company
has already complied with its obligation by the installation of more than 300,000 lines in
Quezon City, Malabon City and Valenzuela City in the National Capital Region and Region V in
early 1997, the escrow deposit and performance bond were not required in your subsequent
authorizations.2
In a Resolution dated October 4, 2004, the Court required petitioners and the NTC to file their
respective comments on the motion.3
Subsequently, in its Manifestation/Comment filed on January 11, 2005, the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG), in behalf of the NTC, likewise referred to the same letter of OIC Heceta
and declared that it fully agrees with respondent that the escrow deposit and performance
bond are not required in subsequent authorizations for additional/new areas outside its
original roll-out obligation under the Service Area Scheme of E.O. No. 109.
Petitioners did not file any comment and it was only after the Court issued a show cause
and compliance Resolution on October 19, 2005 that petitioners manifested in their Entry of
Special Appearance, Manifestation and Compliance dated November 25, 2005 that they have
no further comments on respondent’s motion for partial reconsideration.4
The Court has observed in its Decision that Section 27 of NTC MC No. 11-9-93 is silent as
to whether the posting of an escrow deposit and performance bond is a condition sine qua
non for the grant of a provisional authority. The NTC, through the OSG, explicitly clarified,
which was not disputed by petitioners, that the escrow deposit and performance bond are not
required in subsequent authorizations for additional/new areas outside its original roll-out
obligation under E.O. No. 109. The OSG agreed with respondent’s stance that since the
provisional authority in this case involves a voluntary application not covered by the original
service areas created by the NTC under E.O. No. 109, then it is not subject to the posting of an
escrow deposit and performance bond as required by E.O. No. 109, but only to the conditions
provided in the provisional authority. Further, the OSG adapted the ratiocination of the Court
of Appeals on this matter, i.e., respondent was not subjected to the foregoing escrow deposit
and performance bond requirement because the landline obligation is already outside its
original roll-out commitment under E.O. No. 109.5
The NTC, being the government agency entrusted with the regulation of activities coming
under its special and technical forte, and possessing the necessary rule-making power to
implement its objectives,6 is in the best position to interpret its own rules, regulations and
guidelines. The Court has consistently yielded and accorded great respect to the interpretation
by administrative agencies of their own rules unless there is an error of law, abuse of power,
lack of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion clearly conflicting with the letter and spirit of
the law.7
In City Government of Makati vs. Civil Service Commission,8 the Court cited cases where
the interpretation of a particular administrative agency of a certain rule was adhered to, viz.:
As properly noted, CSC was only interpreting its own rules on leave of absence and not a
statutory provision in coming up with this uniform rule. Undoubtedly, the CSC like any other
agency has the power to interpret its own rules and any phrase contained in them with its
interpretation significantly becoming part of the rules themselves. As observed in West Texas
Compress & Warehouse Co. v. Panhandle & S.F. Railing Co.—
xxx
This principle is not new to us. In Geukeko v. Araneta this Court upheld the interpretation
of the Department of Agriculture and Commerce of its own rules of procedure in suspending
the period of appeal even if such action was nowhere stated therein. We said—
xxx
x x x It must be remembered that Lands Administrative Order No. 6 is in the nature of
procedural rules promulgated by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources pursuant
to the power bestowed on said administrative agency to promulgate rules and regulations
necessary for the proper discharge and management of the functions imposed by law upon
said office. x x x x Recognizing the existence of such rule-making authority, what is the weight
of an interpretation given by an administrative agency to its own rules or
regulations? Authorities sustain the doctrine that the interpretation given to a rule or
regulation by those charged with itsexecution is entitled to the greatest weight by the
Court construing such rule or regulation, and such interpretation will be followed unless it
appears to be clearly unreasonable or arbitrary (42 Am. Jur. 431). It has also been said that:
xxx
The same precept was enunciated in Bagatsing v. Committee on Privatization where we
upheld the action of the Commission on Audit (COA) in validating the sale of Petron
Corporation to Aramco Overseas Corporation on the basis of COA’s interpretation of its own
circular that set bidding and audit guidelines on the disposal of government assets—
The COA itself, the agency that adopted the rules on bidding procedure to be followed by
government offices and corporations, had upheld the validity and legality of the questioned
bidding. The interpretation of an agency of its own rules should be given more weight than
the interpretation by that agency of the law it is merely tasked to administer (italics
supplied).
Given the greater weight accorded to an agency’s interpretation of its own rules than to
its understanding of the statute it seeks to implement, we simply cannot set aside the former
on the same grounds as we would overturn the latter. More specifically, in cases where the
dispute concerns the interpretation by an agency of its own rules, we should apply only these
standards: “Whether the delegation of power was valid; whether the regulation was within
that delegation; and if so, whether it was a reasonable regulation under a due process test.”
An affirmative answer in each of these questions should caution us from discarding the
agency’s interpretation of its own rules. (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, the Court holds that the interpretation of the NTC that Section 27 of NTC MC No. 11-9-
93 regarding the escrow deposit and performance bond shall pertain only to a local exchange
operator’s original roll-out obligation under E.O. No. 109, and not to roll-out obligations made
under subsequent or voluntary applications outside E.O. No. 109, should be sustained.
IN VIEW THEREOF, respondent’s Motion for Partial Reconsideration is GRANTED. The
Court’s Decision dated July 23, 2004 is AMENDED, the dispositive portion of which should read
as follows:
“WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is DENIED. The Order of the National
Telecommunications Commission dated November 10, 1997 in NTC Case No. 96-195 is
AFFIRMED.
thereby deleting the order requiring respondent to make a 20% escrow deposit and to post a
10% performance bond.
SO ORDERED.
 G.R. No. 106724. February 9, 1994.*
THE NATIONAL POLICE COMMISSION (NAPOLCOM), represented by its Acting Chairman, Cesar
Sarino, Teodolo C. Natividad, Vice-Chairman and Executive Officer, Brig. Gen. Virgilio H. David,
Edgar Dula Torre, Guillermo P. Enriquez, Commissioners, and Chief Supt. Levy D. Macasiano,
Director for Personnel, petitioners, vs. HONORABLE JUDGE SALVADOR DE GUZMAN, JR., CHIEF
SUPT. NORBERTO M. LINA, CHIEF SUPT. RICARDO TRINIDAD, JR., SR. SUPT. MANUEL SUAREZ,
SUPT. JUSTITO B. TAGUM, SR. SUPT. TRANQUILINO ASPIRAS, SR., SUPT. RAMON I. NAVARRO,
SR. SUPT. JOSE P. SURIA, SR. SUPT. AGATON ABIERA, CHIEF INSP. BIENVENIDO TORRES, AND
THE NATIONAL (ROTC) ALUMNI ASSOCIATION INC. (NARRA), REPRESENTED BY ITS PRESIDENT
COL. BENJAMIN GUNDRAN, AND DIRECTOR HERMO-GENES PERALTA, JR., respondents.
Police Officers; Statutory Construction; RA. No. 6975 itself distinguishes INP from the PC
and it cannot be construed that “INP” as used in Sec. 89 includes the members of the PC.—From
a careful perusal of the above provisions, it appears therefore that the use of the term INP is
not synonymous with the PC. Had it been otherwise, the statute could have just made a
uniform reference to the members of the whole Philippine National Police (PNP) for retirement
purposes and not just the INP. The law itself distinguishes INP from the PC and it cannot be
construed that “INP” as used in Sec. 89 includes the members of the PC.
Same; Same; In case of doubt as to what a provision of a statute means, the meaning
put to the provision during the legislative deliberations may be adopted.—Having defined the
meaning of INP, the trial court need not have belabored on the supposed dubious meaning of
the term. Nonetheless, if confronted with such a situation, courts are not without recourse in
determining the construction of the statute with doubtful meaning for they may avail
themselves of the actual proceedings of the legislative body. In case of doubt as to what a
provision of a statute means, the meaning put to the provision during the legislative
deliberations may be adopted.
_______________
Same; Same; Same; Courts should not give a literal interpretation to the letter of the
law if it runs counter to the legislative intent.—Courts should not give a literal interpretation
to the letter of the law if it runs counter to the legislative intent.
PETITION for certiorari to reverse a judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Br. 142.
De Guzman, J.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
The Solicitor General for petitioners.
Renecio R. Espiritu for private respondents.
Diosdado P. Peralta for respondent-intervenor.
BIDIN, J.:
The case at bar had its origin in the implementation of the compulsory retirement of PNP
officers as mandated in Sec. 39, RA 6975, otherwise known as “An Act Establishing the
Philippine National Police Under a Reorganized Department of the Interior and Local
Government”, which took effect on January 2, 1991. Among others, RA 6975 provides for a
uniform retirement system for PNP members. Section 39 thereof reads:
“SEC. 39. Compulsory Retirement.—Compulsory retirement, for officer and non-officer, shall
be upon the attainment of age fifty-six (56); Provided, That, in case of any officer with the rank
of chief superintendent, director or deputy director general, the Commission may allow his
retention in the service for an unextendible period of one (1) year.
Based on the above provision, petitioners sent notices of retirement to private respondents
who are all members of the defunct Philippine Constabulary and have reached the age of fifty-
six (56).
In response, private respondents filed a complaint on December 19, 1991 for declaratory
relief with prayer for the issuance of an ex parte restraining order and/or injunction (docketed
as Civil Case No. 91-3498) before the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 142. In their
complaint, respondents aver that the age of retirement set at fifty-six (56) by Section 39 of RA
6975 cannot be applied to them since they are also covered by Sec. 89 thereof which provides:
“Any provision hereof to the contrary notwithstanding, and within the transition period of
four (4) years following the effectivity of this Act, the following members of the INP shall be
considered compulsorily retired:
“a)Those who shall attain the age of sixty (60) on the first year of the effectivity of this
Act.
“b)Those who shall attain the age of fifty-nine (59) on the second year of the effectivity
of this Act.
“c)Those who shall attain the age of fifty-eight (58) on the third year of the effectivity of
this Act.
“d)Those who shall attain the age of fifty-seven (57) on the fourth year of the effectivity
of this Act.”
It is the submission of respondents that the term “INP” includes both the former members of
the Philippine Constabulary and the local police force who were earlier constituted as the
Integrated National Police (INP) by virtue of PD 765 in 1975.
On the other hand, it is the belief of petitioners that the 4-year transition period provided
in Section 89 applies only to the local police forces who previously retire, compulsorily, at age
sixty (60) for those in the ranks of Police/Fire Lieutenant or higher (Sec. 33, PD 1184); while the
retirement age for the PC had already been set at fifty-six (56) under the AFP law.
On December 23, 1991, respondent judge issued a restraining order followed by a writ of
injunction on January 8, 1992 upon posting of a P100,000.00 bond by private respondents.
After the parties have submitted their respective pleadings, the case was submitted for
resolution and on August 14, 1992, the respondent judge rendered the assailed decision, the
decretal portion of which reads:
“WHEREFORE, the court hereby declares that the term “INP” in Section 89 of the PNP Law
includes all members of the present Philippine National Police, irrespective of the original
status of the present members of the Philippine National Police before its creation and
establishment, and that Section 39 thereof shall become operative after the lapse of the four-
year transition period.
“The preliminary injunction issued is made permanent.
 “SO ORDERED.” (Rollo, pp. 29-30)
Petitioners filed the instant petition on October 8, 1992 seeking the reversal of the above
judgment. On January 12, 1993, the Court resolved to treat the respondents’ Comment as
Answer and gave due course to the petition.
In ruling in favor of private respondents, respondent judge observed, among others, that:
“It may have been the intention of Congress to refer to the local police forces as the “INP”, but
the PNP Law failed to define who or what constituted the INP. The natural recourse of the court
is to trace the source of the “INP” as courts are permitted to look to prior laws on the same
subject and to investigate the antecedents involved. There is nothing extant in the statute
books except that which was created and established under PD 765 pursuant to the mandate
of Article XV of the 1973 Constitution providing that the ‘State shall establish and maintain an
integrated national police force whose organization, administration and operation shall be
provided by law.’ Heretofore, INP was unknown. And the said law categorically declared the
PC ‘as the principal component of the Integrated National Police’ (Sec. 5, PD 765).”
“The court was supplied by respondents (petitioners herein) with excerpts taken from the
discussion amongst the members of Congress concerning the particular provision of Section 89.
The court is not persuaded by said discussion; it was a simple matter for the members of the
legislature to state precisely in clear and unequivocal terms their meaning, such as ‘integrated
police forces’ as used in PD 765. Instead, they employed ‘INP’, a generic term that includes the
PC as the principal component of the INP, supra. In failing to categorically restrict the
application of Section 89 as the members of legislature are said to have intended, it gave rise
to the presumption that it has not limited nor intended to limit the meaning of the word when
the bill was finally passed into law. It is not difficult for the court to also presume that in
drafting the wording of the PNP Law, the legislators were aware of the historical legislative
origin of the ‘INP’.
xxx
“The court takes particular note of the fact that Section 89 is found in the Transitory
Provisions of the law which do not provide for any distinction between the former PC officers
and those belonging to the civilian police forces. These provisions are specifically enacted to
regulate the period covering the dissolution of the PC and the creation of the PNP, a period
that necessarily would be attended by imbalances and or confusion occasioned by the
wholesale and mass integration. In fact, the retirement payment scheme of the INP is still to
be formulated, leaving the impression that nothing is really settled until after the transition of
four years has lapsed. Section 89 therefore prevails over Section 39 up to the year 1995 when
the retirement age for members of the PNP shall then be age 56; after the year 1995, Section
39 shall be the applicable law on retirement of PNP members.” (Rollo, pp. 27-28; italics
supplied)
Petitioners disagree and claim that the use of the term INP in Sec. 89 does not imply the same
meaning contemplated under PD 765 wherein it is provided:
“Section 1. Constitution of the Integrated National Police.—There is hereby established and
constituted the Integrated National Police (INP) which shall be composed of the Philippine
Constabulary as the nucleus, and the integrated police forces as established by Presidential
Decrees Nos. 421, 482, 531, 585 and 641, as components, under the Department of National
Defense.
On the other hand, private respondents assert that being the nucleus of the Integrated
National Police (INP) under PD 765, former members of the Philippine Constabulary (PC)
should not be discriminated against from the coverage of the term “INP” in Sec. 89, RA 6975.
Clearly, it is argued, the term “INP” found in Section 89 of RA 6975 refers to the INP in PD 765.
Thus, where the law does not distinguish, the courts should not distinguish.
Does the law, RA 6975, distinguish INP from the PC? Petitioners submit that it does and
cite Sections 23 and 85 to stress the point, viz.:
“SEC. 23. Composition.—Subject to the limitations provided for in this Act, the Philippine
National Police, hereinafter referred to as the PNP, is hereby established, initially consisting of
the members of the police forces who were integrated into the Integrated National Police (INP)
pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 765, and the officers and enlisted personnel of the
Philippine Constabulary (PC). x x x
xxx
“The permanent civilian employees of the present PC, INP, Narcotics Command, CIS and
the technical command of the AFP assigned with the PC, including NAPOLCOM hearing officers
holding regular items as such, shall be absorbed by the Department as employees thereof,
subject to existing laws and regulations.
xxx
“SEC. 85. Phases of Implementation.—The implementation of this Act shall be undertaken
in three (3) phases, to wit:
Phase I—Exercise of option by the uniformed members of the Philippine Constabulary, the
PC elements assigned with the Narcotics Command, CIS, and the personnel of the technical
services of the AFP assigned with the PC to include the regular CIS investigating agents and the
operatives and agents of the NAPOLCOM Inspection, Investigation and Intelligence Branch,
and the personnel of the absorbed National Action Committee on Anti-Hijacking (NACAH) of
the Department of National Defense, to be completed within six (6) months from the date of
the effectivity of this Act. At the end of this phase, all personnel from the INP, PC, Technical
Services, NACAH, and NAPOLCOM Inspection, Investigation and Intelligence Branch shall have
been covered by official orders assigning them to the PNP x x x.
xxx
“x x x. Any PC-INP officer or enlisted personnel may, within the twelve-month period from
the effectivity of this Act, retire x x x.
“Phase III.—x x x. To accomplish the tasks of Phase III, the Commission shall create a Board
of Officers composed of the following: NAPOLCOM Commissioner as Chairman and one (1)
representative each from the PC, INP, Civil Service Commission and the Department of Budget
and Management.”
Section 86 of the same law further provides:
“SEC. 86. Assumption by the PNP of Police Functions.—The PNP shall absorb the functions of
the PC, the INP and the Narcotics Command upon the effectivity of this Act.”
From a careful perusal of the above provisions, it appears therefore that the use of the term
INP is not synonymous with the PC. Had it been otherwise, the statute could have just made a
uniform reference to the members of the whole Philippine National Police (PNP) for retirement
purposes and not just the INP. The law itself distinguishes INP from the PC and it cannot be
construed that “INP” as used in Sec. 89 includes the members of the PC.
And contrary to the pronouncement of respondent judge that the law failed to define who
constitutes the INP, Sec. 90 of RA 6975 has in fact defined the same. Thus,
“SEC. 90. Status of Present NAPOLCOM, PC-INP.—Upon the effectivity of this Act, the present
National Police Commission and the Philippine Constabulary-Integrated National Police shall
cease to exist. The Philippine Constabulary, which is the nuclues of the Philippine
Constabulary-Integrated National Police shall cease to be a major
807
VOL. 229, FEBRUARY 9, 1994 807
National Police Commission vs. De Guzman, Jr.
service of the Armed Forces of the Philippines. The Integrated National Police, which is the
civilian component of the Philippine ConstabularyIntegrated National Police, shall cease to be
the national police force and lieu thereof, a new police force shall be established and
constituted pursuant to this Act.” (italics supplied)
It is not altogether correct to state, therefore, that the legislature failed to define who the
members of the INP are. In this regard, it is of no moment that the legislature failed to
categorically restrict the application of the transition period in Sec. 89 specifically in favor of
the local police forces for it would be a mere superfluity as the PC component of the INP was
already retirable at age fifty-six (56).
Having defined the meaning of INP, the trial court need not have belabored on the
supposed dubious meaning of the term. Nonetheless, if confronted with such a situation,
courts are not without recourse in determining the construction of the statute with doubtful
meaning for they may avail themselves of the actual proceedings of the legislative body. In
case of doubt as to what a provision of a statute means, the meaning put to the provision
during the legislative deliberations may be adopted (De Villa v. Court of Appeals, 195 SCRA
722 [1991] citing Palanca v. City of Manila, 41 Phil. 125 [1920]; Arenas v. City of San Carlos, 82
SCRA 318 [1978]).
Courts should not give a literal interpretation to the letter of the law if it runs counter to
the legislative intent (Yellow Taxi and Pasay Transportation Workers’ Assn. v. Manila Yellow
Taxi Cab Co., 80 Phil. 83 [1948]).
Examining the records of the Bicameral Conference Committee, we find that the
legislature did intend to exclude the members of the PC from the coverage of Sec. 89 insofar
as the retirement age is concerned, thus:
“THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. MACEDA). Well, it seems what people really want is one common rule,
so if it is fifty-six, fifty-six; of course, the PC wants sixty for everybody. Of course, it is not
acceptable to us in the sense that we tied this up really to the question of: If you are lax in
allowing their (the PC) entry into the PNP, then tighten up the retirement. If we will be strict
in, like requiring examinations and other conditions for their original entry, then since we have
sifted out a certain amount of undesirables, then we can allow a longer retirement age. That
was the rationale, that was the tie-up. Since we are relaxing the entry, we should speed up . .
. extension to PC officers’ retirable age from 56 to 60 and then gradually lower it back to 56
“THE CHAIRMAN (REP. GUTANG), Exit.
“THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. MACEDA) . . . . the retirement, the exit.
“THE CHAIRMAN (REP. GUTANG). So let me get it very clear, Mr. Chairman. Fifty-six, let’s
say, that will not make any adjustment in the PC because there (they) are (retirable at age)
fifty-six.
“THE CHAIRMAN. (SEN. MACEDA). Kaya nga, wala na silang masasabi.
“THE CHAIRMAN. (REP. GUTANG). In the case of the Police, since they are retireable now
at sixty, for the officers, it will be applicable to them on a one-year every year basis for a total
period of four years transition.” (Bicameral Conference Committee on National Defense,
March 12, 1990)
“REP. GUTANG. On the first year of effectivity, the police will retire at 60 years.
“THE CHAIRMAN. (SEN. MACEDA). Sixty.
“REP. GUTANG. On the second year, 59.
“THE CHAIRMAN. (SEN. MACEDA). Oo.
“REP. GUTANG. On the third year. 58.
“THE CHAIRMAN. (SEN. MACEDA). Fifty-eight. So ‘yung 55, on the third year, 58, doon siya
re-retire.
“REP. GUTANG. Oo.
“SEN. SAGUISAG. So kung 55, when the law becomes effective
...
“THE CHAIRMAN. (SEN. MACEDA). He will retire at 58, doon siya aabot.
“REP. UNICO. Pwede.
“SEN. SAGUISAG. Dahil ‘yon, may time to . . .
“THE CHAIRMAN. (SEN. MACEDA). Walang problema dito sa transition ng pulis, acceptable
ito, eh.
“THE CHAIRMAN. (REP. COJUANGCO). Sa PC?
“THE CHAIRMAN. (SEN. MACEDA). PC, walang mawawala sa kanila, 56 ang retirement age
nilang talaga, eh. Kaya ayaw ko ngang dagdagan ‘yung 56 nila at ‘yon din ang Armed Forces,
56. (Ibid., May 22, 1990)
In applying the provisions of Sec. 89 in favor of the local police force as established in PD 765,
the Court does not, in any manner, give any undue preferential treatment in favor of the other
group. On the contrary, the Court is merely giving life to the real intent of the legislators based
on the deliberations of the Bicameral Conference Committee that preceded the enactment of
RA 6975.
The legislative intent to classify the INP in such manner that Section 89 of R.A. 6975 is
applicable only to the local police force is clear. The question now is whether the classification
is valid. The test for this is reasonableness such that it must conform to the following
requirements: (1) it must be based upon substantial distinctions; (2) It must be germane to the
purpose of the law; (3) It must not be limited to existing conditions only; and (4) It must apply
equally to all members of the same class (People vs. Cayat, 68 Phil. 12 [1939]).
The classification is based upon substantial distinctions. The PC, before the effectivity of
the law (RA 6975), were already retirable at age 56 while the local police force were retirable
at 60, and governed by different laws (P.D. 1184, Sec. 33 and Sec. 50). The distinction is
relevant for the purpose of the statute, which is to enable the local police force to plan for
their retirement which would be earlier than usual because of the new law. Section 89 is
merely transitory, remedial in nature, and loses its force and effect once the four-year
transitory period has elapsed. Finally, it applies not only to some but to all local police officers.
It may be appropriate to state at this point that it seems absurb that a law will grant an
without any cogent reason at all. Why should the retirement age of PC officers be increased
during the transitory period to the exclusion of other PC officers who would retire at age 56
after such period? Such absurdity was never contemplated by the law and would defeat its
purpose of providing a uniform retirement age for PNP members.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The writ of injunction issued on January 8, 1992 is
hereby LIFTED and the assailed decision of respondent judge is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.
 G.R. No. 87416. April 8, 1991.*
CECILIO S. DE VILLA, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, HONORABLE JOB B. MADAYAG, and ROBERTO Z. LORAYES, respondents.
Courts; Jurisdiction; Criminal Procedure; Information; Since the information alleges that
the offense was committed in Makati, the same is controlling, and it sufficiently vests
jurisdiction upon the RTC of Makati.—In the case of People v. Hon. Manzanilla (156 SCRA 279
[1987] cited in the case of Lim v. Rodrigo, 167 SCRA 487 [1988]), the Supreme Court ruled “that
jurisdiction or venue is determined by the allegations in the information.” The information
under consideration specifically alleged that the offense was committed in Makati, Metro
Manila and therefore, the same is controlling and sufficient to vest jurisdiction upon the
Regional Trial Court of Makati. The Court acquires jurisdiction over the case and over the
person of the accused upon the filing of a complaint or information in court which initiates a
criminal action (Republic v. Sunga, 162 SCRA 191 [1988]).
Same; Same; Criminal Law; Batas Pambansa Blg. 22; Bouncing Checks; Venue; In
offenses involving violations of the Bouncing Checks Law (BP 22), the determinative factor in
determining venue, is the place of the issuance of the check.—Moreover, it has been held in
the case of Que v. People of the Philippines (154 SCRA 160 [1987] cited in the case of People
v. Grospe, 157 SCRA 154 [1988]) that “the determinative factor (in determining venue) is the
place of the issuance of the check.” On the matter of venue for violation of Batas Pambansa
Bilang 22, the Ministry of Justice, citing the case of People v. Yabut (76 SCRA 624 [1977], laid
down the following guidelines in Memorandum Circular No. 4 dated December 15, 1981, the
pertinent portion of which reads: “(1) Venue of the offense lies at the place where the check
was executed and delivered; (2) the place where the check was written, signed or dated does
not necessarily fix the place where it was executed, as what is of decisive importance is the
delivery thereof which is the final act essential to its consummation as an obligation; x x x (Res.
No. 377, s. 1980, Filtex Mfg. Corp. vs. Manuel Chua, October 28, 1980).” (See The Law on
Bouncing Checks Analyzed by Judge Jesus F. Guerrero, Philippine Law Gazette, Vol. 7. Nos. 11
& 12, October-December, 1983, p. 14). It is undisputed that the check in question was executed
and delivered by the petitioner to herein private respondent at Makati, Metro Manila.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Foreign checks, provided they are either drawn and
issued in the Philippines though payable outside thereof, are within the coverage of the
Bouncing Checks Law.—However, petitioner argues that the check in question was drawn
against the dollar account of petitioner with a foreign bank, and is therefore, not covered by
the Bouncing Checks Law (B.P. Blg. 22). But it will be noted that the law does not distinguish
the currency involved in the case. As the trial court correctly ruled in its order dated July 5,
1988: “Under the Bouncing Checks Law (B.P. Blg. 22), foreign checks, provided they are either
drawn and issued in the Philippines though payable outside thereof x x x are within the
coverage of said law.”
Statutes; Where the law does not make any exception, courts may not except something
unless compelling reasons exist to justify it.—It is a cardinal principle in statutory construction
that where the law does not distinguish courts should not distinguish. Parenthetically, the rule
is that where the law does not make any exception, courts may not except something unless
compelling reasons exist to justify it (Phil. British Assurance Co., Inc. v. IAC, 150 SCRA 520
[1987]).
Same; Courts may avail themselves of the actual proceedings of the legislative body to
assist in determining the construction of a statute of doubtful meaning.—More importantly, it
is well established that courts may avail themselves of the actual proceedings of the legislative
body to assist in determining the construction of a statute of doubtful meaning (Palanca v. City
of Manila, 41 Phil. 125 [1920]). Thus, where there is doubts as to what a provision of a statute
means, the meaning put to the provision during the legislative deliberation or discussion on
the bill may be adopted (Arenas v. City of San Carlos, 82 SCRA 318 [1978]).
PETITION for certiorari to review the decision of the Court of Appeals. Melo, J.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
San Jose, Enriquez, Lacas, Santos & Borje for petitioner.
Eduardo R. Robles for private respondent.
PARAS, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari seeks to reverse and set aside the decision** of the Court
of Appeals promulgated on February 1, 1989 in CA-G.R. SP No. 16071 entitled “Cecilio S. de
Villa vs. Judge Job B. Madayag, etc. and Roberto Z. Lorayes”, dismissing the petition for
certiorari filed therein.
The factual backdrop of this case, as found by the Court of Appeals, is as follows:
“On October 5, 1987, petitioner Cecilio S. de Villa was charged before the Regional Trial Court
of the National Capital Judicial Region (Makati, Branch 145) with violation of Batas Pambansa
Bilang 22, allegedly committed as follows:
‘That on or about the 3rd day of April 1987, in the municipality of Makati, Metro Manila,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did,
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously make or draw and issue to ROBERTO Z.
LORAYEZ, to apply on account or for value a Depositors Trust Company Check No. 3371
antedated March 31, 1987, payable to herein complainant in the total amount of U.S.
$2,500.00 equivalent to P50,000.00, said accused well knowing that at the time of issue he had
no sufficient funds in or credit with drawee bank for payment of such check in full upon its
presentment which check when presented to the drawee bank within ninety (90) days from
the date thereof was subsequently dishonored for the reason ‘INSUFFICIENT FUNDS’ and
despite receipt of notice of such dishonor said accused failed to pay said ROBERTO Z. LORAYEZ
the amount of P50,000.00 of said check or to make arrangement for full payment of the same
within five (5) banking days after receiving said notice.’
“After arraignment and after private respondent had testified on direct examination,
petitioner moved to dismiss the Information on the following grounds: (a) Respondent court
has no jurisdiction over the offense charged; and (b) That no offense was committed since the
check involved was payable in dollars, hence, the obligation created is null and void pursuant
to Republic Act No. 529 (An Act to Assure Uniform Value of Philippine Coin and Currency).
 “On July 19, 1988, respondent court issued its first questioned orders stating:
‘Accused’s motion to dismiss dated July 5, 1988, is denied for lack of merit.
‘Under the Bouncing Checks Law (B.P. Blg. 22), foreign checks, provided they are either
drawn and issued in the Philippines though payable outside thereof, or made payable and
dishonored in the Philippines though drawn and issued outside thereof, are within the
coverage of said law. The law likewise applied to checks drawn against current accounts in
foreign currency.’
“Petitioner moved for reconsideration but his motion was subsequently denied by
respondent court in its order dated September 6, 1988, and which reads:
‘Accused’s motion for reconsideration, dated August 9, 1988, which was opposed by the
prosecution, is denied for lack of merit.
‘The Bouncing Checks Law is applicable to checks drawn against current accounts in
foreign currency (Proceedings of the Batasang Pambansa, February 7, 1979, p. 1376, cited in
Makati RTC Judge (now Manila City Fiscal) Jesus F. Guerrero’s The Ramifications of the Law on
Bouncing Checks, p. 5).’ ” (Rollo, Annex “A”, Decision, pp. 20-22).
A petition for certiorari seeking to declare the nullity of the aforequoted orders dated July 19,
1988 and September 6, 1988 was filed by the petitioner in the Court of Appeals wherein he
contended:
“(a)That since the questioned check was drawn against the dollar account of petitioner
with a foreign bank, respondent court has no jurisdiction over the same or with accounts
outside the territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines and that Batas Pambansa Bilang 22
could have not contemplated extending its coverage over dollar accounts;
“(b)That assuming that the subject check was issued in connection with a private
transaction between petitioner and private respondent, the payment could not be
legally paid in dollars as it would violate Republic Act No. 529; and
“(c)That the obligation arising from the issuance of the questioned check is null and void
and is not enforceable within the Philippines either in a civil or criminal suit. Upon such
premises, petitioner concludes that the dishonor of the questioned check cannot be said
to have violated the provisions of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22.” (Rollo, Annex “A”,
Decision, p. 22).
On February 1, 1989, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision, the decretal portion of
which reads:
“WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby dismissed. Costs against petitioner.
“SO ORDERED.” (Rollo, Annex “A”, Decision, p. 5)
A motion for reconsideration of the said decision was filed by the petitioner on February 7,
1989 (Rollo, Petition, p. 6) but the same was denied by the Court of Appeals in its resolution
dated March 3, 1989 (Rollo, Annex “B”, p. 26).
Hence, this petition.
In its resolution dated November 13, 1989, the Second Division of this Court gave due
course to the petition and required the parties to submit simultaneously their respective
memoranda (Rollo, Resolution, p. 81).
The sole issue in this case is whether or not the Regional Trial Court of Makati has
jurisdiction over the case in question.
The petition is without merit.
Jurisdiction is the power with which courts are invested for administering justice, that is,
for hearing and deciding cases (Velunta v. Philippine Constabulary, 157 SCRA 147 [1988]).
Jurisdiction in general, is either over the nature of the action, over the subject matter, over
the person of the defendant, or over the issues framed in the pleadings (Balais, v. Balais, 159
SCRA 37 [1988]).
Jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined by the statute in force at the time of
commencement of the action (De la Cruz v. Moya, 160 SCRA 538 [1988]).
The trial court’s jurisdiction over the case, subject of this review, can not be questioned.
Sections 10 and 15(a), Rule 110 of the Rules of Court specifically provide that:
“Sec. 10. Place of the commission of the offense. The complaint or information is sufficient if it
can be understood therefrom that the offense was committed or some of the essential
ingredients thereof occured at some place within the jurisdiction of the court, unless the
particular place wherein it was committed constitutes an essential element of the offense or
is necessary for identifying the offense charged.
“Sec. 15. Place where action is to be instituted. (a) Subject to existing laws, in all criminal
prosecutions the action shall be instituted and tried in the court of the municipality or territory
where the offense was committed or any of the essential ingredients thereof took place.”
In the case of People v. Hon. Manzanilla (156 SCRA 279[1987] cited in the case of Lim v.
Rodrigo, 167 SCRA 487[1988]), the Supreme Court ruled “that jurisdiction or venue is
determined by the allegations in the information.”
The information under consideration specifically alleged that the offense was committed
in Makati, Metro Manila and therefore, the same is controlling and sufficient to vest
jurisdiction upon the Regional Trial Court of Makati. The Court acquires jurisdiction over the
case and over the person of the accused upon the filing of a complaint or information in court
which initiates a criminal action (Republic v. Sunga, 162 SCRA 191 [1988]).
Moreover, it has been held in the case of Que v. People of the Philippines (154 SCRA
160 [1987] cited in the case of People v. Grospe, 157 SCRA 154 [1988]) that “the determinative
factor (in determining venue) is the place of the issuance of the check.”
On the matter of venue for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22, the Ministry of Justice,
citing the case of People v. Yabut (76 SCRA 624 [1977], laid down the following guidelines in
Memorandum Circular No. 4 dated December 15, 1981, the pertinent portion of which reads:
“(1) Venue of the offense lies at the place where the check was executed and delivered; (2) the
place where the check was written, signed or dated does not necessarily fix the place where it
was executed, as what is of decisive importance is the delivery thereof which is the final act
essential to its consummation as an obligation; x x x (Res. No. 377, s. 1980, Filtex Mfg. Corp.
vs. Manuel Chua, October 28, 1980).” (See The Law on Bouncing Checks Analyzed by Judge
Jesus F. Guerrero, Philippine Law Gazette, Vol. 7. Nos. 11 & 12, October-December, 1983, p.
14).
It is undisputed that the check in question was executed and delivered by the petitioner
to herein private respondent at Makati, Metro Manila.
However, petitioner argues that the check in question was drawn against the dollar
account of petitioner with a foreign bank, and is therefore, not covered by the Bouncing Checks
Law (B.P. Blg. 22).
But it will be noted that the law does not distinguish the currency involved in the case. As
the trial court correctly ruled in its order dated July 5, 1988:
“Under the Bouncing Checks Law (B.P. Blg. 22), foreign checks, provided they are either drawn
and issued in the Philippines though payable outside thereof x x x are within the coverage of
said law.”
It is a cardinal principle in statutory construction that where the law does not distinguish courts
should not distinguish. Parenthetically, the rule is that where the law does not make any
exception, courts may not except something unless compelling reasons exist to justify it (Phil.
British Assurance Co., Inc. v. IAC, 150 SCRA 520 [1987]).
More importantly, it is well established that courts may avail themselves of the actual
proceedings of the legislative body to assist in determining the construction of a statute of
doubtful meaning (Palanca v. City of Manila, 41 Phil. 125[1920]). Thus, where there is doubts
as to what a provision of a statute means, the meaning put to the provision during the
legislative deliberation or discussion on the bill may be adopted (Arenas v. City of San
Carlos, 82 SCRA 318 [1978]).
The records of the Batasan, Vol. III, unmistakably show that the intention of the lawmakers
is to apply the law to whatever currency may be the subject thereof. The discussion on the
floor of the then Batasang Pambansa fully sustains this view, as follows:
“x x x x x x x x x.
“THE SPEAKER. The Gentleman from Basilan is recognized.
“MR.TUPAY. Parliamentary inquiry, Mr. Speaker.
“THE SPEAKER. The Gentleman may proceed.
“MR. TUPAY. Mr. Speaker, it has been mentioned by one of the Gentlemen who interpellated
that any check may be involved, like U.S. dollar checks, etc. We are talking about checks in
our country. There are U.S. dollar checks, checks in our currency, and many others.
“THE SPEAKER. The Sponsor may answer that inquiry.
“MR. MENDOZA. The bill refers to any check, Mr. Speaker, and this check may be a check in
whatever currency. This would not even be limited to U.S. dollar checks. The check may be
in French francs or Japanese yen or deutschunorhs. (sic.) If drawn, then this bill will apply.
“MR. TUPAY. So, it include U.S. dollar checks.
“MR. MENDOZA. Yes, Mr. Speaker.”
xxx xxx
(p. 1376, Records of the Batasan, Volume III; Italics supplied, for emphasis).
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-17931 February 28, 1963
CASCO PHILIPPINE CHEMICAL CO., INC., petitioner,
vs.
HON. PEDRO GIMENEZ, in his capacity as Auditor General of the Philippines,
and HON. ISMAEL MATHAY, in his capacity as Auditor of the Central Bank, respondents.
CONCEPCION, J.:
This is a petition for review of a decision of the Auditor General denying a claim for refund of
petitioner Casco Philippine Chemical Co., Inc.
The main facts are not disputed. Pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act No. 2609, otherwise
known as the Foreign Exchange Margin Fee Law, the Central Bank of the Philippines issued on
July 1, 1959, its Circular No. 95. fixing a uniform margin fee of 25% on foreign exchange
transactions. To supplement the circular, the Bank later promulgated a memorandum
establishing the procedure for applications for exemption from the payment of said fee, as
provided in said Republic Act No. 2609. Several times in November and December 1959,
petitioner Casco Philippine Chemical Co., Inc. — which is engaged in the manufacture of
synthetic resin glues, used in bonding lumber and veneer by plywood and hardwood producers
— bought foreign exchange for the importation of urea and formaldehyde — which are the
main raw materials in the production of said glues — and paid therefor the aforementioned
margin fee aggregating P33,765.42. In May, 1960, petitioner made another purchase of foreign
exchange and paid the sum of P6,345.72 as margin fee therefor.
Prior thereto, petitioner had sought the refund of the first sum of P33,765.42, relying upon
Resolution No. 1529 of the Monetary Board of said Bank, dated November 3, 1959, declaring
that the separate importation of urea and formaldehyde is exempt from said fee. Soon after
the last importation of these products, petitioner made a similar request for refund of the sum
of P6,345.72 paid as margin fee therefor. Although the Central Bank issued the corresponding
margin fee vouchers for the refund of said amounts, the Auditor of the Bank refused to pass in
audit and approve said vouchers, upon the ground that the exemption granted by the
Monetary Board for petitioner's separate importations of urea and formaldehyde is not in
accord with the provisions of section 2, paragraph XVIII of Republic Act No. 2609. On appeal
taken by petitioner, the Auditor General subsequently affirmed said action of the Auditor of
the Bank. Hence, this petition for review.
The only question for determination in this case is whether or not "urea" and "formaldehyde"
are exempt by law from the payment of the aforesaid margin fee. The pertinent portion of
Section 2 of Republic Act No. 2609 reads:
The margin established by the Monetary Board pursuant to the provision of section
one hereof shall not be imposed upon the sale of foreign exchange for the
importation of the following:.
xxx xxx xxx
XVIII. Urea formaldehyde for the manufacture of plywood and hardboard when
imported by and for the exclusive use of end-users.
Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the foregoing stipulation of facts be
admitted and approved by this Honorable Court, without prejudice to the parties
adducing other evidence to prove their case not covered by this stipulation of
facts. 1äwphï1.ñët
Petitioner maintains that the term "urea formaldehyde" appearing in this provision should be
construed as "urea andformaldehyde" (emphasis supplied) and that respondents herein, the
Auditor General and the Auditor of the Central Bank, have erred in holding otherwise. In this
connection, it should be noted that, whereas "urea" and "formaldehyde" are the principal raw
materials in the manufacture of synthetic resin glues, the National Institute of Science and
Technology has expressed, through its Commissioner, the view that:
Urea formaldehyde is not a chemical solution. It is the synthetic resin formed as a
condensation product from definite proportions of urea and formaldehyde under
certain conditions relating to temperature, acidity, and time of reaction. This
produce when applied in water solution and extended with inexpensive fillers
constitutes a fairly low cost adhesive for use in the manufacture of plywood.
Hence, "urea formaldehyde" is clearly a finished product, which is patently distinct and
different from urea" and "formaldehyde", as separate articles used in the manufacture of the
synthetic resin known as "urea formaldehyde". Petitioner contends, however, that the bill
approved in Congress contained the copulative conjunction "and" between the terms "urea"
and "formaldehyde", and that the members of Congress intended to exempt "urea" and
"formaldehyde" separately as essential elements in the manufacture of the synthetic resin glue
called "urea" formaldehyde", not the latter as a finished product, citing in support of this view
the statements made on the floor of the Senate, during the consideration of the bill before
said House, by members thereof. But, said individual statements do not necessarily reflect the
view of the Senate. Much less do they indicate the intent of the House of Representatives (see
Song Kiat Chocolate Factory vs. Central Bank, 54 Off. Gaz., 615; Mayon Motors Inc. vs. Acting
Commissioner of Internal Revenue, L-15000 [March 29, 1961]; Manila Jockey Club, Inc. vs.
Games & Amusement Board, L-12727 [February 29, 1960]). Furthermore, it is well settled that
the enrolled bill — which uses the term "urea formaldehyde" instead of "urea and
formaldehyde" — is conclusive upon the courts as regards the tenor of the measure passed by
Congress and approved by the President (Primicias vs. Paredes, 61 Phil. 118, 120; Mabanag vs.
Lopez Vito, 78 Phil. 1; Macias vs. Comm. on Elections, L-18684, September 14, 1961). If there
has been any mistake in the printing ofthe bill before it was certified by the officers of Congress
and approved by the Executive — on which we cannot speculate, without jeopardizing the
principle of separation of powers and undermining one of the cornerstones of our democratic
system — the remedy is by amendment or curative legislation, not by judicial decree.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs against the petitioner.
It is so ordered.
G.R. No. 127325 March 19, 1997
MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO, ALEXANDER PADILLA, and MARIA ISABEL
ONGPIN, petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, JESUS DELFIN, ALBERTO PEDROSA & CARMEN PEDROSA, in
their capacities as founding members of the People's Initiative for Reforms, Modernization
and Action (PIRMA), respondents.
SENATOR RAUL S. ROCO, DEMOKRASYA-IPAGTANGGOL ANG KONSTITUSYON (DIK),
MOVEMENT OF ATTORNEYS FOR BROTHERHOOD INTEGRITY AND NATIONALISM, INC.
(MABINI), INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES (IBP), and LABAN NG DEMOKRATIKONG
PILIPINO (LABAN), petitioners-intervenors.
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
The heart of this controversy brought to us by way of a petition for prohibition under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is the right of the people to directly propose amendments
to the Constitution through the system of initiative under Section 2 of Article XVII of the
1987 Constitution. Undoubtedly, this demands special attention, as this system of
initiative was unknown to the people of this country, except perhaps to a few scholars,
before the drafting of the 1987 Constitution. The 1986 Constitutional Commission itself,
through the original proponent1 and the main sponsor2 of the proposed Article on
Amendments or Revision of the Constitution, characterized this system as
"innovative".3 Indeed it is, for both under the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions, only two
methods of proposing amendments to, or revision of, the Constitution were
recognized, viz., (1) by Congress upon a vote of three-fourths of all its members and
(2) by a constitutional convention.4 For this and the other reasons hereafter discussed,
we resolved to give due course to this petition.
On 6 December 1996, private respondent Atty. Jesus S. Delfin filed with public
respondent Commission on Elections (hereafter, COMELEC) a "Petition to Amend the
Constitution, to Lift Term Limits of Elective Officials, by People's Initiative" (hereafter,
Delfin Petition)5 wherein Delfin asked the COMELEC for an order
1. Fixing the time and dates for signature gathering all over the
country;
2. Causing the necessary publications of said Order and the attached
"Petition for Initiative on the 1987 Constitution, in newspapers of
general and local circulation;
3. Instructing Municipal Election Registrars in all Regions of the
Philippines, to assist Petitioners and volunteers, in establishing
signing stations at the time and on the dates designated for the
purpose.
Delfin alleged in his petition that he is a founding member of the Movement for People's
Initiative,6 a group of citizens desirous to avail of the system intended to institutionalize
people power; that he and the members of the Movement and other volunteers intend
to exercise the power to directly propose amendments to the Constitution granted under
Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution; that the exercise of that power shall be
conducted in proceedings under the control and supervision of the COMELEC; that, as
required in COMELEC Resolution No. 2300, signature stations shall be established all
over the country, with the assistance of municipal election registrars, who shall verify
the signatures affixed by individual signatories; that before the Movement and other
volunteers can gather signatures, it is necessary that the time and dates to be
designated for the purpose be first fixed in an order to be issued by the COMELEC;
and that to adequately inform the people of the electoral process involved, it is likewise
necessary that the said order, as well as the Petition on which the signatures shall be
affixed, be published in newspapers of general and local circulation, under the control
and supervision of the COMELEC.
The Delfin Petition further alleged that the provisions sought to be amended are
Sections 4 and 7 of Article VI,7Section 4 of Article VII,8 and Section 8 of Article X9 of
the Constitution. Attached to the petition is a copy of a "Petition for Initiative on the 1987
Constitution" 10 embodying the proposed amendments which consist in the deletion
from the aforecited sections of the provisions concerning term limits, and with the
following proposition:
DO YOU APPROVE OF LIFTING THE TERM LIMITS OF ALL
ELECTIVE GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS, AMENDING FOR THE
PURPOSE SECTIONS 4 AND 7 OF ARTICLE VI, SECTION 4 OF
ARTICLE VII, AND SECTION 8 OF ARTICLE X OF THE 1987
PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION?
According to Delfin, the said Petition for Initiative will first be submitted to the people,
and after it is signed by at least twelve per cent of the total number of registered voters
in the country it will be formally filed with the COMELEC.
Upon the filing of the Delfin Petition, which was forthwith given the number UND 96-
037 (INITIATIVE), the COMELEC, through its Chairman, issued an Order 11 (a)
directing Delfin "to cause the publication of the petition, together with the attached
Petition for Initiative on the 1987 Constitution (including the proposal, proposed
constitutional amendment, and the signature form), and the notice of hearing in three
(3) daily newspapers of general circulation at his own expense" not later than 9
December 1996; and (b) setting the case for hearing on 12 December 1996 at 10:00
a.m.
At the hearing of the Delfin Petition on 12 December 1996, the following appeared:
Delfin and Atty. Pete Q. Quadra; representatives of the People's Initiative for Reforms,
Modernization and Action (PIRMA); intervenor-oppositor Senator Raul S. Roco,
together with his two other lawyers, and representatives of, or counsel for, the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), Demokrasya-Ipagtanggol ang Konstitusyon
(DIK), Public Interest Law Center, and Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino
(LABAN). 12 Senator Roco, on that same day, filed a Motion to Dismiss the Delfin
Petition on the ground that it is not the initiatory petition properly cognizable by the
COMELEC.
After hearing their arguments, the COMELEC directed Delfin and the oppositors to file
their "memoranda and/or oppositions/memoranda" within five days. 13
On 18 December 1996, the petitioners herein — Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago,
Alexander Padilla, and Maria Isabel Ongpin — filed this special civil action for
prohibition raising the following arguments:
(1) The constitutional provision on people's initiative to amend the
Constitution can only be implemented by law to be passed by
Congress. No such law has been passed; in fact, Senate Bill No.
1290 entitled An Act Prescribing and Regulating Constitution
Amendments by People's Initiative, which petitioner Senator
Santiago filed on 24 November 1995, is still pending before the
Senate Committee on Constitutional Amendments.
(2) It is true that R.A. No. 6735 provides for three systems of initiative,
namely, initiative on the Constitution, on statutes, and on local
legislation. However, it failed to provide any subtitle on initiative on
the Constitution, unlike in the other modes of initiative, which are
specifically provided for in Subtitle II and Subtitle III. This deliberate
omission indicates that the matter of people's initiative to amend the
Constitution was left to some future law. Former Senator Arturo
Tolentino stressed this deficiency in the law in his privilege speech
delivered before the Senate in 1994: "There is not a single word in
that law which can be considered as implementing [the provision on
constitutional initiative]. Such implementing provisions have been
obviously left to a separate law.
(3) Republic Act No. 6735 provides for the effectivity of the law after
publication in print media. This indicates that the Act covers only laws
and not constitutional amendments because the latter take effect
only upon ratification and not after publication.
(4) COMELEC Resolution No. 2300, adopted on 16 January 1991 to
govern "the conduct of initiative on the Constitution and initiative and
referendum on national and local laws, is ultra vires insofar
as initiative on amendments to the Constitution is concerned, since
the COMELEC has no power to provide rules and regulations for the
exercise of the right of initiative to amend the Constitution. Only
Congress is authorized by the Constitution to pass the implementing
law.
(5) The people's initiative is limited to amendments to the
Constitution, not to revision thereof. Extending or lifting of term limits
constitutes a revision and is, therefore, outside the power of the
people's initiative.
(6) Finally, Congress has not yet appropriated funds for people's
initiative; neither the COMELEC nor any other government
department, agency, or office has realigned funds for the purpose.
To justify their recourse to us via the special civil action for prohibition, the petitioners
allege that in the event the COMELEC grants the Delfin Petition, the people's initiative
spearheaded by PIRMA would entail expenses to the national treasury for general re-
registration of voters amounting to at least P180 million, not to mention the millions of
additional pesos in expenses which would be incurred in the conduct of the initiative
itself. Hence, the transcendental importance to the public and the nation of the issues
raised demands that this petition for prohibition be settled promptly and definitely,
brushing aside technicalities of procedure and calling for the admission of a taxpayer's
and legislator's suit. 14 Besides, there is no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy
in the ordinary course of law.
On 19 December 1996, this Court (a) required the respondents to comment on the
petition within a non-extendible period of ten days from notice; and (b) issued a
temporary restraining order, effective immediately and continuing until further orders,
enjoining public respondent COMELEC from proceeding with the Delfin Petition, and
private respondents Alberto and Carmen Pedrosa from conducting a signature drive for
people's initiative to amend the Constitution.
On 2 January 1997, private respondents, through Atty Quadra, filed their
Comment 15 on the petition. They argue therein that:
1. IT IS NOT TRUE THAT "IT WOULD ENTAIL EXPENSES TO THE
NATIONAL TREASURY FOR GENERAL REGISTRATION OF
VOTERS AMOUNTING TO AT LEAST PESOS: ONE HUNDRED
EIGHTY MILLION (P180,000,000.00)" IF THE "COMELEC GRANTS
THE PETITION FILED BY RESPONDENT DELFIN BEFORE THE
COMELEC.
2. NOT A SINGLE CENTAVO WOULD BE SPENT BY THE
NATIONAL GOVERNMENT IF THE COMELEC GRANTS THE
PETITION OF RESPONDENT DELFIN. ALL EXPENSES IN THE
SIGNATURE GATHERING ARE ALL FOR THE ACCOUNT OF
RESPONDENT DELFIN AND HIS VOLUNTEERS PER THEIR
PROGRAM OF ACTIVITIES AND EXPENDITURES SUBMITTED
TO THE COMELEC. THE ESTIMATED COST OF THE DAILY PER
DIEM OF THE SUPERVISING SCHOOL TEACHERS IN THE
SIGNATURE GATHERING TO BE DEPOSITED and TO BE PAID
BY DELFIN AND HIS VOLUNTEERS IS P2,571,200.00;
3. THE PENDING PETITION BEFORE THE COMELEC IS ONLY
ON THE SIGNATURE GATHERING WHICH BY LAW COMELEC IS
DUTY BOUND "TO SUPERVISE CLOSELY" PURSUANT TO ITS
"INITIATORY JURISDICTION" UPHELD BY THE HONORABLE
COURT IN ITS RECENT SEPTEMBER 26, 1996 DECISION IN THE
CASE OF SUBIC BAY METROPOLITAN AUTHORITY
VS. COMELEC, ET AL. G.R. NO. 125416;
 4. REP. ACT NO. 6735 APPROVED ON AUGUST 4, 1989 IS THE
ENABLING LAW IMPLEMENTING THE POWER OF PEOPLE
INITIATIVE TO PROPOSE AMENDMENTS TO THE
CONSTITUTION. SENATOR DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO'S SENATE
BILL NO. 1290 IS A DUPLICATION OF WHAT ARE ALREADY
PROVIDED FOR IN REP. ACT NO. 6735;
5. COMELEC RESOLUTION NO. 2300 PROMULGATED ON
JANUARY 16, 1991 PURSUANT TO REP. ACT 6735 WAS UPHELD
BY THE HONORABLE COURT IN THE RECENT SEPTEMBER 26,
1996 DECISION IN THE CASE OF SUBIC BAY METROPOLITAN
AUTHORITY VS. COMELEC, ET AL. G.R. NO. 125416 WHERE
THE HONORABLE COURT SAID: "THE COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS CAN DO NO LESS BY SEASONABLY AND
JUDICIOUSLY PROMULGATING GUIDELINES AND RULES FOR
BOTH NATIONAL AND LOCAL USE, IN IMPLEMENTING OF
THESE LAWS."
6. EVEN SENATOR DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO'S SENATE BILL NO.
1290 CONTAINS A PROVISION DELEGATING TO THE COMELEC
THE POWER TO "PROMULGATE SUCH RULES AND
REGULATIONS AS MAY BE NECESSARY TO CARRY OUT THE
PURPOSES OF THIS ACT." (SEC. 12, S.B. NO. 1290, ENCLOSED
AS ANNEX E, PETITION);
7. THE LIFTING OF THE LIMITATION ON THE TERM OF OFFICE
OF ELECTIVE OFFICIALS PROVIDED UNDER THE 1987
CONSTITUTION IS NOT A "REVISION" OF THE CONSTITUTION.
IT IS ONLY AN AMENDMENT. "AMENDMENT ENVISAGES AN
ALTERATION OF ONE OR A FEW SPECIFIC PROVISIONS OF
THE CONSTITUTION. REVISION CONTEMPLATES A RE-
EXAMINATION OF THE ENTIRE DOCUMENT TO DETERMINE
HOW AND TO WHAT EXTENT IT SHOULD BE ALTERED." (PP.
412-413, 2ND. ED. 1992, 1097 PHIL. CONSTITUTION, BY
JOAQUIN G. BERNAS, S.J.).
Also on 2 January 1997, private respondent Delfin filed in his own behalf a
Comment 16 which starts off with an assertion that the instant petition is a "knee-jerk
reaction to a draft 'Petition for Initiative on the 1987 Constitution'. . . which is not formally
filed yet." What he filed on 6 December 1996 was an "Initiatory Pleading" or "Initiatory
Petition," which was legally necessary to start the signature campaign to amend the
Constitution or to put the movement to gather signatures under COMELEC power and
function. On the substantive allegations of the petitioners, Delfin maintains as follows:
(1) Contrary to the claim of the petitioners, there is a law, R.A. No.
6735, which governs the conduct of initiative to amend the
Constitution. The absence therein of a subtitle for such initiative is
not fatal, since subtitles are not requirements for the validity or
sufficiency of laws.
(2) Section 9(b) of R.A. No. 6735 specifically provides that the
proposition in an initiative to amend the Constitution approved by the
majority of the votes cast in the plebiscite shall become effective as
of the day of the plebiscite.
(3) The claim that COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 is ultra vires is
contradicted by (a) Section 2, Article IX-C of the Constitution, which
grants the COMELEC the power to enforce and administer all laws
and regulations relative to the conduct of an election,
plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall; and (b) Section 20 of
R.A. 6735, which empowers the COMELEC to promulgate such rules
and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the purposes of
the Act.
(4) The proposed initiative does not involve a revision of, but
mere amendment to, the Constitution because it seeks to alter only
a few specific provisions of the Constitution, or more specifically, only
those which lay term limits. It does not seek to reexamine or overhaul
the entire document.
As to the public expenditures for registration of voters, Delfin considers petitioners'
estimate of P180 million as unreliable, for only the COMELEC can give the exact figure.
Besides, if there will be a plebiscite it will be simultaneous with the 1997 Barangay
Elections. In any event, fund requirements for initiative will be a priority government
expense because it will be for the exercise of the sovereign power of the people.
In the Comment 17 for the public respondent COMELEC, filed also on 2 January 1997,
the Office of the Solicitor General contends that:
(1) R.A. No. 6735 deals with, inter alia, people's initiative to amend
the Constitution. Its Section 2 on Statement of Policy explicitly
affirms, recognizes, and guarantees that power; and its Section 3,
which enumerates the three systems of initiative, includes initiative
on the Constitution and defines the same as the power to propose
amendments to the Constitution. Likewise, its Section 5 repeatedly
mentions initiative on the Constitution.
(2) A separate subtitle on initiative on the Constitution is not
necessary in R.A. No. 6735 because, being national in scope, that
system of initiative is deemed included in the subtitle on National
Initiative and Referendum; and Senator Tolentino simply overlooked
pertinent provisions of the law when he claimed that nothing therein
was provided for initiative on the Constitution.
(3) Senate Bill No. 1290 is neither a competent nor a material proof
that R.A. No. 6735 does not deal with initiative on the Constitution.
(4) Extension of term limits of elected officials constitutes a mere
amendment to the Constitution, not a revision thereof.
 (5) COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 was validly issued under Section
20 of R.A. No. 6735 and under the Omnibus Election Code. The rule-
making power of the COMELEC to implement the provisions of R.A.
No. 6735 was in fact upheld by this Court in Subic Bay Metropolitan
Authority vs. COMELEC.
On 14 January 1997, this Court (a) confirmed nunc pro tunc the temporary restraining
order; (b) noted the aforementioned Comments and the Motion to Lift Temporary
Restraining Order filed by private respondents through Atty. Quadra, as well as the
latter's Manifestation stating that he is the counsel for private respondents Alberto and
Carmen Pedrosa only and the Comment he filed was for the Pedrosas; and (c) granted
the Motion for Intervention filed on 6 January 1997 by Senator Raul Roco and allowed
him to file his Petition in Intervention not later than 20 January 1997; and (d) set the
case for hearing on 23 January 1997 at 9:30 a.m.
On 17 January 1997, the Demokrasya-Ipagtanggol ang Konstitusyon (DIK) and the
Movement of Attorneys for Brotherhood Integrity and Nationalism, Inc. (MABINI), filed
a Motion for Intervention. Attached to the motion was their Petition in Intervention, which
was later replaced by an Amended Petition in Intervention wherein they contend that:
(1) The Delfin proposal does not involve a mere amendment to, but
a revision of, the Constitution because, in the words of Fr. Joaquin
Bernas, S.J., 18 it would involve a change from a political philosophy
that rejects unlimited tenure to one that accepts unlimited tenure; and
although the change might appear to be an isolated one, it can affect
other provisions, such as, on synchronization of elections and on the
State policy of guaranteeing equal access to opportunities for public
service and prohibiting political dynasties. 19 A revision cannot be
done by initiative which, by express provision of Section 2 of Article
XVII of the Constitution, is limited to amendments.
(2) The prohibition against reelection of the President and the limits
provided for all other national and local elective officials are based
on the philosophy of governance, "to open up the political arena to
as many as there are Filipinos qualified to handle the demands of
leadership, to break the concentration of political and economic
powers in the hands of a few, and to promote effective proper
empowerment for participation in policy and decision-making for the
common good"; hence, to remove the term limits is to negate and
nullify the noble vision of the 1987 Constitution.
(3) The Delfin proposal runs counter to the purpose of initiative,
particularly in a conflict-of-interest situation. Initiative is intended as
a fallback position that may be availed of by the people only if they
are dissatisfied with the performance of their elective officials, but not
as a premium for good performance. 20
(4) R.A. No. 6735 is deficient and inadequate in itself to be called the
enabling law that implements the people's initiative on amendments
to the Constitution. It fails to state (a) the proper parties who may file
the petition, (b) the appropriate agency before whom the petition is
to be filed, (c) the contents of the petition, (d) the publication of the
same, (e) the ways and means of gathering the signatures of the
voters nationwide and 3% per legislative district, (f) the proper parties
who may oppose or question the veracity of the signatures, (g) the
role of the COMELEC in the verification of the signatures and the
sufficiency of the petition, (h) the appeal from any decision of the
COMELEC, (I) the holding of a plebiscite, and (g) the appropriation
of funds for such people's initiative. Accordingly, there being no
enabling law, the COMELEC has no jurisdiction to hear Delfin's
petition.
(5) The deficiency of R.A. No. 6735 cannot be rectified or remedied
by COMELEC Resolution No. 2300, since the COMELEC is without
authority to legislate the procedure for a people's initiative under
Section 2 of Article XVII of the Constitution. That function exclusively
pertains to Congress. Section 20 of R.A. No. 6735 does not
constitute a legal basis for the Resolution, as the former does not set
a sufficient standard for a valid delegation of power.
On 20 January 1997, Senator Raul Roco filed his Petition in
Intervention. 21 He avers that R.A. No. 6735 is the enabling law that implements the
people's right to initiate constitutional amendments. This law is a consolidation of
Senate Bill No. 17 and House Bill No. 21505; he co-authored the House Bill and even
delivered a sponsorship speech thereon. He likewise submits that the COMELEC was
empowered under Section 20 of that law to promulgate COMELEC Resolution No.
2300. Nevertheless, he contends that the respondent Commission is without
jurisdiction to take cognizance of the Delfin Petition and to order its publication because
the said petition is not the initiatory pleading contemplated under the Constitution,
Republic Act No. 6735, and COMELEC Resolution No. 2300. What vests jurisdiction
upon the COMELEC in an initiative on the Constitution is the filing of a petition for
initiative which is signed by the required number of registered voters. He also submits
that the proponents of a constitutional amendment cannot avail of the authority and
resources of the COMELEC to assist them is securing the required number of
signatures, as the COMELEC's role in an initiative on the Constitution is limited to the
determination of the sufficiency of the initiative petition and the call and supervision of
a plebiscite, if warranted.
On 20 January 1997, LABAN filed a Motion for Leave to Intervene.
The following day, the IBP filed a Motion for Intervention to which it attached a Petition
in Intervention raising the following arguments:
(1) Congress has failed to enact an enabling law mandated under
Section 2, Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution.
(2) COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 cannot substitute for the
required implementing law on the initiative to amend the Constitution.
 (3) The Petition for Initiative suffers from a fatal defect in that it does
not have the required number of signatures.
(4) The petition seeks, in effect a revision of the Constitution, which
can be proposed only by Congress or a constitutional convention. 22
On 21 January 1997, we promulgated a Resolution (a) granting the Motions for
Intervention filed by the DIK and MABINI and by the IBP, as well as the Motion for
Leave to Intervene filed by LABAN; (b) admitting the Amended Petition in Intervention
of DIK and MABINI, and the Petitions in Intervention of Senator Roco and of the IBP;
(c) requiring the respondents to file within a nonextendible period of five days their
Consolidated Comments on the aforesaid Petitions in Intervention; and (d) requiring
LABAN to file its Petition in Intervention within a nonextendible period of three days
from notice, and the respondents to comment thereon within a nonextendible period of
five days from receipt of the said Petition in Intervention.
At the hearing of the case on 23 January 1997, the parties argued on the following
pivotal issues, which the Court formulated in light of the allegations and arguments
raised in the pleadings so far filed:
1. Whether R.A. No. 6735, entitled An Act Providing for a System of
Initiative and Referendum and Appropriating Funds Therefor, was
intended to include or cover initiative on amendments to the
Constitution; and if so, whether the Act, as worded, adequately
covers such initiative.
2. Whether that portion of COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 (In re:
Rules and Regulations Governing the Conduct of Initiative on the
Constitution, and Initiative and Referendum on National and Local
Laws) regarding the conduct of initiative on amendments to the
Constitution is valid, considering the absence in the law of specific
provisions on the conduct of such initiative.
3. Whether the lifting of term limits of elective national and local
officials, as proposed in the draft "Petition for Initiative on the 1987
Constitution," would constitute a revision of, or an amendment to, the
Constitution.
4. Whether the COMELEC can take cognizance of, or has jurisdiction
over, a petition solely intended to obtain an order (a) fixing the time
and dates for signature gathering; (b) instructing municipal election
officers to assist Delfin's movement and volunteers in establishing
signature stations; and (c) directing or causing the publication
of, inter alia, the unsigned proposed Petition for Initiative on the 1987
Constitution.
5. Whether it is proper for the Supreme Court to take cognizance of
the petition when there is a pending case before the COMELEC.
After hearing them on the issues, we required the parties to submit simultaneously their
respective memoranda within twenty days and requested intervenor Senator Roco to
submit copies of the deliberations on House Bill No. 21505.
On 27 January 1997, LABAN filed its Petition in Intervention wherein it adopts the
allegations and arguments in the main Petition. It further submits that the COMELEC
should have dismissed the Delfin Petition for failure to state a sufficient cause of action
and that the Commission's failure or refusal to do so constituted grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
On 28 January 1997, Senator Roco submitted copies of portions of both the Journal
and the Record of the House of Representatives relating to the deliberations of House
Bill No. 21505, as well as the transcripts of stenographic notes on the proceedings of
the Bicameral Conference Committee, Committee on Suffrage and Electoral Reforms,
of 6 June 1989 on House Bill No. 21505 and Senate Bill No. 17.
Private respondents Alberto and Carmen Pedrosa filed their Consolidated Comments
on the Petitions in Intervention of Senator Roco, DIK and MABINI, and IBP. 23 The
parties thereafter filed, in due time, their separate memoranda. 24
As we stated in the beginning, we resolved to give due course to this special civil action.
For a more logical discussion of the formulated issues, we shall first take up the fifth
issue which appears to pose a prejudicial procedural question.
I
THE INSTANT PETITION IS VIABLE DESPITE THE PENDENCY IN THE
COMELEC OF THE DELFIN PETITION.
Except for the petitioners and intervenor Roco, the parties paid no serious attention to
the fifth issue, i.e., whether it is proper for this Court to take cognizance of this special
civil action when there is a pending case before the COMELEC. The petitioners provide
an affirmative answer. Thus:
28. The Comelec has no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the petition
filed by private respondent Delfin. This being so, it becomes
imperative to stop the Comelec from proceeding any further, and
under the Rules of Court, Rule 65, Section 2, a petition for prohibition
is the proper remedy.
29. The writ of prohibition is an extraordinary judicial writ issuing out
of a court of superior jurisdiction and directed to an inferior court, for
the purpose of preventing the inferior tribunal from usurping a
jurisdiction with which it is not legally vested. (People v. Vera, supra.,
p. 84). In this case the writ is an urgent necessity, in view of the highly
divisive and adverse environmental consequences on the body
politic of the questioned Comelec order. The consequent climate of
 legal confusion and political instability begs for judicial
statesmanship.
30. In the final analysis, when the system of constitutional law is
threatened by the political ambitions of man, only the Supreme Court
can save a nation in peril and uphold the paramount majesty of the
Constitution. 25
It must be recalled that intervenor Roco filed with the COMELEC a motion to dismiss
the Delfin Petition on the ground that the COMELEC has no jurisdiction or authority to
entertain the petition. 26 The COMELEC made no ruling thereon evidently because after
having heard the arguments of Delfin and the oppositors at the hearing on 12 December
1996, it required them to submit within five days their memoranda or
oppositions/memoranda. 27 Earlier, or specifically on 6 December 1996, it practically
gave due course to the Delfin Petition by ordering Delfin to cause the publication of the
petition, together with the attached Petition for Initiative, the signature form, and the
notice of hearing; and by setting the case for hearing. The COMELEC's failure to act
on Roco's motion to dismiss and its insistence to hold on to the petition rendered ripe
and viable the instant petition under Section 2 of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, which
provides:
Sec. 2. Petition for prohibition. — Where the proceedings of any
tribunal, corporation, board, or person, whether exercising functions
judicial or ministerial, are without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction,
or with grave abuse of discretion, and there is no appeal or any other
plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a
person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper
court alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be
rendered commanding the defendant to desist from further
proceedings in the action or matter specified therein.
It must also be noted that intervenor Roco claims that the COMELEC has no jurisdiction
over the Delfin Petition because the said petition is not supported by the required
minimum number of signatures of registered voters. LABAN also asserts that the
COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in refusing to dismiss the Delfin Petition, which
does not contain the required number of signatures. In light of these claims, the instant
case may likewise be treated as a special civil action for certiorari under Section I of
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
In any event, as correctly pointed out by intervenor Roco in his Memorandum, this Court
may brush aside technicalities of procedure in
cases of transcendental importance. As we stated in Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Guingona,
Jr. 28
A party's standing before this Court is a procedural technicality which
it may, in the exercise of its discretion, set aside in view of the
importance of issues raised. In the landmark Emergency Powers
Cases, this Court brushed aside this technicality because the
transcendental importance to the public of these cases demands that
they be settled promptly and definitely, brushing aside, if we must,
technicalities of procedure.
II
R.A. NO. 6735 INTENDED TO INCLUDE THE SYSTEM OF INITIATIVE ON
AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION, BUT IS, UNFORTUNATELY,
INADEQUATE TO COVER THAT SYSTEM.
Section 2 of Article XVII of the Constitution provides:
Sec. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly
proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition of at least
twelve per centum of the total number of registered voters, of which
every legislative district must be represented by at least three per
centum of the registered voters therein. No amendment under this
section shall be authorized within five years following the ratification
of this Constitution nor oftener than once every five years thereafter.
The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the exercise of this right.
This provision is not self-executory. In his book, 29 Joaquin Bernas, a member of the
1986 Constitutional Commission, stated:
Without implementing legislation Section 2 cannot operate. Thus,
although this mode of amending the Constitution is a mode of
amendment which bypasses congressional action, in the last
analysis it still is dependent on congressional action.
Bluntly stated, the right of the people to directly propose amendments to the
Constitution through the system of initiative would remain entombed in the
cold niche of the Constitution until Congress provides for its implementation.
Stated otherwise, while the Constitution has recognized or granted that right,
the people cannot exercise it if Congress, for whatever reason, does not
provide for its implementation.
This system of initiative was originally included in Section 1 of the draft Article on
Amendment or Revision proposed by the Committee on Amendments and Transitory
Provisions of the 1986 Constitutional Commission in its Committee Report No. 7
(Proposed Resolution No. 332). 30 That section reads as follows:
Sec. 1. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution may be proposed:
(a) by the National Assembly upon a vote of three-fourths of all its
members; or
(b) by a constitutional convention; or
 (c) directly by the people themselves thru initiative as provided for in
Article___ Section ___of the Constitution. 31
After several interpellations, but before the period of amendments, the
Committee submitted a new formulation of the concept of initiative which it
denominated as Section 2; thus:
MR. SUAREZ. Thank you, Madam President. May
we respectfully call attention of the Members of the
Commission that pursuant to the mandate given to
us last night, we submitted this afternoon a
complete Committee Report No. 7 which
embodies the proposed provision governing the
matter of initiative. This is now covered by Section
2 of the complete committee report. With the
permission of the Members, may I quote Section
2:
The people may, after five years from the date of the last plebiscite
held, directly propose amendments to this Constitution thru initiative
upon petition of at least ten percent of the registered voters.
This completes the blanks appearing in the original Committee
Report No. 7. 32
The interpellations on Section 2 showed that the details for carrying out Section 2 are
left to the legislature. Thus:
FR. BERNAS. Madam President, just two simple,
clarificatory questions.
First, on Section 1 on the matter of initiative upon
petition of at least 10 percent, there are no details
in the provision on how to carry this out. Do we
understand, therefore, that we are leaving this
matter to the legislature?
MR. SUAREZ. That is right, Madam President.
FR. BERNAS. And do we also understand,
therefore, that for as long as the legislature does
not pass the necessary implementing law on this,
this will not operate?
MR. SUAREZ. That matter was also taken up
during the committee hearing, especially with
respect to the budget appropriations which would
have to be legislated so that the plebiscite could
be called. We deemed it best that this matter be
left to the legislature. The Gentleman is right. In
any event, as envisioned, no amendment through
the power of initiative can be called until after five
years from the date of the ratification of this
Constitution. Therefore, the first amendment that
could be proposed through the exercise of this
initiative power would be after five years. It is
reasonably expected that within that five-year
period, the National Assembly can come up with
the appropriate rules governing the exercise of this
power.
FR. BERNAS. Since the matter is left to the
legislature — the details on how this is to be
carried out — is it possible that, in effect, what will
be presented to the people for ratification is the
work of the legislature rather than of the people?
Does this provision exclude that possibility?
MR. SUAREZ. No, it does not exclude that
possibility because even the legislature itself as a
body could propose that amendment, maybe
individually or collectively, if it fails to muster the
three-fourths vote in order to constitute itself as a
constituent assembly and submit that proposal to
the people for ratification through the process of
an initiative.
xxx xxx xxx
MS. AQUINO. Do I understand from the sponsor
that the intention in the proposal is to vest
constituent power in the people to amend the
Constitution?
MR. SUAREZ. That is absolutely correct, Madam
President.
MS. AQUINO. I fully concur with the underlying
precept of the proposal in terms of institutionalizing
popular participation in the drafting of the
Constitution or in the amendment thereof, but I
would have a lot of difficulties in terms of accepting
the draft of Section 2, as written. Would the
sponsor agree with me that in the hierarchy of
legal mandate, constituent power has primacy
over all other legal mandates?
 MR. SUAREZ. The Commissioner is right, Madam
President.
MS. AQUINO. And would the sponsor agree with
me that in the hierarchy of legal values, the
Constitution is source of all legal mandates and
that therefore we require a great deal of
circumspection in the drafting and in the
amendments of the Constitution?
MR. SUAREZ. That proposition is nondebatable.
MS. AQUINO. Such that in order to underscore the
primacy of constituent power we have a separate
article in the constitution that would specifically
cover the process and the modes of amending the
Constitution?
MR. SUAREZ. That is right, Madam President.
MS. AQUINO. Therefore, is the sponsor inclined,
as the provisions are drafted now, to again
concede to the legislature the process or the
requirement of determining the mechanics of
amending the Constitution by people's initiative?
MR. SUAREZ. The matter of implementing this
could very well be placed in the hands of the
National Assembly, not unless we can incorporate
into this provision the mechanics that would
adequately cover all the conceivable situations. 33
It was made clear during the interpellations that the aforementioned Section 2 is limited
to proposals to AMEND — not to REVISE — the Constitution; thus:
MR. SUAREZ. . . . This proposal was suggested
on the theory that this matter of initiative, which
came about because of the extraordinary
developments this year, has to be separated from
the traditional modes of amending the Constitution
as embodied in Section 1. The committee
members felt that this system of initiative should
not extend to the revision of the entire Constitution,
so we removed it from the operation of Section 1
of the proposed Article on Amendment or
Revision. 34
xxx xxx xxx
MS. AQUINO. In which case, I am seriously
bothered by providing this process of initiative as
a separate section in the Article on Amendment.
Would the sponsor be amenable to accepting an
amendment in terms of realigning Section 2 as
another subparagraph (c) of Section 1, instead of
setting it up as another separate section as if it
were a self-executing provision?
MR. SUAREZ. We would be amenable except
that, as we clarified a while ago, this process of
initiative is limited to the matter of amendment and
should not expand into a revision which
contemplates a total overhaul of the Constitution.
That was the sense that was conveyed by the
Committee.
MS. AQUINO. In other words, the Committee was
attempting to distinguish the coverage of modes
(a) and (b) in Section 1 to include the process of
revision; whereas the process of initiation to
amend, which is given to the public, would only
apply to amendments?
MR. SUAREZ. That is right. Those were the terms
envisioned in the Committee. 35
Amendments to the proposed Section 2 were thereafter introduced by then
Commissioner Hilario G. Davide, Jr., which the Committee accepted. Thus:
MR. DAVIDE. Thank you Madam President. I
propose to substitute the entire Section 2 with the
following:
MR. DAVIDE. Madam President, I have modified
the proposed amendment after taking into account
the modifications submitted by the sponsor himself
and the honorable Commissioners Guingona,
Monsod, Rama, Ople, de los Reyes and Romulo.
The modified amendment in substitution of the
proposed Section 2 will now read as follows:
"SECTION 2. — AMENDMENTS TO THIS
CONSTITUTION MAY LIKEWISE BE DIRECTLY
PROPOSED BY THE PEOPLE THROUGH
INITIATIVE UPON A PETITION OF AT LEAST
TWELVE PERCENT OF THE TOTAL NUMBER
Of REGISTERED VOTERS, OF WHICH EVERY
LEGISLATIVE DISTRICT MUST BE
REPRESENTED BY AT LEAST THREE
PERCENT OF THE REGISTERED VOTERS
 THEREOF. NO AMENDMENT UNDER THIS
SECTION SHALL BE AUTHORIZED WITHIN
FIVE YEARS FOLLOWING THE RATIFICATION
OF THIS CONSTITUTION NOR OFTENER THAN
ONCE EVERY FIVE YEARS THEREAFTER.
THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY SHALL BY LAW
PROVIDE FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE
EXERCISE OF THIS RIGHT.
MR. SUAREZ. Madam President, considering that
the proposed amendment is reflective of the sense
contained in Section 2 of our completed
Committee Report No. 7, we accept the proposed
amendment. 36
The interpellations which ensued on the proposed modified amendment to Section 2
clearly showed that it was a legislative act which must implement the exercise of the
right. Thus:
MR. ROMULO. Under Commissioner Davide's
amendment, is it possible for the legislature to set
forth certain procedures to carry out the initiative. .
.?
MR. DAVIDE. It can.
xxx xxx xxx
MR. ROMULO. But the Commissioner's
amendment does not prevent the legislature from
asking another body to set the proposition in
proper form.
MR. DAVIDE. The Commissioner is correct. In
other words, the implementation of this particular
right would be subject to legislation, provided the
legislature cannot determine anymore the
percentage of the requirement.
MR. ROMULO. But the procedures, including the
determination of the proper form for submission to
the people, may be subject to legislation.
MR. DAVIDE. As long as it will not destroy the
substantive right to initiate. In other words, none of
the procedures to be proposed by the legislative
body must diminish or impair the right conceded
here.
MR. ROMULO. In that provision of the
Constitution can the procedures which I have
discussed be legislated?
MR. DAVIDE. Yes. 37
Commissioner Davide also reaffirmed that his modified amendment strictly
confines initiative to AMENDMENTS to — NOT REVISION of — the Constitution. Thus:
MR. DAVIDE. With pleasure, Madam President.
MR. MAAMBONG. My first question:
Commissioner Davide's proposed amendment on
line 1 refers to "amendment." Does it not cover the
word "revision" as defined by Commissioner
Padilla when he made the distinction between the
words "amendments" and "revision"?
MR. DAVIDE. No, it does not, because
"amendments" and "revision" should be covered
by Section 1. So insofar as initiative is concerned,
it can only relate to "amendments" not
"revision." 38
Commissioner Davide further emphasized that the process of proposing amendments
through initiative must be more rigorous and difficult than the initiative on legislation.
Thus:
MR. DAVIDE. A distinction has to be made that
under this proposal, what is involved is an
amendment to the Constitution. To amend a
Constitution would ordinarily require a proposal by
the National Assembly by a vote of three-fourths;
and to call a constitutional convention would
require a higher number. Moreover, just to submit
the issue of calling a constitutional convention, a
majority of the National Assembly is required, the
import being that the process of amendment must
be made more rigorous and difficult than probably
initiating an ordinary legislation or putting an end
to a law proposed by the National Assembly by
way of a referendum. I cannot agree to reducing
the requirement approved by the Committee on
the Legislative because it would require another
voting by the Committee, and the voting as
precisely based on a requirement of 10 percent.
 Perhaps, I might present such a proposal, by way
of an amendment, when the Commission shall
take up the Article on the Legislative or on the
National Assembly on plenary sessions. 39
The Davide modified amendments to Section 2 were subjected to amendments, and
the final version, which the Commission approved by a vote of 31 in favor and 3 against,
reads as follows:
MR. DAVIDE. Thank you Madam President.
Section 2, as amended, reads as follows:
"AMENDMENT TO THIS CONSTITUTION MAY
LIKEWISE BE DIRECTLY PROPOSED BY THE
PEOPLE THROUGH INITIATIVE UPON A
PETITION OF AT LEAST TWELVE PERCENT OF
THE TOTAL NUMBER OF REGISTERED
VOTERS, OF WHICH EVERY LEGISLATIVE
DISTRICT MUST BE REPRESENTED BY AT
LEAST THREE PERCENT OF THE
REGISTERED VOTERS THEREOF. NO
AMENDMENT UNDER THIS SECTION SHALL
BE AUTHORIZED WITHIN FIVE YEARS
FOLLOWING THE RATIFICATION OF THIS
CONSTITUTION NOR OFTENER THAN ONCE
EVERY FIVE YEARS THEREAFTER.
THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY SHALL BY LAW
PROVIDE
FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE
EXERCISE OF THIS RIGHT. 40
The entire proposed Article on Amendments or Revisions was approved on
second reading on 9 July 1986. 41Thereafter, upon his motion for
reconsideration, Commissioner Gascon was allowed to introduce an
amendment to Section 2 which, nevertheless, was withdrawn. In view thereof,
the Article was again approved on Second and Third Readings on 1 August
1986. 42
However, the Committee on Style recommended that the approved Section 2 be
amended by changing "percent" to "per centum" and "thereof" to "therein" and deleting
the phrase "by law" in the second paragraph so that said paragraph reads: The
Congress 43 shall provide for the implementation of the exercise of this right. 44 This
amendment was approved and is the text of the present second paragraph of Section
2.
The conclusion then is inevitable that, indeed, the system of initiative on the
Constitution under Section 2 of Article XVII of the Constitution is not self-executory.
Has Congress "provided" for the implementation of the exercise of this right? Those
who answer the question in the affirmative, like the private respondents and intervenor
Senator Roco, point to us R.A. No. 6735.
There is, of course, no other better way for Congress to implement the exercise of the
right than through the passage of a statute or legislative act. This is the essence or
rationale of the last minute amendment by the Constitutional Commission to substitute
the last paragraph of Section 2 of Article XVII then reading:
The Congress 45 shall by law provide for the implementation of the
exercise of this right.
with
The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the exercise of
this right.
This substitute amendment was an investiture on Congress of a power to
provide for the rules implementing the exercise of the right. The "rules" means
"the details on how [the right] is to be carried out." 46
We agree that R.A. No. 6735 was, as its history reveals, intended to cover initiative to
propose amendments to the Constitution. The Act is a consolidation of House Bill No.
21505 and Senate Bill No. 17. The former was prepared by the Committee on Suffrage
and Electoral Reforms of the House of Representatives on the basis of two House Bills
referred to it, viz., (a) House Bill No. 497, 47 which dealt with the initiative and
referendum mentioned
in Sections 1 and 32 of Article VI of the Constitution; and (b) House Bill No.
988, 48 which dealt with the subject matter of House Bill No. 497, as well as with
initiative and referendum under Section 3 of Article X (Local Government) and initiative
provided for in Section 2 of Article XVII of the Constitution. Senate Bill No. 17 49 solely
dealt with initiative and referendum concerning ordinances or resolutions of local
government units. The Bicameral Conference Committee consolidated Senate Bill No.
17 and House Bill No. 21505 into a draft bill, which was subsequently approved on 8
June 1989 by the Senate 50 and by the House of Representatives. 51 This approved bill
is now R.A. No. 6735.
But is R.A. No. 6735 a full compliance with the power and duty of Congress to "provide
for the implementation of the exercise of the right?"
A careful scrutiny of the Act yields a negative answer.
First. Contrary to the assertion of public respondent COMELEC, Section 2 of the Act
does not suggest an initiative on amendments to the Constitution. The said section
reads:
Sec. 2. Statement and Policy. — The power of the people under a
system of initiative and referendum to directly propose, enact,
 approve or reject, in whole or in part, the Constitution, laws,
ordinances, or resolutions passed by any legislative body upon
compliance with the requirements of this Act is hereby affirmed,
recognized and guaranteed. (Emphasis supplied).
The inclusion of the word "Constitution" therein was a delayed afterthought.
That word is neither germane nor relevant to said section, which exclusively
relates to initiative and referendum on national laws and local laws,
ordinances, and resolutions. That section is silent as to amendments on the
Constitution. As pointed out earlier, initiative on the Constitution is confined
only to proposals to AMEND. The people are not accorded the power to
"directly propose, enact, approve, or reject, in whole or in part, the
Constitution" through the system of initiative. They can only do so with respect
to "laws, ordinances, or resolutions."
The foregoing conclusion is further buttressed by the fact that this section was lifted
from Section 1 of Senate Bill No. 17, which solely referred to a statement of policy on
local initiative and referendum and appropriately used the phrases "propose and enact,"
"approve or reject" and "in whole or in part." 52
Second. It is true that Section 3 (Definition of Terms) of the Act defines initiative on
amendments to the Constitution and mentions it as one of the three systems
of initiative, and that Section 5 (Requirements) restates the constitutional requirements
as to the percentage of the registered voters who must submit the proposal. But unlike
in the case of the other systems of initiative, the Act does not provide for the contents
of a petition for initiative on the Constitution. Section 5, paragraph (c) requires, among
other things, statement of the proposed law sought to be enacted, approved or rejected,
amended or repealed, as the case may be. It does not include, as among the contents
of the petition, the provisions of the Constitution sought to be amended, in the case of
initiative on the Constitution. Said paragraph (c) reads in full as follows:
(c) The petition shall state the following:
c.1 contents or text of the proposed law sought to be enacted,
approved or rejected, amended or repealed, as the case may be;
c.2 the proposition;
c.3 the reason or reasons therefor;
c.4 that it is not one of the exceptions provided therein;
c.5 signatures of the petitioners or registered voters; and
c.6 an abstract or summary proposition is not more than one hundred
(100) words which shall be legibly written or printed at the top of
every page of the petition. (Emphasis supplied).
The use of the clause "proposed laws sought to be enacted, approved or
rejected, amended or repealed" only strengthens the conclusion that Section
2, quoted earlier, excludes initiative on amendments to the Constitution.
Third. While the Act provides subtitles for National Initiative and Referendum (Subtitle
II) and for Local Initiative and Referendum (Subtitle III), no subtitle is provided
for initiative on the Constitution. This conspicuous silence as to the latter simply means
that the main thrust of the Act is initiative and referendum on national and local laws. If
Congress intended R.A. No. 6735 to fully provide for the implementation of
the initiative on amendments to the Constitution, it could have provided for a subtitle
therefor, considering that in the order of things, the primacy of interest, or hierarchy of
values, the right of the people to directly propose amendments to the Constitution is far
more important than the initiative on national and local laws.
We cannot accept the argument that the initiative on amendments to the Constitution
is subsumed under the subtitle on National Initiative and Referendum because it is
national in scope. Our reading of Subtitle II (National Initiative and Referendum) and
Subtitle III (Local Initiative and Referendum) leaves no room for doubt that the
classification is not based on the scope of the initiative involved, but on
its nature and character. It is "national initiative," if what is proposed to be adopted or
enacted is a national law, or a law which only Congress can pass. It is "local initiative"
if what is proposed to be adopted or enacted is a law, ordinance, or resolution which
only the legislative bodies of the governments of the autonomous regions, provinces,
cities, municipalities, and barangays can pass. This classification of initiative
into national and local is actually based on Section 3 of the Act, which we quote for
emphasis and clearer understanding:
Sec. 3. Definition of terms —
xxx xxx xxx
There are three (3) systems of initiative, namely:
a.1 Initiative on the Constitution which refers to a petition proposing
amendments to the Constitution;
a.2 Initiative on Statutes which refers to a petition proposing to enact
a national legislation; and
a.3 Initiative on local legislation which refers to a petition proposing
to enact a regional, provincial, city, municipal, or barangay law,
resolution or ordinance. (Emphasis supplied).
Hence, to complete the classification under subtitles there should have been a subtitle
on initiative on amendments to the Constitution. 53
A further examination of the Act even reveals that the subtitling is not accurate.
Provisions not germane to the subtitle on National Initiative and Referendum are placed
therein, like (1) paragraphs (b) and (c) of Section 9, which reads:
(b) The proposition in an initiative on the Constitution approved by
the majority of the votes cast in the plebiscite shall become effective
as to the day of the plebiscite.
(c) A national or local initiative proposition approved by majority of
the votes cast in an election called for the purpose shall become
effective fifteen (15) days after certification and proclamation of the
Commission. (Emphasis supplied).
(2) that portion of Section 11 (Indirect Initiative) referring to indirect initiative with the
legislative bodies of local governments; thus:
Sec. 11. Indirect Initiative. — Any duly accredited people's
organization, as defined by law, may file a petition for indirect
initiative with the House of Representatives, and other legislative
bodies. . . .
and (3) Section 12 on Appeal, since it applies to decisions of the COMELEC
on the findings of sufficiency or insufficiency of the petition for initiative or
referendum, which could be petitions for both national and local initiative and
referendum.
Upon the other hand, Section 18 on "Authority of Courts" under subtitle III on Local
Initiative and Referendum is misplaced, 54 since the provision therein applies to both
national and local initiative and referendum. It reads:
Sec. 18. Authority of Courts. — Nothing in this Act shall prevent or
preclude the proper courts from declaring null and void any
proposition approved pursuant to this Act for violation of the
Constitution or want of capacity of the local legislative body to enact
the said measure.
Curiously, too, while R.A. No. 6735 exerted utmost diligence and care in providing for
the details in the implementation of initiative and referendum on national and local
legislation thereby giving them special attention, it failed, rather intentionally, to do so
on the system of initiative on amendments to the Constitution. Anent the initiative on
national legislation, the Act provides for the following:
(a) The required percentage of registered voters to sign the petition and the contents
of the petition;
(b) The conduct and date of the initiative;
(c) The submission to the electorate of the proposition and the required number of votes
for its approval;
(d) The certification by the COMELEC of the approval of the proposition;
(e) The publication of the approved proposition in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper
of general circulation in the Philippines; and
(f) The effects of the approval or rejection of the proposition. 55
As regards local initiative, the Act provides for the following:
(a) The preliminary requirement as to the number of signatures of registered voters for
the petition;
(b) The submission of the petition to the local legislative body concerned;
(c) The effect of the legislative body's failure to favorably act thereon, and the invocation
of the power of initiative as a consequence thereof;
(d) The formulation of the proposition;
(e) The period within which to gather the signatures;
(f) The persons before whom the petition shall be signed;
(g) The issuance of a certification by the COMELEC through its official in the local
government unit concerned as to whether the required number of signatures have been
obtained;
(h) The setting of a date by the COMELEC for the submission of the proposition to the
registered voters for their approval, which must be within the period specified therein;
(i) The issuance of a certification of the result;
(j) The date of effectivity of the approved proposition;
(k) The limitations on local initiative; and
(l) The limitations upon local legislative bodies. 56
Upon the other hand, as to initiative on amendments to the Constitution, R.A. No. 6735,
in all of its twenty-three sections, merely (a) mentions, the word "Constitution" in Section
2; (b) defines "initiative on the Constitution" and includes it in the enumeration of the
three systems of initiative in Section 3; (c) speaks of "plebiscite" as the process by
which the proposition in an initiative on the Constitution may be approved or rejected
by the people; (d) reiterates the constitutional requirements as to the number of voters
who should sign the petition; and (e) provides for the date of effectivity of the approved
proposition.
There was, therefore, an obvious downgrading of the more important or the paramount
system of initiative. RA. No. 6735 thus delivered a humiliating blow to the system of
initiative on amendments to the Constitution by merely paying it a reluctant lip
service. 57
The foregoing brings us to the conclusion that R.A. No. 6735 is incomplete, inadequate,
or wanting in essential terms and conditions insofar as initiative on amendments to the
Constitution is concerned. Its lacunae on this substantive matter are fatal and cannot
be cured by "empowering" the COMELEC "to promulgate such rules and regulations
as may be necessary to carry out the purposes of [the] Act. 58
The rule is that what has been delegated, cannot be delegated or as expressed in a
Latin maxim: potestas delegata non delegari potest. 59 The recognized exceptions to
the rule are as follows:
(1) Delegation of tariff powers to the President under Section 28(2) of Article VI of the
Constitution;
(2) Delegation of emergency powers to the President under Section 23(2) of Article VI
of the Constitution;
(3) Delegation to the people at large;
(4) Delegation to local governments; and
60
(5) Delegation to administrative bodies.
Empowering the COMELEC, an administrative body exercising quasi-judicial functions,
to promulgate rules and regulations is a form of delegation of legislative authority under
no. 5 above. However, in every case of permissible delegation, there must be a showing
that the delegation itself is valid. It is valid only if the law (a) is complete in itself, setting
forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out, or implemented by the delegate;
and (b) fixes a standard — the limits of which are sufficiently determinate and
determinable — to which the delegate must conform in the performance of his
functions. 61 A sufficient standard is one which defines legislative policy, marks its
limits, maps out its boundaries and specifies the public agency to apply it. It indicates
the circumstances under which the legislative command is to be effected. 62
Insofar as initiative to propose amendments to the Constitution is concerned, R.A. No.
6735 miserably failed to satisfy both requirements in subordinate legislation. The
delegation of the power to the COMELEC is then invalid.
III
COMELEC RESOLUTION NO. 2300, INSOFAR AS IT PRESCRIBES RULES
AND REGULATIONS ON THE CONDUCT OF INITIATIVE ON
AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION, IS VOID.
It logically follows that the COMELEC cannot validly promulgate rules and regulations
to implement the exercise of the right of the people to directly propose amendments to
the Constitution through the system of initiative. It does not have that power under R.A.
No. 6735. Reliance on the COMELEC's power under Section 2(1) of Article IX-C of the
Constitution is misplaced, for the laws and regulations referred to therein are those
promulgated by the COMELEC under (a) Section 3 of Article IX-C of the Constitution,
or (b) a law where subordinate legislation is authorized and which satisfies the
"completeness" and the "sufficient standard" tests.
IV
COMELEC ACTED WITHOUT JURISDICTION OR WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION IN ENTERTAINING THE DELFIN PETITION.
Even if it be conceded ex gratia that R.A. No. 6735 is a full compliance with the power
of Congress to implement the right to initiate constitutional amendments, or that it has
validly vested upon the COMELEC the power of subordinate legislation and that
COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 is valid, the COMELEC acted without jurisdiction or
with grave abuse of discretion in entertaining the Delfin Petition.
Under Section 2 of Article XVII of the Constitution and Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 6735, a
petition for initiative on the Constitution must be signed by at least 12% of the total
number of registered voters of which every legislative district is represented by at least
3% of the registered voters therein. The Delfin Petition does not contain signatures of
the required number of voters. Delfin himself admits that he has not yet gathered
signatures and that the purpose of his petition is primarily to obtain assistance in his
drive to gather signatures. Without the required signatures, the petition cannot be
deemed validly initiated.
The COMELEC acquires jurisdiction over a petition for initiative only after its filing. The
petition then is the initiatory pleading. Nothing before its filing is cognizable by the
COMELEC, sitting en banc. The only participation of the COMELEC or its personnel
before the filing of such petition are (1) to prescribe the form of the petition; 63 (2) to
issue through its Election Records and Statistics Office a certificate on the total number
of registered voters in each legislative district; 64 (3) to assist, through its election
registrars, in the establishment of signature stations; 65 and (4) to verify, through its
election registrars, the signatures on the basis of the registry list of voters, voters'
affidavits, and voters' identification cards used in the immediately preceding election. 66
Since the Delfin Petition is not the initiatory petition under R.A. No. 6735 and
COMELEC Resolution No. 2300, it cannot be entertained or given cognizance of by the
COMELEC. The respondent Commission must have known that the petition does not
fall under any of the actions or proceedings under the COMELEC Rules of Procedure
or under Resolution No. 2300, for which reason it did not assign to the petition a docket
number. Hence, the said petition was merely entered as UND, meaning, undocketed.
That petition was nothing more than a mere scrap of paper, which should not have
been dignified by the Order of 6 December 1996, the hearing on 12 December 1996,
and the order directing Delfin and the oppositors to file their memoranda or oppositions.
In so dignifying it, the COMELEC acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion and merely wasted its time, energy, and resources.

The foregoing considered, further discussion on the issue of whether the proposal to
lift the term limits of elective national and local officials is an amendment to, and not
a revision of, the Constitution is rendered unnecessary, if not academic.

CONCLUSION

This petition must then be granted, and the COMELEC should be permanently enjoined
from entertaining or taking cognizance of any petition for initiative on amendments to
the Constitution until a sufficient law shall have been validly enacted to provide for the
implementation of the system.

We feel, however, that the system of initiative to propose amendments to the

Constitution should no longer be kept in the cold; it should be given flesh and blood,
energy and strength. Congress should not tarry any longer in complying with the
constitutional mandate to provide for the implementation of the right of the people under
that system.

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered

a) GRANTING the instant petition;

b) DECLARING R.A. No. 6735 inadequate to cover the system of initiative on

amendments to the Constitution, and to have failed to provide sufficient standard for
subordinate legislation;

c) DECLARING void those parts of Resolution No. 2300 of the Commission on

Elections prescribing rules and regulations on the conduct of initiative or amendments
to the Constitution; and

d) ORDERING the Commission on Elections to forthwith DISMISS the DELFIN petition

(UND-96-037).

The Temporary Restraining Order issued on 18 December 1996 is made permanent

as against the Commission on Elections, but is LIFTED as against private respondents.

Resolution on the matter of contempt is hereby reserved.

SO ORDERED.