OCLARIT, Jon Raymer P. Local Government Code 1st Semester, S.Y.

2018-2019
PSU School of Law Case Digests Compilation

Province of Batangas vs. Romulo, et al., G.R. No. 152774, May 27, 2004

Facts: In 1998, then President Estrada issued EO No. 48 establishing the “Program for Devolution Adjustment and
Equalization” to enhance the capabilities of LGUs in the discharge of the functions and services devolved to them through
the LGC. The Oversight Committee under Executive Secretary Ronaldo Zamora passed Resolutions No. OCD-99-005, OCD-
99-006 and OCD-99-003 which were approved by Pres. Estrada on October 6, 1999. The guidelines formulated by the
Oversight Committee required the LGUs to identify the projects eligible for funding under the portion of LGSEF and submit
the project proposals and other requirements to the DILG for appraisal before the Committee serves notice to the DBM
for the subsequent release of the corresponding funds. Hon. Herminaldo Mandanas, Governor of Batangas, petitioned to
declare unconstitutional and void certain provisos contained in the General Appropriations Acts (GAAs) of 1999, 2000, and
2001, insofar as they uniformly earmarked for each corresponding year the amount of P5billion for the Internal Revenue
Allotment (IRA) for the Local Government Service Equalization Fund (LGSEF) & imposed conditions for the release thereof.

Issue: Whether the assailed provisos in the GAAs of 1999, 2000, and 2001, and the OCD resolutions infringe the
Constitution and the LGC of 1991.

Held: Yes. The assailed provisos in the GAAs of 1999, 2000, and 2001, and the OCD resolutions constitute a “withholding”
of a portion of the IRA – they effectively encroach on the fiscal autonomy enjoyed by LGUs and must be struck down.
According to Art. II, Sec.25 of the Constitution, “the State shall ensure the local autonomy of local governments“.
Consistent with the principle of local autonomy, the Constitution confines the President’s power over the LGUs to one of
general supervision, which has been interpreted to exclude the power of control. Drilon v. Lim distinguishes supervision
from control: control lays down the rules in the doing of an act the officer has the discretion to order his subordinate to
do or redo the act, or decide to do it himself; supervision merely sees to it that the rules are followed but has no authority
to set down the rules or the discretion to modify/replace them.

Llamas vs. Orbos, 202 SCRA 844

Facts: Ocampo III was the governor of Tarlac Province. Llamas together with some other complainants filed an
administrative case against Ocampo III for alleged acts constituting graft and corruption. Ocampo III was found guilty. He
was suspended for office for 90 days hence his vice governor, Llamas, assumed office. In not less than 30 days however,
Ocampo III returned with an AO showing that he was pardoned hence he can resume office without completing the 90
day suspension imposed upon him.

Issue: Whether pardon is applicable to administrative cases.

Held: The SC held that pardon is applicable to Administrative cases. The SC does not clearly see any valid and convincing
reason why the President cannot grant executive clemency in administrative cases. It is a considered view that if the
President can grant reprieves, commutations and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures in criminal cases, with much
more reason can she grant executive clemency in administrative cases, which are clearly less serious than criminal
offenses.

Chavez vs. Sandigabayan, 193 SCRA 282

Facts: Civil case was filed against Enrile in the Sandiganbayan for alleged illegal activities made by Enrile during the
Marcos era. Enrile filed a motion to dismiss and compulsory counter-claim. In the counter-claim Enrile moved to implead
Chavez and other PCGG officials on the basis that the case filed against him was a “harassment suit”. The motion to
implead Chavez and others was granted by the Sandiganbayan. Chavez and the PCGG officials raised the defense that they
are immune from suit by virtue of Sec. 4 of Executive Order NO. 1. It was found in the records of the PCGG, declared by
Jovito Salonga, the there are no proof linking Enrile with the illegal activities performed by Marcos. It was further averred
that the case filed against Enrile was instigated by Sol. Gen. Chavez. Sol. Gen. Chavez defended himself by saying that he
was acting as a counsel and cannot be made a defendant in a counter-claim.

Issue: Whether Sol. Gen. Chavez can be made liable for damages in filing the suit against Enrile.

Held: The court held that the grounds for allowing the compulsory counter-claim of Enrile was based on the malice or
bad faith of Chavez in filing the suit. It was further stated by the court that immunity from suit is granted only because of
the fact that the Commission has a multitude of task. Immunity for suit on members of the PCGG and other public officers
is available only if such officers are acting in good faith and in the performance of their duty. If the acts done are tainted
with bad faith or in excess of authority they can be held liable personally for damages. In the case at bar the Sol. Gen.
OCLARIT, Jon Raymer P. Local Government Code 1st Semester, S.Y. 2018-2019
PSU School of Law Case Digests Compilation

exceeded his authority and his act is tainted with bad faith by filing baseless suit against Enrile. His office does not give
him the license to prosecute recklessly to the injury of another. Thus he is made liable from his actions in the opinion of
the court.

Montano vs. Silovosa, 97 Phil Reports 143

Facts: Jose Mondano was the mayor of Mainit, Surigao. A complaint was filed against him for rape and concubinage. The
information reached the Assistant Executive Secretary who ordered the governor to investigate the matter. Consequently,
Governor Fernando Silvosa then summoned Mondano and the latter appeared before him. Thereafter Silvosa suspended
Mondano. Mondano filed a petition for prohibition enjoining the governor from further proceeding. In his defense, Silvosa
invoked the Revised Administrative Code which provided that he, as part of the executive and by virtue of the order given
by the Assistant Executive Secretary, is with “direct control, direction, and supervision over all bureaus and offices under
his jurisdiction . . .” and to that end “may order the investigation of any act or conduct of any person in the service of any
bureau or office under his Department and in connection therewith may appoint a committee or designate an official or
person who shall conduct such investigations.

Issue: Whether the Governor, as agent of the Executive, can exercise the power of control over a mayor.

Held: Under the constitutional provision the President has been invested with the power of control of all the executive
departments, bureaus, or offices, but not of all local governments over which he has been granted only the power of
general supervision as may be provided by law. The Department head as agent of the President has direct control and
supervision over all bureaus and offices under his jurisdiction as provided for in section 79(c) of the Revised Administrative
Code, but he does not have the same control of local governments as that exercised by him over bureaus and offices under
his jurisdiction.

Carpio vs. Executive Secretary, 206 SCRA 290

Facts: In 1990, Republic Act No. 6975 entitled “AN ACT ESTABLISHING THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE UNDER A
REORGANIZED DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES” was passed.
Antonio Carpio, as a member of the bar and a defender of the Constitution, assailed the constitutionality of the said law
as he averred that it only interferes with the control power of the president.

He advances the view that RA 6975 weakened the National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM) by limiting its power “to
administrative control” over the PNP thus, “control” remained with the Department Secretary under whom both the NPC
and the PNP were placed; that the system of letting local executives choose local police heads also undermine the power
of the president.

Issue: Whether the president abdicated its control power over the PNP and NPC by virtue of RA 6975.

Held: No. The President has control of all executive departments, bureaus, and offices. This presidential power of control
over the executive branch of government extends over all executive officers from Cabinet Secretary to the lowliest clerk.
Equally well accepted, as a corollary rule to the control powers of the President, is the “Doctrine of Qualified Political
Agency”. As the President cannot be expected to exercise his control powers all at the same time and in person, he will
have to delegate some of them to his Cabinet members.

Ganzon vs. CA, 200 SCRA 271

Facts: Ganzon, after having been issued three successive 60-day of suspension order by Secretary of Local Government,
filed a petition for prohibition with the CA to bar Secretary Santos from implementing the said orders. Ganzon was faced
with 10 administrative complaints on various charges on abuse of authority and grave misconduct.

Issue: Whether or not the Secretary of Local Government (as the alter ego of the President) has the authority to suspend
and remove local officials.

Held: The Constitution did nothing more, and insofar as existing legislation authorizes the President (through the
Secretary of Local Government) to proceed against local officials administratively, the Constitution contains no
prohibition. The Chief Executive is not banned from exercising acts of disciplinary authority because she did not exercise
control powers, but because no law allowed her to exercise disciplinary authority.
OCLARIT, Jon Raymer P. Local Government Code 1st Semester, S.Y. 2018-2019
PSU School of Law Case Digests Compilation

Pelaez vs. Auditor General, 15 SCRA 569

Facts: The President of the Philippines, purporting to act pursuant to Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code,
issued Executive Orders Nos. 93 to 121, 124 and 126 to 129; creating thirty-three (33) municipalities enumerated in the
margin. Petitioner Emmanuel Pelaez, as Vice President of the Philippines and as taxpayer, instituted the present special
civil action, for a writ of prohibition with preliminary injunction, against the Auditor General, to restrain him, as well as his
representatives and agents, from passing in audit any expenditure of public funds in implementation of said executive
orders and/or any disbursement by said municipalities. Petitioner alleges that said executive orders are null and void,
upon the ground that said Section 68 has been impliedly repealed by Republic Act No. 2370 effective January 1, 1960 and
constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power. The third paragraph of Section 3 of Republic Act No. 2370, reads:
“Barrios shall not be created or their boundaries altered nor their names changed except under the provisions of this Act
or by Act of Congress.”

Issue: Whether Section 68 of Revised Administrative Code constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power.

Held: Yes. It did entail an undue delegation of legislative powers. The alleged power of the President to create municipal
corporations would necessarily connote the exercise by him of an authority even greater than that of control which he
has over the executive departments, bureaus or offices. In other words, Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code
does not merely fail to comply with the constitutional mandate. Instead of giving the President less power over local
governments than that vested in him over the executive departments, bureaus or offices, it reverses the process and does
the exact opposite, by conferring upon him more power over municipal corporations than that which he has over said
executive departments, bureaus or offices.

City Government of Quezon City et al. vs. Ericta, G.R. No. L-34915, June 24, 1983

Facts: An ordinance was promulgated in Quezon City which approved the regulation of establishment of private
cemeteries in the said city. According to the ordinance, 6% of the total area of the private memorial park shall be set aside
for charity burial of deceased persons who are paupers and have been residents of QC. Himlayang Pilipino, a private
memorial park, contends that the taking or confiscation of property restricts the use of property such that it cannot be
used for any reasonable purpose and deprives the owner of all beneficial use of his property. It also contends that the
taking is not a valid exercise of police power, since the properties taken in the exercise of police power are destroyed and
not for the benefit of the public.

Issue: Whether the ordinance made by Quezon City is a valid taking of private property.

Held: No, the ordinance made by Quezon City is not a valid way of taking private property. The ordinance is actually a
taking without compensation of a certain area from a private cemetery to benefit paupers who are charges of the
municipal corporation. Instead of building or maintaining a public cemeteries. State's exercise of the power of
expropriation requires payment of just compensation. Passing the ordinance without benefiting the owner of the property
with just compensation or due process, would amount to unjust taking of a real property. Since the property that is needed
to be taken will be used for the public's benefit, then the power of the state to expropriate will come forward and not the
police power of the state.

Tano vs. Socrates, 278 SCRA 154

Facts: On Dec 15, 1992, the Sangguniang Panglungsod ng Puerto Princesa enacted an ordinance banning the shipment
of all live fish and lobster outside Puerto Princesa City from January 1, 1993 to January 1, 1998. Subsequently the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan, Provincial Government of Palawan enacted a resolution prohibiting the catching , gathering,
possessing, buying, selling, and shipment of a several species of live marine coral dwelling aquatic organisms for 5 years,
in and coming from Palawan waters. Petitioners filed a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition, praying that the
court declare the said ordinances and resolutions as unconstitutional on the ground that the said ordinances deprived
them of the due process of law, their livelihood, and unduly restricted them from the practice of their trade, in violation
of Section 2, Article XII and Sections 2 and 7 of Article XIII of the 1987 Constitution.

Issue: Are the challenged ordinances unconstitutional?

Held: No. The Supreme Court found the petitioners contentions baseless and held that the challenged ordinances did
not suffer from any infirmity, both under the Constitution and applicable laws. There is absolutely no showing that any of
the petitioners qualifies as a subsistence or marginal fisherman. Besides, Section 2 of Article XII aims primarily not to
OCLARIT, Jon Raymer P. Local Government Code 1st Semester, S.Y. 2018-2019
PSU School of Law Case Digests Compilation

bestow any right to subsistence fishermen, but to lay stress on the duty of the State to protect the nation’s marine wealth.
The so-called “preferential right” of subsistence or marginal fishermen to the use of marine resources is not at all absolute.

In accordance with the Regalian Doctrine, marine resources belong to the state and pursuant to the first paragraph of
Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution, their “exploration, development and utilization...shall be under the full control
and supervision of the State.

Faviz vs. City of Baguio, G.R. No. L-29910

Facts: Antonio Favis owns a parcel of land fronting Lapu-Lapu Street in Baguio City. There is an 8-meter wide passage
from his property to the street. In 1961, the city authorized a new contract of lease between it and Shell. The contract
stipulated a widened lot for Shell to build its structure and this necessitates the taking of at least 4 meters from the 8
meter wide passage being used by Favis. Favis assailed this contract. There was also a law in place that time stating that
streets and roads should be not less than 10 meters (but existing roads which are less than 10 meters are retained to avoid
massive expenses in expropriation cases in case the 10 meter is strictly imposed). Said law is argued by Favis to be violated.
Favis also argues that the city council does not have the power to close city streets like Lapu-Lapu Street. He asserts that
since municipal bodies have no inherent power to vacate or withdraw a street from public use, there must be a specific
grant by the legislative body to the city or municipality concerned.

Issue: Whether the City can withdraw parts of a street from public use and use the remainder as a mere alley.

Held: Yes. Looking at the city’s charter, the city is empowered to close a city street (Section 2557 of Revised
Administrative Code – Baguio Charter). Considering that “municipal corporations in the Philippines are mere creatures of
Congress; that, as such, said corporations possessed, and may exercise, only such power as Congress may deem fit to grant
thereto”, as what actually happened in the case at bar, the city was granted such power via its charter.

Macasiano vs. Diokno, G.R. No. 97764, August 10, 1992

Facts: The Municipality of Paranque passed an ordinance that authorized the closure of J. Gabriel, G.G. Cruz, Bayanihan,
Lt. Garcia Extension and Opena Streets located at Baclaran, Paranaque Metro Manila and the establishment of a flea
market thereon. Thereafter, the municipal council of Paranaque issued a resolution authorizing Paranaque Mayor
Walfrido N. Ferrer to enter into a contract with any service cooperative for the establishment, operation, maintenance
and management of flea markets and/or vending areas.

Issue: Whether an ordinance or resolution which authorizes the lease and use of public streets or thoroughfares as sites
for flea markets is valid.

Held: No. The aforementioned streets are local roads used for public service and are therefore considered public
properties of respondent municipality. Article 424 of the Civil Code provides that properties of public dominion devoted
for public use and made available to the public in general are outside the commerce of man and cannot be disposed of or
leased by the local government unit to private persons. Properties of the local government which are devoted to public
service are deemed public and are under the absolute control of Congress. Hence, LGUs have no authority whatsoever to
control or regulate the use of public properties unless specific authority is vested upon them by Congress.

Dela Cruz vs. Paras, G.R. Nos. L-42571 or 2571-2, July 25, 1983

Facts: Assailed was the validity of an ordinance which prohibit the operation of night clubs. Petitioners contended that
the ordinance is invalid, tainted with nullity, the municipality being devoid of power to prohibit a lawful business,
occupation or calling. RA 938, as amended, was originally enacted on June 20, 1953. It is entitled: "An Act Granting
Municipal or City Boards and Councils the Power to Regulate the Establishments, Maintenance and Operation of Certain
Places of Amusement within Their Respective Territorial Jurisdictions.' Petitioners contended that RA 938 which prohibits
the operation of night clubs would give rise to a constitutional question. The lower court upheld the constitutionality and
validity of Ordinance No. 84 and dismissed the cases. Hence this petition for certiorari by way of appeal.

Issue: Whether the ordinance is valid.

Held: NO. It is unconstitutional. It undoubtly involves a measure not embraced within the regulatory power but an
exercise of an assumed power to prohibit. Under the Local Govt Code, it is clear that municipal corporations cannot
prohibit the operation of night clubs. They may be regulated, but not prevented from carrying on their business. It would
be, therefore, an exercise in futility if the decision under review were sustained. All that petitioners would have to do is
OCLARIT, Jon Raymer P. Local Government Code 1st Semester, S.Y. 2018-2019
PSU School of Law Case Digests Compilation

to apply once more for licenses to operate night clubs. A refusal to grant licenses, because no such businesses could legally
open, would be subject to judicial correction. That is to comply with the legislative will to allow the operation and
continued existence of night clubs subject to appropriate regulations. In the meanwhile, to compel petitioners to close
their establishments, the necessary result of an affirmance, would amount to no more than a temporary termination of
their business.

Balacuit et al. vs. CFI of Agusan del Norte et al., G.R. No. L-38429, June 30, 1998

Facts: This involves a Petition for Review questioning the validity and constitutionality of Ordinance No.640 passed by
the Municipal Board of the City of Butuan on April 21, 1969, penalizing any person, group of persons, entity or corporation
engaged in the business of selling admission tickets to any movie or other public exhibitions, games, contests or other
performances to require children between 7 and 12years of age to pay full payment for tickets intended for adults but
should charge only one-half of the said ticket. Petitioners who are managers of theaters, affected by the ordinance, filed
a Complaint before the Court of First Instance of Agusan del Norte and Butuan City docketed as Special Civil No. 237 on
June 30,1969, praying that the subject ordinance be declared unconstitutional and, therefore, void and unenforceable.
The Court rendered judgment declaring Ordinance No. 640 of the City of Butuan constitutional and valid.

Issue: Whether Ordinance No. 640 passed by the Municipal Board of the City of Butuan is valid and constitutional and
was the Ordinance a valid exercise of police power.

Held: It is already settled that the operation of theaters, cinematographs and other places of public exhibition are
subject to regulation by the municipal council in the exercise of delegated police power by the local government. However,
to invoke the exercise of police power, not only must it appear that the interest of the public generally requires an
interference with private rights, but the means adopted must be reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the
purpose and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. The legislature may not, under the guise of protecting the public
interest, arbitrarily interfere with private business, or impose unusual and unnecessary restrictions upon lawful
occupations. In other words, the determination as to what is a proper exercise of its police power is not final or conclusive,
but is subject to the supervision of the courts.

Binay vs. Domingo, G.R. No. 92389, September 11, 1991

Facts: Petitioner Municipality of Makati, through its Council, approved Resolution No. 60 which extends P500 burial
assistance to bereaved families whose gross family income does not exceed P2,000.00 a month. The funds are to be taken
out of the unappropriated available funds in the municipal treasury. The Metro Manila Commission approved the
resolution. Thereafter, the municipal secretary certified a disbursement of P400,000.00 for the implementation of the
program. However, the Commission on Audit disapproved said resolution and the disbursement of funds for the
implementation thereof for the following reasons: (1) the resolution has no connection to alleged public safety, general
welfare, safety, etc. of the inhabitants of Makati; (2) government funds must be disbursed for public purposes only; and,
(3) it violates the equal protection clause since it will only benefit a few individuals.

Issue: Whether Resolution No. 60 is a valid exercise of the police power under the general welfare clause.

Held: Police power is inherent in the state but not in municipal corporations. Municipal governments exercise this power
under the general welfare clause. Pursuant thereto they are clothed with authority to "enact such ordinances and issue
such regulations as may be necessary to carry out and discharge the responsibilities conferred upon it by law, and such as
shall be necessary and proper to provide for the health, safety, comfort and convenience, maintain peace and order,
improve public morals, promote the prosperity and general welfare of the municipality and the inhabitants thereof, and
insure the protection of property therein.

Feliciano vs. COA (G.R. No. 147402, January 14, 2004

Facts: COA assessed Leyte Metropolitan Water District (LMWD) auditing fees. Petitioner Feliciano, as General Manager of
LMWD, contended that the water district could not pay the said fees on the basis of Sections 6 and 20 of P.D. No. 198 as
well as Section 18 of R.A. No. 6758. He primarily claimed that LMWD is a private corporation not covered by COA's
jurisdiction. Petitioner also asked for refund of all auditing fees LMWD previously paid to COA.COA Chairman denied
petitioner’s requests. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which COA denied. Hence, this petition.
OCLARIT, Jon Raymer P. Local Government Code 1st Semester, S.Y. 2018-2019
PSU School of Law Case Digests Compilation

Issue: Whether a Local Water District (“LWD”) created under PD 198, as amended, is a government-owned or controlled
corporation subject to the audit jurisdiction of COA or a private corporation which is outside of COA’s audit jurisdiction.

Held: Petition lacks merit. The Constitution under Sec. 2(1), Article IX-D and existing laws mandate COA to audit all
government agencies, including government-owned and controlled corporations with original charters. An LWD is a GOCC
with an original charter. The Constitution recognizes two classes of corporations. The first refers to private corporations
created under a general law. The second refers to government-owned or controlled corporations created by special
charters. Under existing laws, that general law is the Corporation Code. Obviously, LWD’s are not private corporations
because they are not created under the Corporation Code. LWD’s are not registered with the Securities and Exchange
Commission. Section 14 of the Corporation Code states that “all corporations organized under this code shall file with the
SEC articles of incorporation x x x.” LWDs have no articles of incorporation, no incorporators and no stockholders or
members. There are no stockholders or members to elect the board directors of LWDs as in the case of all corporations
registered with the SEC. The local mayor or the provincial governor appoints the directors of LWDs for a fixed term of
office. The board directors of LWDs are not co-owners of the LWDs. The board directors and other personnel of LWDs are
government employees subject to civil service laws and anti-graft laws. Clearly, an LWD is a public and not a private entity,
hence, subject to COA’s audit jurisdiction.

Canet vs Dezena

FACTS: Rolando Canet was a cockpit operator in Bula, Camarines Sur while Julieta Decena was the mayor therein. In 1998,
Canet, by virtue of a council resolution, was allowed to operate a cockpit in Bula. In 1999, the Sangguniang Bayan passed
Ordinance 001 entitled “An Ordinance Regulating the Operation of Cockpits and Other Related Game-Fowl Activities in the
Municipality of Bula, Camarines Sur and Providing Penalties for any Violation to (sic) the Provisions Thereof.” This
ordinance was submitted to Decena for her approval but she denied it because the said ordinance does not contain rules
and regulations as well as a separability clause. The council then decided to shelf the ordinance indefinitely. Meanwhile,
Canet applied for a mayor’s permit for the operation of his cockpit. Decena denied Canet’s application on the ground that
under the Local Government Code of 1991 (Section 447 (a) (3) (v)), the authority to give licenses for the establishment,
operation and maintenance of cockpits as well as the regulation of cockfighting and commercial breeding of gamecocks is
vested in the Sangguniang Bayan. Therefore, she cannot issue the said permit inasmuch as there was no ordinance passed
by the Sangguniang Bayan authorizing the same. Canet then sued Decena on the ground that he should be given a permit
based on the 1998 resolution allowing him to operate a cockpit as by virtue of local municipal tax ordinances which
generally provide for the issuance of a mayor’s permit for the operation of businesses.
ISSUE: Whether or not Decena can be compelled to issue a permit sans a municipal ordinance which would empower her
to do so.
HELD: No. To compel Decena to issue the mayor’s permit would not only be a violation of the explicit provisions of Section
447 of the Local Government Code of 1991, but would also be an undue encroachment on Decena’s administrative
prerogatives. Further, the 1998 resolution allowing Canet to operate cockpits cannot be implemented without an
ordinance allowing the operation of a cockpit (ordinance vs resolution). The tax ordinances Canet mentioned contain
general provisions for the issuance of business permits but do not contain specific provisions prescribing the reasonable
fees to be paid in the operation of cockpits and other game fowl activities.

LTO vs City of Butuan

Facts: Relying on the fiscal autonomy granted to LGU's by the Constittuion and the provisons of the Local Government
Code, the Sangguniang Panglunsod of the City of Butuan enacted an ordinance "Regulating the Operation of Tricycles-for-
Hire, providing mechanism for the issuance of Franchise, Registration and Permit, and Imposing Penalties for Violations
thereof and for other Purposes." The ordinance provided for, among other things, the payment of franchise fees for the
grant of the franchise of tricycles-for-hire, fees for the registration of the vehicle, and fees for the issuance of a permit for
the driving thereof. Petitioner LTO explains that one of the functions of the national government that, indeed, has been
transferred to local government units is the franchising authority over tricycles-for-hire of the Land Transportation
Franchising and Regulatory Board ("LTFRB") but not, it asseverates, the authority of LTO to register all motor vehicles and
to issue to qualified persons of licenses to drive such vehicles. The RTC and CA ruled that the power to give registration
and license for driving tricycles has been devolved to LGU's.
OCLARIT, Jon Raymer P. Local Government Code 1st Semester, S.Y. 2018-2019
PSU School of Law Case Digests Compilation

Issue: Whether or not, the registration of tricycles was given to LGU's, hence the ordinance is a valid exercise of police
power.

Held: No, based on the-"Guidelines to Implement the Devolution of LTFRBs Franchising Authority over Tricycles-For-Hire
to Local Government units pursuant to the Local Government Code"- the newly delegated powers to LGU's pertain to the
franchising and regulatory powers exercised by the LTFRB and not to the functions of the LTO relative to the registration
of motor vehicles and issuance of licenses for the driving thereof. Corollarily, the exercised of a police power must be
through a valid delegation. In this case the police power of registering tricycles was not delegated to the LGU’s, but
remained in the LTO. Clearly unaffected by the Local Government Code are the powers of LTO under R.A. No.4136
requiring the registration of all kinds of motor vehicles "used or operated on or upon any public highway" in the
country. The Commissioner of Land Transportation and his deputies are empowered at anytime to examine and inspect
such motor vehicles to determine whether said vehicles are registered, or are unsightly, unsafe, improperly marked or
equipped, or otherwise unfit to be operated on because of possible excessive damage to highways, bridges and other
infrastructures. The LTO is additionally charged with being the central repository and custodian of all records of all motor
vehicles. Adds the Court, the reliance made by respondents on the broad taxing power of local government units,
specifically under Section 133 of the Local Government Code, is tangential. The power over tricycles granted under Section
458(a)(3)(VI) of the Local Government Code to LGUs is the power to regulate their operation and to grant franchises for
the operation thereof. The exclusionary clause contained in the tax provisions of Section 133 (1) of the Local Government
Code must not be held to have had the effect of withdrawing the express power of LTO to cause the registration of all
motor vehicles and the issuance of licenses for the driving thereof. These functions of the LTO are essentially regulatory
in nature, exercised pursuant to the police power of the State, whose basic objectives are to achieve road safety by
insuring the road worthiness of these motor vehicles and the competence of drivers prescribed by R. A. 4136. Not
insignificant is the rule that a statute must not be construed in isolation but must be taken in harmony with the extant
body of laws. LGUs indubitably now have the power to regulate the operation of tricycles-for-hire and to grant franchises
for the operation thereof, and not to issue registration.

Municipality of Paranaque vs VM Realty

Facts: Petitioner sought to exercise its power of eminent domain based on a resolution by the municipal council.
Petitioner cites a previous case wherein a resolution gave authority to exercise eminent domain. Petitioner also relies on
the Implementing Rules, which provides that a resolution authorizes a Local Government Unit
to exercise eminent domain. Under a city council resolution, the Municipality of Parañaque filed on September 20, 1993,
a Complaint for expropriation against Private Respondent V.M. Realty Corporation over two parcels of land of 10,000
square meters. The city previously negotiated for the sale of the property but VM didn’t accept. The trial court issued an
Order dated February 4, 1994, authorizing petitioner to take possession of the subject property upon deposit with
its clerk of court of an amount equivalent to 15 percent of its fair market value based on its current tax declaration.
According to the respondent, the complaint failed to state a cause of action because it was filed pursuant to a resolution
and not to an ordinance as required by RA 7160 (the Local Government Code); and (b) the cause of action, if any, was
barred by a prior judgment or res judicata. Petitioner claimed that res judicata was not applicable. The trial court dismissed
the case. The petitioner’s MFR was denied. The CA affirmed.

Issue: Whether or Not an LGU can exercise its power of eminent domain pursuant to a resolution by its law-making body.

Held: Under Section 19, of the present Local Government Code (RA 7160), it is stated as the first requisite that LGUs
can exercise its power of eminent domain if there is an ordinance enacted by its legislative body enabling the municipal
chief executive. A resolution is not an ordinance, the former is only an opinion of a law-making body, the latter is a law.
The case cited by Petitioner involves BP 337, which was the previous Local Government Code, which is obviously no longer
in effect. RA 7160 prevails over the Implementing Rules, the former being the law itself and the latter only an
administrative rule which cannot amend the former.

Masikip vs The City of Pasig

Facts: Petitioner Lourdes Dela Paz Masikip is the registered owner of a parcel of land with an area of 4,521 square meters
located at Pag-Asa, Caniogan, Pasig City, Metro Manila. In a letter dated January 6, 1994, the then Municipality of Pasig,
now City of Pasig, respondent, notified petitioner of its intention to expropriate a 1,500 square meter portion of her
property to be used for the "sports development and recreational activities" of the residents... of Barangay Caniogan. On
May 2, 1994, petitioner sent a reply to respondent stating that the intended expropriation of her property is
OCLARIT, Jon Raymer P. Local Government Code 1st Semester, S.Y. 2018-2019
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unconstitutional, invalid, and oppressive, as the area of her lot is neither sufficient nor suitable to "provide land
opportunities to deserving poor sectors of our... community." In its letter of December 20, 1994, respondent reiterated
that the purpose of the expropriation of petitioner's property is "to provide sports and recreational facilities to its poor
residents." Subsequently, on February 21, 1995, respondent filed with the trial court a complaint for expropriation. On
April 25, 1995, petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint. On May 7, 1996, the trial court issued an Order denying
the Motion to Dismiss, on the ground that there is a genuine necessity to expropriate the property for the sports and
recreational activities of the residents of Pasig.
Issues: whether there is indeed a genuine necessity for the taking of the property
Held: The right to take private property for public purposes necessarily originates from "the necessity" and the taking
must be limited to such necessity. The very foundation of... the right to exercise eminent domain is a genuine necessity
and that necessity must be of a public character. Moreover, the ascertainment of the necessity must precede or
accompany and not follow, the taking of the land. necessity within the rule that the particular property to be expropriated
must be necessary, does not mean an absolute but only a reasonable or practical necessity, such as would combine the
greatest benefit to the public... with the least inconvenience and expense to the condemning party and the property
owner consistent with such benefit. Applying this standard, we hold that respondent City of Pasig has failed to establish
that there is a genuine necessity to expropriate petitioner's property.
Our scrutiny of the records shows that the Certification issued by the Caniogan Barangay Council, indicates that the
intended beneficiary is the Melendres Compound Homeowners Association, a private, non-profit organization, not the
residents of Caniogan. It... can be gleaned that the members of the said Association are desirous of having their own
private playground and recreational facility. Petitioner's lot is the nearest vacant space available. The purpose is, therefore,
not clearly and categorically public. The necessity has not... been shown, especially considering that there exists an
alternative facility for sports development and community recreation in the area, which is the Rainforest Park, available
to all residents of Pasig City, including those of Caniogan.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is GRANTED.
Principles:
Where the taking by the State of private property is done for the benefit of a small community which seeks to have its
own sports and recreational facility, notwithstanding that there is such a recreational facility only a short distance away,
such taking... cannot be considered to be for public use. Its expropriation is not valid.
Estate or Heirs of Ex Justice Jose VL Reyes vs. City of Manila

FACTS: The case is a petition for review and certiorari filed by the heirs of J.B.L. Reyes against respondent Court of Appeals
and City of Manila et.al. The case esteemed from the decision of the C.A. for the issuance of protective custody in favor of
respondent on the contested 11 parcels of land owned by the petitioner situated at Sta. Cruz District, Manila with a total
land area of 13, 940sqm and covered by TCT no. 24359 issued by the Register of Deeds, Manila. The land in question was
initially occupied and leased by different tenants, among them are respondents Abiog, Maglonso and members of
Sampaguita Bisig ng Magkakabitbahay, Incorporated (SBMI). On May 9, 1994, petitioners obtained a favorable judgments
against Abiog pursuant to the decision rendered by the MTC Manila, Branch 3 in Civil Case No 142851-CV and against
Maglonso in Civil Case No. 144205CV on May 4, 1995. While the case is underadjudication, the respondents City of Manila
intervenes and file a complaint for imminent domain (expropriation) on April 25, 1995 based on its approved Ordinance
No 7818 enacted on November 29, 1993 authorizing the City Mayor of Manila to expropriate certain parcels of land with
an aggregate area of 9,930square meters, more or less. It argued that the purpose of expropriation is for a socialize
housing project of the city which would otherwise benefit itsunder privileged and homeless citizens. However, petitioner
turned down the offer on various reasons among them, the failure of both to arrive at an amicable offer for the settlement
of the case.

ISSUE: Whether the CA has jurisdiction to issue the protective order despite the finality of order rendered by the trial
court? Whether respondent City deprived petitioners of their property without due process of law? Whether the
respondent City of Manila complied with the legal requirements for expropriation provided under Section 9 and 10 of R.A.
7279?

HELD: RA 7279 Sections 9 states the order of priority in the acquisition of property subject of any expropriation intended
for public purpose. Section 10thereof, made a significant pronouncement that “the expropriation may be resorted to only
when other modes of acquisition have been exhausted: xxx
OCLARIT, Jon Raymer P. Local Government Code 1st Semester, S.Y. 2018-2019
PSU School of Law Case Digests Compilation

underscoring supplied”. Before respondent City can exercise its power of eminent domain, the same must be sanctioned
and must not violate any law. Reiterating the provision of R.A. 7279, it would bear stressing that private lands rank last in
the order of priority for purposes of socialized housing. In the same vein, expropriation proceedings are to be resorted to
only after the other modes of acquisition have been exhausted. Compliance with these conditions is mandatory because
these are the only safeguards of oftentimes helpless owners of private property against violation of due process when
their property is forcibly taken from them for public use. The state in its paramount interest of promoting public good and
general welfare cannot simply ignore the rights of its citizens and such must take precedence over the interest of private
property owners. Individual rights affected by the exercise of such right are also entitled to protection, bearing in mind
that the exercise of this superior right cannot override the guarantee of due process extended by the law to owners of the
property to be expropriated. Due to the fatal infirmity in the City’s exercise of the power of eminent domain, its complaint
for expropriation was turned down by the court. Petitions granted and decision of C.A. was reversed and set aside.

Laguna Lake Development Authority vs CA

GR No. 120865-71; Dec. 7 1995

FACTS: The Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA) was created through Republic Act No. 4850. It was granted, inter
alia, exclusive jurisdiction to issue permits for the use of all surface water for any project or activity in or affecting the said
region including navigation, construction, and operation of fishpens, fish enclosures, fish corrals and the like.
Then came RA 7160, the Local Government Code of 1991. The municipalities in the Laguna Lake region interpreted its
provisions to mean that the newly passed law gave municipal governments the exclusive jurisdiction to issue fishing
privileges within their municipal waters.

ISSUE: Who should exercise jurisdiction over the Laguna Lake and its environs insofar as the issuance of permits for fishing
privileges is concerned, the LLDA or the towns and municipalities comprising the region?

HELD: LLDA has jurisdiction over such matters because the charter of the LLDA prevails over the Local Government Code
of 1991. The said charter constitutes a special law, while the latter is a general law. It is basic in statutory construction
that the enactment of a later legislation which is a general law, cannot be construed to have repealed a special law. The
special law is to be taken as an exception to the general law in the absence of special circumstances forcing a contrary
conclusion. In addition, the charter of the LLDA embodies a valid exercise of police power for the purpose of protecting
and developing the Laguna Lake region, as opposed to the Local Government Code, which grants powers to municipalities
to issue fishing permits for revenue purposes. Thus it has to be concluded that the charter of the LLDA should prevail over
the Local Government Code of 1991 on matters affecting Laguna de Bay.

Republic of the Philippines v. The City of Davao

FACTS: Respondent filed an application for a Certificate of Non-Coverage (CNC) for its proposed project, the Davao City
Artica Sports Dome, with the Environmental Management Bureau however, was denied on the ground that the proposed
project was within an environmentally critical area; that the City of Davao must first undergo the environmental impact
assessment (EIA) process to secure an Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC). Respondent then filed a petition
for mandamus with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), and the latter ruled in favor of respondent.

ISSUE: WON the LGU’s are excluded from the coverage of PD 1586, one which requires an environmental impact
assessment (EIA) process to secure an Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC)

HELD: No. Section 4 of PD 1586 provides that "no person, partnership or corporation shall undertake or operate any such
declared environmentally critical project or area without first securing an Environmental Compliance Certificate issued by
the President or his duly authorized representative." We note that LGU’s are juridical persons.
HOWEVER, after consideration of the evidence finding Artica Sports Dome is not within an environmentally critical area
neither being a critical project. The said project is not classified as environmentally critical, or within an environmentally
critical area. Consequently, the DENR has no choice but to issue the Certificate of Non-Coverage. It becomes its
ministerial duty, the performance of which can be compelled by writ of mandamus, such as that issued by the trial court
in the case at bar.
OCLARIT, Jon Raymer P. Local Government Code 1st Semester, S.Y. 2018-2019
PSU School of Law Case Digests Compilation

Alvarez vs Guingona

Facts: On April 18, 1993, HB No. 8817, entitled “An Act Converting the Municipality of Santiago into an Independent
Component City to be known as the City of Santiago,” was filed in the House of Representatives. Meanwhile, a
counterpart of HB No. 8817, Senate Bill No. 1243, was filed in the Senate. On March 22, 1994, the House of
Representatives, upon being apprised of the action of the Senate, approved the amendments proposed by the Senate.

Issue: Does the passing of SB No. 1243, the Senate’s own version of HB No. 8817, into Republic Act No. 7720 be said to
have originated in the House of Representatives as required?

Held: Yes. Although a bill of local application should originate exclusively in the House of Representatives, the claim of
petitioners that Republic Act No. 7720 did not originate exclusively in the House of Representatives because a bill of the
same import, SB No. 1243, was passed in the Senate, is untenable because it cannot be denied that HB No. 8817 was
filed in the House of Representatives first before SB No. 1243 was filed in the Senate.

The filing in the Senate of a substitute bill in anticipation of its receipt of the bill from the House, does not contravene
the constitutional requirement that a bill of local application should originate in the House of Representatives, for as
long as the Senate does not act thereupon until it receives the House bill.

Pimentel vs Aguirre

Facts: In 1997, President Ramos issued AO 372 which: (1) required all government departments and agencies, including
SUCs, GOCCs and LGUs to identify and implement measures in FY 1998 that will reduce total expenditures for the year by
at least 25% of authorized regular appropriations for non—personal services items (Section 1) and (2) ordered the
withholding of 10% of the IRA to LGUs (Section 4) . On 10 December 1998, President Estrada issued AO 43, reducing to 5%
the amount of IRA to be withheld from LGU.

ISSUE: Whether Section 4 of the same issuance, which withholds 10 percent of their internal revenue allotments, are
valid exercises of the President's power of general supervision over local governments

HELD: Section 4 of AO 372 cannot be upheld. A basic feature of local fiscal autonomy is the automatic release of the
shares of LGUs in the national internal revenue. This is mandated by no less than the Constitution. The Local
Government Code specifies further that the release shall be made directly to the LGU concerned within five (5) days
after every quarter of the year and "shall not be subject to any lien or holdback that may be imposed by the national
government for whatever purpose." As a rule, the term "shall" is a word of command that must be given a compulsory
meaning. The provision is, therefore, imperative.

CORREA vs CFI of BULACAN

FACTS: The petitioner was a former mayor of Norzagaray, Bulacan who was ordered by the respondent court to
personally pay the salaries of private respondents which they failed to receive because of their illegal removal
from office. This Court finds that defendants Eufemio T. Correa and Virgilio Sarmiento, municipal mayor and municipal
treasurer of Norzagaray, Bulacan respectively, should be ordered personally to pay the salaries which the plaintiffs failed
to receive by reason of their illegal removal from office until they are actually reinstated. The aforesaid decision was
affirmed by the Court of Appeals on March 22, 1976,and the motion for reconsideration of the Appellate Court's decision
was denied on May 11, 1976. On August 24, 1976, the decision of the Court of Appeals became final and executory. It is
in connection with the efforts of the petitioner to quash the writ of execution issued to enforce the a fore stated final
judgment that the present proceedings arose. Bulacan. Petitioner invoked the principle that when judgment is rendered
against an officer of the municipal corporation who is sued in his official capacity for the payment of back salaries of
officers illegally removed, the judgment is binding upon the corporation, whether or not the same is included as party to
the action. Petitioner contends that it is the municipality of Norzagaray that is liable. Ex-Mayor Correa claimed that
since he was sued in his official capacity and he was no longer mayor, the judgment should be binding on the
municipality of Norzagaray.

ISSUE: whether or not respondent Court in denying the Motion to Quash the Writ of Execution acted with grave abuse of
discretion or with lack or excess of jurisdiction.
OCLARIT, Jon Raymer P. Local Government Code 1st Semester, S.Y. 2018-2019
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HELD: The court reiterated the rule that the municipal corporation is responsible for the acts of its officers only when they
have acted by authority of the law and in conformity with its requirements. A public officer who commits a tort or other
wrongful act, done in excess or beyond the scope of his duty, is not protected by his office and is personally liable therefore
like any private individual. This principle of personal liability has been applied to cases where a public officer removes
another officer or discharges an employee wrongfully, the reported cases saying that by reason of non-compliance
with the requirements of law in respect to removal from office, the officials were acting outside of their official
authority.

Ramos vs Court of Appeals

GR No. 124354 December 29, 1999

Facts: Plaintiff Erlinda Ramos was, until the afternoon of June 17, 1985 a 47-year old robust woman. Except for occasional
complaints of discomfort due to pains allegedly caused by presence of a stone in her gall bladder, she was as normal as
any other woman. Married to Rogelio Ramos, an executive of Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company (PLDT), she
has three children whose names are Rommel, Roy Roderick, and Ron Raymond. Because of the discomforts somehow
interfered with her normal ways, she sough professional advice. She was told to undergo an operation for the removal of
a stone in her gall bladder. She underwent series of examination which revealed that she was fit for the said surgery.
Through the intercession of a mutual friend, she and her husband met Dr. Osaka for the first time and she was advised by
Dr. Osaka to go under the operation called cholecystectomy and the same was agreed to be scheduled on June 17,1985
at 9:00am at the Delos Santos Medical Center. Rogelio asked Dr. Osaka to look for a good anesthesiologist to which the
latter agreed to. A day before the scheduled operation, she was admitted at the hospital and on the day of the operation,
Erlinda’s sister was with her insider the operating room. Dr. Osaka arrived at the hospital late, Dr. Guttierez, the
anesthesiologist, started to intubate Erlina when Herminda heard her say that intubating Erlinda is quite difficult and there
were complications. This prompt Dr. Osaka to order a call to another anesthesiologist, Dr. Caldron who successfully
intubated Erlina. The patient’s nails became bluish and the patient was placed in a trendelenburg position. After the
operation, Erlina was diagnosed to be suffering from diffuse cerebral parenchymal damage and that the petitioner alleged
that this was due to lack of oxygen supply to Erlinda’s brain which resulted from the intubation.

Issue: Whether or not the doctors and the hospital are liable for damages against petitioner for the result to Erlinda of the
said operation.

Held: Yes. The private respondents were unable to disprove the presumption of negligence on their part in the care of
Erlinda and their negligence was the proximate case of her piteous condition.

Nevertheless, despite the fact that the scope of res ipsa liquitor has been measurably enlarged, it does not automatically
follow that it apply to all cases of medical negligence as to mechanically shift the burden of proof to the defendant to
show that he is not guilty of the ascribed negligence. Res ipsa liquitor is not a rigid or ordinary doctrine to be perfunctorily
used but a rule to be cautiously applied, depending upon the circumstances of each case. It is generally restricted to
situations in malpractice cases where a layman is able to say, as a matter of common knowledge and observation, that
the consequences of professional care were not as such as would ordinarily have followed if due care had been exercised.
A distinction must be made between the failure to secure results, and the occurrence of something more unusual and not
ordinarily found if the service or treatment rendered followed the usual procedure of those skilled in that particular
practice. It must be conceded that the doctrine of res ipsa liquitor can have no application in a suit against a physician or
surgeon which involves the merits of a diagnosis or of a scientific treatment.

Marquez Jr. vs. COMELEC

Facts: Marquez, a candidate for an elective position in Quezon Province during the 1998 elections, filed a petition praying
for the cancellation of the certificate of candidacy of Rodriguez on the ground of disqualification under section 40 of the
Local Government Code Section 40. Disqualification. The following persons are disqualified from running for any local
elective position… (e) Fugitive from justice in criminal or non-political cases here or abroad. Rodriguez is allegedly
criminally charged with insurance fraud or grand theft of personal property in the United States and that his arrest is yet
to be served because of his flight from the country. The COMELEC dismissed Marquez’s Petition. Rodriguez was proclaimed
the Governor-elect of Quezon.

Issue: Whether or not private respondent, who at the time of the filing of his COC is said to be facing criminal charges
before a foreign court and evading a warrant of arrest comes within the term “fugitive from justice”.
OCLARIT, Jon Raymer P. Local Government Code 1st Semester, S.Y. 2018-2019
PSU School of Law Case Digests Compilation

Held: No. Although it is provided in Article 73 of the Rules and Regulations implementing the Local Government Code of
1991 that for a person to be considered a fugitive from justice, he or she has to be convicted by final judgment, but such
definition is an ordinate and under circumscription of the law. For the term fugitive from justice includes not only those
who after conviction to avoid punishment but likewise those who, after being charged, flee to avoid prosecution. This
definition truly finds support from jurisprudence, and it may be conceded as expressing the general and ordinary
connotation of the term.

RODRIGUEZ vs COMELEC

Facts: Petitioner Eduardo T. Rodriguez and private respondent Bienvenido O. Marquez Jr. (Rodriguez and Marquez, for
brevity) were protagonists for the gubernatorial post of Quezon Province in the May 1992 elections. Rodriguez won and
was proclaimed duly-elected governor. Marquez challenged Rodriguez’ victory via petition for quo warranto before the
COMELEC, alleging that the latter has a pending case in LA, hence, a fugitive from justice and thus disqualified for the
elective position. Marquez Decision defined the term “fugitive from justice”, which includes not only those who flee after
conviction to avoid punishment but likewise those who, after being charged, flee to avoid prosecution. This definition truly
finds support from jurisprudence (. . .), and it may be so conceded as expressing the general and ordinary connotation of
the term. Rodriguez and Marquez renewed their rivalry for the same position of governor. This time, Marquez challenged
Rodriguez’ candidacy via petition for disqualification before the COMELEC, based principally on the same allegation that
Rodriguez is a “fugitive from justice.” The COMELEC, allegedly having kept in mind the MARQUEZ Decision definition of
“fugitive from justice”, found Rodriguez to be one. At any rate, Rodriguez again emerged as the victorious candidate in
the May 8, 1995 election for the position of governor. Marquez filed urgent motions to suspend Rodriguez’ proclamation
which the COMELEC granted.

Issue: Whether or not the COMELEC decision suspending Rodriguez is valid?

Held: No. The definition thus indicates that the intent to evade is the compelling factor that animates one’s flight from a
particular jurisdiction. And obviously, there can only be an intent to evade prosecution or punishment when there is
knowledge by the fleeing subject of an already instituted indictment, or of a promulgated judgment of conviction.
To elaborate, the same parties (Rodriguez and Marquez) and issue (whether or not Rodriguez is a “fugitive from justice”)
are involved in the MARQUEZ Decision and the instant petition. The MARQUEZ Decision was an appeal (the Marquez’ quo
warranto petition before the COMELEC). The instant petition is also an appeal although the COMELEC resolved the latter
jointly (Marquez’ petition for the disqualification of Rodriguez). Therefore, what was irrevocably established as the
controlling legal rule in the MARQUEZ Decision must govern the instant petition. And we specifically refer to the concept
of “fugitive from justice” as defined in the main opinion in the MARQUEZ Decision, which highlights the significance of an
intent to evade but which Marquez and the COMELEC, with their proposed expanded definition, seem to trivialize or
undermine.

To re-define “fugitive from justice” would only foment instability in our jurisprudence when hardly has the ink dried in the
MARQUEZ Decision.

To summarize, the term “fugitive from justice” as a ground for the disqualification or ineligibility of a person seeking to
run for any elective local petition under Section 40(e) of the Local Government Code, should be understood according to
the definition given in the MARQUEZ Decision

A “fugitive from justice” includes not only those who flee after conviction to avoid punishment but likewise those who,
after being charged, flee to avoid prosecution.

Intent to evade on the part of a candidate must therefore be established by proof that there has already been a conviction
or at least, a charge has already been filed, at the time of flight.

Not being a “fugitive from justice” under this definition, Rodriguez cannot be denied the Quezon Province gubernatorial
post.
OCLARIT, Jon Raymer P. Local Government Code 1st Semester, S.Y. 2018-2019
PSU School of Law Case Digests Compilation

Borja vs COMELEC [295 SCRA 157; GR 133495, September 3, 1998]

Facts: Private respondent Jose T. Capco, Jr. was elected vice-mayor of Pateros on January 18, 1988 for a term ending June
30, 1992. On September 2, 1989, he became mayor, by operation of law, upon the death of the incumbent, Cesar
Borja. For the next two succeeding elections in 1992 and 1995, he was again re-elected as Mayor.
On March 27, 1998, private respondent Capco filed a certificate of candidacy for mayor of Pateros relative to the May 11,
1998 elections. Petitioner Benjamin U. Borja, Jr., who was also a candidate for mayor, sought Capco’s disqualification on
the theory that the latter would have already served as mayor for three consecutive terms by June 30, 1998 and would
therefore be ineligible to serve for another term after that.

The Second Division of the Commission on Elections ruled in favor of petitioner and declared private respondent Capco
disqualified from running for reelection as mayor of Pateros but in the motion for reconsideration, majority overturned
the original decision.

Issue: WON Capco has served for three consecutive terms as Mayor?

Held: No. Article X, Sec. 8 of the Constitution provides that “…the term of office of elective local officials… …shall be three
years and no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any
length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was
elected.”
This provision is restated in par. 43(b) of the Local Government Code (R.A. No. 71) which states that “…no local elective
official shall serve for more than three (3) consecutive terms in the same position. Voluntary renunciation of the office
for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for which the
elective official concerned was elected….”

The term served must therefore be one “for which [the official concerned] was elected.” The purpose of this provision is
to prevent a circumvention of the limitation on the number of terms an elective official may serve. Conversely, if he is not
serving a term for which he was elected because he is simply continuing the service of the official he succeeds, such official
cannot be considered to have fully served the term not withstanding his voluntary renunciation of office prior to its
expiration.

The term limit for elective local officials must be taken to refer to the right to be elected as well as the right to serve in the
same elective position. Consequently, it is not enough that an individual has served three consecutive terms in an elective
local office, he must also have been elected to the same position for the same number of times before the disqualification
can apply.

Torayno vs COMELEC GR No 137329 09 August 2000

Facts: Vicente Emano was provincial governor of Misamis Oriental for three terms until 1995 election and his certificate
of candidacy showed that his residence was in Tagoloan, Misamis Oriental. On 14 June 1997, while still governor he
executed a voter registration record in Cagayan de Oro City which is geographically located in Misamis Oriental, claiming
20 years of residence. He filed candidacy for mayor in the said city and stated that his residence for the preceding two
years and five months was in the same city. Rogelio Torayno Sr filed petition for disqualification of Emano fo failing to
meet the residency requirement. Emano won the mayoral post and proclaimed winner. Torayno filed for annulment of
election of Emano. COMELEC upheld its decision.
Issue: Whether or not Emano failed the constitutional residency requirement?
Held: Petition dismissed, COMELEC resolution affirmed. Emano was the overwhelming choice of the people of Cagayan
de Oro. The court find it apt to reiterate the principle that the manifest will of the people as expressed through the ballot
be given the fullest effect. Emano was actually and physically residing in CDO while discharging his duties as governor and
even paid his community tax certificate in the same. The residency requirement intends to prevent the possibility of a
“stranger unacquainted with the conditions and needs of the community from seeing an elective office to serve that
community.”
OCLARIT, Jon Raymer P. Local Government Code 1st Semester, S.Y. 2018-2019
PSU School of Law Case Digests Compilation

Coquilla vs COMELEC, G.R. No. 151914, 31 July 2002

FACTS: Coquilla was born on 1938 of Filipino parents in Oras, Eastern Samar. He grew up and resided there until 1965,
when he was subsequently naturalized as a U.S. citizen after joining the US Navy. In 1998, he came to the Philippines and
took out a residence certificate, although he continued making several trips to the United States. Coquilla eventually
applied for repatriation under R.A. No. 8171 which was approved. On November 10, 2000, he took his oath as a citizen of
the Philippines. On November 21, 2000, he applied for registration as a voter of Butunga, Oras, Eastern Samar which was
approved in 2001. On February 27, 2001, he filed his certificate of candidacy stating that he had been a resident of Oras,
Eastern Samar for 2 years. Incumbent mayor Alvarez, who was running for re-election sought to cancel Coquilla’s
certificate of candidacy on the ground that his statement as to the two-year residency in Oras was a material
misrepresentation as he only resided therein for 6 months after his oath as a citizen. Before the COMELEC could render a
decision, elections commenced and Coquilla was proclaimed the winner. On July 19, 2001, COMELEC granted Alvarez’
petition and ordered the cancellation of petitioner’s certificate of candidacy.

ISSUE: Whether or not Coquilla had been a resident of Oras, Eastern Samar at least on year before the elections held on
May 14, 2001 as what he represented in his COC.

RULING: No. The statement in petitioner’s certificate of candidacy that he had been a resident of Oras, Eastern Samar for
“two years” at the time he filed such certificate is not true. The question is whether the COMELEC was justified in ordering
the cancellation of his certificate of candidacy for this reason. Petitioner made a false representation of a material fact in
his certificate of candidacy, thus rendering such certificate liable to cancellation. In the case at bar, what is involved is a
false statement concerning a candidate’s qualification for an office for which he filed the certificate of candidacy. This is
a misrepresentation of a material fact justifying the cancellation of petitioner’s certificate of candidacy. The cancellation
of petitioner’s certificate of candidacy in this case is thus fully justified.