MASYARAKAT Jurnal Sosiologi Vol. 23, No.

2, Juli 2018: 143-165

DOI: 10.7454/M JS.v23 i 2 .8278

Welfare Regime Transformation in Indonesia: A

Citizenship Debate1

Ta u c h i d K o m a r a Yu d a
Social Development & Welfare Undergraduate Program, Universitas Gadjah Mada
Email: tauchid.komara.y@mail.ugm.ac.id

Abstrak
Artikel ini akan mendiskusikan topik rezim kesejahteraan di Indonesia dengan menggu-
nakan kerangka citizenship. Penulis berargumen bahwa transformasi rezim kesejahteraan
Indonesia dari karakteristik rezim productivist menuju universalisme telah terdisrupsi
oleh wacana communitarian citizenship dan market citizenship yang telah menjadi path-
dependency pada rangkaian konfigurasi sistem kesejahteraan Indonesia kontemporer. Hal
ini telah menjadi faktor endogen yang menghambat inovasi dan perubahan kelembagaan
sistem perlindungan sosial universal. Dengan menggunakan berbagai data dari pengala-
man Indonesia, artikel ini pada akhirnya dapat memberikan pemahaman tentang peliknya
hubungan antara distribusi kesejahteraan dan wacana kewargaan dalam konteks negara-
negara berkembang.

Abstract
This article discusses the outlook for the Indonesian welfare regime using citizen-
ship as a framework. I argue that the transformation of the Indonesian welfare regime
from productivist characteristics to universalism has been disrupted by the discourse
of communitarian and market citizenship that have become dependent on the wel-
fare configuration path in contemporary Indonesia. This circumstance has become
an endogenous factor that obstructs innovation and change within an administra-
tive body of universal social protection. Using evidence from Indonesian experiences,
this article can help develop a further understanding of the complexity of relation-
ships between welfare provision and citizenship in the context of developing countries.

Keywords: welfare regime; citizenship; social policy; sistem jaminan sosial nasional (SJSN);
developing countries

1
My thanks go to Prof. Janianton Damanik for offering generous comments on earlier
versions of this article. Also, I would like to express my gratitude to Prof. Susetiawan,
Nurhadi PhD, Bahruddin PhD (cand), M. Abdul Majid S.Sos, Prof. Yasuhiro
Kamimura, Prof. Stefan Kühner, Prof. Patrick Tim Ziegenhain and, of course, all
members of Social Policy Club (SPC) for their encouraging academic support.
 W ELFA R E R EGIME TR A NSFOR M ATION IN INDONESI A | 14 3

I N T RO DU C T I O N

Following democratic transition in 1998, Indonesia began its trans-

formation toward a process of social protection universalization that
was marked by the enactment of the National Social Security System
(Sistem Jaminan Sosial Nasional–SJSN) Act No. 40 of 2004, which was
followed by the implementation of the Social Security Administrative
Body (Badan Penyelenggara Jaminan Sosial–BPJS) in 2014. Nevertheless,
both theoretical and empirical studies on Indonesian welfare regime still
received scant attention. Some studies on welfare regime in Indonesia
(Croissant 2004; Gough 2013; Ramesh 2000; Torheim 2013; Tribowo
& Bahagijo 2006; Sumarto 2017) were mostly confined to a political-
economical approach that stressed the dynamics of a macro economy
and the shift of political power as the determinant factor in constructing
social policy characteristics. Consequently, in-depth discussion on the
citizenship approach as an inherent alternative within the discussion on
welfare regime in Indonesia was eventually disregarded. A citizenship
approach offers a contextual analysis that examines a comprehensive
range of factors, including values, ideational perspectives, and the no-
tions of people’s everyday lives as a critical part of the social order that
collectively represents ethical considerations in the contexts of social
policy-making and its implementation. Specifically, the citizenship
analysis in this article is positioned as the analytical framework for
identifying how a state visualizes its citizens, followed by discussions
on power relationships constructed between the state and its citizens.
Those two substances correlated with the state’s expressions related to
the fulfillment of citizen’s rights, including social protection.
This article aims to reconstruct ideas of social citizenship in so-
cial welfare distribution in a domestic context. I began with the hypo-
thesis which states that the main problem with transformation of welfare
regime in Indonesia might not be with how far it can actually go to
bring fundamental changes to the citizens to access their social rights,
but on to what extent this transformation has gained legitimacy from
society in everyday life. As a matter of fact, the mainstreaming of social
citizenship claimed to have been achieved through the universal cover-
age system encounters some resistance from non-state institutions that
are attributed to discourses of communitarian and market citizenship.
In reflecting on an empirical case: a number of citizens who de-
mand their social protection rights, yet who are reluctant to participate

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and contribute to the BPJS scheme, caused a financial deficit problem.

This case was not only about pragmatic citizens, as most normative
assumptions would claim, but it is also about the absence of willing-
ness by citizens to entrust social risks management to the government.
To obtain detailed illustrations ofthe absence of willingness, we must
investigate the genealogy of Indonesian welfare regime since Soeharto’s
reign (1966-1998), wherein it was attributed by political process and the
economic system as historical components that constructed discourses of
market and communitarian citizenship in the context of social protect-
ion. Adaptations of market and communitarian citizenship had shaped
path-dependency for many years (Hall & Taylor 1996). This situation
became an endogenous factor that hampered the transformation of the
welfare regime toward a universal model. In fact, the transformation
required individuals to convert their former imaginary citizenship status
into social citizenship. This translates into the status coming with re-
quirements to “willingly” divert from “family/community”and “private
insurance companies” to the state in the form of compulsory dues. Of
course, this is not an easy task. In European welfare states, converts
of imaginary citizenship status to social citizenship were ‘completed’
during the industrialization period (Marshall 2009). This argument is
supported by some studies (Esping-Andersen 1999; 1990; Cox 2004;
Gough 2004; 2013) that confirm the existence of cross-class coalitions
in supporting and maintaining universal social protection programs
provided by the state. The advent of this class coalition is based on
along historical genealogy as well as on different contexts compared
to developing countries (Gough 2004; Pierson 2001). To gain further
understanding of this topic, I will examine how the citizenship approach
contributes to the wider-ranging welfare regime discussion by reviewing
the East Asia and South East Asia welfare regime models as a loop to
look at Indonesian cases.

R E S E A RC H M E T H O D

The main objective of this article is to reconstruct ideas of social

citizenship in social welfare distribution in a domestic context (specifi-
cally in Indonesia). Data for this study were collected using a systematic
review method. This method is a quality-focused approach to summa-
rizing the existing empirical evidence in response to the main research
objective (Petticrew & Roberts 2008). This method is especially useful

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 W ELFA R E R EGIME TR A NSFOR M ATION IN INDONESI A | 145

for reviewing and synthesizing perspectives in order to highlight future

research agendas and develop theoretical advancements that will allow
us to understand the complex relationship between welfare provision
and citizenship within the context of developing countries.

W E L FA R E R E G I M E A N D C I T I Z E N S H I P

Th e C on ce pt a n d D e v e l opm e n t of We l fa r e R e g im e in E a st
A sia n a n d S o u t h E a st A si a n C o u n t r i e s

Welfare regime describes a set of institutional arrangements in po-

litical, economic, and social fields that influence how public goods are
produced and managed through a constellation of welfare actors for later
be distributed in the form of social policy within a particular welfare
system (Gough 2004; 2013; Powell & Barrientos 2004; Taylor-Gooby
1991). A study on welfare regime was initially proposed by Gøst Esp-
ing-Andersen (1990), in his influential book entitled The Three Worlds
of Welfare Capitalism. Esping-Andersen classifies welfare regime into
three typologies: social-democratic, liberal-Anglo Saxon, and corporat-
ist. Nevertheless, Esping-Andersen’s typology has been a significant area
of debate in and beyond European and Northern American continental
territories. Especially in Asia, its democratic institutions, values systems,
and capitalistic models have different historical genealogies (Walker &
Wong 2005; Fleckenstein & Lee 2017; Gough 2004; Holiday & Wilding
2003; Hong 2008). For example, it includes the social solidarity principle
without equality, the growing patron-client politics, laissez-faire without
libertarianism, and the development of household economy-based capital-
ism (Jones 1993; Papadopoulos & Roumpakis 2017).
In addition, informal institutions, such as kinship-based institutions,
still hold an alternative role that goes hand in hand with state and market
institutions as the basis of social welfare provision (Chan 2008; Walker
& Wong 2005; Shin & Shaw 2003; Croissant 2004). These cases can be
illustrated briefly by looking at the East Asian region (Japan, South Ko-
rea, China, and Hong Kong SAR) and in some parts of South East Asian
region (Singapore, Thailand, Malaysia. and Indonesia). One of the fun-
damental ideas on social policy within these areas is productivist welfare
regime (Aspalter 2006; Holiday & Wilding 2003; Powell & Barrientos
2004; Walker & Wong 2005). According to this body of literature, social

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policy was utilized as a supporting component of economic development,

including development of the business and investment climate, as well
as building political legitimacy and loyalty toward the regime in power.
To support the status-quo, the government weakened the labor union
(Holiday 2000). The prominent characteristics of this regime include
the very low allocation of public expenditure toward welfare programs,
with a focus on health and education as a social investment to boost
producti-vity and participation in the labor market (Aspalter 2006; Cook
& Kwon 2007). The social protection provided is segmented among a
variety of social groups, such as military and civil servants, while for
non-governmental employees, the social protection scheme focuses on
two mechanisms: market provision and a family- or community-based
scheme. Market provision is based on limited social insurance or provi-
dent funds, while a family- or community-based scheme works through
redistribution and reciprocity.
The formative element of welfare regime discussed earlier is still relat-
ed to the domination of traditional values, such as Confucianism (Cook
& Kwon 2007; Jones 1993), which is strongly rooted in the structure
of Asian society. One of the emphases is on institutionalized obedience
toward hierarchies, collectivism, and kinship that exists in Asian soci-
ety’s social structure. This basic principle appears to be the constructor
of the power relationship between the state and its citizens, which also
places the state leader as high as a deputy God, while the citizens must
be loyal and obedient to the government. Besides, these very patriar-
chal Confucian principles (Shin & Shaw 2003) have also legitimized the
strong dependency on family as the provider of social welfare services
and social services provided by housewives (Cook & Kwon 2007). In its
later development, welfare regime in Asia experienced a discourse shift
from productivist welfare to universal, redistributive, and inclusive welfare
after the global monetary crisis in 1997-1998. This shift was also encour-
aged by intense dissemination of the discourse Millennium Development
Goals (now converted to Sustainable Development Goals/SDGs) injected
globally viainternational agency (Kühner 2015; Mok & Hudson 2014).
In the context of Indonesia, the emergence of SJSN, which later on was
implemented in BPJS, “is a mark of a critical shift in Indonesian welfare
regime toward the universal model” (Yuda 2018:9), within the current
of German corporatism.

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We l fa r e r e g im e a n d t h e con st r u c t i on of c it i z e n ship
d i sco u r se

Many forms of welfare regime embraced by a state in its practice of

social policy making can be seen as a basis of epistemology to identify.
First, how a state visualizes its citizens? Second, what kind of citizen-
ship is being constructed? These two issues will eventually influence the
power relationship constructed between the state and its citizens, as well
as the way the state regards citizens’ rights and the fulfillment procedures
completed through instruments of social policy.
The discussion on citizenship concepts will typically refer to Th. Mar-
shall, a scholar who succeeded in providing a comprehensive illustration
on the citizenship concept. In his work entitled Citizenship and Social
Class, he contends that citizenship is a thorough status given to every
single member of a society within sovereign areas of a state. With that
status, every citizen has obligations to the state, but is also guaranteed
basic rights. Based on that understanding, Marshall describes in detail
the dimensions of what makes an individual’s existence admissible as a
citizen, i.e civil citizenship, political citizenship, and social citizenship
(Marshall 2009).
Civil citizenship is a form of “freedomness” that allows citizens to
have their own opinions, express their ideas, embrace certain faiths, pur-
sue their personal goals, and to be treated equally. Meanwhile, political
citizenship is formed by the implementation of democratic values, such
as the provision of political sites that allow the public to participate in
controlling the power, securing the freedom of politics and the establish-
ment of political parties, legal assurance to freedom of the press, and
participation in public affairs. The next one is social citizenship, an assur-
ance of social rights fulfillment, including social and welfare protections
that are realized through social policies. Social citizenship also becomes
the epistemological demarcation between social policy studies and the
epistemology of other fields of study related to citizenship studies, which
emphasize the civil and political citizenship aspects (Deacon 2007).
The concept of social citizenship does not appear out of nowhere; its
history is embedded in European society’s development, which experi-
enced a transformation toward individualism in its communal landscape
characteristics as aresult of family dislocation and work relationship, as
well as of the dependency over commodification throughout the indus-
trialization period. Along with it, social risks caused by industrializa-

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tion, such as health, environment, economy, work accidents, etc., are

heightened. Consequently, the demand for social risk management also
increases. However, it cannot be managed through a community system
or kinship because these institutions began to be distant. Meanwhile, if
it is managed through a private scheme, it can only be managed as long
as the private individual has adequate financial capability. The condition
eventually demands a discourse that asserts the only way to avoid every
social risk is fulfillment of human rights by the state through social poli-
cies funded by either dues or taxes. The state assures, while the citizens
contribute. This kind of understanding is called a social contract, which
is also the main foundation forthe development of social citizenship dis-
courses (Isin & Turner 2002; Marshall 2009).
In a liberal welfare regime, the idea of social citizenship has a logi-
cal understanding that falls closer to the concept of market citizenship.
This is because the citizens’ right to social protection was just granted
after the mechanism of market failed to bring welfare, instead of because
of a political response to a social risk that occurred as an effect of the
market’s destructiveness (Mas’udi & Hanif 2011). This understanding
of market citizenship refers to citizens who are defined as independent
entities in terms of public goods access (Mulhall & Swift 1992). The role
of the state is only to assure that individual rights to make choices about
their lives are fulfilled. According to Rawls (Gaventa & Jones 2000), in
market citizenship, good society can only be achieved through assurance
and protection of individual interests, and only if it is released from any
individual obstacles.
What is known as rights in market citizenship is the access to funda-
mental needs and resources instead of social protection as is vital in social
citizenship. The right to access is regarded as more important than other
fundamental needs and resources. It is based on granting the principle of
freedomto each citizen entirely. “Freedomness” provides an opportunity
for citizens to fulfil their socioeconomic needs, and to usethem later for
achieving individual needs more freely (Putri 2012; Mas’udi & Hanif
2011; Mulhall & Swift 1992).
Apart from those two constructions of citizenship, which were es-
tablished in developed countries, there is one construction of citizenship
that ischaracteristic of distinguishable social formation in developing
countries; that is, communal citizenship. Communal citizenship is often
used interchangeably with the term communitarian. The term “commu-
nitarian citizens” refers to entities that are connected emotionally, have

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collective interests, and manage multiple aspects of life collectively to

fulfill public goals for society (Etzioni 2011). The collectivity values are at
the core of the communitarian definition. Collectivity becomes the basis
of community to act for or in the name of entities, language, religion,
gender, ideology, geographical border, diversity of natural resources, etc.
(Putri 2012). The strong character of welfare regime embracing a com-
munitarian ideology is the provision of social policy, which is realized in
the form of improving the social community’s immunity from many de-
structive externalities. Examples of this include the programs of commu-
nity empowerment wherein the recipients are members of a community
which is oriented to common virtue instead of individual virtue. Hall and
Midgley (2004) see this characteristic as a populist approach in which the
method of welfare distribution requires the involvement of citizens with
certain identitiesas well as the values included in the implementation of
social policy. Table 1 displays a summary of correlations between forms
of welfare regime embraced, narrative of social policies implemented, and
construction of citizenship discourses provided.

Table 1. The Correlations between Forms of Welfare Regime and the

Construction of Citizenship Discourse
Forms of Narrative of Social Policy Implemented Construction of
Welfare Citizenship
Regime Discourses Provided
Social- Universal andegalitarian, in form of Social citizenship
Democratic national social assistance
Corporatist Industrial achievement performance, in Social citizenship
formof social insurance
Liberal Residual, in form of partial social Market citizenship
assistances to certain group of citizens.
The rest is given over to market
mechanism
Productivist Social protection in form of social Market citizenship
insurance limited only for civil servant + Communitarian
and military, while for non-governmental citizenship
employees, the mechanism of social
protection is given over to market and
family/household and community
Source: modifed by author

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T H E G E N E A L O G Y O F W E L FA R E R E G I M E
I N I NDONE SI A : A R EFL EC T ION ON
C I T I Z E N S H I P DE B AT E S

Returning to the main argument posed at the beginning of this article,

which is that the transformation of the Indonesian welfare regime from
productivist to universalist has been disrupted by the discourse of com-
munitarian citizenship and market citizenship that have become the typi-
cal path of welfare configuration. In order to develop that argument, we
must consider the importance of historicity of institutional welfare, which
is embedded in the political process and economic system as the historical
component that constructed certain values of citizenship (Hall & Taylor
1996). The institutionalization of a certain value via the political process
over years causes its value to tend to be maintained as path-dependent.
This circumstance has become an endogenous factor that obstructs in-
novation within the organization of universal social protection.
Even though the idea to replicate the welfare state in Indonesia as
the maximum role of the state over welfare (decommodification) has
been written in its constitution, the implementation of that particular
idea has come about through a complex dialectic process as the result of
Bonapartist politics that also influenced the historical current of welfare
distribution practices in Indonesia. Bonapartism eventually changed the
direction and goal of the state’s welfare development in contemporary
Indonesia.
The earliest characteristics of Bonapartism can be identified in the
intrigue of the first social insurances cheme, which was targeted at civil
servants (Tabungan Asuransi Pegawai Negeri–TASPEN) in 1963. It re-
flected Sukarno’s interest in reinforcing his position with support from
civil servants at the edge of his regime (Ramesh 2000; Joedadibrata 2012;
Yuda 2018). Likewise, the emergence of Indonesia’s first health insurance,
the Agency for Healthcare Funds (Badan Penyelenggara Dana Pemelihara-
anKesehatan–BPDPK) was established for civil servants and the military
a year prior to the major project of the Five Year Plans (Pembangunan
Lima Tahun–PELITA). It was then followed by the stipulation of retire-
ment insurance that was targeted to armed forces through Indonesian
Armed Forces Social Insurance (Asuransi Angkatan Bersenjata Republik
Indonesia–ASABRI) in 1973. The establishment of these two institu-
tions (BPDK and ASABRI) can be attributed to the importance of civil
servants and military as the key to national stability, and that was the

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basis of Suharto’s regime to maintain the status-quo (Pisani, Kok, &

Nugroho 2016).
After 1977, social protection was expanded to workers in private sec-
tors through Employees Social Insurance (Asuransi Tenaga Kerja–AS-
TEK). This period was indeed the most critical juncture of the growth
and development of industrialization in Indonesia; it contributed to the
improvement of GDP rill’s average up to 7,7% each year (Pudjiastuti
2008) as well as simultaneously creating a job market. Politically, AS-
TEK’s existence can be associated with the government’s attempt to
muffle the labor unions, which were concentrated in several middle class
enterprises after the incident of Malapetaka 15 Januari (Malari) in 1974
(Ramesh 2000).
The ideological tendency of the welfare arrangement mechanism that
is shown in these phases refers to productivist welfare regime as it is
implemented in East Asian countries and some nearby countries such
as Singapore, Malaysia, and Thailand (Aspalter 2006; Holiday 2000;
Ramesh 2004). The characteristics of a productivist welfare regime can
be seen in its social welfare articulation constructed in Rostow’s logic of
economic growth; that is, it has the ability to consume and divert redis-
tributive politics. It can also be identified in Soeharto’s social policies’
focus on poor households and informal workers, which was integrated
via acentered infrastructure establishment, such as the program for left-
behind villages (Inpres Desa Tertinggal–IDT) to cope with problems of
infrastructure provision as well as agriculture and food technology de-
velopment. It was then continued through micro-credit schemes (Kredit
Usaha Keluarga Sejahtera–Kukesra) that provided aid to poor households
for obtaining venture capital with mild conditions. These programs were
formulated to achieve two main functions: first, to boost society in or-
der to improve its productivity and purchasing power so that its citizens
could manage their own welfare through a cash nexus; and second, to
strengthen the family and certain social groups’ immunities in order to
respond to the social risks caused by industrialization (Yuda 2018) with
the intention of easing the state’s responsibility for social protection of-
families and other social groups, in case an individual failed to obtain
social protection from the market.
The formal social protection for poorer households was just provided
in 1992, along with the transformation of two social insurance institu-
tions during Soeharto period. The transformations were BPDPK into
PT. ASKES (Health Insurance–Asuransi Kesehatan), followed by ASTEK

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into Jamsostek (Workers Social Security–Jaminan Sosial Tenaga Kerja)

(Yuda 2018). Under the president’s mandate, PT Askes was then asked
to begin expanding its reach to the private sector as well as managing the
Public Health Maintenance scheme (Jaminan Pemeliharaan Kesehatan-
Masyarakat–JPKM) for poorer households. The extension was an attempt
to prevent post-reformation political and economic instability between
the 80s-90s (Washington Consensus), which required privatization, tight-
ening of fiscal policy, and deregulation of trade barriers as aneffect of the
fall of global oil prices in 1983 (Robison 1986).
This period also became the most important juncture in the journey
of welfare regime in Indonesia with regard to the institutionalization of
the market citizenship’s value as the basis of providing social protection.
The state withdrew itself by opening space for the market to be involved
in social protection; private insurances were established through Act No.
2 of 1992 that allowed life insurance and insurance loss companies to sell
health insurance. A year later, the increased growth of private insurance
was enabled because of Government Regulation No. 14 of 1993 on Jam-
sostek, which stipulated an opt out selection, allowing many companies
to choose private insurance instead of Jamsostek (Thabrany 2014).
Shortly after enjoying a long period of economic growth, the monetary
crisis struck in almost all Asian regions, including Indonesia. Within one
year (1997-1998), the currency of the Rupiah toward the American Dol-
lar had dropped as much as 85%, and average domestic prices increased
almost 80%. The crisis had almost doubled the percentage of absolute
poverty over the previous year, when it was only 14%. As the crisis was
aggravated, mass riots happened in Jakarta and other major cities. The
crisis wave reached its peak by 1998, with the fall of President Soeharto,
who had been president for three decades (Yuda 2018).
Following the recommendation and guidance from the World Bank,
President Habibie introduced the Social Safety Nets plan (Jaring Penga-
man Sosial–JPS), which was aimed at recovering purchasing power after
the crisis. This JPS program covered several items: (1) subsidized rice
distributed monthly to low income families/households with a minimum
purchase of 10 Kg; (2) labor-intensive and community empowerment
programs to establish infrastructure and micro-credit initiative schemes;
(3) education scholarships ranging from US$1 to US$2,5 for each poor
household with children as students; and (4) health care.
However, the program was politically and ideologically paradoxical
due to its basic idea that it was not meant to fulfill citizens’ rights but to

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‘prepare’ human resources for a more open economic system. According

to a study conducted by Sumarto (2007), the JPS program functioned
more as an attempt to legitimize the Structural Adjustment Program’s
(SAP) agenda, which demands political and economic reformation from
the centralized system into a market system through privatization, dereg-
ulation, liberalization, and of course the gradual revocation of subsidies,
up until 2004. Therefore, SAP was the second movement after the eco-
nomic reformation in the 1980-1990s where in the discourses of market
citizenship were massively reinjected and reinstitutionalized, while the
discourses of communitarian citizenship were also strengthened through
labor-intensive, community-based programs.

SJSN: Ma in st r ea m in g of S oc i a l C it i z e n ship D i sco u r se s

Along with the rise of political parties and interest groups in policy-
making, the emergence of the wave of democratization encouraged the
initiative to begin a wider welfare program during Abdurahman Wahid’s
reign (1999-2001). This included the idea of integrating the four exist-
ing social security providers (TASPEN, ASABRI, ASKES, and JAM-
SOSTEK) into a single administrative body (Wisnu 2012; Thabrany
2008).
In 2004, President Megawati (2001-2004) validated the law of Na-
tional Social Security System (Sistem Jaminan Sosial Nasional–SJSN) No.
40 to facilitate the gradual transition of the welfare regime in Indonesia
from a productivist model into a universal model. This main idea repli-
cated the ideas of the German corporatist welfare regime (Joedadibrata
2012) with its construction of partial social welfare without any intention
of establishing equality. This statement is supported by the fact that SJSN
adopted a social class system (classes I, II, and III) in its services. The
funding came from: (1) dues from employers and employees in the pri-
vate sector; (2) the government, which was allocated to pay the premium
contributions for civil servants, the military, and low income citizens of
Penerima Bantuan Iuran (PBI); and (3) independent contributions from
citizens who were not categorized as poor, as civil servants, and as having
work relationships with private sectors. Despite the segmentation of social
classes, the benefits were based on “need” instead of on contributions.
The transition of welfare regime that was expected to fulfill citizens’
social rights eventually had become only a snatch zone of pragmatic-
politicization interests, such as by President Megawati, who was only in-
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terested in building the Indonesian Democracy Party’s (Partai Demokrasi

Indonesia Perjuangan–PDIP) profile. The profile painted the image of
the party for “grassroots people” (wong cilik) which supports the citizens’
welfare, as well as a political machine to strengthen its electability in the
2004 election (Aspinall 2014). The same was true for President Susilo
Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY) (2004-2014) and his Democrat Party (Partai
Demokrat). Instead of responding to the BPJS bill (Rancangan Undang-
Undang–RUU BPJS), which was supposed to be launched a maximum
of five years after the validation of the SJSN law of 2004, the BPJS bill
was still delayed until 2008. SBY focused on developing a set of welfare
programs adopted from social safety net programs, especially the ones
in form of unconditional cash transfers, such as subsidies for poor stu-
dents (Subsidi Siswa Miskin–SSM), improvements on allocations of school
operational assistance (Bantuan Operasional Sekolah–BOS), and direct
cash transfer programs (Bantuan Langsung Tunai–BLT). Several analyses
(Aspinall 2014; Yuda 2018; Sumarto 2014) associated SBY’s actions with
his attempt to strengthen his electability in the upcoming 2009 election.
There was also an assumption that launching the BPJS bill would only
promote Megawati’s popularity as his political rival in election 2009.
Meanwhile, the expansion of social policy, especially the ones in the form
of unconditional cash transfers, was considered more beneficial for raising
political support from constituents.
A year after SBY emerged victorious in the 2009 presidential elections
for the second time, civil society and the labor union attempted to revital-
ize BPJS’ bill. They formed an alliance called the Action Committee on
Social Security (Komite Aksi Jaminan Sosial–KAJS), which was a coalition
of 67 organizations including laborers, farmers, fishermen, students, and
academia. On May 1, 2010, KAJS held a rally in Jakarta demanding
the implementation of SJSN. The alliance also brought up the issue of
BPJS’ bill through the court system by filing citizens’ demands toward
SBY’s administration for not implementing SJSN, and calling for an
immediate validation of BPJS (Torheim 2013). In July 2011, the KAJS
team won incourt, which finally forced the government to stipulate the
law of BPJS No. 24 of 2011. It became the basis of BPJS’ management.
“In 2014, BPJS law was implemented through two operational bodies;i.e.
BPJS-Kesehatan (1 January 2014) administered the national health insur-
ance (also known as Jaminan Kesehatan Nasional–JKN) for all citizens,
whereas BPJS-Ketenagakerjaan (1 July 2014) provided cover for work-

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 W ELFA R E R EGIME TR A NSFOR M ATION IN INDONESI A | 155

related accidents, retirement savings and death benefits for all workers in
both private and public sectors” (Yuda 2018:9).
A few months after Joko Widodo (Jokowi) from the PDI-P party
successfully won the 2014 presidential elections, Jokowi’s administration
(2014-present) politicized BPJS-Kesehatan by exchanging BPJS cards,
which were validated by SBY, with JKN-KIS labeled cards, which were
actually not substantially different. According to Sumarto (2014), the
act of replacing “flag” through welfare programs was part of the attempt
to establish political identity and to support the claim that the ongoing
programs were the product of their positive services.
SJSN realized that the discourses of market and communitarian citi-
zenship were strongly dominating compared to those of social citizenship.
In other words, the requirements of ‘social citizenship’ as a sociological
foundation for establishing a universal welfare regime were not complete.
This statement is strengthened by the fact that the institutional history
of welfare during the Soeharto periodre-institutionalized the informal
system as management of social protection through a number of com-
munity-based programs, and the market system was established by the
opening of the private insurance market. This factor contributed to the
reason that transformation would be difficult to realize once the policy
were initiated. According to Hall dan Taylor (1996), policies have a direct
relationship to the construction of a discourse and paradigm of collective
society in any case. Therefore, society’s adaptation of communitarian
and market discourses, which had been completed during Soeharto’s
establishment, caused difficulty in implementing institutional re-structur-
ization of universal social protection (Tribowo & Bahagijo 2006). Along
with the implementation of SJSN, the weak current of social citizenship
discourses encountered the strong current of market and communitar-
ian discourses, which eventually caused problems in its implementation,
which the author discusses in the following section. Prior to that, please
see the author’s genealogical summary on citizenship discourses within
Indonesian social protection in table 2.

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 Table 2. Genealogical Citizenship Discourses in Indonesia’s Welfare Regime Journey

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TAUCHID KOM A R A Y UDA
15 6 |
Source: modifed by author
 W ELFA R E R EGIME TR A NSFOR M ATION IN INDONESI A | 157

U N I V E R S A L C OV E R AG E : A PRO B L E M AT IC C I T I Z E N S H I P

The contradiction of citizenship discourses visualized by the state

and the reality that is seen in society has caused problems with SJSN’s
sustainability. The first problem is that SJSN adopted a German
corporatist regime model, as proven by the amount of BPJS dues
(BPJS-Kesehatan or BPJS-Ketenagakerjaan) which were designed as
static adjustments to the formal work mechanism of industrial society.
The government ignored informal sectors with fluctuating income, in
addition to 6,2% of others who are recorded as unemployed (Wilmsen,
Kaasch, & Sumarto 2016). Out of 60% of informal laborers, about
50% work in the agriculture sector and live in rural areas (Suryahadi,
Febriyani, & Yumna 2014), which are identical with a shared economic
model and hold relatively strong mechanic solidarity. The part that needs
to be examined further is, in 2013, a year before BPJS was in effect, out
of 114 million Indonesian laborers, only 29,1 million were incorporated
into the scheme of JAMSOSTEK (embryo of BPJS-Ketenagakerjaan)
(PRAKARSA 2013). Others depended on private insurance or informal
schemes. This indicates how low the citizens’ belief was in the state’s
presence as a medium of social protection.
The second problem is the difference ithe definitions of social risks.
By replicating the European social protection system, especially the
German one, without any modification, the government implicitly
assumed that Indonesians have similar risk characteristics as citizens in
an industrial economic society, which assumes an identical risk of work
accidents. In reality, those who work in the agriculture sector and live
in rural areas have the same subsistential economic characteristics that
rely on a multifunction system of social protection on a community risk-
sharing basis. Besides, the agricultural society’s intensity of interacting
with economic activities and modern industry is minimal, especially
in harvest time. These individuals need more of an income protection
scheme that assures their stable income above the line of poverty in case
of crop failure, or to assist them through the waiting period.
The third problem is that, politically, the state’s constitution was not
strong enough in terms of welfare distribution in the face of familialism
and kinship-based institutions that are considered closer to the citizens’
preference for welfare assistance. This assumption can be proven by
examining Indonesian’s tradition of family-based care, whereby it is
natural and normal for elders to be taken care of by their descendants;

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158 | TAUCHID KOM A R A Y UDA

this is also a form of devotion that is related to their ethical and religious
codes. This means that it is not easy for the state to suddenly step in
to try to promote a formal scheme of old-age pension; most of the
citizens have never considered the option as a priority. It is also different
when compared to industrial societies in the West, who tend to be
individualized and defamilizied sociologically, so the state’s offering
to manage old-age pension has a much stronger political legitimacy
among them.
The last problem not only deals with traditional institutions but also
with a state that still has to compete with private institutions. Some of
the citizens who work in formal sectors, even government officials, still
believe that BPJS-Kesehatan insurance is a complementing force rather
than a main one. As Hasbullah Thabrany, an expert in Indonesian
health insurance, argues in Kompas (2016):

“… officials that manage BPJS consciously don’t use BPJS; they have
additional insurance. Those officials who manage and handle BPJS
themselves claim that BPJS has no quality; therefore they need ad-
ditional one. The public regulation was designed for citizens, not
officials...citizens are just an object, and that means it can be assured
that the services are not good.”

The opposite is true for the situations of social democratic welfare

regime or German corporatist welfare regime that has been referred to
SJSN, where the state can compete excellently in providing the best
social services to its citizens. It was once portrayed in a documentary
film by Michael Moore entitled Sicko, which tells the story of
America’s health system and compares it with the health systems in
the UK, Canada, Cuba, and France. In a sequel, the film succeeded in
representing how a cashier at a governmental hospital in the UK did not
function as a receiver of payment for hospital bills, but as an assistant
in helping pay for patients who cannot afford to pay for transportation
from the hospital to their houses. This system was supportedby political
representation for the citizens in economic system management and
social welfare as well as by the factors of solidarity, universalism, and
redistribution values that had become path-dependent in the European
welfare state (Gough 2013).
Another empirical example is the fact that for about three years of
BPJS-Kesehatan operation, many citizens who were incorporated into

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 W ELFA R E R EGIME TR A NSFOR M ATION IN INDONESI A | 159

it only paid the dues when they got sick. Consequently, this caused
BPJS-Kesehatan to experience deficits three years in a row. The first year
was Rp. 3.3 trillion;the second was Rp. 5.85 trillion; and the number
kept increasing, eventually reaching Rp. 9.7 trillion in 2016 (Sumarto
2017). This example indicates that imagination ofthe state’s presence
is only expected asa complementary institution or alternative when the
other “main” institutions, such as family and market, failed to manage
the social risks.
The implication of these problems causes SJSN’s definition of social
citizenship to only reach and benefitsome citizens with certain status
(including low class citizens as certified by the government, some
laborers in private sectors, a few informal laborers, civil servants, and the
military) and excludes the rest, especially those who are not categorized
as poor, from receivingthe state’s subsidy even though they are not quite
“rich” enough to pay the contribution themselves. This particular group
of people is the one that is prone to being commodified.
This explanation demonstrates that even though the mainstreaming
of social citizenship discourses continues to take place, the substantial
definition of social citizenship, such as inclusivity, equity of distributed
social rights, and citizens’ involvement is not acknowledgeable. First
of all, the dichotomy between formal and informal excludes some
groups of citizens. Any form of ideal social citizenship must be able to
reach all the citizens, despite socio economic status. Second, according
to Goodin, distribution of social protection is supposed to achieve
equality among citizens (Sumarto 2014). Yet the class system, especially
within BPJS-Kesehatan, asserts the existence of social stratification
among the citizens. Of course, this undermines the redistribution
spirit SJSN promotes. The third is the minimal involvement by the
citizens, whether as objects or subjects, which is caused by the absence
of a social contract between them and the state. Consequently, the
state’s imagined idea of “social rights fulfillment” within the political
practices of welfare distribution conducted by the state can be seen as
personification of SJSN with regard to political interests. Meanwhile,
the citizens’ imagined idea of “willingness” to contribute, along with
the domination of communitarian and market citizenship discourses,
especially among the middle class, are still embedded in daily society.
Therefore, thelogic of “willingness” tends to be more about insurance
companies or communities that have long been playing prominent roles
in providing welfare, and also have complementary characteristics.

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16 0 | TAUCHID KOM A R A Y UDA

CONCLUSION

The objective of this article was to examine how the ideas for
realizing social policy on the basis of social citizenship discourse in
Indonesia should be reconstructed. The argument is made based on how
the transformation of the Indonesian welfare regime from productivist
to universalist has been disrupted by the discourses of communitarian
and market citizenship that have developed into the path-dependency
of welfare configuration. The argument is also supported by three main
findings. First, the strength of the welfare systems’ non-state institutions
in relation to the mainstreaming of market and communitarian
citizenship discourses during President Soeharto’s New Order period
emphasized: a) welfare policies that were segmented among groups of
civil servants, military, and high level officials, while communitarian
citizenship was injected through schemes of labor-intensive programs
toward low-income citizens who needed economic uplifting; and b)
social welfare for middle class citizens managed by market design,
especially after economic reformation in the 1980-1990s, when the
role of private insurance became strongly dominant. These two policy
narratives caused social welfare for non-governmental employees to
become more commodified, while the state withdrew its responsibility
of social protection over informal relations in case citizens failed to
obtain welfare from the market. These conditions made mainstreaming
of social citizenship discourses difficult to implement without any
modification.
Second, among the strengthening discourses on market and
communitarian citizenship, this article also shows how discourses on
social citizenship were installed through the law of SJSN in 2004, which
was later implemented into BPJS-Kesehatan and BPJS-Ketenagakerjaan.
The clash between the three currents of citizenship eventually made it
impossible for the transformation of welfare regime to reach the ideal
form of social citizenship, which demands inclusivity, equity, and active
participation by the citizens.
Third, Indonesia has historical differences from Europe, especially
Germany, which was the main reference point for social protection
development in Indonesia. As discussed earlier, the individualization
and defamilialization process that was prevalent in Germany and
other European countries, as well as the strength of the countries
in subordinating capitalism, had provided the legitimate basis for

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 W ELFA R E R EGIME TR A NSFOR M ATION IN INDONESI A | 161

establishing state-based welfare systems. These preconditions are still

absent in Indonesia. Therefore, to assure the sustainability of universal
social protection in Indonesia, and to stimulate active citizenship
through social contracts instead of merely showing political ambitions,
a new mode of governance for the welfare regime is required. By doing
so, SJSN can be established upon equality and inclusivity values, so that
the implementation of the programs could eventually cover interests and
needs for all groups of citizens.
Finally, this article raised important theoretical issues that have a
bearing on the development of the approach to welfare regime as well
as opening prospects for further studies to explore the dynamics of
political sociology as an inseparable part of Indonesia’s institutional
welfare system. This is especially true with regard to understanding
the complexity of the relationship between welfare development
and citizenship in the context of developing countries, which are
fundamentally different from welfare state regimes in the West.

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